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| author | Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> | 2026-09-04 10:43:19 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2026-09-04 07:58:36 -0700 |
| commit | 6668ed271eaefaa63e686bdfbedaeb7b8e492722 (patch) | |
| tree | 58e8288fead484f6755ad0815fc74c3742663761 /Documentation/filesystems/ext4/verity.rst | |
| download | linux-stable-6668ed271eaefaa63e686bdfbedaeb7b8e492722.tar.gz linux-stable-6668ed271eaefaa63e686bdfbedaeb7b8e492722.zip | |
selftests/bpf: Reject graph kptr use after RCU unlockgrafted
Add a sleepable verifier test that loads a graph-node local kptr in an
explicit RCU read-side critical section, then passes its node to
bpf_rbtree_remove() after the section ends.
Before the verifier fix, the stale NON_OWN_REF flag makes the node look like
a live borrowed reference and the program is accepted. After the fix, the
pointer is demoted without NON_OWN_REF and the graph kfunc argument is
rejected.
Also exercise a graph kptr loaded while a spin lock provides implicit RCU
protection. The pointer must be invalidated when the lock is released, which
guards the required ordering between non-owning-reference invalidation and
RCU demotion.
Update the existing fault-protected load test state description. The
post-unlock pointer no longer carries NON_OWN_REF, but remains readable
because the load is rewritten to use BPF_PROBE_MEM.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260904084325.52250-7-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/filesystems/ext4/verity.rst')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/filesystems/ext4/verity.rst | 44 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/ext4/verity.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/ext4/verity.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e99ff3fd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/ext4/verity.rst @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +Verity files +------------ + +ext4 supports fs-verity, which is a filesystem feature that provides +Merkle tree based hashing for individual readonly files. Most of +fs-verity is common to all filesystems that support it; see +:ref:`Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst <fsverity>` for the +fs-verity documentation. However, the on-disk layout of the verity +metadata is filesystem-specific. On ext4, the verity metadata is +stored after the end of the file data itself, in the following format: + +- Zero-padding to the next 65536-byte boundary. This padding need not + actually be allocated on-disk, i.e. it may be a hole. + +- The Merkle tree, as documented in + :ref:`Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst + <fsverity_merkle_tree>`, with the tree levels stored in order from + root to leaf, and the tree blocks within each level stored in their + natural order. + +- Zero-padding to the next filesystem block boundary. + +- The verity descriptor, as documented in + :ref:`Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst <fsverity_descriptor>`, + with optionally appended signature blob. + +- Zero-padding to the next offset that is 4 bytes before a filesystem + block boundary. + +- The size of the verity descriptor in bytes, as a 4-byte little + endian integer. + +Verity inodes have EXT4_VERITY_FL set, and they must use extents, i.e. +EXT4_EXTENTS_FL must be set and EXT4_INLINE_DATA_FL must be clear. +They can have EXT4_ENCRYPT_FL set, in which case the verity metadata +is encrypted as well as the data itself. + +Verity files cannot have blocks allocated past the end of the verity +metadata. + +Verity and DAX are not compatible and attempts to set both of these flags +on a file will fail. |
