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authorFuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>2026-09-22 19:14:30 +0100
committerWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>2026-09-23 12:34:30 +0000
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treecb91c941eccb15f94cbec4e96aa3a9c8736b5d66 /Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
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arm64/boot: Disable trapping of PMZR_EL0 writes to EL2grafted
__init_el2_fgt2() writes one mask to both HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2. PMZR_EL0 is write-only, so its trap bit, nPMZR_EL0, exists only in HDFGWTR2_EL2 and is therefore never set: a PMZR_EL0 write from the host traps to EL2, where the nVHE hypervisor has no handler and BUG()s. The kernel never writes PMZR_EL0, but kernel.perf_user_access=1 has the PMU driver set PMUSERENR_EL0.UEN for a task with a user-read event, so a write from EL0 reaches the trap and takes the host down without a panic message. Accumulate the HDFGWTR2_EL2 bits separately, as __init_el2_fgt() already does for HDFGWTR_EL2, and set nPMZR_EL0 with the other FEAT_PMUv3p9 bits. Fixes: 858c7bfcb35e1 ("arm64/boot: Enable EL2 requirements for FEAT_PMUv3p9") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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+=======
+LoadPin
+=======
+
+LoadPin is a Linux Security Module that ensures all kernel-loaded files
+(modules, firmware, etc) all originate from the same filesystem, with
+the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device
+such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified
+and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading
+restrictions without needing to sign the files individually.
+
+The LSM is selectable at build-time with ``CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN``, and
+can be controlled at boot-time with the kernel command line option
+"``loadpin.enforce``". By default, it is enabled, but can be disabled at
+boot ("``loadpin.enforce=0``").
+
+LoadPin starts pinning when it sees the first file loaded. If the
+block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
+created to toggle pinning: ``/proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled``. (Having
+a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
+sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
+
+It's also possible to exclude specific file types from LoadPin using kernel
+command line option "``loadpin.exclude``". By default, all files are
+included, but they can be excluded using kernel command line option such
+as "``loadpin.exclude=kernel-module,kexec-image``". This allows to use
+different mechanisms such as ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG`` and
+``CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG`` to verify kernel module and kernel image while
+still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. The
+full list of valid file types can be found in ``kernel_read_file_str``
+defined in ``include/linux/kernel_read_file.h``.