x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted

When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.

The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:

<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>:  nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>:  mov    %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>:  cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>:  mov    %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>:  xchg   %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>:  mov    %r13,%rdi

Which triggers this crash:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
  RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230

Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.

The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.

During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.

Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.

[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]

Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000

1 files changed, 123 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/files.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/files.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eb770f891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/files.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===================================
+File management in the Linux kernel
+===================================
+
+This document describes how locking for files (struct file)
+and file descriptor table (struct files) works.
+
+Up until 2.6.12, the file descriptor table has been protected
+with a lock (files->file_lock) and reference count (files->count).
+->file_lock protected accesses to all the file related fields
+of the table. ->count was used for sharing the file descriptor
+table between tasks cloned with CLONE_FILES flag. Typically
+this would be the case for posix threads. As with the common
+refcounting model in the kernel, the last task doing
+a put_files_struct() frees the file descriptor (fd) table.
+The files (struct file) themselves are protected using
+reference count (->f_count).
+
+In the new lock-free model of file descriptor management,
+the reference counting is similar, but the locking is
+based on RCU. The file descriptor table contains multiple
+elements - the fd sets (open_fds and close_on_exec, the
+array of file pointers, the sizes of the sets and the array
+etc.). In order for the updates to appear atomic to
+a lock-free reader, all the elements of the file descriptor
+table are in a separate structure - struct fdtable.
+files_struct contains a pointer to struct fdtable through
+which the actual fd table is accessed. Initially the
+fdtable is embedded in files_struct itself. On a subsequent
+expansion of fdtable, a new fdtable structure is allocated
+and files->fdtab points to the new structure. The fdtable
+structure is freed with RCU and lock-free readers either
+see the old fdtable or the new fdtable making the update
+appear atomic. Here are the locking rules for
+the fdtable structure -
+
+1. All references to the fdtable must be done through
+   the files_fdtable() macro::
+
+	struct fdtable *fdt;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	fdt = files_fdtable(files);
+	....
+	if (n <= fdt->max_fds)
+		....
+	...
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+   files_fdtable() uses rcu_dereference() macro which takes care of
+   the memory barrier requirements for lock-free dereference.
+   The fdtable pointer must be read within the read-side
+   critical section.
+
+2. Reading of the fdtable as described above must be protected
+   by rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock().
+
+3. For any update to the fd table, files->file_lock must
+   be held.
+
+4. To look up the file structure given an fd, a reader
+   must use either lookup_fdget_rcu() or files_lookup_fdget_rcu() APIs. These
+   take care of barrier requirements due to lock-free lookup.
+
+   An example::
+
+	struct file *file;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	file = lookup_fdget_rcu(fd);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (file) {
+		...
+                fput(file);
+	}
+	....
+
+5. Since both fdtable and file structures can be looked up
+   lock-free, they must be installed using rcu_assign_pointer()
+   API. If they are looked up lock-free, rcu_dereference()
+   must be used. However it is advisable to use files_fdtable()
+   and lookup_fdget_rcu()/files_lookup_fdget_rcu() which take care of these
+   issues.
+
+6. While updating, the fdtable pointer must be looked up while
+   holding files->file_lock. If ->file_lock is dropped, then
+   another thread expand the files thereby creating a new
+   fdtable and making the earlier fdtable pointer stale.
+
+   For example::
+
+	spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+	fd = locate_fd(files, file, start);
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		/* locate_fd() may have expanded fdtable, load the ptr */
+		fdt = files_fdtable(files);
+		__set_open_fd(fd, fdt);
+		__clear_close_on_exec(fd, fdt);
+		spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
+	.....
+
+   Since locate_fd() can drop ->file_lock (and reacquire ->file_lock),
+   the fdtable pointer (fdt) must be loaded after locate_fd().
+
+On newer kernels rcu based file lookup has been switched to rely on
+SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU instead of call_rcu(). It isn't sufficient anymore
+to just acquire a reference to the file in question under rcu using
+atomic_long_inc_not_zero() since the file might have already been
+recycled and someone else might have bumped the reference. In other
+words, callers might see reference count bumps from newer users. For
+this is reason it is necessary to verify that the pointer is the same
+before and after the reference count increment. This pattern can be seen
+in get_file_rcu() and __files_get_rcu().
+
+In addition, it isn't possible to access or check fields in struct file
+without first acquiring a reference on it under rcu lookup. Not doing
+that was always very dodgy and it was only usable for non-pointer data
+in struct file. With SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU it is necessary that callers
+either first acquire a reference or they must hold the files_lock of the
+fdtable.