usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmdgrafted

generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of
ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]:

    u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F);  /* 0 .. 15 */
    ...
    con->data[cmd] = value;            /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */

struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as
a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44
bytes past the end of the array on the heap.

A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR
request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds
access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions.

Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions.

Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu <liuwb@xiaopeng.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com>
Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez <skunkolee@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 86 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7afcc480e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==================================
+Introduction of non-executable mfd
+==================================
+:Author:
+    Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
+    Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
+
+:Contributor:
+	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
+
+Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfds have always had their
+execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting
+it differently.
+
+However, in a secure-by-default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all
+executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by verified
+boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass
+and enables “confused deputy attack”.  E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm
+process created a memfd to share the content with an external process,
+however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code
+and root escalation. [2] lists more VRP of this kind.
+
+On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use: runc uses memfd’s
+seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then
+execute them. For such a system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's
+use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3].
+
+To address those above:
+ - Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time.
+ - Let memfd be sealed for modifying X bit when NX is set.
+ - Add a new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to help applications in
+   migrating and enforcing non-executable MFD.
+
+User API
+========
+``int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)``
+
+``MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL``
+	When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL bit is set in the ``flags``, memfd is created
+	with NX. F_SEAL_EXEC is set and the memfd can't be modified to
+	add X later. MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is also implied.
+	This is the most common case for the application to use memfd.
+
+``MFD_EXEC``
+	When MFD_EXEC bit is set in the ``flags``, memfd is created with X.
+
+Note:
+	``MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL`` implies ``MFD_ALLOW_SEALING``. In case that
+	an app doesn't want sealing, it can add F_SEAL_SEAL after creation.
+
+
+Sysctl:
+========
+``pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec``
+
+The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values:
+
+ - 0: MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC
+	memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like
+	MFD_EXEC was set.
+
+ - 1: MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL
+	memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like
+	MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set.
+
+ - 2: MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED
+	memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected.
+
+The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old software that
+doesn't set the executable bit; for example, a container with
+vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old software will create non-executable memfd
+by default while new software can create executable memfd by setting
+MFD_EXEC.
+
+The value of vm.memfd_noexec is passed to child namespace at creation
+time. In addition, the setting is hierarchical, i.e. during memfd_create,
+we will search from current ns to root ns and use the most restrictive
+setting.
+
+[1] https://crbug.com/1305267
+
+[2] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=type%3Dbug-security%20memfd%20escalation&can=1
+
+[3] https://lwn.net/Articles/781013/