openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

3 files changed, 72 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/compatibility-list.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/compatibility-list.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..318800b2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/compatibility-list.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+=============================
+Namespaces compatibility list
+=============================
+
+This document contains the information about the problems user
+may have when creating tasks living in different namespaces.
+
+Here's the summary. This matrix shows the known problems, that
+occur when tasks share some namespace (the columns) while living
+in different other namespaces (the rows):
+
+====	===	===	===	===	====	===
+-	UTS	IPC	VFS	PID	User	Net
+====	===	===	===	===	====	===
+UTS	 X
+IPC		 X	 1
+VFS			 X
+PID		 1	 1	 X
+User		 2	 2		 X
+Net						 X
+====	===	===	===	===	====	===
+
+1. Both the IPC and the PID namespaces provide IDs to address
+   object inside the kernel. E.g. semaphore with IPCID or
+   process group with pid.
+
+   In both cases, tasks shouldn't try exposing this ID to some
+   other task living in a different namespace via a shared filesystem
+   or IPC shmem/message. The fact is that this ID is only valid
+   within the namespace it was obtained in and may refer to some
+   other object in another namespace.
+
+2. Intentionally, two equal user IDs in different user namespaces
+   should not be equal from the VFS point of view. In other
+   words, user 10 in one user namespace shouldn't have the same
+   access permissions to files, belonging to user 10 in another
+   namespace.
+
+   The same is true for the IPC namespaces being shared - two users
+   from different user namespaces should not access the same IPC objects
+   even having equal UIDs.
+
+   But currently this is not so.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..384f2e0f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==========
+Namespaces
+==========
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   compatibility-list
+   resource-control
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..553a44803
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+====================================
+User namespaces and resource control
+====================================
+
+The kernel contains many kinds of objects that either don't have
+individual limits or that have limits which are ineffective when
+a set of processes is allowed to switch their UID. On a system
+where the admins don't trust their users or their users' programs,
+user namespaces expose the system to potential misuse of resources.
+
+In order to mitigate this, we recommend that admins enable memory
+control groups on any system that enables user namespaces.
+Furthermore, we recommend that admins configure the memory control
+groups to limit the maximum memory usable by any untrusted user.
+
+Memory control groups can be configured by installing the libcgroup
+package present on most distros editing /etc/cgrules.conf,
+/etc/cgconfig.conf and setting up libpam-cgroup.