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authorKees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>2026-09-02 15:31:14 -0700
committerKees Cook <kees@kernel.org>2026-09-04 21:37:00 -0700
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treec65086f9bdcd48c6360fb7cb4598bca084da1f32 /Documentation/admin-guide/syscall-user-dispatch.rst
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treewide: refresh kmalloc_obj() conversionsgrafted
This is another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc() family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules in scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci This catches both the set of kmalloc() uses added since the first kmalloc_obj() conversions in v7.0 and adds a large group missed in the first pass due to Coccinelle not interacting well with the cleanup.h scoped_...() family of macros[1]. I worked around this with spatch's "--macro-file" argument to a file with all the scoped_...() macros mapped to Coccinelle's YACFE_ITERATOR[2] as that was the closest viable control flow indicator I could find. Build tested allmodconfig on x86, arm64, arm, loongarch, mips, powerpc, riscv, and s390 with no new warnings. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202609021314.8A9C0B8@keescook/ [1] Link: https://github.com/coccinelle/coccinelle/blob/master/standard.h [2] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>
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+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=====================
+Syscall User Dispatch
+=====================
+
+Background
+----------
+
+Compatibility layers like Wine need a way to efficiently emulate system
+calls of only a part of their process - the part that has the
+incompatible code - while being able to execute native syscalls without
+a high performance penalty on the native part of the process. Seccomp
+falls short on this task, since it has limited support to efficiently
+filter syscalls based on memory regions, and it doesn't support removing
+filters. Therefore a new mechanism is necessary.
+
+Syscall User Dispatch brings the filtering of the syscall dispatcher
+address back to userspace. The application is in control of a flip
+switch, indicating the current personality of the process. A
+multiple-personality application can then flip the switch without
+invoking the kernel, when crossing the compatibility layer API
+boundaries, to enable/disable the syscall redirection and execute
+syscalls directly (disabled) or send them to be emulated in userspace
+through a SIGSYS.
+
+The goal of this design is to provide very quick compatibility layer
+boundary crosses, which is achieved by not executing a syscall to change
+personality every time the compatibility layer executes. Instead, a
+userspace memory region exposed to the kernel indicates the current
+personality, and the application simply modifies that variable to
+configure the mechanism.
+
+There is a relatively high cost associated with handling signals on most
+architectures, like x86, but at least for Wine, syscalls issued by
+native Windows code are currently not known to be a performance problem,
+since they are quite rare, at least for modern gaming applications.
+
+Since this mechanism is designed to capture syscalls issued by
+non-native applications, it must function on syscalls whose invocation
+ABI is completely unexpected to Linux. Syscall User Dispatch, therefore
+doesn't rely on any of the syscall ABI to make the filtering. It uses
+only the syscall dispatcher address and the userspace key.
+
+As the ABI of these intercepted syscalls is unknown to Linux, these
+syscalls are not instrumentable via ptrace or the syscall tracepoints.
+
+Interface
+---------
+
+A thread can setup this mechanism on supported kernels by executing the
+following prctl:
+
+ prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, <op>, <offset>, <length>, [selector])
+
+<op> is either PR_SYS_DISPATCH_EXCLUSIVE_ON/PR_SYS_DISPATCH_INCLUSIVE_ON
+or PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF, to enable and disable the mechanism globally for
+that thread. When PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF is used, the other fields must be zero.
+
+For PR_SYS_DISPATCH_EXCLUSIVE_ON [<offset>, <offset>+<length>) delimit
+a memory region interval from which syscalls are always executed directly,
+regardless of the userspace selector. This provides a fast path for the
+C library, which includes the most common syscall dispatchers in the native
+code applications, and also provides a way for the signal handler to return
+without triggering a nested SIGSYS on (rt\_)sigreturn. Users of this
+interface should make sure that at least the signal trampoline code is
+included in this region. In addition, for syscalls that implement the
+trampoline code on the vDSO, that trampoline is never intercepted.
+
+For PR_SYS_DISPATCH_INCLUSIVE_ON [<offset>, <offset>+<length>) delimit
+a memory region interval from which syscalls are dispatched based on
+the userspace selector. Syscalls from outside of the range are always
+executed directly.
+
+[selector] is a pointer to a char-sized region in the process memory
+region, that provides a quick way to enable disable syscall redirection
+thread-wide, without the need to invoke the kernel directly. selector
+can be set to SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_ALLOW or SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_BLOCK.
+Any other value should terminate the program with a SIGSYS.
+
+Additionally, a tasks syscall user dispatch configuration can be peeked
+and poked via the PTRACE_(GET|SET)_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH_CONFIG ptrace
+requests. This is useful for checkpoint/restart software.
+
+Security Notes
+--------------
+
+Syscall User Dispatch provides functionality for compatibility layers to
+quickly capture system calls issued by a non-native part of the
+application, while not impacting the Linux native regions of the
+process. It is not a mechanism for sandboxing system calls, and it
+should not be seen as a security mechanism, since it is trivial for a
+malicious application to subvert the mechanism by jumping to an allowed
+dispatcher region prior to executing the syscall, or to discover the
+address and modify the selector value. If the use case requires any
+kind of security sandboxing, Seccomp should be used instead.
+
+Any fork or exec of the existing process resets the mechanism to
+PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF.