From 55fc280e951ab2b39f3dcb640edc1b1eebc6d173 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Rob Herring (Arm)" <robh@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 14:43:51 -0500
Subject: Input: tsc2007 - read "ti,poll-period" as u32

The "ti,poll-period" property is documented as a normal uint32 cell.
The driver used a u64 helper, which makes the helper type disagree with
the schema even though the stored value is still small.

Read "ti,poll-period" with the u32 helper matching the documented DT
cell size.

Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260831194352.1185860-1-robh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
---
 security/Kconfig                                   |  305 +
 security/Kconfig.hardening                         |  349 +
 security/Makefile                                  |   31 +
 security/apparmor/.gitignore                       |    4 +
 security/apparmor/.kunitconfig                     |    5 +
 security/apparmor/Kconfig                          |  122 +
 security/apparmor/Makefile                         |  114 +
 security/apparmor/af_unix.c                        |  806 ++
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c                     | 2828 +++++++
 security/apparmor/audit.c                          |  291 +
 security/apparmor/capability.c                     |  223 +
 security/apparmor/crypto.c                         |   61 +
 security/apparmor/domain.c                         | 1622 ++++
 security/apparmor/file.c                           |  747 ++
 security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h                |   55 +
 security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h               |   68 +
 security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h             |  148 +
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h                  |  212 +
 security/apparmor/include/capability.h             |   48 +
 security/apparmor/include/cred.h                   |  250 +
 security/apparmor/include/crypto.h                 |   38 +
 security/apparmor/include/domain.h                 |   33 +
 security/apparmor/include/file.h                   |  133 +
 security/apparmor/include/ipc.h                    |   23 +
 security/apparmor/include/label.h                  |  491 ++
 security/apparmor/include/lib.h                    |  363 +
 security/apparmor/include/match.h                  |  193 +
 security/apparmor/include/mount.h                  |   60 +
 security/apparmor/include/net.h                    |  119 +
 security/apparmor/include/path.h                   |   33 +
 security/apparmor/include/perms.h                  |  219 +
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h                 |  450 ++
 security/apparmor/include/policy_compat.h          |   33 +
 security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h              |  153 +
 security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h          |  215 +
 security/apparmor/include/procattr.h               |   17 +
 security/apparmor/include/resource.h               |   47 +
 security/apparmor/include/secid.h                  |   37 +
 security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h              |   97 +
 security/apparmor/include/signal.h                 |   19 +
 security/apparmor/include/task.h                   |  105 +
 security/apparmor/ipc.c                            |  116 +
 security/apparmor/label.c                          | 2135 ++++++
 security/apparmor/lib.c                            |  515 ++
 security/apparmor/lsm.c                            | 2588 +++++++
 security/apparmor/match.c                          |  832 ++
 security/apparmor/mount.c                          |  764 ++
 security/apparmor/net.c                            |  408 +
 security/apparmor/nulldfa.in                       |  107 +
 security/apparmor/path.c                           |  222 +
 security/apparmor/policy.c                         | 1521 ++++
 security/apparmor/policy_compat.c                  |  333 +
 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c                      |  398 +
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c                  | 1803 +++++
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c             |  616 ++
 security/apparmor/procattr.c                       |  141 +
 security/apparmor/resource.c                       |  206 +
 security/apparmor/secid.c                          |  155 +
 security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in                 |  114 +
 security/apparmor/task.c                           |  372 +
 security/bpf/Makefile                              |    5 +
 security/bpf/hooks.c                               |   42 +
 security/commoncap.c                               | 1527 ++++
 security/commoncap_test.c                          |  288 +
 security/device_cgroup.c                           |  870 +++
 security/inode.c                                   |  380 +
 security/integrity/Kconfig                         |  137 +
 security/integrity/Makefile                        |   24 +
 security/integrity/digsig.c                        |  228 +
 security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c             |  302 +
 security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c                |   56 +
 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig                     |   76 +
 security/integrity/evm/Makefile                    |    8 +
 security/integrity/evm/evm.h                       |   89 +
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c                |  459 ++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c                  | 1236 +++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c             |   23 +
 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c                 |  346 +
 security/integrity/iint.c                          |   71 +
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig                     |  350 +
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile                    |   20 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h                       |  625 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c                   |  470 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c              |  831 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c       |   66 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c                |  519 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c                   |   33 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c                    |  849 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c                  |  138 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c                  |  167 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c                 |  351 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c                  | 1341 ++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c                |  151 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c                   |   49 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c                | 2382 ++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c                 |  577 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c            |  177 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c              |  537 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c          |  764 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h          |   69 +
 security/integrity/integrity.h                     |  281 +
 security/integrity/integrity_audit.c               |   69 +
 security/integrity/platform_certs/efi_parser.c     |  108 +
 .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c     |  102 +
 .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h     |   55 +
 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.c  |   36 +
 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c   |  160 +
 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c      |  238 +
 .../integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c     |   91 +
 .../integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c    |   58 +
 security/ipe/.gitignore                            |    2 +
 security/ipe/Kconfig                               |  117 +
 security/ipe/Makefile                              |   31 +
 security/ipe/audit.c                               |  279 +
 security/ipe/audit.h                               |   19 +
 security/ipe/digest.c                              |  119 +
 security/ipe/digest.h                              |   26 +
 security/ipe/eval.c                                |  393 +
 security/ipe/eval.h                                |   70 +
 security/ipe/fs.c                                  |  246 +
 security/ipe/fs.h                                  |   16 +
 security/ipe/hooks.c                               |  342 +
 security/ipe/hooks.h                               |   55 +
 security/ipe/ipe.c                                 |  100 +
 security/ipe/ipe.h                                 |   28 +
 security/ipe/policy.c                              |  244 +
 security/ipe/policy.h                              |   98 +
 security/ipe/policy_fs.c                           |  490 ++
 security/ipe/policy_parser.c                       |  559 ++
 security/ipe/policy_parser.h                       |   11 +
 security/ipe/policy_tests.c                        |  297 +
 security/keys/Kconfig                              |  131 +
 security/keys/Makefile                             |   32 +
 security/keys/big_key.c                            |  290 +
 security/keys/compat.c                             |  132 +
 security/keys/compat_dh.c                          |   36 +
 security/keys/dh.c                                 |  313 +
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile              |   11 +
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c     |   76 +
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.h     |   27 +
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c           | 1002 +++
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h           |   67 +
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c   |   43 +
 security/keys/gc.c                                 |  374 +
 security/keys/internal.h                           |  378 +
 security/keys/key.c                                | 1293 ++++
 security/keys/keyctl.c                             | 2038 +++++
 security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c                        |  335 +
 security/keys/keyring.c                            | 1798 +++++
 security/keys/permission.c                         |  123 +
 security/keys/persistent.c                         |  167 +
 security/keys/proc.c                               |  323 +
 security/keys/process_keys.c                       |  965 +++
 security/keys/request_key.c                        |  821 ++
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c                   |  312 +
 security/keys/sysctl.c                             |   76 +
 security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig                 |   82 +
 security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile                |   20 +
 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1            |   11 +
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c          |  191 +
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c          |  410 +
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c           |  356 +
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c          |  190 +
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c           |  287 +
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c          | 1003 +++
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c          |  605 ++
 security/keys/user_defined.c                       |  207 +
 security/landlock/.kunitconfig                     |    6 +
 security/landlock/Kconfig                          |   37 +
 security/landlock/Makefile                         |   18 +
 security/landlock/access.h                         |  151 +
 security/landlock/audit.c                          |  734 ++
 security/landlock/audit.h                          |   76 +
 security/landlock/common.h                         |   22 +
 security/landlock/cred.c                           |   69 +
 security/landlock/cred.h                           |  158 +
 security/landlock/domain.c                         |  309 +
 security/landlock/domain.h                         |  179 +
 security/landlock/errata.h                         |   99 +
 security/landlock/errata/abi-1.h                   |   24 +
 security/landlock/errata/abi-4.h                   |   22 +
 security/landlock/errata/abi-6.h                   |   29 +
 security/landlock/fs.c                             | 2037 +++++
 security/landlock/fs.h                             |  156 +
 security/landlock/id.c                             |  295 +
 security/landlock/id.h                             |   25 +
 security/landlock/limits.h                         |   42 +
 security/landlock/net.c                            |  379 +
 security/landlock/net.h                            |   34 +
 security/landlock/object.c                         |   67 +
 security/landlock/object.h                         |   91 +
 security/landlock/ruleset.c                        |  744 ++
 security/landlock/ruleset.h                        |  330 +
 security/landlock/setup.c                          |   81 +
 security/landlock/setup.h                          |   22 +
 security/landlock/syscalls.c                       |  631 ++
 security/landlock/task.c                           |  463 ++
 security/landlock/task.h                           |   14 +
 security/landlock/tsync.c                          |  619 ++
 security/landlock/tsync.h                          |   16 +
 security/loadpin/Kconfig                           |   44 +
 security/loadpin/Makefile                          |    2 +
 security/loadpin/loadpin.c                         |  442 ++
 security/lockdown/Kconfig                          |   47 +
 security/lockdown/Makefile                         |    1 +
 security/lockdown/lockdown.c                       |  172 +
 security/lsm.h                                     |   50 +
 security/lsm_audit.c                               |  457 ++
 security/lsm_init.c                                |  568 ++
 security/lsm_notifier.c                            |   31 +
 security/lsm_syscalls.c                            |  129 +
 security/min_addr.c                                |   62 +
 security/safesetid/Kconfig                         |   15 +
 security/safesetid/Makefile                        |    7 +
 security/safesetid/lsm.c                           |  293 +
 security/safesetid/lsm.h                           |   75 +
 security/safesetid/securityfs.c                    |  347 +
 security/security.c                                | 5718 ++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/.gitignore                        |    4 +
 security/selinux/Kconfig                           |  100 +
 security/selinux/Makefile                          |   44 +
 security/selinux/avc.c                             | 1208 +++
 security/selinux/genheaders.c                      |  154 +
 security/selinux/hooks.c                           | 7993 ++++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/ibpkey.c                          |  235 +
 security/selinux/ima.c                             |  120 +
 security/selinux/include/audit.h                   |   71 +
 security/selinux/include/avc.h                     |  172 +
 security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h                  |   23 +
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h                |  193 +
 security/selinux/include/conditional.h             |   23 +
 security/selinux/include/hash.h                    |   47 +
 security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h                  |   35 +
 security/selinux/include/ima.h                     |   28 +
 security/selinux/include/initcalls.h               |   19 +
 security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h   |   38 +
 security/selinux/include/netif.h                   |   24 +
 security/selinux/include/netlabel.h                |  137 +
 security/selinux/include/netnode.h                 |   26 +
 security/selinux/include/netport.h                 |   25 +
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h                  |  290 +
 security/selinux/include/policycap.h               |   29 +
 security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h         |   29 +
 security/selinux/include/security.h                |  414 +
 security/selinux/include/xfrm.h                    |   94 +
 security/selinux/initcalls.c                       |   52 +
 security/selinux/netif.c                           |  283 +
 security/selinux/netlabel.c                        |  619 ++
 security/selinux/netlink.c                         |  120 +
 security/selinux/netnode.c                         |  307 +
 security/selinux/netport.c                         |  235 +
 security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c                        |  234 +
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c                       | 2016 +++++
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c                        |  618 ++
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h                        |  141 +
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c                  |  765 ++
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.h                  |   84 +
 security/selinux/ss/constraint.h                   |   65 +
 security/selinux/ss/context.c                      |   32 +
 security/selinux/ss/context.h                      |  204 +
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c                      |  603 ++
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h                      |  156 +
 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c                      |  199 +
 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h                      |  154 +
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c                          |  663 ++
 security/selinux/ss/mls.h                          |   96 +
 security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h                    |   52 +
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c                     | 4017 ++++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h                     |  428 ++
 security/selinux/ss/services.c                     | 3946 ++++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/services.h                     |   47 +
 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c                       |  638 ++
 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h                       |  160 +
 security/selinux/ss/symtab.c                       |   56 +
 security/selinux/ss/symtab.h                       |   26 +
 security/selinux/status.c                          |  122 +
 security/selinux/xfrm.c                            |  466 ++
 security/smack/Kconfig                             |   55 +
 security/smack/Makefile                            |    9 +
 security/smack/smack.h                             |  541 ++
 security/smack/smack_access.c                      |  756 ++
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c                         | 5380 +++++++++++++
 security/smack/smack_netfilter.c                   |   78 +
 security/smack/smackfs.c                           | 3044 ++++++++
 security/tomoyo/.gitignore                         |    3 +
 security/tomoyo/Kconfig                            |   85 +
 security/tomoyo/Makefile                           |   21 +
 security/tomoyo/audit.c                            |  477 ++
 security/tomoyo/common.c                           | 3025 ++++++++
 security/tomoyo/common.h                           | 1292 ++++
 security/tomoyo/condition.c                        | 1122 +++
 security/tomoyo/domain.c                           |  950 +++
 security/tomoyo/environ.c                          |  124 +
 security/tomoyo/file.c                             | 1050 +++
 security/tomoyo/gc.c                               |  682 ++
 security/tomoyo/group.c                            |  209 +
 security/tomoyo/load_policy.c                      |  110 +
 security/tomoyo/memory.c                           |  207 +
 security/tomoyo/mount.c                            |  242 +
 security/tomoyo/network.c                          |  780 ++
 .../tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default    |    2 +
 security/tomoyo/realpath.c                         |  310 +
 security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c                    |  271 +
 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c                           |  621 ++
 security/tomoyo/util.c                             | 1106 +++
 security/yama/Kconfig                              |   14 +
 security/yama/Makefile                             |    4 +
 security/yama/yama_lsm.c                           |  481 ++
 308 files changed, 129080 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 security/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/Kconfig.hardening
 create mode 100644 security/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/.kunitconfig
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/af_unix.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/audit.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/capability.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/crypto.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/domain.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/file.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/capability.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/cred.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/crypto.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/domain.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/file.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/label.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/lib.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/match.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/path.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/perms.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/policy.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/policy_compat.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/resource.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/secid.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/signal.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/task.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/ipc.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/label.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/lib.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/lsm.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/match.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/nulldfa.in
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/path.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/policy.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/policy_compat.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/procattr.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/resource.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/secid.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/task.c
 create mode 100644 security/bpf/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/bpf/hooks.c
 create mode 100644 security/commoncap.c
 create mode 100644 security/commoncap_test.c
 create mode 100644 security/device_cgroup.c
 create mode 100644 security/inode.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/digsig.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm.h
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/iint.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima.h
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/integrity.h
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/efi_parser.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/audit.c
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/audit.h
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/digest.c
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/digest.h
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/eval.c
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/eval.h
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/fs.c
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/fs.h
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/hooks.c
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/hooks.h
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.c
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.h
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy.c
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy.h
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy_fs.c
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy_parser.c
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy_parser.h
 create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy_tests.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/keys/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/keys/big_key.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/compat.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/compat_dh.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/dh.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.h
 create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h
 create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/gc.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/internal.h
 create mode 100644 security/keys/key.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/keyctl.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/keyring.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/permission.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/persistent.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/proc.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/process_keys.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/request_key.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/request_key_auth.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/sysctl.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1
 create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/user_defined.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/.kunitconfig
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/access.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/audit.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/audit.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/common.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/domain.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/domain.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/errata.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/errata/abi-1.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/errata/abi-4.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/errata/abi-6.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/id.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/id.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/limits.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/syscalls.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/task.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/task.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/tsync.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/tsync.h
 create mode 100644 security/loadpin/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/loadpin/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/loadpin/loadpin.c
 create mode 100644 security/lockdown/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/lockdown/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/lockdown/lockdown.c
 create mode 100644 security/lsm.h
 create mode 100644 security/lsm_audit.c
 create mode 100644 security/lsm_init.c
 create mode 100644 security/lsm_notifier.c
 create mode 100644 security/lsm_syscalls.c
 create mode 100644 security/min_addr.c
 create mode 100644 security/safesetid/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/safesetid/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/safesetid/lsm.c
 create mode 100644 security/safesetid/lsm.h
 create mode 100644 security/safesetid/securityfs.c
 create mode 100644 security/security.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/avc.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/genheaders.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/hooks.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ibpkey.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ima.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/audit.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/avc.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/classmap.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/conditional.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/hash.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/ima.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/initcalls.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/netif.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/netnode.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/netport.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/objsec.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/policycap.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/security.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/initcalls.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/netif.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/netlabel.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/netlink.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/netnode.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/netport.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/context.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/context.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/mls.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/mls.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/services.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/services.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/status.c
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/xfrm.c
 create mode 100644 security/smack/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/smack/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/smack/smack.h
 create mode 100644 security/smack/smack_access.c
 create mode 100644 security/smack/smack_lsm.c
 create mode 100644 security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
 create mode 100644 security/smack/smackfs.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/audit.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/common.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/common.h
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/condition.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/domain.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/environ.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/file.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/gc.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/group.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/memory.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/mount.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/network.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/realpath.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
 create mode 100644 security/tomoyo/util.c
 create mode 100644 security/yama/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/yama/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/yama/yama_lsm.c

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f7bf6cdc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# Security configuration
+#
+
+menu "Security options"
+
+source "security/keys/Kconfig"
+
+config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
+	default n
+	help
+	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
+	  syslog via dmesg(8).
+
+	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
+	  unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+choice
+	prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override"
+	default PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE
+	help
+	  Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory
+	  permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace
+	  capability.
+
+	  This allows people to limit that - either never override, or
+	  require actual active ptrace attachment (default).
+
+config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
+	bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior"
+	help
+	  This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
+	  permissions if you have ptrace access rights.
+
+config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE
+	bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override"
+	help
+	  This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
+	  permissions for active ptracers like gdb.
+
+config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
+	bool "Never"
+	help
+	  Never override memory mapping permissions
+
+endchoice
+
+config MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
+	bool "mseal system mappings"
+	depends on 64BIT
+	depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
+	depends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
+	help
+	  Apply mseal on system mappings.
+	  The system mappings includes vdso, vvar, vvar_vclock,
+	  vectors (arm compat-mode), sigpage (arm compat-mode), uprobes.
+
+	  A 64-bit kernel is required for the memory sealing feature.
+	  No specific hardware features from the CPU are needed.
+
+	  WARNING: This feature breaks programs which rely on relocating
+	  or unmapping system mappings. Known broken software at the time
+	  of writing includes CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, UML, gVisor, rr. Therefore
+	  this config can't be enabled universally.
+
+	  For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see
+	  Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
+
+config SECURITY
+	bool "Enable different security models"
+	depends on SYSFS
+	depends on MULTIUSER
+	help
+	  This allows you to choose different security modules to be
+	  configured into your kernel.
+
+	  If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
+	  model will be used.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config HAS_SECURITY_AUDIT
+	def_bool y
+	depends on AUDIT
+	depends on SECURITY
+
+config SECURITYFS
+	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
+	help
+	  This will build the securityfs filesystem.  It is currently used by
+	  various security modules (AppArmor, IMA, SafeSetID, TOMOYO, TPM).
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_NETWORK
+	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	help
+	  This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
+	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+	  implement socket and networking access controls.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+	bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
+	depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
+	help
+	  This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
+	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+	  implement Infiniband access controls.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+	bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
+	depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
+	help
+	  This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
+	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+	  implement per-packet access controls based on labels
+	  derived from IPSec policy.  Non-IPSec communications are
+	  designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
+	  to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
+	  IPSec.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_PATH
+	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	help
+	  This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
+	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+	  implement pathname based access controls.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config INTEL_TXT
+	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
+	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
+	help
+	  This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
+	  Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
+	  Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
+	  of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
+	  will have no effect.
+
+	  Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
+	  initial state as well as data reset protection.  This is used to
+	  create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
+	  helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
+	  correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
+	  of the kernel itself.
+
+	  Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
+	  confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
+	  it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
+	  providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
+
+	  See <https://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
+	  about Intel(R) TXT.
+	  See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
+	  See Documentation/arch/x86/intel_txt.rst for a description of how to enable
+	  Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
+	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
+	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
+	default 65536
+	help
+	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
+	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
+	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
+
+	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
+	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
+	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
+	  Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
+	  this low address space will need the permission specific to the
+	  systems running LSM.
+
+config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
+	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
+	help
+	  By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
+	  binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
+	  interface.  Some of these binaries are statically defined
+	  either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
+	  option.  However, some of these are dynamically created at
+	  runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
+	  To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
+	  calls through a single executable that can not have its name
+	  changed.
+
+	  Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
+	  "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
+	  passed to it.  If desired, this program can filter and pick
+	  and choose what real programs are called.
+
+	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
+	  disabled, choose this option and then set
+	  STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
+
+config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
+	string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
+	depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
+	default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
+	help
+	  The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
+	  program is wish to be run.  The "real" application's name will
+	  be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
+	  line.
+
+	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
+	  specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
+
+source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
+source "security/smack/Kconfig"
+source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
+source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"
+source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
+source "security/yama/Kconfig"
+source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
+source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
+source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
+source "security/ipe/Kconfig"
+
+source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
+
+choice
+	prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized"
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+
+	help
+	  This choice is there only for converting CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY
+	  in old kernel configs to CONFIG_LSM in new kernel configs. Don't
+	  change this choice unless you are creating a fresh kernel config,
+	  for this choice will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM has been set.
+
+	  Selects the legacy "major security module" that will be
+	  initialized first. Overridden by non-default CONFIG_LSM.
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
+		bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+		bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+		bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+		bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
+
+endchoice
+
+config LSM
+	string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf"
+	help
+	  A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
+	  Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order
+	  LSM_ORDER_FIRST and LSM_ORDER_LAST, which are always enabled
+	  if selected in the kernel configuration, will be ignored.
+	  This can be controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.
+
+	  If unsure, leave this as the default.
+
+config SECURITY_COMMONCAP_KUNIT_TEST
+	bool "Build KUnit tests for commoncap" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	depends on KUNIT=y && USER_NS
+	default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	help
+	  This builds the commoncap KUnit tests.
+
+	  KUnit tests run during boot and output the results to the debug log
+	  in TAP format (https://testanything.org/). Only useful for kernel devs
+	  running KUnit test harness and are not for inclusion into a
+	  production build.
+
+	  For more information on KUnit and unit tests in general please refer
+	  to the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+source "security/Kconfig.hardening"
+
+endmenu
+
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6923036e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+menu "Kernel hardening options"
+
+menu "Memory initialization"
+
+config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
+	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)
+
+config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_BARE
+	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero)
+
+config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_ENABLER
+	# Clang 16 and later warn about using the -enable flag, but it
+	# is required before then.
+	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang)
+	depends on !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_BARE
+
+config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
+	def_bool CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_BARE || CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_ENABLER
+
+choice
+	prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
+	default INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
+	default INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO if CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
+	default INIT_STACK_NONE
+	help
+	  This option enables initialization of stack variables at
+	  function entry time. This has the possibility to have the
+	  greatest coverage (since all functions can have their
+	  variables initialized), but the performance impact depends
+	  on the function calling complexity of a given workload's
+	  syscalls.
+
+	  This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
+	  uninitialized variables. The selected class of variable will be
+	  initialized before use in a function.
+
+	config INIT_STACK_NONE
+		bool "no automatic stack variable initialization (weakest)"
+		help
+		  Disable automatic stack variable initialization.
+		  This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard
+		  classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits
+		  and information exposures.
+
+	config INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
+		bool "pattern-init everything (strongest)"
+		depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
+		depends on !KMSAN
+		help
+		  Initializes everything on the stack (including padding)
+		  with a specific debug value. This is intended to eliminate
+		  all classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and
+		  information exposures, even variables that were warned about
+		  having been left uninitialized.
+
+		  Pattern initialization is known to provoke many existing bugs
+		  related to uninitialized locals, e.g. pointers receive
+		  non-NULL values, buffer sizes and indices are very big. The
+		  pattern is situation-specific; Clang on 64-bit uses 0xAA
+		  repeating for all types and padding except float and double
+		  which use 0xFF repeating (-NaN). Clang on 32-bit uses 0xFF
+		  repeating for all types and padding.
+		  GCC uses 0xFE repeating for all types, and zero for padding.
+
+	config INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
+		bool "zero-init everything (strongest and safest)"
+		depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
+		depends on !KMSAN
+		help
+		  Initializes everything on the stack (including padding)
+		  with a zero value. This is intended to eliminate all
+		  classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and
+		  information exposures, even variables that were warned
+		  about having been left uninitialized.
+
+		  Zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings
+		  (immediately NUL-terminated), pointers (NULL), indices
+		  (index 0), and sizes (0 length), so it is therefore more
+		  suitable as a production security mitigation than pattern
+		  initialization.
+
+endchoice
+
+config CC_HAS_SANCOV_STACK_DEPTH_CALLBACK
+	def_bool $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage-stack-depth-callback-min=1)
+
+config KSTACK_ERASE
+	bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE
+	depends on GCC_PLUGINS || CC_HAS_SANCOV_STACK_DEPTH_CALLBACK
+	help
+	  This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
+	  returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
+	  the stack initialized to the poison value, which both reduces
+	  the lifetime of any sensitive stack contents and reduces
+	  potential for uninitialized stack variable exploits or information
+	  exposures (it does not cover functions reaching the same stack
+	  depth as prior functions during the same syscall). This blocks
+	  most uninitialized stack variable attacks, with the performance
+	  impact being driven by the depth of the stack usage, rather than
+	  the function calling complexity.
+
+	  The performance impact on a single CPU system kernel compilation
+	  sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you
+	  are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before
+	  deploying it.
+
+config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	def_bool KSTACK_ERASE
+	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+	help
+	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
+	   * https://grsecurity.net/
+	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
+
+config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE
+	bool "Report stack depth analysis instrumentation" if EXPERT
+	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	depends on !COMPILE_TEST	# too noisy
+	help
+	  This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
+	  stackleak plugin finds a function it thinks needs to be
+	  instrumented. This is useful for comparing coverage between
+	  builds.
+
+config KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
+	int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by KSTACK_ERASE"
+	default 100
+	range 0 4096
+	depends on KSTACK_ERASE
+	help
+	  The KSTACK_ERASE option instruments the kernel code for tracking
+	  the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
+	  It inserts the __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() call for the functions
+	  with a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
+	  If unsure, leave the default value 100.
+
+config KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS
+	bool "Show KSTACK_ERASE metrics in the /proc file system"
+	depends on KSTACK_ERASE
+	depends on PROC_FS
+	help
+	  If this is set, KSTACK_ERASE metrics for every task are available
+	  in the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
+	  shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
+	  previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
+	  can be useful for estimating the KSTACK_ERASE performance impact
+	  for your workloads.
+
+config KSTACK_ERASE_RUNTIME_DISABLE
+	bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
+	depends on KSTACK_ERASE
+	help
+	  This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
+	  runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
+	  CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE.
+
+config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
+	bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default"
+	depends on !KMSAN
+	help
+	  This has the effect of setting "init_on_alloc=1" on the kernel
+	  command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_alloc=0".
+	  When "init_on_alloc" is enabled, all page allocator and slab
+	  allocator memory will be zeroed when allocated, eliminating
+	  many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory" flaws, especially
+	  heap content exposures. The performance impact varies by
+	  workload, but most cases see <1% impact. Some synthetic
+	  workloads have measured as high as 7%.
+
+config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
+	bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on free by default"
+	depends on !KMSAN
+	help
+	  This has the effect of setting "init_on_free=1" on the kernel
+	  command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_free=0".
+	  Similar to "init_on_alloc", when "init_on_free" is enabled,
+	  all page allocator and slab allocator memory will be zeroed
+	  when freed, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory"
+	  flaws, especially heap content exposures. The primary difference
+	  with "init_on_free" is that data lifetime in memory is reduced,
+	  as anything freed is wiped immediately, making live forensics or
+	  cold boot memory attacks unable to recover freed memory contents.
+	  The performance impact varies by workload, but is more expensive
+	  than "init_on_alloc" due to the negative cache effects of
+	  touching "cold" memory areas. Most cases see 3-5% impact. Some
+	  synthetic workloads have measured as high as 8%.
+
+config CC_HAS_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
+	# supported by gcc-11 or newer and all supported versions of clang
+	def_bool $(cc-option,-fzero-call-used-regs=used-gpr)
+
+config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
+	bool "Enable register zeroing on function exit"
+	depends on CC_HAS_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
+	help
+	  At the end of functions, always zero any caller-used register
+	  contents. This helps ensure that temporary values are not
+	  leaked beyond the function boundary. This means that register
+	  contents are less likely to be available for side channels
+	  and information exposures. Additionally, this helps reduce the
+	  number of useful ROP gadgets by about 20% (and removes compiler
+	  generated "write-what-where" gadgets) in the resulting kernel
+	  image. This has a less than 1% performance impact on most
+	  workloads. Image size growth depends on architecture, and should
+	  be evaluated for suitability. For example, x86_64 grows by less
+	  than 1%, and arm64 grows by about 5%.
+
+endmenu
+
+menu "Bounds checking"
+
+config FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	help
+	  Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
+	  where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY
+	bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
+	imply STRICT_DEVMEM
+	help
+	  This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
+	  copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
+	  copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
+	  are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
+	  separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
+	  or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes
+	  of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON
+	bool "Harden memory copies by default"
+	depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
+	default HARDENED_USERCOPY
+	help
+	  This has the effect of setting "hardened_usercopy=on" on the kernel
+	  command line. This can be disabled with "hardened_usercopy=off".
+
+endmenu
+
+menu "Hardening of kernel data structures"
+
+config LIST_HARDENED
+	bool "Check integrity of linked list manipulation"
+	help
+	  Minimal integrity checking in the linked-list manipulation routines
+	  to catch memory corruptions that are not guaranteed to result in an
+	  immediate access fault.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config RUST_BITMAP_HARDENED
+	bool "Check integrity of bitmap Rust API"
+	depends on RUST
+	help
+	  Enables additional assertions in the Rust Bitmap API to catch
+	  arguments that are not guaranteed to result in an immediate access
+	  fault.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+	bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected"
+	select LIST_HARDENED
+	help
+	  Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters
+	  data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked
+	  for validity.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+endmenu
+
+config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT
+	def_bool $(cc-option,-frandomize-layout-seed-file=/dev/null)
+
+choice
+	prompt "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
+	default RANDSTRUCT_FULL if COMPILE_TEST && (GCC_PLUGINS || CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT)
+	default RANDSTRUCT_NONE
+	help
+	  If you enable this, the layouts of structures that are entirely
+	  function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with
+	  __no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly
+	  marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time.
+	  This can introduce the requirement of an additional information
+	  exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure
+	  types.
+
+	  Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact,
+	  slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic
+	  tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel
+	  source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation).
+
+	  The seed used for compilation is in scripts/basic/randomize.seed.
+	  It remains after a "make clean" to allow for external modules to
+	  be compiled with the existing seed and will be removed by a
+	  "make mrproper" or "make distclean". This file should not be made
+	  public, or the structure layout can be determined.
+
+	config RANDSTRUCT_NONE
+		bool "Disable structure layout randomization"
+		help
+		  Build normally: no structure layout randomization.
+
+	config RANDSTRUCT_FULL
+		bool "Fully randomize structure layout"
+		depends on CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT || GCC_PLUGINS
+		select MODVERSIONS if MODULES && !COMPILE_TEST
+		help
+		  Fully randomize the member layout of sensitive
+		  structures as much as possible, which may have both a
+		  memory size and performance impact.
+
+		  One difference between the Clang and GCC plugin
+		  implementations is the handling of bitfields. The GCC
+		  plugin treats them as fully separate variables,
+		  introducing sometimes significant padding. Clang tries
+		  to keep adjacent bitfields together, but with their bit
+		  ordering randomized.
+
+	config RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
+		bool "Limit randomization of structure layout to cache-lines"
+		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+		select MODVERSIONS if MODULES && !COMPILE_TEST
+		help
+		  Randomization of sensitive kernel structures will make a
+		  best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized
+		  groups of members. It will further not randomize bitfields
+		  in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
+		  at the cost of weakened randomization.
+endchoice
+
+config RANDSTRUCT
+	def_bool !RANDSTRUCT_NONE
+
+config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
+	def_bool GCC_PLUGINS && RANDSTRUCT
+	help
+	  Use GCC plugin to randomize structure layout.
+
+	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
+	  information at:
+	   * https://grsecurity.net/
+	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
+
+endmenu
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4601230ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for the kernel security code
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS)			+= keys/
+
+# always enable default capabilities
+obj-y					+= commoncap.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) 			+= lsm_syscalls.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MMU)			+= min_addr.o
+
+# Object file lists
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o lsm_notifier.o lsm_init.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/
+obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_SECURITY_AUDIT)	+= lsm_audit.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)		+= apparmor/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN)		+= loadpin/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID)       += safesetid/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM)	+= lockdown/
+obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS)			+= device_cgroup.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM)			+= bpf/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK)		+= landlock/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE)		+= ipe/
+
+# Object integrity file lists
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY)			+= integrity/
diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6d1eb1c15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+net_names.h
+capability_names.h
+rlim_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/.kunitconfig b/security/apparmor/.kunitconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa842a026
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/.kunitconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+CONFIG_KUNIT=y
+CONFIG_NET=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_KUNIT_TEST=y
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1e3bd4464
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	bool "AppArmor support"
+	depends on SECURITY && NET
+	select AUDIT
+	select SECURITY_PATH
+	select SECURITYFS
+	select SECURITY_NETWORK
+	default n
+	help
+	  This enables the AppArmor security module.
+	  Required userspace tools (if they are not included in your
+	  distribution) and further information may be found at
+	  http://apparmor.wiki.kernel.org
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG
+	bool "Build AppArmor with debug code"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default n
+	help
+	  Build apparmor with debugging logic in apparmor. Not all
+	  debugging logic will necessarily be enabled. A submenu will
+	  provide fine grained control of the debug options that are
+	  available.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_ASSERTS
+	bool "Build AppArmor with debugging asserts"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable code assertions made with AA_BUG. These are primarily
+	  function entry preconditions but also exist at other key
+	  points. If the assert is triggered it will trigger a WARN
+	  message.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES
+	bool "Debug messages enabled by default"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG
+	default n
+	help
+	  Set the default value of the apparmor.debug kernel parameter.
+	  When enabled, various debug messages will be logged to
+	  the kernel message buffer.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_INTROSPECT_POLICY
+	bool "Allow loaded policy to be introspected"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option selects whether introspection of loaded policy
+	  is available to userspace via the apparmor filesystem. This
+	  adds to kernel memory usage. It is required for introspection
+	  of loaded policy, and check point and restore support. It
+	  can be disabled for embedded systems where reducing memory and
+	  cpu is paramount.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
+	bool "Enable introspection of sha256 hashes for loaded profiles"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_INTROSPECT_POLICY
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option selects whether introspection of loaded policy
+	  hashes is available to userspace via the apparmor
+	  filesystem. This option provides a light weight means of
+	  checking loaded policy.  This option adds to policy load
+	  time and can be disabled for small embedded systems.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT
+       bool "Enable policy hash introspection by default"
+       depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
+       default y
+       help
+	 This option selects whether sha256 hashing of loaded policy
+	 is enabled by default. The generation of sha256 hashes for
+	 loaded policy provide system administrators a quick way to
+	 verify that policy in the kernel matches what is expected,
+	 however it can slow down policy load on some devices. In
+	 these cases policy hashing can be disabled by default and
+	 enabled only if needed.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
+	bool "Allow exporting the raw binary policy"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_INTROSPECT_POLICY
+	select ZSTD_COMPRESS
+	select ZSTD_DECOMPRESS
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option allows reading back binary policy as it was loaded.
+	  It increases the amount of kernel memory needed by policy and
+	  also increases policy load time. This option is required for
+	  checkpoint and restore support, and debugging of loaded policy.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD
+	bool "Perform full verification of loaded policy"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default y
+	help
+	  This options allows controlling whether apparmor does a full
+	  verification of loaded policy. This should not be disabled
+	  except for embedded systems where the image is read only,
+	  includes policy, and has some form of integrity check.
+	  Disabling the check will speed up policy loads.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_KUNIT_TEST
+	tristate "Build KUnit tests for policy_unpack.c" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	depends on KUNIT && SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	help
+	  This builds the AppArmor KUnit tests.
+
+	  KUnit tests run during boot and output the results to the debug log
+	  in TAP format (https://testanything.org/). Only useful for kernel devs
+	  running KUnit test harness and are not for inclusion into a
+	  production build.
+
+	  For more information on KUnit and unit tests in general please refer
+	  to the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..12fb41971
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+# Makefile for AppArmor Linux Security Module
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+
+apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o task.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+              path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o \
+              policy_compat.o af_unix.o
+apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_KUNIT_TEST) += apparmor_policy_unpack_test.o
+apparmor_policy_unpack_test-objs += policy_unpack_test.o
+
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+
+# Build a lower case string table of address family names
+# Transform lines from
+#    #define AF_LOCAL		1	/* POSIX name for AF_UNIX	*/
+#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
+# to
+#    [1] = "local",
+#    [2] = "inet",
+#
+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
+# to
+#    #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet"
+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *const address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
+	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+	printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+	sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
+	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
+	 $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
+# Transform lines from
+#    SOCK_STREAM	= 1,
+# to
+#    [1] = "stream",
+quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *const sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+	sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
+	-e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@
+
+# Build a lower case string table of capability names
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE     1
+# to
+#    [1] = "dac_override",
+quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \
+	-e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+	printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_CAPS_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+	sed $< -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \
+	    -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/\L\1/p' | \
+	     tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+
+# Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define RLIMIT_STACK		3	/* max stack size */
+# to
+#    [RLIMIT_STACK] = "stack",
+#
+# and build a second integer table (with the second sed cmd), that maps
+# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h  This is
+# required by policy load to map policy ordering of RLIMITs to internal
+# ordering for architectures that redefine an RLIMIT.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define RLIMIT_STACK		3	/* max stack size */
+# to
+# RLIMIT_STACK, 
+#
+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define RLIMIT_FSIZE        1   /* Maximum filesize */
+#    #define RLIMIT_STACK		3	/* max stack size */
+# to
+# #define AA_SFS_RLIMIT_MASK "fsize stack"
+quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
+	> $@ ;\
+	sed $< >> $@ -r -n \
+	    -e 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+)).*/[\1] = "\L\2",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+	echo "static const int rlim_map[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" >> $@ ;\
+	sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\
+	echo "};" >> $@ ; \
+	printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_RLIMIT_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+	sed -r -n 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+).*/\L\1/p' $< | \
+	    tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
+$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
+$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
+			    $(src)/Makefile
+	$(call cmd,make-caps)
+$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
+		      $(src)/Makefile
+	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
+$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
+		     $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
+		     $(src)/Makefile
+	$(call cmd,make-af)
+	$(call cmd,make-sock)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/af_unix.c b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b9b22edae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,806 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor af_unix fine grained mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2023 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <net/tcp_states.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+
+
+static inline struct sock *aa_unix_sk(struct unix_sock *u)
+{
+	return &u->sk;
+}
+
+static int unix_fs_perm(const char *op, u32 mask, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	if (unconfined(label) || !label_mediates(label, AA_CLASS_FILE))
+		return 0;
+
+	mask &= NET_FS_PERMS;
+	/* if !u->path.dentry socket is being shutdown - implicit delegation
+	 * until obj delegation is supported
+	 */
+	if (path->dentry) {
+		/* the sunpath may not be valid for this ns so use the path */
+		struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+		vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(path->mnt), inode);
+		struct path_cond cond = {
+			.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
+			.mode = inode->i_mode,
+		};
+
+		return aa_path_perm(op, subj_cred, label, path,
+				    PATH_SOCK_COND, mask, &cond);
+	} /* else implicitly delegated */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* match_addr special constants */
+#define ABSTRACT_ADDR "\x00"		/* abstract socket addr */
+#define ANONYMOUS_ADDR "\x01"		/* anonymous endpoint, no addr */
+#define DISCONNECTED_ADDR "\x02"	/* addr is another namespace */
+#define SHUTDOWN_ADDR "\x03"		/* path addr is shutdown and cleared */
+#define FS_ADDR "/"			/* path addr in fs */
+
+static aa_state_t match_addr(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
+			     struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen)
+{
+	if (addr)
+		/* include leading \0 */
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, addr->sun_path,
+					 unix_addr_len(addrlen));
+	else
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, ANONYMOUS_ADDR, 1);
+	/* todo: could change to out of band for cleaner separation */
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+static aa_state_t match_to_local(struct aa_policydb *policy,
+				 aa_state_t state, u32 request,
+				 int type, int protocol,
+				 struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen,
+				 struct aa_perms **p,
+				 const char **info)
+{
+	state = aa_match_to_prot(policy, state, request, PF_UNIX, type,
+				 protocol, NULL, info);
+	if (state) {
+		state = match_addr(policy->dfa, state, addr, addrlen);
+		if (state) {
+			/* todo: local label matching */
+			state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state);
+			if (!state)
+				*info = "failed local label match";
+		} else {
+			*info = "failed local address match";
+		}
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+struct sockaddr_un *aa_sunaddr(const struct unix_sock *u, int *addrlen)
+{
+	struct unix_address *addr;
+
+	/* memory barrier is sufficient see note in net/unix/af_unix.c */
+	addr = smp_load_acquire(&u->addr);
+	if (addr) {
+		*addrlen = addr->len;
+		return addr->name;
+	}
+	*addrlen = 0;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static aa_state_t match_to_sk(struct aa_policydb *policy,
+			      aa_state_t state, u32 request,
+			      struct unix_sock *u, struct aa_perms **p,
+			      const char **info)
+{
+	int addrlen;
+	struct sockaddr_un *addr = aa_sunaddr(u, &addrlen);
+
+	return match_to_local(policy, state, request, u->sk.sk_type,
+			      u->sk.sk_protocol, addr, addrlen, p, info);
+}
+
+#define CMD_ADDR	1
+#define CMD_LISTEN	2
+#define CMD_OPT		4
+
+static aa_state_t match_to_cmd(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
+			       u32 request, struct unix_sock *u,
+			       char cmd, struct aa_perms **p,
+			       const char **info)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!p);
+
+	state = match_to_sk(policy, state, request, u, p, info);
+	if (state && !*p) {
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, &cmd, 1);
+		if (!state)
+			*info = "failed cmd selection match";
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+static aa_state_t match_to_peer(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
+				u32 request, struct unix_sock *u,
+				struct sockaddr_un *peer_addr, int peer_addrlen,
+				struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!p);
+
+	state = match_to_cmd(policy, state, request, u, CMD_ADDR, p, info);
+	if (state && !*p) {
+		state = match_addr(policy->dfa, state, peer_addr, peer_addrlen);
+		if (!state)
+			*info = "failed peer address match";
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+static aa_state_t match_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			      struct aa_ruleset *rule, aa_state_t state,
+			      u32 request, struct aa_profile *peer,
+			      struct aa_perms *p,
+			      struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!peer);
+
+	ad->peer = &peer->label;
+
+	if (state && !p) {
+		state = aa_dfa_match(rule->policy->dfa, state,
+				     peer->base.hname);
+		if (!state)
+			ad->info = "failed peer label match";
+
+	}
+
+	return aa_do_perms(profile, rule->policy, state, request, p, ad);
+}
+
+
+/* unix sock creation comes before we know if the socket will be an fs
+ * socket
+ * v6 - semantics are handled by mapping in profile load
+ * v7 - semantics require sock create for tasks creating an fs socket.
+ * v8 - same as v7
+ */
+static int profile_create_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, int family,
+			       int type, int protocol,
+			       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules);
+	if (state) {
+		state = aa_match_to_prot(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+					 PF_UNIX, type, protocol, NULL,
+					 &ad->info);
+
+		return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+				   NULL, ad);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type,
+				  protocol);
+}
+
+static int profile_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			   struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
+			   u32 request, struct sock *sk, const struct path *path)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules);
+	if (state) {
+		if (is_unix_fs(sk))
+			return unix_fs_perm(ad->op, request, ad->subj_cred,
+					    &profile->label,
+					    &unix_sk(sk)->path);
+
+		state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, request, unix_sk(sk),
+				    &p, &ad->info);
+
+		return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, request, p,
+				   ad);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk);
+}
+
+static int profile_bind_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
+			     struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(!ad);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules);
+	if (state) {
+		if (is_unix_addr_fs(ad->net.addr, ad->net.addrlen))
+			/* under v7-9 fs hook handles bind */
+			return 0;
+		/* bind for abstract socket */
+		state = match_to_local(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_BIND,
+				       sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol,
+				       unix_addr(ad->net.addr),
+				       ad->net.addrlen,
+				       &p, &ad->info);
+
+		return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_BIND,
+				   p, ad);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_BIND, sk);
+}
+
+static int profile_listen_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
+			       int backlog, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(!ad);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules);
+	if (state) {
+		__be16 b = cpu_to_be16(backlog);
+
+		if (is_unix_fs(sk))
+			return unix_fs_perm(ad->op, AA_MAY_LISTEN,
+					    ad->subj_cred, &profile->label,
+					    &unix_sk(sk)->path);
+
+		state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_LISTEN,
+				     unix_sk(sk), CMD_LISTEN, &p, &ad->info);
+		if (state && !p) {
+			state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state,
+						 (char *) &b, 2);
+			if (!state)
+				ad->info = "failed listen backlog match";
+		}
+		return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_LISTEN,
+				   p, ad);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sk);
+}
+
+static int profile_accept_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			       struct sock *sk,
+			       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(!ad);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules);
+	if (state) {
+		if (is_unix_fs(sk))
+			return unix_fs_perm(ad->op, AA_MAY_ACCEPT,
+					    ad->subj_cred, &profile->label,
+					    &unix_sk(sk)->path);
+
+		state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_ACCEPT,
+				    unix_sk(sk), &p, &ad->info);
+
+		return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_ACCEPT,
+				   p, ad);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int profile_opt_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
+			    struct sock *sk, int optname,
+			    struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(!ad);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules);
+	if (state) {
+		__be16 b = cpu_to_be16(optname);
+		if (is_unix_fs(sk))
+			return unix_fs_perm(ad->op, request,
+					    ad->subj_cred, &profile->label,
+					    &unix_sk(sk)->path);
+
+		state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, request, unix_sk(sk),
+				     CMD_OPT, &p, &ad->info);
+		if (state && !p) {
+			state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state,
+						 (char *) &b, 2);
+			if (!state)
+				ad->info = "failed sockopt match";
+		}
+		return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, request, p,
+				   ad);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk);
+}
+
+/* null peer_label is allowed, in which case the peer_sk label is used */
+static int profile_peer_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
+			     struct sock *sk, const struct path *path,
+			     struct sockaddr_un *peer_addr,
+			     int peer_addrlen, const struct path *peer_path,
+			     struct aa_label *peer_label,
+			     struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(!peer_label);
+	AA_BUG(!ad);
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules);
+	if (state) {
+		struct aa_profile *peerp;
+
+		if (peer_path)
+			return unix_fs_perm(ad->op, request, ad->subj_cred,
+					    &profile->label, peer_path);
+		else if (path)
+			return unix_fs_perm(ad->op, request, ad->subj_cred,
+					    &profile->label, path);
+		state = match_to_peer(rules->policy, state, request,
+				      unix_sk(sk),
+				      peer_addr, peer_addrlen, &p, &ad->info);
+
+		return fn_for_each_in_scope(peer_label, peerp,
+				match_label(profile, rules, state, request,
+					    peerp, p, ad));
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk);
+}
+
+/* -------------------------------- */
+
+int aa_unix_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
+			int protocol)
+{
+	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		struct aa_profile *profile;
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, OP_CREATE, current_cred(), NULL, family,
+				 type, protocol);
+
+		return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				profile_create_perm(profile, family, type,
+						    protocol, &ad));
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int aa_unix_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+				 struct aa_label *label,
+				 const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk,
+				 const struct path *path)
+{
+	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		struct aa_profile *profile;
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, subj_cred, sk);
+
+		return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				profile_sk_perm(profile, &ad, request, sk,
+						path));
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* revalidation, get/set attr, shutdown */
+int aa_unix_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	error = aa_unix_label_sk_perm(current_cred(), label, op,
+				      request, sock->sk,
+				      is_unix_fs(sock->sk) ? &unix_sk(sock->sk)->path : NULL);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int valid_addr(struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = unix_addr(addr);
+
+	/* addr_len == offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) is autobind */
+	if (addr_len < offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) ||
+	    addr_len > sizeof(*sunaddr))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int aa_unix_bind_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+		      int addrlen)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	error = valid_addr(addr, addrlen);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	/* fs bind is handled by mknod */
+	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, OP_BIND, current_cred(), sock->sk);
+
+		ad.net.addr = unix_addr(addr);
+		ad.net.addrlen = addrlen;
+
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				profile_bind_perm(profile, sock->sk, &ad));
+	}
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/*
+ * unix connections are covered by the
+ * - unix_stream_connect (stream) and unix_may_send hooks (dgram)
+ * - fs connect is handled by open
+ * This is just here to document this is not needed for af_unix
+ *
+int aa_unix_connect_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+			 int addrlen)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+*/
+
+int aa_unix_listen_perm(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, OP_LISTEN, current_cred(), sock->sk);
+
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				profile_listen_perm(profile, sock->sk,
+						    backlog, &ad));
+	}
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+
+/* ability of sock to connect, not peer address binding */
+int aa_unix_accept_perm(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, OP_ACCEPT, current_cred(), sock->sk);
+
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				profile_accept_perm(profile, sock->sk, &ad));
+	}
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * dgram handled by unix_may_sendmsg, right to send on stream done at connect
+ * could do per msg unix_stream here, but connect + socket transfer is
+ * sufficient. This is just here to document this is not needed for af_unix
+ *
+ * sendmsg, recvmsg
+int aa_unix_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+		     struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+*/
+
+int aa_unix_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+		     int level, int optname)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, current_cred(), sock->sk);
+
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				profile_opt_perm(profile, request, sock->sk,
+						 optname, &ad));
+	}
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int unix_peer_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			  struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+			  struct sock *sk, const struct path *path,
+			  struct sockaddr_un *peer_addr, int peer_addrlen,
+			  const struct path *peer_path, struct aa_label *peer_label)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, subj_cred, sk);
+
+	ad.net.peer.addr = peer_addr;
+	ad.net.peer.addrlen = peer_addrlen;
+
+	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			profile_peer_perm(profile, request, sk, path,
+					  peer_addr, peer_addrlen, peer_path,
+					  peer_label, &ad));
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ * Requires: lock held on both @sk and @peer_sk
+ *           called by unix_stream_connect, unix_may_send
+ */
+int aa_unix_peer_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		      struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk,
+		      struct aa_label *peer_label)
+{
+	struct unix_sock *peeru = unix_sk(peer_sk);
+	struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
+	int plen;
+	struct sockaddr_un *paddr = aa_sunaddr(unix_sk(peer_sk), &plen);
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(!peer_sk);
+	AA_BUG(!peer_label);
+
+	return unix_peer_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sk,
+			      is_unix_fs(sk) ? &u->path : NULL,
+			      paddr, plen,
+			      is_unix_fs(peer_sk) ? &peeru->path : NULL,
+			      peer_label);
+}
+
+/* sk_plabel for comparison only */
+static void update_sk_ctx(struct sock *sk, struct aa_label *label,
+			  struct aa_label *plabel)
+{
+	struct aa_label *l, *old;
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+	bool update_sk;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	update_sk = (plabel &&
+		     (plabel != rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate) ||
+		      !aa_label_is_subset(plabel, rcu_dereference(ctx->peer)))) ||
+	  !__aa_subj_label_is_cached(label, rcu_dereference(ctx->label));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (!update_sk)
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock(&unix_sk(sk)->lock);
+	old = rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->label,
+					lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(sk)->lock));
+	l = aa_label_merge(old, label, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (l) {
+		if (l != old) {
+			rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, l);
+			aa_put_label(old);
+		} else
+			aa_put_label(l);
+	}
+	if (plabel && rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate) != plabel) {
+		old = rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer, lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(sk)->lock));
+
+		if (old == plabel) {
+			rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate,
+					   aa_get_label(plabel));
+		} else if (aa_label_is_subset(plabel, old)) {
+			rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate,
+					   aa_get_label(plabel));
+			rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer, aa_get_label(plabel));
+			aa_put_label(old);
+		} /* else race or a subset - don't update */
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&unix_sk(sk)->lock);
+}
+
+static void update_peer_ctx(struct sock *sk, struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx,
+			    struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	struct aa_label *l, *old;
+
+	spin_lock(&unix_sk(sk)->lock);
+	old = rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer,
+					lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(sk)->lock));
+	l = aa_label_merge(old, label, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (l) {
+		if (l != old) {
+			rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer, l);
+			aa_put_label(old);
+		} else
+			aa_put_label(l);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&unix_sk(sk)->lock);
+}
+
+/* This fn is only checked if something has changed in the security
+ * boundaries. Otherwise cached info off file is sufficient
+ */
+int aa_unix_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      const char *op, u32 request, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
+	struct sockaddr_un *addr, *peer_addr;
+	int addrlen, peer_addrlen;
+	struct aa_label *plabel = NULL;
+	struct sock *peer_sk = NULL;
+	u32 sk_req = request & ~NET_PEER_MASK;
+	struct path path;
+	bool is_sk_fs;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX);
+
+	/* investigate only using lock via unix_peer_get()
+	 * addr only needs the memory barrier, but need to investigate
+	 * path
+	 */
+	unix_state_lock(sock->sk);
+	peer_sk = unix_peer(sock->sk);
+	if (peer_sk)
+		sock_hold(peer_sk);
+
+	is_sk_fs = is_unix_fs(sock->sk);
+	addr = aa_sunaddr(unix_sk(sock->sk), &addrlen);
+	path = unix_sk(sock->sk)->path;
+	unix_state_unlock(sock->sk);
+
+	if (is_sk_fs && peer_sk)
+		sk_req = request;
+	if (sk_req) {
+			error = aa_unix_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op,
+						      sk_req, sock->sk,
+						      is_sk_fs ? &path : NULL);
+	}
+	if (!peer_sk)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!is_sk_fs) {
+		bool is_peer_fs = is_unix_fs(peer_sk);
+
+		peer_addr = aa_sunaddr(unix_sk(peer_sk), &peer_addrlen);
+		if (is_peer_fs) {
+			struct path peer_path;
+
+			unix_state_lock(peer_sk);
+			peer_path = unix_sk(peer_sk)->path;
+			if (peer_path.dentry)
+				path_get(&peer_path);
+			unix_state_unlock(peer_sk);
+
+			last_error(error,
+				   unix_fs_perm(op, request, subj_cred, label,
+						&peer_path));
+			if (peer_path.dentry)
+				path_put(&peer_path);
+		} else {
+			struct aa_sk_ctx *pctx = aa_sock(peer_sk);
+
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			plabel = aa_get_newest_label(pctx->label);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			/* no fs check of aa_unix_peer_perm because conditions
+			 * above ensure they will never be done
+			 */
+			last_error(error,
+				xcheck(unix_peer_perm(subj_cred, label, op,
+					      MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, sock->sk,
+					      is_sk_fs ? &path : NULL,
+					      peer_addr, peer_addrlen,
+					      NULL, plabel),
+				       unix_peer_perm(file->f_cred, plabel, op,
+					      MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, peer_sk,
+					      NULL, addr, addrlen,
+					      is_sk_fs ? &path : NULL,
+					      label)));
+			if (!error && !__aa_subj_label_is_cached(plabel, label))
+				update_peer_ctx(peer_sk, pctx, label);
+		}
+	}
+	sock_put(peer_sk);
+
+out:
+
+	/* update peer cache to latest successful perm check */
+	if (error == 0)
+		update_sk_ctx(sock->sk, label, plabel);
+	aa_put_label(plabel);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..56155d7d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2828 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor /sys/kernel/security/apparmor interface functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/poll.h>
+#include <linux/zstd.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/major.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/magic.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/crypto.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/lib.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_ns.h"
+#include "include/resource.h"
+#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
+#include "include/task.h"
+
+/*
+ * The apparmor filesystem interface used for policy load and introspection
+ * The interface is split into two main components based on their function
+ * a securityfs component:
+ *   used for static files that are always available, and which allows
+ *   userspace to specify the location of the security filesystem.
+ *
+ *   fns and data are prefixed with
+ *      aa_sfs_
+ *
+ * an apparmorfs component:
+ *   used loaded policy content and introspection. It is not part of  a
+ *   regular mounted filesystem and is available only through the magic
+ *   policy symlink in the root of the securityfs apparmor/ directory.
+ *   Tasks queries will be magically redirected to the correct portion
+ *   of the policy tree based on their confinement.
+ *
+ *   fns and data are prefixed with
+ *      aafs_
+ *
+ * The aa_fs_ prefix is used to indicate the fn is used by both the
+ * securityfs and apparmorfs filesystems.
+ */
+
+#define IREF_POISON 101
+
+/*
+ * support fns
+ */
+
+struct rawdata_f_data {
+	struct aa_loaddata *loaddata;
+	DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, data);
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
+
+static void rawdata_f_data_free(struct rawdata_f_data *private)
+{
+	if (!private)
+		return;
+
+	aa_put_i_loaddata(private->loaddata);
+	kvfree(private);
+}
+
+static struct rawdata_f_data *rawdata_f_data_alloc(size_t size)
+{
+	struct rawdata_f_data *ret;
+
+	if (size > SIZE_MAX - sizeof(*ret))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	ret = kvzalloc(sizeof(*ret) + size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ret)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * mangle_name - mangle a profile name to std profile layout form
+ * @name: profile name to mangle  (NOT NULL)
+ * @target: buffer to store mangled name, same length as @name (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: length of mangled name
+ */
+static int mangle_name(const char *name, char *target)
+{
+	char *t = target;
+
+	while (*name == '/' || *name == '.')
+		name++;
+
+	if (target) {
+		for (; *name; name++) {
+			if (*name == '/')
+				*(t)++ = '.';
+			else if (isspace(*name))
+				*(t)++ = '_';
+			else if (isalnum(*name) || strchr("._-", *name))
+				*(t)++ = *name;
+		}
+
+		*t = 0;
+	} else {
+		int len = 0;
+		for (; *name; name++) {
+			if (isalnum(*name) || isspace(*name) ||
+			    strchr("/._-", *name))
+				len++;
+		}
+
+		return len;
+	}
+
+	return t - target;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * aafs - core fns and data for the policy tree
+ */
+
+#define AAFS_NAME		"apparmorfs"
+static struct vfsmount *aafs_mnt;
+static int aafs_count;
+
+
+static int aafs_show_path(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	seq_printf(seq, "%s:[%llu]", AAFS_NAME, d_inode(dentry)->i_ino);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct aa_ns *get_ns_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
+{
+	if (ref) {
+		struct aa_label *reflabel = container_of(ref, struct aa_label,
+							 count);
+		return aa_get_ns(labels_ns(reflabel));
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct aa_proxy *get_proxy_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
+{
+	if (ref)
+		return aa_get_proxy(container_of(ref, struct aa_proxy, count));
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
+static struct aa_loaddata *get_loaddata_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
+{
+	if (ref)
+		return aa_get_i_loaddata(container_of(ref, struct aa_loaddata,
+						      count));
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void aa_put_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
+{
+	if (!ref)
+		return;
+
+	switch (ref->reftype) {
+	case REF_RAWDATA:
+		aa_put_i_loaddata(container_of(ref, struct aa_loaddata,
+					       count));
+		break;
+	case REF_PROXY:
+		aa_put_proxy(container_of(ref, struct aa_proxy,
+					  count));
+		break;
+	case REF_NS:
+		/* ns count is held on its unconfined label */
+		aa_put_ns(labels_ns(container_of(ref, struct aa_label, count)));
+		break;
+	default:
+		AA_BUG(true, "unknown refcount type");
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void aa_get_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
+{
+	kref_get(&ref->count);
+}
+
+static void aafs_evict(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct aa_common_ref *ref = inode->i_private;
+
+	clear_inode(inode);
+	aa_put_common_ref(ref);
+	inode->i_private = (void *) IREF_POISON;
+}
+
+static void aafs_free_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
+		kfree(inode->i_link);
+	free_inode_nonrcu(inode);
+}
+
+static const struct super_operations aafs_super_ops = {
+	.statfs = simple_statfs,
+	.evict_inode = aafs_evict,
+	.free_inode = aafs_free_inode,
+	.show_path = aafs_show_path,
+};
+
+static int apparmorfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	static struct tree_descr files[] = { {""} };
+	int error;
+
+	error = simple_fill_super(sb, AAFS_MAGIC, files);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+	sb->s_op = &aafs_super_ops;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int apparmorfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	return get_tree_single(fc, apparmorfs_fill_super);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations apparmorfs_context_ops = {
+	.get_tree	= apparmorfs_get_tree,
+};
+
+static int apparmorfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	fc->ops = &apparmorfs_context_ops;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type aafs_ops = {
+	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.name = AAFS_NAME,
+	.init_fs_context = apparmorfs_init_fs_context,
+	.kill_sb = kill_anon_super,
+};
+
+/**
+ * __aafs_setup_d_inode - basic inode setup for apparmorfs
+ * @dir: parent directory for the dentry
+ * @dentry: dentry we are setting the inode up for
+ * @mode: permissions the file should have
+ * @data: data to store on inode.i_private, available in open()
+ * @link: if symlink, symlink target string
+ * @fops: struct file_operations that should be used
+ * @iops: struct of inode_operations that should be used
+ */
+static int __aafs_setup_d_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			       umode_t mode, void *data, char *link,
+			       const struct file_operations *fops,
+			       const struct inode_operations *iops)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = new_inode(dir->i_sb);
+
+	AA_BUG(!dir);
+	AA_BUG(!dentry);
+
+	if (!inode)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
+	inode->i_mode = mode;
+	simple_inode_init_ts(inode);
+	inode->i_private = data;
+	if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
+		inode->i_op = iops ? iops : &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+		inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+		inc_nlink(inode);
+		inc_nlink(dir);
+	} else if (S_ISLNK(mode)) {
+		inode->i_op = iops ? iops : &simple_symlink_inode_operations;
+		inode->i_link = link;
+	} else {
+		inode->i_fop = fops;
+	}
+	d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
+	dget(dentry);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aafs_create - create a dentry in the apparmorfs filesystem
+ *
+ * @name: name of dentry to create
+ * @mode: permissions the file should have
+ * @parent: parent directory for this dentry
+ * @data: data to store on inode.i_private, available in open()
+ * @link: if symlink, symlink target string
+ * @fops: struct file_operations that should be used for
+ * @iops: struct of inode_operations that should be used
+ *
+ * This is the basic "create a xxx" function for apparmorfs.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds, that must be free with
+ * aafs_remove(). Will return ERR_PTR on failure.
+ */
+static struct dentry *aafs_create(const char *name, umode_t mode,
+				  struct dentry *parent,
+				  struct aa_common_ref *data, void *link,
+				  const struct file_operations *fops,
+				  const struct inode_operations *iops)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct inode *dir;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!name);
+	AA_BUG(!parent);
+
+	if (!(mode & S_IFMT))
+		mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | S_IFREG;
+
+	error = simple_pin_fs(&aafs_ops, &aafs_mnt, &aafs_count);
+	if (error)
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
+
+	dir = d_inode(parent);
+
+	dentry = simple_start_creating(parent, name);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	error = __aafs_setup_d_inode(dir, dentry, mode, data, link, fops, iops);
+	simple_done_creating(dentry);
+	if (error)
+		goto fail;
+
+	if (data)
+		aa_get_common_ref(data);
+
+	return dentry;
+
+fail:
+	simple_release_fs(&aafs_mnt, &aafs_count);
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aafs_create_file - create a file in the apparmorfs filesystem
+ *
+ * @name: name of dentry to create
+ * @mode: permissions the file should have
+ * @parent: parent directory for this dentry
+ * @data: data to store on inode.i_private, available in open()
+ * @fops: struct file_operations that should be used for
+ *
+ * see aafs_create
+ */
+static struct dentry *aafs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
+				       struct dentry *parent,
+				       struct aa_common_ref *data,
+				       const struct file_operations *fops)
+{
+	return aafs_create(name, mode, parent, data, NULL, fops, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aafs_create_dir - create a directory in the apparmorfs filesystem
+ *
+ * @name: name of dentry to create
+ * @parent: parent directory for this dentry
+ *
+ * see aafs_create
+ */
+static struct dentry *aafs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
+{
+	return aafs_create(name, S_IFDIR | 0755, parent, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+			   NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aafs_remove - removes a file or directory from the apparmorfs filesystem
+ *
+ * @dentry: dentry of the file/directory/symlink to removed.
+ */
+static void aafs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *dir;
+
+	if (!dentry || IS_ERR(dentry))
+		return;
+
+	/* ->d_parent is stable as rename is not supported */
+	dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent);
+	dentry = start_removing_dentry(dentry->d_parent, dentry);
+	if (!IS_ERR(dentry) && simple_positive(dentry)) {
+		if (d_is_dir(dentry)) {
+			if (!WARN_ON(!simple_empty(dentry))) {
+				__simple_rmdir(dir, dentry);
+				dput(dentry);
+			}
+		} else {
+			__simple_unlink(dir, dentry);
+			dput(dentry);
+		}
+		d_delete(dentry);
+	}
+	end_removing(dentry);
+	simple_release_fs(&aafs_mnt, &aafs_count);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * aa_fs - policy load/replace/remove
+ */
+
+/**
+ * aa_simple_write_to_buffer - common routine for getting policy from user
+ * @userbuf: user buffer to copy data from  (NOT NULL)
+ * @alloc_size: size of user buffer (REQUIRES: @alloc_size >= @copy_size)
+ * @copy_size: size of data to copy from user buffer
+ * @pos: position write is at in the file (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: kernel buffer containing copy of user buffer data or an
+ *          ERR_PTR on failure.
+ */
+static struct aa_loaddata *aa_simple_write_to_buffer(const char __user *userbuf,
+						     size_t alloc_size,
+						     size_t copy_size,
+						     loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *data;
+
+	AA_BUG(copy_size > alloc_size);
+
+	if (*pos != 0)
+		/* only writes from pos 0, that is complete writes */
+		return ERR_PTR(-ESPIPE);
+
+	/* freed by caller to simple_write_to_buffer */
+	data = aa_loaddata_alloc(alloc_size);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return data;
+
+	data->size = copy_size;
+	if (copy_from_user(data->data, userbuf, copy_size)) {
+		/* trigger free - don't need to put pcount */
+		aa_put_i_loaddata(data);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+	}
+
+	return data;
+}
+
+static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size,
+			     loff_t *pos, struct aa_ns *ns,
+			     const struct cred *ocred)
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *data;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	ssize_t error;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+
+	/* high level check about policy management - fine grained in
+	 * below after unpack
+	 */
+	error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, ns, ocred, mask);
+	if (error)
+		goto end_section;
+
+	data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(buf, size, size, pos);
+	error = PTR_ERR(data);
+	if (!IS_ERR(data)) {
+		error = aa_replace_profiles(ns, label, mask, data);
+		/* put pcount, which will put count and free if no
+		 * profiles referencing it.
+		 */
+		aa_put_profile_loaddata(data);
+	}
+end_section:
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* .load file hook fn to load policy */
+static ssize_t profile_load(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, size_t size,
+			    loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns = get_ns_common_ref(f->f_inode->i_private);
+	int error = policy_update(AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY, buf, size, pos, ns,
+				  f->f_cred);
+
+	aa_put_ns(ns);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_load = {
+	.write = profile_load,
+	.llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/* .replace file hook fn to load and/or replace policy */
+static ssize_t profile_replace(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
+			       size_t size, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns = get_ns_common_ref(f->f_inode->i_private);
+	int error = policy_update(AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY | AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY,
+				  buf, size, pos, ns, f->f_cred);
+	aa_put_ns(ns);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_replace = {
+	.write = profile_replace,
+	.llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/* .remove file hook fn to remove loaded policy */
+static ssize_t profile_remove(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t size, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *data;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	ssize_t error;
+	struct aa_ns *ns = get_ns_common_ref(f->f_inode->i_private);
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	/* high level check about policy management - fine grained in
+	 * below after unpack
+	 */
+	error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, ns,
+				     f->f_cred, AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY);
+	if (error)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * aa_remove_profile needs a null terminated string so 1 extra
+	 * byte is allocated and the copied data is null terminated.
+	 */
+	data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(buf, size + 1, size, pos);
+
+	error = PTR_ERR(data);
+	if (!IS_ERR(data)) {
+		data->data[size] = 0;
+		error = aa_remove_profiles(ns, label, data->data, size);
+		aa_put_profile_loaddata(data);
+	}
+ out:
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+	aa_put_ns(ns);
+	return error;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_remove = {
+	.write = profile_remove,
+	.llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+struct aa_revision {
+	struct aa_ns *ns;
+	long last_read;
+};
+
+/* revision file hook fn for policy loads */
+static int ns_revision_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct aa_revision *rev = file->private_data;
+
+	if (rev) {
+		aa_put_ns(rev->ns);
+		kfree(rev);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t ns_revision_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct aa_revision *rev = file->private_data;
+	char buffer[32];
+	long last_read;
+	int avail;
+
+	mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level);
+	last_read = rev->last_read;
+	if (last_read == rev->ns->revision) {
+		mutex_unlock(&rev->ns->lock);
+		if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
+			return -EAGAIN;
+		if (wait_event_interruptible(rev->ns->wait,
+					     last_read !=
+					     READ_ONCE(rev->ns->revision)))
+			return -ERESTARTSYS;
+		mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level);
+	}
+
+	avail = sprintf(buffer, "%ld\n", rev->ns->revision);
+	if (*ppos + size > avail) {
+		rev->last_read = rev->ns->revision;
+		*ppos = 0;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&rev->ns->lock);
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, buffer, avail);
+}
+
+static int ns_revision_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct aa_revision *rev = kzalloc_obj(*rev);
+
+	if (!rev)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rev->ns = get_ns_common_ref(inode->i_private);
+	if (!rev->ns)
+		rev->ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+	file->private_data = rev;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __poll_t ns_revision_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *pt)
+{
+	struct aa_revision *rev = file->private_data;
+	__poll_t mask = 0;
+
+	if (rev) {
+		mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level);
+		poll_wait(file, &rev->ns->wait, pt);
+		if (rev->last_read < rev->ns->revision)
+			mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+		mutex_unlock(&rev->ns->lock);
+	}
+
+	return mask;
+}
+
+void __aa_bump_ns_revision(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	WRITE_ONCE(ns->revision, READ_ONCE(ns->revision) + 1);
+	wake_up_interruptible(&ns->wait);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_ns_revision_fops = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.open		= ns_revision_open,
+	.poll		= ns_revision_poll,
+	.read		= ns_revision_read,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+	.release	= ns_revision_release,
+};
+
+static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
+			     const char *match_str, size_t match_len)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms tmp = { };
+	aa_state_t state = DFA_NOMATCH;
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+		return;
+	if (rules->file->dfa && *match_str == AA_CLASS_FILE) {
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file->dfa,
+					 rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
+					 match_str + 1, match_len - 1);
+		if (state) {
+			struct path_cond cond = { };
+
+			tmp = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(),
+						    rules->file, state, &cond));
+		}
+	} else if (rules->policy->dfa) {
+		if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, *match_str))
+			return;	/* no change to current perms */
+		/* old user space does not correctly detect dbus mediation
+		 * support so we may get dbus policy and requests when
+		 * the abi doesn't support it. This can cause mediation
+		 * regressions, so explicitly test for this situation.
+		 */
+		if (*match_str == AA_CLASS_DBUS &&
+		    !RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules))
+			return; /* no change to current perms */
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa,
+					 rules->policy->start[0],
+					 match_str, match_len);
+		if (state)
+			tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+	}
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
+	aa_perms_accum_raw(perms, &tmp);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * query_data - queries a policy and writes its data to buf
+ * @buf: the resulting data is stored here (NOT NULL)
+ * @buf_len: size of buf
+ * @query: query string used to retrieve data
+ * @query_len: size of query including second NUL byte
+ *
+ * The buffers pointed to by buf and query may overlap. The query buffer is
+ * parsed before buf is written to.
+ *
+ * The query should look like "<LABEL>\0<KEY>\0", where <LABEL> is the name of
+ * the security confinement context and <KEY> is the name of the data to
+ * retrieve. <LABEL> and <KEY> must not be NUL-terminated.
+ *
+ * Don't expect the contents of buf to be preserved on failure.
+ *
+ * Returns: number of characters written to buf or -errno on failure
+ */
+static ssize_t query_data(char *buf, size_t buf_len,
+			  char *query, size_t query_len)
+{
+	char *out;
+	const char *key;
+	struct label_it i;
+	struct aa_label *label, *curr;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_data *data;
+	u32 bytes, blocks;
+	__le32 outle32;
+
+	if (!query_len)
+		return -EINVAL; /* need a query */
+
+	key = query + strnlen(query, query_len) + 1;
+	if (key + 1 >= query + query_len)
+		return -EINVAL; /* not enough space for a non-empty key */
+	if (key + strnlen(key, query + query_len - key) >= query + query_len)
+		return -EINVAL; /* must end with NUL */
+
+	if (buf_len < sizeof(bytes) + sizeof(blocks))
+		return -EINVAL; /* not enough space */
+
+	curr = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	label = aa_label_parse(curr, query, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(curr);
+	if (IS_ERR(label))
+		return PTR_ERR(label);
+
+	/* We are going to leave space for two numbers. The first is the total
+	 * number of bytes we are writing after the first number. This is so
+	 * users can read the full output without reallocation.
+	 *
+	 * The second number is the number of data blocks we're writing. An
+	 * application might be confined by multiple policies having data in
+	 * the same key.
+	 */
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(bytes) + sizeof(blocks));
+	out = buf + sizeof(bytes) + sizeof(blocks);
+
+	blocks = 0;
+	label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
+		if (!profile->data)
+			continue;
+
+		data = rhashtable_lookup_fast(profile->data, &key,
+					      profile->data->p);
+
+		if (data) {
+			if (out + sizeof(outle32) + data->size > buf +
+			    buf_len) {
+				aa_put_label(label);
+				return -EINVAL; /* not enough space */
+			}
+			outle32 = __cpu_to_le32(data->size);
+			memcpy(out, &outle32, sizeof(outle32));
+			out += sizeof(outle32);
+			memcpy(out, data->data, data->size);
+			out += data->size;
+			blocks++;
+		}
+	}
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	outle32 = __cpu_to_le32(out - buf - sizeof(bytes));
+	memcpy(buf, &outle32, sizeof(outle32));
+	outle32 = __cpu_to_le32(blocks);
+	memcpy(buf + sizeof(bytes), &outle32, sizeof(outle32));
+
+	return out - buf;
+}
+
+/**
+ * query_label - queries a label and writes permissions to buf
+ * @buf: the resulting permissions string is stored here (NOT NULL)
+ * @buf_len: size of buf
+ * @query: binary query string to match against the dfa
+ * @query_len: size of query
+ * @view_only: only compute for querier's view
+ *
+ * The buffers pointed to by buf and query may overlap. The query buffer is
+ * parsed before buf is written to.
+ *
+ * The query should look like "LABEL_NAME\0DFA_STRING" where LABEL_NAME is
+ * the name of the label, in the current namespace, that is to be queried and
+ * DFA_STRING is a binary string to match against the label(s)'s DFA.
+ *
+ * LABEL_NAME must be NUL terminated. DFA_STRING may contain NUL characters
+ * but must *not* be NUL terminated.
+ *
+ * Returns: number of characters written to buf or -errno on failure
+ */
+static ssize_t query_label(char *buf, size_t buf_len,
+			   char *query, size_t query_len, bool view_only)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *label, *curr;
+	char *label_name, *match_str;
+	size_t label_name_len, match_len;
+	struct aa_perms perms;
+	struct label_it i;
+
+	if (!query_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	label_name = query;
+	label_name_len = strnlen(query, query_len);
+	if (!label_name_len || label_name_len == query_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/**
+	 * The extra byte is to account for the null byte between the
+	 * profile name and dfa string. profile_name_len is greater
+	 * than zero and less than query_len, so a byte can be safely
+	 * added or subtracted.
+	 */
+	match_str = label_name + label_name_len + 1;
+	match_len = query_len - label_name_len - 1;
+
+	curr = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	label = aa_label_parse(curr, label_name, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(curr);
+	if (IS_ERR(label))
+		return PTR_ERR(label);
+
+	perms = allperms;
+	if (view_only) {
+		label_for_each_in_scope(i, labels_ns(label), label, profile) {
+			profile_query_cb(profile, &perms, match_str, match_len);
+		}
+	} else {
+		label_for_each(i, label, profile) {
+			profile_query_cb(profile, &perms, match_str, match_len);
+		}
+	}
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return scnprintf(buf, buf_len,
+		      "allow 0x%08x\ndeny 0x%08x\naudit 0x%08x\nquiet 0x%08x\n",
+		      perms.allow, perms.deny, perms.audit, perms.quiet);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Transaction based IO.
+ * The file expects a write which triggers the transaction, and then
+ * possibly a read(s) which collects the result - which is stored in a
+ * file-local buffer. Once a new write is performed, a new set of results
+ * are stored in the file-local buffer.
+ */
+struct multi_transaction {
+	struct kref count;
+	ssize_t size;
+	char data[];
+};
+
+#define MULTI_TRANSACTION_LIMIT (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct multi_transaction))
+
+static void multi_transaction_kref(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct multi_transaction *t;
+
+	t = container_of(kref, struct multi_transaction, count);
+	kfree(t);
+}
+
+static struct multi_transaction *
+get_multi_transaction(struct multi_transaction *t)
+{
+	if  (t)
+		kref_get(&(t->count));
+
+	return t;
+}
+
+static void put_multi_transaction(struct multi_transaction *t)
+{
+	if (t)
+		kref_put(&(t->count), multi_transaction_kref);
+}
+
+/* does not increment @new's count */
+static void multi_transaction_set(struct file *file,
+				  struct multi_transaction *new, size_t n)
+{
+	struct multi_transaction *old;
+
+	AA_BUG(n > MULTI_TRANSACTION_LIMIT);
+
+	new->size = n;
+	spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
+	old = (struct multi_transaction *) file->private_data;
+	file->private_data = new;
+	spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
+	put_multi_transaction(old);
+}
+
+static struct multi_transaction *multi_transaction_new(struct file *file,
+						       const char __user *buf,
+						       size_t size)
+{
+	struct multi_transaction *t;
+
+	if (size > MULTI_TRANSACTION_LIMIT - 1)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFBIG);
+
+	t = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!t)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	kref_init(&t->count);
+	if (copy_from_user(t->data, buf, size)) {
+		put_multi_transaction(t);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+	}
+
+	return t;
+}
+
+static ssize_t multi_transaction_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				       size_t size, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct multi_transaction *t;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
+	t = get_multi_transaction(file->private_data);
+	spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
+
+	if (!t)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, pos, t->data, t->size);
+	put_multi_transaction(t);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int multi_transaction_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	put_multi_transaction(file->private_data);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define QUERY_CMD_LABEL		"label\0"
+#define QUERY_CMD_LABEL_LEN	6
+#define QUERY_CMD_PROFILE	"profile\0"
+#define QUERY_CMD_PROFILE_LEN	8
+#define QUERY_CMD_LABELALL	"labelall\0"
+#define QUERY_CMD_LABELALL_LEN	9
+#define QUERY_CMD_DATA		"data\0"
+#define QUERY_CMD_DATA_LEN	5
+
+/**
+ * aa_write_access - generic permissions and data query
+ * @file: pointer to open apparmorfs/access file
+ * @ubuf: user buffer containing the complete query string (NOT NULL)
+ * @count: size of ubuf
+ * @ppos: position in the file (MUST BE ZERO)
+ *
+ * Allows for one permissions or data query per open(), write(), and read()
+ * sequence. The only queries currently supported are label-based queries for
+ * permissions or data.
+ *
+ * For permissions queries, ubuf must begin with "label\0", followed by the
+ * profile query specific format described in the query_label() function
+ * documentation.
+ *
+ * For data queries, ubuf must have the form "data\0<LABEL>\0<KEY>\0", where
+ * <LABEL> is the name of the security confinement context and <KEY> is the
+ * name of the data to retrieve.
+ *
+ * Returns: number of bytes written or -errno on failure
+ */
+static ssize_t aa_write_access(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct multi_transaction *t;
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	if (*ppos)
+		return -ESPIPE;
+
+	t = multi_transaction_new(file, ubuf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(t))
+		return PTR_ERR(t);
+
+	if (count > QUERY_CMD_PROFILE_LEN &&
+	    !memcmp(t->data, QUERY_CMD_PROFILE, QUERY_CMD_PROFILE_LEN)) {
+		len = query_label(t->data, MULTI_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
+				  t->data + QUERY_CMD_PROFILE_LEN,
+				  count - QUERY_CMD_PROFILE_LEN, true);
+	} else if (count > QUERY_CMD_LABEL_LEN &&
+		   !memcmp(t->data, QUERY_CMD_LABEL, QUERY_CMD_LABEL_LEN)) {
+		len = query_label(t->data, MULTI_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
+				  t->data + QUERY_CMD_LABEL_LEN,
+				  count - QUERY_CMD_LABEL_LEN, true);
+	} else if (count > QUERY_CMD_LABELALL_LEN &&
+		   !memcmp(t->data, QUERY_CMD_LABELALL,
+			   QUERY_CMD_LABELALL_LEN)) {
+		len = query_label(t->data, MULTI_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
+				  t->data + QUERY_CMD_LABELALL_LEN,
+				  count - QUERY_CMD_LABELALL_LEN, false);
+	} else if (count > QUERY_CMD_DATA_LEN &&
+		   !memcmp(t->data, QUERY_CMD_DATA, QUERY_CMD_DATA_LEN)) {
+		len = query_data(t->data, MULTI_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
+				 t->data + QUERY_CMD_DATA_LEN,
+				 count - QUERY_CMD_DATA_LEN);
+	} else
+		len = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (len < 0) {
+		put_multi_transaction(t);
+		return len;
+	}
+
+	multi_transaction_set(file, t, len);
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_sfs_access = {
+	.write		= aa_write_access,
+	.read		= multi_transaction_read,
+	.release	= multi_transaction_release,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int aa_sfs_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_sfs_entry *fs_file = seq->private;
+
+	if (!fs_file)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (fs_file->v_type) {
+	case AA_SFS_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
+		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", str_yes_no(fs_file->v.boolean));
+		break;
+	case AA_SFS_TYPE_STRING:
+		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", fs_file->v.string);
+		break;
+	case AA_SFS_TYPE_U64:
+		seq_printf(seq, "%#08lx\n", fs_file->v.u64);
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Ignore unprintable entry types. */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int aa_sfs_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return single_open(file, aa_sfs_seq_show, inode->i_private);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations aa_sfs_seq_file_ops = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.open		= aa_sfs_seq_open,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+	.release	= single_release,
+};
+
+/*
+ * profile based file operations
+ *     policy/profiles/XXXX/profiles/ *
+ */
+
+#define SEQ_PROFILE_FOPS(NAME)						      \
+static int seq_profile_ ##NAME ##_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\
+{									      \
+	return seq_profile_open(inode, file, seq_profile_ ##NAME ##_show);    \
+}									      \
+									      \
+static const struct file_operations seq_profile_ ##NAME ##_fops = {	      \
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,					      \
+	.open		= seq_profile_ ##NAME ##_open,			      \
+	.read		= seq_read,					      \
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,					      \
+	.release	= seq_profile_release,				      \
+}									      \
+
+static int seq_profile_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
+			    int (*show)(struct seq_file *, void *))
+{
+	struct aa_proxy *proxy = get_proxy_common_ref(inode->i_private);
+	int error = single_open(file, show, proxy);
+
+	if (error) {
+		file->private_data = NULL;
+		aa_put_proxy(proxy);
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int seq_profile_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct seq_file *seq = (struct seq_file *) file->private_data;
+	if (seq)
+		aa_put_proxy(seq->private);
+	return single_release(inode, file);
+}
+
+static int seq_profile_name_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_proxy *proxy = seq->private;
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_label_rcu(&proxy->label);
+	struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
+	seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->base.name);
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_profile_mode_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_proxy *proxy = seq->private;
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_label_rcu(&proxy->label);
+	struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
+	seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", aa_profile_mode_names[profile->mode]);
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_profile_attach_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_proxy *proxy = seq->private;
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_label_rcu(&proxy->label);
+	struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
+	if (profile->attach.xmatch_str)
+		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->attach.xmatch_str);
+	else if (profile->attach.xmatch->dfa)
+		seq_puts(seq, "<unknown>\n");
+	else
+		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->base.name);
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_profile_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_proxy *proxy = seq->private;
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_label_rcu(&proxy->label);
+	struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
+	unsigned int i, size = aa_hash_size();
+
+	if (profile->hash) {
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+			seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
+		seq_putc(seq, '\n');
+	}
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEQ_PROFILE_FOPS(name);
+SEQ_PROFILE_FOPS(mode);
+SEQ_PROFILE_FOPS(attach);
+SEQ_PROFILE_FOPS(hash);
+
+/*
+ * namespace based files
+ *     several root files and
+ *     policy/ *
+ */
+
+#define SEQ_NS_FOPS(NAME)						      \
+static int seq_ns_ ##NAME ##_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)     \
+{									      \
+	return single_open(file, seq_ns_ ##NAME ##_show, inode->i_private);   \
+}									      \
+									      \
+static const struct file_operations seq_ns_ ##NAME ##_fops = {	      \
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,					      \
+	.open		= seq_ns_ ##NAME ##_open,			      \
+	.read		= seq_read,					      \
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,					      \
+	.release	= single_release,				      \
+}									      \
+
+static int seq_ns_stacked_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", str_yes_no(label->size > 1));
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_ns_nsstacked_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct label_it it;
+	int count = 1;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+
+	if (label->size > 1) {
+		label_for_each(it, label, profile)
+			if (profile->ns != labels_ns(label)) {
+				count++;
+				break;
+			}
+	}
+
+	seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", str_yes_no(count > 1));
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_ns_level_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	seq_printf(seq, "%d\n", labels_ns(label)->level);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_ns_name_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", labels_ns(label)->base.name);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_ns_compress_min_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	seq_printf(seq, "%d\n", AA_MIN_CLEVEL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_ns_compress_max_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	seq_printf(seq, "%d\n", AA_MAX_CLEVEL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEQ_NS_FOPS(stacked);
+SEQ_NS_FOPS(nsstacked);
+SEQ_NS_FOPS(level);
+SEQ_NS_FOPS(name);
+SEQ_NS_FOPS(compress_min);
+SEQ_NS_FOPS(compress_max);
+
+
+/* policy/raw_data/ * file ops */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
+#define SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(NAME)						      \
+static int seq_rawdata_ ##NAME ##_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\
+{									      \
+	return seq_rawdata_open(inode, file, seq_rawdata_ ##NAME ##_show);    \
+}									      \
+									      \
+static const struct file_operations seq_rawdata_ ##NAME ##_fops = {	      \
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,					      \
+	.open		= seq_rawdata_ ##NAME ##_open,			      \
+	.read		= seq_read,					      \
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,					      \
+	.release	= seq_rawdata_release,				      \
+}									      \
+
+static int seq_rawdata_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
+			    int (*show)(struct seq_file *, void *))
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *data = get_loaddata_common_ref(inode->i_private);
+	int error;
+
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	error = single_open(file, show, data);
+	if (error) {
+		AA_BUG(file->private_data &&
+		       ((struct seq_file *)file->private_data)->private);
+		aa_put_i_loaddata(data);
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int seq_rawdata_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct seq_file *seq = (struct seq_file *) file->private_data;
+
+	if (seq)
+		aa_put_i_loaddata(seq->private);
+
+	return single_release(inode, file);
+}
+
+static int seq_rawdata_abi_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *data = seq->private;
+
+	seq_printf(seq, "v%d\n", data->abi);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_rawdata_revision_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *data = seq->private;
+
+	seq_printf(seq, "%ld\n", data->revision);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_rawdata_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *data = seq->private;
+	unsigned int i, size = aa_hash_size();
+
+	if (data->hash) {
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+			seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", data->hash[i]);
+		seq_putc(seq, '\n');
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_rawdata_compressed_size_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *data = seq->private;
+
+	seq_printf(seq, "%zu\n", data->compressed_size);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(abi);
+SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(revision);
+SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(hash);
+SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(compressed_size);
+
+static int decompress_zstd(char *src, size_t slen, char *dst, size_t dlen)
+{
+	if (slen < dlen) {
+		const size_t wksp_len = zstd_dctx_workspace_bound();
+		zstd_dctx *ctx;
+		void *wksp;
+		size_t out_len;
+		int ret = 0;
+
+		wksp = kvzalloc(wksp_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!wksp) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+		ctx = zstd_init_dctx(wksp, wksp_len);
+		if (ctx == NULL) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+		out_len = zstd_decompress_dctx(ctx, dst, dlen, src, slen);
+		if (zstd_is_error(out_len)) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+cleanup:
+		kvfree(wksp);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (dlen < slen)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(dst, src, slen);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t rawdata_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t size,
+			    loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct rawdata_f_data *private = file->private_data;
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos,
+				       private->data,
+				       private->loaddata->size);
+}
+
+static int rawdata_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	rawdata_f_data_free(file->private_data);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int rawdata_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	int error;
+	struct aa_loaddata *loaddata;
+	struct rawdata_f_data *private;
+
+	if (!aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	loaddata = get_loaddata_common_ref(inode->i_private);
+	if (!loaddata)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	private = rawdata_f_data_alloc(loaddata->size);
+	if (IS_ERR(private)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(private);
+		goto fail_private_alloc;
+	}
+
+	private->loaddata = loaddata;
+
+	error = decompress_zstd(loaddata->data, loaddata->compressed_size,
+				private->data, loaddata->size);
+	if (error)
+		goto fail_decompress;
+
+	file->private_data = private;
+	return 0;
+
+fail_decompress:
+	rawdata_f_data_free(private);
+	return error;
+
+fail_private_alloc:
+	aa_put_i_loaddata(loaddata);
+	return error;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations rawdata_fops = {
+	.open = rawdata_open,
+	.read = rawdata_read,
+	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+	.release = rawdata_release,
+};
+
+static void remove_rawdata_dents(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AAFS_LOADDATA_NDENTS; i++) {
+		if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rawdata->dents[i])) {
+			aafs_remove(rawdata->dents[i]);
+			rawdata->dents[i] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+void __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata)
+{
+	AA_BUG(rawdata->ns && !mutex_is_locked(&rawdata->ns->lock));
+
+	if (rawdata->ns) {
+		remove_rawdata_dents(rawdata);
+		list_del_init(&rawdata->list);
+		aa_put_ns(rawdata->ns);
+		rawdata->ns = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_loaddata *rawdata)
+{
+	struct dentry *dent, *dir;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ns);
+	AA_BUG(!rawdata);
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock));
+	AA_BUG(!ns_subdata_dir(ns));
+
+	/*
+	 * just use ns revision dir was originally created at. This is
+	 * under ns->lock and if load is successful revision will be
+	 * bumped and is guaranteed to be unique
+	 */
+	rawdata->name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%ld", ns->revision);
+	if (!rawdata->name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	dir = aafs_create_dir(rawdata->name, ns_subdata_dir(ns));
+	if (IS_ERR(dir))
+		/* ->name freed when rawdata freed */
+		return PTR_ERR(dir);
+	rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR] = dir;
+
+	dent = aafs_create_file("abi", S_IFREG | 0444, dir, &rawdata->count,
+				      &seq_rawdata_abi_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto fail;
+	rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_ABI] = dent;
+
+	dent = aafs_create_file("revision", S_IFREG | 0444, dir,
+				&rawdata->count,
+				&seq_rawdata_revision_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto fail;
+	rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION] = dent;
+
+	if (aa_g_hash_policy) {
+		dent = aafs_create_file("sha256", S_IFREG | 0444, dir,
+					&rawdata->count,
+					&seq_rawdata_hash_fops);
+		if (IS_ERR(dent))
+			goto fail;
+		rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_HASH] = dent;
+	}
+
+	dent = aafs_create_file("compressed_size", S_IFREG | 0444, dir,
+				&rawdata->count,
+				&seq_rawdata_compressed_size_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto fail;
+	rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_COMPRESSED_SIZE] = dent;
+
+	dent = aafs_create_file("raw_data", S_IFREG | 0444, dir,
+				&rawdata->count, &rawdata_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto fail;
+	rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DATA] = dent;
+	d_inode(dent)->i_size = rawdata->size;
+
+	rawdata->ns = aa_get_ns(ns);
+	list_add(&rawdata->list, &ns->rawdata_list);
+
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	remove_rawdata_dents(rawdata);
+	return PTR_ERR(dent);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
+
+
+/** fns to setup dynamic per profile/namespace files **/
+
+/*
+ *
+ * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held
+ */
+void __aafs_profile_rmdir(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *child;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!profile)
+		return;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(child, &profile->base.profiles, base.list)
+		__aafs_profile_rmdir(child);
+
+	for (i = AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+		if (!profile->dents[i])
+			continue;
+
+		aafs_remove(profile->dents[i]);
+		profile->dents[i] = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ * Requires: @old->ns->lock held
+ */
+void __aafs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old,
+				  struct aa_profile *new)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	AA_BUG(!old);
+	AA_BUG(!new);
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profiles_ns(old)->lock));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF; i++) {
+		new->dents[i] = old->dents[i];
+		if (new->dents[i]) {
+			struct inode *inode = d_inode(new->dents[i]);
+
+			inode_set_mtime_to_ts(inode,
+					      inode_set_ctime_current(inode));
+		}
+		old->dents[i] = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static struct dentry *create_profile_file(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
+					  struct aa_profile *profile,
+					  const struct file_operations *fops)
+{
+	return aafs_create_file(name, S_IFREG | 0444, dir, &profile->label.proxy->count, fops);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
+static int profile_depth(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	int depth = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	for (depth = 0; profile; profile = rcu_access_pointer(profile->parent))
+		depth++;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return depth;
+}
+
+static char *gen_symlink_name(int depth, const char *dirname, const char *fname)
+{
+	char *buffer, *s;
+	int error;
+	const char *path = "../../";
+	size_t path_len = strlen(path);
+	int size;
+
+	/* Extra 11 bytes: "raw_data" (9) + two slashes "//" (2) */
+	size = depth * path_len + strlen(dirname) + strlen(fname) + 11;
+	s = buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	for (; depth > 0; depth--) {
+		memcpy(s, path, path_len);
+		s += path_len;
+		size -= path_len;
+	}
+
+	error = snprintf(s, size, "raw_data/%s/%s", dirname, fname);
+	if (error >= size || error < 0) {
+		kfree(buffer);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
+	}
+
+	return buffer;
+}
+
+static const char *rawdata_get_link_base(struct dentry *dentry,
+					 struct inode *inode,
+					 struct delayed_call *done,
+					 const char *name)
+{
+	struct aa_common_ref *ref = inode->i_private;
+	struct aa_proxy *proxy = container_of(ref, struct aa_proxy, count);
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *target;
+	int depth;
+
+	if (!dentry)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
+	label = aa_get_label_rcu(&proxy->label);
+	profile = labels_profile(label);
+
+	/* rawdata can be null when aa_g_export_binary is unset during
+	 * runtime and a profile is replaced
+	 */
+	if (!profile->rawdata) {
+		aa_put_label(label);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+	}
+
+	depth = profile_depth(profile);
+	target = gen_symlink_name(depth, profile->rawdata->name, name);
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(target))
+		return target;
+
+	set_delayed_call(done, kfree_link, target);
+
+	return target;
+}
+
+static const char *rawdata_get_link_sha256(struct dentry *dentry,
+					 struct inode *inode,
+					 struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+	return rawdata_get_link_base(dentry, inode, done, "sha256");
+}
+
+static const char *rawdata_get_link_abi(struct dentry *dentry,
+					struct inode *inode,
+					struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+	return rawdata_get_link_base(dentry, inode, done, "abi");
+}
+
+static const char *rawdata_get_link_data(struct dentry *dentry,
+					 struct inode *inode,
+					 struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+	return rawdata_get_link_base(dentry, inode, done, "raw_data");
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_sha256_iops = {
+	.get_link	= rawdata_get_link_sha256,
+};
+
+static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_abi_iops = {
+	.get_link	= rawdata_get_link_abi,
+};
+static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_data_iops = {
+	.get_link	= rawdata_get_link_data,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held
+ */
+void __aa_remove_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	aafs_remove(profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH]);
+	profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] = NULL;
+	aafs_remove(profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI]);
+	profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI] = NULL;
+	aafs_remove(profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA]);
+	profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA] = NULL;
+}
+
+static inline int create_symlink_dent(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				      const char *name,
+				      enum aafs_prof_type type,
+				      const struct inode_operations *iops)
+{
+	struct dentry *dent = NULL;
+	struct dentry *dir = prof_dir(profile);
+
+	if (profile->dents[type])
+		return 0;
+
+	dent = aafs_create(name, S_IFLNK | 0444, dir,
+			   &profile->label.proxy->count, NULL, NULL, iops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		return PTR_ERR(dent);
+
+	profile->dents[type] = dent;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held
+ */
+int __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!profile ||
+	    (profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] &&
+	     profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI] &&
+	     profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA]))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!profile->rawdata)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (aa_g_hash_policy) {
+		error = create_symlink_dent(profile, "raw_sha256",
+					    AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH,
+					    &rawdata_link_sha256_iops);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+	}
+
+	error = create_symlink_dent(profile, "raw_abi",
+				    AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI,
+				    &rawdata_link_abi_iops);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+
+	error = create_symlink_dent(profile, "raw_data",
+				    AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA,
+				    &rawdata_link_data_iops);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
+
+/*
+ * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held
+ */
+int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *child;
+	struct dentry *dent = NULL, *dir;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profiles_ns(profile)->lock));
+
+	if (!parent) {
+		struct aa_profile *p;
+		p = aa_deref_parent(profile);
+		dent = prof_dir(p);
+		if (!dent) {
+			error = -ENOENT;
+			goto fail2;
+		}
+		/* adding to parent that previously didn't have children */
+		dent = aafs_create_dir("profiles", dent);
+		if (IS_ERR(dent))
+			goto fail;
+		prof_child_dir(p) = parent = dent;
+	}
+
+	if (!profile->dirname) {
+		int len, id_len;
+		len = mangle_name(profile->base.name, NULL);
+		id_len = snprintf(NULL, 0, ".%ld", profile->ns->uniq_id);
+
+		profile->dirname = kmalloc(len + id_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!profile->dirname) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto fail2;
+		}
+
+		mangle_name(profile->base.name, profile->dirname);
+		sprintf(profile->dirname + len, ".%ld", profile->ns->uniq_id++);
+	}
+
+	dent = aafs_create_dir(profile->dirname, parent);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto fail;
+	prof_dir(profile) = dir = dent;
+
+	dent = create_profile_file(dir, "name", profile,
+				   &seq_profile_name_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto fail;
+	profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_NAME] = dent;
+
+	dent = create_profile_file(dir, "mode", profile,
+				   &seq_profile_mode_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto fail;
+	profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_MODE] = dent;
+
+	dent = create_profile_file(dir, "attach", profile,
+				   &seq_profile_attach_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto fail;
+	profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_ATTACH] = dent;
+
+	if (profile->hash) {
+		dent = create_profile_file(dir, "sha256", profile,
+					   &seq_profile_hash_fops);
+		if (IS_ERR(dent))
+			goto fail;
+		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_HASH] = dent;
+	}
+
+	error = __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(profile);
+	if (error)
+		goto fail2;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(child, &profile->base.profiles, base.list) {
+		error = __aafs_profile_mkdir(child, prof_child_dir(profile));
+		if (error)
+			goto fail2;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	error = PTR_ERR(dent);
+
+fail2:
+	__aafs_profile_rmdir(profile);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *ns_mkdir_op(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+				  struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns, *parent;
+	/* TODO: improve permission check */
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, NULL, NULL,
+				     AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+	if (error)
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
+
+	parent = get_ns_common_ref(dir->i_private);
+	AA_BUG(d_inode(ns_subns_dir(parent)) != dir);
+
+	/* we have to unlock and then relock to get locking order right
+	 * for pin_fs
+	 */
+	inode_unlock(dir);
+	error = simple_pin_fs(&aafs_ops, &aafs_mnt, &aafs_count);
+	mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, parent->level);
+	inode_lock_nested(dir, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
+	if (error)
+		goto out;
+
+	error = __aafs_setup_d_inode(dir, dentry, mode | S_IFDIR,  NULL,
+				     NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	if (error)
+		goto out_pin;
+
+	ns = __aa_find_or_create_ns(parent, READ_ONCE(dentry->d_name.name),
+				    dentry);
+	if (IS_ERR(ns)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(ns);
+		ns = NULL;
+	}
+
+	aa_put_ns(ns);		/* list ref remains */
+out_pin:
+	if (error)
+		simple_release_fs(&aafs_mnt, &aafs_count);
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&parent->lock);
+	aa_put_ns(parent);
+
+	return error ? ERR_PTR(error) : NULL;
+}
+
+static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns, *parent;
+	/* TODO: improve permission check */
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, NULL, NULL,
+				     AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	parent = get_ns_common_ref(dir->i_private);
+	/* rmdir calls the generic securityfs functions to remove files
+	 * from the apparmor dir. It is up to the apparmor ns locking
+	 * to avoid races.
+	 */
+	inode_unlock(dir);
+	inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode);
+
+	mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, parent->level);
+	ns = aa_get_ns(__aa_findn_ns(&parent->sub_ns, dentry->d_name.name,
+				     dentry->d_name.len));
+	if (!ns) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	AA_BUG(ns_dir(ns) != dentry);
+
+	__aa_remove_ns(ns);
+	aa_put_ns(ns);
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&parent->lock);
+	inode_lock_nested(dir, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
+	inode_lock(dentry->d_inode);
+	aa_put_ns(parent);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations ns_dir_inode_operations = {
+	.lookup		= simple_lookup,
+	.mkdir		= ns_mkdir_op,
+	.rmdir		= ns_rmdir_op,
+};
+
+static void __aa_fs_list_remove_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *ent, *tmp;
+
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock));
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &ns->rawdata_list, list)
+		__aa_fs_remove_rawdata(ent);
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ * Requires: @ns->lock held
+ */
+void __aafs_ns_rmdir(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *sub;
+	struct aa_profile *child;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!ns)
+		return;
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock));
+
+	list_for_each_entry(child, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
+		__aafs_profile_rmdir(child);
+
+	list_for_each_entry(sub, &ns->sub_ns, base.list) {
+		mutex_lock_nested(&sub->lock, sub->level);
+		__aafs_ns_rmdir(sub);
+		mutex_unlock(&sub->lock);
+	}
+
+	__aa_fs_list_remove_rawdata(ns);
+
+	for (i = AAFS_NS_SIZEOF - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+		aafs_remove(ns->dents[i]);
+		ns->dents[i] = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/* assumes cleanup in caller */
+static int __aafs_ns_mkdir_entries(struct aa_ns *ns, struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	struct dentry *dent;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ns);
+	AA_BUG(!dir);
+
+	dent = aafs_create_dir("profiles", dir);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		return PTR_ERR(dent);
+	ns_subprofs_dir(ns) = dent;
+
+	dent = aafs_create_dir("raw_data", dir);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		return PTR_ERR(dent);
+	ns_subdata_dir(ns) = dent;
+
+	dent = aafs_create_file("revision", 0444, dir,
+				&ns->unconfined->label.count,
+				&aa_fs_ns_revision_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		return PTR_ERR(dent);
+	ns_subrevision(ns) = dent;
+
+	dent = aafs_create_file(".load", 0640, dir,
+				&ns->unconfined->label.count,
+				&aa_fs_profile_load);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		return PTR_ERR(dent);
+	ns_subload(ns) = dent;
+
+	dent = aafs_create_file(".replace", 0640, dir,
+				&ns->unconfined->label.count,
+				&aa_fs_profile_replace);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		return PTR_ERR(dent);
+	ns_subreplace(ns) = dent;
+
+	dent = aafs_create_file(".remove", 0640, dir,
+				&ns->unconfined->label.count,
+				&aa_fs_profile_remove);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		return PTR_ERR(dent);
+	ns_subremove(ns) = dent;
+
+	  /* use create_dentry so we can supply private data */
+	dent = aafs_create("namespaces", S_IFDIR | 0755, dir,
+			   &ns->unconfined->label.count,
+			   NULL, NULL, &ns_dir_inode_operations);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		return PTR_ERR(dent);
+	ns_subns_dir(ns) = dent;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Requires: @ns->lock held
+ */
+int __aafs_ns_mkdir(struct aa_ns *ns, struct dentry *parent, const char *name,
+		    struct dentry *dent)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *sub;
+	struct aa_profile *child;
+	struct dentry *dir;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ns);
+	AA_BUG(!parent);
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock));
+
+	if (!name)
+		name = ns->base.name;
+
+	if (!dent) {
+		/* create ns dir if it doesn't already exist */
+		dent = aafs_create_dir(name, parent);
+		if (IS_ERR(dent))
+			goto fail;
+	} else
+		dget(dent);
+	ns_dir(ns) = dir = dent;
+	error = __aafs_ns_mkdir_entries(ns, dir);
+	if (error)
+		goto fail2;
+
+	/* profiles */
+	list_for_each_entry(child, &ns->base.profiles, base.list) {
+		error = __aafs_profile_mkdir(child, ns_subprofs_dir(ns));
+		if (error)
+			goto fail2;
+	}
+
+	/* subnamespaces */
+	list_for_each_entry(sub, &ns->sub_ns, base.list) {
+		mutex_lock_nested(&sub->lock, sub->level);
+		error = __aafs_ns_mkdir(sub, ns_subns_dir(ns), NULL, NULL);
+		mutex_unlock(&sub->lock);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail2;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	error = PTR_ERR(dent);
+
+fail2:
+	__aafs_ns_rmdir(ns);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __next_ns - find the next namespace to list
+ * @root: root namespace to stop search at (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: current ns position (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Find the next namespace from @ns under @root and handle all locking needed
+ * while switching current namespace.
+ *
+ * Returns: next namespace or NULL if at last namespace under @root
+ * Requires: ns->parent->lock to be held
+ * NOTE: will not unlock root->lock
+ */
+static struct aa_ns *__next_ns(struct aa_ns *root, struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *parent, *next;
+
+	AA_BUG(!root);
+	AA_BUG(!ns);
+	AA_BUG(ns != root && !mutex_is_locked(&ns->parent->lock));
+
+	/* is next namespace a child */
+	if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) {
+		next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list);
+		mutex_lock_nested(&next->lock, next->level);
+		return next;
+	}
+
+	/* check if the next ns is a sibling, parent, gp, .. */
+	parent = ns->parent;
+	while (ns != root) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+		next = list_next_entry(ns, base.list);
+		if (!list_entry_is_head(next, &parent->sub_ns, base.list)) {
+			mutex_lock_nested(&next->lock, next->level);
+			return next;
+		}
+		ns = parent;
+		parent = parent->parent;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __first_profile - find the first profile in a namespace
+ * @root: namespace that is root of profiles being displayed (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: namespace to start in   (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile or NULL if no profile
+ * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_ns *root,
+					  struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!root);
+	AA_BUG(ns && !mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock));
+
+	for (; ns; ns = __next_ns(root, ns)) {
+		if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles))
+			return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
+						struct aa_profile, base.list);
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __next_profile - step to the next profile in a profile tree
+ * @p: current profile in tree (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Perform a depth first traversal on the profile tree in a namespace
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if done
+ * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *parent;
+	struct aa_ns *ns = p->ns;
+
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profiles_ns(p)->lock));
+
+	/* is next profile a child */
+	if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles))
+		return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p),
+					base.list);
+
+	/* is next profile a sibling, parent sibling, gp, sibling, .. */
+	parent = rcu_dereference_protected(p->parent,
+					   mutex_is_locked(&p->ns->lock));
+	while (parent) {
+		p = list_next_entry(p, base.list);
+		if (!list_entry_is_head(p, &parent->base.profiles, base.list))
+			return p;
+		p = parent;
+		parent = rcu_dereference_protected(parent->parent,
+					    mutex_is_locked(&parent->ns->lock));
+	}
+
+	/* is next another profile in the namespace */
+	p = list_next_entry(p, base.list);
+	if (!list_entry_is_head(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list))
+		return p;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * next_profile - step to the next profile in where ever it may be
+ * @root: root namespace  (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: current profile  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if there isn't one
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_ns *root,
+				       struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *next = __next_profile(profile);
+	if (next)
+		return next;
+
+	/* finished all profiles in namespace move to next namespace */
+	return __first_profile(root, __next_ns(root, profile->ns));
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_start - start a depth first traversal of profile tree
+ * @f: seq_file to fill
+ * @pos: current position
+ *
+ * Returns: first profile under current namespace or NULL if none found
+ *
+ * acquires first ns->lock
+ */
+static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+	struct aa_ns *root = aa_get_current_ns();
+	loff_t l = *pos;
+	f->private = root;
+
+	/* find the first profile */
+	mutex_lock_nested(&root->lock, root->level);
+	profile = __first_profile(root, root);
+
+	/* skip to position */
+	for (; profile && l > 0; l--)
+		profile = next_profile(root, profile);
+
+	return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_next - read the next profile entry
+ * @f: seq_file to fill
+ * @p: profile previously returned
+ * @pos: current position
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile after @p or NULL if none
+ *
+ * may acquire/release locks in namespace tree as necessary
+ */
+static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
+	struct aa_ns *ns = f->private;
+	(*pos)++;
+
+	return next_profile(ns, profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
+ * @f: seq_file we are filling
+ * @p: the last profile written
+ *
+ * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
+ */
+static void p_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
+	struct aa_ns *root = f->private, *ns;
+
+	if (profile) {
+		for (ns = profile->ns; ns && ns != root; ns = ns->parent)
+			mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&root->lock);
+	aa_put_ns(root);
+}
+
+/**
+ * seq_show_profile - show a profile entry
+ * @f: seq_file to file
+ * @p: current position (profile)    (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *)p;
+	struct aa_ns *root = f->private;
+
+	aa_label_seq_xprint(f, root, &profile->label,
+			    FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, GFP_KERNEL);
+	seq_putc(f, '\n');
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations aa_sfs_profiles_op = {
+	.start = p_start,
+	.next = p_next,
+	.stop = p_stop,
+	.show = seq_show_profile,
+};
+
+static int profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	if (!aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	return seq_open(file, &aa_sfs_profiles_op);
+}
+
+static int profiles_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_release(inode, file);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_sfs_profiles_fops = {
+	.open = profiles_open,
+	.read = seq_read,
+	.llseek = seq_lseek,
+	.release = profiles_release,
+};
+
+
+/** Base file system setup **/
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_file[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask",
+			   "create read write exec append mmap_exec link lock"),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ptrace[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "read trace"),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_signal[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_SFS_SIG_MASK),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_attach[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("xattr", 1),
+	{ }
+};
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hat",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hatv",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("unconfined_allowed_children",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_onexec",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("stack",		1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("fix_binfmt_elf_mmap",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("post_nnp_subset",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("computed_longest_left",	1),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("attach_conditions",		aa_sfs_entry_attach),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("disconnected.path",            1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("kill.signal",		1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("version", "1.2"),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_unconfined[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile", 1),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v5",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v6",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v7",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v8",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v9",	1),
+	{ }
+};
+
+#define PERMS32STR "allow deny subtree cond kill complain prompt audit quiet hide xindex tag label"
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_policy[] = {
+	AA_SFS_DIR("versions",			aa_sfs_entry_versions),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load",		1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("diff-encode",		1),
+	/* number of out of band transitions supported */
+	AA_SFS_FILE_U64("outofband",		MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_U64("permstable32_version",	3),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("permstable32", PERMS32STR),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_U64("state32",	1),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("unconfined_restrictions",   aa_sfs_entry_unconfined),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_mount[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount pivot_root"),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("move_mount", "detached"),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ns[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile",		1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root",	0),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "userns_create"),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_dbus[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "acquire send receive"),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_query_label[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("perms", "allow deny audit quiet"),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("data",		1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("multi_transaction",	1),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_query[] = {
+	AA_SFS_DIR("label",			aa_sfs_entry_query_label),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_io_uring[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "sqpoll override_creds"),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = {
+	AA_SFS_DIR("policy",			aa_sfs_entry_policy),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("domain",			aa_sfs_entry_domain),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("file",			aa_sfs_entry_file),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("network_v8",		aa_sfs_entry_network),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("network_v9",		aa_sfs_entry_networkv9),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("mount",			aa_sfs_entry_mount),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces",		aa_sfs_entry_ns),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_sfs_entry_rlimit),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("caps",			aa_sfs_entry_caps),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("ptrace",			aa_sfs_entry_ptrace),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("signal",			aa_sfs_entry_signal),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("dbus",			aa_sfs_entry_dbus),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("query",			aa_sfs_entry_query),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("io_uring",			aa_sfs_entry_io_uring),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_apparmor[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".access", 0666, &aa_sfs_access),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".stacked", 0444, &seq_ns_stacked_fops),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_stacked", 0444, &seq_ns_nsstacked_fops),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_level", 0444, &seq_ns_level_fops),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_name", 0444, &seq_ns_name_fops),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0444, &aa_sfs_profiles_fops),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS("raw_data_compression_level_min", 0444, &seq_ns_compress_min_fops),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS("raw_data_compression_level_max", 0444, &seq_ns_compress_max_fops),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("features", aa_sfs_entry_features),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry =
+	AA_SFS_DIR("apparmor", aa_sfs_entry_apparmor);
+
+/**
+ * entry_create_file - create a file entry in the apparmor securityfs
+ * @fs_file: aa_sfs_entry to build an entry for (NOT NULL)
+ * @parent: the parent dentry in the securityfs
+ *
+ * Use entry_remove_file to remove entries created with this fn.
+ */
+static int __init entry_create_file(struct aa_sfs_entry *fs_file,
+				    struct dentry *parent)
+{
+	int error = 0;
+
+	fs_file->dentry = securityfs_create_file(fs_file->name,
+						 S_IFREG | fs_file->mode,
+						 parent, fs_file,
+						 fs_file->file_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(fs_file->dentry)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(fs_file->dentry);
+		fs_file->dentry = NULL;
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+static void __init entry_remove_dir(struct aa_sfs_entry *fs_dir);
+/**
+ * entry_create_dir - recursively create a directory entry in the securityfs
+ * @fs_dir: aa_sfs_entry (and all child entries) to build (NOT NULL)
+ * @parent: the parent dentry in the securityfs
+ *
+ * Use entry_remove_dir to remove entries created with this fn.
+ */
+static int __init entry_create_dir(struct aa_sfs_entry *fs_dir,
+				   struct dentry *parent)
+{
+	struct aa_sfs_entry *fs_file;
+	struct dentry *dir;
+	int error;
+
+	dir = securityfs_create_dir(fs_dir->name, parent);
+	if (IS_ERR(dir))
+		return PTR_ERR(dir);
+	fs_dir->dentry = dir;
+
+	for (fs_file = fs_dir->v.files; fs_file && fs_file->name; ++fs_file) {
+		if (fs_file->v_type == AA_SFS_TYPE_DIR)
+			error = entry_create_dir(fs_file, fs_dir->dentry);
+		else
+			error = entry_create_file(fs_file, fs_dir->dentry);
+		if (error)
+			goto failed;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+failed:
+	entry_remove_dir(fs_dir);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * entry_remove_file - drop a single file entry in the apparmor securityfs
+ * @fs_file: aa_sfs_entry to detach from the securityfs (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void __init entry_remove_file(struct aa_sfs_entry *fs_file)
+{
+	if (!fs_file->dentry)
+		return;
+
+	securityfs_remove(fs_file->dentry);
+	fs_file->dentry = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * entry_remove_dir - recursively drop a directory entry from the securityfs
+ * @fs_dir: aa_sfs_entry (and all child entries) to detach (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void __init entry_remove_dir(struct aa_sfs_entry *fs_dir)
+{
+	struct aa_sfs_entry *fs_file;
+
+	for (fs_file = fs_dir->v.files; fs_file && fs_file->name; ++fs_file) {
+		if (fs_file->v_type == AA_SFS_TYPE_DIR)
+			entry_remove_dir(fs_file);
+		else
+			entry_remove_file(fs_file);
+	}
+
+	entry_remove_file(fs_dir);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_destroy_aafs - cleanup and free aafs
+ *
+ * releases dentries allocated by aa_create_aafs
+ */
+void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void)
+{
+	entry_remove_dir(&aa_sfs_entry);
+}
+
+
+#define NULL_FILE_NAME ".null"
+struct path aa_null;
+
+static int aa_mk_null_file(struct dentry *parent)
+{
+	struct vfsmount *mount = NULL;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	int count = 0;
+	int error = simple_pin_fs(parent->d_sb->s_type, &mount, &count);
+
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	dentry = simple_start_creating(parent, NULL_FILE_NAME);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	inode = new_inode(parent->d_inode->i_sb);
+	if (!inode) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
+	inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO;
+	simple_inode_init_ts(inode);
+	init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO,
+			   MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
+	d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
+	aa_null.dentry = dget(dentry);
+	aa_null.mnt = mntget(mount);
+
+out:
+	simple_done_creating(dentry);
+	simple_release_fs(&mount, &count);
+	return error;
+}
+
+static const char *policy_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
+				   struct inode *inode,
+				   struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns;
+	struct path path;
+	int error;
+
+	if (!dentry)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
+	ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+	path.mnt = mntget(aafs_mnt);
+	path.dentry = dget(ns_dir(ns));
+	error = nd_jump_link(&path);
+	aa_put_ns(ns);
+
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
+}
+
+static int policy_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer,
+			   int buflen)
+{
+	char name[32];
+	int res;
+
+	res = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s:[%llu]", AAFS_NAME,
+		       d_inode(dentry)->i_ino);
+	if (res > 0 && res < sizeof(name))
+		res = readlink_copy(buffer, buflen, name, strlen(name));
+	else
+		res = -ENOENT;
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations policy_link_iops = {
+	.readlink	= policy_readlink,
+	.get_link	= policy_get_link,
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_create_aafs - create the apparmor security filesystem
+ *
+ * dentries created here are released by aa_destroy_aafs
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
+{
+	struct dentry *dent;
+	int error;
+
+	if (!apparmor_initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (aa_sfs_entry.dentry) {
+		AA_ERROR("%s: AppArmor securityfs already exists\n", __func__);
+		return -EEXIST;
+	}
+
+	/* setup apparmorfs used to virtualize policy/ */
+	aafs_mnt = kern_mount(&aafs_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(aafs_mnt))
+		panic("can't set apparmorfs up\n");
+	aafs_mnt->mnt_sb->s_flags &= ~SB_NOUSER;
+
+	/* Populate fs tree. */
+	error = entry_create_dir(&aa_sfs_entry, NULL);
+	if (error)
+		goto error;
+
+	dent = securityfs_create_file(".load", 0666, aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
+				      NULL, &aa_fs_profile_load);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
+	ns_subload(root_ns) = dent;
+
+	dent = securityfs_create_file(".replace", 0666, aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
+				      NULL, &aa_fs_profile_replace);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
+	ns_subreplace(root_ns) = dent;
+
+	dent = securityfs_create_file(".remove", 0666, aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
+				      NULL, &aa_fs_profile_remove);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
+	ns_subremove(root_ns) = dent;
+
+	dent = securityfs_create_file("revision", 0444, aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
+				      NULL, &aa_fs_ns_revision_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
+	ns_subrevision(root_ns) = dent;
+
+	/* policy tree referenced by magic policy symlink */
+	mutex_lock_nested(&root_ns->lock, root_ns->level);
+	error = __aafs_ns_mkdir(root_ns, aafs_mnt->mnt_root, ".policy",
+				aafs_mnt->mnt_root);
+	mutex_unlock(&root_ns->lock);
+	if (error)
+		goto error;
+
+	/* magic symlink similar to nsfs redirects based on task policy */
+	dent = securityfs_create_symlink("policy", aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
+					 NULL, &policy_link_iops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
+
+	error = aa_mk_null_file(aa_sfs_entry.dentry);
+	if (error)
+		goto error;
+
+	/* TODO: add default profile to apparmorfs */
+
+	/* Report that AppArmor fs is enabled */
+	aa_info_message("AppArmor Filesystem Enabled");
+	return 0;
+
+dent_error:
+	error = PTR_ERR(dent);
+error:
+	aa_destroy_aafs();
+	AA_ERROR("Error creating AppArmor securityfs\n");
+	return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4a60b6fda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor auditing functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_ns.h"
+#include "include/secid.h"
+
+const char *const audit_mode_names[] = {
+	"normal",
+	"quiet_denied",
+	"quiet",
+	"noquiet",
+	"all"
+};
+
+static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
+	"AUDIT",
+	"ALLOWED",
+	"DENIED",
+	"HINT",
+	"STATUS",
+	"ERROR",
+	"KILLED",
+	"AUTO"
+};
+
+static const char *const aa_class_names[] = {
+	"none",
+	"unknown",
+	"file",
+	"cap",
+	"net",
+	"rlimits",
+	"domain",
+	"mount",
+	"unknown",
+	"ptrace",
+	"signal",
+	"xmatch",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"net",
+	"unknown",
+	"label",
+	"posix_mqueue",
+	"io_uring",
+	"module",
+	"lsm",
+	"namespace",
+	"io_uring",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"X",
+	"dbus",
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * Currently AppArmor auditing is fed straight into the audit framework.
+ *
+ * TODO:
+ * netlink interface for complain mode
+ * user auditing, - send user auditing to netlink interface
+ * system control of whether user audit messages go to system log
+ */
+
+/**
+ * audit_pre() - core AppArmor function.
+ * @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Record common AppArmor audit data from @va
+ */
+static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va);
+
+	if (aa_g_audit_header) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=\"%s\"",
+				 aa_audit_type[ad->type]);
+	}
+
+	if (ad->op)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", ad->op);
+
+	if (ad->class)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " class=\"%s\"",
+				 ad->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ?
+				 aa_class_names[ad->class] :
+				 "unknown");
+
+	if (ad->info) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", ad->info);
+		if (ad->error)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", ad->error);
+	}
+
+	if (ad->subj_label) {
+		struct aa_label *label = ad->subj_label;
+
+		if (label_isprofile(label)) {
+			struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
+
+			if (profile->ns != root_ns) {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
+				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+						       profile->ns->base.hname);
+			}
+			audit_log_format(ab, " profile=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname);
+		} else {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " label=");
+			aa_label_xaudit(ab, root_ns, label, FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS,
+					GFP_ATOMIC);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ad->name) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->name);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit_msg - Log a message to the audit subsystem
+ * @type: audit type for the message
+ * @ad: audit event structure (NOT NULL)
+ * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
+		  void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
+{
+	ad->type = type;
+	common_lsm_audit(&ad->common, audit_pre, cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem
+ * @type: audit type for the message
+ * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL)
+ * @ad: audit event (NOT NULL)
+ * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile,
+	     struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
+	     void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
+{
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+
+	if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) {
+		if (likely(!ad->error)) {
+			if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+				return 0;
+			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+		} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED;
+		else
+			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED;
+	}
+	if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
+	    (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
+	     AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED))
+		return ad->error;
+
+	if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+	ad->subj_label = &profile->label;
+
+	aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb);
+
+	if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
+		(void)send_sig_info(profile->signal, NULL,
+			ad->common.type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK &&
+			ad->common.u.tsk ? ad->common.u.tsk : current);
+
+	if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
+		return complain_error(ad->error);
+
+	return ad->error;
+}
+
+struct aa_audit_rule {
+	struct aa_label *label;
+};
+
+void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
+{
+	struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+
+	if (rule) {
+		if (!IS_ERR(rule->label))
+			aa_put_label(rule->label);
+		kfree(rule);
+	}
+}
+
+int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_audit_rule *rule;
+
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	rule = kzalloc_obj(struct aa_audit_rule, gfp);
+
+	if (!rule)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */
+	rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr,
+				     gfp, true, false);
+	if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) {
+		int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label);
+		aa_audit_rule_free(rule);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	*vrule = rule;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+
+		switch (f->type) {
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+{
+	struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	label = prop->apparmor.label;
+
+	if (!label)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (aa_label_is_subset(label, rule->label))
+		found = 1;
+
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			return found;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			return !found;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b9ea6bc45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor capability mediation functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/timekeeping.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+
+/*
+ * Table of capability names: we generate it from capabilities.h.
+ */
+#include "capability_names.h"
+
+struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_SFS_CAPS_MASK),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("extended", 1),
+	{ }
+};
+
+struct audit_cache {
+	const struct cred *ad_subj_cred;
+	/* Capabilities go from 0 to CAP_LAST_CAP */
+	u64 ktime_ns_expiration[CAP_LAST_CAP+1];
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct audit_cache, audit_cache);
+
+/**
+ * audit_cb - call back for capability components of audit struct
+ * @ab: audit buffer   (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit data from  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " capname=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, capability_names[sa->u.cap]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_caps - audit a capability
+ * @ad: audit data
+ * @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL)
+ * @cap: capability tested
+ * @error: error code returned by test
+ *
+ * Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching
+ * and duplicate message elimination.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or ad->error on success,  error code on failure
+ */
+static int audit_caps(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, struct aa_profile *profile,
+		      int cap, int error)
+{
+	const u64 AUDIT_CACHE_TIMEOUT_NS = 1000*1000*1000; /* 1 second */
+
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct audit_cache *ent;
+	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+
+	ad->error = error;
+
+	if (likely(!error)) {
+		/* test if auditing is being forced */
+		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
+			   !cap_raised(rules->caps.audit, cap)))
+			return 0;
+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+	} else if (KILL_MODE(profile) ||
+		   cap_raised(rules->caps.kill, cap)) {
+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+	} else if (cap_raised(rules->caps.quiet, cap) &&
+		   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+		   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) {
+		/* quiet auditing */
+		return error;
+	}
+
+	/* Do simple duplicate message elimination */
+	ent = &get_cpu_var(audit_cache);
+	/* If the capability was never raised the timestamp check would also catch that */
+	if (ad->subj_cred == ent->ad_subj_cred && ktime_get_ns() <= ent->ktime_ns_expiration[cap]) {
+		put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
+		if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+			return complain_error(error);
+		return error;
+	} else {
+		put_cred(ent->ad_subj_cred);
+		ent->ad_subj_cred = get_cred(ad->subj_cred);
+		ent->ktime_ns_expiration[cap] = ktime_get_ns() + AUDIT_CACHE_TIMEOUT_NS;
+	}
+	put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
+
+	return aa_audit(type, profile, ad, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap
+ * @profile: profile being enforced    (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined)
+ * @cap: capability to test if allowed
+ * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
+ * @ad: audit data (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM
+ */
+static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
+			   unsigned int opts, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	aa_state_t state;
+	int error;
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, ad->class);
+	if (state) {
+		struct aa_perms perms = { };
+		u32 request;
+
+		/* caps broken into 256 x 32 bit permission chunks */
+		state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, cap >> 5);
+		request = 1 << (cap & 0x1f);
+		perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+		aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+
+		if (opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) {
+			if (perms.complain & request)
+				ad->info = "optional: no audit";
+			else
+				ad = NULL;
+		}
+		return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
+				      audit_cb);
+	}
+
+	/* fallback to old caps mediation that doesn't support conditionals */
+	if (cap_raised(rules->caps.allow, cap) &&
+	    !cap_raised(rules->caps.denied, cap))
+		error = 0;
+	else
+		error = -EPERM;
+
+	if (opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) {
+		if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+			return error;
+		/* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it
+		 * should be optional.
+		 */
+		ad->info = "optional: no audit";
+	}
+
+	return audit_caps(ad, profile, cap, error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_capable - test permission to use capability
+ * @subj_cred: cred we are testing capability against
+ * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL)
+ * @cap: capability to be tested
+ * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
+ *
+ * Look up capability in profile capability set.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
+ */
+int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	       int cap, unsigned int opts)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	int error = 0;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
+
+	ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
+	ad.common.u.cap = cap;
+	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &ad));
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+kernel_cap_t aa_profile_capget(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_CAP);
+	if (state) {
+		kernel_cap_t caps = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
+		int i;
+
+		/* caps broken into up to 256, 32 bit permission chunks */
+		for (i = 0; i < (CAP_LAST_CAP >> 5); i++) {
+			struct aa_perms perms = { };
+			aa_state_t tmp;
+
+			tmp = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, i);
+			perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, tmp);
+			aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+			caps.val |= ((u64)(perms.allow)) << (i * 5);
+			caps.val |= ((u64)(perms.complain)) << (i * 5);
+		}
+		return caps;
+	}
+
+	/* fallback to old caps */
+	if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+		return CAP_FULL_SET;
+
+	return rules->caps.allow;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/crypto.c b/security/apparmor/crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d8a7bde94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy loading interface function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2013 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * Fns to provide a checksum of policy that has been loaded this can be
+ * compared to userspace policy compiles to check loaded policy is what
+ * it should be.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/crypto.h"
+
+unsigned int aa_hash_size(void)
+{
+	return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+}
+
+char *aa_calc_hash(void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	char *hash;
+
+	hash = kzalloc(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!hash)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	sha256(data, len, hash);
+	return hash;
+}
+
+int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start,
+			 size_t len)
+{
+	struct sha256_ctx sctx;
+	__le32 le32_version = cpu_to_le32(version);
+
+	if (!aa_g_hash_policy)
+		return 0;
+
+	profile->hash = kzalloc(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!profile->hash)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	sha256_init(&sctx);
+	sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&le32_version, 4);
+	sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)start, len);
+	sha256_final(&sctx, profile->hash);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int __init init_profile_hash(void)
+{
+	if (apparmor_initialized)
+		aa_info_message("AppArmor sha256 policy hashing enabled");
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d6958eb00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1622 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy attachment and domain transitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/domain.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_ns.h"
+
+static const char * const CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR = "conflicting profile attachments";
+static const char * const CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_IX =
+	"conflicting profile attachments - ix fallback";
+static const char * const CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_UX =
+	"conflicting profile attachments - ux fallback";
+
+/**
+ * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
+ * @to_cred: cred of task changing domain
+ * @to_label: profile to change to  (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: message if there is an error
+ *
+ * Check if current is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed
+ * to trace the new domain
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed
+ */
+static int may_change_ptraced_domain(const struct cred *to_cred,
+				     struct aa_label *to_label,
+				     const char **info)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tracer;
+	struct aa_label *tracerl = NULL;
+	const struct cred *tracer_cred = NULL;
+
+	int error = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
+	if (tracer) {
+		/* released below */
+		tracerl = aa_get_task_label(tracer);
+		tracer_cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
+	}
+	/* not ptraced */
+	if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerl))
+		goto out;
+
+	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_cred, tracerl, to_cred, to_label,
+			      PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	aa_put_label(tracerl);
+	put_cred(tracer_cred);
+
+	if (error)
+		*info = "ptrace prevents transition";
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**** TODO: dedup to aa_label_match - needs perm and dfa, merging
+ * specifically this is an exact copy of aa_label_match except
+ * aa_compute_perms is replaced with aa_compute_fperms
+ * and policy->dfa with file->dfa
+ ****/
+/* match a profile and its associated ns component if needed
+ * Assumes visibility test has already been done.
+ * If a subns profile is not to be matched should be prescreened with
+ * visibility test.
+ */
+static inline aa_state_t match_component(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					 struct aa_profile *tp,
+					 bool stack, aa_state_t state)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	const char *ns_name;
+
+	if (stack)
+		state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, "&");
+	if (profile->ns == tp->ns)
+		return aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
+
+	/* try matching with namespace name and then profile */
+	ns_name = aa_ns_name(profile->ns, tp->ns, true);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file->dfa, state, ":", 1);
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, ns_name);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file->dfa, state, ":", 1);
+	return aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * label_compound_match - find perms for full compound label
+ * @profile: profile to find perms for
+ * @label: label to check access permissions for
+ * @stack: whether this is a stacking request
+ * @state: state to start match in
+ * @inview: whether to match labels in view or only in scope
+ * @request: permissions to request
+ * @perms: perms struct to set
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success else ERROR
+ *
+ * For the label A//&B//&C this does the perm match for A//&B//&C
+ * @perms should be preinitialized with allperms OR a previous permission
+ *        check to be stacked.
+ */
+static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				struct aa_label *label, bool stack,
+				aa_state_t state, bool inview, u32 request,
+				struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_profile *tp;
+	struct label_it i;
+	struct path_cond cond = { };
+
+	/* find first subcomponent that is in view and going to be interacted with */
+	label_for_each(i, label, tp) {
+		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, inview))
+			continue;
+		state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, state);
+		if (!state)
+			goto fail;
+		goto next;
+	}
+
+	/* no component visible */
+	*perms = allperms;
+	return 0;
+
+next:
+	label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
+		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, inview))
+			continue;
+		state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, "//&");
+		state = match_component(profile, tp, false, state);
+		if (!state)
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	*perms = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(), rules->file, state,
+				       &cond));
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms);
+	if ((perms->allow & request) != request)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	*perms = nullperms;
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+/**
+ * label_components_match - find perms for all subcomponents of a label
+ * @profile: profile to find perms for
+ * @label: label to check access permissions for
+ * @stack: whether this is a stacking request
+ * @start: state to start match in
+ * @inview: whether to match labels in view or only in scope
+ * @request: permissions to request
+ * @perms: an initialized perms struct to add accumulation to
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success else ERROR
+ *
+ * For the label A//&B//&C this does the perm match for each of A and B and C
+ * @perms should be preinitialized with allperms OR a previous permission
+ *        check to be stacked.
+ */
+static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				  struct aa_label *label, bool stack,
+				  aa_state_t start, bool inview, u32 request,
+				  struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_profile *tp;
+	struct label_it i;
+	struct aa_perms tmp;
+	struct path_cond cond = { };
+	aa_state_t state = 0;
+
+	/* find first subcomponent to test */
+	label_for_each(i, label, tp) {
+		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, inview))
+			continue;
+		state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, start);
+		if (!state)
+			goto fail;
+		goto next;
+	}
+
+	/* no subcomponents visible - no change in perms */
+	return 0;
+
+next:
+	tmp = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(), rules->file, state,
+				    &cond));
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
+	aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
+	label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
+		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, inview))
+			continue;
+		state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, start);
+		if (!state)
+			goto fail;
+		tmp = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(), rules->file, state,
+					    &cond));
+		aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
+		aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
+	}
+
+	if ((perms->allow & request) != request)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	*perms = nullperms;
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+/**
+ * label_match - do a multi-component label match
+ * @profile: profile to match against (NOT NULL)
+ * @label: label to match (NOT NULL)
+ * @stack: whether this is a stacking request
+ * @state: state to start in
+ * @inview: whether to match labels in view or only in scope
+ * @request: permission request
+ * @perms: Returns computed perms (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: the state the match finished in, may be the none matching state
+ */
+static int label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label,
+		       bool stack, aa_state_t state, bool inview, u32 request,
+		       struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	*perms = nullperms;
+	error = label_compound_match(profile, label, stack, state, inview,
+				     request, perms);
+	if (!error)
+		return error;
+
+	*perms = allperms;
+	return label_components_match(profile, label, stack, state, inview,
+				      request, perms);
+}
+
+/******* end TODO: dedup *****/
+
+/**
+ * change_profile_perms - find permissions for change_profile
+ * @profile: the current profile  (NOT NULL)
+ * @target: label to transition to (NOT NULL)
+ * @stack: whether this is a stacking request
+ * @request: requested perms
+ * @start: state to start matching in
+ * @perms: Returns computed perms (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ *
+ * Returns: permission set
+ *
+ * currently only matches full label A//&B//&C or individual components A, B, C
+ * not arbitrary combinations. Eg. A//&B, C
+ */
+static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				struct aa_label *target, bool stack,
+				u32 request, aa_state_t start,
+				struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile)) {
+		perms->allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
+		perms->audit = perms->quiet = perms->kill = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* TODO: add profile in ns screening */
+	return label_match(profile, target, stack, start, true, request, perms);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_xattrs_match - check whether a file matches the xattrs defined in profile
+ * @bprm: binprm struct for the process to validate
+ * @profile: profile to match against (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: state to start match in
+ *
+ * Returns: number of extended attributes that matched, or < 0 on error
+ */
+static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			   struct aa_profile *profile, aa_state_t state)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct dentry *d;
+	char *value = NULL;
+	struct aa_attachment *attach = &profile->attach;
+	int size, value_size = 0, ret = attach->xattr_count;
+
+	if (!bprm || !attach->xattr_count)
+		return 0;
+	might_sleep();
+
+	/* transition from exec match to xattr set */
+	state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch->dfa, state);
+	d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < attach->xattr_count; i++) {
+		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, d, attach->xattrs[i],
+					  &value, value_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (size >= 0) {
+			struct aa_perms *perms;
+
+			/*
+			 * Check the xattr presence before value. This ensure
+			 * that not present xattr can be distinguished from a 0
+			 * length value or rule that matches any value
+			 */
+			state = aa_dfa_null_transition(attach->xmatch->dfa,
+						       state);
+			/* Check xattr value */
+			state = aa_dfa_match_len(attach->xmatch->dfa, state,
+						 value, size);
+			perms = aa_lookup_perms(attach->xmatch, state);
+			if (!(perms->allow & MAY_EXEC)) {
+				ret = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		/* transition to next element */
+		state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch->dfa, state);
+		if (size < 0) {
+			/*
+			 * No xattr match, so verify if transition to
+			 * next element was valid. IFF so the xattr
+			 * was optional.
+			 */
+			if (!state) {
+				ret = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* don't count missing optional xattr as matched */
+			ret--;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	kfree(value);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes
+ * @bprm: binprm structure of transitioning task
+ * @ns: the current namespace  (NOT NULL)
+ * @head: profile list to walk  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: to match against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: info message if there was an error (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list.  There is a matching
+ * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses
+ * expressions to match, and matching expressions with the greatest
+ * xmatch_len are preferred.
+ *
+ * Requires: @head not be shared or have appropriate locks held
+ *
+ * Returns: label or NULL if no match found
+ */
+static struct aa_label *find_attach(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+				    struct aa_ns *ns, struct list_head *head,
+				    const char *name, const char **info)
+{
+	int candidate_len = 0, candidate_xattrs = 0;
+	bool conflict = false;
+	struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL;
+
+	AA_BUG(!name);
+	AA_BUG(!head);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+restart:
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(profile, head, base.list) {
+		struct aa_attachment *attach = &profile->attach;
+
+		if (profile->label.flags & FLAG_NULL &&
+		    &profile->label == ns_unconfined(profile->ns))
+			continue;
+
+		/* Find the "best" matching profile. Profiles must
+		 * match the path and extended attributes (if any)
+		 * associated with the file. A more specific path
+		 * match will be preferred over a less specific one,
+		 * and a match with more matching extended attributes
+		 * will be preferred over one with fewer. If the best
+		 * match has both the same level of path specificity
+		 * and the same number of matching extended attributes
+		 * as another profile, signal a conflict and refuse to
+		 * match.
+		 */
+		if (attach->xmatch->dfa) {
+			unsigned int count;
+			aa_state_t state;
+			struct aa_perms *perms;
+
+			state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(attach->xmatch->dfa,
+					attach->xmatch->start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH],
+					name, &count);
+			perms = aa_lookup_perms(attach->xmatch, state);
+			/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
+			if (perms->allow & MAY_EXEC) {
+				int ret = 0;
+
+				if (count < candidate_len)
+					continue;
+
+				if (bprm && attach->xattr_count) {
+					long rev = READ_ONCE(ns->revision);
+
+					if (!aa_get_profile_not0(profile))
+						goto restart;
+					rcu_read_unlock();
+					ret = aa_xattrs_match(bprm, profile,
+							      state);
+					rcu_read_lock();
+					aa_put_profile(profile);
+					if (rev !=
+					    READ_ONCE(ns->revision))
+						/* policy changed */
+						goto restart;
+					/*
+					 * Fail matching if the xattrs don't
+					 * match
+					 */
+					if (ret < 0)
+						continue;
+				}
+				/*
+				 * TODO: allow for more flexible best match
+				 *
+				 * The new match isn't more specific
+				 * than the current best match
+				 */
+				if (count == candidate_len &&
+				    ret <= candidate_xattrs) {
+					/* Match is equivalent, so conflict */
+					if (ret == candidate_xattrs)
+						conflict = true;
+					continue;
+				}
+
+				/* Either the same length with more matching
+				 * xattrs, or a longer match
+				 */
+				candidate = profile;
+				candidate_len = max(count, attach->xmatch_len);
+				candidate_xattrs = ret;
+				conflict = false;
+			}
+		} else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name)) {
+			/*
+			 * old exact non-re match, without conditionals such
+			 * as xattrs. no more searching required
+			 */
+			candidate = profile;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!candidate || conflict) {
+		if (conflict)
+			*info = CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+out:
+	candidate = aa_get_newest_profile(candidate);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return &candidate->label;
+}
+
+static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * x_table_lookup - lookup an x transition name via transition table
+ * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
+ * @xindex: index into x transition table
+ * @name: returns: name tested to find label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted label, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
+ *          @name will always be set with the last name tried
+ */
+struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
+				const char **name)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+	u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
+	int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
+	const char *next;
+
+	AA_BUG(!name);
+
+	/* index is guaranteed to be in range, validated at load time */
+	/* TODO: move lookup parsing to unpack time so this is a straight
+	 *       index into the resultant label
+	 */
+	for (next = rules->file->trans.table[index].strs; next;
+	     next = next_name(xtype, next)) {
+		const char *lookup = (*next == '&') ? next + 1 : next;
+		*name = next;
+		if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) {
+			/* TODO: switich to parse to get stack of child */
+			struct aa_profile *new = aa_find_child(profile, lookup);
+
+			if (new)
+				/* release by caller */
+				return &new->label;
+			continue;
+		}
+		label = aa_label_parse(&profile->label, lookup, GFP_KERNEL,
+				       true, false);
+		if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(label))
+			/* release by caller */
+			return label;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * x_to_label - get target label for a given xindex
+ * @profile: current profile  (NOT NULL)
+ * @bprm: binprm structure of transitioning task
+ * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL)
+ * @xindex: index into x transition table
+ * @lookupname: returns: name used in lookup if one was specified (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: info message if there was an error (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * find label for a transition index
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted label or NULL if not found available
+ */
+static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				   const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+				   const char *name, u32 xindex,
+				   const char **lookupname,
+				   const char **info)
+{
+	struct aa_label *new = NULL;
+	struct aa_label *stack = NULL;
+	struct aa_ns *ns = profile->ns;
+	u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
+	/* Used for info checks during fallback handling */
+	const char *old_info = NULL;
+
+	switch (xtype) {
+	case AA_X_NONE:
+		/* fail exec unless ix || ux fallback - handled by caller */
+		*lookupname = NULL;
+		break;
+	case AA_X_TABLE:
+		/* TODO: fix when perm mapping done at unload */
+		/* released by caller
+		 * if null for both stack and direct want to try fallback
+		 */
+		new = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex, lookupname);
+		if (!new || **lookupname != '&')
+			break;
+		stack = new;
+		new = NULL;
+		fallthrough;	/* to X_NAME */
+	case AA_X_NAME:
+		if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
+			/* released by caller */
+			new = find_attach(bprm, ns, &profile->base.profiles,
+					  name, info);
+		else
+			/* released by caller */
+			new = find_attach(bprm, ns, &ns->base.profiles,
+					  name, info);
+		*lookupname = name;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* fallback transition check */
+	if (!new) {
+		if (xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) {
+			/* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do
+			 * use the newest version
+			 */
+			if (*info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR) {
+				*info = CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_IX;
+			} else {
+				old_info = *info;
+				*info = "ix fallback";
+			}
+			/* no profile && no error */
+			new = aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
+		} else if (xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) {
+			new = aa_get_newest_label(ns_unconfined(profile->ns));
+			if (*info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR) {
+				*info = CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_UX;
+			} else {
+				old_info = *info;
+				*info = "ux fallback";
+			}
+		}
+		/* We set old_info on the code paths above where overwriting
+		 * could have happened, so now check if info was set by
+		 * find_attach as well (i.e. whether we actually overwrote)
+		 * and warn accordingly.
+		 */
+		if (old_info && old_info != CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR) {
+			pr_warn_ratelimited(
+				"AppArmor: find_attach (from profile %s) audit info \"%s\" dropped",
+				profile->base.hname, old_info);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (new && stack) {
+		/* base the stack on post domain transition */
+		struct aa_label *base = new;
+
+		new = aa_label_merge(base, stack, GFP_KERNEL);
+		/* null on error */
+		aa_put_label(base);
+	}
+
+	aa_put_label(stack);
+	/* released by caller */
+	return new;
+}
+
+static struct aa_label *profile_transition(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+					   struct aa_profile *profile,
+					   const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+					   char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
+					   bool *secure_exec)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_label *new = NULL;
+	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+	const char *info = NULL, *name = NULL, *target = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state = rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE];
+	struct aa_perms perms = {};
+	bool nonewprivs = false;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!bprm);
+	AA_BUG(!buffer);
+
+	error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, buffer,
+			     &name, &info, profile->disconnected);
+	if (error) {
+		if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
+		    (profile->label.flags & FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)) {
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "name lookup ix on error");
+			error = 0;
+			new = aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
+		}
+		name = bprm->filename;
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile)) {
+		new = find_attach(bprm, profile->ns,
+				  &profile->ns->base.profiles, name, &info);
+		/* info set -> something unusual that we should report
+		 * Currently this is only conflicting attachments, but other
+		 * infos added in the future should also be logged by default
+		 * and only excluded on a case-by-case basis
+		 */
+		if (info) {
+			/* Because perms is never used again after this audit
+			 * we don't need to care about clobbering it
+			 */
+			perms.audit |= MAY_EXEC;
+			perms.allow |= MAY_EXEC;
+			/* Don't cause error if auditing fails */
+			(void) aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms,
+				OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, target, new, cond->uid,
+				info, error);
+		}
+		if (new) {
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "unconfined attached to new label");
+			return new;
+		}
+		AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "unconfined exec no attachment");
+		return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
+	}
+
+	/* find exec permissions for name */
+	state = aa_str_perms(rules->file, state, name, cond, &perms);
+	if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) {
+		/* exec permission determine how to transition */
+		new = x_to_label(profile, bprm, name, perms.xindex, &target,
+				 &info);
+		if (new && new->proxy == profile->label.proxy && info) {
+			/* Force audit on conflicting attachment fallback
+			 * Because perms is never used again after this audit
+			 * we don't need to care about clobbering it
+			 */
+			if (info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_IX
+			    || info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_UX)
+				perms.audit |= MAY_EXEC;
+			/* hack ix fallback - improve how this is detected */
+			goto audit;
+		} else if (!new) {
+			if (info) {
+				pr_warn_ratelimited(
+					"AppArmor: %s (from profile %s) audit info \"%s\" dropped on missing transition",
+					__func__, profile->base.hname, info);
+			}
+			info = "profile transition not found";
+			/* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure or complaint */
+			perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
+			if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
+				/* create null profile instead of failing */
+				goto create_learning_profile;
+			}
+			error = -EACCES;
+		}
+	} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
+create_learning_profile:
+		/* no exec permission - learning mode */
+		new_profile = aa_new_learning_profile(profile, false, name,
+						      GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!new_profile) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			info = "could not create null profile";
+		} else {
+			error = -EACCES;
+			new = &new_profile->label;
+		}
+		perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
+	} else
+		/* fail exec */
+		error = -EACCES;
+
+	if (!new)
+		goto audit;
+
+
+	if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
+		if (DEBUG_ON) {
+			dbg_printk("apparmor: setting AT_SECURE for %s profile=",
+				   name);
+			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
+			dbg_printk("\n");
+		}
+		*secure_exec = true;
+	}
+
+audit:
+	aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name,
+		      target, new,
+		      cond->uid, info, error);
+	if (!new || nonewprivs) {
+		aa_put_label(new);
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
+	}
+
+	return new;
+}
+
+static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			  struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
+			  bool stack, const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			  char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
+			  bool *secure_exec)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	aa_state_t state = rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE];
+	struct aa_perms perms = {};
+	const char *xname = NULL, *info = "change_profile onexec";
+	int error = -EACCES;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!onexec);
+	AA_BUG(!bprm);
+	AA_BUG(!buffer);
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile)) {
+		/* change_profile on exec already granted */
+		/*
+		 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
+		 * even when no_new_privs is set because this always results
+		 * in a further reduction of permissions.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, buffer,
+			     &xname, &info, profile->disconnected);
+	if (error) {
+		if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
+		    (profile->label.flags & FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)) {
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "name lookup ix on error");
+			error = 0;
+		}
+		xname = bprm->filename;
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+	/* find exec permissions for name */
+	state = aa_str_perms(rules->file, state, xname, cond, &perms);
+	if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) {
+		info = "no change_onexec valid for executable";
+		goto audit;
+	}
+	/* test if this exec can be paired with change_profile onexec.
+	 * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing
+	 * exec\0change_profile
+	 */
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file->dfa, state);
+	error = change_profile_perms(profile, onexec, stack, AA_MAY_ONEXEC,
+				     state, &perms);
+	if (error) {
+		perms.allow &= ~AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+	if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
+		if (DEBUG_ON) {
+			dbg_printk("apparmor: setting AT_SECURE for %s label=",
+				   xname);
+			aa_label_printk(onexec, GFP_KERNEL);
+			dbg_printk("\n");
+		}
+		*secure_exec = true;
+	}
+
+audit:
+	return aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_EXEC,
+			     AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname,
+			     NULL, onexec, cond->uid, info, error);
+}
+
+/* ensure none ns domain transitions are correctly applied with onexec */
+static struct aa_label *label_merge_wrap(struct aa_label *a, struct aa_label *b,
+					 gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_label_merge(a, b, gfp);
+
+	if (!label)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	return label;
+}
+
+static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+				      struct aa_label *label,
+				      struct aa_label *onexec, bool stack,
+				      const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+				      char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
+				      bool *unsafe)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *new;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!onexec);
+	AA_BUG(!bprm);
+	AA_BUG(!buffer);
+
+	/* TODO: determine how much we want to loosen this
+	 * only check profiles in scope for permission to change at exec
+	 */
+	error = fn_for_each_in_scope(label, profile,
+			profile_onexec(subj_cred, profile, onexec, stack,
+				       bprm, buffer, cond, unsafe));
+	if (error)
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
+
+	new = fn_label_build_in_scope(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
+			stack ? label_merge_wrap(&profile->label, onexec,
+						 GFP_KERNEL)
+			      : aa_get_newest_label(onexec),
+			profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm,
+					   buffer, cond, unsafe));
+	AA_BUG(!new);
+	if (!IS_ERR(new))
+		return new;
+
+	/* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */
+	error = fn_for_each_in_scope(label, profile,
+			aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms,
+				      OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC,
+				      AA_MAY_ONEXEC, bprm->filename, NULL,
+				      onexec, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
+				      "failed to build target label",
+				      PTR_ERR(new)));
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec - Update the new creds on the bprm struct
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
+ *
+ * TODO: once the other paths are done see if we can't refactor into a fn
+ */
+int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL;
+	const struct cred *subj_cred;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+	const char *info = NULL;
+	int error = 0;
+	bool unsafe = false;
+	vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(file_mnt_idmap(bprm->file),
+					    file_inode(bprm->file));
+	struct path_cond cond = {
+		vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
+		file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
+	};
+
+	subj_cred = current_cred();
+	ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred));
+	AA_BUG(!ctx);
+
+	label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
+
+	/*
+	 * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it
+	 * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp
+	 * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet.
+	 *
+	 * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test
+	 */
+	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && !unconfined(label) &&
+	    !ctx->nnp)
+		ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
+
+	/* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	if (!buffer) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* Test for onexec first as onexec override other x transitions. */
+	if (ctx->onexec)
+		new = handle_onexec(subj_cred, label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token,
+				    bprm, buffer, &cond, &unsafe);
+	else
+		new = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
+				profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm,
+						   buffer,
+						   &cond, &unsafe));
+	AA_BUG(!new);
+	if (IS_ERR(new)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(new);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* Policy has specified a domain transitions. If no_new_privs and
+	 * confined ensure the transition is to confinement that is subset
+	 * of the confinement when the task entered no new privs.
+	 *
+	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked
+	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
+	 * always results in a further reduction of permissions.
+	 */
+	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
+	    !unconfined(label) &&
+	    !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
+		error = -EPERM;
+		info = "no new privs";
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
+		/* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */
+		;
+	}
+
+	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)) {
+		/* TODO: test needs to be profile of label to new */
+		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(bprm->cred, new, &info);
+		if (error)
+			goto audit;
+	}
+
+	if (unsafe) {
+		if (DEBUG_ON) {
+			dbg_printk("setting AT_SECURE for %s label=",
+				   bprm->filename);
+			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
+			dbg_printk("\n");
+		}
+		bprm->secureexec = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (label->proxy != new->proxy) {
+		/* when transitioning clear unsafe personality bits */
+		if (DEBUG_ON) {
+			dbg_printk("apparmor: clearing unsafe personality bits. %s label=",
+				   bprm->filename);
+			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
+			dbg_printk("\n");
+		}
+		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+	}
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
+	/* transfer reference, released when cred is freed */
+	set_cred_label(bprm->cred, new);
+
+done:
+	aa_put_label(label);
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+
+	return error;
+
+audit:
+	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+			aa_audit_file(current_cred(), profile, &nullperms,
+				      OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
+				      bprm->filename, NULL, new,
+				      vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid), info, error));
+	aa_put_label(new);
+	goto done;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Functions for self directed profile change
+ */
+
+
+/* helper fn for change_hat
+ *
+ * Returns: label for hat transition OR ERR_PTR.  Does NOT return NULL
+ */
+static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+					 struct aa_profile *profile,
+					 const char *name, bool sibling)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *root, *hat = NULL;
+	const char *info = NULL;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (sibling && PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) {
+		root = aa_get_profile_rcu(&profile->parent);
+	} else if (!sibling && !PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) {
+		root = aa_get_profile(profile);
+	} else {
+		info = "conflicting target types";
+		error = -EPERM;
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+	hat = aa_find_child(root, name);
+	if (!hat) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
+			hat = aa_new_learning_profile(profile, true, name,
+						      GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!hat) {
+				info = "failed null profile create";
+				error = -ENOMEM;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	aa_put_profile(root);
+
+audit:
+	aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+		      AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT,
+		      name, hat ? hat->base.hname : NULL,
+		      hat ? &hat->label : NULL, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info,
+		      error);
+	if (!hat || (error && error != -ENOENT))
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
+	/* if hat && error - complain mode, already audited and we adjust for
+	 * complain mode allow by returning hat->label
+	 */
+	return &hat->label;
+}
+
+/* helper fn for changing into a hat
+ *
+ * Returns: label for hat transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL
+ */
+static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+				   struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[],
+				   int count, int flags)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile, *root, *hat = NULL;
+	struct aa_ns *ns, *new_ns;
+	struct aa_label *new;
+	struct label_it it;
+	bool sibling = false;
+	const char *name, *info = NULL;
+	int i, error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!hats);
+	AA_BUG(count < 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Acquire the newest label and then hold the lock until we choose a
+	 * hat, so that profile replacement doesn't atomically truncate the
+	 * list of potential hats. Because we are getting the namespaces from
+	 * the profiles and label, we can rely on the namespaces being live
+	 * and avoid incrementing their refcounts while grabbing the lock.
+	 */
+	label = aa_get_label(label);
+	ns = labels_ns(label);
+
+retry:
+	mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level);
+	if (label_is_stale(label)) {
+		new = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+		new_ns = labels_ns(new);
+		if (new_ns != ns) {
+			aa_put_label(new);
+			mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+			ns = new_ns;
+			label = new;
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		aa_put_label(label);
+		label = new;
+	}
+
+	if (PROFILE_IS_HAT(labels_profile(label)))
+		sibling = true;
+
+	/*find first matching hat */
+	for (i = 0; i < count && !hat; i++) {
+		name = hats[i];
+		label_for_each_in_scope(it, labels_ns(label), label, profile) {
+			if (sibling && PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) {
+				root = aa_get_profile(profile->parent);
+			} else if (!sibling && !PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) {
+				root = aa_get_profile(profile);
+			} else {	/* conflicting change type */
+				info = "conflicting targets types";
+				error = -EPERM;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			hat = aa_find_child(root, name);
+			aa_put_profile(root);
+			if (!hat) {
+				if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+					goto outer_continue;
+				/* complain mode succeed as if hat */
+			} else if (!PROFILE_IS_HAT(hat)) {
+				info = "target not hat";
+				error = -EPERM;
+				aa_put_profile(hat);
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			aa_put_profile(hat);
+		}
+		/* found a hat for all profiles in ns */
+		goto build;
+outer_continue:
+	;
+	}
+	/* no hats that match, find appropriate error
+	 *
+	 * In complain mode audit of the failure is based off of the first
+	 * hat supplied.  This is done due how userspace interacts with
+	 * change_hat.
