staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/alpha/boot/bootloader.lds b/arch/alpha/boot/bootloader.lds
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8cdff54c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/alpha/boot/bootloader.lds
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf64-alpha")
+ENTRY(__start)
+printk = srm_printk;
+SECTIONS
+{
+  . = 0x20000000;
+  .text : { *(.text) }
+  _etext = .;
+  PROVIDE (etext = .);
+  .rodata : { *(.rodata) *(.rodata.*) }
+  .data : { *(.data) CONSTRUCTORS }
+  .got : { *(.got) }
+  .sdata : { *(.sdata) }
+  _edata = .;
+  PROVIDE (edata = .);
+  .sbss : { *(.sbss) *(.scommon) }
+  .bss : { *(.bss) *(COMMON) }
+  _end = . ;
+  PROVIDE (end = .);
+
+  .mdebug 0 : { *(.mdebug) }
+  .note 0 : { *(.note) }
+  .comment 0 : { *(.comment) }
+}