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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/dm-ebs.rst | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/dm-ebs.rst')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/dm-ebs.rst | 51 |
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/dm-ebs.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/dm-ebs.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c09f66db5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/dm-ebs.rst @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +====== +dm-ebs +====== + + +This target is similar to the linear target except that it emulates +a smaller logical block size on a device with a larger logical block +size. Its main purpose is to provide emulation of 512 byte sectors on +devices that do not provide this emulation (i.e. 4K native disks). + +Supported emulated logical block sizes 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096. + +Underlying block size can be set to > 4K to test buffering larger units. + + +Table parameters +---------------- + <dev path> <offset> <emulated sectors> [<underlying sectors>] + +Mandatory parameters: + + <dev path>: + Full pathname to the underlying block-device, + or a "major:minor" device-number. + <offset>: + Starting sector within the device; + has to be a multiple of <emulated sectors>. + <emulated sectors>: + Number of sectors defining the logical block size to be emulated; + 1, 2, 4, 8 sectors of 512 bytes supported. + +Optional parameter: + + <underlying sectors>: + Number of sectors defining the logical block size of <dev path>. + 2^N supported, e.g. 8 = emulate 8 sectors of 512 bytes = 4KiB. + If not provided, the logical block size of <dev path> will be used. + + +Examples: + +Emulate 1 sector = 512 bytes logical block size on /dev/sda starting at +offset 1024 sectors with underlying devices block size automatically set: + +ebs /dev/sda 1024 1 + +Emulate 2 sector = 1KiB logical block size on /dev/sda starting at +offset 128 sectors, enforce 2KiB underlying device block size. +This presumes 2KiB logical blocksize on /dev/sda or less to work: + +ebs /dev/sda 128 2 4 |