+	 */
+	name = NULL;
+	label_for_each_in_scope(it, labels_ns(label), label, profile) {
+		if (!list_empty(&profile->base.profiles)) {
+			info = "hat not found";
+			error = -ENOENT;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	info = "no hats defined";
+	error = -ECHILD;
+
+fail:
+	label_for_each_in_scope(it, labels_ns(label), label, profile) {
+		/*
+		 * no target as it has failed to be found or built
+		 *
+		 * change_hat uses probing and should not log failures
+		 * related to missing hats
+		 */
+		/* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */
+		if (count > 1 || COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
+			aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms,
+				      OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+				      AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, name, NULL, NULL,
+				      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
+
+build:
+	new = fn_label_build_in_scope(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
+				   build_change_hat(subj_cred, profile, name,
+						    sibling),
+				   aa_get_label(&profile->label));
+	mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+	AA_BUG(!new);
+	/* return new label or error ptr */
+
+	return new;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile
+ * @hats: vector of hat names to try changing into (MAYBE NULL if @count == 0)
+ * @count: number of hat names in @hats
+ * @token: magic value to validate the hat change
+ * @flags: flags affecting behavior of the change
+ *
+ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
+ *
+ * Change to the first profile specified in @hats that exists, and store
+ * the @hat_magic in the current task context.  If the count == 0 and the
+ * @token matches that stored in the current task context, return to the
+ * top level profile.
+ *
+ * change_hat only applies to profiles in the current ns, and each profile
+ * in the ns must make the same transition otherwise change_hat will fail.
+ */
+int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
+{
+	const struct cred *subj_cred;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_perms perms = {};
+	const char *info = NULL;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	/* released below */
+	subj_cred = get_current_cred();
+	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(subj_cred);
+	previous = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
+
+	/*
+	 * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it
+	 * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp
+	 * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet.
+	 *
+	 * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test
+	 */
+	if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !ctx->nnp)
+		ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
+
+	/* return -EPERM when unconfined doesn't have children to avoid
+	 * changing the traditional error code for unconfined.
+	 */
+	if (unconfined(label)) {
+		struct label_it i;
+		bool empty = true;
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		label_for_each_in_scope(i, labels_ns(label), label, profile) {
+			empty &= list_empty(&profile->base.profiles);
+		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		if (empty) {
+			info = "unconfined can not change_hat";
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (count) {
+		new = change_hat(subj_cred, label, hats, count, flags);
+		AA_BUG(!new);
+		if (IS_ERR(new)) {
+			error = PTR_ERR(new);
+			new = NULL;
+			/* already audited */
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* target cred is the same as current except new label */
+		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(subj_cred, new, &info);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail;
+
+		/*
+		 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
+		 * reduce restrictions.
+		 */
+		if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
+		    !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
+			/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN,
+				 "no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)
+			goto out;
+
+		target = new;
+		error = aa_set_current_hat(new, token);
+		if (error == -EACCES)
+			/* kill task in case of brute force attacks */
+			goto kill;
+	} else if (previous && !(flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)) {
+		/*
+		 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
+		 * reduce restrictions.
+		 */
+		if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
+		    !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(previous, ctx->nnp)) {
+			/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN,
+				 "no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* Return to saved label.  Kill task if restore fails
+		 * to avoid brute force attacks
+		 */
+		target = previous;
+		error = aa_restore_previous_label(token);
+		if (error) {
+			if (error == -EACCES)
+				goto kill;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	} /* else ignore @flags && restores when there is no saved profile */
+
+out:
+	aa_put_label(new);
+	aa_put_label(previous);
+	aa_put_label(label);
+	put_cred(subj_cred);
+
+	return error;
+
+kill:
+	info = "failed token match";
+	perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT;
+
+fail:
+	fn_for_each_in_scope(label, profile,
+		aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+			      AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, NULL, target,
+			      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error));
+
+	goto out;
+}
+
+
+static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name,
+					const struct cred *subj_cred,
+					struct aa_profile *profile,
+					struct aa_label *target, bool stack,
+					u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	const char *info = NULL;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (!error)
+		error = change_profile_perms(profile, target, stack, request,
+					     rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
+					     perms);
+	if (error)
+		error = aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, perms, op, request,
+				      name,
+				      NULL, target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info,
+				      error);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static const char *stack_msg = "change_profile unprivileged unconfined converted to stacking";
+
+/**
+ * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
+ * @fqname: name of profile may include namespace (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags affecting change behavior
+ *
+ * Change to new profile @name.  Unlike with hats, there is no way
+ * to change back.  If @name isn't specified the current profile name is
+ * used.
+ * If @onexec then the transition is delayed until
+ * the next exec.
+ *
+ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
+ */
+int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_perms perms = {};
+	const char *info = NULL;
+	const char *auditname = fqname;		/* retain leading & if stack */
+	bool stack = flags & AA_CHANGE_STACK;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	const struct cred *subj_cred = get_current_cred();
+	int error = 0;
+	char *op;
+	u32 request;
+
+	label = aa_get_current_label();
+
+	/*
+	 * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it
+	 * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp
+	 * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet.
+	 *
+	 * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test
+	 */
+	if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !ctx->nnp)
+		ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
+
+	if (!fqname || !*fqname) {
+		aa_put_label(label);
+		AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "no profile name");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC) {
+		request = AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
+		if (stack)
+			op = OP_STACK_ONEXEC;
+		else
+			op = OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC;
+	} else {
+		request = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
+		if (stack)
+			op = OP_STACK;
+		else
+			op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE;
+	}
+
+	/* This should move to a per profile test. Requires pushing build
+	 * into callback
+	 */
+	if (!stack && unconfined(label) &&
+	    label == &labels_ns(label)->unconfined->label &&
+	    aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted &&
+	    /* TODO: refactor so this check is a fn */
+	    cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE,
+			CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
+		/* regardless of the request in this case apparmor
+		 * stacks against unconfined so admin set policy can't be
+		 * by-passed
+		 */
+		stack = true;
+		perms.audit = request;
+		(void) fn_for_each_in_scope(label, profile,
+				aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, op,
+					      request, auditname, NULL, target,
+					      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, stack_msg, 0));
+		perms.audit = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (*fqname == '&') {
+		stack = true;
+		/* don't have label_parse() do stacking */
+		fqname++;
+	}
+	target = aa_label_parse(label, fqname, GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
+	if (IS_ERR(target)) {
+		struct aa_profile *tprofile;
+
+		info = "label not found";
+		error = PTR_ERR(target);
+		target = NULL;
+		/*
+		 * TODO: fixme using labels_profile is not right - do profile
+		 * per complain profile
+		 */
+		if ((flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST) ||
+		    !COMPLAIN_MODE(labels_profile(label)))
+			goto audit;
+		/* released below */
+		tprofile = aa_new_learning_profile(labels_profile(label), false,
+						   fqname, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!tprofile) {
+			info = "failed null profile create";
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto audit;
+		}
+		target = &tprofile->label;
+		goto check;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * self directed transitions only apply to current policy ns
+	 * TODO: currently requiring perms for stacking and straight change
+	 *       stacking doesn't strictly need this. Determine how much
+	 *       we want to loosen this restriction for stacking
+	 *
+	 * if (!stack) {
+	 */
+	error = fn_for_each_in_scope(label, profile,
+			change_profile_perms_wrapper(op, auditname,
+						     subj_cred,
+						     profile, target, stack,
+						     request, &perms));
+	if (error)
+		/* auditing done in change_profile_perms_wrapper */
+		goto out;
+
+	/* } */
+
+check:
+	/* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
+	error = may_change_ptraced_domain(subj_cred, target, &info);
+	if (error && !fn_for_each_in_scope(label, profile,
+					COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)))
+		goto audit;
+
+	/* TODO: add permission check to allow this
+	 * if ((flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC) && !current_is_single_threaded()) {
+	 *      info = "not a single threaded task";
+	 *      error = -EACCES;
+	 *      goto audit;
+	 * }
+	 */
+	if (flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* stacking is always a subset, so only check the nonstack case */
+	if (!stack) {
+		new = fn_label_build_in_scope(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
+					   aa_get_label(target),
+					   aa_get_label(&profile->label));
+		AA_BUG(!new);
+		if (IS_ERR(new))
+			goto build_fail;
+		/*
+		 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
+		 * reduce restrictions.
+		 */
+		if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
+		    !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
+			/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN,
+				 "no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC)) {
+		/* only transition profiles in the current ns */
+		if (stack)
+			new = aa_label_merge(label, target, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(new))
+			goto build_fail;
+		error = aa_replace_current_label(new);
+	} else {
+		/* new will be recomputed so at exec time. So discard */
+		aa_put_label(new);
+		new = NULL;
+
+		/* full transition will be built in exec path */
+		aa_set_current_onexec(target, stack);
+	}
+
+	goto audit;
+
+build_fail:
+	info = "failed to build target label";
+	if (!new)
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+	else
+		error = PTR_ERR(new);
+	new = NULL;
+	perms.allow = 0;
+
+audit:
+	error = fn_for_each_in_scope(label, profile,
+			aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+				      profile, &perms, op, request, auditname,
+				      NULL, new ? new : target,
+				      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error));
+
+out:
+	aa_put_label(new);
+	aa_put_label(target);
+	aa_put_label(label);
+	put_cred(subj_cred);
+
+	return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c9d55fe10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,747 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+
+static u32 map_mask_to_chr_mask(u32 mask)
+{
+	u32 m = mask & PERMS_CHRS_MASK;
+
+	if (mask & AA_MAY_GETATTR)
+		m |= MAY_READ;
+	if (mask & (AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN))
+		m |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+	return m;
+}
+
+/**
+ * file_audit_cb - call back for file specific audit fields
+ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
+	kuid_t fsuid = ad->subj_cred ? ad->subj_cred->fsuid : current_fsuid();
+	char str[10];
+
+	if (ad->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+		aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs,
+				    map_mask_to_chr_mask(ad->request));
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"", str);
+	}
+	if (ad->denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+		aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs,
+				    map_mask_to_chr_mask(ad->denied));
+		audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"", str);
+	}
+	if (ad->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d",
+				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fsuid));
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d",
+				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, ad->fs.ouid));
+	}
+
+	if (ad->peer) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
+		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
+				FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, GFP_KERNEL);
+	} else if (ad->fs.target) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->fs.target);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations
+ * @subj_cred: cred of the subject
+ * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
+ * @op: operation being mediated
+ * @request: permissions requested
+ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @target: name of target (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @tlabel: target label (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @ouid: object uid
+ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_audit_file(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
+		  const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
+		  const char *target, struct aa_label *tlabel,
+		  kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
+{
+	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_FILE, op);
+
+	ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
+	ad.request = request;
+	ad.tags = perms->tag;
+	ad.name = name;
+	ad.fs.target = target;
+	ad.peer = tlabel;
+	ad.fs.ouid = ouid;
+	ad.info = info;
+	ad.error = error;
+	ad.common.u.tsk = NULL;
+
+	if (likely(!ad.error)) {
+		u32 mask = perms->audit;
+
+		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
+			mask = 0xffff;
+
+		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
+		ad.request &= mask;
+
+		if (likely(!ad.request))
+			return 0;
+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+	} else {
+		/* only report permissions that were denied */
+		ad.request = ad.request & ~perms->allow;
+		AA_BUG(!ad.request);
+
+		if (ad.request & perms->kill)
+			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
+		if ((ad.request & perms->quiet) &&
+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+			ad.request &= ~perms->quiet;
+
+		if (!ad.request)
+			return ad.error;
+	}
+
+	ad.denied = ad.request & ~perms->allow;
+	return aa_audit(type, profile, &ad, file_audit_cb);
+}
+
+static int path_name(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		     struct aa_label *label,
+		     const struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
+		     const char **name, struct path_cond *cond, u32 request)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	const char *info = NULL;
+	int error;
+
+	/* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */
+	if (unlikely(path->dentry == aa_null.dentry))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	error = aa_path_name(path, flags, buffer, name, &info,
+			     labels_profile(label)->disconnected);
+	if (error) {
+		fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+				      profile, &nullperms, op, request, *name,
+				      NULL, NULL, cond->uid, info, error));
+		return error;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct aa_perms default_perms = {};
+/**
+ * aa_lookup_condperms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms
+ * @subj_uid: uid to use for subject owner test
+ * @rules: the aa_policydb to lookup perms for  (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: state in dfa
+ * @cond:  conditions to consider  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry
+ *
+ * Returns: a pointer to a file permission set
+ */
+struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_condperms(kuid_t subj_uid, struct aa_policydb *rules,
+				     aa_state_t state, struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+	unsigned int index = ACCEPT_TABLE(rules->dfa)[state];
+
+	if (!(rules->perms))
+		return &default_perms;
+
+	if ((ACCEPT_TABLE2(rules->dfa)[state] & ACCEPT_FLAG_OWNER)) {
+		if (uid_eq(subj_uid, cond->uid))
+			return &(rules->perms[index]);
+		return &(rules->perms[index + 1]);
+	}
+
+	return &(rules->perms[index]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_str_perms - find permission that match @name
+ * @file_rules: the aa_policydb to match against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: state to start matching in
+ * @name: string to match against dfa  (NOT NULL)
+ * @cond: conditions to consider for permission set computation  (NOT NULL)
+ * @perms: Returns - the permissions found when matching @name
+ *
+ * Returns: the final state in @dfa when beginning @start and walking @name
+ */
+aa_state_t aa_str_perms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, aa_state_t start,
+			const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
+			struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	aa_state_t state;
+	state = aa_dfa_match(file_rules->dfa, start, name);
+	*perms = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(), file_rules, state,
+				       cond));
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		   struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
+		   u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
+		   struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	int e = 0;
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
+	    ((flags & PATH_SOCK_COND) && !RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules)))
+		return 0;
+	aa_str_perms(rules->file, rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
+		     name, cond, perms);
+	if (request & ~perms->allow)
+		e = -EACCES;
+	return aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+			     profile, perms, op, request, name, NULL, NULL,
+			     cond->uid, NULL, e);
+}
+
+
+static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_profile *profile,
+			     const struct path *path, char *buffer, u32 request,
+			     struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
+			     struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	const char *name = NULL;
+	int error;
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+		return 0;
+
+	error = path_name(op, subj_cred, &profile->label, path,
+			  flags | profile->path_flags, buffer, &name, cond,
+			  request);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+	return __aa_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile, name, request, cond,
+			      flags, perms);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @subj_cred: subject cred
+ * @label: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @path: path to check permissions of  (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies
+ * @request: requested permissions
+ * @cond: conditional info for this request  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error
+ */
+int aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label,
+		 const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request,
+		 struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms = {};
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+	int error;
+
+	flags |= PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED | (S_ISDIR(cond->mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR :
+								0);
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile, path, buffer,
+					  request, cond, flags, &perms));
+
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * xindex_is_subset - helper for aa_path_link
+ * @link: link permission set
+ * @target: target permission set
+ *
+ * test target x permissions are equal OR a subset of link x permissions
+ * this is done as part of the subset test, where a hardlink must have
+ * a subset of permissions that the target has.
+ *
+ * Returns: true if subset else false
+ */
+static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target)
+{
+	if (((link & ~AA_X_UNSAFE) != (target & ~AA_X_UNSAFE)) ||
+	    ((link & AA_X_UNSAFE) && !(target & AA_X_UNSAFE)))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int profile_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_profile *profile,
+			     const struct path *link, char *buffer,
+			     const struct path *target, char *buffer2,
+			     struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	const char *lname = NULL, *tname = NULL;
+	struct aa_perms lperms = {}, perms;
+	const char *info = NULL;
+	u32 request = AA_MAY_LINK;
+	aa_state_t state;
+	int error;
+
+	error = path_name(OP_LINK, subj_cred, &profile->label, link,
+			  profile->path_flags,
+			  buffer, &lname, cond, AA_MAY_LINK);
+	if (error)
+		goto audit;
+
+	/* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
+	error = path_name(OP_LINK, subj_cred, &profile->label, target,
+			  profile->path_flags,
+			  buffer2, &tname, cond, AA_MAY_LINK);
+	if (error)
+		goto audit;
+
+	error = -EACCES;
+	/* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */
+	state = aa_str_perms(rules->file,
+			     rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], lname,
+			     cond, &lperms);
+
+	if (!(lperms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK))
+		goto audit;
+
+	/* test to see if target can be paired with link */
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file->dfa, state);
+	aa_str_perms(rules->file, state, tname, cond, &perms);
+
+	/* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry
+	 * in the link pair.
+	 */
+	lperms.audit = perms.audit;
+	lperms.quiet = perms.quiet;
+	lperms.kill = perms.kill;
+
+	if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK)) {
+		info = "target restricted";
+		lperms = perms;
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+	/* done if link subset test is not required */
+	if (!(perms.allow & AA_LINK_SUBSET))
+		goto done_tests;
+
+	/* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are
+	 * a subset of the allowed permissions on target.
+	 */
+	aa_str_perms(rules->file, rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
+		     tname, cond, &perms);
+
+	/* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */
+	request = lperms.allow & ~AA_MAY_LINK;
+	lperms.allow &= perms.allow | AA_MAY_LINK;
+
+	request |= AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK & (lperms.allow & ~perms.allow);
+	if (request & ~lperms.allow) {
+		goto audit;
+	} else if ((lperms.allow & MAY_EXEC) &&
+		   !xindex_is_subset(lperms.xindex, perms.xindex)) {
+		lperms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
+		request |= MAY_EXEC;
+		info = "link not subset of target";
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+done_tests:
+	error = 0;
+
+audit:
+	return aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+			     profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request, lname, tname,
+			     NULL, cond->uid, info, error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
+ * @subj_cred: subject cred
+ * @label: the label being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @old_dentry: the target dentry  (NOT NULL)
+ * @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in  (NOT NULL)
+ * @new_dentry: the link being created  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Handle the permission test for a link & target pair.  Permission
+ * is encoded as a pair where the link permission is determined
+ * first, and if allowed, the target is tested.  The target test
+ * is done from the point of the link match (not start of DFA)
+ * making the target permission dependent on the link permission match.
+ *
+ * The subset test if required forces that permissions granted
+ * on link are a subset of the permission granted to target.
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 if allowed else error
+ */
+int aa_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+		 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct path link = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = new_dentry };
+	struct path target = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = old_dentry };
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(old_dentry);
+	vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(target.mnt), inode);
+	struct path_cond cond = {
+		.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
+		.mode = inode->i_mode,
+	};
+	char *buffer = NULL, *buffer2 = NULL;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	int error;
+
+	/* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	buffer2 = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	error = -ENOMEM;
+	if (!buffer || !buffer2)
+		goto out;
+
+	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			profile_path_link(subj_cred, profile, &link, buffer,
+					  &target, buffer2, &cond));
+out:
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer2);
+	return error;
+}
+
+static void update_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *fctx, struct aa_label *label,
+			    u32 request)
+{
+	struct aa_label *l, *old;
+
+	/* update caching of label on file_ctx */
+	spin_lock(&fctx->lock);
+	old = rcu_dereference_protected(fctx->label,
+					lockdep_is_held(&fctx->lock));
+	l = aa_label_merge(old, label, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (l) {
+		if (l != old) {
+			rcu_assign_pointer(fctx->label, l);
+			aa_put_label(old);
+		} else
+			aa_put_label(l);
+		fctx->allow |= request;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&fctx->lock);
+}
+
+static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			    struct aa_label *label,
+			    struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
+			    u32 request, u32 denied, bool in_atomic)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_perms perms = {};
+	vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(file_mnt_idmap(file),
+					    file_inode(file));
+	struct path_cond cond = {
+		.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
+		.mode = file_inode(file)->i_mode
+	};
+	char *buffer;
+	int flags, error;
+
+	/* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */
+	if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label))
+		/* TODO: check for revocation on stale profiles */
+		return 0;
+
+	flags = PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED | (S_ISDIR(cond.mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0);
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(in_atomic);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* check every profile in task label not in current cache */
+	error = fn_for_each_not_in_set(flabel, label, profile,
+			profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile,
+					  &file->f_path, buffer,
+					  request, &cond, flags, &perms));
+	if (denied && !error) {
+		/*
+		 * check every profile in file label that was not tested
+		 * in the initial check above.
+		 *
+		 * TODO: cache full perms so this only happens because of
+		 * conditionals
+		 * TODO: don't audit here
+		 */
+		if (label == flabel)
+			error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+				profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred,
+						  profile, &file->f_path,
+						  buffer, request, &cond, flags,
+						  &perms));
+		else
+			error = fn_for_each_not_in_set(label, flabel, profile,
+				profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred,
+						  profile, &file->f_path,
+						  buffer, request, &cond, flags,
+						  &perms));
+	}
+	if (!error)
+		update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request);
+
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			    struct aa_label *label,
+			    struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
+			    u32 request, u32 denied)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	/* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */
+	if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */
+	error = aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, file);
+	if (denied) {
+		/* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */
+		/* check every profile in file label to is cached */
+		last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, flabel, op,
+						    request, file));
+	}
+	if (!error)
+		update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* for now separate fn to indicate semantics of the check */
+static bool __file_is_delegated(struct aa_label *obj_label)
+{
+	return unconfined(obj_label);
+}
+
+static bool __is_unix_file(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
+
+	lockdep_assert_in_rcu_read_lock();
+
+	if (!S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+		return false;
+	/* sock and sock->sk can be NULL for sockets being set up or torn down */
+	if (!sock || !sock->sk)
+		return false;
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool __unix_needs_revalidation(struct file *file, struct aa_label *label,
+				      u32 request)
+{
+	struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
+
+	AA_BUG(!__is_unix_file(file));
+	lockdep_assert_in_rcu_read_lock();
+
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *skctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
+
+	if (rcu_access_pointer(skctx->peer) !=
+	    rcu_access_pointer(skctx->peer_lastupdate))
+		return true;
+
+	return !__aa_subj_label_is_cached(rcu_dereference(skctx->label), label);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @subj_cred: subject cred
+ * @label: label being enforced   (NOT NULL)
+ * @file: file to revalidate access permissions on  (NOT NULL)
+ * @request: requested permissions
+ * @in_atomic: whether allocations need to be done in atomic context
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
+ */
+int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
+		 u32 request, bool in_atomic)
+{
+	struct aa_file_ctx *fctx;
+	struct aa_label *flabel;
+	u32 denied;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!file);
+
+	/* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */
+	if (unlikely(file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	fctx = file_ctx(file);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	flabel  = rcu_dereference(fctx->label);
+	AA_BUG(!flabel);
+
+	/* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
+	 * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
+	 * was granted.
+	 *
+	 * Note: the test for !unconfined(flabel) is to handle file
+	 *       delegation from unconfined tasks
+	 */
+	denied = request & ~fctx->allow;
+	if (unconfined(label) || __file_is_delegated(flabel) ||
+	    (!denied && __is_unix_file(file) && !__unix_needs_revalidation(file, label, request)) ||
+	    (!denied && __aa_subj_label_is_cached(label, flabel))) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* slow path - revalidate access */
+	flabel  = aa_get_newest_label(flabel);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
+		error = __file_path_perm(op, subj_cred, label, flabel, file,
+					 request, denied, in_atomic);
+
+	else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+		error = __file_sock_perm(op, subj_cred, label, flabel, file,
+					 request, denied);
+	aa_put_label(flabel);
+
+done:
+	return error;
+}
+
+static void revalidate_tty(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	struct tty_struct *tty;
+	int drop_tty = 0;
+
+	tty = get_current_tty();
+	if (!tty)
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
+	if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
+		struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
+		struct file *file;
+		/* TODO: Revalidate access to controlling tty. */
+		file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
+					     struct tty_file_private, list);
+		file = file_priv->file;
+
+		if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, subj_cred, label, file,
+				 MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, IN_ATOMIC))
+			drop_tty = 1;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
+	tty_kref_put(tty);
+
+	if (drop_tty)
+		no_tty();
+}
+
+struct cred_label {
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+};
+
+static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned int fd)
+{
+	struct cred_label *cl = (struct cred_label *)p;
+
+	if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, cl->cred, cl->label, file,
+			 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), IN_ATOMIC))
+		return fd + 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* based on selinux's flush_unauthorized_files */
+void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+	struct cred_label cl = {
+		.cred = cred,
+		.label = label,
+	};
+	struct file *devnull = NULL;
+	unsigned int n;
+
+	revalidate_tty(cred, label);
+
+	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
+	n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, &cl);
+	if (!n) /* none found? */
+		goto out;
+
+	devnull = dentry_open(&aa_null, O_RDWR, cred);
+	if (IS_ERR(devnull))
+		devnull = NULL;
+	/* replace all the matching ones with this */
+	do {
+		replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
+	} while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, &cl)) != 0);
+	if (devnull)
+		fput(devnull);
+out:
+	aa_put_label(label);
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h b/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4a62e600d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor af_unix fine grained mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2023 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+#ifndef __AA_AF_UNIX_H
+
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+
+#include "label.h"
+
+#define unix_addr(A) ((struct sockaddr_un *)(A))
+#define unix_addr_len(L) ((L) - sizeof(sa_family_t))
+#define unix_peer(sk) (unix_sk(sk)->peer)
+#define is_unix_addr_abstract_name(B) ((B)[0] == 0)
+#define is_unix_addr_anon(A, L) ((A) && unix_addr_len(L) <= 0)
+#define is_unix_addr_fs(A, L) (!is_unix_addr_anon(A, L) && \
+			    !is_unix_addr_abstract_name(unix_addr(A)->sun_path))
+
+#define is_unix_anonymous(U) (!unix_sk(U)->addr)
+#define is_unix_fs(U) (!is_unix_anonymous(U) &&			\
+		       unix_sk(U)->addr->name->sun_path[0])
+#define is_unix_connected(S) ((S)->state == SS_CONNECTED)
+
+
+struct sockaddr_un *aa_sunaddr(const struct unix_sock *u, int *addrlen);
+int aa_unix_peer_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		      struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk,
+		      struct aa_label *peer_label);
+int aa_unix_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock);
+int aa_unix_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
+			int protocol);
+int aa_unix_bind_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+		      int addrlen);
+int aa_unix_connect_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+			 int addrlen);
+int aa_unix_listen_perm(struct socket *sock, int backlog);
+int aa_unix_accept_perm(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+int aa_unix_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+		     struct msghdr *msg, int size);
+int aa_unix_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, int level,
+		     int optname);
+int aa_unix_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      const char *op, u32 request, struct file *file);
+
+#endif /* __AA_AF_UNIX_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cc6e3df1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor basic global
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __APPARMOR_H
+#define __APPARMOR_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * Class of mediation types in the AppArmor policy db
+ */
+#define AA_CLASS_NONE		0
+#define AA_CLASS_UNKNOWN	1
+#define AA_CLASS_FILE		2
+#define AA_CLASS_CAP		3
+#define AA_CLASS_DEPRECATED	4
+#define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
+#define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
+#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT		7
+#define AA_CLASS_PTRACE		9
+#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL		10
+#define AA_CLASS_XMATCH		11
+#define AA_CLASS_NET		14
+#define AA_CLASS_NETV9		15
+#define AA_CLASS_LABEL		16
+#define AA_CLASS_POSIX_MQUEUE	17
+#define AA_CLASS_MODULE		19
+#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM	20
+#define AA_CLASS_NS		21
+#define AA_CLASS_IO_URING	22
+
+#define AA_CLASS_X		31
+#define AA_CLASS_DBUS		32
+
+/* NOTE: if AA_CLASS_LAST > 63 need to update label->mediates */
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_DBUS
+
+/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
+extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+extern bool aa_g_audit_header;
+extern int aa_g_debug;
+extern bool aa_g_hash_policy;
+extern bool aa_g_export_binary;
+extern int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level;
+extern bool aa_g_lock_policy;
+extern bool aa_g_logsyscall;
+extern bool aa_g_paranoid_load;
+extern unsigned int aa_g_path_max;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
+#define AA_MIN_CLEVEL zstd_min_clevel()
+#define AA_MAX_CLEVEL zstd_max_clevel()
+#define AA_DEFAULT_CLEVEL ZSTD_CLEVEL_DEFAULT
+#else
+#define AA_MIN_CLEVEL 0
+#define AA_MAX_CLEVEL 0
+#define AA_DEFAULT_CLEVEL 0
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
+
+
+#endif /* __APPARMOR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..33243d11f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor filesystem definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_APPARMORFS_H
+#define __AA_APPARMORFS_H
+
+extern struct path aa_null;
+
+enum aa_sfs_type {
+	AA_SFS_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
+	AA_SFS_TYPE_STRING,
+	AA_SFS_TYPE_U64,
+	AA_SFS_TYPE_FOPS,
+	AA_SFS_TYPE_DIR,
+};
+
+struct aa_sfs_entry;
+
+struct aa_sfs_entry {
+	const char *name;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	umode_t mode;
+	enum aa_sfs_type v_type;
+	union {
+		bool boolean;
+		char *string;
+		unsigned long u64;
+		struct aa_sfs_entry *files;
+	} v;
+	const struct file_operations *file_ops;
+};
+
+extern const struct file_operations aa_sfs_seq_file_ops;
+
+#define AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN(_name, _value) \
+	{ .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \
+	  .v_type = AA_SFS_TYPE_BOOLEAN, .v.boolean = (_value), \
+	  .file_ops = &aa_sfs_seq_file_ops }
+#define AA_SFS_FILE_STRING(_name, _value) \
+	{ .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \
+	  .v_type = AA_SFS_TYPE_STRING, .v.string = (_value), \
+	  .file_ops = &aa_sfs_seq_file_ops }
+#define AA_SFS_FILE_U64(_name, _value) \
+	{ .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \
+	  .v_type = AA_SFS_TYPE_U64, .v.u64 = (_value), \
+	  .file_ops = &aa_sfs_seq_file_ops }
+#define AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(_name, _mode, _fops) \
+	{ .name = (_name), .v_type = AA_SFS_TYPE_FOPS, \
+	  .mode = (_mode), .file_ops = (_fops) }
+#define AA_SFS_DIR(_name, _value) \
+	{ .name = (_name), .v_type = AA_SFS_TYPE_DIR, .v.files = (_value) }
+
+extern void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void);
+
+struct aa_profile;
+struct aa_ns;
+
+enum aafs_ns_type {
+	AAFS_NS_DIR,
+	AAFS_NS_PROFS,
+	AAFS_NS_NS,
+	AAFS_NS_RAW_DATA,
+	AAFS_NS_LOAD,
+	AAFS_NS_REPLACE,
+	AAFS_NS_REMOVE,
+	AAFS_NS_REVISION,
+	AAFS_NS_COUNT,
+	AAFS_NS_MAX_COUNT,
+	AAFS_NS_SIZE,
+	AAFS_NS_MAX_SIZE,
+	AAFS_NS_OWNER,
+	AAFS_NS_SIZEOF,
+};
+
+enum aafs_prof_type {
+	AAFS_PROF_DIR,
+	AAFS_PROF_PROFS,
+	AAFS_PROF_NAME,
+	AAFS_PROF_MODE,
+	AAFS_PROF_ATTACH,
+	AAFS_PROF_HASH,
+	AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA,
+	AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH,
+	AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI,
+	AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF,
+};
+
+#define ns_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_DIR])
+#define ns_subns_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_NS])
+#define ns_subprofs_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_PROFS])
+#define ns_subdata_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_RAW_DATA])
+#define ns_subload(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_LOAD])
+#define ns_subreplace(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_REPLACE])
+#define ns_subremove(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_REMOVE])
+#define ns_subrevision(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_REVISION])
+
+#define prof_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_PROF_DIR])
+#define prof_child_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_PROF_PROFS])
+
+int aa_create_aafs(void);
+
+void __aa_bump_ns_revision(struct aa_ns *ns);
+void __aafs_profile_rmdir(struct aa_profile *profile);
+void __aafs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old,
+				   struct aa_profile *new);
+int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent);
+void __aafs_ns_rmdir(struct aa_ns *ns);
+int __aafs_ns_mkdir(struct aa_ns *ns, struct dentry *parent, const char *name,
+		     struct dentry *dent);
+
+struct aa_loaddata;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
+void __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata);
+int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_loaddata *rawdata);
+void __aa_remove_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile);
+int __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile);
+#else
+static inline void __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata)
+{
+	/* empty stub */
+}
+
+static inline int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns,
+					 struct aa_loaddata *rawdata)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void __aa_remove_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	/* empty stub */
+}
+
+static inline int __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
+
+#endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa00b3440
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor auditing function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_AUDIT_H
+#define __AA_AUDIT_H
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "file.h"
+#include "label.h"
+
+extern const char *const audit_mode_names[];
+#define AUDIT_MAX_INDEX 5
+enum audit_mode {
+	AUDIT_NORMAL,		/* follow normal auditing of accesses */
+	AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED,	/* quiet all denied access messages */
+	AUDIT_QUIET,		/* quiet all messages */
+	AUDIT_NOQUIET,		/* do not quiet audit messages */
+	AUDIT_ALL		/* audit all accesses */
+};
+
+enum audit_type {
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_HINT,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO
+};
+
+#define OP_NULL NULL
+
+#define OP_SYSCTL "sysctl"
+#define OP_CAPABLE "capable"
+
+#define OP_UNLINK "unlink"
+#define OP_MKDIR "mkdir"
+#define OP_RMDIR "rmdir"
+#define OP_MKNOD "mknod"
+#define OP_TRUNC "truncate"
+#define OP_LINK "link"
+#define OP_SYMLINK "symlink"
+#define OP_RENAME_SRC "rename_src"
+#define OP_RENAME_DEST "rename_dest"
+#define OP_CHMOD "chmod"
+#define OP_CHOWN "chown"
+#define OP_GETATTR "getattr"
+#define OP_OPEN "open"
+
+#define OP_FRECEIVE "file_receive"
+#define OP_FPERM "file_perm"
+#define OP_FLOCK "file_lock"
+#define OP_FMMAP "file_mmap"
+#define OP_FMPROT "file_mprotect"
+#define OP_INHERIT "file_inherit"
+
+#define OP_PIVOTROOT "pivotroot"
+#define OP_MOUNT "mount"
+#define OP_UMOUNT "umount"
+
+#define OP_CREATE "create"
+#define OP_POST_CREATE "post_create"
+#define OP_BIND "bind"
+#define OP_CONNECT "connect"
+#define OP_LISTEN "listen"
+#define OP_ACCEPT "accept"
+#define OP_SENDMSG "sendmsg"
+#define OP_RECVMSG "recvmsg"
+#define OP_GETSOCKNAME "getsockname"
+#define OP_GETPEERNAME "getpeername"
+#define OP_GETSOCKOPT "getsockopt"
+#define OP_SETSOCKOPT "setsockopt"
+#define OP_SHUTDOWN "socket_shutdown"
+
+#define OP_PTRACE "ptrace"
+#define OP_SIGNAL "signal"
+
+#define OP_EXEC "exec"
+
+#define OP_CHANGE_HAT "change_hat"
+#define OP_CHANGE_PROFILE "change_profile"
+#define OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC "change_onexec"
+#define OP_STACK "stack"
+#define OP_STACK_ONEXEC "stack_onexec"
+
+#define OP_SETPROCATTR "setprocattr"
+#define OP_SETRLIMIT "setrlimit"
+
+#define OP_PROF_REPL "profile_replace"
+#define OP_PROF_LOAD "profile_load"
+#define OP_PROF_RM "profile_remove"
+
+#define OP_USERNS_CREATE "userns_create"
+
+#define OP_URING_OVERRIDE "uring_override"
+#define OP_URING_SQPOLL "uring_sqpoll"
+
+struct apparmor_audit_data {
+	int error;
+	int type;
+	u16 class;
+	const char *op;
+	const struct cred *subj_cred;
+	struct aa_label *subj_label;
+	const char *name;
+	const char *info;
+	u32 request;
+	u32 denied;
+	u32 tags;
+
+	union {
+		/* these entries require a custom callback fn */
+		struct {
+			struct aa_label *peer;
+			union {
+				struct {
+					const char *target;
+					kuid_t ouid;
+				} fs;
+				struct {
+					int rlim;
+					unsigned long max;
+				} rlim;
+				struct {
+					int signal;
+					int unmappedsig;
+				};
+				struct {
+					int type, protocol;
+					void *addr;
+					int addrlen;
+					struct {
+						void *addr;
+						int addrlen;
+					} peer;
+				} net;
+			};
+		};
+		struct {
+			struct aa_profile *profile;
+			const char *ns;
+			long pos;
+		} iface;
+		struct {
+			const char *src_name;
+			const char *type;
+			const char *trans;
+			const char *data;
+			unsigned long flags;
+		} mnt;
+		struct {
+			struct aa_label *target;
+		} uring;
+	};
+
+	struct common_audit_data common;
+};
+
+/* macros for dealing with  apparmor_audit_data structure */
+#define aad(SA) (container_of(SA, struct apparmor_audit_data, common))
+#define aad_of_va(VA) aad((struct common_audit_data *)(VA))
+
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, T, C, X)				\
+	/* TODO: cleanup audit init so we don't need _aad = {0,} */	\
+	struct apparmor_audit_data NAME = {				\
+		.class = (C),						\
+		.op = (X),                                              \
+		.common.type = (T),					\
+		.common.u.tsk = NULL,					\
+		.common.apparmor_audit_data = &NAME,			\
+	};
+
+void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
+		  void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile,
+	     struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
+	     void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
+
+#define aa_audit_error(ERROR, AD, CB)				\
+({								\
+	(AD)->error = (ERROR);					\
+	aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR, (AD), (CB));		\
+	(AD)->error;					\
+})
+
+
+static inline int complain_error(int error)
+{
+	if (error == -EPERM || error == -EACCES)
+		return 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
+int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp);
+int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
+int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
+
+#endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1ddcec2d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor capability mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2013 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_CAPABILITY_H
+#define __AA_CAPABILITY_H
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+
+struct aa_label;
+
+/* aa_caps - confinement data for capabilities
+ * @allowed: capabilities mask
+ * @audit: caps that are to be audited
+ * @denied: caps that are explicitly denied
+ * @quiet: caps that should not be audited
+ * @kill: caps that when requested will result in the task being killed
+ * @extended: caps that are subject finer grained mediation
+ */
+struct aa_caps {
+	kernel_cap_t allow;
+	kernel_cap_t audit;
+	kernel_cap_t denied;
+	kernel_cap_t quiet;
+	kernel_cap_t kill;
+	kernel_cap_t extended;
+};
+
+extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[];
+
+kernel_cap_t aa_profile_capget(struct aa_profile *profile);
+int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	       int cap, unsigned int opts);
+
+static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
+{
+	/* NOP */
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_CAPBILITY_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2b6098149
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor contexts used to associate "labels" to objects.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_CONTEXT_H
+#define __AA_CONTEXT_H
+
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#include "label.h"
+#include "policy_ns.h"
+#include "task.h"
+
+static inline struct aa_label *cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct aa_label **blob = cred->security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
+
+	AA_BUG(!blob);
+	return *blob;
+}
+
+static inline void set_cred_label(const struct cred *cred,
+				  struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	struct aa_label **blob = cred->security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
+
+	AA_BUG(!blob);
+	*blob = label;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_newest_cred_label - obtain the newest label on a cred
+ * @cred: cred to obtain label from (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: newest version of confining label
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_newest_cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	return aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
+}
+
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_newest_cred_label_condref(const struct cred *cred,
+								bool *needput)
+{
+	struct aa_label *l = cred_label(cred);
+
+	if (unlikely(label_is_stale(l))) {
+		*needput = true;
+		return aa_get_newest_label(l);
+	}
+
+	*needput = false;
+	return l;
+}
+
+static inline void aa_put_label_condref(struct aa_label *l, bool needput)
+{
+	if (unlikely(needput))
+		aa_put_label(l);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_current_raw_label - find the current tasks confining label
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This fn will not update the tasks cred to the most up to date version
+ * of the label so it is safe to call when inside of locks.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_current_raw_label(void)
+{
+	return cred_label(current_cred());
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_current_label - get the newest version of the current tasks label
+ *
+ * Returns: newest version of confining label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This fn will not update the tasks cred, so it is safe inside of locks
+ *
+ * The returned reference must be put with aa_put_label()
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_current_label(void)
+{
+	struct aa_label *l = aa_current_raw_label();
+
+	if (label_is_stale(l))
+		return aa_get_newest_label(l);
+	return aa_get_label(l);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __end_cred_crit_section - end crit section begun with __begin_...
+ * @label: label obtained from __begin_cred_crit_section
+ * @needput: output: bool set by __begin_cred_crit_section
+ *
+ * While the cred passed to __begin is guaranteed to not change
+ * and the cred and label could be passed here instead of needput
+ * using needput with a local var makes it easier for the compiler
+ * and processor to optimize and speculatively execute the comparison
+ * than chasing a pointer in the cred struct.
+ */
+static inline void __end_cred_crit_section(struct aa_label *label,
+						    bool needput)
+{
+	if (unlikely(needput))
+		aa_put_label(label);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __begin_cred_crit_section - @cred's confining label
+ * @cred: current's cred to start a crit section on its label
+ * @needput: store whether the label needs to be put when ending crit section
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * safe to call inside locks
+ *
+ * The returned reference must be put with __end_cred_crit_section()
+ * This must NOT be used if the task cred could be updated within the
+ * critical section between
+ *   __begin_cred_crit_section() ..  __end_cred_crit_section()
+ *
+ * The crit section is an optimization to avoid having to get and put
+ * the newest version of the label. While the cred won't change and
+ * hence the label it contains won't change, the newest version of the
+ * label can. During the crit section the newest versions of the label
+ * will be used until the end of the crit section.
+ *
+ * If the label has not been updated at the start of the crit section
+ * no refcount is taken, the cred's refcount is enough to hold the
+ * label for the duration of the crit section.
+ *
+ * If the label has been updated then a refcount will be taken and the
+ * newest version of the label will be returned. While the cred label
+ * and the returned label could be compared at the end of the crit
+ * section, needput is used because it allows better optimization by
+ * the compiler and the processor's speculative execution.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *__begin_cred_crit_section(const struct cred *cred,
+							 bool *needput)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = cred_label(cred);
+
+	if (label_is_stale(label)) {
+		*needput = true;
+		return aa_get_newest_label(label);
+	}
+
+	*needput = false;
+	return label;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __end_current_label_crit_section - end crit section begun with __begin_...
+ * @label: label obtained from __begin_current_label_crit_section
+ * @needput: output: bool set by __begin_current_label_crit_section
+ *
+ * wrapper around __end_cred_crit_section() to pair nicely with
+ * __begin_current_label_crit_section()
+ */
+static inline void __end_current_label_crit_section(struct aa_label *label,
+						    bool needput)
+{
+	__end_cred_crit_section(label, needput);
+}
+
+/**
+ * end_current_label_crit_section - put a reference found with begin_current_label..
+ * @label: label reference to put
+ *
+ * Should only be used with a reference obtained with
+ * begin_current_label_crit_section and never used in situations where the
+ * task cred may be updated
+ */
+static inline void end_current_label_crit_section(struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	if (label != aa_current_raw_label())
+		aa_put_label(label);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __begin_current_label_crit_section - current's confining label
+ * @needput: store whether the label needs to be put when ending crit section
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * safe to call inside locks
+ *
+ * The returned reference must be put with __end_current_label_crit_section()
+ * This must NOT be used if the task cred could be updated within the
+ * critical section between __begin_current_label_crit_section() ..
+ * __end_current_label_crit_section()
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *__begin_current_label_crit_section(bool *needput)
+{
+	return __begin_cred_crit_section(current_cred(), needput);
+}
+
+/**
+ * begin_current_label_crit_section - current's confining label and update it
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Not safe to call inside locks
+ *
+ * The returned reference must be put with end_current_label_crit_section()
+ * This must NOT be used if the task cred could be updated within the
+ * critical section between begin_current_label_crit_section() ..
+ * end_current_label_crit_section()
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *begin_current_label_crit_section(void)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
+
+	might_sleep();
+
+	if (label_is_stale(label)) {
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+		if (aa_replace_current_label(label) == 0)
+			/* task cred will keep the reference */
+			aa_put_label(label);
+	}
+
+	return label;
+}
+
+static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_ns *ns;
+	bool needput;
+
+	label  = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	ns = aa_get_ns(labels_ns(label));
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+
+	return ns;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/crypto.h b/security/apparmor/include/crypto.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f3ffd388c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/crypto.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy loading interface function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2013 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __APPARMOR_CRYPTO_H
+#define __APPARMOR_CRYPTO_H
+
+#include "policy.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
+int init_profile_hash(void);
+unsigned int aa_hash_size(void);
+char *aa_calc_hash(void *data, size_t len);
+int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start,
+			 size_t len);
+#else
+static inline char *aa_calc_hash(void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+static inline int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version,
+				       void *start, size_t len)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int aa_hash_size(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __APPARMOR_CRYPTO_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..77f9a0ed0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor security domain transition function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include "label.h"
+
+#ifndef __AA_DOMAIN_H
+#define __AA_DOMAIN_H
+
+#define AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS 0
+#define AA_CHANGE_TEST 1
+#define AA_CHANGE_CHILD 2
+#define AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC  4
+#define AA_CHANGE_STACK 8
+
+struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
+				const char **name);
+
+int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+
+int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags);
+int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags);
+
+#endif /* __AA_DOMAIN_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ef60f99bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_FILE_H
+#define __AA_FILE_H
+
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "perms.h"
+
+struct aa_policydb;
+struct aa_profile;
+struct path;
+
+#define mask_mode_t(X) (X & (MAY_EXEC | MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ | MAY_APPEND))
+
+#define AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK	(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND |\
+				 AA_MAY_CREATE | AA_MAY_DELETE |	\
+				 AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \
+				 AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_LOCK | \
+				 AA_EXEC_MMAP | AA_MAY_LINK)
+
+static inline struct aa_file_ctx *file_ctx(struct file *file)
+{
+	return file->f_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
+}
+
+/* struct aa_file_ctx - the AppArmor context the file was opened in
+ * @lock: lock to update the ctx
+ * @label: label currently cached on the ctx
+ * @perms: the permission the file was opened with
+ */
+struct aa_file_ctx {
+	spinlock_t lock;
+	struct aa_label __rcu *label;
+	u32 allow;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The xindex is broken into 3 parts
+ * - index - an index into either the exec name table or the variable table
+ * - exec type - which determines how the executable name and index are used
+ * - flags - which modify how the destination name is applied
+ */
+#define AA_X_INDEX_MASK		AA_INDEX_MASK
+
+#define AA_X_TYPE_MASK		0x0c000000
+#define AA_X_NONE		AA_INDEX_NONE
+#define AA_X_NAME		0x04000000 /* use executable name px */
+#define AA_X_TABLE		0x08000000 /* use a specified name ->n# */
+
+#define AA_X_UNSAFE		0x10000000
+#define AA_X_CHILD		0x20000000
+#define AA_X_INHERIT		0x40000000
+#define AA_X_UNCONFINED		0x80000000
+
+/* need to make conditional which ones are being set */
+struct path_cond {
+	kuid_t uid;
+	umode_t mode;
+};
+
+#define COMBINED_PERM_MASK(X) ((X).allow | (X).audit | (X).quiet | (X).kill)
+
+int aa_audit_file(const struct cred *cred,
+		  struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
+		  const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
+		  const char *target, struct aa_label *tlabel, kuid_t ouid,
+		  const char *info, int error);
+
+struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_condperms(kuid_t subj_uid,
+				     struct aa_policydb *file_rules,
+				     aa_state_t state, struct path_cond *cond);
+aa_state_t aa_str_perms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, aa_state_t start,
+			const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
+			struct aa_perms *perms);
+
+int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		   struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
+		   u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
+		   struct aa_perms *perms);
+int aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+		 int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond);
+
+int aa_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		 struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
+		 struct dentry *new_dentry);
+
+int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
+		 u32 request, bool in_atomic);
+
+void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files);
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_map_file_to_perms - map file flags to AppArmor permissions
+ * @file: open file to map flags to AppArmor permissions
+ *
+ * Returns: apparmor permission set for the file
+ */
+static inline u32 aa_map_file_to_perms(struct file *file)
+{
+	int flags = file->f_flags;
+	u32 perms = 0;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		perms |= MAY_WRITE;
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+		perms |= MAY_READ;
+
+	if ((flags & O_APPEND) && (perms & MAY_WRITE))
+		perms = (perms & ~MAY_WRITE) | MAY_APPEND;
+	/* trunc implies write permission */
+	if (flags & O_TRUNC)
+		perms |= MAY_WRITE;
+	if (flags & O_CREAT)
+		perms |= AA_MAY_CREATE;
+
+	return perms;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_FILE_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..323dd071a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_IPC_H
+#define __AA_IPC_H
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#define SIGUNKNOWN 0
+#define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35
+
+int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender,
+		  const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target,
+		  int sig);
+
+#endif /* __AA_IPC_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b5a722a47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
@@ -0,0 +1,491 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor label definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_LABEL_H
+#define __AA_LABEL_H
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+#include "apparmor.h"
+#include "lib.h"
+
+struct aa_ns;
+struct aa_ruleset;
+
+#define LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES 8
+#define DEFINE_VEC(T, V)						\
+	struct aa_ ## T *(_ ## V ## _localtmp)[LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES];	\
+	struct aa_ ## T **(V)
+
+#define vec_setup(T, V, N, GFP)						\
+({									\
+	if ((N) <= LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES) {					\
+		typeof(N) i;						\
+		(V) = (_ ## V ## _localtmp);				\
+		for (i = 0; i < (N); i++)				\
+			(V)[i] = NULL;					\
+	} else								\
+		(V) = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_ ## T *) * (N), (GFP));	\
+	(V) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;						\
+})
+
+#define vec_cleanup(T, V, N)						\
+do {									\
+	int i;								\
+	for (i = 0; i < (N); i++) {					\
+		if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL((V)[i]))				\
+			aa_put_ ## T((V)[i]);				\
+	}								\
+	if ((V) != _ ## V ## _localtmp)					\
+		kfree(V);						\
+} while (0)
+
+#define vec_last(VEC, SIZE) ((VEC)[(SIZE) - 1])
+#define vec_ns(VEC, SIZE) (vec_last((VEC), (SIZE))->ns)
+#define vec_labelset(VEC, SIZE) (&vec_ns((VEC), (SIZE))->labels)
+#define cleanup_domain_vec(V, L) cleanup_label_vec((V), (L)->size)
+
+struct aa_profile;
+#define VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE 1
+int aa_vec_unique(struct aa_profile **vec, int n, int flags);
+struct aa_label *aa_vec_find_or_create_label(struct aa_profile **vec, int len,
+					     gfp_t gfp);
+#define aa_sort_and_merge_vec(N, V) \
+	aa_sort_and_merge_profiles((N), (struct aa_profile **)(V))
+
+
+/* struct aa_labelset - set of labels for a namespace
+ *
+ * Labels are reference counted; aa_labelset does not contribute to label
+ * reference counts. Once a label's last refcount is put it is removed from
+ * the set.
+ */
+struct aa_labelset {
+	rwlock_t lock;
+
+	struct rb_root root;
+};
+
+#define __labelset_for_each(LS, N) \
+	for ((N) = rb_first(&(LS)->root); (N); (N) = rb_next(N))
+
+enum label_flags {
+	FLAG_HAT = 1,			/* profile is a hat */
+	FLAG_UNCONFINED = 2,		/* label unconfined only if all */
+	FLAG_NULL = 4,			/* profile is null learning profile */
+	FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR = 8,	/* fallback to ix on name lookup fail */
+	FLAG_IMMUTIBLE = 0x10,		/* don't allow changes/replacement */
+	FLAG_USER_DEFINED = 0x20,	/* user based profile - lower privs */
+	FLAG_NO_LIST_REF = 0x40,	/* list doesn't keep profile ref */
+	FLAG_NS_COUNT = 0x80,		/* carries NS ref count */
+	FLAG_IN_TREE = 0x100,		/* label is in tree */
+	FLAG_PROFILE = 0x200,		/* label is a profile */
+	FLAG_EXPLICIT = 0x400,		/* explicit static label */
+	FLAG_STALE = 0x800,		/* replaced/removed */
+	FLAG_RENAMED = 0x1000,		/* label has renaming in it */
+	FLAG_REVOKED = 0x2000,		/* label has revocation in it */
+	FLAG_DEBUG1 = 0x4000,
+	FLAG_DEBUG2 = 0x8000,
+
+	/* These flags must correspond with PATH_flags */
+	/* TODO: add new path flags */
+};
+
+struct aa_label;
+struct aa_proxy {
+	struct aa_common_ref count;
+	struct aa_label __rcu *label;
+};
+
+struct label_it {
+	int i, j;
+};
+
+/* struct aa_label_base - base info of label
+ * @count: ref count of active users
+ * @node: rbtree position
+ * @rcu: rcu callback struct
+ * @proxy: is set to the label that replaced this label
+ * @hname: text representation of the label (MAYBE_NULL)
+ * @flags: stale and other flags - values may change under label set lock
+ * @secid: secid that references this label
+ * @size: number of entries in @ent[]
+ * @mediates: bitmask for label_mediates
+ * profile: label vec when embedded in a profile FLAG_PROFILE is set
+ * rules: variable length rules in a profile FLAG_PROFILE is set
+ * vec: vector of profiles comprising the compound label
+ */
+struct aa_label {
+	struct aa_common_ref count;
+	struct rb_node node;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+	struct aa_proxy *proxy;
+	__counted char *hname;
+	long flags;
+	u32 secid;
+	int size;
+	u64 mediates;
+	union {
+		struct {
+			/* only used is the label is a profile, size of
+			 * rules[] is determined by the profile
+			 * profile[1] is poison or null as guard
+			 */
+			struct aa_profile *profile[2];
+			DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct aa_ruleset *, rules);
+		};
+		DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct aa_profile *, vec);
+	};
+};
+
+#define last_error(E, FN)				\
+do {							\
+	int __subE = (FN);				\
+	if (__subE)					\
+		(E) = __subE;				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define label_isprofile(X) ((X)->flags & FLAG_PROFILE)
+#define label_unconfined(X) ((X)->flags & FLAG_UNCONFINED)
+#define unconfined(X) label_unconfined(X)
+#define label_is_stale(X) ((X)->flags & FLAG_STALE)
+#define __label_make_stale(X) ((X)->flags |= FLAG_STALE)
+#define labels_ns(X) (vec_ns(&((X)->vec[0]), (X)->size))
+#define labels_set(X) (&labels_ns(X)->labels)
+#define labels_view(X) labels_ns(X)
+#define labels_profile(X) ((X)->vec[(X)->size - 1])
+
+
+int aa_label_next_confined(struct aa_label *l, int i);
+
+/* for each profile in a label */
+#define label_for_each(I, L, P)						\
+	for ((I).i = 0; ((P) = (L)->vec[(I).i]); ++((I).i))
+
+/* assumes break/goto ended label_for_each */
+#define label_for_each_cont(I, L, P)					\
+	for (++((I).i); ((P) = (L)->vec[(I).i]); ++((I).i))
+
+
+
+/* for each profile that is enforcing confinement in a label */
+#define label_for_each_confined(I, L, P)				\
+	for ((I).i = aa_label_next_confined((L), 0);			\
+	     ((P) = (L)->vec[(I).i]);					\
+	     (I).i = aa_label_next_confined((L), (I).i + 1))
+
+#define label_for_each_in_merge(I, A, B, P)				\
+	for ((I).i = (I).j = 0;						\
+	     ((P) = aa_label_next_in_merge(&(I), (A), (B)));		\
+	     )
+
+#define label_for_each_not_in_set(I, SET, SUB, P)			\
+	for ((I).i = (I).j = 0;						\
+	     ((P) = __aa_label_next_not_in_set(&(I), (SET), (SUB)));	\
+	     )
+
+#define next_in_ns(i, NS, L)						\
+({									\
+	typeof(i) ___i = (i);						\
+	while ((L)->vec[___i] && (L)->vec[___i]->ns != (NS))		\
+		(___i)++;						\
+	(___i);								\
+})
+
+#define label_for_each_in_ns(I, NS, L, P)				\
+	for ((I).i = next_in_ns(0, (NS), (L));				\
+	     ((P) = (L)->vec[(I).i]);					\
+	     (I).i = next_in_ns((I).i + 1, (NS), (L)))
+
+#define fn_for_each_in_ns(L, P, FN)					\
+({									\
+	struct label_it __i;						\
+	struct aa_ns *__ns = labels_ns(L);				\
+	int __E = 0;							\
+	label_for_each_in_ns(__i, __ns, (L), (P)) {			\
+		last_error(__E, (FN));					\
+	}								\
+	__E;								\
+})
+
+
+#define fn_for_each_XXX(L, P, FN, ...)					\
+({									\
+	struct label_it i;						\
+	int __E = 0;							\
+	label_for_each ## __VA_ARGS__(i, (L), (P)) {			\
+		last_error(__E, (FN));					\
+	}								\
+	__E;								\
+})
+
+#define fn_for_each(L, P, FN) fn_for_each_XXX(L, P, FN)
+#define fn_for_each_confined(L, P, FN) fn_for_each_XXX(L, P, FN, _confined)
+
+#define fn_for_each2_XXX(L1, L2, P, FN, ...)				\
+({									\
+	struct label_it i;						\
+	int __E = 0;							\
+	label_for_each ## __VA_ARGS__(i, (L1), (L2), (P)) {		\
+		last_error(__E, (FN));					\
+	}								\
+	__E;								\
+})
+
+#define fn_for_each_in_merge(L1, L2, P, FN)				\
+	fn_for_each2_XXX((L1), (L2), P, FN, _in_merge)
+#define fn_for_each_not_in_set(L1, L2, P, FN)				\
+	fn_for_each2_XXX((L1), (L2), P, FN, _not_in_set)
+
+static inline bool label_mediates(struct aa_label *L, unsigned char C)
+{
+	return (L)->mediates & (((u64) 1) << (C));
+}
+
+static inline bool label_mediates_safe(struct aa_label *L, unsigned char C)
+{
+	if (C > AA_CLASS_LAST)
+		return false;
+	return label_mediates(L, C);
+}
+
+void aa_labelset_destroy(struct aa_labelset *ls);
+void aa_labelset_init(struct aa_labelset *ls);
+void __aa_labelset_update_subtree(struct aa_ns *ns);
+
+void aa_label_destroy(struct aa_label *label);
+void aa_label_free(struct aa_label *label);
+void aa_label_kref(struct kref *kref);
+bool aa_label_init(struct aa_label *label, int size, gfp_t gfp);
+struct aa_label *aa_label_alloc(int size, struct aa_proxy *proxy, gfp_t gfp);
+
+bool aa_label_is_subset(struct aa_label *set, struct aa_label *sub);
+bool aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(struct aa_label *set, struct aa_label *sub);
+struct aa_profile *__aa_label_next_not_in_set(struct label_it *I,
+					     struct aa_label *set,
+					     struct aa_label *sub);
+bool aa_label_remove(struct aa_label *label);
+struct aa_label *aa_label_insert(struct aa_labelset *ls, struct aa_label *l);
+bool aa_label_replace(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new);
+bool aa_label_make_newest(struct aa_labelset *ls, struct aa_label *old,
+			  struct aa_label *new);
+
+struct aa_profile *aa_label_next_in_merge(struct label_it *I,
+					  struct aa_label *a,
+					  struct aa_label *b);
+struct aa_label *aa_label_find_merge(struct aa_label *a, struct aa_label *b);
+struct aa_label *aa_label_merge(struct aa_label *a, struct aa_label *b,
+				gfp_t gfp);
+
+
+bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
+
+#define FLAGS_NONE 0
+#define FLAG_SHOW_MODE 1
+#define FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS 2
+#define FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED 4
+#define FLAG_ABS_ROOT 8
+int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *view,
+		      struct aa_label *label, int flags);
+int aa_label_asxprint(char **strp, struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label,
+		      int flags, gfp_t gfp);
+int aa_label_acntsxprint(char __counted **strp, struct aa_ns *ns,
+			 struct aa_label *label, int flags, gfp_t gfp);
+void aa_label_xaudit(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct aa_ns *ns,
+		     struct aa_label *label, int flags, gfp_t gfp);
+void aa_label_seq_xprint(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_ns *ns,
+			 struct aa_label *label, int flags, gfp_t gfp);
+void aa_label_xprintk(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, int flags,
+		      gfp_t gfp);
+void aa_label_printk(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
+
+struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
+				     size_t n, gfp_t gfp, bool create,
+				     bool force_stack);
+struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
+				gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack);
+
+static inline const char *aa_label_strn_split(const char *str, int n)
+{
+	const char *pos;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	state = aa_dfa_matchn_until(stacksplitdfa, DFA_START, str, n, &pos);
+	if (!ACCEPT_TABLE(stacksplitdfa)[state])
+		return NULL;
+
+	return pos - 3;
+}
+
+static inline const char *aa_label_str_split(const char *str)
+{
+	const char *pos;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	state = aa_dfa_match_until(stacksplitdfa, DFA_START, str, &pos);
+	if (!ACCEPT_TABLE(stacksplitdfa)[state])
+		return NULL;
+
+	return pos - 3;
+}
+
+
+
+struct aa_perms;
+struct aa_ruleset;
+int aa_label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_ruleset *rules,
+		   struct aa_label *label, aa_state_t state, bool subns,
+		   u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms);
+
+
+/**
+ * __aa_get_label - get a reference count to uncounted label reference
+ * @l: reference to get a count on
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to reference OR NULL if race is lost and reference is
+ *          being repeated.
+ * Requires: lock held, and the return code MUST be checked
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *__aa_get_label(struct aa_label *l)
+{
+	if (l && kref_get_unless_zero(&l->count.count))
+		return l;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_label(struct aa_label *l)
+{
+	if (l)
+		kref_get(&(l->count.count));
+
+	return l;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_label_rcu - increment refcount on a label that can be replaced
+ * @l: pointer to label that can be replaced (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to a refcounted label.
+ *     else NULL if no label
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_label_rcu(struct aa_label __rcu **l)
+{
+	struct aa_label *c;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	do {
+		c = rcu_dereference(*l);
+	} while (c && !kref_get_unless_zero(&c->count.count));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return c;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_newest_label - find the newest version of @l
+ * @l: the label to check for newer versions of
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted newest version of @l taking into account
+ *          replacement, renames and removals
+ *          return @l.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_newest_label(struct aa_label *l)
+{
+	if (!l)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (label_is_stale(l)) {
+		struct aa_label *tmp;
+
+		AA_BUG(!l->proxy);
+		AA_BUG(!l->proxy->label);
+		/* BUG: only way this can happen is @l ref count and its
+		 * replacement count have gone to 0 and are on their way
+		 * to destruction. ie. we have a refcounting error
+		 */
+		tmp = aa_get_label_rcu(&l->proxy->label);
+		AA_BUG(!tmp);
+
+		return tmp;
+	}
+
+	return aa_get_label(l);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_newest_label_condref - find the newest version of @l
+ * @l: the label to check for newer versions of
+ * @needput: returns whether the reference needs put
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted newest version of @l taking into account
+ *          replacement, renames and removals
+ *          return @l.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_newest_label_condref(struct aa_label *l,
+							   bool *needput)
+{
+	if (l && unlikely(label_is_stale(l))) {
+		struct aa_label *tmp;
+
+		AA_BUG(!l->proxy);
+		AA_BUG(!l->proxy->label);
+		/* BUG: only way this can happen is @l ref count and its
+		 * replacement count have gone to 0 and are on their way
+		 * to destruction. ie. we have a refcounting error
+		 */
+		tmp = aa_get_label_rcu(&l->proxy->label);
+		AA_BUG(!tmp);
+
+		*needput = true;
+		return tmp;
+	}
+
+	*needput = false;
+	return l;
+}
+
+static inline void aa_put_label(struct aa_label *l)
+{
+	if (l)
+		kref_put(&l->count.count, aa_label_kref);
+}
+
+/* wrapper fn to indicate semantics of the check */
+static inline bool __aa_subj_label_is_cached(struct aa_label *subj_label,
+					  struct aa_label *obj_label)
+{
+	return aa_label_is_subset(obj_label, subj_label);
+}
+
+
+struct aa_proxy *aa_alloc_proxy(struct aa_label *l, gfp_t gfp);
+void aa_proxy_kref(struct kref *kref);
+
+static inline struct aa_proxy *aa_get_proxy(struct aa_proxy *proxy)
+{
+	if (proxy)
+		kref_get(&(proxy->count.count));
+
+	return proxy;
+}
+
+static inline void aa_put_proxy(struct aa_proxy *proxy)
+{
+	if (proxy)
+		kref_put(&proxy->count.count, aa_proxy_kref);
+}
+
+void __aa_proxy_redirect(struct aa_label *orig, struct aa_label *new);
+
+#endif /* __AA_LABEL_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e3c8cb044
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor lib definitions
+ *
+ * 2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_LIB_H
+#define __AA_LIB_H
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+#include "match.h"
+
+extern struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
+
+/*
+ * split individual debug cases out in preparation for finer grained
+ * debug controls in the future.
+ */
+#define dbg_printk(__fmt, __args...) pr_debug(__fmt, ##__args)
+
+#define DEBUG_NONE 0
+#define DEBUG_LABEL_ABS_ROOT 1
+#define DEBUG_LABEL 2
+#define DEBUG_DOMAIN 4
+#define DEBUG_POLICY 8
+#define DEBUG_INTERFACE 0x10
+#define DEBUG_UNPACK 0x20
+#define DEBUG_TAGS 0x40
+
+#define DEBUG_ALL 0x7f		/* update if new DEBUG_X added */
+#define DEBUG_PARSE_ERROR (-1)
+
+#define DEBUG_ON (aa_g_debug != DEBUG_NONE)
+#define DEBUG_ABS_ROOT (aa_g_debug & DEBUG_LABEL_ABS_ROOT)
+
+#define AA_DEBUG(opt, fmt, args...)					\
+	do {								\
+		if (aa_g_debug & opt)					\
+			pr_warn_ratelimited("%s: " fmt, __func__, ##args); \
+	} while (0)
+#define AA_DEBUG_LABEL(LAB, X, fmt, args...)				\
+do {									\
+	if ((LAB)->flags & FLAG_DEBUG1)					\
+		AA_DEBUG(X, fmt, ##args);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define AA_DEBUG_PROFILE(PROF, X, fmt...) AA_DEBUG_LABEL(&(PROF)->label, X, ##fmt)
+
+#define AA_WARN(X) WARN((X), "APPARMOR WARN %s: %s\n", __func__, #X)
+
+#define AA_BUG(X, args...)						    \
+	do {								    \
+		_Pragma("GCC diagnostic ignored \"-Wformat-zero-length\""); \
+		AA_BUG_FMT((X), "" args);				    \
+		_Pragma("GCC diagnostic warning \"-Wformat-zero-length\""); \
+	} while (0)
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_ASSERTS
+#define AA_BUG_FMT(X, fmt, args...)					\
+	WARN((X), "AppArmor WARN %s: (" #X "): " fmt, __func__, ##args)
+#else
+#define AA_BUG_FMT(X, fmt, args...)					\
+	do {								\
+		BUILD_BUG_ON_INVALID(X);				\
+		no_printk(fmt, ##args);					\
+	} while (0)
+#endif
+
+int aa_parse_debug_params(const char *str);
+int aa_print_debug_params(char *buffer);
+
+#define AA_ERROR(fmt, args...)						\
+	pr_err_ratelimited("AppArmor: " fmt, ##args)
+
+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+extern int apparmor_initialized;
+
+/* semantic split of scope and view */
+#define aa_in_scope(SUBJ, OBJ)						\
+	aa_ns_visible(SUBJ, OBJ, false)
+
+#define aa_in_view(SUBJ, OBJ)						\
+	aa_ns_visible(SUBJ, OBJ, true)
+
+#define label_for_each_in_scope(I, NS, L, P)				\
+	label_for_each_in_ns(I, NS, L, P)
+
+#define fn_for_each_in_scope(L, P, FN)					\
+	fn_for_each_in_ns(L, P, FN)
+
+/* fn's in lib */
+const char *skipn_spaces(const char *str, size_t n);
+const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, const char **ns_name,
+			     size_t *ns_len);
+void aa_info_message(const char *str);
+
+/* Security blob offsets */
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes;
+
+enum reftype {
+	REF_NS,
+	REF_PROXY,
+	REF_RAWDATA,
+};
+
+/* common reference count used by data the shows up in aafs */
+struct aa_common_ref {
+	struct kref count;
+	enum reftype reftype;
+};
+
+/**
+ * aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring
+ * @str: a null terminated string
+ * @sub: a substring, not necessarily null terminated
+ * @len: length of @sub to compare
+ *
+ * The @str string must be full consumed for this to be considered a match
+ */
+static inline bool aa_strneq(const char *str, const char *sub, int len)
+{
+	return !strncmp(str, sub, len) && !str[len];
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_null_transition - step to next state after null character
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match against
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_null_transition transitions to the next state after a null
+ * character which is not used in standard matching and is only
+ * used to separate pairs.
+ */
+static inline aa_state_t aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
+						aa_state_t start)
+{
+	/* the null transition only needs the string's null terminator byte */
+	return aa_dfa_next(dfa, start, 0);
+}
+
+static inline bool path_mediated_fs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return !(dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER);
+}
+
+struct aa_str_table_ent {
+	int count;
+	int size;
+	char *strs;
+};
+
+struct aa_str_table {
+	int size;
+	struct aa_str_table_ent *table;
+};
+
+bool aa_resize_str_table(struct aa_str_table *t, int newsize, gfp_t gfp);
+void aa_destroy_str_table(struct aa_str_table *table);
+
+struct counted_str {
+	struct kref count;
+	char name[];
+};
+
+#define str_to_counted(str) \
+	((struct counted_str *)(str - offsetof(struct counted_str, name)))
+
+#define __counted	/* atm just a notation */
+
+void aa_str_kref(struct kref *kref);
+char *aa_str_alloc(int size, gfp_t gfp);
+
+
+static inline __counted char *aa_get_str(__counted char *str)
+{
+	if (str)
+		kref_get(&(str_to_counted(str)->count));
+
+	return str;
+}
+
+static inline void aa_put_str(__counted char *str)
+{
+	if (str)
+		kref_put(&str_to_counted(str)->count, aa_str_kref);
+}
+
+
+/* struct aa_policy - common part of both namespaces and profiles
+ * @name: name of the object
+ * @hname - The hierarchical name
+ * @list: list policy object is on
+ * @profiles: head of the profiles list contained in the object
+ */
+struct aa_policy {
+	const char *name;
+	__counted char *hname;
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct list_head profiles;
+};
+
+/**
+ * basename - find the last component of an hname
+ * @hname: hname to find the base profile name component of  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: the tail (base profile name) name component of an hname
+ */
+static inline const char *basename(const char *hname)
+{
+	char *split;
+
+	hname = strim((char *)hname);
+	for (split = strstr(hname, "//"); split; split = strstr(hname, "//"))
+		hname = split + 2;
+
+	return hname;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __policy_find - find a policy by @name on a policy list
+ * @head: list to search  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name to search for  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted policy that match @name or NULL if not found
+ */
+static inline struct aa_policy *__policy_find(struct list_head *head,
+					      const char *name)
+{
+	struct aa_policy *policy;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(policy, head, list) {
+		if (!strcmp(policy->name, name))
+			return policy;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __policy_strn_find - find a policy that's name matches @len chars of @str
+ * @head: list to search  (NOT NULL)
+ * @str: string to search for  (NOT NULL)
+ * @len: length of match required
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted policy that match @str or NULL if not found
+ *
+ * if @len == strlen(@strlen) then this is equiv to __policy_find
+ * other wise it allows searching for policy by a partial match of name
+ */
+static inline struct aa_policy *__policy_strn_find(struct list_head *head,
+					    const char *str, int len)
+{
+	struct aa_policy *policy;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(policy, head, list) {
+		if (aa_strneq(policy->name, str, len))
+			return policy;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+bool aa_policy_init(struct aa_policy *policy, const char *prefix,
+		    const char *name, gfp_t gfp);
+void aa_policy_destroy(struct aa_policy *policy);
+
+
+/*
+ * fn_label_build - abstract out the build of a label transition
+ * @L: label the transition is being computed for
+ * @P: profile parameter derived from L by this macro, can be passed to FN
+ * @GFP: memory allocation type to use
+ * @FN: fn to call for each profile transition. @P is set to the profile
+ *
+ * Returns: new label on success
+ *	    NULL if all callbacks decline to specify a transition
+ *          ERR_PTR if build @FN fails
+ *
+ * @FN must return a label or ERR_PTR on failure.
+ */
+#define fn_label_build(L, P, GFP, FN)					\
+({									\
+	__label__ __do_cleanup, __done;					\
+	struct aa_label *__new_ = NULL;					\
+									\
+	if ((L)->size > 1) {						\
+		/* TODO: add cache of transitions already done */	\
+		struct label_it __i;					\
+		int __j, __k, __count;					\
+		DEFINE_VEC(label, __lvec);				\
+		DEFINE_VEC(profile, __pvec);				\
+		if (vec_setup(label, __lvec, (L)->size, (GFP)))	{	\
+			__new_ = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);			\
+			goto __done;					\
+		}							\
+		__j = 0;						\
+		label_for_each(__i, (L), (P)) {				\
+			__new_ = (FN);					\
+			if (!__new_)					\
+				continue;				\
+			if (IS_ERR(__new_))				\
+				goto __do_cleanup;			\
+			__lvec[__j++] = __new_;				\
+		}							\
+		if (__j == 0)						\
+			/* no components adding to build */		\
+			goto __do_cleanup;				\
+		for (__j = __count = 0; __j < (L)->size; __j++)		\
+			__count += __lvec[__j]->size;			\
+		if (!vec_setup(profile, __pvec, __count, (GFP))) {	\
+			for (__j = __k = 0; __j < (L)->size; __j++) {	\
+				label_for_each(__i, __lvec[__j], (P))	\
+					__pvec[__k++] = aa_get_profile(P); \
+			}						\
+			__count -= aa_vec_unique(__pvec, __count, 0);	\
+			if (__count > 1) {				\
+				__new_ = aa_vec_find_or_create_label(__pvec,\
+						     __count, (GFP));	\
+				if (!__new_)				\
+					__new_ = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);	\
+			} else						\
+				__new_ = aa_get_label(&__pvec[0]->label); \
+			vec_cleanup(profile, __pvec, __count);		\
+		} else							\
+			__new_ = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);			\
+__do_cleanup:								\
+		vec_cleanup(label, __lvec, (L)->size);			\
+	} else {							\
+		(P) = labels_profile(L);				\
+		__new_ = (FN);						\
+	}								\
+__done:									\
+	if (PTR_ERR(__new_))						\
+		AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_LABEL, "label build failed\n");		\
+	(__new_);							\
+})
+
+
+#define __fn_build_in_scope(NS, P, NS_FN, OTHER_FN)			\
+({									\
+	struct aa_label *__new;						\
+	if ((P)->ns != (NS))						\
+		__new = (OTHER_FN);					\
+	else								\
+		__new = (NS_FN);					\
+	(__new);							\
+})
+
+#define fn_label_build_in_scope(L, P, GFP, NS_FN, OTHER_FN)		\
+({									\
+	fn_label_build((L), (P), (GFP),					\
+		__fn_build_in_scope(labels_ns(L), (P), (NS_FN), (OTHER_FN))); \
+})
+
+#endif /* __AA_LIB_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7accb1c39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy dfa matching engine definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_MATCH_H
+#define __AA_MATCH_H
+
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+
+#define DFA_NOMATCH			0
+#define DFA_START			1
+
+
+/*
+ * The format used for transition tables is based on the GNU flex table
+ * file format (--tables-file option; see Table File Format in the flex
+ * info pages and the flex sources for documentation). The magic number
+ * used in the header is 0x1B5E783D instead of 0xF13C57B1 though, because
+ * new tables have been defined and others YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF
+ * (default) tables are used slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser
+ * package).
+ *
+ *
+ * The data in the packed dfa is stored in network byte order, and the tables
+ * are arranged for flexibility.  We convert the table data to host native
+ * byte order.
+ *
+ * The dfa begins with a table set header, and is followed by the actual
+ * tables.
+ */
+
+#define YYTH_MAGIC	0x1B5E783D
+#define YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE	1
+#define YYTH_FLAG_OOB_TRANS	2
+#define YYTH_FLAGS (YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE | YYTH_FLAG_OOB_TRANS)
+
+#define MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED	1
+
+struct table_set_header {
+	u32 th_magic;		/* YYTH_MAGIC */
+	u32 th_hsize;
+	u32 th_ssize;
+	u16 th_flags;
+	char th_version[];
+};
+
+/* The YYTD_ID are one less than flex table mappings.  The flex id
+ * has 1 subtracted at table load time, this allows us to directly use the
+ * ID's as indexes.
