Input: tsc2007 - read "ti,poll-period" as u32grafted

The "ti,poll-period" property is documented as a normal uint32 cell.
The driver used a u64 helper, which makes the helper type disagree with
the schema even though the stored value is still small.

Read "ti,poll-period" with the u32 helper matching the documented DT
cell size.

Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260831194352.1185860-1-robh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 124 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..61fe020b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+===================
+Speculation Control
+===================
+
+Quite some CPUs have speculation-related misfeatures which are in
+fact vulnerabilities causing data leaks in various forms even across
+privilege domains.
+
+The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various
+forms. Some of these mitigations are compile-time configurable and some
+can be supplied on the kernel command line.
+
+There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can
+be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled
+environments. The mechanism to control these mitigations is via
+:manpage:`prctl(2)`.
+
+There are two prctl options which are related to this:
+
+ * PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+ * PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+-----------------------
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
+which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-3 with
+the following meaning (with the caveat that PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH has less obvious
+semantics, see documentation for that specific control below):
+
+==== ====================== ==================================================
+Bit  Define                 Description
+==== ====================== ==================================================
+0    PR_SPEC_PRCTL          Mitigation can be controlled per task by
+                            PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
+1    PR_SPEC_ENABLE         The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
+                            disabled.
+2    PR_SPEC_DISABLE        The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
+                            enabled.
+3    PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE  Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but cannot be undone. A
+                            subsequent prctl(..., PR_SPEC_ENABLE) will fail.
+4    PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but the state will be
+                            cleared on :manpage:`execve(2)`.
+==== ====================== ==================================================
+
+If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
+
+If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
+available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
+misfeature will fail.
+
+.. _set_spec_ctrl:
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+-----------------------
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
+is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand
+in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE or
+PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
+
+Common error codes
+------------------
+======= =================================================================
+Value   Meaning
+======= =================================================================
+EINVAL  The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused
+        prctl(2) arguments are not 0.
+
+ENODEV  arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature.
+======= =================================================================
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes
+-----------------------------------
+======= =================================================================
+Value   Meaning
+======= =================================================================
+0       Success
+
+ERANGE  arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor
+        PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
+
+ENXIO   For PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: control of the selected speculation misfeature
+        is not possible via prctl, because of the system's boot configuration.
+
+EPERM   Speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller tried to
+        enable it again.
+
+EPERM   For PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH and PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH: control of the
+        mitigation is not possible because of the system's boot configuration.
+
+======= =================================================================
+
+Speculation misfeature controls
+-------------------------------
+- PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: Speculative Store Bypass
+
+  Invocations:
+   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC, 0, 0);
+
+- PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH: Indirect Branch Speculation in User Processes
+                        (Mitigate Spectre V2 style attacks against user processes)
+
+  Invocations:
+   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+
+- PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH: Flush L1D Cache on context switch out of the task
+                        (works only when tasks run on non SMT cores)
+
+For this control, PR_SPEC_ENABLE means that the **mitigation** is enabled (L1D
+is flushed), PR_SPEC_DISABLE means it is disabled.
+
+  Invocations:
+   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH, 0, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);