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| author | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 09:55:01 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 11:08:21 -0400 |
| commit | 4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5 (patch) | |
| tree | 350aa83b47da0b574a814795392b20b0bed83cbc /Documentation/admin-guide/aoe/todo.rst | |
| download | linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.tar.gz linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.zip | |
ftrace: Synchronize the initialization of ftrace_opsgrafted
There's some internal state that ftrace_ops needs to have set, but since
it can be declared outside of the ftrace.c code, it calls
ftrace_ops_init() on the ops in every global function. The issue is that
if two tasks call it on the same ops at the same time it is possible to
have the initialization of one corrupt the initialization of the other
call.
Create a ops_mutex to use to synchronize every initialization of the
ftrace_ops. The mutex is taken within checking the ftrace_ops flag that
states it was initializied but the flag is checked again after the mutex
has been taken. Checking first outside the mutex allows it to shortcut
having to take the mutex. But then the check needs to be done again after
the mute is taken in case of races.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260902095501.6b59af20@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: f04f24fb7e48d ("ftrace, kprobes: Fix a deadlock on ftrace_regex_lock")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260829025528.49A831F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/aoe/todo.rst')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/aoe/todo.rst | 17 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/aoe/todo.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/aoe/todo.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dea8db5a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/aoe/todo.rst @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +TODO +==== + +There is a potential for deadlock when allocating a struct sk_buff for +data that needs to be written out to aoe storage. If the data is +being written from a dirty page in order to free that page, and if +there are no other pages available, then deadlock may occur when a +free page is needed for the sk_buff allocation. This situation has +not been observed, but it would be nice to eliminate any potential for +deadlock under memory pressure. + +Because ATA over Ethernet is not fragmented by the kernel's IP code, +the destructor member of the struct sk_buff is available to the aoe +driver. By using a mempool for allocating all but the first few +sk_buffs, and by registering a destructor, we should be able to +efficiently allocate sk_buffs without introducing any potential for +deadlock. |