+ */
+#define	YYTD_ID_ACCEPT	0
+#define YYTD_ID_BASE	1
+#define YYTD_ID_CHK	2
+#define YYTD_ID_DEF	3
+#define YYTD_ID_EC	4
+#define YYTD_ID_META	5
+#define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 6
+#define YYTD_ID_NXT	7
+#define YYTD_ID_TSIZE	8
+#define YYTD_ID_MAX	8
+
+#define YYTD_DATA8	1
+#define YYTD_DATA16	2
+#define YYTD_DATA32	4
+#define YYTD_DATA64	8
+
+/* ACCEPT & ACCEPT2 tables gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the
+ * first flags
+ */
+#define ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) ((X) & 0x3f)
+#define ACCEPT2_FLAGS(X) ACCEPT1_FLAGS((X) >> YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2)
+#define TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(X) ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X)
+#define TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(X) (ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) << YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2)
+#define DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES 0x1000
+
+struct table_header {
+	u16 td_id;
+	u16 td_flags;
+	u32 td_hilen;
+	u32 td_lolen;
+	char td_data[];
+};
+
+#define TABLE_DATAU16(TABLE) ((u16 *)((TABLE)->td_data))
+#define TABLE_DATAU32(TABLE) ((u32 *)((TABLE)->td_data))
+#define DEFAULT_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_data))
+#define BASE_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_data))
+#define NEXT_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_data))
+#define CHECK_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_data))
+#define EQUIV_TABLE(DFA) ((u8 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_data))
+#define ACCEPT_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_data))
+#define ACCEPT_TABLE2(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_data))
+
+struct aa_dfa {
+	struct kref count;
+	u16 flags;
+	u32 max_oob;
+	struct table_header *tables[YYTD_ID_TSIZE];
+};
+
+#define UNPACK_ARRAY(TABLE, BLOB, LEN, TTYPE, BTYPE, NTOHX)	\
+	do { \
+		typeof(LEN) __i; \
+		TTYPE *__t = (TTYPE *) TABLE; \
+		BTYPE *__b = (BTYPE *) BLOB; \
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(TTYPE) != sizeof(BTYPE)); \
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)) \
+			memcpy(__t, __b, (LEN) * sizeof(BTYPE)); \
+		else /* copy & convert from big-endian */ \
+			for (__i = 0; __i < LEN; __i++) { \
+				__t[__i] = NTOHX(&__b[__i]); \
+			} \
+	} while (0)
+
+static inline size_t table_size(size_t len, size_t el_size)
+{
+	return ALIGN(sizeof(struct table_header) + len * el_size, 8);
+}
+
+#define aa_state_t unsigned int
+
+struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags);
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,
+			    const char *str, int len);
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,
+			const char *str);
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state, const char c);
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_outofband_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state);
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_match_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,
+			      const char *str, const char **retpos);
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,
+			       const char *str, int n, const char **retpos);
+
+void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
+
+/* This needs to be a power of 2 */
+#define WB_HISTORY_SIZE 32
+struct match_workbuf {
+	unsigned int pos;
+	unsigned int len;
+	aa_state_t history[WB_HISTORY_SIZE];
+};
+#define DEFINE_MATCH_WB(N)		\
+struct match_workbuf N = {		\
+	.pos = 0,			\
+	.len = 0,			\
+}
+
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_leftmatch(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,
+			    const char *str, unsigned int *count);
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_dfa - increment refcount on dfa @p
+ * @dfa: dfa  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @dfa if @dfa is NULL will return NULL
+ * Requires: @dfa must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_dfa *aa_get_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
+{
+	if (dfa)
+		kref_get(&(dfa->count));
+
+	return dfa;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_put_dfa - put a dfa refcount
+ * @dfa: dfa to put refcount   (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: if @dfa != NULL that a valid refcount be held
+ */
+static inline void aa_put_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
+{
+	if (dfa)
+		kref_put(&dfa->count, aa_dfa_free_kref);
+}
+
+#define MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE 0x80000000
+#define MARK_DIFF_ENCODE 0x40000000
+#define MATCH_FLAG_OOB_TRANSITION 0x20000000
+#define MARK_DIFF_ENCODE_VERIFIED 0x10000000
+#define MATCH_FLAGS_MASK 0xff000000
+#define MATCH_FLAGS_VALID (MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE | MATCH_FLAG_OOB_TRANSITION)
+#define MATCH_FLAGS_INVALID (MATCH_FLAGS_MASK & ~MATCH_FLAGS_VALID)
+
+#endif /* __AA_MATCH_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..46834f828
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
+#define __AA_MOUNT_H
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+
+/* mount perms */
+#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT	0x01
+#define AA_MAY_MOUNT		0x02
+#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT		0x04
+#define AA_AUDIT_DATA		0x40
+#define AA_MNT_CONT_MATCH	0x40
+
+#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
+
+int aa_remount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+	       struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+	       unsigned long flags, void *data);
+
+int aa_bind_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+		  const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
+
+
+int aa_mount_change_type(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			 struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+			 unsigned long flags);
+
+int aa_move_mount_old(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		      struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+		      const char *old_name);
+int aa_move_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_label *label, const struct path *from_path,
+		  const struct path *to_path);
+
+int aa_new_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
+		 const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+		 void *data);
+
+int aa_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+	      struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
+
+int aa_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
+		 const struct path *new_path);
+
+#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d0b0ce42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
+#define __AA_NET_H
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+#include "label.h"
+#include "perms.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+
+#define AA_MAY_SEND		AA_MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE		AA_MAY_READ
+
+#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN		AA_MAY_DELETE
+
+#define AA_MAY_CONNECT		AA_MAY_OPEN
+#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT		0x00100000
+
+#define AA_MAY_BIND		0x00200000
+#define AA_MAY_LISTEN		0x00400000
+
+#define AA_MAY_SETOPT		0x01000000
+#define AA_MAY_GETOPT		0x02000000
+
+#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE |    \
+			AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN |	  \
+			AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \
+			AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT)
+
+#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE |	\
+		      AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\
+		      AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD |	\
+		      AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK |	\
+		      AA_MAY_MPROT)
+
+#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT |	\
+		       AA_MAY_ACCEPT)
+struct aa_sk_ctx {
+	struct aa_label __rcu *label;
+	struct aa_label __rcu *peer;
+	struct aa_label __rcu *peer_lastupdate;	/* ptr cmp only, no deref */
+};
+
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, CRED, SK, F, T, P)			  \
+	struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK),		  \
+						  .family = (F)};	  \
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME,						  \
+			  ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \
+						     LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \
+						     AA_CLASS_NET,        \
+			  OP);						  \
+	NAME.common.u.net = &(NAME ## _net);				  \
+	NAME.subj_cred = (CRED);					  \
+	NAME.net.type = (T);						  \
+	NAME.net.protocol = (P)
+
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, CRED, SK)				     \
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, CRED, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \
+			 (SK)->sk_protocol)
+
+
+struct aa_secmark {
+	u8 audit;
+	u8 deny;
+	u32 secid;
+	char *label;
+};
+
+extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[];
+extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_networkv9[];
+
+int aa_do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_policydb *policy,
+		aa_state_t state, u32 request, struct aa_perms *p,
+		struct apparmor_audit_data *ad);
+/* passing in state returned by XXX_mediates_AF() */
+aa_state_t aa_match_to_prot(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
+			    u32 request, u16 af, int type, int protocol,
+			    struct aa_perms **p, const char **info);
+void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+		       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
+		       u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol);
+int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	       const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+	       int type, int protocol);
+static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
+					u32 request,
+					struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, ad, request, sk->sk_family,
+				  sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol);
+}
+int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);
+
+int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct file *file);
+
+int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
+			   u32 secid, const struct sock *sk);
+
+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/path.h b/security/apparmor/include/path.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8bb915d48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/path.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor basic path manipulation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_PATH_H
+#define __AA_PATH_H
+
+enum path_flags {
+	PATH_IS_DIR = 0x1,		/* path is a directory */
+	PATH_SOCK_COND = 0x2,
+	PATH_CONNECT_PATH = 0x4,	/* connect disconnected paths to / */
+	PATH_CHROOT_REL = 0x8,		/* do path lookup relative to chroot */
+	PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT = 0x10,	/* connect paths that are at ns root */
+
+	PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED = 0x10000, /* delegate deleted files */
+	PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x20000,	 /* mediate deleted paths */
+};
+
+int aa_path_name(const struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
+		 const char **name, const char **info,
+		 const char *disconnected);
+
+#define IN_ATOMIC true
+char *aa_get_buffer(bool in_atomic);
+void aa_put_buffer(char *buf);
+
+#endif /* __AA_PATH_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..37a3781b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor basic permission sets definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_PERM_H
+#define __AA_PERM_H
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include "label.h"
+
+#define AA_MAY_EXEC		MAY_EXEC
+#define AA_MAY_WRITE		MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_MAY_READ		MAY_READ
+#define AA_MAY_APPEND		MAY_APPEND
+
+#define AA_MAY_CREATE		0x0010
+#define AA_MAY_DELETE		0x0020
+#define AA_MAY_OPEN		0x0040
+#define AA_MAY_RENAME		0x0080		/* pair */
+
+#define AA_MAY_SETATTR		0x0100		/* meta write */
+#define AA_MAY_GETATTR		0x0200		/* meta read */
+#define AA_MAY_SETCRED		0x0400		/* security cred/attr */
+#define AA_MAY_GETCRED		0x0800
+
+#define AA_MAY_CHMOD		0x1000		/* pair */
+#define AA_MAY_CHOWN		0x2000		/* pair */
+#define AA_MAY_CHGRP		0x4000		/* pair */
+#define AA_MAY_LOCK		0x8000		/* LINK_SUBSET overlaid */
+
+#define AA_EXEC_MMAP		0x00010000
+#define AA_MAY_MPROT		0x00020000	/* extend conditions */
+#define AA_MAY_LINK		0x00040000	/* pair */
+#define AA_MAY_SNAPSHOT		0x00080000	/* pair */
+
+#define AA_MAY_DELEGATE
+#define AA_CONT_MATCH		0x08000000
+
+#define AA_MAY_STACK		0x10000000
+#define AA_MAY_ONEXEC		0x20000000 /* either stack or change_profile */
+#define AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE	0x40000000
+#define AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT	0x80000000
+
+#define AA_LINK_SUBSET		AA_MAY_LOCK	/* overlaid */
+
+#define AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL   AA_MAY_CREATE
+#define AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED   AA_MAY_APPEND
+#define AA_URING_PERM_MASK     (AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED | AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL)
+
+#define PERMS_CHRS_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_CREATE |		\
+			 AA_MAY_DELETE | AA_MAY_LINK | AA_MAY_LOCK |	\
+			 AA_MAY_EXEC | AA_EXEC_MMAP | AA_MAY_APPEND)
+
+#define PERMS_NAMES_MASK (PERMS_CHRS_MASK | AA_MAY_OPEN | AA_MAY_RENAME |     \
+			  AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETCRED | \
+			  AA_MAY_GETCRED | AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN | \
+			  AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_MPROT | AA_MAY_SNAPSHOT | \
+			  AA_MAY_STACK | AA_MAY_ONEXEC |		\
+			  AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT)
+
+extern const char aa_file_perm_chrs[];
+extern const char *aa_file_perm_names[];
+
+struct aa_perms {
+	u32 allow;
+	u32 deny;	/* explicit deny, or conflict if allow also set */
+
+	u32 subtree;	/* allow perm on full subtree only when allow is set */
+	u32 cond;	/* set only when ~allow and ~deny */
+
+	u32 kill;	/* set only when ~allow | deny */
+	u32 complain;	/* accumulates only used when ~allow & ~deny */
+	u32 prompt;	/* accumulates only used when ~allow & ~deny */
+
+	u32 audit;	/* set only when allow is set */
+	u32 quiet;	/* set only when ~allow | deny */
+	u32 hide;	/* set only when  ~allow | deny */
+
+
+	u32 xindex;
+	u32 tag;	/* tag string index, if present */
+	u32 label;	/* label string index, if present */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Indexes are broken into a 24 bit index and 8 bit flag.
+ * For the index to be valid there must be a value in the flag
+ */
+#define AA_INDEX_MASK			0x00ffffff
+#define AA_INDEX_FLAG_MASK		0xff000000
+#define AA_INDEX_NONE			0
+
+#define ALL_PERMS_MASK 0xffffffff
+extern struct aa_perms nullperms;
+extern struct aa_perms allperms;
+
+/**
+ * aa_perms_accum_raw - accumulate perms with out masking off overlapping perms
+ * @accum: perms struct to accumulate into
+ * @addend: perms struct to add to @accum
+ */
+static inline void aa_perms_accum_raw(struct aa_perms *accum,
+				      struct aa_perms *addend)
+{
+	accum->deny |= addend->deny;
+	accum->allow &= addend->allow & ~addend->deny;
+	accum->audit |= addend->audit & addend->allow;
+	accum->quiet &= addend->quiet & ~addend->allow;
+	accum->kill |= addend->kill & ~addend->allow;
+	accum->complain |= addend->complain & ~addend->allow & ~addend->deny;
+	accum->cond |= addend->cond & ~addend->allow & ~addend->deny;
+	accum->hide &= addend->hide & ~addend->allow;
+	accum->prompt |= addend->prompt & ~addend->allow & ~addend->deny;
+	accum->subtree |= addend->subtree & ~addend->deny;
+
+	if (!accum->xindex)
+		accum->xindex = addend->xindex;
+	if (!accum->tag)
+		accum->tag = addend->tag;
+	if (!accum->label)
+		accum->label = addend->label;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_perms_accum - accumulate perms, masking off overlapping perms
+ * @accum: perms struct to accumulate into
+ * @addend: perms struct to add to @accum
+ */
+static inline void aa_perms_accum(struct aa_perms *accum,
+				  struct aa_perms *addend)
+{
+	accum->deny |= addend->deny;
+	accum->allow &= addend->allow & ~accum->deny;
+	accum->audit |= addend->audit & accum->allow;
+	accum->quiet &= addend->quiet & ~accum->allow;
+	accum->kill |= addend->kill & ~accum->allow;
+	accum->complain |= addend->complain & ~accum->allow & ~accum->deny;
+	accum->cond |= addend->cond & ~accum->allow & ~accum->deny;
+	accum->hide &= addend->hide & ~accum->allow;
+	accum->prompt |= addend->prompt & ~accum->allow & ~accum->deny;
+	accum->subtree &= addend->subtree & ~accum->deny;
+
+	if (!accum->xindex)
+		accum->xindex = addend->xindex;
+	if (!accum->tag)
+		accum->tag = addend->tag;
+	if (!accum->label)
+		accum->label = addend->label;
+}
+
+#define xcheck(FN1, FN2)	\
+({				\
+	int e, error = FN1;	\
+	e = FN2;		\
+	if (e)			\
+		error = e;	\
+	error;			\
+})
+
+
+/*
+ * TODO: update for labels pointing to labels instead of profiles
+ * TODO: optimize the walk, currently does subwalk of L2 for each P in L1
+ * gah this doesn't allow for label compound check!!!!
+ */
+#define xcheck_ns_profile_profile(P1, P2, FN, args...)		\
+({								\
+	int ____e = 0;						\
+	if (P1->ns == P2->ns)					\
+		____e = FN((P1), (P2), args);			\
+	(____e);						\
+})
+
+#define xcheck_ns_profile_label(P, L, FN, args...)		\
+({								\
+	struct aa_profile *__p2;				\
+	fn_for_each((L), __p2,					\
+		    xcheck_ns_profile_profile((P), __p2, (FN), args));	\
+})
+
+#define xcheck_ns_labels(L1, L2, FN, args...)			\
+({								\
+	struct aa_profile *__p1;				\
+	fn_for_each((L1), __p1, FN(__p1, (L2), args));		\
+})
+
+/* Do the cross check but applying FN at the profiles level */
+#define xcheck_labels_profiles(L1, L2, FN, args...)		\
+	xcheck_ns_labels((L1), (L2), xcheck_ns_profile_label, (FN), args)
+
+#define xcheck_labels(L1, L2, P, FN1, FN2)			\
+	xcheck(fn_for_each((L1), (P), (FN1)), fn_for_each((L2), (P), (FN2)))
+
+
+extern struct aa_perms default_perms;
+
+
+void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, size_t str_size, const char *chrs,
+			 u32 mask);
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
+			 u32 mask);
+void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
+			u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask);
+void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			     struct aa_perms *perms);
+void aa_perms_accum(struct aa_perms *accum, struct aa_perms *addend);
+void aa_perms_accum_raw(struct aa_perms *accum, struct aa_perms *addend);
+void aa_profile_match_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			    struct aa_ruleset *rules, struct aa_label *label,
+			    int type, u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms);
+int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
+		   u32 request, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
+		   void (*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *));
+#endif /* __AA_PERM_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3895f8774
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_POLICY_H
+#define __AA_POLICY_H
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/rhashtable.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+
+#include "apparmor.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "capability.h"
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "file.h"
+#include "lib.h"
+#include "label.h"
+#include "net.h"
+#include "perms.h"
+#include "resource.h"
+
+
+struct aa_ns;
+
+extern int unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy;
+extern int aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted;
+
+extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[];
+#define APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 4
+
+#define PROFILE_MODE(_profile, _mode)		\
+	((aa_g_profile_mode == (_mode)) ||	\
+	 ((_profile)->mode == (_mode)))
+
+#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile)	PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
+
+#define USER_MODE(_profile)	PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_USER)
+
+#define KILL_MODE(_profile) PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_KILL)
+
+#define PROFILE_IS_HAT(_profile) ((_profile)->label.flags & FLAG_HAT)
+
+#define CHECK_DEBUG1(_profile) ((_profile)->label.flags & FLAG_DEBUG1)
+
+#define CHECK_DEBUG2(_profile) ((_profile)->label.flags & FLAG_DEBUG2)
+
+#define profile_is_stale(_profile) (label_is_stale(&(_profile)->label))
+
+#define on_list_rcu(X) (!list_empty(X) && (X)->prev != LIST_POISON2)
+
+/* flags in the dfa accept2 table */
+enum dfa_accept_flags {
+	ACCEPT_FLAG_OWNER = 1,
+};
+
+/*
+ * FIXME: currently need a clean way to replace and remove profiles as a
+ * set.  It should be done at the namespace level.
+ * Either, with a set of profiles loaded at the namespace level or via
+ * a mark and remove marked interface.
+ */
+enum profile_mode {
+	APPARMOR_ENFORCE,	/* enforce access rules */
+	APPARMOR_COMPLAIN,	/* allow and log access violations */
+	APPARMOR_KILL,		/* kill task on access violation */
+	APPARMOR_UNCONFINED,	/* profile set to unconfined */
+	APPARMOR_USER,		/* modified complain mode to userspace */
+};
+
+
+struct aa_tags_header {
+	u32 mask;	/* bit mask matching permissions */
+	u32 count;	/* number of strings per entry */
+	u32 size;	/* size of all strings covered by count */
+	u32 tags;	/* index into string table */
+};
+
+struct aa_tags_struct {
+	struct {
+		u32 size;		/* number of entries in tagsets */
+		u32 *table;		/* indexes into headers & strs */
+	} sets;
+	struct {
+		u32 size;		/* number of headers == num of strs */
+		struct aa_tags_header *table;
+	} hdrs;
+	struct aa_str_table strs;
+};
+
+/* struct aa_policydb - match engine for a policy
+ * @count: refcount for the pdb
+ * @dfa: dfa pattern match
+ * @perms: table of permissions
+ * @size: number of entries in @perms
+ * @trans: table of strings, index by x
+ * @tags: table of tags that perms->tag indexes
+ * @start:_states to start in for each class
+ * start: set of start states for the different classes of data
+ */
+struct aa_policydb {
+	struct kref count;
+	struct aa_dfa *dfa;
+	struct {
+		struct aa_perms *perms;
+		u32 size;
+	};
+	struct aa_str_table trans;
+	struct aa_tags_struct tags;
+	aa_state_t start[AA_CLASS_LAST + 1];
+};
+
+extern struct aa_policydb *nullpdb;
+
+void aa_destroy_tags(struct aa_tags_struct *tags);
+struct aa_policydb *aa_alloc_pdb(gfp_t gfp);
+void aa_pdb_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_pdb - increment refcount on @pdb
+ * @pdb: policydb  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @pdb if @pdb is NULL will return NULL
+ * Requires: @pdb must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_policydb *aa_get_pdb(struct aa_policydb *pdb)
+{
+	if (pdb)
+		kref_get(&(pdb->count));
+
+	return pdb;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_put_pdb - put a pdb refcount
+ * @pdb: pdb to put refcount   (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: if @pdb != NULL that a valid refcount be held
+ */
+static inline void aa_put_pdb(struct aa_policydb *pdb)
+{
+	if (pdb)
+		kref_put(&pdb->count, aa_pdb_free_kref);
+}
+
+/* lookup perm that doesn't have and object conditional */
+static inline struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_perms(struct aa_policydb *policy,
+					       aa_state_t state)
+{
+	unsigned int index = ACCEPT_TABLE(policy->dfa)[state];
+
+	if (!(policy->perms))
+		return &default_perms;
+
+	return &(policy->perms[index]);
+}
+
+/* struct aa_data - generic data structure
+ * key: name for retrieving this data
+ * size: size of data in bytes
+ * data: binary data
+ * head: reserved for rhashtable
+ */
+struct aa_data {
+	char *key;
+	u32 size;
+	char *data;
+	struct rhash_head head;
+};
+
+/* struct aa_ruleset - data covering mediation rules
+ * @list: list the rule is on
+ * @size: the memory consumed by this ruleset
+ * @policy: general match rules governing policy
+ * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
+ * @caps: capabilities for the profile
+ * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
+ * @secmark_count: number of secmark entries
+ * @secmark: secmark label match info
+ */
+struct aa_ruleset {
+	int size;
+
+	/* TODO: merge policy and file */
+	struct aa_policydb *policy;
+	struct aa_policydb *file;
+	struct aa_caps caps;
+
+	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
+
+	int secmark_count;
+	struct aa_secmark *secmark;
+};
+
+
+/* struct aa_attachment - data and rules for a profiles attachment
+ * @list:
+ * @xmatch_str: human readable attachment string
+ * @xmatch: optional extended matching for unconfined executables names
+ * @xmatch_len: xmatch prefix len, used to determine xmatch priority
+ * @xattr_count: number of xattrs in table
+ * @xattrs: table of xattrs
+ */
+struct aa_attachment {
+	const char *xmatch_str;
+	struct aa_policydb *xmatch;
+	unsigned int xmatch_len;
+	int xattr_count;
+	char **xattrs;
+};
+
+/* struct aa_profile - basic confinement data
+ * @base - base components of the profile (name, refcount, lists, lock ...)
+ * @parent: parent of profile
+ * @ns: namespace the profile is in
+ * @rename: optional profile name that this profile renamed
+ *
+ * @audit: the auditing mode of the profile
+ * @mode: the enforcement mode of the profile
+ * @path_flags: flags controlling path generation behavior
+ * @signal: the signal that should be used when kill is used
+ * @disconnected: what to prepend if attach_disconnected is specified
+ * @attach: attachment rules for the profile
+ * @rules: rules to be enforced
+ *
+ * learning_cache: the accesses learned in complain mode
+ * raw_data: rawdata of the loaded profile policy
+ * hash: cryptographic hash of the profile
+ * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
+ * @dirname: name of the profile dir in apparmorfs
+ * @dents: set of dentries associated with the profile
+ * @data: hashtable for free-form policy aa_data
+ * @label - label this profile is an extension of
+ * @rules - label with the rule vec on its end
+ *
+ * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data.  Each profile
+ * has a name, and exists in a namespace.  The @name and @exec_match are
+ * used to determine profile attachment against unconfined tasks.  All other
+ * attachments are determined by profile X transition rules.
+ *
+ * Profiles have a hierarchy where hats and children profiles keep
+ * a reference to their parent.
+ *
+ * Profile names can not begin with a : and can not contain the \0
+ * character.  If a profile name begins with / it will be considered when
+ * determining profile attachment on "unconfined" tasks.
+ */
+struct aa_profile {
+	struct aa_policy base;
+	struct aa_profile __rcu *parent;
+
+	struct aa_ns *ns;
+	const char *rename;
+
+	enum audit_mode audit;
+	long mode;
+	u32 path_flags;
+	int signal;
+	const char *disconnected;
+
+	struct aa_attachment attach;
+
+	struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
+	unsigned char *hash;
+	char *dirname;
+	struct dentry *dents[AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF];
+	struct rhashtable *data;
+
+	int n_rules;
+	/* special - variable length must be last entry in profile */
+	struct aa_label label;
+};
+
+extern enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode;
+
+#define AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY	AA_MAY_APPEND
+#define AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY	AA_MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY	AA_MAY_DELETE
+
+#define profiles_ns(P) ((P)->ns)
+#define name_is_shared(A, B) ((A)->hname && (A)->hname == (B)->hname)
+
+struct aa_ruleset *aa_alloc_ruleset(gfp_t gfp);
+struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *name, struct aa_proxy *proxy,
+				    gfp_t gfp);
+struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_null(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name,
+				 gfp_t gfp);
+struct aa_profile *aa_new_learning_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat,
+					   const char *base, gfp_t gfp);
+void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile);
+struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name);
+struct aa_profile *aa_lookupn_profile(struct aa_ns *ns, const char *hname,
+				      size_t n);
+struct aa_profile *aa_fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base,
+					const char *fqname, size_t n);
+
+ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_label *label,
+			    u32 mask, struct aa_loaddata *udata);
+ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_label *label,
+			   char *name, size_t size);
+void __aa_profile_list_release(struct list_head *head);
+
+#define profile_unconfined(X) ((X)->mode == APPARMOR_UNCONFINED)
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_newest_profile - simple wrapper fn to wrap the label version
+ * @p: profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns refcount to newest version of the profile (maybe @p)
+ *
+ * Requires: @p must be held with a valid refcount
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_newest_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+	return labels_profile(aa_get_newest_label(&p->label));
+}
+
+static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES(struct aa_ruleset *rules,
+				       unsigned char class)
+{
+	if (class <= AA_CLASS_LAST)
+		return rules->policy->start[class];
+	else
+		return aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa,
+					rules->policy->start[0], &class, 1);
+}
+
+static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(struct aa_ruleset *rules)
+{
+	return RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NETV9);
+}
+
+static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_NET(struct aa_ruleset *rules)
+{
+	/* can not use RULE_MEDIATE_v9AF here, because AF match fail
+	 * can not be distiguished from class match fail, and we only
+	 * fallback to checking older class on class match failure
+	 */
+	aa_state_t state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NETV9);
+
+	/* fallback and check v7/8 if v9 is NOT mediated */
+	if (!state)
+		state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET);
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+
+void aa_compute_profile_mediates(struct aa_profile *profile);
+static inline bool profile_mediates(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				    unsigned char class)
+{
+	return label_mediates(&profile->label, class);
+}
+
+static inline bool profile_mediates_safe(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					 unsigned char class)
+{
+	return label_mediates_safe(&profile->label, class);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p
+ * @p: profile  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @p if @p is NULL will return NULL
+ * Requires: @p must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+	if (p)
+		kref_get(&(p->label.count.count));
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_profile_not0 - increment refcount on profile @p found via lookup
+ * @p: profile  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @p if @p is NULL will return NULL
+ * Requires: @p must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_profile_not0(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+	if (p && kref_get_unless_zero(&p->label.count.count))
+		return p;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_profile_rcu - increment a refcount profile that can be replaced
+ * @p: pointer to profile that can be replaced (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to a refcounted profile.
+ *     else NULL if no profile
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_profile_rcu(struct aa_profile __rcu **p)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *c;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	do {
+		c = rcu_dereference(*p);
+	} while (c && !kref_get_unless_zero(&c->label.count.count));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return c;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_put_profile - decrement refcount on profile @p
+ * @p: profile  (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_put_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+	if (p)
+		kref_put(&p->label.count.count, aa_label_kref);
+}
+
+static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	if (aa_g_audit != AUDIT_NORMAL)
+		return aa_g_audit;
+
+	return profile->audit;
+}
+
+bool aa_policy_view_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			    struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
+bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
+int aa_may_manage_policy(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			 struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns,
+			 const struct cred *ocred, u32 mask);
+bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns);
+bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns);
+
+#endif /* __AA_POLICY_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_compat.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..af0e17433
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * Code to provide backwards compatibility with older policy versions,
+ * by converting/mapping older policy formats into the newer internal
+ * formats.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2022 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __POLICY_COMPAT_H
+#define __POLICY_COMPAT_H
+
+#include "policy.h"
+
+#define K_ABI_MASK 0x3ff
+#define FORCE_COMPLAIN_FLAG 0x800
+#define VERSION_LT(X, Y) (((X) & K_ABI_MASK) < ((Y) & K_ABI_MASK))
+#define VERSION_LE(X, Y) (((X) & K_ABI_MASK) <= ((Y) & K_ABI_MASK))
+#define VERSION_GT(X, Y) (((X) & K_ABI_MASK) > ((Y) & K_ABI_MASK))
+
+#define v5	5	/* base version */
+#define v6	6	/* per entry policydb mediation check */
+#define v7	7
+#define v8	8	/* full network masking */
+#define v9	9	/* xbits are used as permission bits in policydb */
+
+int aa_compat_map_xmatch(struct aa_policydb *policy);
+int aa_compat_map_policy(struct aa_policydb *policy, u32 version);
+int aa_compat_map_file(struct aa_policydb *policy);
+
+#endif /* __POLICY_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cc6e84151
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_NAMESPACE_H
+#define __AA_NAMESPACE_H
+
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+
+#include "apparmor.h"
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+#include "label.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+
+/* Match max depth of user namespaces */
+#define MAX_NS_DEPTH 32
+
+/* struct aa_ns_acct - accounting of profiles in namespace
+ * @max_size: maximum space allowed for all profiles in namespace
+ * @max_count: maximum number of profiles that can be in this namespace
+ * @size: current size of profiles
+ * @count: current count of profiles (includes null profiles)
+ */
+struct aa_ns_acct {
+	int max_size;
+	int max_count;
+	int size;
+	int count;
+};
+
+/* struct aa_ns - namespace for a set of profiles
+ * @base: common policy
+ * @parent: parent of namespace
+ * @lock: lock for modifying the object
+ * @acct: accounting for the namespace
+ * @unconfined: special unconfined profile for the namespace
+ * @sub_ns: list of namespaces under the current namespace.
+ * @uniq_null: uniq value used for null learning profiles
+ * @uniq_id: a unique id count for the profiles in the namespace
+ * @level: level of ns within the tree hierarchy
+ * @dents: dentries for the namespaces file entries in apparmorfs
+ *
+ * An aa_ns defines the set profiles that are searched to determine which
+ * profile to attach to a task.  Profiles can not be shared between aa_ns
+ * and profile names within a namespace are guaranteed to be unique.  When
+ * profiles in separate namespaces have the same name they are NOT considered
+ * to be equivalent.
+ *
+ * Namespaces are hierarchical and only namespaces and profiles below the
+ * current namespace are visible.
+ *
+ * Namespace names must be unique and can not contain the characters :/\0
+ */
+struct aa_ns {
+	struct aa_policy base;
+	struct aa_ns *parent;
+	struct mutex lock;
+	struct aa_ns_acct acct;
+	struct aa_profile *unconfined;
+	struct list_head sub_ns;
+	atomic_t uniq_null;
+	long uniq_id;
+	int level;
+	long revision;
+	wait_queue_head_t wait;
+
+	struct aa_labelset labels;
+	struct list_head rawdata_list;
+
+	struct dentry *dents[AAFS_NS_SIZEOF];
+};
+
+extern struct aa_label *kernel_t;
+extern struct aa_ns *root_ns;
+
+extern const char *aa_hidden_ns_name;
+
+#define ns_unconfined(NS) (&(NS)->unconfined->label)
+
+bool aa_ns_visible(struct aa_ns *curr, struct aa_ns *view, bool subns);
+const char *aa_ns_name(struct aa_ns *parent, struct aa_ns *child, bool subns);
+void aa_free_ns(struct aa_ns *ns);
+int aa_alloc_root_ns(void);
+void aa_free_root_ns(void);
+
+struct aa_ns *__aa_lookupn_ns(struct aa_ns *view, const char *hname, size_t n);
+struct aa_ns *aa_lookupn_ns(struct aa_ns *view, const char *name, size_t n);
+struct aa_ns *__aa_find_or_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name,
+				     struct dentry *dir);
+struct aa_ns *aa_prepare_ns(struct aa_ns *root, const char *name);
+void __aa_remove_ns(struct aa_ns *ns);
+
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_deref_parent(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+	return rcu_dereference_protected(p->parent,
+					 mutex_is_locked(&p->ns->lock));
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_ns - increment references count on @ns
+ * @ns: namespace to increment reference count of (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @ns, if @ns is NULL returns NULL
+ * Requires: @ns must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_ns(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	if (ns)
+		aa_get_profile(ns->unconfined);
+
+	return ns;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_put_ns - decrement refcount on @ns
+ * @ns: namespace to put reference of
+ *
+ * Decrement reference count of @ns and if no longer in use free it
+ */
+static inline void aa_put_ns(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	if (ns)
+		aa_put_profile(ns->unconfined);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_findn_ns - find a namespace on a list by @name
+ * @head: list to search for namespace on  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of namespace to look for  (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: length of @name
+ * Returns: unrefcounted namespace
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ */
+static inline struct aa_ns *__aa_findn_ns(struct list_head *head,
+					  const char *name, size_t n)
+{
+	return (struct aa_ns *)__policy_strn_find(head, name, n);
+}
+
+static inline struct aa_ns *__aa_find_ns(struct list_head *head,
+					 const char *name)
+{
+	return __aa_findn_ns(head, name, strlen(name));
+}
+
+#endif /* AA_NAMESPACE_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4ea9b6479
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy loading interface function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __POLICY_INTERFACE_H
+#define __POLICY_INTERFACE_H
+
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+
+
+struct aa_load_ent {
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct aa_profile *new;
+	struct aa_profile *old;
+	struct aa_profile *rename;
+	const char *ns_name;
+};
+
+void aa_load_ent_free(struct aa_load_ent *ent);
+struct aa_load_ent *aa_load_ent_alloc(void);
+
+#define PACKED_FLAG_HAT		1
+#define PACKED_FLAG_DEBUG1	2
+#define PACKED_FLAG_DEBUG2	4
+
+#define PACKED_MODE_ENFORCE	0
+#define PACKED_MODE_COMPLAIN	1
+#define PACKED_MODE_KILL	2
+#define PACKED_MODE_UNCONFINED	3
+#define PACKED_MODE_USER	4
+
+struct aa_ns;
+
+enum {
+	AAFS_LOADDATA_ABI = 0,
+	AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION,
+	AAFS_LOADDATA_HASH,
+	AAFS_LOADDATA_DATA,
+	AAFS_LOADDATA_COMPRESSED_SIZE,
+	AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR,		/* must be last actual entry */
+	AAFS_LOADDATA_NDENTS		/* count of entries */
+};
+
+/*
+ * The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the
+ * actual data.  The interface has the notion of a named entry
+ * which has a name (AA_NAME typecode followed by name string) followed by
+ * the entries typecode and data.  Named types allow for optional
+ * elements and extensions to be added and tested for without breaking
+ * backwards compatibility.
+ */
+
+enum aa_code {
+	AA_U8,
+	AA_U16,
+	AA_U32,
+	AA_U64,
+	AA_NAME,		/* same as string except it is items name */
+	AA_STRING,
+	AA_BLOB,
+	AA_STRUCT,
+	AA_STRUCTEND,
+	AA_LIST,
+	AA_LISTEND,
+	AA_ARRAY,
+	AA_ARRAYEND,
+};
+
+/*
+ * aa_ext is the read of the buffer containing the serialized profile.  The
+ * data is copied into a kernel buffer in apparmorfs and then handed off to
+ * the unpack routines.
+ */
+struct aa_ext {
+	void *start;
+	void *end;
+	void *pos;		/* pointer to current position in the buffer */
+	u32 version;
+};
+
+/* struct aa_loaddata - buffer of policy raw_data set
+ * @count: inode/filesystem refcount - use aa_get_i_loaddata()
+ * @pcount: profile refcount - use aa_get_profile_loaddata()
+ * @list: list the loaddata is on
+ * @work: used to do a delayed cleanup
+ * @dents: refs to dents created in aafs
+ * @ns: the namespace this loaddata was loaded into
+ * @name:
+ * @size: the size of the data that was loaded
+ * @compressed_size: the size of the data when it is compressed
+ * @revision: unique revision count that this data was loaded as
+ * @abi: the abi number the loaddata uses
+ * @hash: a hash of the loaddata, used to help dedup data
+ *
+ * There is no loaddata ref for being on ns->rawdata_list, so
+ * @ns->lock must be held when walking the list. Dentries and
+ * inode opens hold refs on @count; profiles hold refs on @pcount.
+ * When the last @pcount drops, do_ploaddata_rmfs() removes the
+ * fs entries and drops the associated @count ref.
+ */
+struct aa_loaddata {
+	struct aa_common_ref count;
+	struct kref pcount;
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct work_struct work;
+	struct dentry *dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_NDENTS];
+	struct aa_ns *ns;
+	char *name;
+	size_t size;			/* the original size of the payload */
+	size_t compressed_size;		/* the compressed size of the payload */
+	long revision;			/* the ns policy revision this caused */
+	int abi;
+	unsigned char *hash;
+
+	/* Pointer to payload. If @compressed_size > 0, then this is the
+	 * compressed version of the payload, else it is the uncompressed
+	 * version (with the size indicated by @size).
+	 */
+	char *data;
+};
+
+int aa_unpack(struct aa_loaddata *udata, struct list_head *lh, const char **ns);
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_i_loaddata - get a reference count from a counted data reference
+ * @data: reference to get a count on
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to reference
+ * Requires: @data to have a valid reference count on it. It is a bug
+ *           if the race to reap can be encountered when it is used.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_loaddata *
+aa_get_i_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data)
+{
+
+	if (data)
+		kref_get(&(data->count.count));
+	return data;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_profile_loaddata - get a profile reference count on loaddata
+ * @data: reference to get a count on
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to reference
+ * Requires: @data to have a valid reference count on it.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_loaddata *
+aa_get_profile_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data)
+{
+	if (data)
+		kref_get(&(data->pcount));
+	return data;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0 - get a profile reference count if not zero
+ * @data: reference to get a count on
+ *
+ * Like aa_get_profile_loaddata(), but safe to call on an entry that may
+ * be on a list (e.g. ns->rawdata_list) where the last pcount has already
+ * dropped and the deferred cleanup has not yet run.
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to reference, or %NULL if @data is NULL or its
+ *          profile refcount has already reached zero.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_loaddata *
+aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(struct aa_loaddata *data)
+{
+	if (data && kref_get_unless_zero(&data->pcount))
+		return data;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision);
+bool aa_rawdata_eq(struct aa_loaddata *l, struct aa_loaddata *r);
+void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref);
+void aa_ploaddata_kref(struct kref *kref);
+struct aa_loaddata *aa_loaddata_alloc(size_t size);
+static inline void aa_put_i_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data)
+{
+	if (data)
+		kref_put(&data->count.count, aa_loaddata_kref);
+}
+
+static inline void aa_put_profile_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data)
+{
+	if (data)
+		kref_put(&data->pcount, aa_ploaddata_kref);
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT)
+bool aa_inbounds(struct aa_ext *e, size_t size);
+size_t aa_unpack_u16_chunk(struct aa_ext *e, char **chunk);
+bool aa_unpack_X(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code);
+bool aa_unpack_nameX(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code, const char *name);
+bool aa_unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name);
+bool aa_unpack_u64(struct aa_ext *e, u64 *data, const char *name);
+bool aa_unpack_array(struct aa_ext *e, const char *name, u16 *size);
+size_t aa_unpack_blob(struct aa_ext *e, char **blob, const char *name);
+int aa_unpack_str(struct aa_ext *e, const char **string, const char *name);
+int aa_unpack_strdup(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __POLICY_INTERFACE_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..03dbfdb2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor /proc/<pid>/attr/ interface function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
+#define __AA_PROCATTR_H
+
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
+int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
+
+#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ad2c0da8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor resource limits function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_RESOURCE_H
+#define __AA_RESOURCE_H
+
+#include <linux/resource.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+/* struct aa_rlimit - rlimit settings for the profile
+ * @mask: which hard limits to set
+ * @limits: rlimit values that override task limits
+ *
+ * AppArmor rlimits are used to set confined task rlimits.  Only the
+ * limits specified in @mask will be controlled by apparmor.
+ */
+struct aa_rlimit {
+	unsigned int mask;
+	struct rlimit limits[RLIM_NLIMITS];
+};
+
+extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_rlimit[];
+
+int aa_map_resource(int resource);
+int aa_task_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      struct task_struct *task,
+		      unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim);
+
+void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new);
+
+static inline void aa_free_rlimit_rules(struct aa_rlimit *rlims)
+{
+	/* NOP */
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_RESOURCE_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6025d3849
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor security identifier (secid) definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright 2009-2018 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_SECID_H
+#define __AA_SECID_H
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct aa_label;
+
+/* secid value that will not be allocated */
+#define AA_SECID_INVALID 0
+
+/* secid value that matches any other secid */
+#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
+
+/* sysctl to enable displaying mode when converting secid to secctx */
+extern int apparmor_display_secid_mode;
+
+struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid);
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, struct lsm_context *cp);
+int apparmor_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, struct lsm_context *cp);
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);
+
+
+int aa_alloc_secid(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
+void aa_free_secid(u32 secid);
+
+#endif /* __AA_SECID_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c772668cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#include <linux/signal.h>
+#include "signal.h"
+
+/* provide a mapping of arch signal to internal signal # for mediation
+ * those that are always an alias SIGCLD for SIGCLHD and SIGPOLL for SIGIO
+ * map to the same entry those that may/or may not get a separate entry
+ */
+static const int sig_map[MAXMAPPED_SIG] = {
+	[0] = MAXMAPPED_SIG,	/* existence test */
+	[SIGHUP] = 1,
+	[SIGINT] = 2,
+	[SIGQUIT] = 3,
+	[SIGILL] = 4,
+	[SIGTRAP] = 5,		/* -, 5, - */
+	[SIGABRT] = 6,		/*  SIGIOT: -, 6, - */
+	[SIGBUS] = 7,		/* 10, 7, 10 */
+	[SIGFPE] = 8,
+	[SIGKILL] = 9,
+	[SIGUSR1] = 10,		/* 30, 10, 16 */
+	[SIGSEGV] = 11,
+	[SIGUSR2] = 12,		/* 31, 12, 17 */
+	[SIGPIPE] = 13,
+	[SIGALRM] = 14,
+	[SIGTERM] = 15,
+#ifdef SIGSTKFLT
+	[SIGSTKFLT] = 16,	/* -, 16, - */
+#endif
+	[SIGCHLD] = 17,		/* 20, 17, 18.  SIGCHLD -, -, 18 */
+	[SIGCONT] = 18,		/* 19, 18, 25 */
+	[SIGSTOP] = 19,		/* 17, 19, 23 */
+	[SIGTSTP] = 20,		/* 18, 20, 24 */
+	[SIGTTIN] = 21,		/* 21, 21, 26 */
+	[SIGTTOU] = 22,		/* 22, 22, 27 */
+	[SIGURG] = 23,		/* 16, 23, 21 */
+	[SIGXCPU] = 24,		/* 24, 24, 30 */
+	[SIGXFSZ] = 25,		/* 25, 25, 31 */
+	[SIGVTALRM] = 26,	/* 26, 26, 28 */
+	[SIGPROF] = 27,		/* 27, 27, 29 */
+	[SIGWINCH] = 28,	/* 28, 28, 20 */
+	[SIGIO] = 29,		/* SIGPOLL: 23, 29, 22 */
+	[SIGPWR] = 30,		/* 29, 30, 19.  SIGINFO 29, -, - */
+#ifdef SIGSYS
+	[SIGSYS] = 31,		/* 12, 31, 12. often SIG LOST/UNUSED */
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGEMT
+	[SIGEMT] = 32,		/* 7, - , 7 */
+#endif
+#if defined(SIGLOST) && SIGPWR != SIGLOST		/* sparc */
+	[SIGLOST] = 33,		/* unused on Linux */
+#endif
+#if defined(SIGUNUSED) && \
+    defined(SIGLOST) && defined(SIGSYS) && SIGLOST != SIGSYS
+	[SIGUNUSED] = 34,	/* -, 31, - */
+#endif
+};
+
+/* this table is ordered post sig_map[sig] mapping */
+static const char *const sig_names[MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME] = {
+	"unknown",
+	"hup",
+	"int",
+	"quit",
+	"ill",
+	"trap",
+	"abrt",
+	"bus",
+	"fpe",
+	"kill",
+	"usr1",
+	"segv",
+	"usr2",
+	"pipe",
+	"alrm",
+	"term",
+	"stkflt",
+	"chld",
+	"cont",
+	"stop",
+	"stp",
+	"ttin",
+	"ttou",
+	"urg",
+	"xcpu",
+	"xfsz",
+	"vtalrm",
+	"prof",
+	"winch",
+	"io",
+	"pwr",
+	"sys",
+	"emt",
+	"lost",
+	"unused",
+
+	"exists",	/* always last existence test mapped to MAXMAPPED_SIG */
+};
+
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/signal.h b/security/apparmor/include/signal.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..729763fa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/signal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2023 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_SIGNAL_H
+#define __AA_SIGNAL_H
+
+#define SIGUNKNOWN 0
+#define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35
+
+#define MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME (MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1)
+#define SIGRT_BASE 128
+
+#endif /* __AA_SIGNAL_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b1aaaf60f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor task related definitions and mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_TASK_H
+#define __AA_TASK_H
+
+static inline struct aa_task_ctx *task_ctx(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return task->security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_task;
+}
+
+/*
+ * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
+ * @nnp: snapshot of label at time of no_new_privs
+ * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
+ */
+struct aa_task_ctx {
+	struct aa_label *nnp;
+	struct aa_label *onexec;
+	struct aa_label *previous;
+	u64 token;
+};
+
+int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label);
+void aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
+int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie);
+struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_task_ctx - free a task_ctx
+ * @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx) {
+		aa_put_label(ctx->nnp);
+		aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
+		aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dup_task_ctx - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
+ * @new: a blank task context      (NOT NULL)
+ * @old: the task context to copy  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new,
+				   const struct aa_task_ctx *old)
+{
+	*new = *old;
+	aa_get_label(new->nnp);
+	aa_get_label(new->previous);
+	aa_get_label(new->onexec);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
+ * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!ctx);
+
+	aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
+	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+	ctx->previous = NULL;
+	ctx->onexec = NULL;
+	ctx->token = 0;
+}
+
+#define AA_PTRACE_TRACE		MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_PTRACE_READ		MAY_READ
+#define AA_MAY_BE_TRACED	AA_MAY_APPEND
+#define AA_MAY_BE_READ		AA_MAY_CREATE
+#define PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT	2
+
+#define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \
+			     AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED)
+#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
+
+#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \
+	"segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
+	"xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
+
+int aa_may_ptrace(const struct cred *tracer_cred, struct aa_label *tracer,
+		  const struct cred *tracee_cred, struct aa_label *tracee,
+		  u32 request);
+
+
+
+#define AA_USERNS_CREATE	8
+
+int aa_profile_ns_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+		       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request);
+
+#endif /* __AA_TASK_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..df5712cea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/sig_names.h"
+
+
+static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
+{
+	if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
+		return SIGUNKNOWN;
+	else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
+		return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE;
+	else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
+		return sig_map[sig];
+	return SIGUNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_signal_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to static string
+ */
+static const char *audit_signal_mask(u32 mask)
+{
+	if (mask & MAY_READ)
+		return "receive";
+	if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+		return "send";
+	return "";
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_signal_cb() - call back for signal specific audit fields
+ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
+
+	if (ad->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
+				 audit_signal_mask(ad->request));
+		if (ad->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
+					 audit_signal_mask(ad->denied));
+		}
+	}
+	if (ad->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)",
+				 ad->unmappedsig);
+	else if (ad->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[ad->signal]);
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
+				 ad->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
+			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+}
+
+static int profile_signal_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct aa_profile *profile,
+			       struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+			       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms perms;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+		return 0;
+
+	ad->subj_cred = cred;
+	ad->peer = peer;
+	/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL);
+	if (!state)
+		return 0;
+	state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, ad->signal);
+	aa_label_match(profile, rules, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_signal_cb);
+}
+
+int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender,
+		  const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target,
+		  int sig)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL, OP_SIGNAL);
+
+	ad.signal = map_signal_num(sig);
+	ad.unmappedsig = sig;
+	return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
+			     profile_signal_perm(subj_cred, profile, target,
+						 MAY_WRITE, &ad),
+			     profile_signal_perm(target_cred, profile, sender,
+						 MAY_READ, &ad));
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3fd384d8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2135 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor label definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/sort.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/secid.h"
+
+
+/*
+ * the aa_label represents the set of profiles confining an object
+ *
+ * Labels maintain a reference count to the set of pointers they reference
+ * Labels are ref counted by
+ *   tasks and object via the security field/security context off the field
+ *   code - will take a ref count on a label if it needs the label
+ *          beyond what is possible with an rcu_read_lock.
+ *   profiles - each profile is a label
+ *   secids - a pinned secid will keep a refcount of the label it is
+ *          referencing
+ *   objects - inode, files, sockets, ...
+ *
+ * Labels are not ref counted by the label set, so they maybe removed and
+ * freed when no longer in use.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define PROXY_POISON 97
+#define LABEL_POISON 100
+
+static void free_proxy(struct aa_proxy *proxy)
+{
+	if (proxy) {
+		/* p->label will not updated any more as p is dead */
+		aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(proxy->label, true));
+		memset(proxy, 0, sizeof(*proxy));
+		RCU_INIT_POINTER(proxy->label, (struct aa_label *)PROXY_POISON);
+		kfree(proxy);
+	}
+}
+
+void aa_proxy_kref(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct aa_proxy *proxy = container_of(kref, struct aa_proxy,
+					      count.count);
+
+	free_proxy(proxy);
+}
+
+struct aa_proxy *aa_alloc_proxy(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_proxy *new;
+
+	new = kzalloc_obj(struct aa_proxy, gfp);
+	if (new) {
+		kref_init(&new->count.count);
+		new->count.reftype = REF_PROXY;
+		rcu_assign_pointer(new->label, aa_get_label(label));
+	}
+	return new;
+}
+
+/* requires profile list write lock held */
+void __aa_proxy_redirect(struct aa_label *orig, struct aa_label *new)
+{
+	struct aa_label *tmp;
+
+	AA_BUG(!orig);
+	AA_BUG(!new);
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&labels_set(orig)->lock);
+
+	tmp = rcu_dereference_protected(orig->proxy->label,
+					&labels_ns(orig)->lock);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(orig->proxy->label, aa_get_label(new));
+	__label_make_stale(orig);
+	aa_put_label(tmp);
+}
+
+static void __proxy_share(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new)
+{
+	struct aa_proxy *proxy = new->proxy;
+
+	new->proxy = aa_get_proxy(old->proxy);
+	__aa_proxy_redirect(old, new);
+	aa_put_proxy(proxy);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * ns_cmp - compare ns for label set ordering
+ * @a: ns to compare (NOT NULL)
+ * @b: ns to compare (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: <0 if a < b
+ *          ==0 if a == b
+ *          >0  if a > b
+ */
+static int ns_cmp(struct aa_ns *a, struct aa_ns *b)
+{
+	int res;
+
+	AA_BUG(!a);
+	AA_BUG(!b);
+	AA_BUG(!a->base.hname);
+	AA_BUG(!b->base.hname);
+
+	if (a == b)
+		return 0;
+
+	res = a->level - b->level;
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+
+	return strcmp(a->base.hname, b->base.hname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * profile_cmp - profile comparison for set ordering
+ * @a: profile to compare (NOT NULL)
+ * @b: profile to compare (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: <0  if a < b
+ *          ==0 if a == b
+ *          >0  if a > b
+ */
+static int profile_cmp(struct aa_profile *a, struct aa_profile *b)
+{
+	int res;
+
+	AA_BUG(!a);
+	AA_BUG(!b);
+	AA_BUG(!a->ns);
+	AA_BUG(!b->ns);
+	AA_BUG(!a->base.hname);
+	AA_BUG(!b->base.hname);
+
+	if (a == b || a->base.hname == b->base.hname)
+		return 0;
+	res = ns_cmp(a->ns, b->ns);
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+
+	return strcmp(a->base.hname, b->base.hname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * vec_cmp - label comparison for set ordering
+ * @a: aa_profile to compare (NOT NULL)
+ * @an: length of @a
+ * @b: aa_profile to compare (NOT NULL)
+ * @bn: length of @b
+ *
+ * Returns: <0  if @a < @b
+ *          ==0 if @a == @b
+ *          >0  if @a > @b
+ */
+static int vec_cmp(struct aa_profile **a, int an, struct aa_profile **b, int bn)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	AA_BUG(!a);
+	AA_BUG(!*a);
+	AA_BUG(!b);
+	AA_BUG(!*b);
+	AA_BUG(an <= 0);
+	AA_BUG(bn <= 0);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < an && i < bn; i++) {
+		int res = profile_cmp(a[i], b[i]);
+
+		if (res != 0)
+			return res;
+	}
+
+	return an - bn;
+}
+
+static bool vec_is_stale(struct aa_profile **vec, int n)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	AA_BUG(!vec);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (profile_is_stale(vec[i]))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void accum_label_info(struct aa_label *new)
+{
+	long u = FLAG_UNCONFINED;
+	int i;
+
+	AA_BUG(!new);
+
+	/* size == 1 is a profile and flags must be set as part of creation */
+	if (new->size == 1)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < new->size; i++) {
+		u |= new->vec[i]->label.flags & (FLAG_DEBUG1 | FLAG_DEBUG2 |
+						 FLAG_STALE);
+		if (!(u & new->vec[i]->label.flags & FLAG_UNCONFINED))
+			u &= ~FLAG_UNCONFINED;
+		new->mediates |= new->vec[i]->label.mediates;
+	}
+	new->flags |= u;
+}
+
+static int sort_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+	return profile_cmp(*(struct aa_profile **)a, *(struct aa_profile **)b);
+}
+
+/*
+ * assumes vec is sorted
+ * Assumes @vec has null terminator at vec[n], and will null terminate
+ * vec[n - dups]
+ */
+static inline int unique(struct aa_profile **vec, int n)
+{
+	int i, pos, dups = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(n < 1);
+	AA_BUG(!vec);
+
+	pos = 0;
+	for (i = 1; i < n; i++) {
+		int res = profile_cmp(vec[pos], vec[i]);
+
+		AA_BUG(res > 0, "vec not sorted");
+		if (res == 0) {
+			/* drop duplicate */
+			aa_put_profile(vec[i]);
+			dups++;
+			continue;
+		}
+		pos++;
+		if (dups)
+			vec[pos] = vec[i];
+	}
+
+	AA_BUG(dups < 0);
+
+	return dups;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_vec_unique - canonical sort and unique a list of profiles
+ * @n: number of refcounted profiles in the list (@n > 0)
+ * @vec: list of profiles to sort and merge
+ * @flags: null terminator flags of @vec
+ *
+ * Returns: the number of duplicates eliminated == references put
+ *
+ * If @flags & VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE @vec has null terminator at vec[n], and will
+ * null terminate vec[n - dups]
+ */
+int aa_vec_unique(struct aa_profile **vec, int n, int flags)
+{
+	int i, dups = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(n < 1);
+	AA_BUG(!vec);
+
+	/* vecs are usually small and inorder, have a fallback for larger */
+	if (n > 8) {
+		sort(vec, n, sizeof(struct aa_profile *), sort_cmp, NULL);
+		dups = unique(vec, n);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* insertion sort + unique in one */
+	for (i = 1; i < n; i++) {
+		struct aa_profile *tmp = vec[i];
+		int pos, j;
+
+		for (pos = i - 1 - dups; pos >= 0; pos--) {
+			int res = profile_cmp(vec[pos], tmp);
+
+			if (res == 0) {
+				/* drop duplicate entry */
+				aa_put_profile(tmp);
+				dups++;
+				goto continue_outer;
+			} else if (res < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+		/* pos is at entry < tmp, or index -1. Set to insert pos */
+		pos++;
+
+		for (j = i - dups; j > pos; j--)
+			vec[j] = vec[j - 1];
+		vec[pos] = tmp;
+continue_outer:
+		;
+	}
+
+	AA_BUG(dups < 0);
+
+out:
+	if (flags & VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE)
+		vec[n - dups] = NULL;
+
+	return dups;
+}
+
+
+void aa_label_destroy(struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	if (!label_isprofile(label)) {
+		struct aa_profile *profile;
+		struct label_it i;
+
+		aa_put_str(label->hname);
+
+		label_for_each(i, label, profile) {
+			aa_put_profile(profile);
+			label->vec[i.i] = (struct aa_profile *)
+					   (LABEL_POISON + (long) i.i);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (label->proxy) {
+		if (rcu_dereference_protected(label->proxy->label, true) == label)
+			rcu_assign_pointer(label->proxy->label, NULL);
+		aa_put_proxy(label->proxy);
+	}
+	aa_free_secid(label->secid);
+
+	label->proxy = (struct aa_proxy *) PROXY_POISON + 1;
+}
+
+void aa_label_free(struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	if (!label)
+		return;
+
+	aa_label_destroy(label);
+	kfree(label);
+}
+
+static void label_free_switch(struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	if (label->flags & FLAG_NS_COUNT)
+		aa_free_ns(labels_ns(label));
+	else if (label_isprofile(label))
+		aa_free_profile(labels_profile(label));
+	else
+		aa_label_free(label);
+}
+
+static void label_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = container_of(head, struct aa_label, rcu);
+
+	if (label->flags & FLAG_IN_TREE)
+		(void) aa_label_remove(label);
+	label_free_switch(label);
+}
+
+void aa_label_kref(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = container_of(kref, struct aa_label,
+					      count.count);
+	struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
+
+	if (!ns) {
+		/* never live, no rcu callback needed, just using the fn */
+		label_free_switch(label);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* TODO: update labels_profile macro so it works here */
+	AA_BUG(label_isprofile(label) &&
+	       on_list_rcu(&label->vec[0]->base.profiles));
+	AA_BUG(label_isprofile(label) &&
+	       on_list_rcu(&label->vec[0]->base.list));
+
+	/* TODO: if compound label and not stale add to reclaim cache */
+	call_rcu(&label->rcu, label_free_rcu);
+}
+
+static void label_free_or_put_new(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_label *new)
+{
+	if (label != new)
+		/* need to free directly to break circular ref with proxy */
+		aa_label_free(new);
+	else
+		aa_put_label(new);
+}
+
+bool aa_label_init(struct aa_label *label, int size, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(size < 1);
+
+	if (aa_alloc_secid(label, gfp) < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	label->size = size;			/* doesn't include null */
+	label->vec[size] = NULL;		/* null terminate */
+	kref_init(&label->count.count);
+	label->count.reftype = REF_NS;		/* for aafs purposes */
+	RB_CLEAR_NODE(&label->node);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_alloc - allocate a label with a profile vector of @size length
+ * @size: size of profile vector in the label
+ * @proxy: proxy to use OR null if to allocate a new one
+ * @gfp: memory allocation type
+ *
+ * Returns: new label
+ *     else NULL if failed
+ */
+struct aa_label *aa_label_alloc(int size, struct aa_proxy *proxy, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_label *new;
+
+	AA_BUG(size < 1);
+
+	/*  + 1 for null terminator entry on vec */
+	new = kzalloc_flex(*new, vec, size + 1, gfp);
+	AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_LABEL, "%s (%p)\n", __func__, new);
+	if (!new)
+		goto fail;
+
+	if (!aa_label_init(new, size, gfp))
+		goto fail;
+
+	if (!proxy) {
+		proxy = aa_alloc_proxy(new, gfp);
+		if (!proxy)
+			goto fail;
+	} else
+		aa_get_proxy(proxy);
+	/* just set new's proxy, don't redirect proxy here if it was passed in*/
+	new->proxy = proxy;
+
+	return new;
+
+fail:
+	aa_label_free(new);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * label_cmp - label comparison for set ordering
+ * @a: label to compare (NOT NULL)
+ * @b: label to compare (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: <0  if a < b
+ *          ==0 if a == b
+ *          >0  if a > b
+ */
+static int label_cmp(struct aa_label *a, struct aa_label *b)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!b);
+
+	if (a == b)
+		return 0;
+
+	return vec_cmp(a->vec, a->size, b->vec, b->size);
+}
+
+/* helper fn for label_for_each_confined */
+int aa_label_next_confined(struct aa_label *label, int i)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(i < 0);
+
+	for (; i < label->size; i++) {
+		if (!profile_unconfined(label->vec[i]))
+			return i;
+	}
+
+	return i;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_label_next_not_in_set - return the next profile of @sub not in @set
+ * @I: label iterator
+ * @set: label to test against
+ * @sub: label to if is subset of @set
+ *
+ * Returns: profile in @sub that is not in @set, with iterator set pos after
+ *     else NULL if @sub is a subset of @set
+ */
+struct aa_profile *__aa_label_next_not_in_set(struct label_it *I,
+					      struct aa_label *set,
+					      struct aa_label *sub)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!set);
+	AA_BUG(!I);
+	AA_BUG(I->i < 0);
+	AA_BUG(I->i > set->size);
+	AA_BUG(!sub);
+	AA_BUG(I->j < 0);
+	AA_BUG(I->j > sub->size);
+
+	while (I->j < sub->size && I->i < set->size) {
+		int res = profile_cmp(sub->vec[I->j], set->vec[I->i]);
+
+		if (res == 0) {
+			(I->j)++;
+			(I->i)++;
+		} else if (res > 0)
+			(I->i)++;
+		else
+			return sub->vec[(I->j)++];
+	}
+
+	if (I->j < sub->size)
+		return sub->vec[(I->j)++];
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_is_subset - test if @sub is a subset of @set
+ * @set: label to test against
+ * @sub: label to test if is subset of @set
+ *
+ * Returns: true if @sub is subset of @set
+ *     else false
+ */
+bool aa_label_is_subset(struct aa_label *set, struct aa_label *sub)
+{
+	struct label_it i = { };
+
+	AA_BUG(!set);
+	AA_BUG(!sub);
+
+	if (sub == set)
+		return true;
+
+	return __aa_label_next_not_in_set(&i, set, sub) == NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_is_unconfined_subset - test if @sub is a subset of @set
+ * @set: label to test against
+ * @sub: label to test if is subset of @set
+ *
+ * This checks for subset but taking into account unconfined. IF
+ * @sub contains an unconfined profile that does not have a matching
+ * unconfined in @set then this will not cause the test to fail.
+ * Conversely we don't care about an unconfined in @set that is not in
+ * @sub
+ *
+ * Returns: true if @sub is special_subset of @set
+ *     else false
+ */
+bool aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(struct aa_label *set, struct aa_label *sub)
+{
+	struct label_it i = { };
+	struct aa_profile *p;
+
+	AA_BUG(!set);
+	AA_BUG(!sub);
+
+	if (sub == set)
+		return true;
+
+	do {
+		p = __aa_label_next_not_in_set(&i, set, sub);
+		if (p && !profile_unconfined(p))
+			break;
+	} while (p);
+
+	return p == NULL;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * __label_remove - remove @label from the label set
+ * @label: label to remove
+ * @new: label to redirect to
+ *
+ * Requires: labels_set(@label)->lock write_lock
+ * Returns:  true if the label was in the tree and removed
+ */
+static bool __label_remove(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_label *new)
+{
+	struct aa_labelset *ls = labels_set(label);
+
+	AA_BUG(!ls);
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&ls->lock);
+
+	if (new)
+		__aa_proxy_redirect(label, new);
+
+	if (!label_is_stale(label))
+		__label_make_stale(label);
+
+	if (label->flags & FLAG_IN_TREE) {
+		rb_erase(&label->node, &ls->root);
+		label->flags &= ~FLAG_IN_TREE;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __label_replace - replace @old with @new in label set
+ * @old: label to remove from label set
+ * @new: label to replace @old with
+ *
+ * Requires: labels_set(@old)->lock write_lock
+ *           valid ref count be held on @new
+ * Returns: true if @old was in set and replaced by @new
+ *
+ * Note: current implementation requires label set be order in such a way
+ *       that @new directly replaces @old position in the set (ie.
+ *       using pointer comparison of the label address would not work)
+ */
+static bool __label_replace(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new)
+{
+	struct aa_labelset *ls = labels_set(old);
+
+	AA_BUG(!ls);
+	AA_BUG(!old);
+	AA_BUG(!new);
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&ls->lock);
+	AA_BUG(new->flags & FLAG_IN_TREE);
+
+	if (!label_is_stale(old))
+		__label_make_stale(old);
+
+	if (old->flags & FLAG_IN_TREE) {
+		rb_replace_node(&old->node, &new->node, &ls->root);
+		old->flags &= ~FLAG_IN_TREE;
+		new->flags |= FLAG_IN_TREE;
+		accum_label_info(new);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __label_insert - attempt to insert @l into a label set
+ * @ls: set of labels to insert @l into (NOT NULL)
+ * @label: new label to insert (NOT NULL)
+ * @replace: whether insertion should replace existing entry that is not stale
+ *
+ * Requires: @ls->lock
+ *           caller to hold a valid ref on l
+ *           if @replace is true l has a preallocated proxy associated
+ * Returns: @l if successful in inserting @l - with additional refcount
+ *          else ref counted equivalent label that is already in the set,
+ *          the else condition only happens if @replace is false
+ */
+static struct aa_label *__label_insert(struct aa_labelset *ls,
+				       struct aa_label *label, bool replace)
+{
+	struct rb_node **new, *parent = NULL;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ls);
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(labels_set(label) != ls);
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&ls->lock);
+	AA_BUG(label->flags & FLAG_IN_TREE);
+
+	/* Figure out where to put new node */
+	new = &ls->root.rb_node;
+	while (*new) {
+		struct aa_label *this = rb_entry(*new, struct aa_label, node);
+		int result = label_cmp(label, this);
+
+		parent = *new;
+		if (result == 0) {
+			/* !__aa_get_label means queued for destruction,
+			 * so replace in place, however the label has
+			 * died before the replacement so do not share
+			 * the proxy
+			 */
+			if (!replace && !label_is_stale(this)) {
+				if (__aa_get_label(this))
+					return this;
+			} else
+				__proxy_share(this, label);
+			AA_BUG(!__label_replace(this, label));
+			return aa_get_label(label);
+		} else if (result < 0)
+			new = &((*new)->rb_left);
+		else /* (result > 0) */
+			new = &((*new)->rb_right);
+	}
+
+	/* Add new node and rebalance tree. */
+	rb_link_node(&label->node, parent, new);
+	rb_insert_color(&label->node, &ls->root);
+	label->flags |= FLAG_IN_TREE;
+	accum_label_info(label);
+
+	return aa_get_label(label);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __vec_find - find label that matches @vec in label set
+ * @vec: vec of profiles to find matching label for (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: length of @vec
+ *
+ * Requires: @vec_labelset(vec) lock held
+ *           caller to hold a valid ref on l
+ *
+ * Returns: ref counted @label if matching label is in tree
+ *          ref counted label that is equiv to @l in tree
+ *     else NULL if @vec equiv is not in tree
+ */
+static struct aa_label *__vec_find(struct aa_profile **vec, int n)
+{
+	struct rb_node *node;
+
+	AA_BUG(!vec);
+	AA_BUG(!*vec);
+	AA_BUG(n <= 0);
+
+	node = vec_labelset(vec, n)->root.rb_node;
+	while (node) {
+		struct aa_label *this = rb_entry(node, struct aa_label, node);
+		int result = vec_cmp(this->vec, this->size, vec, n);
+
+		if (result > 0)
+			node = node->rb_left;
+		else if (result < 0)
+			node = node->rb_right;
+		else
+			return __aa_get_label(this);
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __label_find - find label @label in label set
+ * @label: label to find (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: labels_set(@label)->lock held
+ *           caller to hold a valid ref on l
+ *
+ * Returns: ref counted @label if @label is in tree OR
+ *          ref counted label that is equiv to @label in tree
+ *     else NULL if @label or equiv is not in tree
+ */
+static struct aa_label *__label_find(struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	return __vec_find(label->vec, label->size);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_remove - remove a label from the labelset
+ * @label: label to remove
+ *
+ * Returns: true if @label was removed from the tree
+ *     else @label was not in tree so it could not be removed
+ */
+bool aa_label_remove(struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	struct aa_labelset *ls = labels_set(label);
+	unsigned long flags;
+	bool res;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ls);
+
+	write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+	res = __label_remove(label, ns_unconfined(labels_ns(label)));
+	write_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_replace - replace a label @old with a new version @new
+ * @old: label to replace
+ * @new: label replacing @old
+ *
+ * Returns: true if @old was in tree and replaced
+ *     else @old was not in tree, and @new was not inserted
+ */
+bool aa_label_replace(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	bool res;
+
+	if (name_is_shared(old, new) && labels_ns(old) == labels_ns(new)) {
+		write_lock_irqsave(&labels_set(old)->lock, flags);
+		if (old->proxy != new->proxy)
+			__proxy_share(old, new);
+		else
+			__aa_proxy_redirect(old, new);
+		res = __label_replace(old, new);
+		write_unlock_irqrestore(&labels_set(old)->lock, flags);
+	} else {
+		struct aa_label *l;
+		struct aa_labelset *ls = labels_set(old);
+
+		write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+		res = __label_remove(old, new);
+		if (labels_ns(old) != labels_ns(new)) {
+			write_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+			ls = labels_set(new);
+			write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+		}
+		l = __label_insert(ls, new, true);
+		res = (l == new);
+		write_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+		aa_put_label(l);
+	}
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+/**
+ * vec_find - find label @l in label set
+ * @vec: array of profiles to find equiv label for (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: length of @vec
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted label if @vec equiv is in tree
+ *     else NULL if @vec equiv is not in tree
+ */
+static struct aa_label *vec_find(struct aa_profile **vec, int n)
+{
+	struct aa_labelset *ls;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	AA_BUG(!vec);
+	AA_BUG(!*vec);
+	AA_BUG(n <= 0);
+
+	ls = vec_labelset(vec, n);
+	read_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+	label = __vec_find(vec, n);
+	read_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+
+	return label;
+}
+
+/* requires sort and merge done first */
+static struct aa_label *vec_create_and_insert_label(struct aa_profile **vec,
+						    int len, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+	struct aa_labelset *ls;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct aa_label *new;
+	int i;
+
+	AA_BUG(!vec);
+
+	if (len == 1)
+		return aa_get_label(&vec[0]->label);
+
+	ls = labels_set(&vec[len - 1]->label);
+
+	/* TODO: enable when read side is lockless
+	 * check if label exists before taking locks
+	 */
+	new = aa_label_alloc(len, NULL, gfp);
+	if (!new)
+		return NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		new->vec[i] = aa_get_profile(vec[i]);
+
+	write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+	label = __label_insert(ls, new, false);
+	write_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+	label_free_or_put_new(label, new);
+
+	return label;
+}
+
+struct aa_label *aa_vec_find_or_create_label(struct aa_profile **vec, int len,
+					     gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = vec_find(vec, len);
+
+	if (label)
+		return label;
+
+	return vec_create_and_insert_label(vec, len, gfp);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_insert - insert label @label into @ls or return existing label
+ * @ls: labelset to insert @label into
+ * @label: label to insert
+ *
+ * Requires: caller to hold a valid ref on @label
+ *
+ * Returns: ref counted @label if successful in inserting @label
+ *     else ref counted equivalent label that is already in the set
+ */
+struct aa_label *aa_label_insert(struct aa_labelset *ls, struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	struct aa_label *l;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ls);
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	/* check if label exists before taking lock */
+	if (!label_is_stale(label)) {
+		read_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+		l = __label_find(label);
+		read_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+		if (l)
+			return l;
+	}
+
+	write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+	l = __label_insert(ls, label, false);
+	write_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+
+	return l;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_next_in_merge - find the next profile when merging @a and @b
+ * @I: label iterator
+ * @a: label to merge
+ * @b: label to merge
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile
+ *     else null if no more profiles
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_label_next_in_merge(struct label_it *I,
+					  struct aa_label *a,
+					  struct aa_label *b)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!a);
+	AA_BUG(!b);
+	AA_BUG(!I);
+	AA_BUG(I->i < 0);
+	AA_BUG(I->i > a->size);
+	AA_BUG(I->j < 0);
+	AA_BUG(I->j > b->size);
+
+	if (I->i < a->size) {
+		if (I->j < b->size) {
+			int res = profile_cmp(a->vec[I->i], b->vec[I->j]);
+
+			if (res > 0)
+				return b->vec[(I->j)++];
+			if (res == 0)
+				(I->j)++;
+		}
+
+		return a->vec[(I->i)++];
+	}
+
+	if (I->j < b->size)
+		return b->vec[(I->j)++];
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * label_merge_cmp - cmp of @a merging with @b against @z for set ordering
+ * @a: label to merge then compare (NOT NULL)
+ * @b: label to merge then compare (NOT NULL)
+ * @z: label to compare merge against (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Assumes: using the most recent versions of @a, @b, and @z
+ *
+ * Returns: <0  if a < b
+ *          ==0 if a == b
+ *          >0  if a > b
+ */
+static int label_merge_cmp(struct aa_label *a, struct aa_label *b,
+			   struct aa_label *z)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *p = NULL;
+	struct label_it i = { };
+	int k;
+
+	AA_BUG(!a);
+	AA_BUG(!b);
+	AA_BUG(!z);
+
+	for (k = 0;
+	     k < z->size && (p = aa_label_next_in_merge(&i, a, b));
+	     k++) {
+		int res = profile_cmp(p, z->vec[k]);
+
+		if (res != 0)
+			return res;
+	}
+
+	if (p)
+		return 1;
+	else if (k < z->size)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * label_merge_insert - create a new label by merging @a and @b
+ * @new: preallocated label to merge into (NOT NULL)
+ * @a: label to merge with @b  (NOT NULL)
+ * @b: label to merge with @a  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: preallocated proxy
+ *
+ * Returns: ref counted label either @new if merge is unique
+ *          @a if @b is a subset of @a
+ *          @b if @a is a subset of @b
+ *
+ * NOTE: will not use @new if the merge results in @new == @a or @b
+ *
+ *       Must be used within labelset write lock to avoid racing with
+ *       setting labels stale.
+ */
+static struct aa_label *label_merge_insert(struct aa_label *new,
+					   struct aa_label *a,
+					   struct aa_label *b)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_labelset *ls;
+	struct aa_profile *next;
+	struct label_it i;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int k = 0, invcount = 0;
+	bool stale = false;
+
+	AA_BUG(!a);
+	AA_BUG(a->size < 0);
+	AA_BUG(!b);
+	AA_BUG(b->size < 0);
+	AA_BUG(!new);
+	AA_BUG(new->size < a->size + b->size);
+
+	label_for_each_in_merge(i, a, b, next) {
+		AA_BUG(!next);
+		if (profile_is_stale(next)) {
+			new->vec[k] = aa_get_newest_profile(next);
+			AA_BUG(!new->vec[k]->label.proxy);
+			AA_BUG(!new->vec[k]->label.proxy->label);
+			if (next->label.proxy != new->vec[k]->label.proxy)
+				invcount++;
+			k++;
+			stale = true;
+		} else
+			new->vec[k++] = aa_get_profile(next);
+	}
+	/* set to actual size which is <= allocated len */
+	new->size = k;
+	new->vec[k] = NULL;
+
+	if (invcount) {
+		new->size -= aa_vec_unique(&new->vec[0], new->size,
+					   VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE);
+		/* TODO: deal with reference labels */
+		if (new->size == 1) {
+			label = aa_get_label(&new->vec[0]->label);
+			return label;
+		}
+	} else if (!stale) {
+		/*
+		 * merge could be same as a || b, note: it is not possible
+		 * for new->size == a->size == b->size unless a == b
+		 */
+		if (k == a->size)
+			return aa_get_label(a);
+		else if (k == b->size)
+			return aa_get_label(b);
+	}
+	ls = labels_set(new);
+	write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+	label = __label_insert(labels_set(new), new, false);
+	write_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+
+	return label;
+}
+
+/**
+ * labelset_of_merge - find which labelset a merged label should be inserted
+ * @a: label to merge and insert
+ * @b: label to merge and insert
+ *
+ * Returns: labelset that the merged label should be inserted into
+ */
+static struct aa_labelset *labelset_of_merge(struct aa_label *a,
+					     struct aa_label *b)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *nsa = labels_ns(a);
+	struct aa_ns *nsb = labels_ns(b);
+
+	if (ns_cmp(nsa, nsb) <= 0)
+		return &nsa->labels;
+	return &nsb->labels;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __label_find_merge - find label that is equiv to merge of @a and @b
+ * @ls: set of labels to search (NOT NULL)
+ * @a: label to merge with @b  (NOT NULL)
+ * @b: label to merge with @a  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: ls->lock read_lock held
+ *
+ * Returns: ref counted label that is equiv to merge of @a and @b
+ *     else NULL if merge of @a and @b is not in set
+ */
+static struct aa_label *__label_find_merge(struct aa_labelset *ls,
+					   struct aa_label *a,
+					   struct aa_label *b)
+{
+	struct rb_node *node;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ls);
+	AA_BUG(!a);
+	AA_BUG(!b);
+
+	if (a == b)
+		return __label_find(a);
+
+	node  = ls->root.rb_node;
+	while (node) {
+		struct aa_label *this = container_of(node, struct aa_label,
+						     node);
+		int result = label_merge_cmp(a, b, this);
+
+		if (result < 0)
+			node = node->rb_left;
+		else if (result > 0)
+			node = node->rb_right;
+		else
+			return __aa_get_label(this);
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_find_merge - find label that is equiv to merge of @a and @b
+ * @a: label to merge with @b  (NOT NULL)
+ * @b: label to merge with @a  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: labels be fully constructed with a valid ns
+ *
+ * Returns: ref counted label that is equiv to merge of @a and @b
+ *     else NULL if merge of @a and @b is not in set
+ */
+struct aa_label *aa_label_find_merge(struct aa_label *a, struct aa_label *b)
+{
+	struct aa_labelset *ls;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	bool a_needput, b_needput;
+
+	AA_BUG(!a);
+	AA_BUG(!b);
+
+	a = aa_get_newest_label_condref(a, &a_needput);
+	b = aa_get_newest_label_condref(b, &b_needput);
+	ls = labelset_of_merge(a, b);
+	read_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+	label = __label_find_merge(ls, a, b);
+	read_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+	aa_put_label_condref(a, a_needput);
+	aa_put_label_condref(b, b_needput);
+
+	return label;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_merge - attempt to insert new merged label of @a and @b
+ * @a: label to merge with @b  (NOT NULL)
+ * @b: label to merge with @a  (NOT NULL)
+ * @gfp: memory allocation type
+ *
+ * Requires: caller to hold valid refs on @a and @b
+ *           labels be fully constructed with a valid ns
+ *
+ * Returns: ref counted new label if successful in inserting merge of a & b
+ *     else ref counted equivalent label that is already in the set.
