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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-current
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
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+What: /proc/*/attr/current
+Contact: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
+ selinux@vger.kernel.org,
+ apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com
+Description: The current security information used by a Linux
+ security module (LSM) that is active on the system.
+ The details of permissions required to read from
+ this interface and hence obtain the security state
+ of the task identified is LSM dependent.
+ A process cannot write to this interface unless it
+ refers to itself.
+ The other details of permissions required to write to
+ this interface and hence change the security state of
+ the task identified are LSM dependent.
+ The format of the data used by this interface is LSM
+ dependent.
+ SELinux, Smack and AppArmor provide this interface.
+Users: SELinux user-space
+ Smack user-space
+ AppArmor user-space