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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-tee
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
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+What: /sys/class/tee/tee{,priv}X/rpmb_routing_model
+Date: May 2024
+KernelVersion: 6.10
+Contact: op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org
+Description:
+ RPMB frames can be routed to the RPMB device via the
+ user-space daemon tee-supplicant or the RPMB subsystem
+ in the kernel. The value "user" means that the driver
+ will route the RPMB frames via user space. Conversely,
+ "kernel" means that the frames are routed via the RPMB
+ subsystem without assistance from tee-supplicant. It
+ should be assumed that RPMB frames are routed via user
+ space if the variable is absent. The primary purpose
+ of this variable is to let systemd know whether
+ tee-supplicant is needed in the early boot with initramfs.
+
+What: /sys/class/tee/tee{,priv}X/revision
+Date: Jan 2026
+KernelVersion: 6.19
+Contact: op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org
+Description:
+ Read-only revision string reported by the TEE driver. This is
+ for diagnostics only and must not be used to infer feature
+ support. Use TEE_IOC_VERSION for capability and compatibility
+ checks.