+ *     else NULL if could not create label (-ENOMEM)
+ */
+struct aa_label *aa_label_merge(struct aa_label *a, struct aa_label *b,
+				gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+
+	AA_BUG(!a);
+	AA_BUG(!b);
+
+	if (a == b)
+		return aa_get_newest_label(a);
+
+	/* TODO: enable when read side is lockless
+	 * check if label exists before taking locks
+	if (!label_is_stale(a) && !label_is_stale(b))
+		label = aa_label_find_merge(a, b);
+	*/
+
+	if (!label) {
+		struct aa_label *new;
+		bool a_needput, b_needput;
+
+		a = aa_get_newest_label_condref(a, &a_needput);
+		b = aa_get_newest_label_condref(b, &b_needput);
+
+		/* could use label_merge_len(a, b), but requires double
+		 * comparison for small savings
+		 */
+		new = aa_label_alloc(a->size + b->size, NULL, gfp);
+		if (!new)
+			goto out;
+
+		label = label_merge_insert(new, a, b);
+		label_free_or_put_new(label, new);
+out:
+		aa_put_label_condref(a, a_needput);
+		aa_put_label_condref(b, b_needput);
+	}
+
+	return label;
+}
+
+/* match a profile and its associated ns component if needed
+ * Assumes visibility test has already been done.
+ * If a subns profile is not to be matched should be prescreened with
+ * visibility test.
+ */
+static inline aa_state_t match_component(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					 struct aa_ruleset *rules,
+					 struct aa_profile *tp,
+					 aa_state_t state)
+{
+	const char *ns_name;
+
+	if (profile->ns == tp->ns)
+		return aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
+
+	/* try matching with namespace name and then profile */
+	ns_name = aa_ns_name(profile->ns, tp->ns, true);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, ":", 1);
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, state, ns_name);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, ":", 1);
+	return aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * label_compound_match - find perms for full compound label
+ * @profile: profile to find perms for
+ * @rules: ruleset to search
+ * @label: label to check access permissions for
+ * @state: state to start match in
+ * @inview: whether to match labels in view or only in scope
+ * @request: permissions to request
+ * @perms: perms struct to set
+ *
+ * Returns: state match stopped at or DFA_NOMATCH if aborted early
+ *
+ * For the label A//&B//&C this does the perm match for A//&B//&C
+ * @perms should be preinitialized with allperms OR a previous permission
+ *        check to be stacked.
+ */
+static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				struct aa_ruleset *rules,
+				struct aa_label *label,
+				aa_state_t state, bool inview, u32 request,
+				struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *tp;
+	struct label_it i;
+
+	/* find first subcomponent that is visible */
+	label_for_each(i, label, tp) {
+		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, inview))
+			continue;
+		state = match_component(profile, rules, tp, state);
+		if (!state)
+			goto fail;
+		goto next;
+	}
+
+	/* no component visible */
+	*perms = allperms;
+	return state;
+
+next:
+	label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
+		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, inview))
+			continue;
+		state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, state, "//&");
+		state = match_component(profile, rules, tp, state);
+		if (!state)
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	*perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+	return state;
+
+fail:
+	*perms = nullperms;
+	return DFA_NOMATCH;
+}
+
+/**
+ * label_components_match - find perms for all subcomponents of a label
+ * @profile: profile to find perms for
+ * @rules: ruleset to search
+ * @label: label to check access permissions for
+ * @start: state to start match in
+ * @inview: whether to match labels in view or only in scope
+ * @request: permissions to request
+ * @perms: an initialized perms struct to add accumulation to
+ *
+ * Returns: the state the match finished in, may be the none matching state
+ *
+ * For the label A//&B//&C this does the perm match for each of A and B and C
+ * @perms should be preinitialized with allperms OR a previous permission
+ *        check to be stacked.
+ */
+static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				  struct aa_ruleset *rules,
+				  struct aa_label *label, aa_state_t start,
+				  bool inview, u32 request,
+				  struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *tp;
+	struct label_it i;
+	struct aa_perms tmp;
+	aa_state_t state = 0;
+
+	/* find first subcomponent to test */
+	label_for_each(i, label, tp) {
+		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, inview))
+			continue;
+		state = match_component(profile, rules, tp, start);
+		if (!state)
+			goto fail;
+		goto next;
+	}
+
+	/* no subcomponents visible - no change in perms */
+	return state;
+
+next:
+	tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+	aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
+	label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
+		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, inview))
+			continue;
+		state = match_component(profile, rules, tp, start);
+		if (!state)
+			goto fail;
+		tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+		aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
+	}
+
+	if ((perms->allow & request) != request)
+		return DFA_NOMATCH;
+
+	return state;
+
+fail:
+	*perms = nullperms;
+	return DFA_NOMATCH;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_match - do a multi-component label match
+ * @profile: profile to match against (NOT NULL)
+ * @rules: ruleset to search
+ * @label: label to match (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: state to start in
+ * @inview: whether to match labels in view or only in scope
+ * @request: permission request
+ * @perms: Returns computed perms (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: the state the match finished in, may be the none matching state
+ */
+int aa_label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_ruleset *rules,
+		   struct aa_label *label, aa_state_t state, bool inview,
+		   u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	aa_state_t tmp = label_compound_match(profile, rules, label, state,
+					      inview, request, perms);
+	if ((perms->allow & request) == request)
+		return tmp;
+
+	/* failed compound_match try component matches */
+	*perms = allperms;
+	return label_components_match(profile, rules, label, state, inview,
+				      request, perms);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_update_label_name - update a label to have a stored name
+ * @ns: ns being viewed from (NOT NULL)
+ * @label: label to update (NOT NULL)
+ * @gfp: type of memory allocation
+ *
+ * Requires: labels_set(label) not locked in caller
+ *
+ * note: only updates the label name if it does not have a name already
+ *       and if it is in the labelset
+ */
+bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_labelset *ls;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	char __counted *name;
+	bool res = false;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ns);
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	if (label->hname || labels_ns(label) != ns)
+		return res;
+
+	if (aa_label_acntsxprint(&name, ns, label, FLAGS_NONE, gfp) < 0)
+		return res;
+
+	ls = labels_set(label);
+	write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+	if (!label->hname && label->flags & FLAG_IN_TREE) {
+		label->hname = name;
+		res = true;
+	} else
+		aa_put_str(name);
+	write_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cached label name is present and visible
+ * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierarchical
+ */
+static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label,
+				   int flags)
+{
+	if (label->hname && (!ns || labels_ns(label) == ns) &&
+	    !(flags & ~FLAG_SHOW_MODE))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* helper macro for snprint routines */
+#define update_for_len(total, len, size, str)	\
+do {					\
+	size_t ulen = len;		\
+					\
+	AA_BUG(len < 0);		\
+	total += ulen;			\
+	ulen = min(ulen, size);		\
+	size -= ulen;			\
+	str += ulen;			\
+} while (0)
+
+/**
+ * aa_profile_snxprint - print a profile name to a buffer
+ * @str: buffer to write to. (MAY BE NULL if @size == 0)
+ * @size: size of buffer
+ * @view: namespace profile is being viewed from
+ * @profile: profile to view (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: whether to include the mode string
+ * @prev_ns: last ns printed when used in compound print
+ *
+ * Returns: size of name written or would be written if larger than
+ *          available buffer
+ *
+ * Note: will not print anything if the profile is not visible
+ */
+static int aa_profile_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *view,
+			       struct aa_profile *profile, int flags,
+			       struct aa_ns **prev_ns)
+{
+	const char *ns_name = NULL;
+
+	AA_BUG(!str && size != 0);
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+
+	if (!view)
+		view = profiles_ns(profile);
+
+	if (view != profile->ns &&
+	    (!prev_ns || (*prev_ns != profile->ns))) {
+		if (prev_ns)
+			*prev_ns = profile->ns;
+		ns_name = aa_ns_name(view, profile->ns,
+				     flags & FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS);
+		if (ns_name == aa_hidden_ns_name) {
+			if (flags & FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED)
+				return snprintf(str, size, "%s", "unconfined");
+			return snprintf(str, size, "%s", ns_name);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((flags & FLAG_SHOW_MODE) && profile != profile->ns->unconfined) {
+		const char *modestr = aa_profile_mode_names[profile->mode];
+
+		if (ns_name)
+			return snprintf(str, size, ":%s:%s (%s)", ns_name,
+					profile->base.hname, modestr);
+		return snprintf(str, size, "%s (%s)", profile->base.hname,
+				modestr);
+	}
+
+	if (ns_name)
+		return snprintf(str, size, ":%s:%s", ns_name,
+				profile->base.hname);
+	return snprintf(str, size, "%s", profile->base.hname);
+}
+
+static const char *label_modename(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label,
+				  int flags)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct label_it i;
+	int mode = -1, count = 0;
+
+	label_for_each(i, label, profile) {
+		if (aa_ns_visible(ns, profile->ns, flags & FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS)) {
+			count++;
+			if (profile == profile->ns->unconfined)
+				/* special case unconfined so stacks with
+				 * unconfined don't report as mixed. ie.
+				 * profile_foo//&:ns1:unconfined (mixed)
+				 */
+				continue;
+			if (mode == -1)
+				mode = profile->mode;
+			else if (mode != profile->mode)
+				return "mixed";
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (count == 0)
+		return "-";
+	if (mode == -1)
+		/* everything was unconfined */
+		mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED;
+
+	return aa_profile_mode_names[mode];
+}
+
+/* if any visible label is not unconfined the display_mode returns true */
+static inline bool display_mode(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label,
+				int flags)
+{
+	if ((flags & FLAG_SHOW_MODE)) {
+		struct aa_profile *profile;
+		struct label_it i;
+
+		label_for_each(i, label, profile) {
+			if (aa_ns_visible(ns, profile->ns,
+					  flags & FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS) &&
+			    profile != profile->ns->unconfined)
+				return true;
+		}
+		/* only ns->unconfined in set of profiles in ns */
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_snxprint - print a label name to a string buffer
+ * @str: buffer to write to. (MAY BE NULL if @size == 0)
+ * @size: size of buffer
+ * @ns: namespace profile is being viewed from
+ * @label: label to view (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: whether to include the mode string
+ *
+ * Returns: size of name written or would be written if larger than
+ *          available buffer
+ *
+ * Note: labels do not have to be strictly hierarchical to the ns as
+ *       objects may be shared across different namespaces and thus
+ *       pickup labeling from each ns.  If a particular part of the
+ *       label is not visible it will just be excluded.  And if none
+ *       of the label is visible "---" will be used.
+ */
+int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *ns,
+		      struct aa_label *label, int flags)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_ns *prev_ns = NULL;
+	struct label_it i;
+	int count = 0, total = 0;
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	AA_BUG(!str && size != 0);
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	if (DEBUG_ABS_ROOT && (flags & FLAG_ABS_ROOT)) {
+		ns = root_ns;
+		len = snprintf(str, size, "_");
+		update_for_len(total, len, size, str);
+	} else if (!ns) {
+		ns = labels_ns(label);
+	}
+
+	label_for_each(i, label, profile) {
+		if (aa_ns_visible(ns, profile->ns, flags & FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS)) {
+			if (count > 0) {
+				len = snprintf(str, size, "//&");
+				update_for_len(total, len, size, str);
+			}
+			len = aa_profile_snxprint(str, size, ns, profile,
+						  flags & FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS,
+						  &prev_ns);
+			update_for_len(total, len, size, str);
+			count++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (count == 0) {
+		if (flags & FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED)
+			return snprintf(str, size, "%s", "unconfined");
+		return snprintf(str, size, "%s", aa_hidden_ns_name);
+	}
+
+	/* count == 1 && ... is for backwards compat where the mode
+	 * is not displayed for 'unconfined' in the current ns
+	 */
+	if (display_mode(ns, label, flags)) {
+		len = snprintf(str, size, " (%s)",
+			       label_modename(ns, label, flags));
+		update_for_len(total, len, size, str);
+	}
+
+	return total;
+}
+#undef update_for_len
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_asxprint - allocate a string buffer and print label into it
+ * @strp: Returns - the allocated buffer with the label name. (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: namespace profile is being viewed from
+ * @label: label to view (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling what label info is printed
+ * @gfp: kernel memory allocation type
+ *
+ * Returns: size of name written or would be written if larger than
+ *          available buffer
+ */
+int aa_label_asxprint(char **strp, struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label,
+		      int flags, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	int size;
+
+	AA_BUG(!strp);
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	size = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, ns, label, flags);
+	if (size < 0)
+		return size;
+
+	*strp = kmalloc(size + 1, gfp);
+	if (!*strp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return aa_label_snxprint(*strp, size + 1, ns, label, flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_acntsxprint - allocate a __counted string buffer and print label
+ * @strp: buffer to write to.
+ * @ns: namespace profile is being viewed from
+ * @label: label to view (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling what label info is printed
+ * @gfp: kernel memory allocation type
+ *
+ * Returns: size of name written or would be written if larger than
+ *          available buffer
+ */
+int aa_label_acntsxprint(char __counted **strp, struct aa_ns *ns,
+			 struct aa_label *label, int flags, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	int size;
+
+	AA_BUG(!strp);
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	size = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, ns, label, flags);
+	if (size < 0)
+		return size;
+
+	*strp = aa_str_alloc(size + 1, gfp);
+	if (!*strp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return aa_label_snxprint(*strp, size + 1, ns, label, flags);
+}
+
+
+void aa_label_xaudit(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct aa_ns *ns,
+		     struct aa_label *label, int flags, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	const char *str;
+	char *name = NULL;
+	int len;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ab);
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags) ||
+	    display_mode(ns, label, flags)) {
+		len  = aa_label_asxprint(&name, ns, label, flags, gfp);
+		if (len < 0) {
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_LABEL, "label print error");
+			return;
+		}
+		str = name;
+	} else {
+		str = (char *) label->hname;
+		len = strlen(str);
+	}
+	if (audit_string_contains_control(str, len))
+		audit_log_n_hex(ab, str, len);
+	else
+		audit_log_n_string(ab, str, len);
+
+	kfree(name);
+}
+
+void aa_label_seq_xprint(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_ns *ns,
+			 struct aa_label *label, int flags, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!f);
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags)) {
+		char *str;
+		int len;
+
+		len = aa_label_asxprint(&str, ns, label, flags, gfp);
+		if (len < 0) {
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_LABEL, "label print error");
+			return;
+		}
+		seq_puts(f, str);
+		kfree(str);
+	} else if (display_mode(ns, label, flags))
+		seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)", label->hname,
+			   label_modename(ns, label, flags));
+	else
+		seq_puts(f, label->hname);
+}
+
+void aa_label_xprintk(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, int flags,
+		      gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags)) {
+		char *str;
+		int len;
+
+		len = aa_label_asxprint(&str, ns, label, flags, gfp);
+		if (len < 0) {
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_LABEL, "label print error");
+			return;
+		}
+		pr_info("%s", str);
+		kfree(str);
+	} else if (display_mode(ns, label, flags))
+		pr_info("%s (%s)", label->hname,
+		       label_modename(ns, label, flags));
+	else
+		pr_info("%s", label->hname);
+}
+
+void aa_label_printk(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+
+	aa_label_xprintk(ns, label, FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, gfp);
+	aa_put_ns(ns);
+}
+
+static int label_count_strn_entries(const char *str, size_t n)
+{
+	const char *end = str + n;
+	const char *split;
+	int count = 1;
+
+	AA_BUG(!str);
+
+	for (split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str);
+	     split;
+	     split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str)) {
+		count++;
+		str = split + 3;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ensure stacks with components like
+ *   :ns:A//&B
+ * have :ns: applied to both 'A' and 'B' by making the lookup relative
+ * to the base if the lookup specifies an ns, else making the stacked lookup
+ * relative to the last embedded ns in the string.
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base,
+					    struct aa_label *currentbase,
+					    const char *str, size_t n)
+{
+	const char *first = skipn_spaces(str, n);
+
+	if (first && *first == ':')
+		return aa_fqlookupn_profile(base, str, n);
+
+	return aa_fqlookupn_profile(currentbase, str, n);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_label_strn_parse - parse, validate and convert a text string to a label
+ * @base: base label to use for lookups (NOT NULL)
+ * @str: null terminated text string (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: length of str to parse, will stop at \0 if encountered before n
+ * @gfp: allocation type
+ * @create: true if should create compound labels if they don't exist
+ * @force_stack: true if should stack even if no leading &
+ *
+ * Returns: the matching refcounted label if present
+ *     else ERRPTR
+ */
+struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
+				     size_t n, gfp_t gfp, bool create,
+				     bool force_stack)
+{
+	DEFINE_VEC(profile, vec);
+	struct aa_label *label, *currbase = base;
+	int i, len, stack = 0, error;
+	const char *end = str + n;
+	const char *split;
+
+	AA_BUG(!base);
+	AA_BUG(!str);
+
+	str = skipn_spaces(str, n);
+	if (str == NULL || (DEBUG_ABS_ROOT && *str == '_' &&
+			    base != &root_ns->unconfined->label))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	len = label_count_strn_entries(str, end - str);
+	if (*str == '&' || force_stack) {
+		/* stack on top of base */
+		stack = base->size;
+		len += stack;
+		if (*str == '&')
+			str++;
+	}
+
+	error = vec_setup(profile, vec, len, gfp);
+	if (error)
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < stack; i++)
+		vec[i] = aa_get_profile(base->vec[i]);
+
+	for (split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str), i = stack;
+	     split && i < len; i++) {
+		vec[i] = fqlookupn_profile(base, currbase, str, split - str);
+		if (!vec[i])
+			goto fail;
+		/*
+		 * if component specified a new ns it becomes the new base
+		 * so that subsequent lookups are relative to it
+		 */
+		if (vec[i]->ns != labels_ns(currbase))
+			currbase = &vec[i]->label;
+		str = split + 3;
+		split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str);
+	}
+	/* last element doesn't have a split */
+	if (i < len) {
+		vec[i] = fqlookupn_profile(base, currbase, str, end - str);
+		if (!vec[i])
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	if (len == 1)
+		/* no need to free vec as len < LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES */
+		return &vec[0]->label;
+
+	len -= aa_vec_unique(vec, len, VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE);
+	/* TODO: deal with reference labels */
+	if (len == 1) {
+		label = aa_get_label(&vec[0]->label);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (create)
+		label = aa_vec_find_or_create_label(vec, len, gfp);
+	else
+		label = vec_find(vec, len);
+	if (!label)
+		goto fail;
+
+out:
+	/* use adjusted len from after vec_unique, not original */
+	vec_cleanup(profile, vec, len);
+	return label;
+
+fail:
+	label = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
+				gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack)
+{
+	return aa_label_strn_parse(base, str, strlen(str), gfp, create,
+				   force_stack);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_labelset_destroy - remove all labels from the label set
+ * @ls: label set to cleanup (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Labels that are removed from the set may still exist beyond the set
+ * being destroyed depending on their reference counting
+ */
+void aa_labelset_destroy(struct aa_labelset *ls)
+{
+	struct rb_node *node;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ls);
+
+	write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+	for (node = rb_first(&ls->root); node; node = rb_first(&ls->root)) {
+		struct aa_label *this = rb_entry(node, struct aa_label, node);
+
+		if (labels_ns(this) != root_ns)
+			__label_remove(this,
+				       ns_unconfined(labels_ns(this)->parent));
+		else
+			__label_remove(this, NULL);
+	}
+	write_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * @ls: labelset to init (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void aa_labelset_init(struct aa_labelset *ls)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!ls);
+
+	rwlock_init(&ls->lock);
+	ls->root = RB_ROOT;
+}
+
+static struct aa_label *labelset_next_stale(struct aa_labelset *ls)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct rb_node *node;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ls);
+
+	read_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+
+	__labelset_for_each(ls, node) {
+		label = rb_entry(node, struct aa_label, node);
+		if ((label_is_stale(label) ||
+		     vec_is_stale(label->vec, label->size)) &&
+		    __aa_get_label(label))
+			goto out;
+
+	}
+	label = NULL;
+
+out:
+	read_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+
+	return label;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __label_update - insert updated version of @label into labelset
+ * @label: the label to update/replace
+ *
+ * Returns: new label that is up to date
+ *     else NULL on failure
+ *
+ * Requires: @ns lock be held
+ *
+ * Note: worst case is the stale @label does not get updated and has
+ *       to be updated at a later time.
+ */
+static struct aa_label *__label_update(struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	struct aa_label *new, *tmp;
+	struct aa_labelset *ls;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int i, invcount = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&labels_ns(label)->lock));
+
+	new = aa_label_alloc(label->size, label->proxy, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * while holding the ns_lock will stop profile replacement, removal,
+	 * and label updates, label merging and removal can be occurring
+	 */
+	ls = labels_set(label);
+	write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+	for (i = 0; i < label->size; i++) {
+		AA_BUG(!label->vec[i]);
+		new->vec[i] = aa_get_newest_profile(label->vec[i]);
+		AA_BUG(!new->vec[i]);
+		AA_BUG(!new->vec[i]->label.proxy);
+		AA_BUG(!new->vec[i]->label.proxy->label);
+		if (new->vec[i]->label.proxy != label->vec[i]->label.proxy)
+			invcount++;
+	}
+
+	/* updated stale label by being removed/renamed from labelset */
+	if (invcount) {
+		new->size -= aa_vec_unique(&new->vec[0], new->size,
+					   VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE);
+		/* TODO: deal with reference labels */
+		if (new->size == 1) {
+			tmp = aa_get_label(&new->vec[0]->label);
+			AA_BUG(tmp == label);
+			goto remove;
+		}
+		if (labels_set(label) != labels_set(new)) {
+			write_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+			tmp = aa_label_insert(labels_set(new), new);
+			write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
+			goto remove;
+		}
+	} else
+		AA_BUG(labels_ns(label) != labels_ns(new));
+
+	tmp = __label_insert(labels_set(label), new, true);
+remove:
+	/* ensure label is removed, and redirected correctly */
+	__label_remove(label, tmp);
+	write_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
+	label_free_or_put_new(tmp, new);
+
+	return tmp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __labelset_update - update labels in @ns
+ * @ns: namespace to update labels in  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: @ns lock be held
+ *
+ * Walk the labelset ensuring that all labels are up to date and valid
+ * Any label that has a stale component is marked stale and replaced and
+ * by an updated version.
+ *
+ * If failures happen due to memory pressures then stale labels will
+ * be left in place until the next pass.
+ */
+static void __labelset_update(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ns);
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock));
+
+	do {
+		label = labelset_next_stale(&ns->labels);
+		if (label) {
+			struct aa_label *l = __label_update(label);
+
+			aa_put_label(l);
+			aa_put_label(label);
+		}
+	} while (label);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_labelset_update_subtree - update all labels with a stale component
+ * @ns: ns to start update at (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: @ns lock be held
+ *
+ * Invalidates labels based on @p in @ns and any children namespaces.
+ */
+void __aa_labelset_update_subtree(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *child;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ns);
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock));
+
+	__labelset_update(ns);
+
+	list_for_each_entry(child, &ns->sub_ns, base.list) {
+		mutex_lock_nested(&child->lock, child->level);
+		__aa_labelset_update_subtree(child);
+		mutex_unlock(&child->lock);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e41ff5779
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,515 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains basic common functions used in AppArmor
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/lib.h"
+#include "include/perms.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+struct aa_perms nullperms;
+struct aa_perms allperms = { .allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK,
+			     .quiet = ALL_PERMS_MASK,
+			     .hide = ALL_PERMS_MASK };
+
+struct val_table_ent {
+	const char *str;
+	int value;
+};
+
+static struct val_table_ent debug_values_table[] = {
+	{ "N", DEBUG_NONE },
+	{ "none", DEBUG_NONE },
+	{ "n", DEBUG_NONE },
+	{ "0", DEBUG_NONE },
+	{ "all", DEBUG_ALL },
+	{ "Y", DEBUG_ALL },
+	{ "y", DEBUG_ALL },
+	{ "1", DEBUG_ALL },
+	{ "abs_root", DEBUG_LABEL_ABS_ROOT },
+	{ "label", DEBUG_LABEL },
+	{ "domain", DEBUG_DOMAIN },
+	{ "policy", DEBUG_POLICY },
+	{ "interface", DEBUG_INTERFACE },
+	{ "unpack", DEBUG_UNPACK },
+	{ "tags", DEBUG_TAGS },
+	{ NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+static struct val_table_ent *val_table_find_ent(struct val_table_ent *table,
+						const char *name, size_t len)
+{
+	struct val_table_ent *entry;
+
+	for (entry = table; entry->str != NULL; entry++) {
+		if (strncmp(entry->str, name, len) == 0 &&
+		    strlen(entry->str) == len)
+			return entry;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int aa_parse_debug_params(const char *str)
+{
+	struct val_table_ent *ent;
+	const char *next;
+	int val = 0;
+
+	do {
+		size_t n = strcspn(str, "\r\n,");
+
+		next = str + n;
+		ent = val_table_find_ent(debug_values_table, str, next - str);
+		if (ent)
+			val |= ent->value;
+		else
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_INTERFACE, "unknown debug type '%.*s'",
+				 (int)(next - str), str);
+		str = next + 1;
+	} while (*next != 0);
+	return val;
+}
+
+/**
+ * val_mask_to_str - convert a perm mask to its short string
+ * @str: character buffer to store string in (at least 10 characters)
+ * @size: size of the @str buffer
+ * @table: NUL-terminated character buffer of permission characters (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ */
+static int val_mask_to_str(char *str, size_t size,
+			   const struct val_table_ent *table, u32 mask)
+{
+	const struct val_table_ent *ent;
+	int total = 0;
+
+	for (ent = table; ent->str; ent++) {
+		if (ent->value && (ent->value & mask) == ent->value) {
+			int len = scnprintf(str, size, "%s%s", total ? "," : "",
+					    ent->str);
+			size -= len;
+			str += len;
+			total += len;
+			mask &= ~ent->value;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return total;
+}
+
+int aa_print_debug_params(char *buffer)
+{
+	if (!aa_g_debug)
+		return sprintf(buffer, "N");
+	return val_mask_to_str(buffer, PAGE_SIZE, debug_values_table,
+			       aa_g_debug);
+}
+
+bool aa_resize_str_table(struct aa_str_table *t, int newsize, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_str_table_ent *n;
+	int i;
+
+	if (t->size == newsize)
+		return true;
+	n = kzalloc_objs(*n, newsize, gfp);
+	if (!n)
+		return false;
+	for (i = 0; i < min(t->size, newsize); i++)
+		n[i] = t->table[i];
+	for (; i < t->size; i++)
+		kfree_sensitive(t->table[i].strs);
+	if (newsize > t->size)
+		memset(&n[t->size], 0, (newsize-t->size)*sizeof(*n));
+	kfree_sensitive(t->table);
+	t->table = n;
+	t->size = newsize;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_destroy_str_table - free entries str table
+ * @t: the string table to free  (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+void aa_destroy_str_table(struct aa_str_table *t)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (t) {
+		if (!t->table)
+			return;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < t->size; i++)
+			kfree_sensitive(t->table[i].strs);
+		kfree_sensitive(t->table);
+		t->table = NULL;
+		t->size = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * skipn_spaces - Removes leading whitespace from @str.
+ * @str: The string to be stripped.
+ * @n: length of str to parse, will stop at \0 if encountered before n
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the first non-whitespace character in @str.
+ * if all whitespace will return NULL
+ */
+
+const char *skipn_spaces(const char *str, size_t n)
+{
+	for (; n && isspace(*str); --n)
+		++str;
+	if (n)
+		return (char *)str;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, const char **ns_name,
+			     size_t *ns_len)
+{
+	const char *end = fqname + n;
+	const char *name = skipn_spaces(fqname, n);
+
+	*ns_name = NULL;
+	*ns_len = 0;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (name[0] == ':') {
+		char *split = strnchr(&name[1], end - &name[1], ':');
+		*ns_name = skipn_spaces(&name[1], end - &name[1]);
+		if (!*ns_name)
+			return NULL;
+		if (split) {
+			*ns_len = split - *ns_name;
+			if (*ns_len == 0)
+				*ns_name = NULL;
+			split++;
+			if (end - split > 1 && strncmp(split, "//", 2) == 0)
+				split += 2;
+			name = skipn_spaces(split, end - split);
+		} else {
+			/* a ns name without a following profile is allowed */
+			name = NULL;
+			*ns_len = end - *ns_name;
+		}
+	}
+	if (name && *name == 0)
+		name = NULL;
+
+	return name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_info_message - log a none profile related status message
+ * @str: message to log
+ */
+void aa_info_message(const char *str)
+{
+	if (audit_enabled) {
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, NULL);
+
+		ad.info = str;
+		aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &ad, NULL);
+	}
+	printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str);
+}
+
+__counted char *aa_str_alloc(int size, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct counted_str *str;
+
+	str = kmalloc_flex(*str, name, size, gfp);
+	if (!str)
+		return NULL;
+
+	kref_init(&str->count);
+	return str->name;
+}
+
+void aa_str_kref(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	kfree(container_of(kref, struct counted_str, count));
+}
+
+
+const char aa_file_perm_chrs[] = "xwracd         km l     ";
+const char *aa_file_perm_names[] = {
+	"exec",
+	"write",
+	"read",
+	"append",
+
+	"create",
+	"delete",
+	"open",
+	"rename",
+
+	"setattr",
+	"getattr",
+	"setcred",
+	"getcred",
+
+	"chmod",
+	"chown",
+	"chgrp",
+	"lock",
+
+	"mmap",
+	"mprot",
+	"link",
+	"snapshot",
+
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"stack",
+	"change_onexec",
+	"change_profile",
+	"change_hat",
+};
+
+/**
+ * aa_perm_mask_to_str - convert a perm mask to its short string
+ * @str: character buffer to store string in (at least 10 characters)
+ * @str_size: size of the @str buffer
+ * @chrs: NUL-terminated character buffer of permission characters
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ */
+void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, size_t str_size, const char *chrs, u32 mask)
+{
+	unsigned int i, perm = 1;
+	size_t num_chrs = strlen(chrs);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_chrs; perm <<= 1, i++) {
+		if (mask & perm) {
+			/* Ensure that one byte is left for NUL-termination */
+			if (WARN_ON_ONCE(str_size <= 1))
+				break;
+
+			*str++ = chrs[i];
+			str_size--;
+		}
+	}
+	*str = '\0';
+}
+
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
+			 u32 mask)
+{
+	const char *fmt = "%s";
+	unsigned int i, perm = 1;
+	bool prev = false;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 32; perm <<= 1, i++) {
+		if (mask & perm) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, fmt, names[i]);
+			if (!prev) {
+				prev = true;
+				fmt = " %s";
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
+			u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask)
+{
+	char str[33];
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
+	if ((mask & chrsmask) && chrs) {
+		aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), chrs, mask & chrsmask);
+		mask &= ~chrsmask;
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%s", str);
+		if (mask & namesmask)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+	}
+	if ((mask & namesmask) && names)
+		aa_audit_perm_names(ab, names, mask & namesmask);
+	audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_apply_modes_to_perms - apply namespace and profile flags to perms
+ * @profile: that perms where computed from
+ * @perms: perms to apply mode modifiers to
+ *
+ * TODO: split into profile and ns based flags for when accumulating perms
+ */
+void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	switch (AUDIT_MODE(profile)) {
+	case AUDIT_ALL:
+		perms->audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+		fallthrough;
+	case AUDIT_NOQUIET:
+		perms->quiet = 0;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_QUIET:
+		perms->audit = 0;
+		fallthrough;
+	case AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED:
+		perms->quiet = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (KILL_MODE(profile))
+		perms->kill = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+	else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+		perms->complain = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+	else if (USER_MODE(profile))
+		perms->prompt = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+}
+
+void aa_profile_match_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			    struct aa_ruleset *rules,
+			    struct aa_label *label,
+			    int type, u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	/* TODO: doesn't yet handle extended types */
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa,
+			    rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_LABEL],
+			    type);
+	aa_label_match(profile, rules, label, state, false, request, perms);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_check_perms - do audit mode selection based on perms set
+ * @profile: profile being checked
+ * @perms: perms computed for the request
+ * @request: requested perms
+ * @ad: initialized audit structure (MAY BE NULL if not auditing)
+ * @cb: callback fn for type specific fields (MAY BE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if permission else error code
+ *
+ * Note: profile audit modes need to be set before calling by setting the
+ *       perm masks appropriately.
+ *
+ *       If not auditing then complain mode is not enabled and the
+ *       error code will indicate whether there was an explicit deny
+ *	 with a positive value.
+ */
+int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
+		   u32 request, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
+		   void (*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *))
+{
+	int type, error;
+	u32 denied = request & (~perms->allow | perms->deny);
+
+	if (likely(!denied)) {
+		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
+		request &= perms->audit;
+		if (!request || !ad)
+			return 0;
+
+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+		error = 0;
+	} else {
+		error = -EACCES;
+
+		if (denied & perms->kill)
+			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+		else if (denied == (denied & perms->complain))
+			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED;
+		else
+			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED;
+
+		if (denied == (denied & perms->hide))
+			error = -ENOENT;
+
+		denied &= ~perms->quiet;
+		if (!ad || !denied)
+			return error;
+	}
+
+	if (ad) {
+		ad->subj_label = &profile->label;
+		ad->request = request;
+		ad->denied = denied;
+		ad->error = error;
+		aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb);
+	}
+
+	if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
+		error = 0;
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_policy_init - initialize a policy structure
+ * @policy: policy to initialize  (NOT NULL)
+ * @prefix: prefix name if any is required.  (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @name: name of the policy, init will make a copy of it  (NOT NULL)
+ * @gfp: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Note: this fn creates a copy of strings passed in
+ *
+ * Returns: true if policy init successful
+ */
+bool aa_policy_init(struct aa_policy *policy, const char *prefix,
+		    const char *name, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	char *hname;
+	size_t hname_sz;
+
+	hname_sz = (prefix ? strlen(prefix) + 2 : 0) + strlen(name) + 1;
+	/* freed by policy_free */
+	hname = aa_str_alloc(hname_sz, gfp);
+	if (!hname)
+		return false;
+	if (prefix)
+		scnprintf(hname, hname_sz, "%s//%s", prefix, name);
+	else
+		strscpy(hname, name, hname_sz);
+	policy->hname = hname;
+	/* base.name is a substring of fqname */
+	policy->name = basename(policy->hname);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&policy->list);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&policy->profiles);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_policy_destroy - free the elements referenced by @policy
+ * @policy: policy that is to have its elements freed  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void aa_policy_destroy(struct aa_policy *policy)
+{
+	AA_BUG(on_list_rcu(&policy->profiles));
+	AA_BUG(on_list_rcu(&policy->list));
+
+	/* don't free name as its a subset of hname */
+	aa_put_str(policy->hname);
+}
+
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88d12e89d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2588 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/zstd.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/crypto.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_ns.h"
+#include "include/procattr.h"
+#include "include/mount.h"
+#include "include/secid.h"
+
+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+int apparmor_initialized;
+
+union aa_buffer {
+	struct list_head list;
+	DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, buffer);
+};
+
+struct aa_local_cache {
+	unsigned int hold;
+	unsigned int count;
+	struct list_head head;
+};
+
+#define RESERVE_COUNT 2
+static int reserve_count = RESERVE_COUNT;
+static int buffer_count;
+
+static LIST_HEAD(aa_global_buffers);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(aa_buffers_lock);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_local_cache, aa_local_buffers);
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook functions
+ */
+
+/*
+ * put the associated labels
+ */
+static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(cred));
+	set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
+ */
+static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block
+ */
+static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+				 gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
+}
+
+static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+
+	aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task));
+}
+
+static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
+			       u64 clone_flags)
+{
+	struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task);
+
+	aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+					unsigned int mode)
+{
+	struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	int error;
+	bool needput;
+
+	cred = get_task_cred(child);
+	tracee = cred_label(cred);	/* ref count on cred */
+	tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	error = aa_may_ptrace(current_cred(), tracer, cred, tracee,
+			(mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
+						  : AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(tracer, needput);
+	put_cred(cred);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+	struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	int error;
+	bool needput;
+
+	tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	cred = get_task_cred(parent);
+	tracer = cred_label(cred);	/* ref count on cred */
+	error = aa_may_ptrace(cred, tracer, current_cred(), tracee,
+			      AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
+	put_cred(cred);
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(tracee, needput);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
+static int apparmor_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+			   kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	const struct cred *cred;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	cred = __task_cred(target);
+	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+
+	/*
+	 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
+	 * initialize effective and permitted.
+	 */
+	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		struct aa_profile *profile;
+		struct label_it i;
+
+		label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
+			kernel_cap_t allowed;
+
+			allowed = aa_profile_capget(profile);
+			*effective = cap_intersect(*effective, allowed);
+			*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, allowed);
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+			    int cap, unsigned int opts)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+	if (!unconfined(label))
+		error = aa_capable(cred, label, cap, opts);
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @path: path to check permission of  (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permissions mask
+ * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
+		       struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+	bool needput;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	if (!unconfined(label))
+		error = aa_path_perm(op, current_cred(), label, path, 0, mask,
+				     cond);
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permissions mask
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
+{
+	vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(path->mnt),
+					    d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
+	struct path_cond cond = {
+		vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
+		d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
+	};
+
+	if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry))
+		return 0;
+
+	return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @dir: directory of the dentry  (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry to check  (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permissions mask
+ * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
+				  struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
+				  struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+	struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
+
+	return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @dir: directory that the dentry is in  (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry being rm'd  (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permission mask
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
+			  struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct path_cond cond = { };
+	vfsuid_t vfsuid;
+
+	if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
+		return 0;
+
+	vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(dir->mnt), inode);
+	cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
+	cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
+
+	return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in  (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry to create   (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: request permission mask
+ * @mode: created file mode
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
+			      struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
+{
+	struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
+
+	if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry))
+		return 0;
+
+	return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			       umode_t mode)
+{
+	return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+				  S_IFDIR);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			       umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
+{
+	return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
+{
+	return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_truncate(struct file *file)
+{
+	return apparmor_path_truncate(&file->f_path);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 const char *old_name)
+{
+	return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+				  S_IFLNK);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
+			      struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
+		return 0;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (!unconfined(label))
+		error = aa_path_link(current_cred(), label, old_dentry, new_dir,
+				     new_dentry);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+				const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+				const unsigned int flags)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
+		return 0;
+	if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && !path_mediated_fs(new_dentry))
+		return 0;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(old_dir->mnt);
+		vfsuid_t vfsuid;
+		struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
+					 .dentry = old_dentry };
+		struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
+					 .dentry = new_dentry };
+		struct path_cond cond = {
+			.mode = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
+		};
+		vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
+		cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
+
+		if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
+			struct path_cond cond_exchange = {
+				.mode = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_mode,
+			};
+			vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
+			cond_exchange.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
+
+			error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
+					     label, &new_path, 0,
+					     MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
+					     AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
+					     &cond_exchange);
+			if (!error)
+				error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
+						     label, &old_path,
+						     0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
+						     AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond_exchange);
+		}
+
+		if (!error)
+			error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
+					     label, &old_path, 0,
+					     MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
+					     AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
+					     &cond);
+		if (!error)
+			error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
+					     label, &new_path,
+					     0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
+					     AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
+
+	}
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
+{
+	return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
+{
+	return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+{
+	return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file);
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+	bool needput;
+
+	if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
+	 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
+	 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
+	 * actually execute the image.
+	 *
+	 * Illogically, FMODE_EXEC is in f_flags, not f_mode.
+	 */
+	if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) {
+		fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label_condref(file->f_cred, &needput);
+	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file);
+		struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+		vfsuid_t vfsuid;
+		struct path_cond cond = {
+			.mode = inode->i_mode,
+		};
+		vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
+		cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
+
+		error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, file->f_cred,
+				     label, &file->f_path, 0,
+				     aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
+		/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
+		fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
+	}
+	aa_put_label_condref(label, needput);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
+	struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+
+	spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
+
+	if (ctx)
+		aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
+}
+
+static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	error = aa_file_perm(op, current_cred(), label, file, mask, false);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+	return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file));
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
+
+	if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
+		mask |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+	return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
+}
+
+static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+		       unsigned long flags)
+{
+	int mask = 0;
+
+	if (!file || !file_ctx(file))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (prot & PROT_READ)
+		mask |= MAY_READ;
+	/*
+	 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
+	 * write back to the files
+	 */
+	if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
+		mask |= MAY_WRITE;
+	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+		mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+
+	return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			      unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				  unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
+{
+	return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
+			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+static const char *audit_uring_mask(u32 mask)
+{
+	if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL)
+		return "sqpoll";
+	if (mask & AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED)
+		return "override_creds";
+	return "";
+}
+
+static void audit_uring_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va);
+
+	if (ad->request & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested=\"%s\"",
+				 audit_uring_mask(ad->request));
+		if (ad->denied & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " denied=\"%s\"",
+					 audit_uring_mask(ad->denied));
+		}
+	}
+	if (ad->uring.target) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=");
+		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label),
+				ad->uring.target,
+				FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	}
+}
+
+static int profile_uring(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
+			 struct aa_label *new, int cap,
+			 struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	unsigned int state;
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+
+	rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_IO_URING);
+	if (state) {
+		struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+		if (new) {
+			aa_label_match(profile, rules, new, state,
+				       false, request, &perms);
+		} else {
+			perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+		}
+		aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+		error = aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
+				       audit_uring_cb);
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
+ * @new: the target creds
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
+ * to service an io_uring operation.
+ */
+static int apparmor_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+	bool needput;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING,
+			  OP_URING_OVERRIDE);
+
+	ad.uring.target = cred_label(new);
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+			profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED,
+				      cred_label(new), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad));
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
+ * kernel polling thread.
+ */
+static int apparmor_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+	bool needput;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING,
+			  OP_URING_SQPOLL);
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+			profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL,
+				      NULL, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad));
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+
+	return error;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
+static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+			     const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+	bool needput;
+
+	/* Discard magic */
+	if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
+		flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
+
+	flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+			error = aa_remount(current_cred(), label, path, flags,
+					   data);
+		else if (flags & MS_BIND)
+			error = aa_bind_mount(current_cred(), label, path,
+					      dev_name, flags);
+		else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
+				  MS_UNBINDABLE))
+			error = aa_mount_change_type(current_cred(), label,
+						     path, flags);
+		else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
+			error = aa_move_mount_old(current_cred(), label, path,
+						  dev_name);
+		else
+			error = aa_new_mount(current_cred(), label, dev_name,
+					     path, type, flags, data);
+	}
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
+			       const struct path *to_path)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+	bool needput;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	if (!unconfined(label))
+		error = aa_move_mount(current_cred(), label, from_path,
+				      to_path);
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+	bool needput;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	if (!unconfined(label))
+		error = aa_umount(current_cred(), label, mnt, flags);
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
+				 const struct path *new_path)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	label = aa_get_current_label();
+	if (!unconfined(label))
+		error = aa_pivotroot(current_cred(), label, old_path, new_path);
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *lx,
+				u32 *size, u32 flags)
+{
+	int error = -ENOENT;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+	char *value = NULL;
+
+	switch (attr) {
+	case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(current_cred()));
+		break;
+	case LSM_ATTR_PREV:
+		if (ctx->previous)
+			label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
+		break;
+	case LSM_ATTR_EXEC:
+		if (ctx->onexec)
+			label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (label) {
+		error = aa_getprocattr(label, &value, false);
+		if (error > 0)
+			error = lsm_fill_user_ctx(lx, size, value, error,
+						  LSM_ID_APPARMOR, 0);
+		kfree(value);
+	}
+
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	if (error < 0)
+		return error;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, const char *name,
+				char **value)
+{
+	int error = -ENOENT;
+	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
+		label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(__task_cred(task));
+	else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && task_ctx(task)->previous)
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(task_ctx(task)->previous);
+	else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && task_ctx(task)->onexec)
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(task_ctx(task)->onexec);
+	else
+		error = -EINVAL;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (label)
+		error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, true);
+
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int do_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
+	size_t arg_size;
+	int error;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE,
+			  OP_SETPROCATTR);
+
+	if (size == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
+	if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
+		largs = args = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!args)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	error = -EINVAL;
+	args = strim(args);
+	command = strsep(&args, " ");
+	if (!args)
+		goto out;
+	args = skip_spaces(args);
+	if (!*args)
+		goto out;
+
+	arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
+	if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) {
+		if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
+			error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
+							 AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
+		} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
+			error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
+							 AA_CHANGE_TEST);
+		} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
+			error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
+		} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
+			error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST);
+		} else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) {
+			error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK);
+		} else
+			goto fail;
+	} else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) {
+		if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
+			error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC);
+		else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0)
+			error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC |
+							 AA_CHANGE_STACK));
+		else
+			goto fail;
+	} else
+		/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
+		goto fail;
+
+	if (!error)
+		error = size;
+out:
+	kfree(largs);
+	return error;
+
+fail:
+	ad.subj_label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT)
+		ad.info = "current";
+	else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC)
+		ad.info = "exec";
+	else
+		ad.info = "invalid";
+	ad.error = error = -EINVAL;
+	aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &ad, NULL);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(ad.subj_label);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx,
+				u32 size, u32 flags)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (attr != LSM_ATTR_CURRENT && attr != LSM_ATTR_EXEC)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	rc = do_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len);
+	if (rc > 0)
+		return 0;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
+				size_t size)
+{
+	int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
+
+	if (attr)
+		return do_setattr(attr, value, size);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
+	struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred);
+
+	/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
+	if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
+	    (unconfined(new_label)))
+		return;
+
+	aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
+
+	current->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+	/* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */
+	__aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_committed_creds() - do cleanup after new creds committed
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
+	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));
+
+	return;
+}
+
+static void apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	bool needput;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	prop->apparmor.label = label;
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+}
+
+static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+					  struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
+
+	prop->apparmor.label = label;
+	aa_put_label(label);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
+		unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+	bool needput;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+
+	if (!unconfined(label))
+		error = aa_task_setrlimit(current_cred(), label, task,
+					  resource, new_rlim);
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
+			      int sig, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	const struct cred *tc;
+	struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
+	int error;
+	bool needput;
+
+	tc = get_task_cred(target);
+	tl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(tc);
+	if (cred) {
+		/*
+		 * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
+		 */
+		cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+		error = aa_may_signal(cred, cl, tc, tl, sig);
+		aa_put_label(cl);
+	} else {
+		cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+		error = aa_may_signal(current_cred(), cl, tc, tl, sig);
+		__end_current_label_crit_section(cl, needput);
+	}
+	aa_put_label(tl);
+	put_cred(tc);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	int error = 0;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_NS,
+			  OP_USERNS_CREATE);
+
+	ad.subj_cred = current_cred();
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+				    aa_profile_ns_perm(profile, &ad,
+						       AA_USERNS_CREATE));
+	}
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	bool needput;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	//spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
+	rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer, NULL);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate, NULL);
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+
+	/* dead these won't be updated any more */
+	aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->label, true));
+	aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer, true));
+	aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer_lastupdate, true));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sk_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
+ * @sk: sock to have security cloned
+ * @newsk: sock getting clone
+ */
+static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
+				       struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
+
+	/* not actually in use yet */
+	if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label) != rcu_access_pointer(new->label)) {
+		aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(new->label, true));
+		rcu_assign_pointer(new->label, aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->label));
+	}
+
+	if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer) != rcu_access_pointer(new->peer)) {
+		aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(new->peer, true));
+		rcu_assign_pointer(new->peer, aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->peer));
+	}
+
+	if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate) != rcu_access_pointer(new->peer_lastupdate)) {
+		aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(new->peer_lastupdate, true));
+		rcu_assign_pointer(new->peer_lastupdate,
+				   aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->peer_lastupdate));
+	}
+}
+
+static int unix_connect_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct aa_label *label,
+			     struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = aa_sock(peer_sk);
+	int error;
+
+	error = aa_unix_peer_perm(cred, label, OP_CONNECT,
+				(AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE),
+				  sk, peer_sk,
+				  rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label,
+				     lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(peer_sk)->lock)));
+	if (!is_unix_fs(peer_sk)) {
+		last_error(error,
+			   aa_unix_peer_perm(cred,
+				rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label,
+				     lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(peer_sk)->lock)),
+				OP_CONNECT,
+				(AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE),
+							  peer_sk, sk, label));
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* lockdep check in unix_connect_perm - push sks here to check */
+static void unix_connect_peers(struct aa_sk_ctx *sk_ctx,
+			       struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx)
+{
+	/* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC */
+	struct aa_label *label = rcu_dereference_protected(sk_ctx->label, true);
+
+	aa_get_label(label);
+	aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->peer,
+					     true));
+	rcu_assign_pointer(peer_ctx->peer, label);	/* transfer cnt */
+
+	label = aa_get_label(rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label,
+					     true));
+	//spin_unlock(&peer_ctx->lock);
+
+	//spin_lock(&sk_ctx->lock);
+	aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(sk_ctx->peer,
+					       true));
+	aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(sk_ctx->peer_lastupdate,
+					       true));
+
+	rcu_assign_pointer(sk_ctx->peer, aa_get_label(label));
+	rcu_assign_pointer(sk_ctx->peer_lastupdate, label);     /* transfer cnt */
+	//spin_unlock(&sk_ctx->lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_unix_stream_connect - check perms before making unix domain conn
+ * @sk: sk attempting to connect
+ * @peer_sk: sk that is accepting the connection
+ * @newsk: new sk created for this connection
+ * peer is locked when this hook is called
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   0 if connection is permitted
+ *   error code on denial or failure
+ */
+static int apparmor_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk,
+					struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *sk_ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = aa_sock(peer_sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *new_ctx = aa_sock(newsk);
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+	bool needput;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	error = unix_connect_perm(current_cred(), label, sk, peer_sk);
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	/* newsk doesn't go through post_create, but does go through
+	 * security_sk_alloc()
+	 */
+	rcu_assign_pointer(new_ctx->label,
+			   aa_get_label(rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label,
+								  true)));
+
+	/* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC */
+	unix_connect_peers(sk_ctx, new_ctx);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_unix_may_send - check perms before conn or sending unix dgrams
+ * @sock: socket sending the message
+ * @peer: socket message is being send to
+ *
+ * Performs bidirectional permission checks for Unix domain socket communication:
+ * 1. Verifies sender has AA_MAY_SEND to target socket
+ * 2. Verifies receiver has AA_MAY_RECEIVE from source socket
+ *
+ * sock and peer are locked when this hook is called
+ * called by: dgram_connect peer setup but path not copied to newsk
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   0 if transmission is permitted
+ *   error code on denial or failure
+ */
+static int apparmor_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *peer)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = aa_sock(peer->sk);
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+	bool needput;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	error = xcheck(aa_unix_peer_perm(current_cred(),
+				label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
+				sock->sk, peer->sk,
+				rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label,
+							  true)),
+		       aa_unix_peer_perm(peer->file ? peer->file->f_cred : NULL,
+				rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label,
+							  true),
+				OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, peer->sk,
+				sock->sk, label));
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	if (kern)
+		return 0;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		if (family == PF_UNIX)
+			error = aa_unix_create_perm(label, family, type,
+						    protocol);
+		else
+			error = aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label, OP_CREATE,
+					   AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type,
+					   protocol);
+	}
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
+ * @sock: socket that is being setup
+ * @family: family of socket being created
+ * @type: type of the socket
+ * @protocol: protocol of the socket
+ * @kern: socket is a special kernel socket
+ *
+ * Note:
+ * -   kernel sockets labeled kernel_t used to use unconfined
+ * -   socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
+ *     sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
+ *     sock_graft.
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				       int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+
+	if (kern) {
+		label = aa_get_label(kernel_t);
+	} else
+		label = aa_get_current_label();
+
+	if (sock->sk) {
+		struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
+
+		/* still not live */
+		aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->label, true));
+		rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
+	}
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
+				      struct socket *sockb)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *a_ctx = aa_sock(socka->sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *b_ctx = aa_sock(sockb->sk);
+	struct aa_label *label;
+
+	/* socks not live yet - initial values set in sk_alloc */
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (rcu_access_pointer(a_ctx->label) != label) {
+		AA_BUG("a_ctx != label");
+		aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(a_ctx->label, true));
+		rcu_assign_pointer(a_ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
+	}
+	if (rcu_access_pointer(b_ctx->label) != label) {
+		AA_BUG("b_ctx != label");
+		aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(b_ctx->label, true));
+		rcu_assign_pointer(b_ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
+	}
+
+	if (socka->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) {
+		/* unix socket pairs by-pass unix_stream_connect */
+		unix_connect_peers(a_ctx, b_ctx);
+	}
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
+ * @sock: socket to bind the address to (must be non-NULL)
+ * @address: address that is being bound (must be non-NULL)
+ * @addrlen: length of @address
+ *
+ * Performs security checks before allowing a socket to bind to an address.
+ * Handles Unix domain sockets specially through aa_unix_bind_perm().
+ * For other socket families, uses generic permission check via aa_sk_perm().
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   0 if binding is permitted
+ *   error code on denial or invalid parameters
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(!address);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		return aa_unix_bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen);
+	return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(!address);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	/* PF_UNIX goes through unix_stream_connect && unix_may_send */
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		return 0;
+	return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		return aa_unix_listen_perm(sock, backlog);
+	return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
+ *       has not been done.
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(!newsock);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		return aa_unix_accept_perm(sock, newsock);
+	return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk);
+}
+
+static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+			    struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(!msg);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	/* PF_UNIX goes through unix_may_send */
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		return 0;
+	return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+	int error = aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	/* TCP fast open carries connect() semantics in sendmsg(); mediate
+	 * the implicit connect so it cannot bypass the connect permission.
+	 */
+	if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_FASTOPEN) && msg->msg_name &&
+	    (sk_is_tcp(sock->sk) ||
+	     (sk_is_inet(sock->sk) && sock->sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM &&
+	      sock->sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP)))
+		error = aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
+	return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
+static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		return aa_unix_sock_perm(op, request, sock);
+	return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
+static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+			    int level, int optname)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		return aa_unix_opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname);
+	return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				      int optname)
+{
+	return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
+				level, optname);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				      int optname)
+{
+	return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
+				level, optname);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+	return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
+ * @sk: sk to associate @skb with
+ * @skb: skb to check for perms
+ *
+ * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
+ *
+ * don't want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
+ * to deny an incoming connection  socket_sock_rcv_skb()
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+	int error;
+
+	if (!skb->secmark)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If reach here before socket_post_create hook is called, in which
+	 * case label is null, drop the packet.
+	 */
+	if (!rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	error = apparmor_secmark_check(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), OP_RECVMSG,
+				       AA_MAY_RECEIVE, skb->secmark, sk);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return error;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+static struct aa_label *sk_peer_get_label(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+
+	if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer))
+		return aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->peer);
+
+	return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
+ * @sock: socket that we are trying to get the peer context of
+ * @optval: output - buffer to copy peer name to
+ * @optlen: output - size of copied name in @optval
+ * @len: size of @optval buffer
+ * Returns: 0 on success, -errno of failure
+ *
+ * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+					     sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
+					     unsigned int len)
+{
+	char *name = NULL;
+	int slen, error = 0;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_label *peer;
+
+	peer = sk_peer_get_label(sock->sk);
+	if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(peer);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
+				 FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
+				 FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
+	/* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
+	if (slen < 0) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		goto done_put;
+	}
+	if (slen > len) {
+		error = -ERANGE;
+		goto done_len;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, name, slen))
+		error = -EFAULT;
+done_len:
+	if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &slen, sizeof(slen)))
+		error = -EFAULT;
+
+done_put:
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+	aa_put_label(peer);
+done:
+	kfree(name);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
+ * @sock: the peer socket
+ * @skb: packet data
+ * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+					    struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+
+{
+	/* TODO: requires secid support */
+	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
+ * @sk: child sock
+ * @parent: parent socket
+ *
+ * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
+ *       just set sk security information off of current creating process label
+ *       Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
+ *       instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
+ *       socket is shared by different tasks.
+ */
+static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+
+	/* setup - not live */
+	if (!rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label))
+		rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_current_label());
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				      struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+	int error;
+
+	if (!skb->secmark)
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	error = apparmor_secmark_check(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), OP_CONNECT,
+				       AA_MAY_CONNECT, skb->secmark, sk);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return error;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_label.
+ */
+struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_label *),
+	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
+	.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid = {
+	.name = "apparmor",
+	.id = LSM_ID_APPARMOR,
+};
+
+static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, apparmor_move_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, apparmor_file_truncate),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, apparmor_getselfattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, apparmor_setselfattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, apparmor_unix_stream_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, apparmor_unix_may_send),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, apparmor_socket_socketpair),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+#endif
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
+		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
+#endif
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj,
+		      apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create),
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, aa_audit_rule_known),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, aa_audit_rule_match),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, aa_audit_rule_free),
+#endif
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsmprop_to_secctx, apparmor_lsmprop_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx),
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, apparmor_uring_override_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, apparmor_uring_sqpoll),
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
+ */
+
+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
+static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
+	.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
+	.set = param_set_aabool,
+	.get = param_get_aabool
+};
+
+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
+static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
+	.set = param_set_aauint,
+	.get = param_get_aauint
+};
+
+static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val,
+					const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer,
+					const struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aacompressionlevel param_check_int
+static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aacompressionlevel = {
+	.set = param_set_aacompressionlevel,
+	.get = param_get_aacompressionlevel
+};
+
+static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
+static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
+	.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
+	.set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
+	.get = param_get_aalockpolicy
+};
+
+static int param_set_debug(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_debug(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+
+static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+
+static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+
+/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
+ * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
+ */
+
+/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
+enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
+module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
+		  &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
+bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
+module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+#endif
+
+/* whether policy exactly as loaded is retained for debug and checkpointing */
+bool aa_g_export_binary = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
+module_param_named(export_binary, aa_g_export_binary, aabool, 0600);
+#endif
+
+/* policy loaddata compression level */
+int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = AA_DEFAULT_CLEVEL;
+module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level,
+		   aacompressionlevel, 0400);
+
+/* Debug mode */
+int aa_g_debug;
+module_param_call(debug, param_set_debug, param_get_debug,
+		  &aa_g_debug, 0600);
+
+/* Audit mode */
+enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
+		  &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages.  This
+ * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
+ */
+bool aa_g_audit_header = true;
+module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
+		   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* lock out loading/removal of policy
+ * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
+ *       load policy, if lock_policy is set
+ */
+bool aa_g_lock_policy;
+module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
+		   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Syscall logging mode */
+bool aa_g_logsyscall;
+module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
+unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
+module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
+
+/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
+ * on the loaded policy is done.
+ * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
+ * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
+ */
+bool aa_g_paranoid_load = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD);
+module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aaintbool param_check_int
+static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = {
+	.set = param_set_aaintbool,
+	.get = param_get_aaintbool
+};
+/* Boot time disable flag */
+static int apparmor_enabled __ro_after_init = 1;
+module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444);
+
+static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long enabled;
+	int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
+	if (!error)
+		apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
+
+/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
+static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return param_set_bool(val, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return param_set_bool(val, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */
+	if (apparmor_initialized)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	error = param_set_uint(val, kp);
+	aa_g_path_max = max_t(uint32_t, aa_g_path_max, sizeof(union aa_buffer));
+	pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+/* Can only be set before AppArmor is initialized (i.e. on boot cmdline). */
+static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	struct kernel_param kp_local;
+	bool value;
+	int error;
+
+	if (apparmor_initialized)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */
+	value = !!*((int *)kp->arg);
+	memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local));
+	kp_local.arg = &value;
+
+	error = param_set_bool(val, &kp_local);
+	if (!error)
+		*((int *)kp->arg) = *((bool *)kp_local.arg);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/*
+ * To avoid changing /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled from Y/N to
+ * 1/0, this converts the "int that is actually bool" back to bool for
+ * display in the /sys filesystem, while keeping it "int" for the LSM
+ * infrastructure.
+ */
+static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	struct kernel_param kp_local;
+	bool value;
+
+	/* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */
+	value = !!*((int *)kp->arg);
+	memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local));
+	kp_local.arg = &value;
+
+	return param_get_bool(buffer, &kp_local);
+}
+
+static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val,
+					const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	error = param_set_int(val, kp);
+
+	aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = clamp(aa_g_rawdata_compression_level,
+					       AA_MIN_CLEVEL, AA_MAX_CLEVEL);
+	pr_info("AppArmor: policy rawdata compression level set to %d\n",
+		aa_g_rawdata_compression_level);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer,
+					const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return param_get_int(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_debug(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return aa_print_debug_params(buffer);
+}
+
+static int param_set_debug(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!val)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	i = aa_parse_debug_params(val);
+	if (i == DEBUG_PARSE_ERROR)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	aa_g_debug = i;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return sysfs_emit(buffer, "%s\n", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
+}
+
+static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!val)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	i = match_string(audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, val);
+	if (i < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	aa_g_audit = i;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return sysfs_emit(buffer, "%s\n", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
+}
+
+static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!val)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	i = match_string(aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX,
+			 val);
+	if (i < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	aa_g_profile_mode = i;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* arbitrary cap on how long to hold buffer because contention was
+ * encountered before trying to put it back into the global pool
+ */
+#define MAX_HOLD_COUNT 64
+
+/* the hold count is a heuristic for lock contention, and can be
+ * incremented async to actual buffer alloc/free.  Because buffers
+ * may be put back onto a percpu cache different than the ->hold was
+ * added to the counts can be out of sync. Guard against underflow
+ * and overflow
+ */
+static void cache_hold_inc(unsigned int *hold)
+{
+	if (*hold < MAX_HOLD_COUNT)
+		(*hold)++;
+}
+
+char *aa_get_buffer(bool in_atomic)
+{
+	union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
+	struct aa_local_cache *cache;
+	bool try_again = true;
+	gfp_t flags = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN);
+
+	/* use per cpu cached buffers first */
+	cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
+	if (!list_empty(&cache->head)) {
+		aa_buf = list_first_entry(&cache->head, union aa_buffer, list);
+		list_del(&aa_buf->list);
+		if (cache->hold)
+			cache->hold--;
+		cache->count--;
+		put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
+		return &aa_buf->buffer[0];
+	}
+	/* exit percpu as spinlocks may sleep on realtime kernels */
+	put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
+
+	if (!spin_trylock(&aa_buffers_lock)) {
+		/* had contention on lock so increase hold count. Doesn't
+		 * really matter if recorded before or after the spin lock
+		 * as there is no way to guarantee the buffer will be put
+		 * back on the same percpu cache. Instead rely on holds
+		 * roughly averaging out over time.
+		 */
+		cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
+		cache_hold_inc(&cache->hold);
+		put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
+		spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
+	}
+retry:
+	if (buffer_count > reserve_count ||
+	    (in_atomic && !list_empty(&aa_global_buffers))) {
+		aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer,
+					  list);
+		list_del(&aa_buf->list);
+		buffer_count--;
+		spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
+		return aa_buf->buffer;
+	}
+	if (in_atomic) {
+		/*
+		 * out of reserve buffers and in atomic context so increase
+		 * how many buffers to keep in reserve
+		 */
+		reserve_count++;
+		flags = GFP_ATOMIC;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
+
+	if (!in_atomic)
+		might_sleep();
+	aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, flags);
+	if (!aa_buf) {
+		if (try_again) {
+			try_again = false;
+			spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		pr_warn_once("AppArmor: Failed to allocate a memory buffer.\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return aa_buf->buffer;
+}
+
+void aa_put_buffer(char *buf)
+{
+	union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
+	struct aa_local_cache *cache;
+
+	if (!buf)
+		return;
+	aa_buf = container_of(buf, union aa_buffer, buffer[0]);
+
+	cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
+	if (!cache->hold) {
+		put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
+
+		if (spin_trylock(&aa_buffers_lock)) {
+			/* put back on global list */
+			list_add(&aa_buf->list, &aa_global_buffers);
+			buffer_count++;
+			spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
+			return;
+		}
+		/* contention on global list, fallback to percpu */
+		cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
+		cache_hold_inc(&cache->hold);
+	}
+
+	/* cache in percpu list */
+	list_add(&aa_buf->list, &cache->head);
+	cache->count++;
+	put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
+}
+
+/*
+ * AppArmor init functions
+ */
+
+/**
+ * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task.
+ *
+ * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
+ */
+static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
+{
+	struct cred *cred = (__force struct cred *)current->real_cred;
+
+	set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_buffers(void)
+{
+	union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
+
+	spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
+	while (!list_empty(&aa_global_buffers)) {
+		aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer,
+					 list);
+		list_del(&aa_buf->list);
+		spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
+		kfree(aa_buf);
+		spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
+}
+
+static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
+{
+	union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
+	int i, num;
+
+	/*
+	 * per cpu set of cached allocated buffers used to help reduce
+	 * lock contention
+	 */
+	for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+		per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).hold = 0;
+		per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).count = 0;
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).head);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * A function may require two buffers at once. Usually the buffers are
+	 * used for a short period of time and are shared. On UP kernel buffers
+	 * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more
+	 * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow.
+	 * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be
+	 * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremely high.
+	 */
+	if (num_online_cpus() > 1)
+		num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT;
+	else
+		num = 2 + RESERVE_COUNT;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+
+		aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL |
+				 __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN);
+		if (!aa_buf) {
+			destroy_buffers();
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		aa_put_buffer(aa_buf->buffer);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static int apparmor_dointvec(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+			     void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	if (!aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
+static const struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
+	{
+		.procname       = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy",
+		.data           = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0600,
+		.proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
+	},
+#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
+	{
+		.procname       = "apparmor_display_secid_mode",
+		.data           = &apparmor_display_secid_mode,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0600,
+		.proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
+	},
+	{
+		.procname       = "apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_unconfined",
+		.data           = &aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0600,
+		.proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
+	},
+};
+
+static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
+{
+	return register_sysctl("kernel", apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+}
+#else
+static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
+					  struct sk_buff *skb,
+					  const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
+	struct sock *sk;
+	int error;
+
+	if (!skb->secmark)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+	if (sk == NULL)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	error = apparmor_secmark_check(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), OP_SENDMSG,
+				       AA_MAY_SEND, skb->secmark, sk);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (!error)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+}
+
+static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = {
+	{
+		.hook =         apparmor_ip_postroute,
+		.pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+		.priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	{
+		.hook =         apparmor_ip_postroute,
+		.pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+		.priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+#endif
+};
+
+static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net)
+{
+	return nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
+				    ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
+{
+	nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
+				ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = {
+	.init = apparmor_nf_register,
+	.exit = apparmor_nf_unregister,
+};
+
+static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops);
+	if (err)
+		panic("Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static char nulldfa_src[] __aligned(8) = {
+	#include "nulldfa.in"
+};
+static struct aa_dfa *nulldfa;
+
+static char stacksplitdfa_src[] __aligned(8) = {
+	#include "stacksplitdfa.in"
+};
+struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
+struct aa_policydb *nullpdb;
+
+static int __init aa_setup_dfa_engine(void)
+{
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	nullpdb = aa_alloc_pdb(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!nullpdb)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(nulldfa_src, sizeof(nulldfa_src),
+			    TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
+			    TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
+	if (IS_ERR(nulldfa)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa);
+		nulldfa = NULL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	nullpdb->dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+	nullpdb->perms = kzalloc_objs(struct aa_perms, 2);
+	if (!nullpdb->perms)
+		goto fail;
+	nullpdb->size = 2;
+
+	stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(stacksplitdfa_src,
+				      sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src),
+				      TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
+				      TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
+	if (IS_ERR(stacksplitdfa)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(stacksplitdfa);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	aa_put_pdb(nullpdb);
+	aa_put_dfa(nulldfa);
+	nullpdb = NULL;
+	nulldfa = NULL;
+	stacksplitdfa = NULL;
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static void __init aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void)
+{
+	aa_put_dfa(stacksplitdfa);
+	aa_put_dfa(nulldfa);
+	aa_put_pdb(nullpdb);
+	nullpdb = NULL;
+	stacksplitdfa = NULL;
+	nulldfa = NULL;
+}
+
+static int __init apparmor_init(void)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
+	if (error) {
+		AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
+		goto alloc_out;
+	}
+
+	error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
+	if (error) {
+		AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
+		goto alloc_out;
+	}
+
+	error = apparmor_init_sysctl();
+	if (error) {
+		AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n");
+		goto alloc_out;
+
+	}
+
+	error = alloc_buffers();
+	if (error) {
+		AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n");
+		goto alloc_out;
+	}
+
+	error = set_init_ctx();
+	if (error) {
+		AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
+		aa_free_root_ns();
+		goto buffers_out;
+	}
+	security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
+				&apparmor_lsmid);
+
+	/* Inform the audit system that secctx is used */
+	audit_cfg_lsm(&apparmor_lsmid, AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_SUBJECT);
+
+	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
+	apparmor_initialized = 1;
+	if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
+		aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
+	else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
+		aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
+	else
+		aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
+
+	return error;
+
+buffers_out:
+	destroy_buffers();
+alloc_out:
+	aa_destroy_aafs();
+	aa_teardown_dfa_engine();
+
+	apparmor_enabled = false;
+	return error;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
+	.id = &apparmor_lsmid,
+	.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+	.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
+	.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
+	.init = apparmor_init,
+	.initcall_fs = aa_create_aafs,
+#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+	.initcall_device = apparmor_nf_ip_init,
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
+	.initcall_late = init_profile_hash,
+#endif
+};
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d43ff34d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -0,0 +1,832 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor dfa based regular expression matching engine
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+
+#include "include/lib.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+
+#define base_idx(X) ((X) & 0xffffff)
+
+/**
+ * unpack_table - unpack a dfa table (one of accept, default, base, next check)
+ * @blob: data to unpack (NOT NULL)
+ * @bsize: size of blob
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to table else ERR_PTR on failure
+ *
+ * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kfree)
+ */
+static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
+{
+	struct table_header *table = ERR_PTR(-EPROTO);
+	struct table_header th;
+	size_t tsize;
+
+	if (bsize < sizeof(struct table_header))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* loaded td_id's start at 1, subtract 1 now to avoid doing
+	 * it every time we use td_id as an index
+	 */
+	th.td_id = get_unaligned_be16(blob) - 1;
+	if (th.td_id > YYTD_ID_MAX)
+		goto out;
+	th.td_flags = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2);
+	th.td_lolen = get_unaligned_be32(blob + 8);
+	blob += sizeof(struct table_header);
+
+	if (!(th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA16 || th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA32 ||
+	      th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* if we have a table it must have some entries */
+	if (th.td_lolen == 0)
+		goto out;
+	tsize = table_size(th.td_lolen, th.td_flags);
+	if (bsize < tsize)
+		goto out;
+
+	table = kvzalloc(tsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (table) {
+		table->td_id = th.td_id;
+		table->td_flags = th.td_flags;
+		table->td_lolen = th.td_lolen;
+		if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
+			memcpy(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen);
+		else if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA16)
+			UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
+				     u16, __be16, get_unaligned_be16);
+		else if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA32)
+			UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
+				     u32, __be32, get_unaligned_be32);
+		else {
+			kvfree(table);
+			table = ERR_PTR(-EPROTO);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced
+		 * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus.
+		 */
+		if (is_vmalloc_addr(table))
+			vm_unmap_aliases();
+	} else
+		table = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+out:
+	return table;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_table_headers - verify that the tables headers are as expected
+ * @tables: array of dfa tables to check (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling what type of accept table are acceptable
+ *
+ * Assumes dfa has gone through the first pass verification done by unpacking
+ * NOTE: this does not valid accept table values
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code on failure to verify
+ */
+static int verify_table_headers(struct table_header **tables, int flags)
+{
+	size_t state_count, trans_count;
+	int error = -EPROTO;
+
+	/* check that required tables exist */
+	if (!(tables[YYTD_ID_DEF] && tables[YYTD_ID_BASE] &&
+	      tables[YYTD_ID_NXT] && tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* accept.size == default.size == base.size */
+	state_count = tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+	if (ACCEPT1_FLAGS(flags)) {
+		if (!tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT])
+			goto out;
+		if (state_count != tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (ACCEPT2_FLAGS(flags)) {
+		if (!tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2])
+			goto out;
+		if (state_count != tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (state_count != tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_lolen)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* next.size == chk.size */
+	trans_count = tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen;
+	if (trans_count != tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_lolen)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* if equivalence classes then its table size must be 256 */
+	if (tables[YYTD_ID_EC] && tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_lolen != 256)
+		goto out;
+
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_dfa - verify that transitions and states in the tables are in bounds.
+ * @dfa: dfa to test  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Assumes dfa has gone through the first pass verification done by unpacking
+ * NOTE: this does not valid accept table values
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code on failure to verify
+ */
+static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
+{
+	size_t i, state_count, trans_count;
+	int error = -EPROTO;
+
+	state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+	trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen;
+	if (state_count < 2)
+		goto out;
+	for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
+		if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count) {
+			pr_err("AppArmor DFA default state out of bounds");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] & MATCH_FLAGS_INVALID) {
+			pr_err("AppArmor DFA state with invalid match flags");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE)) {
+			if (!(dfa->flags & YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE)) {
+				pr_err("AppArmor DFA diff encoded transition state without header flag");
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		if ((BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] & MATCH_FLAG_OOB_TRANSITION)) {
+			if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) < dfa->max_oob) {
+				pr_err("AppArmor DFA out of bad transition out of range");
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (!(dfa->flags & YYTH_FLAG_OOB_TRANS)) {
+				pr_err("AppArmor DFA out of bad transition state without header flag");
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) {
+			pr_err("AppArmor DFA next/check upper bounds error\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < trans_count; i++) {
+		if (NEXT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+			goto out;
+		if (CHECK_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Now that all the other tables are verified, verify diffencoding */
+	for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
+		size_t j, k;
+
+		for (j = i;
+		     ((BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) &&
+		      !(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MARK_DIFF_ENCODE_VERIFIED));
+		     j = k) {
+			if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MARK_DIFF_ENCODE)
+				/* loop in current chain */
+				goto out;
+			k = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[j];
+			if (j == k)
+				/* self loop */
+				goto out;
+			BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] |= MARK_DIFF_ENCODE;
+		}
+		/* move mark to verified */
+		for (j = i;
+		     (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE);
+		     j = k) {
+			k = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[j];
+			if (j < i)
+				/* jumps to state/chain that has been
+				 * verified
+				 */
+				break;
+			BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] &= ~MARK_DIFF_ENCODE;
+			BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] |= MARK_DIFF_ENCODE_VERIFIED;
+		}
+	}
+	error = 0;
+
+out:
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * dfa_free - free a dfa allocated by aa_dfa_unpack
+ * @dfa: the dfa to free  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: reference count to dfa == 0
+ */
+static void dfa_free(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
+{
+	if (dfa) {
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dfa->tables); i++) {
+			kvfree(dfa->tables[i]);
+			dfa->tables[i] = NULL;
+		}
+		kfree(dfa);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_free_kref - free aa_dfa by kref (called by aa_put_dfa)
+ * @kref: kref callback for freeing of a dfa  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct aa_dfa *dfa = container_of(kref, struct aa_dfa, count);
+	dfa_free(dfa);
+}
+
+
+
+/**
+ * remap_data16_to_data32 - remap u16 @old table to a u32 based table
+ * @old: table to remap
+ *
+ * Returns: new table with u32 entries instead of u16.
