summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-decoding.rst
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLiu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com>2026-09-21 15:25:51 +0800
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-10-01 07:12:43 +0200
commit9062d50e75c24dc7911be05c9b1719b3b256af15 (patch)
tree09559f03fb76730b4f551425ce28e6e2b01db6db /Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-decoding.rst
downloadlinux-stable-9062d50e75c24dc7911be05c9b1719b3b256af15.tar.gz
linux-stable-9062d50e75c24dc7911be05c9b1719b3b256af15.zip
usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmdgrafted
generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]: u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F); /* 0 .. 15 */ ... con->data[cmd] = value; /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */ struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44 bytes past the end of the array on the heap. A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions. Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions. Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu <liuwb@xiaopeng.com> Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com> Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez <skunkolee@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-decoding.rst')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-decoding.rst31
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-decoding.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-decoding.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..380d6bb3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-decoding.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+==============================
+Decoding an IOCTL Magic Number
+==============================
+
+To decode a hex IOCTL code:
+
+Most architectures use this generic format, but check
+include/ARCH/ioctl.h for specifics, e.g. powerpc
+uses 3 bits to encode read/write and 13 bits for size.
+
+ ====== ==================================
+ bits meaning
+ ====== ==================================
+ 31-30 00 - no parameters: uses _IO macro
+ 10 - read: _IOR
+ 01 - write: _IOW
+ 11 - read/write: _IOWR
+
+ 29-16 size of arguments
+
+ 15-8 ascii character supposedly
+ unique to each driver
+
+ 7-0 function #
+ ====== ==================================
+
+
+So for example 0x82187201 is a read with arg length of 0x218,
+character 'r' function 1. Grepping the source reveals this is::
+
+ #define VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH _IOR('r', 1, struct dirent [2])