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authorLiu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com>2026-09-21 15:25:51 +0800
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-10-01 07:12:43 +0200
commit9062d50e75c24dc7911be05c9b1719b3b256af15 (patch)
tree09559f03fb76730b4f551425ce28e6e2b01db6db /Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst
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usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmdgrafted
generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]: u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F); /* 0 .. 15 */ ... con->data[cmd] = value; /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */ struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44 bytes past the end of the array on the heap. A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions. Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions. Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu <liuwb@xiaopeng.com> Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com> Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez <skunkolee@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===============================================
+TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) driver API
+===============================================
+
+Kernel provides a TEE bus infrastructure where a Trusted Application is
+represented as a device identified via Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) and
+client drivers register a table of supported device UUIDs.
+
+TEE bus infrastructure registers following APIs:
+
+match():
+ iterates over the client driver UUID table to find a corresponding
+ match for device UUID. If a match is found, then this particular device is
+ probed via corresponding probe API registered by the client driver. This
+ process happens whenever a device or a client driver is registered with TEE
+ bus.
+
+uevent():
+ notifies user-space (udev) whenever a new device is registered on
+ TEE bus for auto-loading of modularized client drivers.
+
+TEE bus device enumeration is specific to underlying TEE implementation, so it
+is left open for TEE drivers to provide corresponding implementation.
+
+Then TEE client driver can talk to a matched Trusted Application using APIs
+listed in include/linux/tee_drv.h.
+
+TEE client driver example
+-------------------------
+
+Suppose a TEE client driver needs to communicate with a Trusted Application
+having UUID: ``ac6a4085-0e82-4c33-bf98-8eb8e118b6c2``, so driver registration
+snippet would look like::
+
+ static const struct tee_client_device_id client_id_table[] = {
+ {UUID_INIT(0xac6a4085, 0x0e82, 0x4c33,
+ 0xbf, 0x98, 0x8e, 0xb8, 0xe1, 0x18, 0xb6, 0xc2)},
+ {}
+ };
+
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, client_id_table);
+
+ static struct tee_client_driver client_driver = {
+ .probe = client_probe,
+ .remove = client_remove,
+ .id_table = client_id_table,
+ .driver = {
+ .name = DRIVER_NAME,
+ },
+ };
+
+ module_tee_client_driver(client_driver);