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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-08-30 09:22:00 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-08-30 09:22:00 -0700 |
| commit | 034dd340b08be1f2f0477ad16131d609f9dbd53c (patch) | |
| tree | 2536f4b2d7893ccd916b5abdf3c454ad6edc03c2 /Documentation/usb/authorization.rst | |
| download | linux-stable-034dd340b08be1f2f0477ad16131d609f9dbd53c.tar.gz linux-stable-034dd340b08be1f2f0477ad16131d609f9dbd53c.zip | |
Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-tracegrafted
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
- Fix error output of boot instance creation failure
Currently if a boot instance creation fails, instead of printing out
the name of the instance that failed, it prints "(null)". That is
because it prints "cur_str" that had already been processed by
strsep(). Print the saved name instead.
While at it, print the error code of the failure.
- Fix use-after-free for same named historgrams
Histograms can be named so that they can be used in multiple events.
But if the named histogram has a variable attached, the second event
that uses the named histogram which duplicates it and needs to free
the original after duplication leaves the old variable in place and
still visible. If another histogram uses than variable, it will use
the stale one which will try to reference the freed duplicate
histogram and crash the kernel.
Free the duplicate variables along with the duplicated histogram
data.
- Check return value of kthread_run() in event self test
The events self tests uses a kthread for testing but does not check
if it succeeded in creating a kthread. If the kthread creation were
to fail, the code will still try to call kthread_stop() on the error
returned.
- Fix race between reading trace_pipe and updating subbuffer size
If a user is reading the trace_pipe file at the same time they update
the ring buffer sub-buffer size, can cause the trace_pipe read to
read stale data. Add trace_access_lock() around updating the ring
buffer sub-buffer size.
- Fix eventfs_inode on failure path in creation of the events directory
In the creation of the "events" directory, if after allocating the
eventfs_inode a failure is detected, it calls cleanup_ei() which
calls free_ei(). The free_ei() will test if eventfs_inode being freed
has no children. It is a bug if it does. But on the failure case of
the creation of the "events" directory, the children lists have not
yet been initialized and the free will trigger a warning because
list_empty() on an uninitialized list returns false.
Move the initialization into init_ei() where it makes more sense and
makes sure that a created eventfs_inode has its lists initialized
upon creation.
- Check return value of kthread_run() in ftrace direct sample code
The sample code that shows how to use the ftrace direct calls does
not test the return of kthread_run() to see if it succeeds. Return a
failure if the kthread_run() doesn't succeed.
- Clear user events state on fork in case of alloc failure
On fork, the child gets a pointer to the parent's user events state.
It makes a copy of it then updates the child's pointer to it. But if
the allocation fails, the duplication function leaves the child with
a pointer to its parent's descriptor. When the child cleans up its
data, it will free the parent's descriptor while the parent is still
using it.
In the duplication function, set the child's user_event_mm to NULL
before testing if the allocation succeeded, and when it exits it will
not free the parent's descriptor.
- Fix retry exhaustion in simple ring buffer reader swap
simple_ring_buffer_swap_reader_page() starts with retry set to 8 and
post-decrements it only after a failed link replacement. On the final
attempt, a successful replacement leaves retry at zero, while a
failed replacement leaves it at -1.
But the check for success expects the retry value to be non-zero and
exits with an error on zero. This is the opposite result. Fix it.
- Fail nicely when the remote swap_reader_page() returns an error
Currently, if the swap_reader_page() of a remote buffer fails, it
triggers a WARN_ON_ONCE() and continues normally. Instead, have it
exit with an error and a pr_warn() print instead of a full WARNING.
