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authorLiu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com>2026-09-21 15:25:51 +0800
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-10-01 07:12:43 +0200
commit9062d50e75c24dc7911be05c9b1719b3b256af15 (patch)
tree09559f03fb76730b4f551425ce28e6e2b01db6db /Documentation/userspace-api/ebpf
downloadlinux-stable-9062d50e75c24dc7911be05c9b1719b3b256af15.tar.gz
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usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmdgrafted
generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]: u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F); /* 0 .. 15 */ ... con->data[cmd] = value; /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */ struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44 bytes past the end of the array on the heap. A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions. Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions. Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu <liuwb@xiaopeng.com> Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com> Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez <skunkolee@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/userspace-api/ebpf')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/userspace-api/ebpf/index.rst17
-rw-r--r--Documentation/userspace-api/ebpf/syscall.rst24
2 files changed, 41 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ebpf/index.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ebpf/index.rst
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index 000000000..473dfba78
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+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ebpf/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+eBPF Userspace API
+==================
+
+eBPF is a kernel mechanism to provide a sandboxed runtime environment in the
+Linux kernel for runtime extension and instrumentation without changing kernel
+source code or loading kernel modules. eBPF programs can be attached to various
+kernel subsystems, including networking, tracing and Linux security modules
+(LSM).
+
+For internal kernel documentation on eBPF, see Documentation/bpf/index.rst.
+
+.. toctree::
+ :maxdepth: 1
+
+ syscall
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ebpf/syscall.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ebpf/syscall.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ea9918084
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+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ebpf/syscall.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+eBPF Syscall
+------------
+
+:Authors: - Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
+ - Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
+ - Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
+
+The primary info for the bpf syscall is available in the `man-pages`_
+for `bpf(2)`_.
+
+bpf() subcommand reference
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+ :doc: eBPF Syscall Preamble
+
+.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+ :doc: eBPF Syscall Commands
+
+.. Links:
+.. _man-pages: https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
+.. _bpf(2): https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/bpf.2.html