+ *
+ * Note: will free @old so caller does not have to
+ */
+static struct table_header *remap_data16_to_data32(struct table_header *old)
+{
+	struct table_header *new;
+	size_t tsize;
+	u32 i;
+
+	tsize = table_size(old->td_lolen, YYTD_DATA32);
+	new = kvzalloc(tsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new) {
+		kvfree(old);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	new->td_id = old->td_id;
+	new->td_flags = YYTD_DATA32;
+	new->td_lolen = old->td_lolen;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < old->td_lolen; i++)
+		TABLE_DATAU32(new)[i] = (u32) TABLE_DATAU16(old)[i];
+
+	kvfree(old);
+	if (is_vmalloc_addr(new))
+		vm_unmap_aliases();
+
+	return new;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_unpack - unpack the binary tables of a serialized dfa
+ * @blob: aligned serialized stream of data to unpack  (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: size of data to unpack
+ * @flags: flags controlling what type of accept tables are acceptable
+ *
+ * Unpack a dfa that has been serialized.  To find information on the dfa
+ * format look in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/apparmor.rst
+ * Assumes the dfa @blob stream has been aligned on a 8 byte boundary
+ *
+ * Returns: an unpacked dfa ready for matching or ERR_PTR on failure
+ */
+struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	int hsize;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	char *data = blob;
+	struct table_header *table = NULL;
+	struct aa_dfa *dfa = kzalloc_obj(struct aa_dfa);
+	if (!dfa)
+		goto fail;
+
+	kref_init(&dfa->count);
+
+	error = -EPROTO;
+
+	/* get dfa table set header */
+	if (size < sizeof(struct table_set_header))
+		goto fail;
+
+	if (get_unaligned_be32(data) != YYTH_MAGIC)
+		goto fail;
+
+	hsize = get_unaligned_be32(data + 4);
+	if (size < hsize)
+		goto fail;
+
+	dfa->flags = get_unaligned_be16(data + 12);
+	if (dfa->flags & ~(YYTH_FLAGS))
+		goto fail;
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: needed for dfa to support more than 1 oob
+	 * if (dfa->flags & YYTH_FLAGS_OOB_TRANS) {
+	 *	if (hsize < 16 + 4)
+	 *		goto fail;
+	 *	dfa->max_oob = get_unaligned_be32(data + 16);
+	 *	if (dfa->max <= MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED) {
+	 *		pr_err("AppArmor DFA OOB greater than supported\n");
+	 *		goto fail;
+	 *	}
+	 * }
+	 */
+	dfa->max_oob = 1;
+
+	data += hsize;
+	size -= hsize;
+
+	while (size > 0) {
+		table = unpack_table(data, size);
+		if (IS_ERR(table)) {
+			error = PTR_ERR(table);
+			table = NULL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+
+		switch (table->td_id) {
+		case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT:
+			if (!(table->td_flags & ACCEPT1_FLAGS(flags)))
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2:
+			if (!(table->td_flags & ACCEPT2_FLAGS(flags)))
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		case YYTD_ID_BASE:
+			if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA32)
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		case YYTD_ID_DEF:
+		case YYTD_ID_NXT:
+		case YYTD_ID_CHK:
+			if (!(table->td_flags == YYTD_DATA16 ||
+			      table->td_flags == YYTD_DATA32)) {
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			break;
+		case YYTD_ID_EC:
+			if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA8)
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		/* check for duplicate table entry */
+		if (dfa->tables[table->td_id])
+			goto fail;
+		dfa->tables[table->td_id] = table;
+		data += table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags);
+		size -= table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags);
+
+		/*
+		 * this remapping has to be done after incrementing data above
+		 * for now straight remap, later have dfa support both
+		 */
+		switch (table->td_id) {
+		case YYTD_ID_DEF:
+		case YYTD_ID_NXT:
+		case YYTD_ID_CHK:
+			if (table->td_flags == YYTD_DATA16) {
+				table = remap_data16_to_data32(table);
+				if (!table)
+					goto fail;
+			}
+			dfa->tables[table->td_id] = table;
+			break;
+		}
+		table = NULL;
+	}
+	error = verify_table_headers(dfa->tables, flags);
+	if (error)
+		goto fail;
+
+	if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
+		error = verify_dfa(dfa);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
+	return dfa;
+
+fail:
+	kvfree(table);
+	dfa_free(dfa);
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
+}
+
+#define match_char(state, def, base, next, check, C)	\
+do {							\
+	u32 b = (base)[(state)];			\
+	unsigned int pos = base_idx(b) + (C);		\
+	if ((check)[pos] != (state)) {			\
+		(state) = (def)[(state)];		\
+		if (b & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE)		\
+			continue;			\
+		break;					\
+	}						\
+	(state) = (next)[pos];				\
+	break;						\
+} while (1)
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_match_len - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the string of bytes to match against the dfa  (NOT NULL)
+ * @len: length of the string of bytes to match
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match_len will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * This function will happily match again the 0 byte and only finishes
+ * when @len input is consumed.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,
+			    const char *str, int len)
+{
+	u32 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	aa_state_t state = start;
+
+	if (state == DFA_NOMATCH)
+		return DFA_NOMATCH;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		for (; len; len--) {
+			u8 c = equiv[(u8) *str];
+
+			match_char(state, def, base, next, check, c);
+			str++;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		for (; len; len--) {
+			match_char(state, def, base, next, check, (u8) *str);
+			str++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_match - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start, const char *str)
+{
+	u32 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	aa_state_t state = start;
+
+	if (state == DFA_NOMATCH)
+		return DFA_NOMATCH;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			u8 c = equiv[(u8) *str];
+
+			match_char(state, def, base, next, check, c);
+			str++;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			match_char(state, def, base, next, check, (u8) *str);
+			str++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_next - step one character to the next state in the dfa
+ * @dfa: the dfa to traverse (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: the state to start in
+ * @c: the input character to transition on
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will step through the dfa by one input character @c
+ *
+ * Returns: state reach after input @c
+ */
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state, const char c)
+{
+	u32 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		match_char(state, def, base, next, check, equiv[(u8) c]);
+	} else
+		match_char(state, def, base, next, check, (u8) c);
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_outofband_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state)
+{
+	u32 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 b = (base)[(state)];
+
+	if (!(b & MATCH_FLAG_OOB_TRANSITION))
+		return DFA_NOMATCH;
+
+	/* No Equivalence class remapping for outofband transitions */
+	match_char(state, def, base, next, check, -1);
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_match_until - traverse @dfa until accept state or end of input
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
+ * @retpos: first character in str after match OR end of string
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_match_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,
+				const char *str, const char **retpos)
+{
+	u32 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *accept = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa);
+	aa_state_t state = start, pos;
+
+	if (state == DFA_NOMATCH)
+		return DFA_NOMATCH;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (accept[state])
+				break;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (accept[state])
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*retpos = str;
+	return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_matchn_until - traverse @dfa until accept or @n bytes consumed
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the string of bytes to match against the dfa  (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: length of the string of bytes to match
+ * @retpos: first character in str after match OR str + n
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match_len will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * This function will happily match again the 0 byte and only finishes
+ * when @n input is consumed.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,
+				 const char *str, int n, const char **retpos)
+{
+	u32 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *accept = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa);
+	aa_state_t state = start, pos;
+
+	*retpos = NULL;
+	if (state == DFA_NOMATCH)
+		return DFA_NOMATCH;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		for (; n; n--) {
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (accept[state])
+				break;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		for (; n; n--) {
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (accept[state])
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*retpos = str;
+	return state;
+}
+
+#define inc_wb_pos(wb)							\
+do {									\
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_NOT_POWER_OF_2(WB_HISTORY_SIZE);			\
+	wb->pos = (wb->pos + 1) & (WB_HISTORY_SIZE - 1);		\
+	wb->len = (wb->len + 1) > WB_HISTORY_SIZE ? WB_HISTORY_SIZE :	\
+				wb->len + 1;				\
+} while (0)
+
+/* For DFAs that don't support extended tagging of states */
+/* adjust is only set if is_loop returns true */
+static bool is_loop(struct match_workbuf *wb, aa_state_t state,
+		    unsigned int *adjust)
+{
+	int pos = wb->pos;
+	int i;
+
+	if (wb->history[pos] < state)
+		return false;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < wb->len; i++) {
+		if (wb->history[pos] == state) {
+			*adjust = i;
+			return true;
+		}
+		/* -1 wraps to WB_HISTORY_SIZE - 1 */
+		pos = (pos - 1) & (WB_HISTORY_SIZE - 1);
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static aa_state_t leftmatch_fb(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,
+				 const char *str, struct match_workbuf *wb,
+				 unsigned int *count)
+{
+	u32 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	aa_state_t state = start, pos;
+
+	AA_BUG(!dfa);
+	AA_BUG(!str);
+	AA_BUG(!wb);
+	AA_BUG(!count);
+
+	*count = 0;
+	if (state == DFA_NOMATCH)
+		return DFA_NOMATCH;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			unsigned int adjust;
+
+			wb->history[wb->pos] = state;
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (is_loop(wb, state, &adjust)) {
+				state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, str);
+				*count -= adjust;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			inc_wb_pos(wb);
+			(*count)++;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			unsigned int adjust;
+
+			wb->history[wb->pos] = state;
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (is_loop(wb, state, &adjust)) {
+				state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, str);
+				*count -= adjust;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			inc_wb_pos(wb);
+			(*count)++;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (!state)
+		*count = 0;
+	return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_leftmatch - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
+ * @count: current count of longest left.
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+aa_state_t aa_dfa_leftmatch(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start,
+			    const char *str, unsigned int *count)
+{
+	DEFINE_MATCH_WB(wb);
+
+	/* TODO: match for extended state dfas */
+
+	return leftmatch_fb(dfa, start, str, &wb, count);
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2f5d91883
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -0,0 +1,764 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/domain.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/mount.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+
+static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
+	if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
+	if (flags & MS_NODEV)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
+	if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
+	if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
+	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
+	if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
+	if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
+	if (flags & MS_NOSYMFOLLOW)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nosymfollow");
+	if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
+	if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
+	if (flags & MS_BIND)
+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
+	if (flags & MS_MOVE)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
+	if (flags & MS_SILENT)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
+	if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
+	if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
+				 ", unbindable");
+	if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
+				 ", private");
+	if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
+				 ", slave");
+	if (flags & MS_SHARED)
+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
+				 ", shared");
+	if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
+	if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
+	if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
+	if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
+ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
+
+	if (ad->mnt.type) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.type);
+	}
+	if (ad->mnt.src_name) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.src_name);
+	}
+	if (ad->mnt.trans) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.trans);
+	}
+	if (ad->mnt.flags) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
+		audit_mnt_flags(ab, ad->mnt.flags);
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
+	}
+	if (ad->mnt.data) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.data);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
+ * @subj_cred: cred of the subject
+ * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
+ * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
+ * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @flags: filesystem independent mount flags
+ * @data: filesystem mount flags
+ * @request: permissions requested
+ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
+ */
+static int audit_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		       struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op,
+		       const char *name, const char *src_name,
+		       const char *type, const char *trans,
+		       unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
+		       struct aa_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
+{
+	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_MOUNT, op);
+
+	if (likely(!error)) {
+		u32 mask = perms->audit;
+
+		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
+			mask = 0xffff;
+
+		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
+		request &= mask;
+
+		if (likely(!request))
+			return 0;
+		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+	} else {
+		/* only report permissions that were denied */
+		request = request & ~perms->allow;
+
+		if (request & perms->kill)
+			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
+		if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+			request &= ~perms->quiet;
+
+		if (!request)
+			return error;
+	}
+
+	ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
+	ad.name = name;
+	ad.mnt.src_name = src_name;
+	ad.mnt.type = type;
+	ad.mnt.trans = trans;
+	ad.mnt.flags = flags;
+	if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
+		ad.mnt.data = data;
+	ad.info = info;
+	ad.error = error;
+
+	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, &ad, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
+ * @dfa: dfa to match against
+ * @state: state to start in
+ * @flags: mount flags to match against
+ *
+ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
+ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
+ * on the flags.
+ *
+ * Returns: next state after flags match
+ */
+static aa_state_t match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
+				    unsigned long flags)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
+		if ((1 << i) & flags)
+			state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+static const char * const mnt_info_table[] = {
+	"match succeeded",
+	"failed mntpnt match",
+	"failed srcname match",
+	"failed type match",
+	"failed flags match",
+	"failed data match",
+	"failed perms check"
+};
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
+ * index into the mnt_info_table above
+ */
+static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t start,
+			const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
+			const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+			void *data, bool binary, struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!policy);
+	AA_BUG(!policy->dfa);
+	AA_BUG(!policy->perms);
+	AA_BUG(!perms);
+
+	state = aa_dfa_match(policy->dfa, start, mntpnt);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state);
+	if (!state)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (devname)
+		state = aa_dfa_match(policy->dfa, state, devname);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state);
+	if (!state)
+		return 2;
+
+	if (type)
+		state = aa_dfa_match(policy->dfa, state, type);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state);
+	if (!state)
+		return 3;
+
+	state = match_mnt_flags(policy->dfa, state, flags);
+	if (!state)
+		return 4;
+	*perms = *aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
+	if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
+	if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_MNT_CONT_MATCH)) {
+		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state);
+		if (!state)
+			return 4;
+
+		state = aa_dfa_match(policy->dfa, state, data);
+		if (!state)
+			return 5;
+		*perms = *aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
+		if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* failed at perms check, don't confuse with flags match */
+	return 6;
+}
+
+
+static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	return profile->path_flags |
+		(S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt_path_str - handle path matching for mount
+ * @subj_cred: cred of confined subject
+ * @profile: the confining profile
+ * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
+ * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath
+ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAY BE NULL OR ERRPTR)
+ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @flags: mount flags to match
+ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @binary: whether @data is binary
+ * @devinfo: error str if (IS_ERR(@devname))
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success else error
+ */
+static int match_mnt_path_str(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			      struct aa_profile *profile,
+			      const struct path *mntpath, char *buffer,
+			      const char *devname, const char *type,
+			      unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
+			      const char *devinfo)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	const char *mntpnt = NULL, *info = NULL;
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	int pos, error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!mntpath);
+	AA_BUG(!buffer);
+
+	if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
+		return 0;
+
+	error = aa_path_name(mntpath, path_flags(profile, mntpath), buffer,
+			     &mntpnt, &info, profile->disconnected);
+	if (error)
+		goto audit;
+	if (IS_ERR(devname)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(devname);
+		devname = NULL;
+		info = devinfo;
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+	error = -EACCES;
+	pos = do_match_mnt(rules->policy,
+			   rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+			   mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, &perms);
+	if (pos) {
+		info = mnt_info_table[pos];
+		goto audit;
+	}
+	error = 0;
+
+audit:
+	return audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_MOUNT, mntpnt, devname,
+			   type, NULL,
+			   flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
+ * @subj_cred: cred of the subject
+ * @profile: the confining profile
+ * @path: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
+ * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath
+ * @devpath: path devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @devbuffer: buffer to be used to lookup devname/src_name
+ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @flags: mount flags to match
+ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @binary: whether @data is binary
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success else error
+ */
+static int match_mnt(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		     struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+		     char *buffer, const struct path *devpath, char *devbuffer,
+		     const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data,
+		     bool binary)
+{
+	const char *devname = NULL, *info = NULL;
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	int error = -EACCES;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(devpath && !devbuffer);
+
+	if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (devpath) {
+		error = aa_path_name(devpath, path_flags(profile, devpath),
+				     devbuffer, &devname, &info,
+				     profile->disconnected);
+		if (error)
+			devname = ERR_PTR(error);
+	}
+
+	return match_mnt_path_str(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, devname,
+				  type, flags, data, binary, info);
+}
+
+int aa_remount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+	       struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+	       unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+	bool binary;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
+
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, NULL,
+				  NULL, NULL,
+				  flags, data, binary));
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_bind_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+		  const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
+	struct path old_path;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
+
+	error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	old_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	error = -ENOMEM;
+	if (!buffer || !old_buffer)
+		goto out;
+
+	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, &old_path,
+				  old_buffer, NULL, flags, NULL, false));
+out:
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+	aa_put_buffer(old_buffer);
+	path_put(&old_path);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_mount_change_type(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			 struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+			 unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	/* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
+	flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
+		  MS_UNBINDABLE);
+
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, NULL,
+				  NULL, NULL,
+				  flags, NULL, false));
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_move_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_label *label, const struct path *from_path,
+		  const struct path *to_path)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *to_buffer = NULL, *from_buffer = NULL;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!from_path);
+	AA_BUG(!to_path);
+
+	to_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	from_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	error = -ENOMEM;
+	if (!to_buffer || !from_buffer)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!our_mnt(from_path->mnt))
+		/* moving a mount detached from the namespace */
+		from_path = NULL;
+	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, to_path, to_buffer,
+				  from_path, from_buffer,
+				  NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, false));
+out:
+	aa_put_buffer(to_buffer);
+	aa_put_buffer(from_buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_move_mount_old(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      const struct path *path, const char *orig_name)
+{
+	struct path old_path;
+	int error;
+
+	if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	error = aa_move_mount(subj_cred, label, &old_path, path);
+	path_put(&old_path);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_new_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		 const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+		 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
+	bool binary = true;
+	int error;
+	int requires_dev = 0;
+	struct path tmp_path, *dev_path = NULL;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	if (type) {
+		struct file_system_type *fstype;
+
+		fstype = get_fs_type(type);
+		if (!fstype)
+			return -ENODEV;
+		binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
+		requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
+		put_filesystem(fstype);
+
+		if (requires_dev) {
+			if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
+				return -ENOENT;
+
+			error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &tmp_path);
+			if (error)
+				return error;
+			dev_path = &tmp_path;
+		}
+	}
+
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	if (!buffer) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (dev_path) {
+		dev_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+		if (!dev_buffer) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer,
+					  dev_path, dev_buffer,
+				  type, flags, data, binary));
+	} else {
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				match_mnt_path_str(subj_cred, profile, path,
+					buffer, dev_name,
+					type, flags, data, binary, NULL));
+	}
+
+out:
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+	aa_put_buffer(dev_buffer);
+	if (dev_path)
+		path_put(dev_path);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int profile_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			  struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+			  char *buffer)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
+		return 0;
+
+	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), buffer, &name,
+			     &info, profile->disconnected);
+	if (error)
+		goto audit;
+
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa,
+			     rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+			     name);
+	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+	if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
+		error = -EACCES;
+
+audit:
+	return audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
+			   NULL, 0, NULL,
+			   AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
+}
+
+int aa_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	      struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+	int error;
+	struct path path = { .mnt = mnt, .dentry = mnt->mnt_root };
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!mnt);
+
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			profile_umount(subj_cred, profile, &path, buffer));
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* helper fn for transition on pivotroot
+ *
+ * Returns: label for transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL
+ */
+static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+					struct aa_profile *profile,
+					const struct path *new_path,
+					char *new_buffer,
+					const struct path *old_path,
+					char *old_buffer)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+	const char *trans_name = NULL;
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	aa_state_t state;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!new_path);
+	AA_BUG(!old_path);
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
+	    !RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
+		return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
+
+	error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
+			     old_buffer, &old_name, &info,
+			     profile->disconnected);
+	if (error)
+		goto audit;
+	error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
+			     new_buffer, &new_name, &info,
+			     profile->disconnected);
+	if (error)
+		goto audit;
+
+	error = -EACCES;
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa,
+			     rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+			     new_name);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->policy->dfa, state);
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, state, old_name);
+	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+
+	if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow)
+		error = 0;
+
+audit:
+	error = audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
+			    old_name,
+			    NULL, trans_name, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT,
+			    &perms, info, error);
+	if (error)
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
+
+	return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
+}
+
+int aa_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		 const struct path *old_path,
+		 const struct path *new_path)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *target = NULL;
+	char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL, *info = NULL;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!old_path);
+	AA_BUG(!new_path);
+
+	old_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	new_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	error = -ENOMEM;
+	if (!old_buffer || !new_buffer)
+		goto out;
+	target = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
+			build_pivotroot(subj_cred, profile, new_path,
+					new_buffer,
+					old_path, old_buffer));
+	AA_BUG(!target);
+	if (!IS_ERR(target)) {
+		error = aa_replace_current_label(target);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail;
+		aa_put_label(target);
+	} else
+		/* already audited error */
+		error = PTR_ERR(target);
+out:
+	aa_put_buffer(old_buffer);
+	aa_put_buffer(new_buffer);
+
+	return error;
+
+fail:
+	/* TODO: add back in auditing of new_name and old_name */
+	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+			audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_PIVOTROOT,
+				    NULL /*new_name */,
+				    NULL /* old_name */,
+				    NULL, NULL,
+				    0, target->hname, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &nullperms, info,
+				    error));
+	aa_put_label(target);
+	goto out;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf590dd08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/secid.h"
+
+#include "net_names.h"
+
+
+struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("tcp-fast-open",		1),
+	{ }
+};
+
+struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_networkv9[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("af_unix",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("tcp-fast-open",		1),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
+	"unknown",
+	"send",
+	"receive",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"create",
+	"shutdown",
+	"connect",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"setattr",
+	"getattr",
+	"setcred",
+	"getcred",
+
+	"chmod",
+	"chown",
+	"chgrp",
+	"lock",
+
+	"mmap",
+	"mprot",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"accept",
+	"bind",
+	"listen",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"setopt",
+	"getopt",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+};
+
+static void audit_unix_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *str,
+			    struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen)
+{
+	int len = unix_addr_len(addrlen);
+
+	if (!addr || len <= 0) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=none", str);
+	} else if (addr->sun_path[0]) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", str);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, addr->sun_path);
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"@", str);
+		if (audit_string_contains_control(&addr->sun_path[1], len - 1))
+			audit_log_n_hex(ab, &addr->sun_path[1], len - 1);
+		else
+			audit_log_format(ab, "%.*s", len - 1,
+					 &addr->sun_path[1]);
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
+	}
+}
+
+static void audit_unix_sk_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *str,
+			       const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	const struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
+
+	if (u && u->addr) {
+		int addrlen;
+		struct sockaddr_un *addr = aa_sunaddr(u, &addrlen);
+
+		audit_unix_addr(ab, str, addr, addrlen);
+	} else {
+		audit_unix_addr(ab, str, NULL, 0);
+
+	}
+}
+
+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
+void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
+
+	if (address_family_names[ad->common.u.net->family])
+		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
+				 address_family_names[ad->common.u.net->family]);
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
+				 ad->common.u.net->family);
+	if (sock_type_names[ad->net.type])
+		audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
+				 sock_type_names[ad->net.type]);
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"",
+				 ad->net.type);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", ad->net.protocol);
+
+	if (ad->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
+		aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->request, NULL, 0,
+				   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
+
+		if (ad->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
+			aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->denied, NULL, 0,
+					   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
+		}
+	}
+	if (ad->common.u.net->family == PF_UNIX) {
+		if (ad->net.addr || !ad->common.u.net->sk)
+			audit_unix_addr(ab, "addr",
+					unix_addr(ad->net.addr),
+					ad->net.addrlen);
+		else
+			audit_unix_sk_addr(ab, "addr", ad->common.u.net->sk);
+		if (ad->request & NET_PEER_MASK) {
+			audit_unix_addr(ab, "peer_addr",
+					unix_addr(ad->net.peer.addr),
+					ad->net.peer.addrlen);
+		}
+	}
+	if (ad->peer) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
+				FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	}
+}
+
+/* standard permission lookup pattern - supports early bailout */
+int aa_do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_policydb *policy,
+		aa_state_t state, u32 request,
+		struct aa_perms *p, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!policy);
+
+
+	if (state || !p)
+		p = aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
+	perms = *p;
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
+			      audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+/* only continue match if
+ *   insufficient current perms at current state
+ *   indicates there are more perms in later state
+ * Returns: perms struct if early match
+ */
+static struct aa_perms *early_match(struct aa_policydb *policy,
+				    aa_state_t state, u32 request)
+{
+	struct aa_perms *p;
+
+	p = aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
+	if (((p->allow & request) != request) && (p->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH))
+		return NULL;
+	return p;
+}
+
+static aa_state_t aa_dfa_match_be16(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
+					  u16 data)
+{
+	__be16 buffer = cpu_to_be16(data);
+
+	return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, 2);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_match_to_prot - match the af, type, protocol triplet
+ * @policy: policy being matched
+ * @state: state to start in
+ * @request: permissions being requested, ignored if @p == NULL
+ * @af: socket address family
+ * @type: socket type
+ * @protocol: socket protocol
+ * @p: output - pointer to permission associated with match
+ * @info: output - pointer to string describing failure
+ *
+ * RETURNS: state match stopped in.
+ *
+ * If @(p) is assigned a value the returned state will be the
+ * corresponding state. Will not set @p on failure or if match completes
+ * only if an early match occurs
+ */
+aa_state_t aa_match_to_prot(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
+			    u32 request, u16 af, int type, int protocol,
+			    struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
+{
+	state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)af);
+	if (!state) {
+		*info = "failed af match";
+		return state;
+	}
+	state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)type);
+	if (state) {
+		if (p)
+			*p = early_match(policy, state, request);
+		if (!p || !*p) {
+			state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)protocol);
+			if (!state)
+				*info = "failed protocol match";
+		}
+	} else {
+		*info = "failed type match";
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/* Generic af perm */
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+		       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, u16 family,
+		       int type, int protocol)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
+	AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+		return 0;
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_NET(rules);
+	if (!state)
+		return 0;
+	state = aa_match_to_prot(rules->policy, state, request, family, type,
+				 protocol, &p, &ad->info);
+	return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, request, p, ad);
+}
+
+int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	       const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, subj_cred, NULL, family, type, protocol);
+
+	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &ad, request, family,
+					   type, protocol));
+}
+
+static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			    struct aa_label *label,
+			    const char *op, u32 request,
+			    struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+	int error = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+
+	if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label) != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) {
+		struct aa_profile *profile;
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, subj_cred, sk);
+
+		ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			    aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &ad, request, sk));
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	error = aa_label_sk_perm(current_cred(), label, op, request, sk);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+
+int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      const char *op, u32 request, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	/* sock && sock->sk can be NULL for sockets being set up or torn down */
+	if (!sock || !sock->sk)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		return aa_unix_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, file);
+	return aa_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+
+	if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
+		secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
+				    secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
+				    GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(label))
+		return PTR_ERR(label);
+
+	secmark->secid = label->secid;
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
+			   struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+
+	if (rules->secmark_count == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rules->secmark_count; i++) {
+		if (!rules->secmark[i].secid) {
+			ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&rules->secmark[i]);
+			if (ret)
+				return ret;
+		}
+
+		if (rules->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
+		    rules->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
+			if (rules->secmark[i].deny)
+				perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+			else
+				perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+
+			if (rules->secmark[i].audit)
+				perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+		}
+	}
+
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
+			   u32 secid, const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, NULL, sk);
+
+	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				    aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
+						    &ad));
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/security/apparmor/nulldfa.in b/security/apparmor/nulldfa.in
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..095f42a24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/nulldfa.in
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
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diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2494e8101
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor function for pathnames
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/* modified from dcache.c */
+static int prepend(char **buffer, int buflen, const char *str, int namelen)
+{
+	buflen -= namelen;
+	if (buflen < 0)
+		return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	*buffer -= namelen;
+	memcpy(*buffer, str, namelen);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define CHROOT_NSCONNECT (PATH_CHROOT_REL | PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT)
+
+/* If the path is not connected to the expected root,
+ * check if it is a sysctl and handle specially else remove any
+ * leading / that __d_path may have returned.
+ * Unless
+ *     specifically directed to connect the path,
+ * OR
+ *     if in a chroot and doing chroot relative paths and the path
+ *     resolves to the namespace root (would be connected outside
+ *     of chroot) and specifically directed to connect paths to
+ *     namespace root.
+ */
+static int disconnect(const struct path *path, char *buf, char **name,
+		      int flags, const char *disconnected)
+{
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (!(flags & PATH_CONNECT_PATH) &&
+	    !(((flags & CHROOT_NSCONNECT) == CHROOT_NSCONNECT) &&
+	      our_mnt(path->mnt))) {
+		/* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting
+		 * with '/'
+		 */
+		error = -EACCES;
+		if (**name == '/')
+			*name = *name + 1;
+	} else {
+		if (**name != '/')
+			/* CONNECT_PATH with missing root */
+			error = prepend(name, *name - buf, "/", 1);
+		if (!error && disconnected)
+			error = prepend(name, *name - buf, disconnected,
+					strlen(disconnected));
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * d_namespace_path - lookup a name associated with a given path
+ * @path: path to lookup  (NOT NULL)
+ * @buf:  buffer to store path to  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: Returns - pointer for start of path name with in @buf (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling path lookup
+ * @disconnected: string to prefix to disconnected paths
+ *
+ * Handle path name lookup.
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if path lookup fails
+ *          When no error the path name is returned in @name which points to
+ *          a position in @buf
+ */
+static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, char **name,
+			    int flags, const char *disconnected)
+{
+	char *res;
+	int error = 0;
+	int connected = 1;
+	int isdir = (flags & PATH_IS_DIR) ? 1 : 0;
+	int buflen = aa_g_path_max - isdir;
+
+	if (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) {
+		/* it's not mounted anywhere */
+		res = dentry_path(path->dentry, buf, buflen);
+		*name = res;
+		if (IS_ERR(res)) {
+			*name = buf;
+			return PTR_ERR(res);
+		}
+		if (path->dentry->d_sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC &&
+		    strncmp(*name, "/sys/", 5) == 0) {
+			/* TODO: convert over to using a per namespace
+			 * control instead of hard coded /proc
+			 */
+			error = prepend(name, *name - buf, "/proc", 5);
+			goto out;
+		} else
+			error = disconnect(path, buf, name, flags,
+					   disconnected);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* resolve paths relative to chroot?*/
+	if (flags & PATH_CHROOT_REL) {
+		struct path root;
+		get_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
+		res = __d_path(path, &root, buf, buflen);
+		path_put(&root);
+	} else {
+		res = d_absolute_path(path, buf, buflen);
+		if (!our_mnt(path->mnt))
+			connected = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* handle error conditions - and still allow a partial path to
+	 * be returned.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(res)) {
+		if (PTR_ERR(res) == -ENAMETOOLONG) {
+			error = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+			*name = buf;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		connected = 0;
+		res = dentry_path_raw(path->dentry, buf, buflen);
+		if (IS_ERR(res)) {
+			error = PTR_ERR(res);
+			*name = buf;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	} else if (!our_mnt(path->mnt))
+		connected = 0;
+
+	*name = res;
+
+	if (!connected)
+		error = disconnect(path, buf, name, flags, disconnected);
+
+	/* Handle two cases:
+	 * 1. A deleted dentry && profile is not allowing mediation of deleted
+	 * 2. On some filesystems, newly allocated dentries appear to the
+	 *    security_path hooks as a deleted dentry except without an inode
+	 *    allocated.
+	 */
+	if (d_unlinked(path->dentry) && d_is_positive(path->dentry) &&
+	    !(flags & (PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED | PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED))) {
+			error = -ENOENT;
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+out:
+	/* Append "/" to directory paths and reterminate string, except for
+	 * root "/" which already ends in a slash.
+	 */
+	if (!error && isdir) {
+		bool is_root = (*name)[0] == '/' && (*name)[1] == '\0';
+
+		if (!is_root) {
+			buf[aa_g_path_max - 2] = '/';
+			buf[aa_g_path_max - 1] = '\0';
+		}
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_path_name - get the pathname to a buffer ensure dir / is appended
+ * @path: path the file  (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling path name generation
+ * @buffer: buffer to put name in (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: Returns - the generated path name if !error (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: Returns - information on why the path lookup failed (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @disconnected: string to prepend to disconnected paths
+ *
+ * @name is a pointer to the beginning of the pathname (which usually differs
+ * from the beginning of the buffer), or NULL.  If there is an error @name
+ * may contain a partial or invalid name that can be used for audit purposes,
+ * but it can not be used for mediation.
+ *
+ * We need PATH_IS_DIR to indicate whether the file is a directory or not
+ * because the file may not yet exist, and so we cannot check the inode's
+ * file type.
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if could retrieve name
+ */
+int aa_path_name(const struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
+		 const char **name, const char **info, const char *disconnected)
+{
+	char *str = NULL;
+	int error = d_namespace_path(path, buffer, &str, flags, disconnected);
+
+	if (info && error) {
+		if (error == -ENOENT)
+			*info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
+		else if (error == -EACCES)
+			*info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
+		else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
+			*info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";
+		else
+			*info = "Failed name lookup";
+	}
+
+	*name = str;
+
+	return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..94b4a7e72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1521 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy manipulation functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * AppArmor policy is based around profiles, which contain the rules a
+ * task is confined by.  Every task in the system has a profile attached
+ * to it determined either by matching "unconfined" tasks against the
+ * visible set of profiles or by following a profiles attachment rules.
+ *
+ * Each profile exists in a profile namespace which is a container of
+ * visible profiles.  Each namespace contains a special "unconfined" profile,
+ * which doesn't enforce any confinement on a task beyond DAC.
+ *
+ * Namespace and profile names can be written together in either
+ * of two syntaxes.
+ *	:namespace:profile - used by kernel interfaces for easy detection
+ *	namespace://profile - used by policy
+ *
+ * Profile names can not start with : or @ or ^ and may not contain \0
+ *
+ * Reserved profile names
+ *	unconfined - special automatically generated unconfined profile
+ *	inherit - special name to indicate profile inheritance
+ *	null-XXXX-YYYY - special automatically generated learning profiles
+ *
+ * Namespace names may not start with / or @ and may not contain \0 or :
+ * Reserved namespace names
+ *	user-XXXX - user defined profiles
+ *
+ * a // in a profile or namespace name indicates a hierarchical name with the
+ * name before the // being the parent and the name after the child.
+ *
+ * Profile and namespace hierarchies serve two different but similar purposes.
+ * The namespace contains the set of visible profiles that are considered
+ * for attachment.  The hierarchy of namespaces allows for virtualizing
+ * the namespace so that for example a chroot can have its own set of profiles
+ * which may define some local user namespaces.
+ * The profile hierarchy severs two distinct purposes,
+ * -  it allows for sub profiles or hats, which allows an application to run
+ *    subprograms under its own profile with different restriction than it
+ *    self, and not have it use the system profile.
+ *    eg. if a mail program starts an editor, the policy might make the
+ *        restrictions tighter on the editor tighter than the mail program,
+ *        and definitely different than general editor restrictions
+ * - it allows for binary hierarchy of profiles, so that execution history
+ *   is preserved.  This feature isn't exploited by AppArmor reference policy
+ *   but is allowed.  NOTE: this is currently suboptimal because profile
+ *   aliasing is not currently implemented so that a profile for each
+ *   level must be defined.
+ *   eg. /bin/bash///bin/ls as a name would indicate /bin/ls was started
+ *       from /bin/bash
+ *
+ *   A profile or namespace name that can contain one or more // separators
+ *   is referred to as an hname (hierarchical).
+ *   eg.  /bin/bash//bin/ls
+ *
+ *   An fqname is a name that may contain both namespace and profile hnames.
+ *   eg. :ns:/bin/bash//bin/ls
+ *
+ * NOTES:
+ *   - locking of profile lists is currently fairly coarse.  All profile
+ *     lists within a namespace use the namespace lock.
+ * FIXME: move profile lists to using rcu_lists
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_ns.h"
+#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
+#include "include/resource.h"
+
+int unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy = 1;
+int aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted;
+
+const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[] = {
+	"enforce",
+	"complain",
+	"kill",
+	"unconfined",
+	"user",
+};
+
+void aa_destroy_tags(struct aa_tags_struct *tags)
+{
+	kfree_sensitive(tags->hdrs.table);
+	kfree_sensitive(tags->sets.table);
+	aa_destroy_str_table(&tags->strs);
+	memset(tags, 0, sizeof(*tags));
+}
+
+static void aa_free_pdb(struct aa_policydb *pdb)
+{
+	if (pdb) {
+		aa_put_dfa(pdb->dfa);
+		kvfree(pdb->perms);
+		aa_destroy_str_table(&pdb->trans);
+		aa_destroy_tags(&pdb->tags);
+		kfree(pdb);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_pdb_free_kref - free aa_policydb by kref (called by aa_put_pdb)
+ * @kref: kref callback for freeing of a dfa  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void aa_pdb_free_kref(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct aa_policydb *pdb = container_of(kref, struct aa_policydb, count);
+
+	aa_free_pdb(pdb);
+}
+
+
+struct aa_policydb *aa_alloc_pdb(gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_policydb *pdb = kzalloc_obj(struct aa_policydb, gfp);
+
+	if (!pdb)
+		return NULL;
+
+	kref_init(&pdb->count);
+
+	return pdb;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * __add_profile - add a profiles to list and label tree
+ * @list: list to add it to  (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: the profile to add  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * refcount @profile, should be put by __list_remove_profile
+ *
+ * Requires: namespace lock be held, or list not be shared
+ */
+static void __add_profile(struct list_head *list, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	struct aa_label *l;
+
+	AA_BUG(!list);
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!profile->ns);
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profile->ns->lock));
+
+	list_add_rcu(&profile->base.list, list);
+	/* get list reference */
+	aa_get_profile(profile);
+	l = aa_label_insert(&profile->ns->labels, &profile->label);
+	AA_BUG(l != &profile->label);
+	aa_put_label(l);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __list_remove_profile - remove a profile from the list it is on
+ * @profile: the profile to remove  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * remove a profile from the list, warning generally removal should
+ * be done with __replace_profile as most profile removals are
+ * replacements to the unconfined profile.
+ *
+ * put @profile list refcount
+ *
+ * Requires: namespace lock be held, or list not have been live
+ */
+static void __list_remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!profile->ns);
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profile->ns->lock));
+
+	list_del_rcu(&profile->base.list);
+	aa_put_profile(profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __remove_profile - remove profile, and children
+ * @profile: profile to be removed  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: namespace list lock be held, or list not be shared
+ */
+static void __remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *curr, *to_remove;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!profile->ns);
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profile->ns->lock));
+
+	/* release any children lists first */
+	if (!list_empty(&profile->base.profiles)) {
+		curr = list_first_entry(&profile->base.profiles, struct aa_profile, base.list);
+
+		while (curr != profile) {
+
+			while (!list_empty(&curr->base.profiles))
+				curr = list_first_entry(&curr->base.profiles,
+							struct aa_profile, base.list);
+
+			to_remove = curr;
+			if (!list_is_last(&to_remove->base.list,
+					  &aa_deref_parent(curr)->base.profiles))
+				curr = list_next_entry(to_remove, base.list);
+			else
+				curr = aa_deref_parent(curr);
+
+			/* released by free_profile */
+			aa_label_remove(&to_remove->label);
+			__aafs_profile_rmdir(to_remove);
+			__list_remove_profile(to_remove);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* released by free_profile */
+	aa_label_remove(&profile->label);
+	__aafs_profile_rmdir(profile);
+	__list_remove_profile(profile);
+	/* rawdata is only ever referenced by fs lookup, that is no
+	 * longer possible here, so put the reference to it. This will
+	 * enable the rawdata to be freed if for some reason the profile
+	 * is pinned and going to live for a while.
+	 */
+	aa_put_profile_loaddata(profile->rawdata);
+	profile->rawdata = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_profile_list_release - remove all profiles on the list and put refs
+ * @head: list of profiles  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: namespace lock be held
+ */
+void __aa_profile_list_release(struct list_head *head)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile, *tmp;
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(profile, tmp, head, base.list)
+		__remove_profile(profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_data - free a data blob
+ * @ptr: data to free
+ * @arg: unused
+ */
+static void aa_free_data(void *ptr, void *arg)
+{
+	struct aa_data *data = ptr;
+
+	if (!ptr)
+		return;
+
+	kvfree_sensitive(data->data, data->size);
+	kfree_sensitive(data->key);
+	kfree_sensitive(data);
+}
+
+static void free_attachment(struct aa_attachment *attach)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!attach)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < attach->xattr_count; i++)
+		kfree_sensitive(attach->xattrs[i]);
+	kfree_sensitive(attach->xattrs);
+	aa_put_pdb(attach->xmatch);
+}
+
+static void free_ruleset(struct aa_ruleset *rules)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!rules)
+	  return;
+
+	aa_put_pdb(rules->file);
+	aa_put_pdb(rules->policy);
+	aa_free_cap_rules(&rules->caps);
+	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&rules->rlimits);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rules->secmark_count; i++)
+		kfree_sensitive(rules->secmark[i].label);
+	kfree_sensitive(rules->secmark);
+	kfree_sensitive(rules);
+}
+
+struct aa_ruleset *aa_alloc_ruleset(gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules;
+
+	rules = kzalloc_obj(*rules, gfp);
+
+	return rules;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_profile - free a profile
+ * @profile: the profile to free  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Free a profile, its hats and null_profile. All references to the profile,
+ * its hats and null_profile must have been put.
+ *
+ * If the profile was referenced from a task context, free_profile() will
+ * be called from an rcu callback routine, so we must not sleep here.
+ */
+void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	struct rhashtable *rht;
+
+	AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_POLICY, "%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
+
+	if (!profile)
+		return;
+
+	/* free children profiles */
+	aa_policy_destroy(&profile->base);
+	aa_put_profile(rcu_access_pointer(profile->parent));
+
+	aa_put_ns(profile->ns);
+	kfree_sensitive(profile->rename);
+	kfree_sensitive(profile->disconnected);
+
+	free_attachment(&profile->attach);
+
+	/*
+	 * at this point there are no tasks that can have a reference
+	 * to rules
+	 */
+	for (int i = 0; i < profile->n_rules; i++)
+		free_ruleset(profile->label.rules[i]);
+
+	kfree_sensitive(profile->dirname);
+
+	if (profile->data) {
+		rht = profile->data;
+		profile->data = NULL;
+		rhashtable_free_and_destroy(rht, aa_free_data, NULL);
+		kfree_sensitive(rht);
+	}
+
+	kfree_sensitive(profile->hash);
+	aa_put_profile_loaddata(profile->rawdata);
+	aa_label_destroy(&profile->label);
+
+	kfree_sensitive(profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile
+ * @hname: name of the profile  (NOT NULL)
+ * @proxy: proxy to use OR null if to allocate a new one
+ * @gfp: allocation type
+ *
+ * Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname, struct aa_proxy *proxy,
+				    gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+	/* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile
+	 * this adds space for a single ruleset in the rules section of the
+	 * label
+	 */
+	profile = kzalloc_flex(*profile, label.rules, 1, gfp);
+	if (!profile)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!aa_policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname, gfp))
+		goto fail;
+	if (!aa_label_init(&profile->label, 1, gfp))
+		goto fail;
+
+	/* allocate the first ruleset, but leave it empty */
+	profile->label.rules[0] = aa_alloc_ruleset(gfp);
+	if (!profile->label.rules[0])
+		goto fail;
+	profile->n_rules = 1;
+
+	/* update being set needed by fs interface */
+	if (!proxy) {
+		proxy = aa_alloc_proxy(&profile->label, gfp);
+		if (!proxy)
+			goto fail;
+	} else
+		aa_get_proxy(proxy);
+	profile->label.proxy = proxy;
+
+	profile->label.hname = profile->base.hname;
+	profile->label.flags |= FLAG_PROFILE;
+	profile->label.vec[0] = profile;
+
+	profile->signal = SIGKILL;
+	/* refcount released by caller */
+	return profile;
+
+fail:
+	aa_free_profile(profile);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline bool ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				     unsigned char class)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < profile->n_rules; i++) {
+		if (RULE_MEDIATES(profile->label.rules[i], class))
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* set of rules that are mediated by unconfined */
+static int unconfined_mediates[] = { AA_CLASS_NS, AA_CLASS_IO_URING, 0 };
+
+/* must be called after profile rulesets and start information is setup */
+void aa_compute_profile_mediates(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	int c;
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile)) {
+		int *pos;
+
+		for (pos = unconfined_mediates; *pos; pos++) {
+			if (ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(profile, *pos))
+				profile->label.mediates |= ((u64) 1) << AA_CLASS_NS;
+		}
+		return;
+	}
+	for (c = 0; c <= AA_CLASS_LAST; c++) {
+		if (ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(profile, c))
+			profile->label.mediates |= ((u64) 1) << c;
+	}
+}
+
+/* TODO: profile accounting - setup in remove */
+
+/**
+ * __strn_find_child - find a profile on @head list using substring of @name
+ * @head: list to search  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of profile (NOT NULL)
+ * @len: length of @name substring to match
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile ptr, or NULL if not found
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__strn_find_child(struct list_head *head,
+					    const char *name, int len)
+{
+	return (struct aa_profile *)__policy_strn_find(head, name, len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __find_child - find a profile on @head list with a name matching @name
+ * @head: list to search  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile ptr, or NULL if not found
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__find_child(struct list_head *head, const char *name)
+{
+	return __strn_find_child(head, name, strlen(name));
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_find_child - find a profile by @name in @parent
+ * @parent: profile to search  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: profile name to search for  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: a refcounted profile or NULL if not found
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	do {
+		profile = __find_child(&parent->base.profiles, name);
+	} while (profile && !aa_get_profile_not0(profile));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/* refcount released by caller */
+	return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __lookup_parent - lookup the parent of a profile of name @hname
+ * @ns: namespace to lookup profile in  (NOT NULL)
+ * @hname: hierarchical profile name to find parent of  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Lookups up the parent of a fully qualified profile name, the profile
+ * that matches hname does not need to exist, in general this
+ * is used to load a new profile.
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted policy or NULL if not found
+ */
+static struct aa_policy *__lookup_parent(struct aa_ns *ns,
+					 const char *hname)
+{
+	struct aa_policy *policy;
+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+	char *split;
+
+	policy = &ns->base;
+
+	for (split = strstr(hname, "//"); split;) {
+		profile = __strn_find_child(&policy->profiles, hname,
+					    split - hname);
+		if (!profile)
+			return NULL;
+		policy = &profile->base;
+		hname = split + 2;
+		split = strstr(hname, "//");
+	}
+	if (!profile)
+		return &ns->base;
+	return &profile->base;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestors
+ * @ns: namespace to lookup profile in (NOT NULL)
+ * @hname: hierarchical profile name to find parent of (NOT NULL)
+ * @gfp: type of allocation.
+ *
+ * Requires: ns mutex lock held
+ *
+ * Return: unrefcounted parent policy on success or %NULL if error creating
+ *          place holder profiles.
+ */
+static struct aa_policy *__create_missing_ancestors(struct aa_ns *ns,
+						    const char *hname,
+						    gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_policy *policy;
+	struct aa_profile *parent, *profile = NULL;
+	char *split;
+
+	AA_BUG(!ns);
+	AA_BUG(!hname);
+
+	policy = &ns->base;
+
+	for (split = strstr(hname, "//"); split;) {
+		parent = profile;
+		profile = __strn_find_child(&policy->profiles, hname,
+					    split - hname);
+		if (!profile) {
+			const char *name = kstrndup(hname, split - hname,
+						    gfp);
+			if (!name)
+				return NULL;
+			profile = aa_alloc_null(parent, name, gfp);
+			kfree(name);
+			if (!profile)
+				return NULL;
+			if (!parent)
+				profile->ns = aa_get_ns(ns);
+		}
+		policy = &profile->base;
+		hname = split + 2;
+		split = strstr(hname, "//");
+	}
+	if (!profile)
+		return &ns->base;
+	return &profile->base;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __lookupn_profile - lookup the profile matching @hname
+ * @base: base list to start looking up profile name from  (NOT NULL)
+ * @hname: hierarchical profile name  (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: length of @hname
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile pointer or NULL if not found
+ *
+ * Do a relative name lookup, recursing through profile tree.
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__lookupn_profile(struct aa_policy *base,
+					    const char *hname, size_t n)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+	const char *split;
+
+	for (split = strnstr(hname, "//", n); split;
+	     split = strnstr(hname, "//", n)) {
+		profile = __strn_find_child(&base->profiles, hname,
+					    split - hname);
+		if (!profile)
+			return NULL;
+
+		base = &profile->base;
+		n -= split + 2 - hname;
+		hname = split + 2;
+	}
+
+	if (n)
+		return __strn_find_child(&base->profiles, hname, n);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct aa_profile *__lookup_profile(struct aa_policy *base,
+					   const char *hname)
+{
+	return __lookupn_profile(base, hname, strlen(hname));
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_lookupn_profile - find a profile by its full or partial name
+ * @ns: the namespace to start from (NOT NULL)
+ * @hname: name to do lookup on.  Does not contain namespace prefix (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: size of @hname
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted profile or NULL if not found
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_lookupn_profile(struct aa_ns *ns, const char *hname,
+				      size_t n)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	do {
+		profile = __lookupn_profile(&ns->base, hname, n);
+	} while (profile && !aa_get_profile_not0(profile));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/* the unconfined profile is not in the regular profile list */
+	if (!profile && strncmp(hname, "unconfined", n) == 0)
+		profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ns->unconfined);
+
+	/* refcount released by caller */
+	return profile;
+}
+
+struct aa_profile *aa_fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base,
+					const char *fqname, size_t n)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_ns *ns;
+	const char *name, *ns_name;
+	size_t ns_len;
+
+	name = aa_splitn_fqname(fqname, n, &ns_name, &ns_len);
+	if (ns_name) {
+		ns = aa_lookupn_ns(labels_ns(base), ns_name, ns_len);
+		if (!ns)
+			return NULL;
+	} else
+		ns = aa_get_ns(labels_ns(base));
+
+	if (name)
+		profile = aa_lookupn_profile(ns, name, n - (name - fqname));
+	else if (ns)
+		/* default profile for ns, currently unconfined */
+		profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ns->unconfined);
+	else
+		profile = NULL;
+	aa_put_ns(ns);
+
+	return profile;
+}
+
+
+struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_null(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name,
+				 gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules;
+
+	profile = aa_alloc_profile(name, NULL, gfp);
+	if (!profile)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* TODO: ideally we should inherit abi from parent */
+	profile->label.flags |= FLAG_NULL;
+	profile->attach.xmatch = aa_get_pdb(nullpdb);
+	rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	rules->file = aa_get_pdb(nullpdb);
+	rules->policy = aa_get_pdb(nullpdb);
+	aa_compute_profile_mediates(profile);
+
+	if (parent) {
+		profile->path_flags = parent->path_flags;
+		/* override/inherit what is mediated from parent */
+		profile->label.mediates = parent->label.mediates;
+		/* released on free_profile */
+		rcu_assign_pointer(profile->parent, aa_get_profile(parent));
+		profile->ns = aa_get_ns(parent->ns);
+	}
+
+	return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_new_learning_profile - create or find a null-X learning profile
+ * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL)
+ * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
+ * @base: name to base the null profile off of
+ * @gfp: type of allocation
+ *
+ * Find/Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode.  The
+ * name of the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-XXX.
+ * where XXX is based on the @name or if that fails or is not supplied
+ * a unique number
+ *
+ * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
+ * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
+ * not in use.
+ *
+ * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_new_learning_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat,
+					   const char *base, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *p, *profile;
+	const char *bname;
+	char *name = NULL;
+	size_t name_sz;
+
+	AA_BUG(!parent);
+
+	if (base) {
+		name_sz = strlen(parent->base.hname) + 8 + strlen(base);
+		name = kmalloc(name_sz, gfp);
+		if (name) {
+			snprintf(name, name_sz, "%s//null-%s",
+				 parent->base.hname, base);
+			goto name;
+		}
+		/* fall through to try shorter uniq */
+	}
+
+	name_sz = strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8;
+	name = kmalloc(name_sz, gfp);
+	if (!name)
+		return NULL;
+	snprintf(name, name_sz, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname,
+		 atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null));
+
+name:
+	/* lookup to see if this is a dup creation */
+	bname = basename(name);
+	profile = aa_find_child(parent, bname);
+	if (profile)
+		goto out;
+
+	profile = aa_alloc_null(parent, name, gfp);
+	if (!profile)
+		goto fail;
+	profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
+	if (hat)
+		profile->label.flags |= FLAG_HAT;
+
+	mutex_lock_nested(&profile->ns->lock, profile->ns->level);
+	p = __find_child(&parent->base.profiles, bname);
+	if (p) {
+		aa_free_profile(profile);
+		profile = aa_get_profile(p);
+	} else {
+		__add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
+
+	/* refcount released by caller */
+out:
+	kfree(name);
+
+	return profile;
+
+fail:
+	kfree(name);
+	aa_free_profile(profile);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * replacement_allowed - test to see if replacement is allowed
+ * @profile: profile to test if it can be replaced  (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @noreplace: true if replacement shouldn't be allowed but addition is okay
+ * @info: Returns - info about why replacement failed (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 if replacement allowed else error code
+ */
+static int replacement_allowed(struct aa_profile *profile, int noreplace,
+			       const char **info)
+{
+	if (profile) {
+		if (profile->label.flags & FLAG_IMMUTIBLE) {
+			*info = "cannot replace immutable profile";
+			return -EPERM;
+		} else if (noreplace) {
+			*info = "profile already exists";
+			return -EEXIST;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
+
+	if (ad->iface.ns) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ns=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->iface.ns);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_policy - Do auditing of policy changes
+ * @subj_label: label to check if it can manage policy
+ * @op: policy operation being performed
+ * @ns_name: name of namespace being manipulated
+ * @name: name of profile being manipulated (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: any extra information to be audited (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @error: error code
+ *
+ * Returns: the error to be returned after audit is done
+ */
+static int audit_policy(struct aa_label *subj_label, const char *op,
+			const char *ns_name, const char *name,
+			const char *info, int error)
+{
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, op);
+
+	ad.iface.ns = ns_name;
+	ad.name = name;
+	ad.info = info;
+	ad.error = error;
+	ad.subj_label = subj_label;
+
+	aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &ad, audit_cb);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* don't call out to other LSMs in the stack for apparmor policy admin
+ * permissions
+ */
+static int policy_ns_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_label *label,
+			     struct user_namespace *userns, int cap)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/* check for MAC_ADMIN cap in cred */
+	err = cap_capable(subj_cred, userns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+	if (!err)
+		err = aa_capable(subj_cred, label, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_policy_view_capable - check if viewing policy in at @ns is allowed
+ * @subj_cred: cred of subject
+ * @label: label that is trying to view policy in ns
+ * @ns: namespace being viewed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns)
+ *
+ * Returns: true if viewing policy is allowed
+ *
+ * If @ns is NULL then the namespace being viewed is assumed to be the
+ * tasks current namespace.
+ */
+bool aa_policy_view_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = subj_cred->user_ns;
+	struct aa_ns *view_ns = labels_view(label);
+	bool root_in_user_ns = uid_eq(current_euid(), make_kuid(user_ns, 0)) ||
+			       in_egroup_p(make_kgid(user_ns, 0));
+	bool response = false;
+	if (!ns)
+		ns = view_ns;
+
+	if (root_in_user_ns && aa_ns_visible(view_ns, ns, true) &&
+	    (user_ns == &init_user_ns ||
+	     (unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy != 0 &&
+	      user_ns->level == view_ns->level)))
+		response = true;
+
+	return response;
+}
+
+bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = subj_cred->user_ns;
+	bool capable = policy_ns_capable(subj_cred, label, user_ns,
+					 CAP_MAC_ADMIN) == 0;
+
+	AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_POLICY, "cap_mac_admin? %d\n", capable);
+	AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_POLICY, "policy locked? %d\n", aa_g_lock_policy);
+
+	return aa_policy_view_capable(subj_cred, label, ns) && capable &&
+		!aa_g_lock_policy;
+}
+
+bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	bool needput, res;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	res = aa_policy_view_capable(current_cred(), label, ns);
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	bool needput, res;
+
+	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
+	res = aa_policy_admin_capable(current_cred(), label, ns);
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+static bool is_subset_of_obj_privilege(const struct cred *cred,
+				       struct aa_label *label,
+				       const struct cred *ocred)
+{
+	if (cred == ocred)
+		return true;
+
+	if (!aa_label_is_subset(label, cred_label(ocred)))
+		return false;
+	/* don't allow crossing userns for now */
+	if (cred->user_ns != ocred->user_ns)
+		return false;
+	if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_inheritable, ocred->cap_inheritable))
+		return false;
+	if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_permitted, ocred->cap_permitted))
+		return false;
+	if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_effective, ocred->cap_effective))
+		return false;
+	if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_bset, ocred->cap_bset))
+		return false;
+	if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_ambient, ocred->cap_ambient))
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy
+ * @subj_cred: subjects cred
+ * @label: label to check if it can manage policy
+ * @ns: namespace being managed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns)
+ * @ocred: object cred if request is coming from an open object
+ * @mask: contains the policy manipulation operation being done
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the task is allowed to manipulate policy else error
+ */
+int aa_may_manage_policy(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+			 struct aa_ns *ns, const struct cred *ocred, u32 mask)
+{
+	const char *op;
+
+	if (mask & AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY)
+		op = OP_PROF_RM;
+	else if (mask & AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY)
+		op = OP_PROF_REPL;
+	else
+		op = OP_PROF_LOAD;
+
+	/* check if loading policy is locked out */
+	if (aa_g_lock_policy)
+		return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "policy_locked",
+				    -EACCES);
+
+	if (ocred && !is_subset_of_obj_privilege(subj_cred, label, ocred))
+		return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL,
+				    "not privileged for target profile",
+				    -EACCES);
+
+	if (!aa_policy_admin_capable(subj_cred, label, ns))
+		return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "not policy admin",
+				    -EACCES);
+
+	/* TODO: add fine grained mediation of policy loads */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct aa_profile *__list_lookup_parent(struct list_head *lh,
+					       struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	const char *base = basename(profile->base.hname);
+	long len = base - profile->base.hname;
+	struct aa_load_ent *ent;
+
+	/* parent won't have trailing // so remove from len */
+	if (len <= 2)
+		return NULL;
+	len -= 2;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(ent, lh, list) {
+		if (ent->new == profile)
+			continue;
+		if (strncmp(ent->new->base.hname, profile->base.hname, len) ==
+		    0 && ent->new->base.hname[len] == 0)
+			return ent->new;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __replace_profile - replace @old with @new on a list
+ * @old: profile to be replaced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @new: profile to replace @old with  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Will duplicate and refcount elements that @new inherits from @old
+ * and will inherit @old children.
+ *
+ * refcount @new for list, put @old list refcount
+ *
+ * Requires: namespace list lock be held, or list not be shared
+ */
+static void __replace_profile(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *child, *tmp;
+
+	if (!list_empty(&old->base.profiles)) {
+		LIST_HEAD(lh);
+		list_splice_init_rcu(&old->base.profiles, &lh, synchronize_rcu);
+
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(child, tmp, &lh, base.list) {
+			struct aa_profile *p;
+
+			list_del_init(&child->base.list);
+			p = __find_child(&new->base.profiles, child->base.name);
+			if (p) {
+				/* @p replaces @child  */
+				__replace_profile(child, p);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/* inherit @child and its children */
+			/* TODO: update hname of inherited children */
+			/* list refcount transferred to @new */
+			p = aa_deref_parent(child);
+			rcu_assign_pointer(child->parent, aa_get_profile(new));
+			list_add_rcu(&child->base.list, &new->base.profiles);
+			aa_put_profile(p);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!rcu_access_pointer(new->parent)) {
+		struct aa_profile *parent = aa_deref_parent(old);
+		rcu_assign_pointer(new->parent, aa_get_profile(parent));
+	}
+	aa_label_replace(&old->label, &new->label);
+	/* migrate dents must come after label replacement b/c update */
+	__aafs_profile_migrate_dents(old, new);
+
+	if (list_empty(&new->base.list)) {
+		/* new is not on a list already */
+		list_replace_rcu(&old->base.list, &new->base.list);
+		aa_get_profile(new);
+		aa_put_profile(old);
+	} else
+		__list_remove_profile(old);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __lookup_replace - lookup replacement information for a profile
+ * @ns: namespace the lookup occurs in
+ * @hname: name of profile to lookup
+ * @noreplace: true if not replacing an existing profile
+ * @p: Returns - profile to be replaced
+ * @info: Returns - info string on why lookup failed
+ *
+ * Returns: profile to replace (no ref) on success else ptr error
+ */
+static int __lookup_replace(struct aa_ns *ns, const char *hname,
+			    bool noreplace, struct aa_profile **p,
+			    const char **info)
+{
+	*p = aa_get_profile(__lookup_profile(&ns->base, hname));
+	if (*p) {
+		int error = replacement_allowed(*p, noreplace, info);
+		if (error) {
+			*info = "profile can not be replaced";
+			return error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void share_name(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new)
+{
+	aa_put_str(new->base.hname);
+	aa_get_str(old->base.hname);
+	new->base.hname = old->base.hname;
+	new->base.name = old->base.name;
+	new->label.hname = old->label.hname;
+}
+
+/* Update to newest version of parent after previous replacements
+ * Returns: unrefcount newest version of parent
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *update_to_newest_parent(struct aa_profile *new)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *parent, *newest;
+
+	parent = rcu_dereference_protected(new->parent,
+					   mutex_is_locked(&new->ns->lock));
+	newest = aa_get_newest_profile(parent);
+
+	/* parent replaced in this atomic set? */
+	if (newest != parent) {
+		aa_put_profile(parent);
+		rcu_assign_pointer(new->parent, newest);
+	} else
+		aa_put_profile(newest);
+
+	return newest;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_replace_profiles - replace profile(s) on the profile list
+ * @policy_ns: namespace load is occurring on
+ * @label: label that is attempting to load/replace policy
+ * @mask: permission mask
+ * @udata: serialized data stream  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * unpack and replace a profile on the profile list and uses of that profile
+ * by any task creds via invalidating the old version of the profile, which
+ * tasks will notice to update their own cred.  If the profile does not exist
+ * on the profile list it is added.
+ *
+ * Returns: size of data consumed else error code on failure.
+ */
+ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
+			    u32 mask, struct aa_loaddata *udata)
+{
+	const char *ns_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+	struct aa_ns *ns = NULL;
+	struct aa_load_ent *ent, *tmp;
+	struct aa_loaddata *rawdata_ent;
+	const char *op;
+	ssize_t count, error;
+	LIST_HEAD(lh);
+
+	op = mask & AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY ? OP_PROF_REPL : OP_PROF_LOAD;
+	aa_get_profile_loaddata(udata);
+	/* released below */
+	error = aa_unpack(udata, &lh, &ns_name);
+	if (error)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* ensure that profiles are all for the same ns
+	 * TODO: update locking to remove this constraint. All profiles in
+	 *       the load set must succeed as a set or the load will
+	 *       fail. Sort ent list and take ns locks in hierarchy order
+	 */
+	count = 0;
+	list_for_each_entry(ent, &lh, list) {
+		if (ns_name) {
+			if (ent->ns_name &&
+			    strcmp(ent->ns_name, ns_name) != 0) {
+				info = "policy load has mixed namespaces";
+				error = -EACCES;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		} else if (ent->ns_name) {
+			if (count) {
+				info = "policy load has mixed namespaces";
+				error = -EACCES;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			ns_name = ent->ns_name;
+			ent->ns_name = NULL;
+		} else
+			count++;
+	}
+	if (ns_name) {
+		ns = aa_prepare_ns(policy_ns ? policy_ns : labels_ns(label),
+				   ns_name);
+		if (IS_ERR(ns)) {
+			op = OP_PROF_LOAD;
+			info = "failed to prepare namespace";
+			error = PTR_ERR(ns);
+			ns = NULL;
+			ent = NULL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	} else
+		ns = aa_get_ns(policy_ns ? policy_ns : labels_ns(label));
+
+	mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level);
+	/* check for duplicate rawdata blobs: space and file dedup */
+	if (!list_empty(&ns->rawdata_list)) {
+		list_for_each_entry(rawdata_ent, &ns->rawdata_list, list) {
+			if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) {
+				struct aa_loaddata *tmp;
+
+				/*
+				 * Entries remain on rawdata_list with
+				 * pcount == 0 until do_ploaddata_rmfs()
+				 * runs; only take a live profile ref.
+				 */
+				tmp = aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(rawdata_ent);
+				if (tmp) {
+					aa_put_profile_loaddata(udata);
+					udata = tmp;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	/* setup parent and ns info */
+	list_for_each_entry(ent, &lh, list) {
+		struct aa_policy *policy;
+		struct aa_profile *p;
+
+		if (aa_g_export_binary)
+			ent->new->rawdata = aa_get_profile_loaddata(udata);
+		error = __lookup_replace(ns, ent->new->base.hname,
+					 !(mask & AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY),
+					 &ent->old, &info);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail_lock;
+
+		if (ent->new->rename) {
+			error = __lookup_replace(ns, ent->new->rename,
+						!(mask & AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY),
+						&ent->rename, &info);
+			if (error)
+				goto fail_lock;
+		}
+
+		/* released when @new is freed */
+		ent->new->ns = aa_get_ns(ns);
+
+		if (ent->old || ent->rename)
+			continue;
+
+		/* no ref on policy only use inside lock */
+		p = NULL;
+		policy = __lookup_parent(ns, ent->new->base.hname);
+		if (!policy) {
+			/* first check for parent in the load set */
+			p = __list_lookup_parent(&lh, ent->new);
+			if (!p) {
+				/*
+				 * fill in missing parent with null
+				 * profile that doesn't have
+				 * permissions. This allows for
+				 * individual profile loading where
+				 * the child is loaded before the
+				 * parent, and outside of the current
+				 * atomic set. This unfortunately can
+				 * happen with some userspaces.  The
+				 * null profile will be replaced once
+				 * the parent is loaded.
+				 */
+				policy = __create_missing_ancestors(ns,
+							ent->new->base.hname,
+							GFP_KERNEL);
+				if (!policy) {
+					error = -ENOENT;
+					info = "parent does not exist";
+					goto fail_lock;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if (!p && policy != &ns->base)
+			/* released on profile replacement or free_profile */
+			p = (struct aa_profile *) policy;
+		rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, aa_get_profile(p));
+	}
+
+	/* create new fs entries for introspection if needed */
+	if (!udata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR] && aa_g_export_binary) {
+		error = __aa_fs_create_rawdata(ns, udata);
+		if (error) {
+			info = "failed to create raw_data dir and files";
+			ent = NULL;
+			goto fail_lock;
+		}
+	}
+	list_for_each_entry(ent, &lh, list) {
+		if (!ent->old) {
+			struct dentry *parent;
+			if (rcu_access_pointer(ent->new->parent)) {
+				struct aa_profile *p;
+				p = aa_deref_parent(ent->new);
+				parent = prof_child_dir(p);
+			} else
+				parent = ns_subprofs_dir(ent->new->ns);
+			error = __aafs_profile_mkdir(ent->new, parent);
+		}
+
+		if (error) {
+			info = "failed to create";
+			goto fail_lock;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Done with checks that may fail - do actual replacement */
+	__aa_bump_ns_revision(ns);
+	if (aa_g_export_binary)
+		__aa_loaddata_update(udata, ns->revision);
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &lh, list) {
+		list_del_init(&ent->list);
+		op = (!ent->old && !ent->rename) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
+
+		if (ent->old && ent->old->rawdata == ent->new->rawdata &&
+		    ent->new->rawdata) {
+			/* dedup actual profile replacement */
+			audit_policy(label, op, ns_name, ent->new->base.hname,
+				     "same as current profile, skipping",
+				     error);
+			/* break refcount cycle with proxy. */
+			aa_put_proxy(ent->new->label.proxy);
+			ent->new->label.proxy = NULL;
+			goto skip;
+		}
+
+		if (!aa_g_export_binary) {
+			if (ent->old && ent->old->rawdata &&
+			    ent->old->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR]) {
+				/* remove rawdata symlinks because the symlink
+				 * target will be removed
+				 */
+				__aa_remove_rawdata_symlink_dents(ent->old);
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * TODO: finer dedup based on profile range in data. Load set
+		 * can differ but profile may remain unchanged
+		 */
+		audit_policy(label, op, ns_name, ent->new->base.hname, NULL,
+			     error);
+
+		if (ent->old) {
+			share_name(ent->old, ent->new);
+			__replace_profile(ent->old, ent->new);
+			if (aa_g_export_binary) {
+				/* recreate rawdata symlinks */
+				if (!ent->old->rawdata)
+					__aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(ent->new);
+			}
+		} else {
+			struct list_head *lh;
+
+			if (rcu_access_pointer(ent->new->parent)) {
+				struct aa_profile *parent;
+
+				parent = update_to_newest_parent(ent->new);
+				lh = &parent->base.profiles;
+			} else
+				lh = &ns->base.profiles;
+			__add_profile(lh, ent->new);
+		}
+	skip:
+		aa_load_ent_free(ent);
+	}
+	__aa_labelset_update_subtree(ns);
+	mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+
+out:
+	aa_put_ns(ns);
+
+	ssize_t udata_sz = udata->size;
+
+	aa_put_profile_loaddata(udata);
+	kfree(ns_name);
+
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+	return udata_sz;
+
+fail_lock:
+	mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+
+	/* audit cause of failure */
+	op = (ent && !ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
+fail:
+	  audit_policy(label, op, ns_name, ent ? ent->new->base.hname : NULL,
+		       info, error);
+	/* audit status that rest of profiles in the atomic set failed too */
+	info = "valid profile in failed atomic policy load";
+	list_for_each_entry(tmp, &lh, list) {
+		if (tmp == ent) {
+			info = "unchecked profile in failed atomic policy load";
+			/* skip entry that caused failure */
+			continue;
+		}
+		op = (!tmp->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
+		audit_policy(label, op, ns_name, tmp->new->base.hname, info,
+			     error);
+	}
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &lh, list) {
+		list_del_init(&ent->list);
+		aa_load_ent_free(ent);
+	}
+
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_remove_profiles - remove profile(s) from the system
+ * @policy_ns: namespace the remove is being done from
+ * @subj: label attempting to remove policy
+ * @fqname: name of the profile or namespace to remove  (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: size of the name
+ *
+ * Remove a profile or sub namespace from the current namespace, so that
+ * they can not be found anymore and mark them as replaced by unconfined
+ *
+ * NOTE: removing confinement does not restore rlimits to preconfinement values
+ *
+ * Returns: size of data consume else error code if fails
+ */
+ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *subj,
+			   char *fqname, size_t size)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns = NULL;
+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+	const char *name = fqname, *info = NULL;
+	const char *ns_name = NULL;
+	ssize_t error = 0;
+
+	if (*fqname == 0) {
+		info = "no profile specified";
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (fqname[0] == ':') {
+		size_t ns_len;
+
+		name = aa_splitn_fqname(fqname, size, &ns_name, &ns_len);
+		/* released below */
+		ns = aa_lookupn_ns(policy_ns ? policy_ns : labels_ns(subj),
+				   ns_name, ns_len);
+		if (!ns) {
+			info = "namespace does not exist";
+			error = -ENOENT;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	} else
+		/* released below */
+		ns = aa_get_ns(policy_ns ? policy_ns : labels_ns(subj));
+
+	if (!name) {
+		/* remove namespace - can only happen if fqname[0] == ':' */
+		mutex_lock_nested(&ns->parent->lock, ns->parent->level);
+		__aa_bump_ns_revision(ns);
+		__aa_remove_ns(ns);
+		mutex_unlock(&ns->parent->lock);
+	} else {
+		/* remove profile */
+		mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level);
+		profile = aa_get_profile(__lookup_profile(&ns->base, name));
+		if (!profile) {
+			error = -ENOENT;
+			info = "profile does not exist";
+			goto fail_ns_lock;
+		}
+		name = profile->base.hname;
+		__aa_bump_ns_revision(ns);
+		__remove_profile(profile);
+		__aa_labelset_update_subtree(ns);
+		mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+	}
+
+	/* don't fail removal if audit fails */
+	(void) audit_policy(subj, OP_PROF_RM, ns_name, name, info,
+			    error);
+	aa_put_ns(ns);
+	aa_put_profile(profile);
+	return size;
+
+fail_ns_lock:
+	mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+	aa_put_ns(ns);
+
+fail:
+	(void) audit_policy(subj, OP_PROF_RM, ns_name, name, info,
+			    error);
+	return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c b/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5fc16d56f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor functions for unpacking policy loaded
+ * from userspace.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2022 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * Code to provide backwards compatibility with older policy versions,
+ * by converting/mapping older policy formats into the newer internal
+ * formats.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+#include "include/lib.h"
+#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
+#include "include/policy_compat.h"
+
+/* remap old accept table embedded permissions to separate permission table */
+static u32 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask)
+{
+	u16 old_index = (mask >> 10) & 0xf;
+	u32 index = 0;
+
+	if (mask & 0x100)
+		index |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
+	if (mask & 0x200)
+		index |= AA_X_INHERIT;
+	if (mask & 0x80)
+		index |= AA_X_UNCONFINED;
+
+	if (old_index == 1) {
+		index |= AA_X_UNCONFINED;
+	} else if (old_index == 2) {
+		index |= AA_X_NAME;
+	} else if (old_index == 3) {
+		index |= AA_X_NAME | AA_X_CHILD;
+	} else if (old_index) {
+		index |= AA_X_TABLE;
+		index |= old_index - 4;
+	}
+
+	return index;
+}
+
+/*
+ * map old dfa inline permissions to new format
+ */
+#define dfa_user_allow(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f) | \
+				    ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000))
+#define dfa_user_xbits(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 7) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_user_audit(dfa, state) ((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state) \
+	(dfa_map_xindex(ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x3fff))
+
+#define dfa_other_allow(dfa, state) ((((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & \
+				      0x7f) |				\
+				     ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000))
+#define dfa_other_xbits(dfa, state) \
+	((((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_other_audit(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state) \
+	((((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state) \
+	dfa_map_xindex((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] >> 14) & 0x3fff)
+
+/**
+ * map_old_perms - map old file perms layout to the new layout
+ * @old: permission set in old mapping
+ *
+ * Returns: new permission mapping
+ */
+static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old)
+{
+	u32 new = old & 0xf;
+
+	if (old & MAY_READ)
+		new |= AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_OPEN;
+	if (old & MAY_WRITE)
+		new |= AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_CREATE | AA_MAY_DELETE |
+		       AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_OPEN;
+	if (old & 0x10)
+		new |= AA_MAY_LINK;
+	/* the old mapping lock and link_subset flags where overlaid
+	 * and use was determined by part of a pair that they were in
+	 */
+	if (old & 0x20)
+		new |= AA_MAY_LOCK | AA_LINK_SUBSET;
+	if (old & 0x40)	/* AA_EXEC_MMAP */
+		new |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+
+	return new;
+}
+
+static void compute_fperms_allow(struct aa_perms *perms, struct aa_dfa *dfa,
+				 aa_state_t state)
+{
+	perms->allow |= AA_MAY_GETATTR;
+
+	/* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
+	if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000)
+		perms->allow |= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
+	if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x40000000)
+		perms->allow |= AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
+}
+
+static struct aa_perms compute_fperms_user(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
+					   aa_state_t state)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+	perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state));
+	perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa, state));
+	perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state));
+	perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
+
+	compute_fperms_allow(&perms, dfa, state);
+
+	return perms;
+}
+
+static struct aa_perms compute_fperms_other(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
+					    aa_state_t state)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+	perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(dfa, state));
+	perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_other_audit(dfa, state));
+	perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state));
+	perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state);
+
+	compute_fperms_allow(&perms, dfa, state);
+
+	return perms;
+}
+
+/**
+ * compute_fperms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms and store
+ *		    them so they can be retrieved later.
+ * @dfa: a dfa using fperms to remap to internal permissions
+ * @size: Returns the permission table size
+ *
+ * Returns: remapped perm table
+ */
+static struct aa_perms *compute_fperms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
+				       u32 *size)
+{
+	aa_state_t state;
+	unsigned int state_count;
+	struct aa_perms *table;
+
+	AA_BUG(!dfa);
+
+	state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+	/* DFAs are restricted from having a state_count of less than 2 */
+	table = kvzalloc_objs(struct aa_perms, state_count * 2);
+	if (!table)
+		return NULL;
+	*size = state_count * 2;
+
+	for (state = 0; state < state_count; state++) {
+		table[state * 2] = compute_fperms_user(dfa, state);
+		table[state * 2 + 1] = compute_fperms_other(dfa, state);
+	}
+
+	return table;
+}
+
+static struct aa_perms *compute_xmatch_perms(struct aa_dfa *xmatch,
+				      u32 *size)
+{
+	struct aa_perms *perms;
+	int state;
+	int state_count;
+
+	AA_BUG(!xmatch);
+
+	state_count = xmatch->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+	/* DFAs are restricted from having a state_count of less than 2 */
+	perms = kvzalloc_objs(struct aa_perms, state_count);
+	if (!perms)
+		return NULL;
+	*size = state_count;
+
+	/* zero init so skip the trap state (state == 0) */
+	for (state = 1; state < state_count; state++)
+		perms[state].allow = dfa_user_allow(xmatch, state);
+
+	return perms;
+}
+
+static u32 map_other(u32 x)
+{
+	return ((x & 0x3) << 8) |	/* SETATTR/GETATTR */
+		((x & 0x1c) << 18) |	/* ACCEPT/BIND/LISTEN */
+		((x & 0x60) << 19);	/* SETOPT/GETOPT */
+}
+
+static u32 map_xbits(u32 x)
+{
+	return ((x & 0x1) << 7) |
+		((x & 0x7e) << 9);
+}
+
+static struct aa_perms compute_perms_entry(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
+					   aa_state_t state,
+					   u32 version)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+	perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
+	perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
+	perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
+
+	/*
+	 * This mapping is convulated due to history.
+	 * v1-v4: only file perms, which are handled by compute_fperms
+	 * v5: added policydb which dropped user conditional to gain new
+	 *     perm bits, but had to map around the xbits because the
+	 *     userspace compiler was still munging them.
+	 * v9: adds using the xbits in policydb because the compiler now
+	 *     supports treating policydb permission bits different.
+	 *     Unfortunately there is no way to force auditing on the
+	 *     perms represented by the xbits
+	 */
+	perms.allow |= map_other(dfa_other_allow(dfa, state));
+	if (VERSION_LE(version, v8))
+		perms.allow |= AA_MAY_LOCK;
+	else
+		perms.allow |= map_xbits(dfa_user_xbits(dfa, state));
+
+	/*
+	 * for v5-v9 perm mapping in the policydb, the other set is used
+	 * to extend the general perm set
+	 */
+	perms.audit |= map_other(dfa_other_audit(dfa, state));
+	perms.quiet |= map_other(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state));
+	if (VERSION_GT(version, v8))
+		perms.quiet |= map_xbits(dfa_other_xbits(dfa, state));
+
+	return perms;
+}
+
+static struct aa_perms *compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, u32 version,
+				      u32 *size)
+{
+	unsigned int state;
+	unsigned int state_count;
+	struct aa_perms *table;
+
+	AA_BUG(!dfa);
+
+	state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+	/* DFAs are restricted from having a state_count of less than 2 */
+	table = kvzalloc_objs(struct aa_perms, state_count);
+	if (!table)
+		return NULL;
+	*size = state_count;
+
+	/* zero init so skip the trap state (state == 0) */
+	for (state = 1; state < state_count; state++) {
+		table[state] = compute_perms_entry(dfa, state, version);
+		AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK,
+			 "[%d]: (0x%x/0x%x/0x%x//0x%x/0x%x//0x%x), converted from accept1: 0x%x, accept2: 0x%x",
+			 state, table[state].allow, table[state].deny,
+			 table[state].prompt, table[state].audit,
+			 table[state].quiet, table[state].xindex,
+			 ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state], ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]);
+	}
+	return table;
+}
+
+/**
+ * remap_dfa_accept - remap old dfa accept table to be an index
+ * @dfa: dfa to do the remapping on
+ * @factor: scaling factor for the index conversion.
+ *
+ * Used in conjunction with compute_Xperms, it converts old style perms
+ * that are encoded in the dfa accept tables to the new style where
+ * there is a permission table and the accept table is an index into
+ * the permission table.
+ */
+static void remap_dfa_accept(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int factor)
+{
+	unsigned int state;
+	unsigned int state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+
+	AA_BUG(!dfa);
+
+	for (state = 0; state < state_count; state++) {
+		ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] = state * factor;
+		ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state] = factor > 1 ? ACCEPT_FLAG_OWNER : 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/* TODO: merge different dfa mappings into single map_policy fn */
+int aa_compat_map_xmatch(struct aa_policydb *policy)
+{
+	policy->perms = compute_xmatch_perms(policy->dfa, &policy->size);
+	if (!policy->perms)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	remap_dfa_accept(policy->dfa, 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int aa_compat_map_policy(struct aa_policydb *policy, u32 version)
+{
+	policy->perms = compute_perms(policy->dfa, version, &policy->size);
+	if (!policy->perms)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	remap_dfa_accept(policy->dfa, 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int aa_compat_map_file(struct aa_policydb *policy)
+{
+	policy->perms = compute_fperms(policy->dfa, &policy->size);
+	if (!policy->perms)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	remap_dfa_accept(policy->dfa, 2);
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5a907a875
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy manipulation functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * AppArmor policy namespaces, allow for different sets of policies
+ * to be loaded for tasks within the namespace.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/policy_ns.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/* kernel label */
+struct aa_label *kernel_t;
+
+/* root profile namespace */
+struct aa_ns *root_ns;
+const char *aa_hidden_ns_name = "---";
+
+/**
+ * aa_ns_visible - test if @view is visible from @curr
+ * @curr: namespace to treat as the parent (NOT NULL)
+ * @view: namespace to test if visible from @curr (NOT NULL)
+ * @subns: whether view of a subns is allowed
+ *
+ * Returns: true if @view is visible from @curr else false
+ */
+bool aa_ns_visible(struct aa_ns *curr, struct aa_ns *view, bool subns)
+{
+	if (curr == view)
+		return true;
+
+	if (!subns)
+		return false;
+
+	for ( ; view; view = view->parent) {
+		if (view->parent == curr)
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_ns_name - Find the ns name to display for @view from @curr
+ * @curr: current namespace (NOT NULL)
+ * @view: namespace attempting to view (NOT NULL)
+ * @subns: are subns visible
+ *
+ * Returns: name of @view visible from @curr
+ */
+const char *aa_ns_name(struct aa_ns *curr, struct aa_ns *view, bool subns)
+{
+	/* if view == curr then the namespace name isn't displayed */
+	if (curr == view)
+		return "";
+
+	if (aa_ns_visible(curr, view, subns)) {
+		/* at this point if a ns is visible it is in a view ns
+		 * thus the curr ns.hname is a prefix of its name.
