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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
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openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
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+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===============================================
+TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) driver API
+===============================================
+
+Kernel provides a TEE bus infrastructure where a Trusted Application is
+represented as a device identified via Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) and
+client drivers register a table of supported device UUIDs.
+
+TEE bus infrastructure registers following APIs:
+
+match():
+ iterates over the client driver UUID table to find a corresponding
+ match for device UUID. If a match is found, then this particular device is
+ probed via corresponding probe API registered by the client driver. This
+ process happens whenever a device or a client driver is registered with TEE
+ bus.
+
+uevent():
+ notifies user-space (udev) whenever a new device is registered on
+ TEE bus for auto-loading of modularized client drivers.
+
+TEE bus device enumeration is specific to underlying TEE implementation, so it
+is left open for TEE drivers to provide corresponding implementation.
+
+Then TEE client driver can talk to a matched Trusted Application using APIs
+listed in include/linux/tee_drv.h.
+
+TEE client driver example
+-------------------------
+
+Suppose a TEE client driver needs to communicate with a Trusted Application
+having UUID: ``ac6a4085-0e82-4c33-bf98-8eb8e118b6c2``, so driver registration
+snippet would look like::
+
+ static const struct tee_client_device_id client_id_table[] = {
+ {UUID_INIT(0xac6a4085, 0x0e82, 0x4c33,
+ 0xbf, 0x98, 0x8e, 0xb8, 0xe1, 0x18, 0xb6, 0xc2)},
+ {}
+ };
+
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, client_id_table);
+
+ static struct tee_client_driver client_driver = {
+ .probe = client_probe,
+ .remove = client_remove,
+ .id_table = client_id_table,
+ .driver = {
+ .name = DRIVER_NAME,
+ },
+ };
+
+ module_tee_client_driver(client_driver);