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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-08-19 10:09:22 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-08-19 10:09:22 -0700 |
| commit | f4cdf7ca9a1fdcca413157df19753f388a5a224e (patch) | |
| tree | 60a31895b2446cd7fa27514e8c2843534a0de0da /Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco | |
| download | linux-stable-f4cdf7ca9a1fdcca413157df19753f388a5a224e.tar.gz linux-stable-f4cdf7ca9a1fdcca413157df19753f388a5a224e.zip | |
Merge tag 'media/v7.3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-mediagrafted
Pull media updates from Mauro Carvalho Chehab:
- v4l2-core: added ISP statistics support and per-block validation
- v4l2-core: Allow unknown HDR10 white point and luminance
- New camera sensors: Sony IMX678 and IMX471m, Himax HM1092 IR sensor
- New codec: Milos: VPU v2.0 codec support
- isp driver: gained support for Dreamchip RPPX1 ISP framework
- vsp1 driver: gained support for RZ/T2H and RZ/N2H
- Novalake driver: gained CVS support for new NVL hardware
- dvb-core: fix feed leak on failed DMX_ADD_PID
- several driver fixes, cleanups and minor improvements
* tag 'media/v7.3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-media: (308 commits)
media: ipu-bridge: check all DMI entries when overriding sensor rotation
media: v4l2-async: avoid deleting unlinked ASC entry on link error
media: rzg2l-cru: Align bytesperline to hardware DMA stride requirement
media: intel/ipu6: fix async notifier cleanup leak on parse error
media: staging/ipu7: fix async notifier UAF on probe error path
media: amd: isp4: fix self-deadlock in isp4sd_pwron_and_init() error path
media: amd: isp4: release partial allocations in isp4if_alloc_fw_gpumem()
media: rcar-isp: Fix VSPX reference leaks
media: rcar-isp: Release ISPCORE resources
media: i2c: imx415: Release runtime PM reference on VBLANK error
media: i2c: imx415: Return test pattern write errors
media: renesas: vsp1: Declare index variables in for loop statement
media: renesas: vsp1: Make reset control optional to support platforms without a reset line
media: dt-bindings: media: renesas,vsp1: Document RZ/T2H and RZ/N2H SoCs
media: dt-bindings: media: renesas,fcp: Document RZ/T2H and RZ/N2H SoCs
media: nxp: imx8-isi: Add additional 32-bit RGB format support
media: nxp: imx8-isi: Add 16-bit raw Bayer format support
media: nxp: imx8-isi: Implement per-stream reference counting for multiplexed streams
media: nxp: imx8-isi: Use BIT_ULL() for 64-bit stream masks
media: nxp: imx8-isi: Correct color map between V4L2 and ISI
...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco | 51 |
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco b/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f2b690915 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +What: security/secrets/coco +Date: February 2022 +Contact: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> +Description: + Exposes confidential computing (coco) EFI secrets to + userspace via securityfs. + + EFI can declare memory area used by confidential computing + platforms (such as AMD SEV and SEV-ES) for secret injection by + the Guest Owner during VM's launch. The secrets are encrypted + by the Guest Owner and decrypted inside the trusted enclave, + and therefore are not readable by the untrusted host. + + The efi_secret module exposes the secrets to userspace. Each + secret appears as a file under <securityfs>/secrets/coco, + where the filename is the GUID of the entry in the secrets + table. This module is loaded automatically by the EFI driver + if the EFI secret area is populated. + + Two operations are supported for the files: read and unlink. + Reading the file returns the content of secret entry. + Unlinking the file overwrites the secret data with zeroes and + removes the entry from the filesystem. A secret cannot be read + after it has been unlinked. + + For example, listing the available secrets:: + + # modprobe efi_secret + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + Reading the secret data by reading a file:: + + # cat /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + the-content-of-the-secret-data + + Wiping a secret by unlinking a file:: + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + Note: The binary format of the secrets table injected by the + Guest Owner is described in + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c under "Structure of + the EFI secret area". |
