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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /Documentation/security/sak.rst | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/security/sak.rst')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/sak.rst | 91 |
1 files changed, 91 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/sak.rst b/Documentation/security/sak.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..260e1d368 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/sak.rst @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +========================================= +Linux Secure Attention Key (SAK) handling +========================================= + +:Date: 18 March 2001 +:Author: Andrew Morton + +An operating system's Secure Attention Key is a security tool which is +provided as protection against trojan password capturing programs. It +is an undefeatable way of killing all programs which could be +masquerading as login applications. Users need to be taught to enter +this key sequence before they log in to the system. + +From the PC keyboard, Linux has two similar but different ways of +providing SAK. One is the ALT-SYSRQ-K sequence. You shouldn't use +this sequence. It is only available if the kernel was compiled with +sysrq support. + +The proper way of generating a SAK is to define the key sequence using +``loadkeys``. This will work whether or not sysrq support is compiled +into the kernel. + +SAK works correctly when the keyboard is in raw mode. This means that +once defined, SAK will kill a running X server. If the system is in +run level 5, the X server will restart. This is what you want to +happen. + +What key sequence should you use? Well, CTRL-ALT-DEL is used to reboot +the machine. CTRL-ALT-BACKSPACE is magical to the X server. We'll +choose CTRL-ALT-PAUSE. + +In your rc.sysinit (or rc.local) file, add the command:: + + echo "control alt keycode 101 = SAK" | /bin/loadkeys + +And that's it! Only the superuser may reprogram the SAK key. + + +.. note:: + + 1. Linux SAK is said to be not a "true SAK" as is required by + systems which implement C2 level security. This author does not + know why. + + + 2. On the PC keyboard, SAK kills all applications which have + /dev/console opened. + + Unfortunately this includes a number of things which you don't + actually want killed. This is because these applications are + incorrectly holding /dev/console open. Be sure to complain to your + Linux distributor about this! + + You can identify processes which will be killed by SAK with the + command:: + + # ls -l /proc/[0-9]*/fd/* | grep console + l-wx------ 1 root root 64 Mar 18 00:46 /proc/579/fd/0 -> /dev/console + + Then:: + + # ps aux|grep 579 + root 579 0.0 0.1 1088 436 ? S 00:43 0:00 gpm -t ps/2 + + So ``gpm`` will be killed by SAK. This is a bug in gpm. It should + be closing standard input. You can work around this by finding the + initscript which launches gpm and changing it thusly: + + Old:: + + daemon gpm + + New:: + + daemon gpm < /dev/null + + Vixie cron also seems to have this problem, and needs the same treatment. + + Also, one prominent Linux distribution has the following three + lines in its rc.sysinit and rc scripts:: + + exec 3<&0 + exec 4>&1 + exec 5>&2 + + These commands cause **all** daemons which are launched by the + initscripts to have file descriptors 3, 4 and 5 attached to + /dev/console. So SAK kills them all. A workaround is to simply + delete these lines, but this may cause system management + applications to malfunction - test everything well. + |
