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authorShivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>2026-08-22 19:22:05 +0000
committerVinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>2026-09-09 17:51:44 +0530
commite873c74132f0c5f1452816cd9bb26208f0bba1e1 (patch)
treecc1ce1567f5b982359331863ebd9da38741f8d2e /Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
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dmaengine: fix use-after-free in dma_chan_put() and dma_release_channel()grafted
When dma_device_put() drops the last reference on chan->device->ref, dma_device_release() runs and may free the dma_device along with its channels. dma_chan_put() then still reads chan->device->owner via dma_chan_to_owner() for the trailing module_put(). KASAN catches it: slab-use-after-free in dma_chan_put+0x3e6/0x4c0 Read of size 8 by task insmod/6319 Freed by task 6319: kfree+0x225/0x470 dma_chan_put+0x395/0x4c0 dmaengine_put+0xf8/0x160 Cache the module owner in dma_chan_put() before the put so the trailing module_put() does not need chan->device. Fixes: 8ad342a86359 ("dmaengine: Add reference counting to dma_device struct") Suggested-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org> Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260518-dmaengine-kref-fix-v1-1-4d6125048fb7@amd.com Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> Signed-off-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260822-dmaengine-kref-fix-v5-3-d4a4ee47d927@amd.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
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+What: /sys/firmware/secvar
+Date: August 2019
+Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
+Description: This directory is created if the POWER firmware supports OS
+ secureboot, thereby secure variables. It exposes interface
+ for reading/writing the secure variables
+
+What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars
+Date: August 2019
+Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
+Description: This directory lists all the secure variables that are supported
+ by the firmware.
+
+What: /sys/firmware/secvar/format
+Date: August 2019
+Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
+Description: A string indicating which backend is in use by the firmware.
+ This determines the format of the variable and the accepted
+ format of variable updates.
+
+ On powernv/OPAL, this value is provided by the OPAL firmware
+ and is expected to be "ibm,edk2-compat-v1".
+
+ On pseries/PLPKS, this is generated by the kernel based on the
+ version number in the SB_VERSION variable in the keystore. The
+ version numbering in the SB_VERSION variable starts from 1. The
+ format string takes the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v<version>" in the
+ case of dynamic key management mode. If the SB_VERSION variable
+ does not exist (or there is an error while reading it), it takes
+ the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v0", indicating that the key management
+ mode is static.
+
+What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable name>
+Date: August 2019
+Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
+Description: Each secure variable is represented as a directory named as
+ <variable_name>. The variable name is unique and is in ASCII
+ representation. The data and size can be determined by reading
+ their respective attribute files.
+
+ Only secvars relevant to the key management mode are exposed.
+ Only in the dynamic key management mode should the user have
+ access (read and write) to the secure boot secvars db, dbx,
+ grubdb, grubdbx, and sbat. These secvars are not consumed in the
+ static key management mode. PK, trustedcadb and moduledb are the
+ secvars common to both static and dynamic key management modes.
+
+What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/size
+Date: August 2019
+Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
+Description: An integer representation of the size of the content of the
+ variable. In other words, it represents the size of the data.
+
+What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/data
+Date: August 2019
+Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
+Description: A read-only file containing the value of the variable. The size
+ of the file represents the maximum size of the variable data.
+
+What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/update
+Date: August 2019
+Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
+Description: A write-only file that is used to submit the new value for the
+ variable. The size of the file represents the maximum size of
+ the variable data that can be written.