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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-prev | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-prev')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-prev | 19 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-prev b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-prev new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f990b3595 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-prev @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +What: /proc/*/attr/prev +Contact: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, + selinux@vger.kernel.org, + apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com +Description: The security information used on the process by + a Linux security module (LSM) active on the system + prior to the most recent exec() call. + The details of permissions required to read from + this interface is LSM dependent. + A process cannot write to this interface unless it + refers to itself. + The other details of permissions required to write to + this interface are LSM dependent. + The format of the data used by this interface is LSM + dependent. + SELinux and AppArmor provide this interface. +Users: SELinux user-space + AppArmor user-space + |
