From ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Bilal Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:54:55 +0500 Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse() rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/perf/util/parse-regs-options.c | 124 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 124 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/perf/util/parse-regs-options.c (limited to 'tools/perf/util/parse-regs-options.c') diff --git a/tools/perf/util/parse-regs-options.c b/tools/perf/util/parse-regs-options.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c93c2f0c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/parse-regs-options.c @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "util/debug.h" +#include +#include +#include "util/perf_regs.h" +#include "util/parse-regs-options.h" + +static void list_perf_regs(FILE *fp, uint64_t mask) +{ + const char *last_name = NULL; + + fprintf(fp, "available registers: "); + for (int reg = 0; reg < 64; reg++) { + const char *name; + + if (((1ULL << reg) & mask) == 0) + continue; + + name = perf_reg_name(reg, EM_HOST, EF_HOST); + if (name && (!last_name || strcmp(last_name, name))) + fprintf(fp, "%s%s", reg > 0 ? " " : "", name); + last_name = name; + } + fputc('\n', fp); +} + +static uint64_t name_to_perf_reg_mask(const char *to_match, uint64_t mask) +{ + uint64_t reg_mask = 0; + + for (int reg = 0; reg < 64; reg++) { + const char *name; + + if (((1ULL << reg) & mask) == 0) + continue; + + name = perf_reg_name(reg, EM_HOST, EF_HOST); + if (!name) + continue; + + if (!strcasecmp(to_match, name)) + reg_mask |= 1ULL << reg; + } + return reg_mask; +} + +static int +__parse_regs(const struct option *opt, const char *str, int unset, bool intr) +{ + uint64_t *mode = (uint64_t *)opt->value; + char *s, *os = NULL, *p; + int ret = -1; + uint64_t mask; + + if (unset) + return 0; + + /* + * cannot set it twice + */ + if (*mode) + return -1; + + mask = intr ? perf_intr_reg_mask(EM_HOST) : perf_user_reg_mask(EM_HOST); + + /* str may be NULL in case no arg is passed to -I */ + if (!str) { + *mode = mask; + return 0; + } + + /* because str is read-only */ + s = os = strdup(str); + if (!s) + return -1; + + for (;;) { + uint64_t reg_mask; + + p = strchr(s, ','); + if (p) + *p = '\0'; + + if (!strcmp(s, "?")) { + list_perf_regs(stderr, mask); + goto error; + } + + reg_mask = name_to_perf_reg_mask(s, mask); + if (reg_mask == 0) { + ui__warning("Unknown register \"%s\", check man page or run \"perf record %s?\"\n", + s, intr ? "-I" : "--user-regs="); + goto error; + } + *mode |= reg_mask; + + if (!p) + break; + + s = p + 1; + } + ret = 0; + +error: + free(os); + return ret; +} + +int +parse_user_regs(const struct option *opt, const char *str, int unset) +{ + return __parse_regs(opt, str, unset, false); +} + +int +parse_intr_regs(const struct option *opt, const char *str, int unset) +{ + return __parse_regs(opt, str, unset, true); +} -- cgit v1.3.1