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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-08-30 09:22:00 -0700 |
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| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-08-30 09:22:00 -0700 |
| commit | 034dd340b08be1f2f0477ad16131d609f9dbd53c (patch) | |
| tree | 2536f4b2d7893ccd916b5abdf3c454ad6edc03c2 /Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst | |
| download | linux-stable-034dd340b08be1f2f0477ad16131d609f9dbd53c.tar.gz linux-stable-034dd340b08be1f2f0477ad16131d609f9dbd53c.zip | |
Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-tracegrafted
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
- Fix error output of boot instance creation failure
Currently if a boot instance creation fails, instead of printing out
the name of the instance that failed, it prints "(null)". That is
because it prints "cur_str" that had already been processed by
strsep(). Print the saved name instead.
While at it, print the error code of the failure.
- Fix use-after-free for same named historgrams
Histograms can be named so that they can be used in multiple events.
But if the named histogram has a variable attached, the second event
that uses the named histogram which duplicates it and needs to free
the original after duplication leaves the old variable in place and
still visible. If another histogram uses than variable, it will use
the stale one which will try to reference the freed duplicate
histogram and crash the kernel.
Free the duplicate variables along with the duplicated histogram
data.
- Check return value of kthread_run() in event self test
The events self tests uses a kthread for testing but does not check
if it succeeded in creating a kthread. If the kthread creation were
to fail, the code will still try to call kthread_stop() on the error
returned.
- Fix race between reading trace_pipe and updating subbuffer size
If a user is reading the trace_pipe file at the same time they update
the ring buffer sub-buffer size, can cause the trace_pipe read to
read stale data. Add trace_access_lock() around updating the ring
buffer sub-buffer size.
- Fix eventfs_inode on failure path in creation of the events directory
In the creation of the "events" directory, if after allocating the
eventfs_inode a failure is detected, it calls cleanup_ei() which
calls free_ei(). The free_ei() will test if eventfs_inode being freed
has no children. It is a bug if it does. But on the failure case of
the creation of the "events" directory, the children lists have not
yet been initialized and the free will trigger a warning because
list_empty() on an uninitialized list returns false.
Move the initialization into init_ei() where it makes more sense and
makes sure that a created eventfs_inode has its lists initialized
upon creation.
- Check return value of kthread_run() in ftrace direct sample code
The sample code that shows how to use the ftrace direct calls does
not test the return of kthread_run() to see if it succeeds. Return a
failure if the kthread_run() doesn't succeed.
- Clear user events state on fork in case of alloc failure
On fork, the child gets a pointer to the parent's user events state.
It makes a copy of it then updates the child's pointer to it. But if
the allocation fails, the duplication function leaves the child with
a pointer to its parent's descriptor. When the child cleans up its
data, it will free the parent's descriptor while the parent is still
using it.
In the duplication function, set the child's user_event_mm to NULL
before testing if the allocation succeeded, and when it exits it will
not free the parent's descriptor.
- Fix retry exhaustion in simple ring buffer reader swap
simple_ring_buffer_swap_reader_page() starts with retry set to 8 and
post-decrements it only after a failed link replacement. On the final
attempt, a successful replacement leaves retry at zero, while a
failed replacement leaves it at -1.
But the check for success expects the retry value to be non-zero and
exits with an error on zero. This is the opposite result. Fix it.
- Fail nicely when the remote swap_reader_page() returns an error
Currently, if the swap_reader_page() of a remote buffer fails, it
triggers a WARN_ON_ONCE() and continues normally. Instead, have it
exit with an error and a pr_warn() print instead of a full WARNING.
* tag 'trace-v7.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
ring-buffer: Stop remote reader update when page swap fails
tracing: Fix retry exhaustion in simple ring buffer reader swap
tracing/user_events: Clear copied tracing state before fork duplication
samples/ftrace: Fix kthread_stop() on ERR_PTR in ftrace-direct-multi-modify
samples/ftrace: Fix kthread_stop() on ERR_PTR in ftrace-direct-modify
eventfs: Initialize ei->children and ei->list in init_ei()
tracing: Fix use-after-free in trace_pipe read on sub-buffer order change
tracing: Fix crash passing ERR_PTR to kthread_stop()
tracing: Fix use-after-free with same-name named triggers
tracing: Fix logged instance name on creation failure
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst | 75 |
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d9cd937eb --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +==== +Yama +==== + +Yama is a Linux Security Module that collects system-wide DAC security +protections that are not handled by the core kernel itself. This is +selectable at build-time with ``CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA``, and can be controlled +at run-time through sysctls in ``/proc/sys/kernel/yama``: + +ptrace_scope +============ + +As Linux grows in popularity, it will become a larger target for +malware. One particularly troubling weakness of the Linux process +interfaces is that a single user is able to examine the memory and +running state of any of their processes. For example, if one application +(e.g. Pidgin) was compromised, it would be possible for an attacker to +attach to other running processes (e.g. Firefox, SSH sessions, GPG agent, +etc) to extract additional credentials and continue to expand the scope +of their attack without resorting to user-assisted phishing. + +This is not a theoretical problem. `SSH session hijacking +<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf>`_ +and `arbitrary code injection +<https://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html>`_ attacks already +exist and remain possible if ptrace is allowed to operate as before. +Since ptrace is not commonly used by non-developers and non-admins, system +builders should be allowed the option to disable this debugging system. + +For a solution, some applications use ``prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, ...)`` to +specifically disallow such ptrace attachment (e.g. ssh-agent), but many +do not. A more general solution is to only allow ptrace directly from a +parent to a child process (i.e. direct "gdb EXE" and "strace EXE" still +work), or with ``CAP_SYS_PTRACE`` (i.e. "gdb --pid=PID", and "strace -p PID" +still work as root). + +In mode 1, software that has defined application-specific relationships +between a debugging process and its inferior (crash handlers, etc), +``prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, pid, ...)`` can be used. An inferior can declare which +other process (and its descendants) are allowed to call ``PTRACE_ATTACH`` +against it. Only one such declared debugging process can exists for +each inferior at a time. For example, this is used by KDE, Chromium, and +Firefox's crash handlers, and by Wine for allowing only Wine processes +to ptrace each other. If a process wishes to entirely disable these ptrace +restrictions, it can call ``prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY, ...)`` +so that any otherwise allowed process (even those in external pid namespaces) +may attach. + +The sysctl settings (writable only with ``CAP_SYS_PTRACE``) are: + +0 - classic ptrace permissions: + a process can ``PTRACE_ATTACH`` to any other + process running under the same uid, as long as it is dumpable (i.e. + did not transition uids, start privileged, or have called + ``prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE...)`` already). Similarly, ``PTRACE_TRACEME`` is + unchanged. + +1 - restricted ptrace: + a process must have a predefined relationship + with the inferior it wants to call ``PTRACE_ATTACH`` on. By default, + this relationship is that of only its descendants when the above + classic criteria is also met. To change the relationship, an + inferior can call ``prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, debugger, ...)`` to declare + an allowed debugger PID to call ``PTRACE_ATTACH`` on the inferior. + Using ``PTRACE_TRACEME`` is unchanged. + +2 - admin-only attach: + only processes with ``CAP_SYS_PTRACE`` may use ptrace, either with + ``PTRACE_ATTACH`` or through children calling ``PTRACE_TRACEME``. + +3 - no attach: + no processes may use ptrace with ``PTRACE_ATTACH`` nor via + ``PTRACE_TRACEME``. Once set, this sysctl value cannot be changed. + +The original children-only logic was based on the restrictions in grsecurity. |
