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authorUlises Mendez Martinez <umendez@google.com>2026-09-04 15:07:09 +0000
committerJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>2026-09-13 18:15:43 -0700
commit7e61560628d17ea6b1d8ee370f6d42694cff8758 (patch)
treee6080164b2f4c4c419894bdb3ce4d956ca9a98c5 /Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces
downloadlinux-stable-7e61560628d17ea6b1d8ee370f6d42694cff8758.tar.gz
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objtool: Validate disassembler headers in libopcodes probegrafted
commit 3f2de814c059 ("objtool: Fix libopcodes linking with static libraries") tested for libopcodes availability by linking a test snippet with a forward declaration of disassemble_init_for_target(). However, testing symbol linkage with an extern declaration only verifies the presence of the library (.so/.a) and bypasses checking for development headers (binutils-dev). On systems where libopcodes is present without development headers installed, the probe succeeds, enabling BUILD_DISAS. Subsequent compilation of objtool then fails: fatal error: 'bfd.h' file not found 113 | #include <bfd.h> Additionally, the probe invokes $(HOSTCC) without $(HOSTCFLAGS), ignoring any sysroot or include flags specified for the host compiler. Fix this by including <bfd.h> and <dis-asm.h> directly in the test snippet, passing $(HOSTCFLAGS) so host compiler options are respected, and defining PACKAGE="objtool" to satisfy the configuration check in <bfd.h>. Fixes: 3f2de814c059 ("objtool: Fix libopcodes linking with static libraries") Fixes: 436326bc525d ("objtool: fix build failure due to missing libopcodes check") Reported-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com> Assisted-by: Antigravity:Gemini-Next Signed-off-by: Ulises Mendez Martinez <umendez@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260904150710.2997558-1-umendez@google.com Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/compatibility-list.rst43
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/index.rst11
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst18
3 files changed, 72 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/compatibility-list.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/compatibility-list.rst
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+=============================
+Namespaces compatibility list
+=============================
+
+This document contains the information about the problems user
+may have when creating tasks living in different namespaces.
+
+Here's the summary. This matrix shows the known problems, that
+occur when tasks share some namespace (the columns) while living
+in different other namespaces (the rows):
+
+==== === === === === ==== ===
+- UTS IPC VFS PID User Net
+==== === === === === ==== ===
+UTS X
+IPC X 1
+VFS X
+PID 1 1 X
+User 2 2 X
+Net X
+==== === === === === ==== ===
+
+1. Both the IPC and the PID namespaces provide IDs to address
+ object inside the kernel. E.g. semaphore with IPCID or
+ process group with pid.
+
+ In both cases, tasks shouldn't try exposing this ID to some
+ other task living in a different namespace via a shared filesystem
+ or IPC shmem/message. The fact is that this ID is only valid
+ within the namespace it was obtained in and may refer to some
+ other object in another namespace.
+
+2. Intentionally, two equal user IDs in different user namespaces
+ should not be equal from the VFS point of view. In other
+ words, user 10 in one user namespace shouldn't have the same
+ access permissions to files, belonging to user 10 in another
+ namespace.
+
+ The same is true for the IPC namespaces being shared - two users
+ from different user namespaces should not access the same IPC objects
+ even having equal UIDs.
+
+ But currently this is not so.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/index.rst
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+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==========
+Namespaces
+==========
+
+.. toctree::
+ :maxdepth: 1
+
+ compatibility-list
+ resource-control
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst
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+====================================
+User namespaces and resource control
+====================================
+
+The kernel contains many kinds of objects that either don't have
+individual limits or that have limits which are ineffective when
+a set of processes is allowed to switch their UID. On a system
+where the admins don't trust their users or their users' programs,
+user namespaces expose the system to potential misuse of resources.
+
+In order to mitigate this, we recommend that admins enable memory
+control groups on any system that enables user namespaces.
+Furthermore, we recommend that admins configure the memory control
+groups to limit the maximum memory usable by any untrusted user.
+
+Memory control groups can be configured by installing the libcgroup
+package present on most distros editing /etc/cgrules.conf,
+/etc/cgconfig.conf and setting up libpam-cgroup.