diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /Documentation/admin-guide/hw_random.rst | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/hw_random.rst')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw_random.rst | 104 |
1 files changed, 104 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw_random.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw_random.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bfc39f1cf --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw_random.rst @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +================================= +Hardware random number generators +================================= + +Introduction +============ + +The hw_random framework is software that makes use of a +special hardware feature on your CPU or motherboard, +a Random Number Generator (RNG). The software has two parts: +a core providing the /dev/hwrng character device and its +sysfs support, plus a hardware-specific driver that plugs +into that core. + +To make the most effective use of these mechanisms, you +should download the support software as well. Download the +latest version of the "rng-tools" package from: + + https://github.com/nhorman/rng-tools + +Those tools use /dev/hwrng to fill the kernel entropy pool, +which is used internally and exported by the /dev/urandom and +/dev/random special files. + +Theory of operation +=================== + +CHARACTER DEVICE. Using the standard open() +and read() system calls, you can read random data from +the hardware RNG device. This data is NOT CHECKED by any +fitness tests, and could potentially be bogus (if the +hardware is faulty or has been tampered with). Data is only +output if the hardware "has-data" flag is set, but nevertheless +a security-conscious person would run fitness tests on the +data before assuming it is truly random. + +The rng-tools package uses such tests in "rngd", and lets you +run them by hand with a "rngtest" utility. + +/dev/hwrng is char device major 10, minor 183. + +CLASS DEVICE. There is a /sys/class/misc/hw_random node with +two unique attributes, "rng_available" and "rng_current". The +"rng_available" attribute lists the hardware-specific drivers +available, while "rng_current" lists the one which is currently +connected to /dev/hwrng. If your system has more than one +RNG available, you may change the one used by writing a name from +the list in "rng_available" into "rng_current". + +========================================================================== + + +Hardware driver for Intel/AMD/VIA Random Number Generators (RNG) + - Copyright 2000,2001 Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pobox.com> + - Copyright 2000,2001 Philipp Rumpf <prumpf@mandrakesoft.com> + + +About the Intel RNG hardware, from the firmware hub datasheet +============================================================= + +The Firmware Hub integrates a Random Number Generator (RNG) +using thermal noise generated from inherently random quantum +mechanical properties of silicon. When not generating new random +bits the RNG circuitry will enter a low power state. Intel will +provide a binary software driver to give third party software +access to our RNG for use as a security feature. At this time, +the RNG is only to be used with a system in an OS-present state. + +Intel RNG Driver notes +====================== + +FIXME: support poll(2) + +.. note:: + + request_mem_region was removed, for three reasons: + + 1) Only one RNG is supported by this driver; + 2) The location used by the RNG is a fixed location in + MMIO-addressable memory; + 3) users with properly working BIOS e820 handling will always + have the region in which the RNG is located reserved, so + request_mem_region calls always fail for proper setups. + However, for people who use mem=XX, BIOS e820 information is + **not** in /proc/iomem, and request_mem_region(RNG_ADDR) can + succeed. + +Driver details +============== + +Based on: + Intel 82802AB/82802AC Firmware Hub (FWH) Datasheet + May 1999 Order Number: 290658-002 R + +Intel 82802 Firmware Hub: + Random Number Generator + Programmer's Reference Manual + December 1999 Order Number: 298029-001 R + +Intel 82802 Firmware HUB Random Number Generator Driver + Copyright (c) 2000 Matt Sottek <msottek@quiknet.com> + +Special thanks to Matt Sottek. I did the "guts", he +did the "brains" and all the testing. |
