x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted

When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.

The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:

<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>:  nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>:  mov    %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>:  cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>:  mov    %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>:  xchg   %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>:  mov    %r13,%rdi

Which triggers this crash:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
  RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230

Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.

The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.

During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.

Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.

[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]

Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000

1 files changed, 65 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/locks.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/locks.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..26429317d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/locks.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==========================
+File Locking Release Notes
+==========================
+
+		Andy Walker <andy@lysaker.kvaerner.no>
+
+			    12 May 1997
+
+
+1. What's New?
+==============
+
+1.1 Broken Flock Emulation
+--------------------------
+
+The old flock(2) emulation in the kernel was swapped for proper BSD
+compatible flock(2) support in the 1.3.x series of kernels. With the
+release of the 2.1.x kernel series, support for the old emulation has
+been totally removed, so that we don't need to carry this baggage
+forever.
+
+This should not cause problems for anybody, since everybody using a
+2.1.x kernel should have updated their C library to a suitable version
+anyway (see the file "Documentation/process/changes.rst".)
+
+1.2 Allow Mixed Locks Again
+---------------------------
+
+1.2.1 Typical Problems - Sendmail
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+Because sendmail was unable to use the old flock() emulation, many sendmail
+installations use fcntl() instead of flock(). This is true of Slackware 3.0
+for example. This gave rise to some other subtle problems if sendmail was
+configured to rebuild the alias file. Sendmail tried to lock the aliases.dir
+file with fcntl() at the same time as the GDBM routines tried to lock this
+file with flock(). With pre 1.3.96 kernels this could result in deadlocks that,
+over time, or under a very heavy mail load, would eventually cause the kernel
+to lock solid with deadlocked processes.
+
+
+1.2.2 The Solution
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+The solution I have chosen, after much experimentation and discussion,
+is to make flock() and fcntl() locks oblivious to each other. Both can
+exists, and neither will have any effect on the other.
+
+I wanted the two lock styles to be cooperative, but there were so many
+race and deadlock conditions that the current solution was the only
+practical one. It puts us in the same position as, for example, SunOS
+4.1.x and several other commercial Unices. The only OS's that support
+cooperative flock()/fcntl() are those that emulate flock() using
+fcntl(), with all the problems that implies.
+
+
+1.3 Mandatory Locking As A Mount Option
+---------------------------------------
+
+Mandatory locking was prior to this release a general configuration option
+that was valid for all mounted filesystems.  This had a number of inherent
+dangers, not the least of which was the ability to freeze an NFS server by
+asking it to read a file for which a mandatory lock existed.
+
+Such option was dropped in Kernel v5.14.