Merge tag 'pinctrl-v7.3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linusw/linux-pinctrlgrafted

Pull pin control updates from Linus Walleij:
 "Core changes:

   - Use the non-blocking mux_state_try_select() in the generic MUX pin
     control back-end

   - Free pin maps on pinctrl_generic_to_map() failure in the core
     helpers

  New hardware pin control:

   - Qualcomm Maili TLMM SoC, PMG1110 PMIC, and Eliza LPASS LPI TLMM SoC
     (this is for the low power audio, LPASS = Low Power Audio SubSystem
     portions)

   - Upboard support on top of the Intel pin controller

   - Apple T6030 and T6031 support (just compatible strings)

   - Samsung Exynos 8855 SoC

   - Mediatek MT6858 SoC

   - Rockchip RK3308B and RV1106 SoCs

   - Airoha EN7523 and AN7563 SoCs

  Improvements:

   - Qualcomm TLMM GPIOs are unconditionally marked as wakeup capable

   - Qualcomm improvements on top of the Qualcomm PDC (power domain
     controller) irqchip improvements from tglx:s tree

   - Qualcomm IPQ806x and IPQ9650 non-urgent pin grop fixups

   - The NPCM8xx driver has been put into shape fixing many pin and
     group definitions

   - Some non-urgent Tegra 264 pin assignments are fixed up

   - Some non-urgent fixups to Airoha AN7581 and AN7583 registers and
     pin assignments, missing features etc"

* tag 'pinctrl-v7.3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linusw/linux-pinctrl: (130 commits)
  dt-bindings: pinctrl: Convert TI DA850 pupd to DT schema
  pinctrl: meson: sync some modify from A4
  pinctrl: meson: a4: Add input enable pin configuration
  pinctrl: realtek: rtd1625: remove unused group name spdif_sel
  pinctrl: realtek: rtd1625: fix base_bit for VE4 GPIO 13
  dt-bindings: pinctrl: microchip,pic32mzda-pinctrl: Convert to DT schema
  Revert "Merge branch 'ib-rsk7204' into devel"
  pinctrl: rockchip: Add RV1106 pinctrl support
  dt-bindings: pinctrl: rockchip: Add RV1106 compatible
  pinctrl: rockchip: Decode drive strength in the get function
  pinctrl: fix PINCTRL_GENERIC_MUX not always being selectable
  pinctrl: airoha: add support of an7563 SoC
  dt-bindings: pinctrl: airoha: add support of an7563 pin controller
  pinctrl: airoha: try to find chip scu node by phandle first
  pinctrl: airoha: add support of en7523 SoC
  dt-bindings: pinctrl: airoha: add support of en7523 pin controller
  pinctrl: airoha: an7583: add support for olt pinmux
  pinctrl: airoha: an7583: add support for pon_alt pinmux
  pinctrl: airoha: an7583: add support for npu_uart pinmux
  dt-bindings: pinctrl: airoha: an7583: add missed features
  ...

1 files changed, 124 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..61fe020b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+===================
+Speculation Control
+===================
+
+Quite some CPUs have speculation-related misfeatures which are in
+fact vulnerabilities causing data leaks in various forms even across
+privilege domains.
+
+The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various
+forms. Some of these mitigations are compile-time configurable and some
+can be supplied on the kernel command line.
+
+There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can
+be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled
+environments. The mechanism to control these mitigations is via
+:manpage:`prctl(2)`.
+
+There are two prctl options which are related to this:
+
+ * PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+ * PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+-----------------------
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
+which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-3 with
+the following meaning (with the caveat that PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH has less obvious
+semantics, see documentation for that specific control below):
+
+==== ====================== ==================================================
+Bit  Define                 Description
+==== ====================== ==================================================
+0    PR_SPEC_PRCTL          Mitigation can be controlled per task by
+                            PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
+1    PR_SPEC_ENABLE         The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
+                            disabled.
+2    PR_SPEC_DISABLE        The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
+                            enabled.
+3    PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE  Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but cannot be undone. A
+                            subsequent prctl(..., PR_SPEC_ENABLE) will fail.
+4    PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but the state will be
+                            cleared on :manpage:`execve(2)`.
+==== ====================== ==================================================
+
+If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
+
+If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
+available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
+misfeature will fail.
+
+.. _set_spec_ctrl:
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+-----------------------
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
+is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand
+in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE or
+PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
+
+Common error codes
+------------------
+======= =================================================================
+Value   Meaning
+======= =================================================================
+EINVAL  The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused
+        prctl(2) arguments are not 0.
+
+ENODEV  arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature.
+======= =================================================================
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes
+-----------------------------------
+======= =================================================================
+Value   Meaning
+======= =================================================================
+0       Success
+
+ERANGE  arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor
+        PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
+
+ENXIO   For PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: control of the selected speculation misfeature
+        is not possible via prctl, because of the system's boot configuration.
+
+EPERM   Speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller tried to
+        enable it again.
+
+EPERM   For PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH and PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH: control of the
+        mitigation is not possible because of the system's boot configuration.
+
+======= =================================================================
+
+Speculation misfeature controls
+-------------------------------
+- PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: Speculative Store Bypass
+
+  Invocations:
+   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC, 0, 0);
+
+- PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH: Indirect Branch Speculation in User Processes
+                        (Mitigate Spectre V2 style attacks against user processes)
+
+  Invocations:
+   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+
+- PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH: Flush L1D Cache on context switch out of the task
+                        (works only when tasks run on non SMT cores)
+
+For this control, PR_SPEC_ENABLE means that the **mitigation** is enabled (L1D
+is flushed), PR_SPEC_DISABLE means it is disabled.
+
+  Invocations:
+   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH, 0, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);