ata: libata-scsi: fix ata_dsm_trim_pages() kernel-docgrafted

make htmldocs fails with:

  Documentation/driver-api/libata:604: ./drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c:2301:
  ERROR: Unexpected indentation. [docutils]

The Return: section of ata_dsm_trim_pages() ends its first sentence with
a colon and continues with an indented bullet list. reStructuredText
requires a blank line before an indented block, so docutils chokes on
the list.

Simply adding the missing blank line does not work either: Return: is a
kernel-doc "special section", which is terminated by the first blank
line, so the bullet list would end up in the Description section,
detached from the sentence introducing it.

Spell the two bounds out as prose instead, so that the Return: section
stays self-contained. Documentation-only change.

Fixes: e64e6b5dc867 ("ata: libata-scsi: scale DSM TRIM payload by MAX PAGES PER DSM COMMAND")
Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-ide/b0a0b8e8-cc4f-4c7b-8bc5-fee0712d405a@redhat.com/
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260916130031.29990-2-cassel@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>

1 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco b/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f2b690915
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+What:		security/secrets/coco
+Date:		February 2022
+Contact:	Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
+Description:
+		Exposes confidential computing (coco) EFI secrets to
+		userspace via securityfs.
+
+		EFI can declare memory area used by confidential computing
+		platforms (such as AMD SEV and SEV-ES) for secret injection by
+		the Guest Owner during VM's launch.  The secrets are encrypted
+		by the Guest Owner and decrypted inside the trusted enclave,
+		and therefore are not readable by the untrusted host.
+
+		The efi_secret module exposes the secrets to userspace.  Each
+		secret appears as a file under <securityfs>/secrets/coco,
+		where the filename is the GUID of the entry in the secrets
+		table.  This module is loaded automatically by the EFI driver
+		if the EFI secret area is populated.
+
+		Two operations are supported for the files: read and unlink.
+		Reading the file returns the content of secret entry.
+		Unlinking the file overwrites the secret data with zeroes and
+		removes the entry from the filesystem.  A secret cannot be read
+		after it has been unlinked.
+
+		For example, listing the available secrets::
+
+		  # modprobe efi_secret
+		  # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco
+		  -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
+		  -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
+		  -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
+		  -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
+
+		Reading the secret data by reading a file::
+
+		  # cat /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
+		  the-content-of-the-secret-data
+
+		Wiping a secret by unlinking a file::
+
+		  # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
+		  # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco
+		  -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
+		  -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
+		  -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
+
+		Note: The binary format of the secrets table injected by the
+		Guest Owner is described in
+		drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c under "Structure of
+		the EFI secret area".