+		 * Only output the virtualized portion of the name
+		 * Add + 2 to skip over // separating curr hname prefix
+		 * from the visible tail of the views hname
+		 */
+		return view->base.hname + strlen(curr->base.hname) + 2;
+	}
+
+	return aa_hidden_ns_name;
+}
+
+static struct aa_profile *alloc_unconfined(const char *name)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+	profile = aa_alloc_null(NULL, name, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!profile)
+		return NULL;
+
+	profile->label.flags |= FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR |
+		FLAG_IMMUTIBLE | FLAG_NS_COUNT | FLAG_UNCONFINED;
+	profile->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED;
+
+	return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * alloc_ns - allocate, initialize and return a new namespace
+ * @prefix: parent namespace name (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @name: a preallocated name  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted namespace or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static struct aa_ns *alloc_ns(const char *prefix, const char *name)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns;
+
+	ns = kzalloc_obj(*ns);
+	AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_POLICY, "%s(%p)\n", __func__, ns);
+	if (!ns)
+		return NULL;
+	if (!aa_policy_init(&ns->base, prefix, name, GFP_KERNEL))
+		goto fail_ns;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->sub_ns);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->rawdata_list);
+	mutex_init(&ns->lock);
+	init_waitqueue_head(&ns->wait);
+
+	/* released by aa_free_ns() */
+	ns->unconfined = alloc_unconfined("unconfined");
+	if (!ns->unconfined)
+		goto fail_unconfined;
+	/* ns and ns->unconfined share ns->unconfined refcount */
+	ns->unconfined->ns = ns;
+
+	atomic_set(&ns->uniq_null, 0);
+
+	aa_labelset_init(&ns->labels);
+
+	return ns;
+
+fail_unconfined:
+	aa_policy_destroy(&ns->base);
+fail_ns:
+	kfree_sensitive(ns);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_ns - free a profile namespace
+ * @ns: the namespace to free  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: All references to the namespace must have been put, if the
+ *           namespace was referenced by a profile confining a task,
+ */
+void aa_free_ns(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	if (!ns)
+		return;
+
+	aa_policy_destroy(&ns->base);
+	aa_labelset_destroy(&ns->labels);
+	aa_put_ns(ns->parent);
+
+	ns->unconfined->ns = NULL;
+	aa_free_profile(ns->unconfined);
+	kfree_sensitive(ns);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_lookupn_ns - lookup the namespace matching @hname
+ * @view: namespace to search in  (NOT NULL)
+ * @hname: hierarchical ns name  (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: length of @hname
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted ns pointer or NULL if not found
+ *
+ * Do a relative name lookup, recursing through profile tree.
+ */
+struct aa_ns *__aa_lookupn_ns(struct aa_ns *view, const char *hname, size_t n)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns = view;
+	const char *split;
+
+	for (split = strnstr(hname, "//", n); split;
+	     split = strnstr(hname, "//", n)) {
+		ns = __aa_findn_ns(&ns->sub_ns, hname, split - hname);
+		if (!ns)
+			return NULL;
+
+		n -= split + 2 - hname;
+		hname = split + 2;
+	}
+
+	if (n)
+		return __aa_findn_ns(&ns->sub_ns, hname, n);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_lookupn_ns  -  look up a policy namespace relative to @view
+ * @view: namespace to search in  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of namespace to find  (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: length of @name
+ *
+ * Returns: a refcounted namespace on the list, or NULL if no namespace
+ *          called @name exists.
+ *
+ * refcount released by caller
+ */
+struct aa_ns *aa_lookupn_ns(struct aa_ns *view, const char *name, size_t n)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns = NULL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ns = aa_get_ns(__aa_lookupn_ns(view, name, n));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return ns;
+}
+
+static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name,
+				    struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!parent);
+	AA_BUG(!name);
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&parent->lock));
+
+	if (parent->level > MAX_NS_DEPTH)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
+	ns = alloc_ns(parent->base.hname, name);
+	if (!ns)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	ns->level = parent->level + 1;
+	mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level);
+	error = __aafs_ns_mkdir(ns, ns_subns_dir(parent), name, dir);
+	if (error) {
+		AA_ERROR("Failed to create interface for ns %s\n",
+			 ns->base.name);
+		mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+		aa_free_ns(ns);
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
+	}
+	ns->parent = aa_get_ns(parent);
+	list_add_rcu(&ns->base.list, &parent->sub_ns);
+	/* add list ref */
+	aa_get_ns(ns);
+	mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+
+	return ns;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_find_or_create_ns - create an ns, fail if it already exists
+ * @parent: the parent of the namespace being created
+ * @name: the name of the namespace
+ * @dir: if not null the dir to put the ns entries in
+ *
+ * Returns: the a refcounted ns that has been add or an ERR_PTR
+ */
+struct aa_ns *__aa_find_or_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name,
+				     struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns;
+
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&parent->lock));
+
+	/* try and find the specified ns */
+	/* released by caller */
+	ns = aa_get_ns(__aa_find_ns(&parent->sub_ns, name));
+	if (!ns)
+		ns = __aa_create_ns(parent, name, dir);
+	else
+		ns = ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
+
+	/* return ref */
+	return ns;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_prepare_ns - find an existing or create a new namespace of @name
+ * @parent: ns to treat as parent
+ * @name: the namespace to find or add  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted namespace or PTR_ERR if failed to create one
+ */
+struct aa_ns *aa_prepare_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns;
+
+	mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, parent->level);
+	/* try and find the specified ns and if it doesn't exist create it */
+	/* released by caller */
+	ns = aa_get_ns(__aa_find_ns(&parent->sub_ns, name));
+	if (!ns)
+		ns = __aa_create_ns(parent, name, NULL);
+	mutex_unlock(&parent->lock);
+
+	/* return ref */
+	return ns;
+}
+
+static void __ns_list_release(struct list_head *head);
+
+/**
+ * destroy_ns - remove everything contained by @ns
+ * @ns: namespace to have it contents removed  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void destroy_ns(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	if (!ns)
+		return;
+
+	mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level);
+	/* release all profiles in this namespace */
+	__aa_profile_list_release(&ns->base.profiles);
+
+	/* release all sub namespaces */
+	__ns_list_release(&ns->sub_ns);
+
+	if (ns->parent) {
+		unsigned long flags;
+
+		write_lock_irqsave(&ns->labels.lock, flags);
+		__aa_proxy_redirect(ns_unconfined(ns),
+				    ns_unconfined(ns->parent));
+		write_unlock_irqrestore(&ns->labels.lock, flags);
+	}
+	__aafs_ns_rmdir(ns);
+	mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_remove_ns - remove a namespace and all its children
+ * @ns: namespace to be removed  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: ns->parent->lock be held and ns removed from parent.
+ */
+void __aa_remove_ns(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+	/* remove ns from namespace list */
+	list_del_rcu(&ns->base.list);
+	destroy_ns(ns);
+	aa_put_ns(ns);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __ns_list_release - remove all profile namespaces on the list put refs
+ * @head: list of profile namespaces  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: namespace lock be held
+ */
+static void __ns_list_release(struct list_head *head)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns, *tmp;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ns, tmp, head, base.list)
+		__aa_remove_ns(ns);
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_root_ns - allocate the root profile namespace
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 on success else error
+ *
+ */
+int __init aa_alloc_root_ns(void)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *kernel_p;
+
+	/* released by aa_free_root_ns - used as list ref*/
+	root_ns = alloc_ns(NULL, "root");
+	if (!root_ns)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	kernel_p = alloc_unconfined("kernel_t");
+	if (!kernel_p) {
+		destroy_ns(root_ns);
+		aa_free_ns(root_ns);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	kernel_t = &kernel_p->label;
+	root_ns->unconfined->ns = aa_get_ns(root_ns);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+ /**
+  * aa_free_root_ns - free the root profile namespace
+  */
+void __init aa_free_root_ns(void)
+{
+	 struct aa_ns *ns = root_ns;
+
+	 root_ns = NULL;
+
+	 aa_label_free(kernel_t);
+	 destroy_ns(ns);
+	 aa_put_ns(ns);
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d9dcff167
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1803 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor functions for unpacking policy loaded from
+ * userspace.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * AppArmor uses a serialized binary format for loading policy. To find
+ * policy format documentation see Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/apparmor.rst
+ * All policy is validated before it is used.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+#include <kunit/visibility.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/zstd.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/crypto.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
+#include "include/policy_compat.h"
+#include "include/signal.h"
+
+/* audit callback for unpack fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
+
+	if (ad->iface.ns) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ns=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->iface.ns);
+	}
+	if (ad->name) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->name);
+	}
+	if (ad->iface.pos)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", ad->iface.pos);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_iface - do audit message for policy unpacking/load/replace/remove
+ * @new: profile if it has been allocated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @ns_name: name of the ns the profile is to be loaded to (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @name: name of the profile being manipulated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @info: any extra info about the failure (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @e: buffer position info
+ * @error: error code
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error
+ */
+static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *ns_name,
+		       const char *name, const char *info, struct aa_ext *e,
+		       int error)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(aa_current_raw_label());
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, NULL);
+	if (e)
+		ad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
+	ad.iface.ns = ns_name;
+	if (new)
+		ad.name = new->base.hname;
+	else
+		ad.name = name;
+	ad.info = info;
+	ad.error = error;
+
+	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, &ad, audit_cb);
+}
+
+void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!data);
+	AA_BUG(!data->ns);
+	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&data->ns->lock));
+	AA_BUG(data->revision > revision);
+
+	data->revision = revision;
+	if ((data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION])) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		inode = d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR]);
+		inode_set_mtime_to_ts(inode, inode_set_ctime_current(inode));
+
+		inode = d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION]);
+		inode_set_mtime_to_ts(inode, inode_set_ctime_current(inode));
+	}
+}
+
+bool aa_rawdata_eq(struct aa_loaddata *l, struct aa_loaddata *r)
+{
+	if (l->size != r->size)
+		return false;
+	if (l->compressed_size != r->compressed_size)
+		return false;
+	if (aa_g_hash_policy && memcmp(l->hash, r->hash, aa_hash_size()) != 0)
+		return false;
+	return memcmp(l->data, r->data, r->compressed_size ?: r->size) == 0;
+}
+
+static void do_loaddata_free(struct aa_loaddata *d)
+{
+	kfree_sensitive(d->hash);
+	kfree_sensitive(d->name);
+	kvfree(d->data);
+	kfree_sensitive(d);
+}
+
+void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(kref, struct aa_loaddata,
+					     count.count);
+
+	do_loaddata_free(d);
+}
+
+/*
+ * need to take the ns mutex lock which is NOT safe most places that
+ * put_loaddata is called, so we have to delay freeing it
+ */
+static void do_ploaddata_rmfs(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(work, struct aa_loaddata, work);
+	struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_ns(d->ns);
+
+	if (ns) {
+		mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level);
+		/* remove fs ref to loaddata */
+		__aa_fs_remove_rawdata(d);
+		mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+		aa_put_ns(ns);
+	}
+	/* called by dropping last pcount, so drop its associated icount */
+	aa_put_i_loaddata(d);
+}
+
+void aa_ploaddata_kref(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(kref, struct aa_loaddata, pcount);
+
+	if (d) {
+		INIT_WORK(&d->work, do_ploaddata_rmfs);
+		schedule_work(&d->work);
+	}
+}
+
+struct aa_loaddata *aa_loaddata_alloc(size_t size)
+{
+	struct aa_loaddata *d;
+
+	d = kzalloc_obj(*d);
+	if (d == NULL)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	d->data = kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!d->data) {
+		kfree(d);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+	kref_init(&d->count.count);
+	d->count.reftype = REF_RAWDATA;
+	kref_init(&d->pcount);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&d->list);
+
+	return d;
+}
+
+/* test if read will be in packed data bounds */
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT bool aa_inbounds(struct aa_ext *e, size_t size)
+{
+	return (size <= e->end - e->pos);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(aa_inbounds);
+
+/**
+ * aa_unpack_u16_chunk - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk
+ * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL)
+ * @chunk: start address for chunk of data (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: the size of chunk found with the read head at the end of the chunk.
+ */
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT size_t aa_unpack_u16_chunk(struct aa_ext *e, char **chunk)
+{
+	size_t size = 0;
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
+		goto fail;
+	size = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le16 *) e->pos));
+	e->pos += sizeof(__le16);
+	if (!aa_inbounds(e, size))
+		goto fail;
+	*chunk = e->pos;
+	e->pos += size;
+	return size;
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(aa_unpack_u16_chunk);
+
+/* unpack control byte */
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT bool aa_unpack_X(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code)
+{
+	if (!aa_inbounds(e, 1))
+		return false;
+	if (*(u8 *) e->pos != code)
+		return false;
+	e->pos++;
+	return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(aa_unpack_X);
+
+/**
+ * aa_unpack_nameX - check is the next element is of type X with a name of @name
+ * @e: serialized data extent information  (NOT NULL)
+ * @code: type code
+ * @name: name to match to the serialized element.  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * check that the next serialized data element is of type X and has a tag
+ * name @name.  If @name is specified then there must be a matching
+ * name element in the stream.  If @name is NULL any name element will be
+ * skipped and only the typecode will be tested.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success (both type code and name tests match) and the read
+ * head is advanced past the headers
+ *
+ * Returns: false if either match fails, the read head does not move
+ */
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT bool aa_unpack_nameX(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code, const char *name)
+{
+	/*
+	 * May need to reset pos if name or type doesn't match
+	 */
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+	/*
+	 * Check for presence of a tagname, and if present name size
+	 * AA_NAME tag value is a u16.
+	 */
+	if (aa_unpack_X(e, AA_NAME)) {
+		char *tag = NULL;
+		size_t size = aa_unpack_u16_chunk(e, &tag);
+		/* if a name is specified it must match. otherwise skip tag */
+		if (name && (!size || tag[size-1] != '\0' || strcmp(name, tag)))
+			goto fail;
+	} else if (name) {
+		/* if a name is specified and there is no name tag fail */
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* now check if type code matches */
+	if (aa_unpack_X(e, code))
+		return true;
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(aa_unpack_nameX);
+
+static bool unpack_u8(struct aa_ext *e, u8 *data, const char *name)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_U8, name)) {
+		if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u8)))
+			goto fail;
+		if (data)
+			*data = *((u8 *)e->pos);
+		e->pos += sizeof(u8);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return false;
+}
+
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT bool aa_unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
+		if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u32)))
+			goto fail;
+		if (data)
+			*data = le32_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le32 *) e->pos));
+		e->pos += sizeof(u32);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(aa_unpack_u32);
+
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT bool aa_unpack_u64(struct aa_ext *e, u64 *data, const char *name)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_U64, name)) {
+		if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u64)))
+			goto fail;
+		if (data)
+			*data = le64_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le64 *) e->pos));
+		e->pos += sizeof(u64);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(aa_unpack_u64);
+
+static bool aa_unpack_cap_low(struct aa_ext *e, kernel_cap_t *data, const char *name)
+{
+	u32 val;
+
+	if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &val, name))
+		return false;
+	data->val = val;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool aa_unpack_cap_high(struct aa_ext *e, kernel_cap_t *data, const char *name)
+{
+	u32 val;
+
+	if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &val, name))
+		return false;
+	data->val = (u32)data->val | ((u64)val << 32);
+	return true;
+}
+
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT bool aa_unpack_array(struct aa_ext *e, const char *name, u16 *size)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAY, name)) {
+		if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
+			goto fail;
+		*size = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le16 *) e->pos));
+		e->pos += sizeof(u16);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(aa_unpack_array);
+
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT size_t aa_unpack_blob(struct aa_ext *e, char **blob, const char *name)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_BLOB, name)) {
+		u32 size;
+		if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u32)))
+			goto fail;
+		size = le32_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le32 *) e->pos));
+		e->pos += sizeof(u32);
+		if (aa_inbounds(e, (size_t) size)) {
+			*blob = e->pos;
+			e->pos += size;
+			return size;
+		}
+	}
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(aa_unpack_blob);
+
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT int aa_unpack_str(struct aa_ext *e, const char **string, const char *name)
+{
+	char *src_str;
+	size_t size = 0;
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+	*string = NULL;
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRING, name)) {
+		size = aa_unpack_u16_chunk(e, &src_str);
+		if (size) {
+			/* strings are null terminated, length is size - 1 */
+			if (src_str[size - 1] != 0)
+				goto fail;
+			*string = src_str;
+
+			return size;
+		}
+	}
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(aa_unpack_str);
+
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT int aa_unpack_strdup(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name)
+{
+	const char *tmp;
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+	int res = aa_unpack_str(e, &tmp, name);
+	*string = NULL;
+
+	if (!res)
+		return 0;
+
+	*string = kmemdup(tmp, res, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!*string) {
+		e->pos = pos;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return res;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(aa_unpack_strdup);
+
+
+/**
+ * unpack_dfa - unpack a file rule dfa
+ * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: dfa flags to check
+ *
+ * returns dfa or ERR_PTR or NULL if no dfa
+ */
+static struct aa_dfa *unpack_dfa(struct aa_ext *e, int flags)
+{
+	char *blob = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+	struct aa_dfa *dfa = NULL;
+
+	size = aa_unpack_blob(e, &blob, "aadfa");
+	if (size) {
+		/*
+		 * The dfa is aligned with in the blob to 8 bytes
+		 * from the beginning of the stream.
+		 * alignment adjust needed by dfa unpack
+		 */
+		size_t sz = blob - (char *) e->start -
+			((e->pos - e->start) & 7);
+		size_t pad = ALIGN(sz, 8) - sz;
+		if (aa_g_paranoid_load)
+			flags |= DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES;
+		dfa = aa_dfa_unpack(blob + pad, size - pad, flags);
+
+		if (IS_ERR(dfa))
+			return dfa;
+
+	}
+
+	return dfa;
+}
+
+static int process_strs_entry(char *str, int size, bool multi)
+{
+	int c = 1;
+
+	if (size <= 0)
+		return -1;
+	if (multi) {
+		if (size < 2)
+			return -2;
+		/* multi ends with double \0 */
+		if (str[size - 2])
+			return -3;
+	}
+
+	char *save = str;
+	char *pos = str;
+	char *end = multi ? str + size - 2 : str + size - 1;
+	/* count # of internal \0 */
+	while (str < end) {
+		if (str == pos) {
+			/* starts with ... */
+			if (!*str) {
+				AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK,
+					 "starting with null save=%lu size %d c=%d",
+					 (unsigned long)(str - save), size, c);
+				return -4;
+			}
+			if (isspace(*str))
+				return -5;
+			if (*str == ':') {
+				/* :ns_str\0str\0
+				 * first character after : must be valid
+				 */
+				if (!str[1])
+					return -6;
+			}
+		} else if (!*str) {
+			if (*pos == ':')
+				*str = ':';
+			else
+				c++;
+			pos = str +  1;
+		}
+		str++;
+	} /* while */
+
+	return c;
+}
+
+/**
+ * unpack_strs_table - unpack a profile transition table
+ * @e: serialized data extent information  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of table (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @multi: allow multiple strings on a single entry
+ * @strs: str table to unpack to (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if table successfully unpacked or not present, else error
+ */
+static int unpack_strs_table(struct aa_ext *e, const char *name, bool multi,
+			      struct aa_str_table *strs)
+{
+	void *saved_pos = e->pos;
+	struct aa_str_table_ent *table = NULL;
+	int error = -EPROTO;
+
+	/* exec table is optional */
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, name)) {
+		u16 size;
+		int i;
+
+		if (!aa_unpack_array(e, NULL, &size))
+			/*
+			 * Note: index into trans table array is a max
+			 * of 2^24, but unpack array can only unpack
+			 * an array of 2^16 in size atm so no need
+			 * for size check here
+			 */
+			goto fail;
+		table = kzalloc_objs(struct aa_str_table_ent, size);
+		if (!table) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		strs->table = table;
+		strs->size = size;
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+			char *str;
+			int c, size2 = aa_unpack_strdup(e, &str, NULL);
+			/* aa_unpack_strdup verifies that the last character is
+			 * null termination byte.
+			 */
+			c = process_strs_entry(str, size2, multi);
+			if (c <= 0) {
+				AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK, "process_strs %d i %d pos %ld",
+					 c, i,
+					 (unsigned long)(e->pos - saved_pos));
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			if (!multi && c > 1) {
+				AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK, "!multi && c > 1");
+				/* fail - all other cases with embedded \0 */
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			table[i].strs = str;
+			table[i].count = c;
+			table[i].size = size2;
+		}
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	aa_destroy_str_table(strs);
+	e->pos = saved_pos;
+	return error;
+}
+
+static bool unpack_xattrs(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xattrs")) {
+		u16 size;
+		int i;
+
+		if (!aa_unpack_array(e, NULL, &size))
+			goto fail;
+		profile->attach.xattr_count = size;
+		profile->attach.xattrs = kcalloc(size, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!profile->attach.xattrs)
+			goto fail;
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+			if (!aa_unpack_strdup(e, &profile->attach.xattrs[i], NULL))
+				goto fail;
+		}
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool unpack_secmark(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_ruleset *rules)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+	u16 size;
+	int i;
+
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "secmark")) {
+		if (!aa_unpack_array(e, NULL, &size))
+			goto fail;
+
+		rules->secmark = kzalloc_objs(struct aa_secmark, size);
+		if (!rules->secmark)
+			goto fail;
+
+		rules->secmark_count = size;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+			if (!unpack_u8(e, &rules->secmark[i].audit, NULL))
+				goto fail;
+			if (!unpack_u8(e, &rules->secmark[i].deny, NULL))
+				goto fail;
+			if (!aa_unpack_strdup(e, &rules->secmark[i].label, NULL))
+				goto fail;
+		}
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+
+fail:
+	if (rules->secmark) {
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+			kfree_sensitive(rules->secmark[i].label);
+		kfree_sensitive(rules->secmark);
+		rules->secmark_count = 0;
+		rules->secmark = NULL;
+	}
+
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_ruleset *rules)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	/* rlimits are optional */
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "rlimits")) {
+		u16 size;
+		int i;
+		u32 tmp = 0;
+		if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		rules->rlimits.mask = tmp;
+
+		if (!aa_unpack_array(e, NULL, &size) ||
+		    size > RLIM_NLIMITS)
+			goto fail;
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+			u64 tmp2 = 0;
+			int a = aa_map_resource(i);
+			if (!aa_unpack_u64(e, &tmp2, NULL))
+				goto fail;
+			rules->rlimits.limits[a].rlim_max = tmp2;
+		}
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	return true;
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return false;
+}
+
+
+static bool verify_tags(struct aa_tags_struct *tags, const char **info)
+{
+	if ((tags->hdrs.size && !tags->hdrs.table) ||
+	    (!tags->hdrs.size && tags->hdrs.table)) {
+		*info = "failed verification tag.hdrs disagree";
+		return false;
+	}
+	if ((tags->sets.size && !tags->sets.table) ||
+	    (!tags->sets.size && tags->sets.table)) {
+		*info = "failed verification tag.sets disagree";
+		return false;
+	}
+	if ((tags->strs.size && !tags->strs.table) ||
+	    (!tags->strs.size && tags->strs.table)) {
+		*info = "failed verification tags->strs disagree";
+		return false;
+	}
+	/* no data present */
+	if (!tags->sets.size && !tags->hdrs.size && !tags->strs.size) {
+		return true;
+	} else if (!(tags->sets.size && tags->hdrs.size && tags->strs.size)) {
+		/* some data present but not all */
+		*info = "failed verification tags partial data present";
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	u32 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tags->sets.size; i++) {
+		/* count followed by count indexes into hdrs */
+		u32 cnt = tags->sets.table[i];
+
+		if (i+cnt >= tags->sets.size) {
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK,
+				 "tagset too large %d+%d > sets.table[%d]",
+				 i, cnt, tags->sets.size);
+			*info = "failed verification tagset too large";
+			return false;
+		}
+		for (; cnt; cnt--) {
+			if (tags->sets.table[++i] >= tags->hdrs.size) {
+				AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK,
+					 "tagsets idx out of bounds cnt %d sets.table[%d] >= %d",
+					 cnt, i-1, tags->hdrs.size);
+				*info = "failed verification tagsets idx out of bounds";
+				return false;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < tags->hdrs.size; i++) {
+		u32 idx = tags->hdrs.table[i].tags;
+
+		if (idx >= tags->strs.size) {
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK,
+				 "tag.hdrs idx oob idx %d > tags->strs.size=%d",
+				 idx, tags->strs.size);
+			*info = "failed verification tags.hdrs idx out of bounds";
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (tags->hdrs.table[i].count != tags->strs.table[idx].count) {
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK, "hdrs.table[%d].count=%d != tags->strs.table[%d]=%d",
+				 i, tags->hdrs.table[i].count, idx, tags->strs.table[idx].count);
+			*info = "failed verification tagd.hdrs[idx].count";
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (tags->hdrs.table[i].size != tags->strs.table[idx].size) {
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK, "hdrs.table[%d].size=%d != strs.table[%d].size=%d",
+				 i, tags->hdrs.table[i].size, idx, tags->strs.table[idx].size);
+			*info = "failed verification tagd.hdrs[idx].size";
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int unpack_tagsets(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_tags_struct *tags)
+{
+	u32 *sets;
+	u16 i, size;
+	int error = -EPROTO;
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	if (!aa_unpack_array(e, "sets", &size))
+		goto fail_reset;
+	sets = kcalloc(size, sizeof(u32), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sets) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		goto fail_reset;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+		if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &sets[i], NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+
+	tags->sets.size = size;
+	tags->sets.table = sets;
+
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	kfree_sensitive(sets);
+fail_reset:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return error;
+}
+
+static bool unpack_tag_header_ent(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_tags_header *h)
+{
+	return aa_unpack_u32(e, &h->mask, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &h->count, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &h->size, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &h->tags, NULL);
+}
+
+static int unpack_tag_headers(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_tags_struct *tags)
+{
+	struct aa_tags_header *hdrs;
+	u16 i, size;
+	int error = -EPROTO;
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	if (!aa_unpack_array(e, "hdrs", &size))
+		goto fail_reset;
+	hdrs = kzalloc_objs(struct aa_tags_header, size);
+	if (!hdrs) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		goto fail_reset;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+		if (!unpack_tag_header_ent(e, &hdrs[i]))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+
+	tags->hdrs.size = size;
+	tags->hdrs.table = hdrs;
+	AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK, "headers %ld size %d", (long) hdrs, size);
+	return true;
+
+fail:
+	kfree_sensitive(hdrs);
+fail_reset:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return error;
+}
+
+
+static int unpack_tags(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_tags_struct *tags,
+	const char **info)
+{
+	int error = -EPROTO;
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	AA_BUG(!tags);
+	/* policy tags are optional */
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "tags")) {
+		u32 version;
+
+		if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &version, "version") || version != 1) {
+			*info = "invalid tags version";
+			goto fail_reset;
+		}
+		error = unpack_strs_table(e, "strs", true, &tags->strs);
+		if (error) {
+			*info = "failed to unpack profile tag.strs";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		error = unpack_tag_headers(e, tags);
+		if (error) {
+			*info = "failed to unpack profile tag.headers";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		error = unpack_tagsets(e, tags);
+		if (error) {
+			*info = "failed to unpack profile tag.sets";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		error = -EPROTO;
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+
+		if (!verify_tags(tags, info))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	aa_destroy_tags(tags);
+fail_reset:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return error;
+}
+
+static bool unpack_perm(struct aa_ext *e, u32 version, struct aa_perms *perm)
+{
+	u32 reserved;
+
+	if (version != 1)
+		return false;
+
+	/* reserved entry is for later expansion, discard for now */
+	return	aa_unpack_u32(e, &reserved, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->allow, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->deny, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->subtree, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->cond, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->kill, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->complain, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->prompt, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->audit, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->quiet, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->hide, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->xindex, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->tag, NULL) &&
+		aa_unpack_u32(e, &perm->label, NULL);
+}
+
+static ssize_t unpack_perms_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_perms **perms)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+	u16 size = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(!perms);
+	/*
+	 * policy perms are optional, in which case perms are embedded
+	 * in the dfa accept table
+	 */
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "perms")) {
+		int i;
+		u32 version;
+
+		if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &version, "version"))
+			goto fail_reset;
+		if (!aa_unpack_array(e, NULL, &size))
+			goto fail_reset;
+		*perms = kzalloc_objs(struct aa_perms, size);
+		if (!*perms) {
+			e->pos = pos;
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+			if (!unpack_perm(e, version, &(*perms)[i]))
+				goto fail;
+		}
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	} else
+		*perms = NULL;
+
+	return size;
+
+fail:
+	kfree(*perms);
+fail_reset:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return -EPROTO;
+}
+
+static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb **policy,
+		      bool required_dfa, bool required_trans,
+		      const char **info)
+{
+	struct aa_policydb *pdb;
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+	int i, flags, error = -EPROTO;
+	ssize_t size;
+	u32 version = 0;
+
+	pdb = aa_alloc_pdb(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!pdb)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK, "unpacking tags");
+	if (unpack_tags(e, &pdb->tags, info) < 0)
+		goto fail;
+	AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK, "done unpacking tags");
+
+	size = unpack_perms_table(e, &pdb->perms);
+	if (size < 0) {
+		error = size;
+		pdb->perms = NULL;
+		*info = "failed to unpack - perms";
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	pdb->size = size;
+
+	if (pdb->perms) {
+		/* perms table present accept is index */
+		flags = TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32);
+		if (aa_unpack_u32(e, &version, "permsv") && version > 2)
+			/* accept2 used for dfa flags */
+			flags |= TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32);
+	} else {
+		/* packed perms in accept1 and accept2 */
+		flags = TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
+			TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32);
+	}
+
+	pdb->dfa = unpack_dfa(e, flags);
+	if (IS_ERR(pdb->dfa)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(pdb->dfa);
+		pdb->dfa = NULL;
+		*info = "failed to unpack - dfa";
+		goto fail;
+	} else if (!pdb->dfa) {
+		if (required_dfa) {
+			*info = "missing required dfa";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * only unpack the following if a dfa is present
+		 *
+		 * sadly start was given different names for file and policydb
+		 * but since it is optional we can try both
+		 */
+		if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &pdb->start[0], "start"))
+			/* default start state */
+			pdb->start[0] = DFA_START;
+		if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &pdb->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], "dfa_start")) {
+			/* default start state for xmatch and file dfa */
+			pdb->start[AA_CLASS_FILE] = DFA_START;
+		}
+
+		size_t state_count = pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+
+		if (pdb->start[0] >= state_count ||
+		    pdb->start[AA_CLASS_FILE] >= state_count) {
+			*info = "invalid dfa start state";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+
+		/* setup class index */
+		for (i = AA_CLASS_FILE + 1; i <= AA_CLASS_LAST; i++) {
+			pdb->start[i] = aa_dfa_next(pdb->dfa, pdb->start[0],
+						    i);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* accept2 is in some cases being allocated, even with perms */
+	if (pdb->dfa && pdb->perms && !pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) {
+		/* add dfa flags table missing in v2 */
+		u32 noents = pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen;
+		u16 tdflags = pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_flags;
+		size_t tsize = table_size(noents, tdflags);
+
+		pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2] = kvzalloc(tsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) {
+			*info = "failed to alloc dfa flags table";
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen = noents;
+		pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_flags = tdflags;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Unfortunately due to a bug in earlier userspaces, a
+	 * transition table may be present even when the dfa is
+	 * not. For compatibility reasons unpack and discard.
+	 */
+	error = unpack_strs_table(e, "xtable", false, &pdb->trans);
+	if (error && required_trans) {
+		*info = "failed to unpack profile transition table";
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (!pdb->dfa && pdb->trans.table)
+		aa_destroy_str_table(&pdb->trans);
+
+	/* TODO:
+	 * - move compat mapping here, requires dfa merging first
+	 * - move verify here, it has to be done after compat mappings
+	 * - move free of unneeded trans table here, has to be done
+	 *   after perm mapping.
+	 */
+	*policy = pdb;
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	aa_put_pdb(pdb);
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return error;
+}
+
+static u32 strhash(const void *data, u32 len, u32 seed)
+{
+	const char * const *key = data;
+
+	return jhash(*key, strlen(*key), seed);
+}
+
+static int datacmp(struct rhashtable_compare_arg *arg, const void *obj)
+{
+	const struct aa_data *data = obj;
+	const char * const *key = arg->key;
+
+	return strcmp(data->key, *key);
+}
+
+/**
+ * unpack_profile - unpack a serialized profile
+ * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns_name: pointer of newly allocated copy of %NULL in case of error
+ *
+ * NOTE: unpack profile sets audit struct if there is a failure
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules;
+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+	const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL;
+	const char *info = "failed to unpack profile";
+	size_t ns_len;
+	struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 };
+	char *key = NULL, *disconnected = NULL;
+	struct aa_data *data;
+	int error = -EPROTO;
+	kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
+	u32 tmp;
+
+	*ns_name = NULL;
+
+	/* check that we have the right struct being passed */
+	if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "profile"))
+		goto fail;
+	if (!aa_unpack_str(e, &name, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (*name == '\0')
+		goto fail;
+
+	tmpname = aa_splitn_fqname(name, strlen(name), &tmpns, &ns_len);
+	if (tmpns) {
+		if (!tmpname) {
+			info = "empty profile name";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		*ns_name = kstrndup(tmpns, ns_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!*ns_name) {
+			info = "out of memory";
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		name = tmpname;
+	}
+
+	profile = aa_alloc_profile(name, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!profile) {
+		info = "out of memory";
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+
+	/* profile renaming is optional */
+	(void) aa_unpack_str(e, &profile->rename, "rename");
+
+	/* attachment string is optional */
+	(void) aa_unpack_str(e, &profile->attach.xmatch_str, "attach");
+
+	/* xmatch is optional and may be NULL */
+	error = unpack_pdb(e, &profile->attach.xmatch, false, false, &info);
+	if (error) {
+		info = "bad xmatch";
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* neither xmatch_len not xmatch_perms are optional if xmatch is set */
+	if (profile->attach.xmatch->dfa) {
+		if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) {
+			info = "missing xmatch len";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		profile->attach.xmatch_len = tmp;
+		profile->attach.xmatch->start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH] = DFA_START;
+		if (!profile->attach.xmatch->perms) {
+			error = aa_compat_map_xmatch(profile->attach.xmatch);
+			if (error) {
+				info = "failed to convert xmatch permission table";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* disconnected attachment string is optional */
+	(void) aa_unpack_strdup(e, &disconnected, "disconnected");
+	profile->disconnected = disconnected;
+
+	/* optional */
+	(void) aa_unpack_u32(e, &profile->signal, "kill");
+	if (profile->signal < 1 || profile->signal > MAXMAPPED_SIG) {
+		info = "profile kill.signal invalid value";
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	/* per profile debug flags (complain, audit) */
+	if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags")) {
+		info = "profile missing flags";
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	info = "failed to unpack profile flags";
+	if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_HAT)
+		profile->label.flags |= FLAG_HAT;
+	if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_DEBUG1)
+		profile->label.flags |= FLAG_DEBUG1;
+	if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_DEBUG2)
+		profile->label.flags |= FLAG_DEBUG2;
+	if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_COMPLAIN || (e->version & FORCE_COMPLAIN_FLAG)) {
+		profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
+	} else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_ENFORCE) {
+		profile->mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
+	} else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_KILL) {
+		profile->mode = APPARMOR_KILL;
+	} else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_UNCONFINED) {
+		profile->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED;
+		profile->label.flags |= FLAG_UNCONFINED;
+	} else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_USER) {
+		profile->mode = APPARMOR_USER;
+	} else {
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (tmp)
+		profile->audit = AUDIT_ALL;
+
+	if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+
+	/* path_flags is optional */
+	if (aa_unpack_u32(e, &profile->path_flags, "path_flags"))
+		profile->path_flags |= profile->label.flags &
+			PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED;
+	else
+		/* set a default value if path_flags field is not present */
+		profile->path_flags = PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED;
+
+	info = "failed to unpack profile capabilities";
+	if (!aa_unpack_cap_low(e, &rules->caps.allow, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (!aa_unpack_cap_low(e, &rules->caps.audit, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (!aa_unpack_cap_low(e, &rules->caps.quiet, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (!aa_unpack_cap_low(e, &tmpcap, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+
+	info = "failed to unpack upper profile capabilities";
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "caps64")) {
+		/* optional upper half of 64 bit caps */
+		if (!aa_unpack_cap_high(e, &rules->caps.allow, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!aa_unpack_cap_high(e, &rules->caps.audit, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!aa_unpack_cap_high(e, &rules->caps.quiet, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!aa_unpack_cap_high(e, &tmpcap, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
+	info = "failed to unpack extended profile capabilities";
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "capsx")) {
+		/* optional extended caps mediation mask */
+		if (!aa_unpack_cap_low(e, &rules->caps.extended, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!aa_unpack_cap_high(e, &rules->caps.extended, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (!unpack_xattrs(e, profile)) {
+		info = "failed to unpack profile xattrs";
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, rules)) {
+		info = "failed to unpack profile rlimits";
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (!unpack_secmark(e, rules)) {
+		info = "failed to unpack profile secmark rules";
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
+		/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
+		info = "failed to unpack policydb";
+		error = unpack_pdb(e, &rules->policy, true, false,
+				   &info);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail;
+		/* Fixup: drop when we get rid of start array */
+		if (aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, rules->policy->start[0],
+				AA_CLASS_FILE))
+			rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_FILE] =
+			  aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa,
+				      rules->policy->start[0],
+				      AA_CLASS_FILE);
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!rules->policy->perms) {
+			error = aa_compat_map_policy(rules->policy,
+						     e->version);
+			if (error) {
+				info = "failed to remap policydb permission table";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		rules->policy = aa_get_pdb(nullpdb);
+	}
+	/* get file rules */
+	error = unpack_pdb(e, &rules->file, false, true, &info);
+	if (error) {
+		goto fail;
+	} else if (rules->file->dfa) {
+		if (!rules->file->perms) {
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_UNPACK, "compat mapping perms");
+			error = aa_compat_map_file(rules->file);
+			if (error) {
+				info = "failed to remap file permission table";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		}
+	} else if (rules->policy->dfa &&
+		   rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_FILE]) {
+		aa_put_pdb(rules->file);
+		rules->file = aa_get_pdb(rules->policy);
+	} else {
+		aa_put_pdb(rules->file);
+		rules->file = aa_get_pdb(nullpdb);
+	}
+	error = -EPROTO;
+	if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "data")) {
+		info = "out of memory";
+		profile->data = kzalloc_obj(*profile->data);
+		if (!profile->data) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		params.nelem_hint = 3;
+		params.key_len = sizeof(void *);
+		params.key_offset = offsetof(struct aa_data, key);
+		params.head_offset = offsetof(struct aa_data, head);
+		params.hashfn = strhash;
+		params.obj_cmpfn = datacmp;
+
+		if (rhashtable_init(profile->data, &params)) {
+			info = "failed to init key, value hash table";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+
+		while (aa_unpack_strdup(e, &key, NULL)) {
+			data = kzalloc_obj(*data);
+			if (!data) {
+				kfree_sensitive(key);
+				error = -ENOMEM;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+
+			data->key = key;
+			data->size = aa_unpack_blob(e, &data->data, NULL);
+			data->data = kvmemdup(data->data, data->size, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (data->size && !data->data) {
+				kfree_sensitive(data->key);
+				kfree_sensitive(data);
+				error = -ENOMEM;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+
+			if (rhashtable_insert_fast(profile->data, &data->head,
+						   profile->data->p)) {
+				kvfree_sensitive(data->data, data->size);
+				kfree_sensitive(data->key);
+				kfree_sensitive(data);
+				info = "failed to insert data to table";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) {
+			info = "failed to unpack end of key, value data table";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) {
+		info = "failed to unpack end of profile";
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	aa_compute_profile_mediates(profile);
+
+	return profile;
+
+fail:
+	if (error == 0)
+		/* default error covers most cases */
+		error = -EPROTO;
+	if (*ns_name) {
+		kfree(*ns_name);
+		*ns_name = NULL;
+	}
+	if (profile)
+		name = NULL;
+	else if (!name)
+		name = "unknown";
+	audit_iface(profile, NULL, name, info, e, error);
+	aa_free_profile(profile);
+
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_header - unpack serialized stream header
+ * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL)
+ * @required: whether the header is required or optional
+ * @ns: Returns - namespace if one is specified else NULL (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: error or 0 if header is good
+ */
+static int verify_header(struct aa_ext *e, int required, const char **ns)
+{
+	int error = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
+	const char *name = NULL;
+
+	/* get the interface version */
+	if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &e->version, "version")) {
+		if (required) {
+			audit_iface(NULL, NULL, NULL, "invalid profile format",
+				    e, error);
+			return error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Check that the interface version is currently supported.
+	 * if not specified use previous version
+	 * Mask off everything that is not kernel abi version
+	 */
+	if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v5) || VERSION_GT(e->version, v9)) {
+		audit_iface(NULL, NULL, NULL, "unsupported interface version",
+			    e, error);
+		return error;
+	}
+
+	/* read the namespace if present */
+	if (aa_unpack_str(e, &name, "namespace")) {
+		if (*name == '\0') {
+			audit_iface(NULL, NULL, NULL, "invalid namespace name",
+				    e, error);
+			return error;
+		}
+		if (*ns && strcmp(*ns, name)) {
+			audit_iface(NULL, NULL, NULL, "invalid ns change", e,
+				    error);
+			return error;
+		} else if (!*ns) {
+			*ns = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!*ns)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_dfa_accept_index - verify accept indexes are in range of perms table
+ * @dfa: the dfa to check accept indexes are in range
+ * @table_size: the permission table size the indexes should be within
+ */
+static bool verify_dfa_accept_index(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int table_size)
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; i++) {
+		if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= table_size)
+			return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool verify_perm(struct aa_perms *perm)
+{
+	/* TODO: allow option to just force the perms into a valid state */
+	if (perm->allow & perm->deny)
+		return false;
+	if (perm->subtree & ~perm->allow)
+		return false;
+	if (perm->cond & (perm->allow | perm->deny))
+		return false;
+	if (perm->kill & perm->allow)
+		return false;
+	if (perm->complain & (perm->allow | perm->deny))
+		return false;
+	if (perm->prompt & (perm->allow | perm->deny))
+		return false;
+	if (perm->complain & perm->prompt)
+		return false;
+	if (perm->hide & perm->allow)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool verify_perms(struct aa_policydb *pdb)
+{
+	int i;
+	int xidx, xmax = -1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < pdb->size; i++) {
+		if (!verify_perm(&pdb->perms[i]))
+			return false;
+		/* verify indexes into str table */
+		if ((pdb->perms[i].xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
+			xidx = pdb->perms[i].xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
+			if (xidx >= pdb->trans.size)
+				return false;
+			if (xmax < xidx)
+				xmax = xidx;
+		}
+		if (pdb->perms[i].tag && pdb->perms[i].tag >= pdb->tags.sets.size)
+			return false;
+		if (pdb->perms[i].label &&
+		    pdb->perms[i].label >= pdb->trans.size)
+			return false;
+	}
+	/* deal with incorrectly constructed string tables */
+	if (xmax == -1) {
+		aa_destroy_str_table(&pdb->trans);
+	} else if (pdb->trans.size > xmax + 1) {
+		if (!aa_resize_str_table(&pdb->trans, xmax + 1, GFP_KERNEL))
+			return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_profile - Do post unpack analysis to verify profile consistency
+ * @profile: profile to verify (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if passes verification else error
+ *
+ * This verification is post any unpack mapping or changes
+ */
+static int verify_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+
+	if (!rules)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (rules->file->dfa && !verify_dfa_accept_index(rules->file->dfa,
+							rules->file->size)) {
+		audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL,
+			    "Unpack: file Invalid named transition", NULL,
+			    -EPROTO);
+		return -EPROTO;
+	}
+	if (rules->policy->dfa &&
+	    !verify_dfa_accept_index(rules->policy->dfa, rules->policy->size)) {
+		audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL,
+			    "Unpack: policy Invalid named transition", NULL,
+			    -EPROTO);
+		return -EPROTO;
+	}
+
+	if (!verify_perms(rules->file)) {
+		audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL,
+			    "Unpack: Invalid perm index", NULL, -EPROTO);
+		return -EPROTO;
+	}
+	if (!verify_perms(rules->policy)) {
+		audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL,
+			    "Unpack: Invalid perm index", NULL, -EPROTO);
+		return -EPROTO;
+	}
+	if (!verify_perms(profile->attach.xmatch)) {
+		audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL,
+			    "Unpack: Invalid perm index", NULL, -EPROTO);
+		return -EPROTO;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void aa_load_ent_free(struct aa_load_ent *ent)
+{
+	if (ent) {
+		aa_put_profile(ent->rename);
+		aa_put_profile(ent->old);
+		aa_put_profile(ent->new);
+		kfree(ent->ns_name);
+		kfree_sensitive(ent);
+	}
+}
+
+struct aa_load_ent *aa_load_ent_alloc(void)
+{
+	struct aa_load_ent *ent = kzalloc_obj(*ent);
+	if (ent)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ent->list);
+	return ent;
+}
+
+static int compress_zstd(const char *src, size_t slen, char **dst, size_t *dlen)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
+	const zstd_parameters params =
+		zstd_get_params(aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, slen);
+	const size_t wksp_len = zstd_cctx_workspace_bound(&params.cParams);
+	void *wksp = NULL;
+	zstd_cctx *ctx = NULL;
+	size_t out_len = zstd_compress_bound(slen);
+	void *out = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	out = kvzalloc(out_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!out) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	wksp = kvzalloc(wksp_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!wksp) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	ctx = zstd_init_cctx(wksp, wksp_len);
+	if (!ctx) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	out_len = zstd_compress_cctx(ctx, out, out_len, src, slen, &params);
+	if (zstd_is_error(out_len) || out_len >= slen) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if (is_vmalloc_addr(out)) {
+		*dst = kvzalloc(out_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (*dst) {
+			memcpy(*dst, out, out_len);
+			kvfree(out);
+			out = NULL;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * If the staging buffer was kmalloc'd, then using krealloc is
+		 * probably going to be faster. The destination buffer will
+		 * always be smaller, so it's just shrunk, avoiding a memcpy
+		 */
+		*dst = krealloc(out, out_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	}
+
+	if (!*dst) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	*dlen = out_len;
+
+cleanup:
+	if (ret) {
+		kvfree(out);
+		*dst = NULL;
+	}
+
+	kvfree(wksp);
+	return ret;
+#else
+	*dlen = slen;
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int compress_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data)
+{
+	AA_BUG(data->compressed_size > 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Shortcut the no compression case, else we increase the amount of
+	 * storage required by a small amount
+	 */
+	if (aa_g_rawdata_compression_level != 0) {
+		void *udata = data->data;
+		int error = compress_zstd(udata, data->size, &data->data,
+					  &data->compressed_size);
+		if (error) {
+			data->compressed_size = data->size;
+			return error;
+		}
+		if (udata != data->data)
+			kvfree(udata);
+	} else
+		data->compressed_size = data->size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_unpack - unpack packed binary profile(s) data loaded from user space
+ * @udata: user data copied to kmem  (NOT NULL)
+ * @lh: list to place unpacked profiles in a aa_repl_ws
+ * @ns: Returns namespace profile is in if specified else NULL (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Unpack user data and return refcounted allocated profile(s) stored in
+ * @lh in order of discovery, with the list chain stored in base.list
+ * or error
+ *
+ * Returns: profile(s) on @lh else error pointer if fails to unpack
+ */
+int aa_unpack(struct aa_loaddata *udata, struct list_head *lh,
+	      const char **ns)
+{
+	struct aa_load_ent *tmp, *ent;
+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+	char *ns_name = NULL;
+	int error;
+	struct aa_ext e = {
+		.start = udata->data,
+		.end = udata->data + udata->size,
+		.pos = udata->data,
+	};
+
+	*ns = NULL;
+	while (e.pos < e.end) {
+		void *start;
+		error = verify_header(&e, e.pos == e.start, ns);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail;
+
+		start = e.pos;
+		profile = unpack_profile(&e, &ns_name);
+		if (IS_ERR(profile)) {
+			error = PTR_ERR(profile);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+
+		error = verify_profile(profile);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail_profile;
+
+		if (aa_g_hash_policy)
+			error = aa_calc_profile_hash(profile, e.version, start,
+						     e.pos - start);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail_profile;
+
+		ent = aa_load_ent_alloc();
+		if (!ent) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto fail_profile;
+		}
+
+		ent->new = profile;
+		ent->ns_name = ns_name;
+		ns_name = NULL;
+		list_add_tail(&ent->list, lh);
+	}
+	udata->abi = e.version & K_ABI_MASK;
+	if (aa_g_hash_policy) {
+		udata->hash = aa_calc_hash(udata->data, udata->size);
+		if (IS_ERR(udata->hash)) {
+			error = PTR_ERR(udata->hash);
+			udata->hash = NULL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (aa_g_export_binary) {
+		error = compress_loaddata(udata);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+fail_profile:
+	kfree(ns_name);
+	aa_put_profile(profile);
+
+fail:
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, lh, list) {
+		list_del_init(&ent->list);
+		aa_load_ent_free(ent);
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf18744da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,616 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * KUnit tests for AppArmor's policy unpack.
+ */
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <kunit/visibility.h>
+
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
+
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+
+#define TEST_STRING_NAME "TEST_STRING"
+#define TEST_STRING_DATA "testing"
+#define TEST_STRING_BUF_OFFSET \
+	(3 + strlen(TEST_STRING_NAME) + 1)
+
+#define TEST_U32_NAME "U32_TEST"
+#define TEST_U32_DATA ((u32)0x01020304)
+#define TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET \
+	(TEST_STRING_BUF_OFFSET + 3 + strlen(TEST_STRING_DATA) + 1)
+#define TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET \
+	(TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET + 3 + strlen(TEST_U32_NAME) + 1)
+
+#define TEST_U16_OFFSET (TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET + 3)
+#define TEST_U16_DATA ((u16)(TEST_U32_DATA >> 16))
+
+#define TEST_U64_NAME "U64_TEST"
+#define TEST_U64_DATA ((u64)0x0102030405060708)
+#define TEST_NAMED_U64_BUF_OFFSET (TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u32) + 1)
+#define TEST_U64_BUF_OFFSET \
+	(TEST_NAMED_U64_BUF_OFFSET + 3 + strlen(TEST_U64_NAME) + 1)
+
+#define TEST_BLOB_NAME "BLOB_TEST"
+#define TEST_BLOB_DATA "\xde\xad\x00\xbe\xef"
+#define TEST_BLOB_DATA_SIZE (ARRAY_SIZE(TEST_BLOB_DATA))
+#define TEST_NAMED_BLOB_BUF_OFFSET (TEST_U64_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u64) + 1)
+#define TEST_BLOB_BUF_OFFSET \
+	(TEST_NAMED_BLOB_BUF_OFFSET + 3 + strlen(TEST_BLOB_NAME) + 1)
+
+#define TEST_ARRAY_NAME "ARRAY_TEST"
+#define TEST_ARRAY_SIZE 16
+#define TEST_NAMED_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET \
+	(TEST_BLOB_BUF_OFFSET + 5 + TEST_BLOB_DATA_SIZE)
+#define TEST_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET \
+	(TEST_NAMED_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET + 3 + strlen(TEST_ARRAY_NAME) + 1)
+
+MODULE_IMPORT_NS("EXPORTED_FOR_KUNIT_TESTING");
+
+struct policy_unpack_fixture {
+	struct aa_ext *e;
+	size_t e_size;
+};
+
+static struct aa_ext *build_aa_ext_struct(struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf,
+					  struct kunit *test, size_t buf_size)
+{
+	char *buf;
+	struct aa_ext *e;
+
+	buf = kunit_kzalloc(test, buf_size, GFP_USER);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, buf);
+
+	e = kunit_kmalloc(test, sizeof(*e), GFP_USER);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, e);
+
+	e->start = buf;
+	e->end = e->start + buf_size;
+	e->pos = e->start;
+
+	*buf = AA_NAME;
+	*(buf + 1) = strlen(TEST_STRING_NAME) + 1;
+	strscpy(buf + 3, TEST_STRING_NAME, e->end - (void *)(buf + 3));
+
+	buf = e->start + TEST_STRING_BUF_OFFSET;
+	*buf = AA_STRING;
+	*(buf + 1) = strlen(TEST_STRING_DATA) + 1;
+	strscpy(buf + 3, TEST_STRING_DATA, e->end - (void *)(buf + 3));
+	buf = e->start + TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET;
+	*buf = AA_NAME;
+	*(buf + 1) = strlen(TEST_U32_NAME) + 1;
+	strscpy(buf + 3, TEST_U32_NAME, e->end - (void *)(buf + 3));
+	*(buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_U32_NAME) + 1) = AA_U32;
+	put_unaligned_le32(TEST_U32_DATA, buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_U32_NAME) + 2);
+
+	buf = e->start + TEST_NAMED_U64_BUF_OFFSET;
+	*buf = AA_NAME;
+	*(buf + 1) = strlen(TEST_U64_NAME) + 1;
+	strscpy(buf + 3, TEST_U64_NAME, e->end - (void *)(buf + 3));
+	*(buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_U64_NAME) + 1) = AA_U64;
+	*((__le64 *)(buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_U64_NAME) + 2)) = cpu_to_le64(TEST_U64_DATA);
+
+	buf = e->start + TEST_NAMED_BLOB_BUF_OFFSET;
+	*buf = AA_NAME;
+	*(buf + 1) = strlen(TEST_BLOB_NAME) + 1;
+	strscpy(buf + 3, TEST_BLOB_NAME, e->end - (void *)(buf + 3));
+	*(buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_BLOB_NAME) + 1) = AA_BLOB;
+	*(buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_BLOB_NAME) + 2) = TEST_BLOB_DATA_SIZE;
+	memcpy(buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_BLOB_NAME) + 6,
+		TEST_BLOB_DATA, TEST_BLOB_DATA_SIZE);
+
+	buf = e->start + TEST_NAMED_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET;
+	*buf = AA_NAME;
+	*(buf + 1) = strlen(TEST_ARRAY_NAME) + 1;
+	strscpy(buf + 3, TEST_ARRAY_NAME, e->end - (void *)(buf + 3));
+	*(buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_ARRAY_NAME) + 1) = AA_ARRAY;
+	put_unaligned_le16(TEST_ARRAY_SIZE, buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_ARRAY_NAME) + 2);
+
+	return e;
+}
+
+static int policy_unpack_test_init(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	size_t e_size = TEST_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u16) + 1;
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf;
+
+	puf = kunit_kmalloc(test, sizeof(*puf), GFP_USER);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, puf);
+
+	puf->e_size = e_size;
+	puf->e = build_aa_ext_struct(puf, test, e_size);
+
+	test->priv = puf;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_inbounds_when_inbounds(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, aa_inbounds(puf->e, 0));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, aa_inbounds(puf->e, puf->e_size / 2));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, aa_inbounds(puf->e, puf->e_size));
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_inbounds_when_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, aa_inbounds(puf->e, puf->e_size + 1));
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	u16 array_size = 0;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET;
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, aa_unpack_array(puf->e, NULL, &array_size));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, array_size, (u16)TEST_ARRAY_SIZE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+		puf->e->start + TEST_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u16) + 1);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	const char name[] = TEST_ARRAY_NAME;
+	u16 array_size = 0;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET;
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, aa_unpack_array(puf->e, name, &array_size));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, array_size, (u16)TEST_ARRAY_SIZE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+		puf->e->start + TEST_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u16) + 1);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	const char name[] = TEST_ARRAY_NAME;
+	u16 array_size;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET;
+	puf->e->end = puf->e->start + TEST_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u16);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, aa_unpack_array(puf->e, name, &array_size));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+		puf->e->start + TEST_NAMED_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_blob_with_null_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	char *blob = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_BLOB_BUF_OFFSET;
+	size = aa_unpack_blob(puf->e, &blob, NULL);
+
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, size, TEST_BLOB_DATA_SIZE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test,
+		memcmp(blob, TEST_BLOB_DATA, TEST_BLOB_DATA_SIZE) == 0);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_blob_with_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	char *blob = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_BLOB_BUF_OFFSET;
+	size = aa_unpack_blob(puf->e, &blob, TEST_BLOB_NAME);
+
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, size, TEST_BLOB_DATA_SIZE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test,
+		memcmp(blob, TEST_BLOB_DATA, TEST_BLOB_DATA_SIZE) == 0);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_blob_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	char *blob = NULL;
+	void *start;
+	int size;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_BLOB_BUF_OFFSET;
+	start = puf->e->pos;
+	puf->e->end = puf->e->start + TEST_BLOB_BUF_OFFSET
+		+ TEST_BLOB_DATA_SIZE - 1;
+
+	size = aa_unpack_blob(puf->e, &blob, TEST_BLOB_NAME);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, 0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, start);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_str_with_null_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	const char *string = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_STRING_BUF_OFFSET;
+	size = aa_unpack_str(puf->e, &string, NULL);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, strlen(TEST_STRING_DATA) + 1);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, string, TEST_STRING_DATA);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_str_with_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	const char *string = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+
+	size = aa_unpack_str(puf->e, &string, TEST_STRING_NAME);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, strlen(TEST_STRING_DATA) + 1);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, string, TEST_STRING_DATA);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_str_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	const char *string = NULL;
+	void *start = puf->e->pos;
+	int size;
+
+	puf->e->end = puf->e->pos + TEST_STRING_BUF_OFFSET
+		+ strlen(TEST_STRING_DATA) - 1;
+
+	size = aa_unpack_str(puf->e, &string, TEST_STRING_NAME);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, 0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, start);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_null_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	char *string = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_STRING_BUF_OFFSET;
+	size = aa_unpack_strdup(puf->e, &string, NULL);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, strlen(TEST_STRING_DATA) + 1);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test,
+			   ((uintptr_t)puf->e->start <= (uintptr_t)string)
+			   && ((uintptr_t)string <= (uintptr_t)puf->e->end));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, string, TEST_STRING_DATA);
+
+	kfree(string);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	char *string = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+
+	size = aa_unpack_strdup(puf->e, &string, TEST_STRING_NAME);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, strlen(TEST_STRING_DATA) + 1);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test,
+			   ((uintptr_t)puf->e->start <= (uintptr_t)string)
+			   && ((uintptr_t)string <= (uintptr_t)puf->e->end));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, string, TEST_STRING_DATA);
+
+	kfree(string);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	void *start = puf->e->pos;
+	char *string = NULL;
+	int size;
+
+	puf->e->end = puf->e->pos + TEST_STRING_BUF_OFFSET
+		+ strlen(TEST_STRING_DATA) - 1;
+
+	size = aa_unpack_strdup(puf->e, &string, TEST_STRING_NAME);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, 0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_NULL(test, string);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, start);
+
+	kfree(string);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_nameX_with_null_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	bool success;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET;
+
+	success = aa_unpack_nameX(puf->e, AA_U32, NULL);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, success);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+			    puf->e->start + TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET + 1);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_nameX_with_wrong_code(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	bool success;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET;
+
+	success = aa_unpack_nameX(puf->e, AA_BLOB, NULL);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, success);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+			    puf->e->start + TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_nameX_with_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	const char name[] = TEST_U32_NAME;
+	bool success;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET;
+
+	success = aa_unpack_nameX(puf->e, AA_U32, name);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, success);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+			    puf->e->start + TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET + 1);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_nameX_with_wrong_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	static const char name[] = "12345678";
+	bool success;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET;
+
+	success = aa_unpack_nameX(puf->e, AA_U32, name);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, success);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+			    puf->e->start + TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u16_chunk_basic(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	char *chunk = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_U16_OFFSET;
+	/*
+	 * WARNING: For unit testing purposes, we're pushing puf->e->end past
+	 * the end of the allocated memory. Doing anything other than comparing
+	 * memory addresses is dangerous.
+	 */
+	puf->e->end += TEST_U16_DATA;
+
+	size = aa_unpack_u16_chunk(puf->e, &chunk);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, chunk,
+			    puf->e->start + TEST_U16_OFFSET + 2);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, TEST_U16_DATA);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, (chunk + TEST_U16_DATA));
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u16_chunk_out_of_bounds_1(
+		struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	char *chunk = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+
+	puf->e->pos = puf->e->end - 1;
+
+	size = aa_unpack_u16_chunk(puf->e, &chunk);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, 0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_NULL(test, chunk);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, puf->e->end - 1);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u16_chunk_out_of_bounds_2(
+		struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	char *chunk = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_U16_OFFSET;
+	/*
+	 * WARNING: For unit testing purposes, we're pushing puf->e->end past
+	 * the end of the allocated memory. Doing anything other than comparing
+	 * memory addresses is dangerous.
+	 */
+	puf->e->end = puf->e->pos + TEST_U16_DATA - 1;
+
+	size = aa_unpack_u16_chunk(puf->e, &chunk);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, 0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_NULL(test, chunk);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, puf->e->start + TEST_U16_OFFSET);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u32_with_null_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	bool success;
+	u32 data = 0;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET;
+
+	success = aa_unpack_u32(puf->e, &data, NULL);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, success);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, data, TEST_U32_DATA);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+			puf->e->start + TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u32) + 1);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u32_with_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	const char name[] = TEST_U32_NAME;
+	bool success;
+	u32 data = 0;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET;
+
+	success = aa_unpack_u32(puf->e, &data, name);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, success);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, data, TEST_U32_DATA);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+			puf->e->start + TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u32) + 1);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u32_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	const char name[] = TEST_U32_NAME;
+	bool success;
+	u32 data = 0;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET;
+	puf->e->end = puf->e->start + TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u32);
+
+	success = aa_unpack_u32(puf->e, &data, name);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, success);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+			puf->e->start + TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u64_with_null_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	bool success;
+	u64 data = 0;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_U64_BUF_OFFSET;
+
+	success = aa_unpack_u64(puf->e, &data, NULL);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, success);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, data, TEST_U64_DATA);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+			puf->e->start + TEST_U64_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u64) + 1);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u64_with_name(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	const char name[] = TEST_U64_NAME;
+	bool success;
+	u64 data = 0;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U64_BUF_OFFSET;
+
+	success = aa_unpack_u64(puf->e, &data, name);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, success);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, data, TEST_U64_DATA);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+			puf->e->start + TEST_U64_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u64) + 1);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u64_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	const char name[] = TEST_U64_NAME;
+	bool success;
+	u64 data = 0;
+
+	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U64_BUF_OFFSET;
+	puf->e->end = puf->e->start + TEST_U64_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u64);
+
+	success = aa_unpack_u64(puf->e, &data, name);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, success);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos,
+			puf->e->start + TEST_NAMED_U64_BUF_OFFSET);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_X_code_match(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	bool success = aa_unpack_X(puf->e, AA_NAME);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, success);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, puf->e->pos == puf->e->start + 1);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_X_code_mismatch(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	bool success = aa_unpack_X(puf->e, AA_STRING);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, success);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, puf->e->pos == puf->e->start);
+}
+
+static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_X_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
+	bool success;
+
+	puf->e->pos = puf->e->end;
+	success = aa_unpack_X(puf->e, AA_NAME);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, success);
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case apparmor_policy_unpack_test_cases[] = {
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_inbounds_when_inbounds),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_inbounds_when_out_of_bounds),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_out_of_bounds),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_blob_with_null_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_blob_with_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_blob_out_of_bounds),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_nameX_with_null_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_nameX_with_wrong_code),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_nameX_with_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_nameX_with_wrong_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_str_with_null_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_str_with_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_str_out_of_bounds),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_null_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_out_of_bounds),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_u16_chunk_basic),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_u16_chunk_out_of_bounds_1),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_u16_chunk_out_of_bounds_2),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_u32_with_null_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_u32_with_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_u32_out_of_bounds),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_u64_with_null_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_u64_with_name),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_u64_out_of_bounds),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_X_code_match),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_X_code_mismatch),
+	KUNIT_CASE(policy_unpack_test_unpack_X_out_of_bounds),
+	{},
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite apparmor_policy_unpack_test_module = {
+	.name = "apparmor_policy_unpack",
+	.init = policy_unpack_test_init,
+	.test_cases = apparmor_policy_unpack_test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suite(apparmor_policy_unpack_test_module);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("KUnit tests for AppArmor's policy unpack");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c07b6e8fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor /proc/<pid>/attr/ interface functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_ns.h"
+#include "include/domain.h"
+#include "include/procattr.h"
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_getprocattr - Return the label information for @label
+ * @label: the label to print label info about  (NOT NULL)
+ * @string: Returns - string containing the label info (NOT NULL)
+ * @newline: indicates that a newline should be added
+ *
+ * Requires: label != NULL && string != NULL
+ *
+ * Creates a string containing the label information for @label.
+ *
+ * Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
+ */
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
+{
+	struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
+	struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+	int len;
+
+	if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns, true)) {
+		aa_put_ns(current_ns);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label,
+				FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
+				FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+	AA_BUG(len < 0);
+
+	*string = kmalloc(len + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!*string) {
+		aa_put_ns(current_ns);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label,
+				FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
+				FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+	if (len < 0) {
+		kfree(*string);
+		*string = NULL;
+		aa_put_ns(current_ns);
+		return len;
+	}
+
+	if (newline)
+		(*string)[len++] = '\n';
+	(*string)[len] = 0;
+
+	aa_put_ns(current_ns);
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * split_token_from_name - separate a string of form  <token>^<name>
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @args: string to parse  (NOT NULL)
+ * @token: stores returned parsed token value  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: start position of name after token else NULL on failure
+ */
+static char *split_token_from_name(const char *op, char *args, u64 *token)
+{
+	char *name;
+
+	*token = simple_strtoull(args, &name, 16);
+	if ((name == args) || *name != '^') {
+		AA_ERROR("%s: Invalid input '%s'", op, args);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	name++;			/* skip ^ */
+	if (!*name)
+		name = NULL;
+	return name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_setprocattr_changehat - handle procattr interface to change_hat
+ * @args: args received from writing to /proc/<pid>/attr/current (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: size of the args
+ * @flags: set of flags governing behavior
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error code if change_hat fails
+ */
+int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	char *hat;
+	u64 token;
+	const char *hats[16];		/* current hard limit on # of names */
+	int count = 0;
+
+	hat = split_token_from_name(OP_CHANGE_HAT, args, &token);
+	if (IS_ERR(hat))
+		return PTR_ERR(hat);
+
+	if (!hat && !token) {
+		AA_ERROR("change_hat: Invalid input, NULL hat and NULL magic");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (hat) {
+		/* set up hat name vector, args guaranteed null terminated
+		 * at args[size] by setprocattr.
+		 *
+		 * If there are multiple hat names in the buffer each is
+		 * separated by a \0.  Ie. userspace writes them pre tokenized
+		 */
+		char *end = args + size;
+		for (count = 0; (hat < end) && count < 16; ++count) {
+			char *next = hat + strlen(hat) + 1;
+			hats[count] = hat;
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN,
+				 "%s: (pid %d) Magic 0x%llx count %d hat '%s'\n"
+				 , __func__, current->pid, token, count, hat);
+			hat = next;
+		}
+	} else
+		AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN,
+			 "%s: (pid %d) Magic 0x%llx count %d Hat '%s'\n",
+			 __func__, current->pid, token, count, "<NULL>");
+
+	return aa_change_hat(hats, count, token, flags);
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..64212b39b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor resource mediation and attachment
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/resource.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/*
+ * Table of rlimit names: we generate it from resource.h.
+ */
+#include "rlim_names.h"
+
+struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_rlimit[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_SFS_RLIMIT_MASK),
+	{ }
+};
+
+/* audit callback for resource specific fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu",
+			 rlim_names[ad->rlim.rlim], ad->rlim.max);
+	if (ad->peer) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
+				FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_resource - audit setting resource limit
+ * @subj_cred: cred setting the resource
+ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @resource: rlimit being auditing
+ * @value: value being set
+ * @peer: aa_albel of the task being set
+ * @info: info being auditing
+ * @error: error value
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or ad->error else other error code on failure
+ */
+static int audit_resource(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			  struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
+			  unsigned long value, struct aa_label *peer,
+			  const char *info, int error)
+{
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_RLIMITS,
+			  OP_SETRLIMIT);
+
+	ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
+	ad.rlim.rlim = resource;
+	ad.rlim.max = value;
+	ad.peer = peer;
+	ad.info = info;
+	ad.error = error;
+
+	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, &ad, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_map_resource - map compiled policy resource to internal #
+ * @resource: flattened policy resource number
+ *
+ * Returns: resource # for the current architecture.
+ *
+ * rlimit resource can vary based on architecture, map the compiled policy
+ * resource # to the internal representation for the architecture.
+ */
+int aa_map_resource(int resource)
+{
+	return rlim_map[resource];
+}
+
+static int profile_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
+			     struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	int e = 0;
+
+	if (rules->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max >
+	    rules->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max)
+		e = -EACCES;
+	return audit_resource(subj_cred, profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max,
+			      NULL, NULL, e);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_task_setrlimit - test permission to set an rlimit
+ * @subj_cred: cred setting the limit
+ * @label: label confining the task  (NOT NULL)
+ * @task: task the resource is being set on
+ * @resource: the resource being set
+ * @new_rlim: the new resource limit  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Control raising the processes hard limit.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error code if setting resource failed
+ */
+int aa_task_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      struct task_struct *task,
+		      unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *peer;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	peer = aa_get_newest_cred_label(__task_cred(task));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current)
+	 * profiles.  AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
+	 * that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with
+	 * the same profile or that the task setting the resource of another
+	 * task has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
+	 */
+
+	if (label != peer &&
+	    aa_capable(subj_cred, label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
+		error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+				audit_resource(subj_cred, profile, resource,
+					       new_rlim->rlim_max, peer,
+					       "cap_sys_resource", -EACCES));
+	else
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				profile_setrlimit(subj_cred, profile, resource,
+						  new_rlim));
+	aa_put_label(peer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_transition_rlimits - apply new profile rlimits
+ * @old_l: old label on task  (NOT NULL)
+ * @new_l: new label with rlimits to apply  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_label *old_l, struct aa_label *new_l)
+{
+	unsigned int mask = 0;
+	struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
+	struct aa_profile *old, *new;
+	struct label_it i;
+
+	old = labels_profile(old_l);
+	new = labels_profile(new_l);
+
+	/* for any rlimits the profile controlled, reset the soft limit
+	 * to the lesser of the tasks hard limit and the init tasks soft limit
+	 */
+	label_for_each_confined(i, old_l, old) {
+		struct aa_ruleset *rules = old->label.rules[0];
+		if (rules->rlimits.mask) {
+			int j;
+
+			for (j = 0, mask = 1; j < RLIM_NLIMITS; j++,
+				     mask <<= 1) {
+				if (rules->rlimits.mask & mask) {
+					rlim = current->signal->rlim + j;
+					initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + j;
+					rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,
+							    initrlim->rlim_cur);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* set any new hard limits as dictated by the new profile */
+	label_for_each_confined(i, new_l, new) {
+		struct aa_ruleset *rules = new->label.rules[0];
+		int j;
+
+		if (!rules->rlimits.mask)
+			continue;
+		for (j = 0, mask = 1; j < RLIM_NLIMITS; j++, mask <<= 1) {
+			if (!(rules->rlimits.mask & mask))
+				continue;
+
+			rlim = current->signal->rlim + j;
+			rlim->rlim_max = min(rlim->rlim_max,
+					     rules->rlimits.limits[j].rlim_max);
+			/* soft limit should not exceed hard limit */
+			rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_cur, rlim->rlim_max);
+			if (j == RLIMIT_CPU &&
+			    rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY &&
+			    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
+				(void) update_rlimit_cpu(current->group_leader,
+							 rlim->rlim_cur);
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..28caf66b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor security identifier (secid) manipulation fns
+ *
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * AppArmor allocates a unique secid for every label used. If a label
+ * is replaced it receives the secid of the label it is replacing.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/xarray.h>
+
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/lib.h"
+#include "include/secid.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/policy_ns.h"
+
+/*
+ * secids - do not pin labels with a refcount. They rely on the label
+ * properly updating/freeing them
+ */
+#define AA_FIRST_SECID 2
+
+static DEFINE_XARRAY_FLAGS(aa_secids, XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ | XA_FLAGS_TRACK_FREE);
+
+int apparmor_display_secid_mode;
+
+/*
+ * TODO: allow policy to reserve a secid range?
+ * TODO: add secid pinning
+ * TODO: use secid_update in label replace
+ */
+
+/*
+ * see label for inverse aa_label_to_secid
+ */
+struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid)
+{
+	return xa_load(&aa_secids, secid);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_label_to_secctx(struct aa_label *label,
+				    struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
+	int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT;
+	int len;
+
+	if (!label)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (apparmor_display_secid_mode)
+		flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
+
+	if (cp)
+		len = aa_label_asxprint(&cp->context, root_ns, label,
+					flags, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	else
+		len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, root_ns, label, flags);
+
+	if (len < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (cp) {
+		cp->len = len;
+		cp->id = LSM_ID_APPARMOR;
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid);
+
+	return apparmor_label_to_secctx(label, cp);
+}
+
+int apparmor_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+
+	label = prop->apparmor.label;
+
+	return apparmor_label_to_secctx(label, cp);
+}
+
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+
+	label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, secdata,
+				    seclen, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
+	if (IS_ERR(label))
+		return PTR_ERR(label);
+	*secid = label->secid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	if (cp->id == LSM_ID_APPARMOR) {
+		kfree(cp->context);
+		cp->context = NULL;
+		cp->id = LSM_ID_UNDEF;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_secid - allocate a new secid for a profile
+ * @label: the label to allocate a secid for
+ * @gfp: memory allocation flags
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 with @label->secid initialized
+ *          <0 returns error with @label->secid set to AA_SECID_INVALID
+ */
+int aa_alloc_secid(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int ret;
+
+	xa_lock_irqsave(&aa_secids, flags);
+	ret = __xa_alloc(&aa_secids, &label->secid, label,
+			XA_LIMIT(AA_FIRST_SECID, INT_MAX), gfp);
+	xa_unlock_irqrestore(&aa_secids, flags);
+
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		label->secid = AA_SECID_INVALID;
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_secid - free a secid
+ * @secid: secid to free
+ */
+void aa_free_secid(u32 secid)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	xa_lock_irqsave(&aa_secids, flags);
+	__xa_erase(&aa_secids, secid);
+	xa_unlock_irqrestore(&aa_secids, flags);
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in b/security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4bddd10b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/* 0x1 [^\000]*[^/\000]//& */ 0x1B, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x3D, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x74,
+0x66, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04,
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diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b9fb37381
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor task related definitions and mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * TODO
+ * If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old
+ * cred or task context but instead creates a new one.  Ideally the task
+ * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/task.h"
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_task_label - Get another task's label
+ * @task: task to query  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: counted reference to @task's label
+ */
+struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct aa_label *p;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	p = aa_get_newest_cred_label(__task_cred(task));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_replace_current_label - replace the current tasks label
+ * @label: new label  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	struct aa_label *old = aa_current_raw_label();
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	if (old == label)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (current_cred() != current_real_cred())
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	new  = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (ctx->nnp && label_is_stale(ctx->nnp)) {
+		struct aa_label *tmp = ctx->nnp;
+
+		ctx->nnp = aa_get_newest_label(tmp);
+		aa_put_label(tmp);
+	}
+	if (unconfined(label) || (labels_ns(old) != labels_ns(label)))
+		/*
+		 * if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace
+		 * clear out context state
+		 */
+		aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));
+
+	/*
+	 * be careful switching cred label, when racing replacement it
+	 * is possible that the cred labels's->proxy->label is the reference
+	 * keeping @label valid, so make sure to get its reference before
+	 * dropping the reference on the cred's label
+	 */
+	aa_get_label(label);
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
+	set_cred_label(new, label);
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_set_current_onexec - set the tasks change_profile to happen onexec
+ * @label: system label to set at exec  (MAYBE NULL to clear value)
+ * @stack: whether stacking should be done
+ */
+void aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack)
+{
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+
+	aa_get_label(label);
+	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+	ctx->onexec = label;
+	ctx->token = stack;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_set_current_hat - set the current tasks hat
+ * @label: label to set as the current hat  (NOT NULL)
+ * @token: token value that must be specified to change from the hat
+ *
+ * Do switch of tasks hat.  If the task is currently in a hat
+ * validate the token to match.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
+{
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	if (!ctx->previous) {
+		/* transfer refcount */
+		ctx->previous = cred_label(new);
+		ctx->token = token;
+	} else if (ctx->token == token) {
+		aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
+	} else {
+		/* previous_profile && ctx->token != token */
+		abort_creds(new);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(label));
+	/* clear exec on switching context */
+	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+	ctx->onexec = NULL;
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_restore_previous_label - exit from hat context restoring previous label
+ * @token: the token that must be matched to exit hat context
+ *
+ * Attempt to return out of a hat to the previous label.  The token
+ * must match the stored token value.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error of failure
+ */
+int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
+{
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	if (ctx->token != token)
+		return -EACCES;
+	/* ignore restores when there is no saved label */
+	if (!ctx->previous)
+		return 0;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
+	set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous));
+	AA_BUG(!cred_label(new));
+	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
+	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to static string
+ */
+static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
+{
+	switch (mask) {
+	case MAY_READ:
+		return "read";
+	case MAY_WRITE:
+		return "trace";
+	case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
+		return "readby";
+	case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
+		return "tracedby";
+	}
+	return "";
+}
+
+/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
+static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
+
+	if (ad->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
+				 audit_ptrace_mask(ad->request));
+
+		if (ad->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
+					 audit_ptrace_mask(ad->denied));
+		}
+	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
+			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+}
+
+/* assumes check for RULE_MEDIATES is already done */
+/* TODO: conditionals */
+static int profile_ptrace_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct aa_profile *profile,
+			       struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+			       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+	ad->subj_cred = cred;
+	ad->peer = peer;
+	aa_profile_match_label(profile, rules, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
+			       &perms);
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracee_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct aa_profile *tracee,
+			       struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
+			       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
+	    !label_mediates(&tracee->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return profile_ptrace_perm(cred, tracee, tracer, request, ad);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracer_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct aa_profile *tracer,
+			       struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
+			       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (label_mediates(&tracer->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+		return profile_ptrace_perm(cred, tracer, tracee, request, ad);
+
+	/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
+	if (&tracer->label == tracee)
+		return 0;
+
+	ad->subj_label = &tracer->label;
+	ad->peer = tracee;
+	ad->request = 0;
+	ad->error = aa_capable(cred, &tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+			       CAP_OPT_NONE);
+
+	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, ad, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
+ * @tracer_cred: cred of task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracee_cred: cred of task to be traced
+ * @tracee: task label to be traced
+ * @request: permission request
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
+ */
+int aa_may_ptrace(const struct cred *tracer_cred, struct aa_label *tracer,
+		  const struct cred *tracee_cred, struct aa_label *tracee,
+		  u32 request)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, OP_PTRACE);
+
+	return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
+			profile_tracer_perm(tracer_cred, profile, tracee,
+					    request, &sa),
+			profile_tracee_perm(tracee_cred, profile, tracer,
+					    xrequest, &sa));
+}
+
+static const char *get_current_exe_path(char *buffer, int buffer_size)
+{
+	struct file *exe_file;
+	struct path p;
+	const char *path_str;
+
+	exe_file = get_task_exe_file(current);
+	if (!exe_file)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+	p = exe_file->f_path;
+	path_get(&p);
+
+	if (aa_path_name(&p, FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, buffer, &path_str, NULL, NULL))
+		path_str = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	fput(exe_file);
+	path_put(&p);
+
+	return path_str;
+}
+
+/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
+static void audit_ns_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va);
+	char *buffer;
+	const char *path;
+
+	if (ad->request & AA_USERNS_CREATE)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested=\"userns_create\"");
+
+	if (ad->denied & AA_USERNS_CREATE)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " denied=\"userns_create\"");
+
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return; // OOM
+	path = get_current_exe_path(buffer, aa_g_path_max);
+	if (!IS_ERR(path))
+		audit_log_format(ab, " execpath=\"%s\"", path);
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+}
+
+int aa_profile_ns_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+		       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
+		       u32 request)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	int error = 0;
+
+	ad->subj_label = &profile->label;
+	ad->request = request;
+
+	if (!profile_unconfined(profile)) {
+		struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+		aa_state_t state;
+
+		state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, ad->class);
+		if (!state)
+			/* TODO: add flag to complain about unmediated */
+			return 0;
+		perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+		aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+		error = aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
+				       audit_ns_cb);
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/bpf/Makefile b/security/bpf/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c7a89a962
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/bpf/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC.
