summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/Documentation/networking/ipsec.rst
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorShivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>2026-08-22 19:22:05 +0000
committerVinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>2026-09-09 17:51:44 +0530
commite873c74132f0c5f1452816cd9bb26208f0bba1e1 (patch)
treecc1ce1567f5b982359331863ebd9da38741f8d2e /Documentation/networking/ipsec.rst
downloadlinux-stable-e873c74132f0c5f1452816cd9bb26208f0bba1e1.tar.gz
linux-stable-e873c74132f0c5f1452816cd9bb26208f0bba1e1.zip
dmaengine: fix use-after-free in dma_chan_put() and dma_release_channel()grafted
When dma_device_put() drops the last reference on chan->device->ref, dma_device_release() runs and may free the dma_device along with its channels. dma_chan_put() then still reads chan->device->owner via dma_chan_to_owner() for the trailing module_put(). KASAN catches it: slab-use-after-free in dma_chan_put+0x3e6/0x4c0 Read of size 8 by task insmod/6319 Freed by task 6319: kfree+0x225/0x470 dma_chan_put+0x395/0x4c0 dmaengine_put+0xf8/0x160 Cache the module owner in dma_chan_put() before the put so the trailing module_put() does not need chan->device. Fixes: 8ad342a86359 ("dmaengine: Add reference counting to dma_device struct") Suggested-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org> Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260518-dmaengine-kref-fix-v1-1-4d6125048fb7@amd.com Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> Signed-off-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260822-dmaengine-kref-fix-v5-3-d4a4ee47d927@amd.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/networking/ipsec.rst')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/networking/ipsec.rst46
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ipsec.rst b/Documentation/networking/ipsec.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..afe9d7b48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/networking/ipsec.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=====
+IPsec
+=====
+
+
+Here documents known IPsec corner cases which need to be keep in mind when
+deploy various IPsec configuration in real world production environment.
+
+1. IPcomp:
+ Small IP packet won't get compressed at sender, and failed on
+ policy check on receiver.
+
+Quote from RFC3173::
+
+ 2.2. Non-Expansion Policy
+
+ If the total size of a compressed payload and the IPComp header, as
+ defined in section 3, is not smaller than the size of the original
+ payload, the IP datagram MUST be sent in the original non-compressed
+ form. To clarify: If an IP datagram is sent non-compressed, no
+
+ IPComp header is added to the datagram. This policy ensures saving
+ the decompression processing cycles and avoiding incurring IP
+ datagram fragmentation when the expanded datagram is larger than the
+ MTU.
+
+ Small IP datagrams are likely to expand as a result of compression.
+ Therefore, a numeric threshold should be applied before compression,
+ where IP datagrams of size smaller than the threshold are sent in the
+ original form without attempting compression. The numeric threshold
+ is implementation dependent.
+
+Current IPComp implementation is indeed by the book, while as in practice
+when sending non-compressed packet to the peer (whether or not packet len
+is smaller than the threshold or the compressed len is larger than original
+packet len), the packet is dropped when checking the policy as this packet
+matches the selector but not coming from any XFRM layer, i.e., with no
+security path. Such naked packet will not eventually make it to upper layer.
+The result is much more wired to the user when ping peer with different
+payload length.
+
+One workaround is try to set "level use" for each policy if user observed
+above scenario. The consequence of doing so is small packet(uncompressed)
+will skip policy checking on receiver side.