iio: proximity: vl53l0x-i2c: claim direct mode for raw readsgrafted

vl53l0x_read_raw() starts a single-shot ranging measurement and reads
back the result. Once the triggered buffer is enabled the sensor runs in
continuous mode and its data-ready interrupt is routed to the trigger,
so a concurrent in_distance_raw read disturbs the streaming setup and
never gets its completion, returning -ETIMEDOUT.

The original submission claimed direct mode here, but it was dropped
during review because the driver had no buffer support at the time [1].
Continuous (buffered) mode was later added without restoring the
claim [2], reintroducing the conflict.

Reject direct reads while buffered capture is active by claiming direct
mode around the measurement, as the vl53l1x sibling already does.

Fixes: 762186c6e7b1 ("iio: proximity: vl53l0x-i2c: Added continuous mode support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iio/20180911160300.GA9212@himanshu-Vostro-3559/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iio/20240909101508.263085-3-abhashkumarjha123@gmail.com/ [2]
Signed-off-by: Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@oss.qualcomm.com>

1 files changed, 131 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c20c7c72e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+========================================================
+Linux Security Modules: General Security Hooks for Linux
+========================================================
+
+:Author: Stephen Smalley
+:Author: Timothy Fraser
+:Author: Chris Vance
+
+.. note::
+
+   The APIs described in this book are outdated.
+
+Introduction
+============
+
+In March 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) gave a presentation
+about Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) at the 2.5 Linux Kernel Summit.
+SELinux is an implementation of flexible and fine-grained
+nondiscretionary access controls in the Linux kernel, originally
+implemented as its own particular kernel patch. Several other security
+projects (e.g. RSBAC, Medusa) have also developed flexible access
+control architectures for the Linux kernel, and various projects have
+developed particular access control models for Linux (e.g. LIDS, DTE,
+SubDomain). Each project has developed and maintained its own kernel
+patch to support its security needs.
+
+In response to the NSA presentation, Linus Torvalds made a set of
+remarks that described a security framework he would be willing to
+consider for inclusion in the mainstream Linux kernel. He described a
+general framework that would provide a set of security hooks to control
+operations on kernel objects and a set of opaque security fields in
+kernel data structures for maintaining security attributes. This
+framework could then be used by loadable kernel modules to implement any
+desired model of security. Linus also suggested the possibility of
+migrating the Linux capabilities code into such a module.
+
+The Linux Security Modules (LSM) project was started by WireX to develop
+such a framework. LSM was a joint development effort by several security
+projects, including Immunix, SELinux, SGI and Janus, and several
+individuals, including Greg Kroah-Hartman and James Morris, to develop a
+Linux kernel patch that implements this framework. The work was
+incorporated in the mainstream in December of 2003. This technical
+report provides an overview of the framework and the capabilities
+security module.
+
+LSM Framework
+=============
+
+The LSM framework provides a general kernel framework to support
+security modules. In particular, the LSM framework is primarily focused
+on supporting access control modules, although future development is
+likely to address other security needs such as sandboxing. By itself, the
+framework does not provide any additional security; it merely provides
+the infrastructure to support security modules. The LSM framework is
+optional, requiring `CONFIG_SECURITY` to be enabled. The capabilities
+logic is implemented as a security module.
+This capabilities module is discussed further in
+`LSM Capabilities Module`_.
+
+The LSM framework includes security fields in kernel data structures and
+calls to hook functions at critical points in the kernel code to
+manage the security fields and to perform access control.
+It also adds functions for registering security modules.
+An interface `/sys/kernel/security/lsm` reports a comma separated list
+of security modules that are active on the system.
+
+The LSM security fields are simply ``void*`` pointers.
+The data is referred to as a blob, which may be managed by
+the framework or by the individual security modules that use it.
+Security blobs that are used by more than one security module are
+typically managed by the framework.
+For process and
+program execution security information, security fields are included in
+:c:type:`struct task_struct <task_struct>` and
+:c:type:`struct cred <cred>`.
+For filesystem
+security information, a security field is included in :c:type:`struct
+super_block <super_block>`. For pipe, file, and socket security
+information, security fields are included in :c:type:`struct inode
+<inode>` and :c:type:`struct file <file>`.
+For System V IPC security information,
+security fields were added to :c:type:`struct kern_ipc_perm
+<kern_ipc_perm>` and :c:type:`struct msg_msg
+<msg_msg>`; additionally, the definitions for :c:type:`struct
+msg_msg <msg_msg>`, struct msg_queue, and struct shmid_kernel
+were moved to header files (``include/linux/msg.h`` and
+``include/linux/shm.h`` as appropriate) to allow the security modules to
+use these definitions.
+
+For packet and
+network device security information, security fields were added to
+:c:type:`struct sk_buff <sk_buff>` and
+:c:type:`struct scm_cookie <scm_cookie>`.
+Unlike the other security module data, the data used here is a
+32-bit integer. The security modules are required to map or otherwise
+associate these values with real security attributes.
+
+LSM hooks are maintained in lists. A list is maintained for each
+hook, and the hooks are called in the order specified by CONFIG_LSM.
+Detailed documentation for each hook is
+included in the `security/security.c` source file.
+
+The LSM framework provides for a close approximation of
+general security module stacking. It defines
+security_add_hooks() to which each security module passes a
+:c:type:`struct security_hooks_list <security_hooks_list>`,
+which are added to the lists.
+The LSM framework does not provide a mechanism for removing hooks that
+have been registered. The SELinux security module has implemented
+a way to remove itself, however the feature has been deprecated.
+
+The hooks can be viewed as falling into two major
+categories: hooks that are used to manage the security fields and hooks
+that are used to perform access control. Examples of the first category
+of hooks include the security_inode_alloc() and security_inode_free()
+These hooks are used to allocate
+and free security structures for inode objects.
+An example of the second category of hooks
+is the security_inode_permission() hook.
+This hook checks permission when accessing an inode.
+
+LSM Capabilities Module
+=======================
+
+The POSIX.1e capabilities logic is maintained as a security module
+stored in the file ``security/commoncap.c``. The capabilities
+module uses the order field of the :c:type:`lsm_info` description
+to identify it as the first security module to be registered.
+The capabilities security module does not use the general security
+blobs, unlike other modules. The reasons are historical and are
+based on overhead, complexity and performance concerns.