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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-decoding.rst
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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+==============================
+Decoding an IOCTL Magic Number
+==============================
+
+To decode a hex IOCTL code:
+
+Most architectures use this generic format, but check
+include/ARCH/ioctl.h for specifics, e.g. powerpc
+uses 3 bits to encode read/write and 13 bits for size.
+
+ ====== ==================================
+ bits meaning
+ ====== ==================================
+ 31-30 00 - no parameters: uses _IO macro
+ 10 - read: _IOR
+ 01 - write: _IOW
+ 11 - read/write: _IOWR
+
+ 29-16 size of arguments
+
+ 15-8 ascii character supposedly
+ unique to each driver
+
+ 7-0 function #
+ ====== ==================================
+
+
+So for example 0x82187201 is a read with arg length of 0x218,
+character 'r' function 1. Grepping the source reveals this is::
+
+ #define VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH _IOR('r', 1, struct dirent [2])