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| author | Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com> | 2026-08-22 19:22:05 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> | 2026-09-09 17:51:44 +0530 |
| commit | e873c74132f0c5f1452816cd9bb26208f0bba1e1 (patch) | |
| tree | cc1ce1567f5b982359331863ebd9da38741f8d2e /Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar | |
| download | linux-stable-e873c74132f0c5f1452816cd9bb26208f0bba1e1.tar.gz linux-stable-e873c74132f0c5f1452816cd9bb26208f0bba1e1.zip | |
dmaengine: fix use-after-free in dma_chan_put() and dma_release_channel()grafted
When dma_device_put() drops the last reference on chan->device->ref,
dma_device_release() runs and may free the dma_device along with its
channels.
dma_chan_put() then still reads chan->device->owner via
dma_chan_to_owner() for the trailing module_put(). KASAN catches it:
slab-use-after-free in dma_chan_put+0x3e6/0x4c0
Read of size 8 by task insmod/6319
Freed by task 6319:
kfree+0x225/0x470
dma_chan_put+0x395/0x4c0
dmaengine_put+0xf8/0x160
Cache the module owner in dma_chan_put() before the put so the trailing
module_put() does not need chan->device.
Fixes: 8ad342a86359 ("dmaengine: Add reference counting to dma_device struct")
Suggested-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260518-dmaengine-kref-fix-v1-1-4d6125048fb7@amd.com
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Signed-off-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260822-dmaengine-kref-fix-v5-3-d4a4ee47d927@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar | 65 |
1 files changed, 65 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c52a5fd15 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +What: /sys/firmware/secvar +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> +Description: This directory is created if the POWER firmware supports OS + secureboot, thereby secure variables. It exposes interface + for reading/writing the secure variables + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> +Description: This directory lists all the secure variables that are supported + by the firmware. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/format +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> +Description: A string indicating which backend is in use by the firmware. + This determines the format of the variable and the accepted + format of variable updates. + + On powernv/OPAL, this value is provided by the OPAL firmware + and is expected to be "ibm,edk2-compat-v1". + + On pseries/PLPKS, this is generated by the kernel based on the + version number in the SB_VERSION variable in the keystore. The + version numbering in the SB_VERSION variable starts from 1. The + format string takes the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v<version>" in the + case of dynamic key management mode. If the SB_VERSION variable + does not exist (or there is an error while reading it), it takes + the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v0", indicating that the key management + mode is static. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable name> +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> +Description: Each secure variable is represented as a directory named as + <variable_name>. The variable name is unique and is in ASCII + representation. The data and size can be determined by reading + their respective attribute files. + + Only secvars relevant to the key management mode are exposed. + Only in the dynamic key management mode should the user have + access (read and write) to the secure boot secvars db, dbx, + grubdb, grubdbx, and sbat. These secvars are not consumed in the + static key management mode. PK, trustedcadb and moduledb are the + secvars common to both static and dynamic key management modes. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/size +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> +Description: An integer representation of the size of the content of the + variable. In other words, it represents the size of the data. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/data +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> +Description: A read-only file containing the value of the variable. The size + of the file represents the maximum size of the variable data. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/update +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> +Description: A write-only file that is used to submit the new value for the + variable. The size of the file represents the maximum size of + the variable data that can be written. |
