treewide: refresh kmalloc_obj() conversionsgrafted

This is another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc()
family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules in
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci

This catches both the set of kmalloc() uses added since the first
kmalloc_obj() conversions in v7.0 and adds a large group missed in the
first pass due to Coccinelle not interacting well with the cleanup.h
scoped_...() family of macros[1]. I worked around this with spatch's
"--macro-file" argument to a file with all the scoped_...() macros mapped
to Coccinelle's YACFE_ITERATOR[2] as that was the closest viable control
flow indicator I could find.

Build tested allmodconfig on x86, arm64, arm, loongarch, mips, powerpc,
riscv, and s390 with no new warnings.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202609021314.8A9C0B8@keescook/ [1]
Link: https://github.com/coccinelle/coccinelle/blob/master/standard.h [2]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>

3 files changed, 72 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/compatibility-list.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/compatibility-list.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..318800b2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/compatibility-list.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+=============================
+Namespaces compatibility list
+=============================
+
+This document contains the information about the problems user
+may have when creating tasks living in different namespaces.
+
+Here's the summary. This matrix shows the known problems, that
+occur when tasks share some namespace (the columns) while living
+in different other namespaces (the rows):
+
+====	===	===	===	===	====	===
+-	UTS	IPC	VFS	PID	User	Net
+====	===	===	===	===	====	===
+UTS	 X
+IPC		 X	 1
+VFS			 X
+PID		 1	 1	 X
+User		 2	 2		 X
+Net						 X
+====	===	===	===	===	====	===
+
+1. Both the IPC and the PID namespaces provide IDs to address
+   object inside the kernel. E.g. semaphore with IPCID or
+   process group with pid.
+
+   In both cases, tasks shouldn't try exposing this ID to some
+   other task living in a different namespace via a shared filesystem
+   or IPC shmem/message. The fact is that this ID is only valid
+   within the namespace it was obtained in and may refer to some
+   other object in another namespace.
+
+2. Intentionally, two equal user IDs in different user namespaces
+   should not be equal from the VFS point of view. In other
+   words, user 10 in one user namespace shouldn't have the same
+   access permissions to files, belonging to user 10 in another
+   namespace.
+
+   The same is true for the IPC namespaces being shared - two users
+   from different user namespaces should not access the same IPC objects
+   even having equal UIDs.
+
+   But currently this is not so.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..384f2e0f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==========
+Namespaces
+==========
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   compatibility-list
+   resource-control
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..553a44803
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+====================================
+User namespaces and resource control
+====================================
+
+The kernel contains many kinds of objects that either don't have
+individual limits or that have limits which are ineffective when
+a set of processes is allowed to switch their UID. On a system
+where the admins don't trust their users or their users' programs,
+user namespaces expose the system to potential misuse of resources.
+
+In order to mitigate this, we recommend that admins enable memory
+control groups on any system that enables user namespaces.
+Furthermore, we recommend that admins configure the memory control
+groups to limit the maximum memory usable by any untrusted user.
+
+Memory control groups can be configured by installing the libcgroup
+package present on most distros editing /etc/cgrules.conf,
+/etc/cgconfig.conf and setting up libpam-cgroup.