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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/zero.rst | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/zero.rst')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/zero.rst | 37 |
1 files changed, 37 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/zero.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/zero.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..11fb5cf45 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/zero.rst @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +======= +dm-zero +======= + +Device-Mapper's "zero" target provides a block-device that always returns +zero'd data on reads and silently drops writes. This is similar behavior to +/dev/zero, but as a block-device instead of a character-device. + +Dm-zero has no target-specific parameters. + +One very interesting use of dm-zero is for creating "sparse" devices in +conjunction with dm-snapshot. A sparse device reports a device-size larger +than the amount of actual storage space available for that device. A user can +write data anywhere within the sparse device and read it back like a normal +device. Reads to previously unwritten areas will return a zero'd buffer. When +enough data has been written to fill up the actual storage space, the sparse +device is deactivated. This can be very useful for testing device and +filesystem limitations. + +To create a sparse device, start by creating a dm-zero device that's the +desired size of the sparse device. For this example, we'll assume a 10TB +sparse device:: + + TEN_TERABYTES=`expr 10 \* 1024 \* 1024 \* 1024 \* 2` # 10 TB in sectors + echo "0 $TEN_TERABYTES zero" | dmsetup create zero1 + +Then create a snapshot of the zero device, using any available block-device as +the COW device. The size of the COW device will determine the amount of real +space available to the sparse device. For this example, we'll assume /dev/sdb1 +is an available 10GB partition:: + + echo "0 $TEN_TERABYTES snapshot /dev/mapper/zero1 /dev/sdb1 p 128" | \ + dmsetup create sparse1 + +This will create a 10TB sparse device called /dev/mapper/sparse1 that has +10GB of actual storage space available. If more than 10GB of data is written +to this device, it will start returning I/O errors. |
