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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst | 54 |
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst b/Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4d58ac071 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +=============================================== +TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) driver API +=============================================== + +Kernel provides a TEE bus infrastructure where a Trusted Application is +represented as a device identified via Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) and +client drivers register a table of supported device UUIDs. + +TEE bus infrastructure registers following APIs: + +match(): + iterates over the client driver UUID table to find a corresponding + match for device UUID. If a match is found, then this particular device is + probed via corresponding probe API registered by the client driver. This + process happens whenever a device or a client driver is registered with TEE + bus. + +uevent(): + notifies user-space (udev) whenever a new device is registered on + TEE bus for auto-loading of modularized client drivers. + +TEE bus device enumeration is specific to underlying TEE implementation, so it +is left open for TEE drivers to provide corresponding implementation. + +Then TEE client driver can talk to a matched Trusted Application using APIs +listed in include/linux/tee_drv.h. + +TEE client driver example +------------------------- + +Suppose a TEE client driver needs to communicate with a Trusted Application +having UUID: ``ac6a4085-0e82-4c33-bf98-8eb8e118b6c2``, so driver registration +snippet would look like:: + + static const struct tee_client_device_id client_id_table[] = { + {UUID_INIT(0xac6a4085, 0x0e82, 0x4c33, + 0xbf, 0x98, 0x8e, 0xb8, 0xe1, 0x18, 0xb6, 0xc2)}, + {} + }; + + MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, client_id_table); + + static struct tee_client_driver client_driver = { + .probe = client_probe, + .remove = client_remove, + .id_table = client_id_table, + .driver = { + .name = DRIVER_NAME, + }, + }; + + module_tee_client_driver(client_driver); |
