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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/xen.rst
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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+===============
+/proc/sys/xen/
+===============
+
+Copyright (c) 2026, Shubham Chakraborty <chakrabortyshubham66@gmail.com>
+
+For general info and legal blurb, please look in
+Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/index.rst.
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+These files show up in ``/proc/sys/xen/``, depending on the
+kernel configuration:
+
+.. contents:: :local:
+
+balloon/hotplug_unpopulated
+===========================
+
+This flag controls whether unpopulated memory ranges are automatically
+hotplugged as system RAM.
+
+- ``0``: Unpopulated ranges are not hotplugged (default).
+- ``1``: Unpopulated ranges are automatically hotplugged.
+
+When enabled, the Xen balloon driver will add memory regions that are
+marked as unpopulated in the Xen memory map to the system as usable RAM.
+This allows for dynamic memory expansion in Xen guest domains.
+
+This option is only available when the kernel is built with
+``CONFIG_XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG`` enabled.