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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /Documentation/driver-api/firmware/firmware-usage-guidelines.rst
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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+===================
+Firmware Guidelines
+===================
+
+Users switching to a newer kernel should *not* have to install newer
+firmware files to keep their hardware working. At the same time updated
+firmware files must not cause any regressions for users of older kernel
+releases.
+
+Drivers that use firmware from linux-firmware should follow the rules in
+this guide. (Where there is limited control of the firmware,
+i.e. company doesn't support Linux, firmwares sourced from misc places,
+then of course these rules will not apply strictly.)
+
+* Firmware files shall be designed in a way that it allows checking for
+ firmware ABI version changes. It is recommended that firmware files be
+ versioned with at least a major/minor version. It is suggested that
+ the firmware files in linux-firmware be named with some device
+ specific name, and just the major version. The firmware version should
+ be stored in the firmware header, or as an exception, as part of the
+ firmware file name, in order to let the driver detact any non-ABI
+ fixes/changes. The firmware files in linux-firmware should be
+ overwritten with the newest compatible major version. Newer major
+ version firmware shall remain compatible with all kernels that load
+ that major number.
+
+* If the kernel support for the hardware is normally inactive, or the
+ hardware isn't available for public consumption, this can
+ be ignored, until the first kernel release that enables that hardware.
+ This means no major version bumps without the kernel retaining
+ backwards compatibility for the older major versions. Minor version
+ bumps should not introduce new features that newer kernels depend on
+ non-optionally.
+
+* If a security fix needs lockstep firmware and kernel fixes in order to
+ be successful, then all supported major versions in the linux-firmware
+ repo that are required by currently supported stable/LTS kernels,
+ should be updated with the security fix. The kernel patches should
+ detect if the firmware is new enough to declare if the security issue
+ is fixed. All communications around security fixes should point at
+ both the firmware and kernel fixes. If a security fix requires
+ deprecating old major versions, then this should only be done as a
+ last option, and be stated clearly in all communications.
+
+* Firmware files that affect the User API (UAPI) shall not introduce
+ changes that break existing userspace programs. Updates to such firmware
+ must ensure backward compatibility with existing userspace applications.
+ This includes maintaining consistent interfaces and behaviors that
+ userspace programs rely on.