* tag 'trace-v7.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
ring-buffer: Stop remote reader update when page swap fails
tracing: Fix retry exhaustion in simple ring buffer reader swap
tracing/user_events: Clear copied tracing state before fork duplication
samples/ftrace: Fix kthread_stop() on ERR_PTR in ftrace-direct-multi-modify
samples/ftrace: Fix kthread_stop() on ERR_PTR in ftrace-direct-modify
eventfs: Initialize ei->children and ei->list in init_ei()
tracing: Fix use-after-free in trace_pipe read on sub-buffer order change
tracing: Fix crash passing ERR_PTR to kthread_stop()
tracing: Fix use-after-free with same-name named triggers
tracing: Fix logged instance name on creation failure
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/usb/authorization.rst')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/usb/authorization.rst | 129 |
1 files changed, 129 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/usb/authorization.rst b/Documentation/usb/authorization.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..150a14970 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/usb/authorization.rst @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +============================================================== +Authorizing (or not) your USB devices to connect to the system +============================================================== + +Copyright (C) 2007 Inaky Perez-Gonzalez <inaky@linux.intel.com> Intel Corporation + +This feature allows you to control if a USB device can be used (or +not) in a system. This feature will allow you to implement a lock-down +of USB devices, fully controlled by user space. + +As of now, when a USB device is connected it is configured and +its interfaces are immediately made available to the users. With this +modification, only if root authorizes the device to be configured will +then it be possible to use it. + +Usage +===== + +Authorize a device to connect:: + + $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/DEVICE/authorized + +De-authorize a device:: + + $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/DEVICE/authorized + +Set new devices connected to hostX to be deauthorized by default (ie: +lock down):: + + $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/usbX/authorized_default + +Remove the lock down:: + + $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/usbX/authorized_default + +By default, all USB devices are authorized. Writing "2" to the +authorized_default attribute causes the kernel to authorize by default +only devices connected to internal USB ports. + + +Example system lockdown (lame) +------------------------------ + +Imagine you want to implement a lockdown so only devices of type XYZ +can be connected (for example, it is a kiosk machine with a visible +USB port):: + + boot up + rc.local -> + + for host in /sys/bus/usb/devices/usb* + do + echo 0 > $host/authorized_default + done + +Hookup an script to udev, for new USB devices:: + + if device_is_my_type $DEV + then + echo 1 > $device_path/authorized + done + + +Now, device_is_my_type() is where the juice for a lockdown is. Just +checking if the class, type and protocol match something is the worse +security verification you can make (or the best, for someone willing +to break it). If you need something secure, use crypto and Certificate +Authentication or stuff like that. Something simple for an storage key +could be:: + + function device_is_my_type() + { + echo 1 > authorized # temporarily authorize it + # FIXME: make sure none can mount it + mount DEVICENODE /mntpoint + sum=$(md5sum /mntpoint/.signature) + if [ $sum = $(cat /etc/lockdown/keysum) ] + then + echo "We are good, connected" + umount /mntpoint + # Other stuff so others can use it + else + echo 0 > authorized + fi + } + + +Of course, this is lame, you'd want to do a real certificate +verification stuff with PKI, so you don't depend on a shared secret, +etc, but you get the idea. Anybody with access to a device gadget kit +can fake descriptors and device info. Don't trust that. You are +welcome. + + +Interface authorization +----------------------- + +There is a similar approach to allow or deny specific USB interfaces. +That allows to block only a subset of an USB device. + +Authorize an interface:: + + $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/INTERFACE/authorized + +Deauthorize an interface:: + + $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/INTERFACE/authorized + +The default value for new interfaces +on a particular USB bus can be changed, too. + +Allow interfaces per default:: + + $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/usbX/interface_authorized_default + +Deny interfaces per default:: + + $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/usbX/interface_authorized_default + +Per default the interface_authorized_default bit is 1. +So all interfaces would authorized per default. + +Note: + If a deauthorized interface will be authorized so the driver probing must + be triggered manually by writing INTERFACE to /sys/bus/usb/drivers_probe + +For drivers that need multiple interfaces all needed interfaces should be +authorized first. After that the drivers should be probed. +This avoids side effects. |