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) := hooks.o
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7b98f5d1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC.
+ */
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+bool bpf_lsm_initialized __ro_after_init;
+
+static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME),
+	#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
+	#undef LSM_HOOK
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, bpf_inode_storage_free),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid = {
+	.name = "bpf",
+	.id = LSM_ID_BPF,
+};
+
+static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
+			   &bpf_lsmid);
+	bpf_lsm_initialized = true;
+	pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes bpf_lsm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct bpf_storage_blob),
+};
+
+DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = {
+	.id = &bpf_lsmid,
+	.init = bpf_lsm_init,
+	.blobs = &bpf_lsm_blob_sizes
+};
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..339953580
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1527 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/capability.h>
+
+/*
+ * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
+ * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
+ * However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only
+ * the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root
+ * bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or
+ * to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities
+ * support.  So in that case we do not raise capabilities.
+ *
+ * Warn if that happens, once per boot.
+ */
+static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
+{
+	static int warned;
+	if (!warned) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and"
+			" effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all"
+			" capabilities.\n", fname);
+		warned = 1;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_capable_helper - Determine whether a task has a particular effective
+ * capability.
+ * @cred: The credentials to use
+ * @target_ns:  The user namespace of the resource being accessed
+ * @cred_ns:  The user namespace of the credentials
+ * @cap: The capability to check for
+ *
+ * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
+ * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
+ *
+ * See cap_capable for more details.
+ */
+static inline int cap_capable_helper(const struct cred *cred,
+				     struct user_namespace *target_ns,
+				     const struct user_namespace *cred_ns,
+				     int cap)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *ns = target_ns;
+
+	/* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace
+	 * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target
+	 * user namespace's parents.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
+		if (likely(ns == cred_ns))
+			return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+
+		/*
+		 * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for,
+		 * we're done searching.
+		 */
+		if (ns->level <= cred_ns->level)
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		/* 
+		 * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the
+		 * user namespace has all caps.
+		 */
+		if ((ns->parent == cred_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
+			return 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
+		 * it over all children user namespaces as well.
+		 */
+		ns = ns->parent;
+	}
+
+	/* We never get here */
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
+ * @cred: The credentials to use
+ * @target_ns:  The user namespace of the resource being accessed
+ * @cap: The capability to check for
+ * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h (unused)
+ *
+ * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
+ * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
+ *
+ * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() has reverse semantics to the capable() call
+ * and friends. That is cap_capable() returns an int 0 when a task has
+ * a capability, while the kernel's capable(), has_ns_capability(),
+ * has_ns_capability_noaudit(), and has_capability_noaudit() return a
+ * bool true (1) for this case.
+ */
+int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *target_ns,
+		int cap, unsigned int opts)
+{
+	const struct user_namespace *cred_ns = cred->user_ns;
+	int ret = cap_capable_helper(cred, target_ns, cred_ns, cap);
+
+	trace_cap_capable(cred, target_ns, cred_ns, cap, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock
+ * @ts: The time to set
+ * @tz: The timezone to set
+ *
+ * Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone
+ * information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied.
+ */
+int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
+ *			   another
+ * @child: The process to be accessed
+ * @mode: The mode of attachment.
+ *
+ * If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target
+ * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
+ * If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace
+ * access is allowed.
+ * Else denied.
+ *
+ * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
+ * granted, -ve if denied.
+ */
+int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
+	const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	cred = current_cred();
+	child_cred = __task_cred(child);
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
+		caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective;
+	else
+		caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted;
+	if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
+	    cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
+		goto out;
+	if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+		goto out;
+	ret = -EPERM;
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current
+ * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer
+ *
+ * If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's
+ * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
+ * If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace
+ * access is allowed.
+ * Else denied.
+ *
+ * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current
+ * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
+ */
+int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	cred = __task_cred(parent);
+	child_cred = current_cred();
+	if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
+	    cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+		goto out;
+	if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+		goto out;
+	ret = -EPERM;
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets
+ * @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets
+ * @effective: The place to record the effective set
+ * @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set
+ * @permitted: The place to record the permitted set
+ *
+ * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns
+ * them to the caller.
+ */
+int cap_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+	       kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred;
+
+	/* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	cred = __task_cred(target);
+	*effective   = cred->cap_effective;
+	*inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
+	*permitted   = cred->cap_permitted;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old
+ * permitted set.  Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not.
+ */
+static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
+{
+	/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
+	 * capability
+	 */
+	if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
+			CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities
+ * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here
+ * @old: The current task's current credentials
+ * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
+ * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
+ * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
+ *
+ * This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current
+ * process's capability sets.  The changes are made to the proposed new
+ * credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM.
+ */
+int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
+	       const struct cred *old,
+	       const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+	       const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+	       const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
+	    !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
+			  cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
+				      old->cap_permitted)))
+		/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
+			  cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
+				      old->cap_bset)))
+		/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
+	if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
+	if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	new->cap_effective   = *effective;
+	new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
+	new->cap_permitted   = *permitted;
+
+	/*
+	 * Mask off ambient bits that are no longer both permitted and
+	 * inheritable.
+	 */
+	new->cap_ambient = cap_intersect(new->cap_ambient,
+					 cap_intersect(*permitted,
+						       *inheritable));
+	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges
+ * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
+ *
+ * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
+ * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should
+ * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected.
+ *
+ * Return: 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv()
+ * is required, 0 otherwise, meaning inode_killpriv() is not required.
+ */
+int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	int error;
+
+	error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
+	return error > 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode
+ *
+ * @idmap:	idmap of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dentry:	The inode/dentry to alter
+ *
+ * Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the idmap of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then
+ * take care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking
+ * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
+ * performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error.
+ */
+int cap_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	error = __vfs_removexattr(idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
+	if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * kuid_root_in_ns - check whether the given kuid is root in the given ns
+ * @kuid: the kuid to be tested
+ * @ns: the user namespace to test against
+ *
+ * Returns true if @kuid represents the root user in @ns, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool kuid_root_in_ns(kuid_t kuid, struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	for (;; ns = ns->parent) {
+		if (from_kuid(ns, kuid) == 0)
+			return true;
+		if (ns == &init_user_ns)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool vfsuid_root_in_currentns(vfsuid_t vfsuid)
+{
+	kuid_t kuid;
+
+	if (!vfsuid_valid(vfsuid))
+		return false;
+	kuid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
+	return kuid_root_in_ns(kuid, current_user_ns());
+}
+
+static __u32 sansflags(__u32 m)
+{
+	return m & ~VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+}
+
+static bool is_v2header(int size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
+{
+	if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
+		return false;
+	return sansflags(le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc)) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
+}
+
+static bool is_v3header(int size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
+{
+	if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
+		return false;
+	return sansflags(le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc)) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
+}
+
+/*
+ * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the
+ * xattr from the inode itself.
+ *
+ * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it.  If we
+ * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler.
+ *
+ * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called
+ * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
+ * so that's good.
+ */
+int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			  struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
+			  bool alloc)
+{
+	int size;
+	kuid_t kroot;
+	vfsuid_t vfsroot;
+	u32 nsmagic, magic;
+	uid_t root, mappedroot;
+	char *tmpbuf = NULL;
+	struct vfs_cap_data *cap;
+	struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = NULL;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
+	if (!dentry)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &tmpbuf,
+				  sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data), GFP_NOFS);
+	dput(dentry);
+	/* gcc11 complains if we don't check for !tmpbuf */
+	if (size < 0 || !tmpbuf)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+	cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
+	if (is_v2header(size, cap)) {
+		root = 0;
+	} else if (is_v3header(size, cap)) {
+		nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
+		root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
+	} else {
+		size = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root);
+
+	/* If this is an idmapped mount shift the kuid. */
+	vfsroot = make_vfsuid(idmap, fs_ns, kroot);
+
+	/* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return
+	 * this as a nscap. */
+	mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsroot));
+	if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1 && mappedroot != (uid_t)0) {
+		size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
+		if (alloc) {
+			if (!nscap) {
+				/* v2 -> v3 conversion */
+				nscap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
+				if (!nscap) {
+					size = -ENOMEM;
+					goto out_free;
+				}
+				nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
+				magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
+				if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+					nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+				memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
+				nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
+			} else {
+				/* use allocated v3 buffer */
+				tmpbuf = NULL;
+			}
+			nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
+			*buffer = nscap;
+		}
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	if (!vfsuid_root_in_currentns(vfsroot)) {
+		size = -EOVERFLOW;
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	/* This comes from a parent namespace.  Return as a v2 capability */
+	size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data);
+	if (alloc) {
+		if (nscap) {
+			/* v3 -> v2 conversion */
+			cap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!cap) {
+				size = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out_free;
+			}
+			magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
+			nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc);
+			if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+				magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+			memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
+			cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
+		} else {
+			/* use unconverted v2 */
+			tmpbuf = NULL;
+		}
+		*buffer = cap;
+	}
+out_free:
+	kfree(tmpbuf);
+	return size;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rootid_from_xattr - translate root uid of vfs caps
+ *
+ * @value:	vfs caps value which may be modified by this function
+ * @size:	size of @ivalue
+ * @task_ns:	user namespace of the caller
+ */
+static vfsuid_t rootid_from_xattr(const void *value, size_t size,
+				  struct user_namespace *task_ns)
+{
+	const struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = value;
+	uid_t rootid = 0;
+
+	if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
+		rootid = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
+
+	return VFSUIDT_INIT(make_kuid(task_ns, rootid));
+}
+
+static bool validheader(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
+{
+	return is_v2header(size, cap) || is_v3header(size, cap);
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_convert_nscap - check vfs caps
+ *
+ * @idmap:	idmap of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dentry:	used to retrieve inode to check permissions on
+ * @ivalue:	vfs caps value which may be modified by this function
+ * @size:	size of @ivalue
+ *
+ * User requested a write of security.capability.  If needed, update the
+ * xattr to change from v2 to v3, or to fixup the v3 rootid.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the idmap of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then
+ * take care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking
+ * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
+ * performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
+ *
+ * Return: On success, return the new size; on error, return < 0.
+ */
+int cap_convert_nscap(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+		      const void **ivalue, size_t size)
+{
+	struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
+	uid_t nsrootid;
+	const struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *ivalue;
+	__u32 magic, nsmagic;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct user_namespace *task_ns = current_user_ns(),
+		*fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+	kuid_t rootid;
+	vfsuid_t vfsrootid;
+	size_t newsize;
+
+	if (!*ivalue)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!validheader(size, cap))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(idmap, inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 && (idmap == &nop_mnt_idmap))
+		if (ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SETFCAP))
+			/* user is privileged, just write the v2 */
+			return size;
+
+	vfsrootid = rootid_from_xattr(*ivalue, size, task_ns);
+	if (!vfsuid_valid(vfsrootid))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rootid = from_vfsuid(idmap, fs_ns, vfsrootid);
+	if (!uid_valid(rootid))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	nsrootid = from_kuid(fs_ns, rootid);
+	if (nsrootid == -1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	newsize = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
+	nscap = kmalloc(newsize, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!nscap)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(nsrootid);
+	nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
+	magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
+	if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+		nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+	nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
+	memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
+
+	*ivalue = nscap;
+	return newsize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
+ * to a file.
+ */
+static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
+					  struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+					  bool *effective,
+					  bool *has_fcap)
+{
+	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+		*effective = true;
+
+	if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
+		*has_fcap = true;
+
+	/*
+	 * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
+	 * The addition of pA' is handled later.
+	 */
+	new->cap_permitted.val =
+		(new->cap_bset.val & caps->permitted.val) |
+		(new->cap_inheritable.val & caps->inheritable.val);
+
+	if (caps->permitted.val & ~new->cap_permitted.val)
+		/* insufficient to execute correctly */
+		ret = -EPERM;
+
+	/*
+	 * For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they
+	 * do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are
+	 * missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities.
+	 */
+	return *effective ? ret : 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * get_vfs_caps_from_disk - retrieve vfs caps from disk
+ *
+ * @idmap:	idmap of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dentry:	dentry from which @inode is retrieved
+ * @cpu_caps:	vfs capabilities
+ *
+ * Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the idmap of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then
+ * take care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking
+ * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
+ * performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
+ */
+int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			   const struct dentry *dentry,
+			   struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	__u32 magic_etc;
+	int size;
+	struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data;
+	struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data;
+	kuid_t rootkuid;
+	vfsuid_t rootvfsuid;
+	struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
+
+	memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
+
+	if (!inode)
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+	size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode,
+			      XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
+	if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		/* no data, that's ok */
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	if (size < 0)
+		return size;
+
+	if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
+
+	rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, 0);
+	switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) {
+	case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
+		if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
+		if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case VFS_CAP_REVISION_3:
+		if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, le32_to_cpu(nscaps->rootid));
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	rootvfsuid = make_vfsuid(idmap, fs_ns, rootkuid);
+	if (!vfsuid_valid(rootvfsuid))
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	/* Limit the caps to the mounter of the filesystem
+	 * or the more limited uid specified in the xattr.
+	 */
+	if (!vfsuid_root_in_currentns(rootvfsuid))
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	cpu_caps->permitted.val = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[0].permitted);
+	cpu_caps->inheritable.val = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[0].inheritable);
+
+	/*
+	 * Rev1 had just a single 32-bit word, later expanded
+	 * to a second one for the high bits
+	 */
+	if ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) != VFS_CAP_REVISION_1) {
+		cpu_caps->permitted.val += (u64)le32_to_cpu(caps->data[1].permitted) << 32;
+		cpu_caps->inheritable.val += (u64)le32_to_cpu(caps->data[1].inheritable) << 32;
+	}
+
+	cpu_caps->permitted.val &= CAP_VALID_MASK;
+	cpu_caps->inheritable.val &= CAP_VALID_MASK;
+
+	cpu_caps->rootid = vfsuid_into_kuid(rootvfsuid);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from
+ * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
+ * constructed by execve().
+ */
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file,
+			 bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
+
+	cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted);
+
+	if (!file_caps_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * This check is redundant with mnt_may_suid() but is kept to make
+	 * explicit that capability bits are limited to s_user_ns and its
+	 * descendants.
+	 */
+	if (!current_in_userns(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(file_mnt_idmap(file),
+				    file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		if (rc == -EINVAL)
+			printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n",
+					bprm->filename);
+		else if (rc == -ENODATA)
+			rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
+
+out:
+	if (rc)
+		cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); }
+
+static inline bool __is_real(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
+{ return uid_eq(cred->uid, uid); }
+
+static inline bool __is_eff(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
+{ return uid_eq(cred->euid, uid); }
+
+static inline bool __is_suid(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
+{ return !__is_real(uid, cred) && __is_eff(uid, cred); }
+
+/*
+ * handle_privileged_root - Handle case of privileged root
+ * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
+ * @has_fcap: Are any file capabilities set?
+ * @effective: Do we have effective root privilege?
+ * @root_uid: This namespace' root UID WRT initial USER namespace
+ *
+ * Handle the case where root is privileged and hasn't been neutered by
+ * SECURE_NOROOT.  If file capabilities are set, they won't be combined with
+ * set UID root and nothing is changed.  If we are root, cap_permitted is
+ * updated.  If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set.
+ */
+static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
+				   bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
+{
+	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
+
+	if (!root_privileged())
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
+	 * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user.  Do set it
+	 * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
+	 */
+	if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) {
+		warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
+		return;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
+	 * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
+	 * capability sets for the file.
+	 */
+	if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) {
+		/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
+		new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
+						 old->cap_inheritable);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
+	 */
+	if (__is_eff(root_uid, new))
+		*effective = true;
+}
+
+#define __cap_gained(field, target, source) \
+	!cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field)
+#define __cap_grew(target, source, cred) \
+	!cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source)
+#define __cap_full(field, cred) \
+	cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field)
+
+/*
+ * 1) Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
+ *
+ * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
+ *   1) cap_effective has all caps
+ *   2) we became root *OR* are were already root
+ *   3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
+ * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
+ *
+ * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
+ * that is interesting information to audit.
+ *
+ * A number of other conditions require logging:
+ * 2) something prevented setuid root getting all caps
+ * 3) non-setuid root gets fcaps
+ * 4) non-setuid root gets ambient
+ */
+static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+				     kuid_t root, bool has_fcap)
+{
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) &&
+	     !(__cap_full(effective, new) &&
+	       (__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) &&
+	       root_privileged())) ||
+	    (root_privileged() &&
+	     __is_suid(root, new) &&
+	     !__cap_full(effective, new)) ||
+	    (uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) &&
+	     ((has_fcap &&
+	       __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) ||
+	      __cap_gained(ambient, new, old))))
+
+		ret = true;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_bprm_creds_from_file - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
+ * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
+ * @file: The file to pull the credentials from
+ *
+ * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
+ * constructed by execve().  The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,
+ * which won't take effect immediately.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error.
+ */
+int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
+{
+	/* Process setpcap binaries and capabilities for uid 0 */
+	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
+	bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, id_changed;
+	int ret;
+	kuid_t root_uid;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	ret = get_file_caps(bprm, file, &effective, &has_fcap);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
+
+	handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
+
+	/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
+	if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
+		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+	/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
+	 * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
+	 *
+	 * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.
+	 */
+	id_changed = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) || !in_group_p(new->egid);
+
+	if ((id_changed || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&
+	    ((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) ||
+	     !ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {
+		/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
+		if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SETUID) ||
+		    (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) {
+			new->euid = new->uid;
+			new->egid = new->gid;
+		}
+		new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
+						   old->cap_permitted);
+	}
+
+	new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
+	new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
+
+	/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
+	if (has_fcap || id_changed)
+		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
+
+	/*
+	 * Now that we've computed pA', update pP' to give:
+	 *   pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
+	 */
+	new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA').  Because pA' is zero if fE is set,
+	 * this is the same as pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) | pA'.
+	 */
+	if (effective)
+		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
+	else
+		new->cap_effective = new->cap_ambient;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) {
+		ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* Check for privilege-elevated exec. */
+	if (id_changed ||
+	    !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) ||
+	    !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) ||
+	    (!__is_real(root_uid, new) &&
+	     (effective ||
+	      __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))))
+		bprm->secureexec = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_inode_setxattr - Determine whether an xattr may be altered
+ * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
+ * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
+ * @value: The value that the xattr will be changed to
+ * @size: The size of value
+ * @flags: The replacement flag
+ *
+ * Determine whether an xattr may be altered or set on an inode, returning 0 if
+ * permission is granted, -ve if denied.
+ *
+ * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get updated or set by those
+ * who aren't privileged to do so.
+ */
+int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+		       const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
+
+	/* Ignore non-security xattrs */
+	if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+			XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * For XATTR_NAME_CAPS the check will be done in
+	 * cap_convert_nscap(), called by setxattr()
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed
+ *
+ * @idmap:	idmap of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dentry:	The inode/dentry being altered
+ * @name:	The name of the xattr to be changed
+ *
+ * Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if
+ * permission is granted, -ve if denied.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the idmap of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then
+ * take care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking
+ * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
+ * performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
+ *
+ * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who
+ * aren't privileged to remove them.
+ */
+int cap_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			  struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
+
+	/* Ignore non-security xattrs */
+	if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+			XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
+		/* security.capability gets namespaced */
+		struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+		if (!inode)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(idmap, inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
+			return -EPERM;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
+ * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
+ *
+ *  1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
+ *  {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
+ *  cleared.
+ *
+ *  2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
+ *  capabilities of the process are cleared.
+ *
+ *  3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
+ *  capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
+ *
+ *  fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
+ *  never happen.
+ *
+ *  -astor
+ *
+ * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
+ * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
+ * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
+ * effective sets will be retained.
+ * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
+ * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
+ * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
+ * files..
+ * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
+ */
+static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
+
+	if ((uid_eq(old->uid, root_uid) ||
+	     uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) ||
+	     uid_eq(old->suid, root_uid)) &&
+	    (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&
+	     !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) &&
+	     !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid))) {
+		if (!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
+			cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);
+			cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Pre-ambient programs expect setresuid to nonroot followed
+		 * by exec to drop capabilities.  We should make sure that
+		 * this remains the case.
+		 */
+		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
+	}
+	if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
+		cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
+	if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
+		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call
+ * @new: The proposed credentials
+ * @old: The current task's current credentials
+ * @flags: Indications of what has changed
+ *
+ * Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are
+ * actually applied.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them.
+ */
+int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
+{
+	switch (flags) {
+	case LSM_SETID_RE:
+	case LSM_SETID_ID:
+	case LSM_SETID_RES:
+		/* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless
+		 * otherwise suppressed */
+		if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
+			cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old);
+		break;
+
+	case LSM_SETID_FS:
+		/* juggle the capabilities to follow FSUID changes, unless
+		 * otherwise suppressed
+		 *
+		 * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
+		 *          if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
+		 */
+		if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
+			kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
+			if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))
+				new->cap_effective =
+					cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);
+
+			if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))
+				new->cap_effective =
+					cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,
+							 new->cap_permitted);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
+ * task_setnice, assumes that
+ *   . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
+ *   . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
+ *   	then those actions should be allowed
+ * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
+ * yet with increased caps.
+ * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
+ */
+static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	int is_subset, ret = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted,
+				 current_cred()->cap_permitted);
+	if (!is_subset && !ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_task_setscheduler - Determine if scheduler policy change is permitted
+ * @p: The task to affect
+ *
+ * Determine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
+ * specified task.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
+ */
+int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return cap_safe_nice(p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_task_setioprio - Determine if I/O priority change is permitted
+ * @p: The task to affect
+ * @ioprio: The I/O priority to set
+ *
+ * Determine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified
+ * task.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
+ */
+int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	return cap_safe_nice(p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_task_setnice - Determine if task priority change is permitted
+ * @p: The task to affect
+ * @nice: The nice value to set
+ *
+ * Determine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the
+ * specified task.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
+ */
+int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	return cap_safe_nice(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP.  Attempt to remove the specified capability from
+ * the current task's bounding set.  Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
+ */
+static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
+{
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (!cap_valid(cap))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);
+	return commit_creds(new);
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
+ * @option: The process control function requested
+ * @arg2: The argument data for this function
+ * @arg3: The argument data for this function
+ * @arg4: The argument data for this function
+ * @arg5: The argument data for this function
+ *
+ * Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may
+ * also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented
+ * here, other -ve on error.  If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM
+ * modules will consider performing the function.
+ */
+int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+		   unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
+{
+	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	switch (option) {
+	case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
+		if (!cap_valid(arg2))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return !!cap_raised(old->cap_bset, arg2);
+
+	case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
+		return cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
+
+	/*
+	 * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
+	 * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
+	 * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
+	 * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
+	 *
+	 * Note:
+	 *
+	 *  PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
+	 *      issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
+	 *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
+	 *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
+	 *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
+	 *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
+	 *
+	 * will ensure that the current process and all of its
+	 * children will be locked into a pure
+	 * capability-based-privilege environment.
+	 */
+	case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
+		if ((((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
+		     & (old->securebits ^ arg2))			/*[1]*/
+		    || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))	/*[2]*/
+		    || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))	/*[3]*/
+			/*
+			 * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
+			 * [2] no unlocking of locks
+			 * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
+			 */
+		    )
+			/* cannot change a locked bit */
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		/*
+		 * Doing anything requires privilege (go read about the
+		 * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits.
+		 * Indeed, the SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not
+		 * restrictions enforced by the kernel but by user space on
+		 * itself.
+		 */
+		if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
+				CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) {
+			const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks =
+				SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
+				SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
+			const unsigned long changed = old->securebits ^ arg2;
+
+			/* For legacy reason, denies non-change. */
+			if (!changed)
+				return -EPERM;
+
+			/* Denies privileged changes. */
+			if (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks)
+				return -EPERM;
+		}
+
+		new = prepare_creds();
+		if (!new)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		new->securebits = arg2;
+		return commit_creds(new);
+
+	case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
+		return old->securebits;
+
+	case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
+		return !!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+
+	case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
+		if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		new = prepare_creds();
+		if (!new)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (arg2)
+			new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+		else
+			new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+		return commit_creds(new);
+
+	case PR_CAP_AMBIENT:
+		if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL) {
+			if (arg3 | arg4 | arg5)
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			new = prepare_creds();
+			if (!new)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
+			return commit_creds(new);
+		}
+
+		if (((!cap_valid(arg3)) | arg4 | arg5))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET) {
+			return !!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_ambient, arg3);
+		} else if (arg2 != PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE &&
+			   arg2 != PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER) {
+			return -EINVAL;
+		} else {
+			if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE &&
+			    (!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_permitted, arg3) ||
+			     !cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_inheritable,
+					 arg3) ||
+			     issecure(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)))
+				return -EPERM;
+
+			new = prepare_creds();
+			if (!new)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)
+				cap_raise(new->cap_ambient, arg3);
+			else
+				cap_lower(new->cap_ambient, arg3);
+			return commit_creds(new);
+		}
+
+	default:
+		/* No functionality available - continue with default */
+		return -ENOSYS;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted
+ * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made
+ * @pages: The size of the mapping
+ *
+ * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
+ * task is permitted.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if permission granted, negative error code if not.
+ */
+int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
+{
+	return cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+			   CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr
+ * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
+ *
+ * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
+ * CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  The other parameters to this function are unused by the
+ * capability security module.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if this mapping should be allowed or -EPERM if not.
+ */
+int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
+		ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+				  CAP_OPT_NONE);
+		/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
+		if (ret == 0)
+			current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+
+static const struct lsm_id capability_lsmid = {
+	.name = "capability",
+	.id = LSM_ID_CAPABILITY,
+};
+
+static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, cap_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_from_file, cap_bprm_creds_from_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, cap_task_prctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, cap_task_setscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, cap_task_setioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, cap_task_setnice),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, cap_vm_enough_memory),
+};
+
+static int __init capability_init(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
+			   &capability_lsmid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(capability) = {
+	.id = &capability_lsmid,
+	.order = LSM_ORDER_FIRST,
+	.init = capability_init,
+};
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_COMMONCAP_KUNIT_TEST
+#include "commoncap_test.c"
+#endif
diff --git a/security/commoncap_test.c b/security/commoncap_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e9b278be3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/commoncap_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * KUnit tests for commoncap.c security functions
+ *
+ * Tests for security-critical functions in the capability subsystem,
+ * particularly namespace-related capability checks.
+ */
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/uidgid.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_COMMONCAP_KUNIT_TEST
+
+/* Functions are static in commoncap.c, but we can call them since we're
+ * included in the same compilation unit when tests are enabled.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * test_vfsuid_root_in_currentns_init_ns - Test vfsuid_root_in_currentns with init ns
+ *
+ * Verifies that UID 0 in the init namespace correctly owns the current
+ * namespace when running in init_user_ns.
+ *
+ * @test: KUnit test context
+ */
+static void test_vfsuid_root_in_currentns_init_ns(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	vfsuid_t vfsuid;
+	kuid_t kuid;
+
+	/* Create UID 0 in init namespace */
+	kuid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
+	vfsuid = VFSUIDT_INIT(kuid);
+
+	/* In init namespace, UID 0 should own current namespace */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, vfsuid_root_in_currentns(vfsuid));
+}
+
+/**
+ * test_vfsuid_root_in_currentns_invalid - Test vfsuid_root_in_currentns with invalid vfsuid
+ *
+ * Verifies that an invalid vfsuid correctly returns false.
+ *
+ * @test: KUnit test context
+ */
+static void test_vfsuid_root_in_currentns_invalid(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	vfsuid_t invalid_vfsuid;
+
+	/* Use the predefined invalid vfsuid */
+	invalid_vfsuid = INVALID_VFSUID;
+
+	/* Invalid vfsuid should return false */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, vfsuid_root_in_currentns(invalid_vfsuid));
+}
+
+/**
+ * test_vfsuid_root_in_currentns_nonzero - Test vfsuid_root_in_currentns with non-zero UID
+ *
+ * Verifies that a non-zero UID correctly returns false.
+ *
+ * @test: KUnit test context
+ */
+static void test_vfsuid_root_in_currentns_nonzero(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	vfsuid_t vfsuid;
+	kuid_t kuid;
+
+	/* Create a non-zero UID */
+	kuid = KUIDT_INIT(1000);
+	vfsuid = VFSUIDT_INIT(kuid);
+
+	/* Non-zero UID should return false */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, vfsuid_root_in_currentns(vfsuid));
+}
+
+/**
+ * test_kuid_root_in_ns_init_ns_uid0 - Test kuid_root_in_ns with init namespace and UID 0
+ *
+ * Verifies that kuid_root_in_ns correctly identifies UID 0 in init namespace.
+ * This tests the core namespace traversal logic. In init namespace, UID 0
+ * maps to itself, so it should own the namespace.
+ *
+ * @test: KUnit test context
+ */
+static void test_kuid_root_in_ns_init_ns_uid0(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	kuid_t kuid;
+	struct user_namespace *init_ns;
+
+	kuid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
+	init_ns = &init_user_ns;
+
+	/* UID 0 should own init namespace */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(kuid, init_ns));
+}
+
+/**
+ * test_kuid_root_in_ns_init_ns_nonzero - Test kuid_root_in_ns with init namespace and non-zero UID
+ *
+ * Verifies that kuid_root_in_ns correctly rejects non-zero UIDs in init namespace.
+ * Only UID 0 should own a namespace.
+ *
+ * @test: KUnit test context
+ */
+static void test_kuid_root_in_ns_init_ns_nonzero(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	kuid_t kuid;
+	struct user_namespace *init_ns;
+
+	kuid = KUIDT_INIT(1000);
+	init_ns = &init_user_ns;
+
+	/* Non-zero UID should not own namespace */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(kuid, init_ns));
+}
+
+/**
+ * create_test_user_ns_with_mapping - Create a mock user namespace with UID mapping
+ *
+ * Creates a minimal user namespace structure for testing where uid 0 in the
+ * namespace maps to a specific kuid in the parent namespace.
+ *
+ * @test: KUnit test context
+ * @parent_ns: Parent namespace (typically init_user_ns)
+ * @mapped_kuid: The kuid that uid 0 in this namespace maps to in parent
+ *
+ * Returns: Pointer to allocated namespace, or NULL on failure
+ */
+static struct user_namespace *create_test_user_ns_with_mapping(struct kunit *test,
+								 struct user_namespace *parent_ns,
+								 kuid_t mapped_kuid)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *ns;
+	struct uid_gid_extent extent;
+
+	/* Allocate a test namespace - use kzalloc to zero all fields */
+	ns = kunit_kzalloc(test, sizeof(*ns), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ns)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* Initialize basic namespace structure fields */
+	ns->parent = parent_ns;
+	ns->level = parent_ns ? parent_ns->level + 1 : 0;
+	ns->owner = mapped_kuid;
+	ns->group = KGIDT_INIT(0);
+
+	/* Initialize ns_common structure */
+	refcount_set(&ns->ns.__ns_ref, 1);
+	ns->ns.inum = 0; /* Mock inum */
+
+	/* Set up uid mapping: uid 0 in this namespace maps to mapped_kuid in parent
+	 * Format: first (uid in ns) : lower_first (kuid in parent) : count
+	 * So: uid 0 in ns -> kuid mapped_kuid in parent
+	 * This means from_kuid(ns, mapped_kuid) returns 0
+	 */
+	extent.first = 0;                              /* uid 0 in this namespace */
+	extent.lower_first = __kuid_val(mapped_kuid);  /* maps to this kuid in parent */
+	extent.count = 1;
+
+	ns->uid_map.extent[0] = extent;
+	ns->uid_map.nr_extents = 1;
+
+	/* Set up gid mapping: gid 0 maps to gid 0 in parent (simplified) */
+	extent.first = 0;
+	extent.lower_first = 0;
+	extent.count = 1;
+
+	ns->gid_map.extent[0] = extent;
+	ns->gid_map.nr_extents = 1;
+
+	return ns;
+}
+
+/**
+ * test_kuid_root_in_ns_with_mapping - Test kuid_root_in_ns with namespace where uid 0
+ *				       maps to different kuid
+ *
+ * Creates a user namespace where uid 0 maps to kuid 1000 in the parent namespace.
+ * Verifies that kuid_root_in_ns correctly identifies kuid 1000 as owning the namespace.
+ *
+ * Note: kuid_root_in_ns walks up the namespace hierarchy, so it checks the current
+ * namespace first, then parent, then parent's parent, etc. So:
+ * - kuid 1000 owns test_ns because from_kuid(test_ns, 1000) == 0
+ * - kuid 0 also owns test_ns because from_kuid(init_user_ns, 0) == 0
+ *   (checked in parent)
+ *
+ * This tests the actual functionality as requested: creating namespaces with
+ * different values for the namespace's uid 0.
+ *
+ * @test: KUnit test context
+ */
+static void test_kuid_root_in_ns_with_mapping(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *test_ns;
+	struct user_namespace *parent_ns;
+	kuid_t mapped_kuid, other_kuid;
+
+	parent_ns = &init_user_ns;
+	mapped_kuid = KUIDT_INIT(1000);
+	other_kuid = KUIDT_INIT(2000);
+
+	test_ns = create_test_user_ns_with_mapping(test, parent_ns, mapped_kuid);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, test_ns);
+
+	/* kuid 1000 should own test_ns because it maps to uid 0 in test_ns */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(mapped_kuid, test_ns));
+
+	/* kuid 0 should also own test_ns (checked via parent init_user_ns) */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(0), test_ns));
+
+	/* Other kuids should not own test_ns */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(other_kuid, test_ns));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(500), test_ns));
+}
+
+/**
+ * test_kuid_root_in_ns_with_different_mappings - Test with multiple namespaces
+ *
+ * Creates multiple user namespaces with different UID mappings to verify
+ * that kuid_root_in_ns correctly distinguishes between namespaces.
+ *
+ * Each namespace maps uid 0 to a different kuid, and we verify that each
+ * kuid only owns its corresponding namespace (plus kuid 0 owns all via
+ * init_user_ns parent).
+ *
+ * @test: KUnit test context
+ */
+static void test_kuid_root_in_ns_with_different_mappings(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *ns1, *ns2, *ns3;
+
+	/* Create three independent namespaces, each mapping uid 0 to different kuids */
+	ns1 = create_test_user_ns_with_mapping(test, &init_user_ns, KUIDT_INIT(1000));
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ns1);
+
+	ns2 = create_test_user_ns_with_mapping(test, &init_user_ns, KUIDT_INIT(2000));
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ns2);
+
+	ns3 = create_test_user_ns_with_mapping(test, &init_user_ns, KUIDT_INIT(3000));
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ns3);
+
+	/* Test ns1: kuid 1000 owns it, kuid 0 owns it (via parent), others do not */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(1000), ns1));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(0), ns1));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(2000), ns1));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(3000), ns1));
+
+	/* Test ns2: kuid 2000 owns it, kuid 0 owns it (via parent), others do not */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(2000), ns2));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(0), ns2));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(1000), ns2));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(3000), ns2));
+
+	/* Test ns3: kuid 3000 owns it, kuid 0 owns it (via parent), others do not */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(3000), ns3));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(0), ns3));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(1000), ns3));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, kuid_root_in_ns(KUIDT_INIT(2000), ns3));
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case commoncap_test_cases[] = {
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_vfsuid_root_in_currentns_init_ns),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_vfsuid_root_in_currentns_invalid),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_vfsuid_root_in_currentns_nonzero),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_kuid_root_in_ns_init_ns_uid0),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_kuid_root_in_ns_init_ns_nonzero),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_kuid_root_in_ns_with_mapping),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_kuid_root_in_ns_with_different_mappings),
+	{}
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite commoncap_test_suite = {
+	.name = "commoncap",
+	.test_cases = commoncap_test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suite(commoncap_test_suite);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_COMMONCAP_KUNIT_TEST */
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cd166dee6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,870 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * device_cgroup.c - device cgroup subsystem
+ *
+ * Copyright 2007 IBM Corp
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h>
+#include <linux/device_cgroup.h>
+#include <linux/cgroup.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex);
+
+enum devcg_behavior {
+	DEVCG_DEFAULT_NONE,
+	DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW,
+	DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY,
+};
+
+/*
+ * exception list locking rules:
+ * hold devcgroup_mutex for update/read.
+ * hold rcu_read_lock() for read.
+ */
+
+struct dev_exception_item {
+	u32 major, minor;
+	short type;
+	short access;
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+struct dev_cgroup {
+	struct cgroup_subsys_state css;
+	struct list_head exceptions;
+	enum devcg_behavior behavior;
+};
+
+static inline struct dev_cgroup *css_to_devcgroup(struct cgroup_subsys_state *s)
+{
+	return s ? container_of(s, struct dev_cgroup, css) : NULL;
+}
+
+static inline struct dev_cgroup *task_devcgroup(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return css_to_devcgroup(task_css(task, devices_cgrp_id));
+}
+
+/*
+ * called under devcgroup_mutex
+ */
+static int dev_exceptions_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig)
+{
+	struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp, *new;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&devcgroup_mutex);
+
+	list_for_each_entry(ex, orig, list) {
+		new = kmemdup(ex, sizeof(*ex), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!new)
+			goto free_and_exit;
+		list_add_tail(&new->list, dest);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+free_and_exit:
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, dest, list) {
+		list_del(&ex->list);
+		kfree(ex);
+	}
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static void dev_exceptions_move(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig)
+{
+	struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&devcgroup_mutex);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, orig, list) {
+		list_move_tail(&ex->list, dest);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * called under devcgroup_mutex
+ */
+static int dev_exception_add(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
+			     struct dev_exception_item *ex)
+{
+	struct dev_exception_item *excopy, *walk;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&devcgroup_mutex);
+
+	excopy = kmemdup(ex, sizeof(*ex), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!excopy)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(walk, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
+		if (walk->type != ex->type)
+			continue;
+		if (walk->major != ex->major)
+			continue;
+		if (walk->minor != ex->minor)
+			continue;
+
+		walk->access |= ex->access;
+		kfree(excopy);
+		excopy = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (excopy != NULL)
+		list_add_tail_rcu(&excopy->list, &dev_cgroup->exceptions);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * called under devcgroup_mutex
+ */
+static void dev_exception_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
+			     struct dev_exception_item *ex)
+{
+	struct dev_exception_item *walk, *tmp;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&devcgroup_mutex);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(walk, tmp, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
+		if (walk->type != ex->type)
+			continue;
+		if (walk->major != ex->major)
+			continue;
+		if (walk->minor != ex->minor)
+			continue;
+
+		walk->access &= ~ex->access;
+		if (!walk->access) {
+			list_del_rcu(&walk->list);
+			kfree_rcu(walk, rcu);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void __dev_exception_clean(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup)
+{
+	struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
+		list_del_rcu(&ex->list);
+		kfree_rcu(ex, rcu);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * dev_exception_clean - frees all entries of the exception list
+ * @dev_cgroup: dev_cgroup with the exception list to be cleaned
+ *
+ * called under devcgroup_mutex
+ */
+static void dev_exception_clean(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup)
+{
+	lockdep_assert_held(&devcgroup_mutex);
+
+	__dev_exception_clean(dev_cgroup);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_devcg_online(const struct dev_cgroup *devcg)
+{
+	return (devcg->behavior != DEVCG_DEFAULT_NONE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * devcgroup_online - initializes devcgroup's behavior and exceptions based on
+ * 		      parent's
+ * @css: css getting online
+ * returns 0 in case of success, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int devcgroup_online(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
+{
+	struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css);
+	struct dev_cgroup *parent_dev_cgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css->parent);
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex);
+
+	if (parent_dev_cgroup == NULL)
+		dev_cgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
+	else {
+		ret = dev_exceptions_copy(&dev_cgroup->exceptions,
+					  &parent_dev_cgroup->exceptions);
+		if (!ret)
+			dev_cgroup->behavior = parent_dev_cgroup->behavior;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&devcgroup_mutex);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void devcgroup_offline(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
+{
+	struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css);
+
+	mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex);
+	dev_cgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_NONE;
+	mutex_unlock(&devcgroup_mutex);
+}
+
+/*
+ * called from kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c with cgroup_lock() held.
+ */
+static struct cgroup_subsys_state *
+devcgroup_css_alloc(struct cgroup_subsys_state *parent_css)
+{
+	struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
+
+	dev_cgroup = kzalloc_obj(*dev_cgroup);
+	if (!dev_cgroup)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_cgroup->exceptions);
+	dev_cgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_NONE;
+
+	return &dev_cgroup->css;
+}
+
+static void devcgroup_css_free(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
+{
+	struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css);
+
+	__dev_exception_clean(dev_cgroup);
+	kfree(dev_cgroup);
+}
+
+#define DEVCG_ALLOW 1
+#define DEVCG_DENY 2
+#define DEVCG_LIST 3
+
+static void seq_putaccess(struct seq_file *m, short access)
+{
+	if (access & DEVCG_ACC_READ)
+		seq_putc(m, 'r');
+	if (access & DEVCG_ACC_WRITE)
+		seq_putc(m, 'w');
+	if (access & DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD)
+		seq_putc(m, 'm');
+}
+
+static void seq_puttype(struct seq_file *m, short type)
+{
+	if (type == DEVCG_DEV_ALL)
+		seq_putc(m, 'a');
+	else if (type == DEVCG_DEV_CHAR)
+		seq_putc(m, 'c');
+	else if (type == DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK)
+		seq_putc(m, 'b');
+	else
+		seq_putc(m, 'X');
+}
+
+static void seq_putversion(struct seq_file *m, unsigned int version)
+{
+	if (version == ~0)
+		seq_putc(m, '*');
+	else
+		seq_printf(m, "%u", version);
+}
+
+static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+	struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = css_to_devcgroup(seq_css(m));
+	struct dev_exception_item *ex;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	/*
+	 * To preserve the compatibility:
+	 * - Only show the "all devices" when the default policy is to allow
+	 * - List the exceptions in case the default policy is to deny
+	 * This way, the file remains as a "whitelist of devices"
+	 */
+	if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
+		seq_puts(m, "a *:* rwm\n");
+	} else {
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, &devcgroup->exceptions, list) {
+			seq_puttype(m, ex->type);
+			seq_putc(m, ' ');
+			seq_putversion(m, ex->major);
+			seq_putc(m, ':');
+			seq_putversion(m, ex->minor);
+			seq_putc(m, ' ');
+			seq_putaccess(m, ex->access);
+			seq_putc(m, '\n');
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_exception	- iterates the exception list trying to find a complete match
+ * @exceptions: list of exceptions
+ * @type: device type (DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK or DEVCG_DEV_CHAR)
+ * @major: device file major number, ~0 to match all
+ * @minor: device file minor number, ~0 to match all
+ * @access: permission mask (DEVCG_ACC_READ, DEVCG_ACC_WRITE, DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD)
+ *
+ * It is considered a complete match if an exception is found that will
+ * contain the entire range of provided parameters.
+ *
+ * Return: true in case it matches an exception completely
+ */
+static bool match_exception(struct list_head *exceptions, short type,
+			    u32 major, u32 minor, short access)
+{
+	struct dev_exception_item *ex;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, exceptions, list) {
+		if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK))
+			continue;
+		if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR))
+			continue;
+		if (ex->major != ~0 && ex->major != major)
+			continue;
+		if (ex->minor != ~0 && ex->minor != minor)
+			continue;
+		/* provided access cannot have more than the exception rule */
+		if (access & (~ex->access))
+			continue;
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_exception_partial - iterates the exception list trying to find a partial match
+ * @exceptions: list of exceptions
+ * @type: device type (DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK or DEVCG_DEV_CHAR)
+ * @major: device file major number, ~0 to match all
+ * @minor: device file minor number, ~0 to match all
+ * @access: permission mask (DEVCG_ACC_READ, DEVCG_ACC_WRITE, DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD)
+ *
+ * It is considered a partial match if an exception's range is found to
+ * contain *any* of the devices specified by provided parameters. This is
+ * used to make sure no extra access is being granted that is forbidden by
+ * any of the exception list.
+ *
+ * Return: true in case the provided range mat matches an exception completely
+ */
+static bool match_exception_partial(struct list_head *exceptions, short type,
+				    u32 major, u32 minor, short access)
+{
+	struct dev_exception_item *ex;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, exceptions, list,
+				lockdep_is_held(&devcgroup_mutex)) {
+		if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK))
+			continue;
+		if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR))
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * We must be sure that both the exception and the provided
+		 * range aren't masking all devices
+		 */
+		if (ex->major != ~0 && major != ~0 && ex->major != major)
+			continue;
+		if (ex->minor != ~0 && minor != ~0 && ex->minor != minor)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * In order to make sure the provided range isn't matching
+		 * an exception, all its access bits shouldn't match the
+		 * exception's access bits
+		 */
+		if (!(access & ex->access))
+			continue;
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_new_ex - verifies if a new exception is allowed by parent cgroup's permissions
+ * @dev_cgroup: dev cgroup to be tested against
+ * @refex: new exception
+ * @behavior: behavior of the exception's dev_cgroup
+ *
+ * This is used to make sure a child cgroup won't have more privileges
+ * than its parent
+ */
+static bool verify_new_ex(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
+		          struct dev_exception_item *refex,
+		          enum devcg_behavior behavior)
+{
+	bool match = false;
+
+	RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_read_lock_held() &&
+			 !lockdep_is_held(&devcgroup_mutex),
+			 "device_cgroup:verify_new_ex called without proper synchronization");
+
+	if (dev_cgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
+		if (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
+			/*
+			 * new exception in the child doesn't matter, only
+			 * adding extra restrictions
+			 */ 
+			return true;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * new exception in the child will add more devices
+			 * that can be accessed, so it can't match any of
+			 * parent's exceptions, even slightly
+			 */ 
+			match = match_exception_partial(&dev_cgroup->exceptions,
+							refex->type,
+							refex->major,
+							refex->minor,
+							refex->access);
+
+			if (match)
+				return false;
+			return true;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Only behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY allowed here, therefore
+		 * the new exception will add access to more devices and must
+		 * be contained completely in an parent's exception to be
+		 * allowed
+		 */
+		match = match_exception(&dev_cgroup->exceptions, refex->type,
+					refex->major, refex->minor,
+					refex->access);
+
+		if (match)
+			/* parent has an exception that matches the proposed */
+			return true;
+		else
+			return false;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parent_has_perm:
+ * when adding a new allow rule to a device exception list, the rule
+ * must be allowed in the parent device
+ */
+static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg,
+				  struct dev_exception_item *ex)
+{
+	struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(childcg->css.parent);
+
+	if (!parent)
+		return 1;
+	return verify_new_ex(parent, ex, childcg->behavior);
+}
+
+/**
+ * parent_allows_removal - verify if it's ok to remove an exception
+ * @childcg: child cgroup from where the exception will be removed
+ * @ex: exception being removed
+ *
+ * When removing an exception in cgroups with default ALLOW policy, it must
+ * be checked if removing it will give the child cgroup more access than the
+ * parent.
+ *
+ * Return: true if it's ok to remove exception, false otherwise
+ */
+static bool parent_allows_removal(struct dev_cgroup *childcg,
+				  struct dev_exception_item *ex)
+{
+	struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(childcg->css.parent);
+
+	if (!parent)
+		return true;
+
+	/* It's always allowed to remove access to devices */
+	if (childcg->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure you're not removing part or a whole exception existing in
+	 * the parent cgroup
+	 */
+	return !match_exception_partial(&parent->exceptions, ex->type,
+					ex->major, ex->minor, ex->access);
+}
+
+/**
+ * may_allow_all - checks if it's possible to change the behavior to
+ *		   allow based on parent's rules.
+ * @parent: device cgroup's parent
+ * returns: != 0 in case it's allowed, 0 otherwise
+ */
+static inline int may_allow_all(struct dev_cgroup *parent)
+{
+	if (!parent)
+		return 1;
+	return parent->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
+}
+
+/**
+ * revalidate_active_exceptions - walks through the active exception list and
+ * 				  revalidates the exceptions based on parent's
+ * 				  behavior and exceptions. The exceptions that
+ * 				  are no longer valid will be removed.
+ * 				  Called with devcgroup_mutex held.
+ * @devcg: cgroup which exceptions will be checked
+ *
+ * This is one of the three key functions for hierarchy implementation.
+ * This function is responsible for re-evaluating all the cgroup's active
+ * exceptions due to a parent's exception change.
+ * Refer to Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/devices.rst for more details.
+ */
+static void revalidate_active_exceptions(struct dev_cgroup *devcg)
+{
+	struct dev_exception_item *ex;
+	struct list_head *this, *tmp;
+
+	list_for_each_safe(this, tmp, &devcg->exceptions) {
+		ex = container_of(this, struct dev_exception_item, list);
+		if (!parent_has_perm(devcg, ex))
+			dev_exception_rm(devcg, ex);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * propagate_exception - propagates a new exception to the children
+ * @devcg_root: device cgroup that added a new exception
+ * @ex: new exception to be propagated
+ *
+ * returns: 0 in case of success, != 0 in case of error
+ */
+static int propagate_exception(struct dev_cgroup *devcg_root,
+			       struct dev_exception_item *ex)
+{
+	struct cgroup_subsys_state *pos;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	css_for_each_descendant_pre(pos, &devcg_root->css) {
+		struct dev_cgroup *devcg = css_to_devcgroup(pos);
+
+		/*
+		 * Because devcgroup_mutex is held, no devcg will become
+		 * online or offline during the tree walk (see on/offline
+		 * methods), and online ones are safe to access outside RCU
+		 * read lock without bumping refcnt.
+		 */
+		if (pos == &devcg_root->css || !is_devcg_online(devcg))
+			continue;
+
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		/*
+		 * in case both root's behavior and devcg is allow, a new
+		 * restriction means adding to the exception list
+		 */
+		if (devcg_root->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW &&
+		    devcg->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
+			rc = dev_exception_add(devcg, ex);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * in the other possible cases:
+			 * root's behavior: allow, devcg's: deny
+			 * root's behavior: deny, devcg's: deny
+			 * the exception will be removed
+			 */
+			dev_exception_rm(devcg, ex);
+		}
+		revalidate_active_exceptions(devcg);
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Modify the exception list using allow/deny rules.
+ * CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this.  It's at least separate from CAP_MKNOD
+ * so we can give a container CAP_MKNOD to let it create devices but not
+ * modify the exception list.
+ * It seems likely we'll want to add a CAP_CONTAINER capability to allow
+ * us to also grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to containers without giving away the
+ * device exception list controls, but for now we'll stick with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+ *
+ * Taking rules away is always allowed (given CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  Granting
+ * new access is only allowed if you're in the top-level cgroup, or your
+ * parent cgroup has the access you're asking for.
+ */
+static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
+				   int filetype, char *buffer)
+{
+	const char *b;
+	char temp[12];		/* 11 + 1 characters needed for a u32 */
+	int count, rc = 0;
+	struct dev_exception_item ex;
+	struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(devcgroup->css.parent);
+	struct dev_cgroup tmp_devcgrp;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex));
+	memset(&tmp_devcgrp, 0, sizeof(tmp_devcgrp));
+	b = buffer;
+
+	switch (*b) {
+	case 'a':
+		switch (filetype) {
+		case DEVCG_ALLOW:
+			if (css_has_online_children(&devcgroup->css))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			if (!may_allow_all(parent))
+				return -EPERM;
+			if (!parent) {
+				devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
+				dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
+				break;
+			}
+
+			INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tmp_devcgrp.exceptions);
+			rc = dev_exceptions_copy(&tmp_devcgrp.exceptions,
+						 &devcgroup->exceptions);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
+			rc = dev_exceptions_copy(&devcgroup->exceptions,
+						 &parent->exceptions);
+			if (rc) {
+				dev_exceptions_move(&devcgroup->exceptions,
+						    &tmp_devcgrp.exceptions);
+				return rc;
+			}
+			devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
+			dev_exception_clean(&tmp_devcgrp);
+			break;
+		case DEVCG_DENY:
+			if (css_has_online_children(&devcgroup->css))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
+			devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	case 'b':
+		ex.type = DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK;
+		break;
+	case 'c':
+		ex.type = DEVCG_DEV_CHAR;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	b++;
+	if (!isspace(*b))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	b++;
+	if (*b == '*') {
+		ex.major = ~0;
+		b++;
+	} else if (isdigit(*b)) {
+		memset(temp, 0, sizeof(temp));
+		for (count = 0; count < sizeof(temp) - 1; count++) {
+			temp[count] = *b;
+			b++;
+			if (!isdigit(*b))
+				break;
+		}
+		rc = kstrtou32(temp, 10, &ex.major);
+		if (rc)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (*b != ':')
+		return -EINVAL;
+	b++;
+
+	/* read minor */
+	if (*b == '*') {
+		ex.minor = ~0;
+		b++;
+	} else if (isdigit(*b)) {
+		memset(temp, 0, sizeof(temp));
+		for (count = 0; count < sizeof(temp) - 1; count++) {
+			temp[count] = *b;
+			b++;
+			if (!isdigit(*b))
+				break;
+		}
+		rc = kstrtou32(temp, 10, &ex.minor);
+		if (rc)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!isspace(*b))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	for (b++, count = 0; count < 3; count++, b++) {
+		switch (*b) {
+		case 'r':
+			ex.access |= DEVCG_ACC_READ;
+			break;
+		case 'w':
+			ex.access |= DEVCG_ACC_WRITE;
+			break;
+		case 'm':
+			ex.access |= DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD;
+			break;
+		case '\n':
+		case '\0':
+			count = 3;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	switch (filetype) {
+	case DEVCG_ALLOW:
+		/*
+		 * If the default policy is to allow by default, try to remove
+		 * an matching exception instead. And be silent about it: we
+		 * don't want to break compatibility
+		 */
+		if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
+			/* Check if the parent allows removing it first */
+			if (!parent_allows_removal(devcgroup, &ex))
+				return -EPERM;
+			dev_exception_rm(devcgroup, &ex);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (!parent_has_perm(devcgroup, &ex))
+			return -EPERM;
+		rc = dev_exception_add(devcgroup, &ex);
+		break;
+	case DEVCG_DENY:
+		/*
+		 * If the default policy is to deny by default, try to remove
+		 * an matching exception instead. And be silent about it: we
+		 * don't want to break compatibility
+		 */
+		if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY)
+			dev_exception_rm(devcgroup, &ex);
+		else
+			rc = dev_exception_add(devcgroup, &ex);
+
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		/* we only propagate new restrictions */
+		rc = propagate_exception(devcgroup, &ex);
+		break;
+	default:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static ssize_t devcgroup_access_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+				      char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
+{
+	int retval;
+
+	mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex);
+	retval = devcgroup_update_access(css_to_devcgroup(of_css(of)),
+					 of_cft(of)->private, strstrip(buf));
+	mutex_unlock(&devcgroup_mutex);
+	return retval ?: nbytes;
+}
+
+static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = {
+	{
+		.name = "allow",
+		.write = devcgroup_access_write,
+		.private = DEVCG_ALLOW,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "deny",
+		.write = devcgroup_access_write,
+		.private = DEVCG_DENY,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "list",
+		.seq_show = devcgroup_seq_show,
+		.private = DEVCG_LIST,
+	},
+	{ }	/* terminate */
+};
+
+struct cgroup_subsys devices_cgrp_subsys = {
+	.css_alloc = devcgroup_css_alloc,
+	.css_free = devcgroup_css_free,
+	.css_online = devcgroup_online,
+	.css_offline = devcgroup_offline,
+	.legacy_cftypes = dev_cgroup_files,
+};
+
+/**
+ * devcgroup_legacy_check_permission - checks if an inode operation is permitted
+ * @type: device type
+ * @major: device major number
+ * @minor: device minor number
+ * @access: combination of DEVCG_ACC_WRITE, DEVCG_ACC_READ and DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD
+ *
+ * returns 0 on success, -EPERM case the operation is not permitted
+ */
+static int devcgroup_legacy_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
+					short access)
+{
+	struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
+	bool rc;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
+	if (dev_cgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW)
+		/* Can't match any of the exceptions, even partially */
+		rc = !match_exception_partial(&dev_cgroup->exceptions,
+					      type, major, minor, access);
+	else
+		/* Need to match completely one exception to be allowed */
+		rc = match_exception(&dev_cgroup->exceptions, type, major,
+				     minor, access);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (!rc)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) || defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF)
+
+int devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, short access)
+{
+	int rc = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_DEVICE_CGROUP(type, major, minor, access);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE
+	return devcgroup_legacy_check_permission(type, major, minor, access);
+
+	#else /* CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE */
+	return 0;
+
+	#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE */
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(devcgroup_check_permission);
+#endif /* defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) || defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF) */
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..080402367
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ *  inode.c - securityfs
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2005 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
+ *
+ *  Based on fs/debugfs/inode.c which had the following copyright notice:
+ *    Copyright (C) 2004 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
+ *    Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Inc.
+ */
+
+/* #define DEBUG */
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <linux/kobject.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+
+#include "lsm.h"
+
+static struct vfsmount *mount;
+static int mount_count;
+
+static void securityfs_free_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
+		kfree_const(inode->i_link);
+	free_inode_nonrcu(inode);
+}
+
+static const struct super_operations securityfs_super_operations = {
+	.statfs		= simple_statfs,
+	.free_inode	= securityfs_free_inode,
+};
+
+static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	static const struct tree_descr files[] = {{""}};
+	int error;
+
+	error = simple_fill_super(sb, SECURITYFS_MAGIC, files);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	sb->s_op = &securityfs_super_operations;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int securityfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	return get_tree_single(fc, securityfs_fill_super);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations securityfs_context_ops = {
+	.get_tree	= securityfs_get_tree,
+};
+
+static int securityfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	fc->ops = &securityfs_context_ops;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type fs_type = {
+	.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
+	.name =		"securityfs",
+	.init_fs_context = securityfs_init_fs_context,
+	.kill_sb =	kill_anon_super,
+};
+
+/**
+ * securityfs_create_dentry - create a dentry in the securityfs filesystem
+ *
+ * @name: a pointer to a string containing the name of the file to create.
+ * @mode: the permission that the file should have
+ * @parent: a pointer to the parent dentry for this file.  This should be a
+ *          directory dentry if set.  If this parameter is %NULL, then the
+ *          file will be created in the root of the securityfs filesystem.
+ * @data: a pointer to something that the caller will want to get to later
+ *        on.  The inode.i_private pointer will point to this value on
+ *        the open() call.
+ * @fops: a pointer to a struct file_operations that should be used for
+ *        this file.
+ * @iops: a point to a struct of inode_operations that should be used for
+ *        this file/dir
+ *
+ * This is the basic "create a file/dir/symlink" function for
+ * securityfs.  It allows for a wide range of flexibility in creating
+ * a file, or a directory (if you want to create a directory, the
+ * securityfs_create_dir() function is recommended to be used
+ * instead).
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds.  This
+ * pointer must be passed to the securityfs_remove() function when the
+ * file is to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module
+ * is unloaded, you are responsible here).  If an error occurs, the
+ * function will return the error value (via ERR_PTR).
+ *
+ * If securityfs is not enabled in the kernel, the value %-ENODEV is
+ * returned.
+ */
+static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
+					struct dentry *parent, void *data,
+					const struct file_operations *fops,
+					const struct inode_operations *iops)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct inode *dir, *inode;
+	int error;
+	bool pinned = false;
+
+	if (!(mode & S_IFMT))
+		mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | S_IFREG;
+
+	pr_debug("securityfs: creating file '%s'\n",name);
+
+	if (!parent) {
+		error = simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count);
+		if (error)
+			return ERR_PTR(error);
+		pinned = true;
+		parent = mount->mnt_root;
+	}
+
+	inode = new_inode(parent->d_sb);
+	if (unlikely(!inode)) {
+		dentry = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dir = d_inode(parent);
+
+	dentry = simple_start_creating(parent, name);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		iput(inode);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
+	inode->i_mode = mode;
+	simple_inode_init_ts(inode);
+	inode->i_private = data;
+	if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
+		inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+		inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+		inc_nlink(inode);
+		inc_nlink(dir);
+	} else if (S_ISLNK(mode)) {
+		inode->i_op = iops ? iops : &simple_symlink_inode_operations;
+		inode->i_link = data;
+	} else {
+		inode->i_fop = fops;
+	}
+	d_make_persistent(dentry, inode);
+	simple_done_creating(dentry);
+	return dentry; // borrowed
+
+out:
+	if (pinned)
+		simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+	return dentry;
+}
+
+/**
+ * securityfs_create_file - create a file in the securityfs filesystem
+ *
+ * @name: a pointer to a string containing the name of the file to create.
+ * @mode: the permission that the file should have
+ * @parent: a pointer to the parent dentry for this file.  This should be a
+ *          directory dentry if set.  If this parameter is %NULL, then the
+ *          file will be created in the root of the securityfs filesystem.
+ * @data: a pointer to something that the caller will want to get to later
+ *        on.  The inode.i_private pointer will point to this value on
+ *        the open() call.
+ * @fops: a pointer to a struct file_operations that should be used for
+ *        this file.
+ *
+ * This function creates a file in securityfs with the given @name.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds.  This
+ * pointer must be passed to the securityfs_remove() function when the file is
+ * to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module is unloaded,
+ * you are responsible here).  If an error occurs, the function will return
+ * the error value (via ERR_PTR).
+ *
+ * If securityfs is not enabled in the kernel, the value %-ENODEV is
+ * returned.
+ */
+struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
+				      struct dentry *parent, void *data,
+				      const struct file_operations *fops)
+{
+	return securityfs_create_dentry(name, mode, parent, data, fops, NULL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_create_file);
+
+/**
+ * securityfs_create_dir - create a directory in the securityfs filesystem
+ *
+ * @name: a pointer to a string containing the name of the directory to
+ *        create.
+ * @parent: a pointer to the parent dentry for this file.  This should be a
+ *          directory dentry if set.  If this parameter is %NULL, then the
+ *          directory will be created in the root of the securityfs filesystem.
+ *
+ * This function creates a directory in securityfs with the given @name.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds.  This
+ * pointer must be passed to the securityfs_remove() function when the file is
+ * to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module is unloaded,
+ * you are responsible here).  If an error occurs, the function will return
+ * the error value (via ERR_PTR).
+ *
+ * If securityfs is not enabled in the kernel, the value %-ENODEV is
+ * returned.
+ */
+struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
+{
+	return securityfs_create_file(name, S_IFDIR | 0755, parent, NULL, NULL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_create_dir);
+
+/**
+ * securityfs_create_symlink - create a symlink in the securityfs filesystem
+ *
+ * @name: a pointer to a string containing the name of the symlink to
+ *        create.
+ * @parent: a pointer to the parent dentry for the symlink.  This should be a
+ *          directory dentry if set.  If this parameter is %NULL, then the
+ *          directory will be created in the root of the securityfs filesystem.
+ * @target: a pointer to a string containing the name of the symlink's target.
+ *          If this parameter is %NULL, then the @iops parameter needs to be
+ *          setup to handle .readlink and .get_link inode_operations.
+ * @iops: a pointer to the struct inode_operations to use for the symlink. If
+ *        this parameter is %NULL, then the default simple_symlink_inode
+ *        operations will be used.
+ *
+ * This function creates a symlink in securityfs with the given @name.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds.  This
+ * pointer must be passed to the securityfs_remove() function when the file is
+ * to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module is unloaded,
+ * you are responsible here).  If an error occurs, the function will return
+ * the error value (via ERR_PTR).
+ *
+ * If securityfs is not enabled in the kernel, the value %-ENODEV is
+ * returned.
+ */
+struct dentry *securityfs_create_symlink(const char *name,
+					 struct dentry *parent,
+					 const char *target,
+					 const struct inode_operations *iops)
+{
+	struct dentry *dent;
+	const char *link = NULL;
+
+	if (target) {
+		link = kstrdup_const(target, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!link)
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+	dent = securityfs_create_dentry(name, S_IFLNK | 0444, parent,
+					(void *)link, NULL, iops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		kfree_const(link);
+
+	return dent;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_create_symlink);
+
+static void remove_one(struct dentry *victim)
+{
+	if (victim->d_parent == victim->d_sb->s_root)
+		simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+}
+
+/**
+ * securityfs_remove - removes a file or directory from the securityfs filesystem
+ *
+ * @dentry: a pointer to a the dentry of the file or directory to be removed.
+ *
+ * This function removes a file or directory in securityfs that was previously
+ * created with a call to another securityfs function (like
+ * securityfs_create_file() or variants thereof.)
+ *
+ * This function is required to be called in order for the file to be
+ * removed. No automatic cleanup of files will happen when a module is
+ * removed; you are responsible here.
+ *
+ * AV: when applied to directory it will take all children out; no need to call
+ * it for descendents if ancestor is getting killed.
+ */
+void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dentry))
+		return;
+
+	simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count);
+	simple_recursive_removal(dentry, remove_one);
+	simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+static struct dentry *lsm_dentry;
+
+static ssize_t lsm_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+			loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int i;
+	static char *str;
+	static size_t len;
+	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
+
+	/* NOTE: we never free or modify the string once it is set */
+
+	if (unlikely(!str || !len)) {
+		char *str_tmp;
+		size_t len_tmp = 0;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < lsm_active_cnt; i++)
+			/* the '+ 1' accounts for either a comma or a NUL */
+			len_tmp += strlen(lsm_idlist[i]->name) + 1;
+
+		str_tmp = kmalloc(len_tmp, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!str_tmp)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		str_tmp[0] = '\0';
+
+		for (i = 0; i < lsm_active_cnt; i++) {
+			if (i > 0)
+				strcat(str_tmp, ",");
+			strcat(str_tmp, lsm_idlist[i]->name);
+		}
+
+		spin_lock(&lock);
+		if (!str) {
+			str = str_tmp;
+			len = len_tmp - 1;
+		} else
+			kfree(str_tmp);
+		spin_unlock(&lock);
+	}
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, str, len);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations lsm_ops = {
+	.read = lsm_read,
+	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+#endif
+
+int __init securityfs_init(void)
+{
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = sysfs_create_mount_point(kernel_kobj, "security");
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+
+	retval = register_filesystem(&fs_type);
+	if (retval) {
+		sysfs_remove_mount_point(kernel_kobj, "security");
+		return retval;
+	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+	lsm_dentry = securityfs_create_file("lsm", 0444, NULL, NULL,
+						&lsm_ops);
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..916d4f2bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+config INTEGRITY
+	bool "Integrity subsystem"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option enables the integrity subsystem, which is comprised
+	  of a number of different components including the Integrity
+	  Measurement Architecture (IMA), Extended Verification Module
+	  (EVM), IMA-appraisal extension, digital signature verification
+	  extension and audit measurement log support.
+
+	  Each of these components can be enabled/disabled separately.
+	  Refer to the individual components for additional details.
+
+if INTEGRITY
+
+config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
+	bool "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings"
+	default n
+	select KEYS
+	select SIGNATURE
+	help
+	  This option enables digital signature verification support
+	  using multiple keyrings. It defines separate keyrings for each
+	  of the different use cases - evm, ima, and modules.
+	  Different keyrings improves search performance, but also allow
+	  to "lock" certain keyring to prevent adding new keys.
+	  This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
+	  usually only added from initramfs.
+
+config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	bool "Enable asymmetric keys support"
+	depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
+	default n
+	select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+	select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_RSA
+	select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+	help
+	  This option enables digital signature verification using
+	  asymmetric keys.
+
+config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	bool "Require all keys on the integrity keyrings be signed"
+	depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	default y
+	help
+	   This option requires that all keys added to the .ima and
+	   .evm keyrings be signed by a key on the system trusted
+	   keyring.
+
+config INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+	bool "Provide keyring for platform/firmware trusted keys"
+	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+	help
+	  Provide a separate, distinct keyring for platform trusted keys, which
+	  the kernel automatically populates during initialization from values
+	  provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image
+	  and, possibly, the initramfs signature.
+
+config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
+	bool "Provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys may be added"
+	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+	depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS || LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+	help
+	  If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may
+	  be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys.  Unlike keys
+	  in the platform keyring, keys contained in the .machine keyring will
+	  be trusted within the kernel.
+
+config INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING
+	bool "Enforce Machine Keyring CA Restrictions"
+	depends on INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
+	default n
+	help
+	  The .machine keyring can be configured to enforce CA restriction
+	  on any key added to it.  By default no restrictions are in place
+	  and all Machine Owner Keys (MOK) are added to the machine keyring.
+	  If enabled only CA keys are added to the machine keyring, all
+	  other MOK keys load into the platform keyring.
+
+config INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX
+	bool "Only CA keys without DigitialSignature usage set"
+	depends on INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING
+	default n
+	help
+	  When selected, only load CA keys are loaded into the machine
+	  keyring that contain the CA bit set along with the keyCertSign
+	  Usage field.  Keys containing the digitialSignature Usage field
+	  will not be loaded. The remaining MOK keys are loaded into the
+	  .platform keyring.
+
+config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
+	depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+	depends on EFI
+	def_bool y
+
+config LOAD_IPL_KEYS
+	depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+	depends on S390
+	def_bool y
+
+config LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+	bool "Enable loading of platform and blacklisted keys for POWER"
+	depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+	depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable loading of keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted
+	  hashes to the .blacklist keyring for powerpc based platforms.
+
+config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
+	bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
+	depends on AUDIT
+	default y
+	help
+	  In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this
+	  option adds a kernel parameter 'integrity_audit', which
+	  controls the level of integrity auditing messages.
+	  0 - basic integrity auditing messages (default)
+	  1 - additional integrity auditing messages
+
+	  Additional informational integrity auditing messages would
+	  be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel
+	  command line.
+
+source "security/integrity/ima/Kconfig"
+source "security/integrity/evm/Kconfig"
+
+endif   # if INTEGRITY
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..45dfdedbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for caching inode integrity data (iint)
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o
+
+integrity-y := iint.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += platform_certs/platform_keyring.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) += platform_certs/machine_keyring.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
+				      platform_certs/load_uefi.o \
+				      platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
+                                     platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \
+                                     platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_EFI) += efi_secureboot.o
+# The relative order of the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs depends on the order below.
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima/
+obj-$(CONFIG_EVM)			+= evm/
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1ed686154
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/digsig.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+
+#include "integrity.h"
+
+static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
+
+static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
+#ifndef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	"_evm",
+	"_ima",
+#else
+	".evm",
+	".ima",
+#endif
+	".platform",
+	".machine",
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
+#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary
+#else
+#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin
+#endif
+
+static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	if (!keyring[id]) {
+		keyring[id] =
+			request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
+		if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
+			int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
+			pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
+			keyring[id] = NULL;
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return keyring[id];
+}
+
+int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
+			    const char *digest, int digestlen, u8 algo)
+{
+	struct key *keyring;
+
+	if (siglen < 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+		return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
+	switch (sig[1]) {
+	case 1:
+		/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
+		return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest,
+				     digestlen);
+	case 2: /* regular file data hash based signature */
+		return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
+					    digestlen);
+	case 3: /* struct ima_file_id data based signature */
+		return asymmetric_verify_v3(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
+					    digestlen, algo);
+	}
+
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+int integrity_modsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+	struct key *keyring;
+
+	keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+		return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
+	return ima_modsig_verify(keyring, modsig);
+}
+
+static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id,
+					   key_perm_t perm,
+					   struct key_restriction *restriction)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int err = 0;
+
+	keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
+				    KGIDT_INIT(0), cred, perm,
+				    KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, restriction, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
+		pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n",
+			keyring_name[id], err);
+		keyring[id] = NULL;
+	} else {
+		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM)
+			set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
+		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && imputed_trust_enabled())
+			set_machine_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
+		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA)
+			load_module_cert(keyring[id]);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	struct key_restriction *restriction;
+	key_perm_t perm;
+	int ret;
+
+	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW
+		| KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH;
+
+	if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM ||
+	    (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE &&
+	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING))) {
+		restriction = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING))
+		return 0;
+
+	restriction = kzalloc_obj(struct key_restriction);
+	if (!restriction)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
+		restriction->check = restrict_link_by_ca;
+	else
+		restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
+
+	/*
+	 * MOK keys can only be added through a read-only runtime services
+	 * UEFI variable during boot. No additional keys shall be allowed to
+	 * load into the machine keyring following init from userspace.
+	 */
+	if (id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
+		perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
+
+out:
+	ret = __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction);
+	if (ret)
+		kfree(restriction);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,
+				    off_t size, key_perm_t perm)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!keyring[id])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1), "asymmetric",
+				   NULL, data, size, perm,
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(key);
+		if (id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
+			pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
+			  key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+		key_ref_put(key);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+
+}
+
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
+{
+	void *data = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+	int rc;
+	key_perm_t perm;
+
+	rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, 0, &data, INT_MAX, NULL,
+					READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	size = rc;
+
+	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ;
+
+	pr_info("Loading X.509 certificate: %s\n", path);
+	rc = integrity_add_key(id, (const void *)data, size, perm);
+
+	vfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id, const char *source,
+			       const void *data, size_t len, key_perm_t perm)
+{
+	if (!data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	pr_info("Loading X.509 certificate: %s\n", source);
+	return integrity_add_key(id, data, len, perm);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b4c23a0ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+
+#include "integrity.h"
+
+/*
+ * Request an asymmetric key.
+ */
+static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	char name[12];
+
+	sprintf(name, "id:%08x", keyid);
+
+	pr_debug("key search: \"%s\"\n", name);
+
+	key = get_ima_blacklist_keyring();
+	if (key) {
+		key_ref_t kref;
+
+		kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(key, 1),
+				      &key_type_asymmetric, name, true);
+		if (!IS_ERR(kref)) {
+			pr_err("Key '%s' is in ima_blacklist_keyring\n", name);
+			return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (keyring) {
+		/* search in specific keyring */
+		key_ref_t kref;
+
+		kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+				      &key_type_asymmetric, name, true);
+		if (IS_ERR(kref))
+			key = ERR_CAST(kref);
+		else
+			key = key_ref_to_ptr(kref);
+	} else {
+		key = request_key(&key_type_asymmetric, name, NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		if (keyring)
+			pr_err_ratelimited("Request for unknown key '%s' in '%s' keyring. err %ld\n",
+					   name, keyring->description,
+					   PTR_ERR(key));
+		else
+			pr_err_ratelimited("Request for unknown key '%s' err %ld\n",
+					   name, PTR_ERR(key));
+
+		switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+			/* Hide some search errors */
+		case -EACCES:
+		case -ENOTDIR:
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		default:
+			return key;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));
+
+	return key;
+}
+
+/**
+ * asymmetric_verify_common -- sigv2 and sigv3 common verify function
+ * @key: The key to use for signature verification; caller must free it
+ * @pk: The associated public key; must not be NULL
+ * @sig: The xattr signature
+ * @siglen: The length of the xattr signature; must be at least
+ *          sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)
+ * @data: The data to verify the signature on
+ * @datalen: Length of @data
+ */
+static int asymmetric_verify_common(const struct key *key,
+				    const struct public_key *pk,
+				    const char *sig, int siglen,
+				    const char *data, int datalen)
+{
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
+	struct public_key_signature pks;
+	int ret;
+
+	siglen -= sizeof(*hdr);
+
+	if (siglen != be16_to_cpu(hdr->sig_size))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	if (hdr->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	memset(&pks, 0, sizeof(pks));
+
+	pks.hash_algo = hash_algo_name[hdr->hash_algo];
+	pks.pkey_algo = pk->pkey_algo;
+	if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "rsa")) {
+		pks.encoding = "pkcs1";
+	} else if (!strncmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6)) {
+		/* edcsa-nist-p192 etc. */
+		pks.encoding = "x962";
+	} else if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa")) {
+		pks.encoding = "raw";
+	} else {
+		ret = -ENOPKG;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	pks.m = (u8 *)data;
+	pks.m_size = datalen;
+	pks.s = hdr->sig;
+	pks.s_size = siglen;
+	ret = verify_signature(key, &pks);
+out:
+	pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
+		      int siglen, const char *data, int datalen)
+{
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
+	const struct public_key *pk;
+	struct key *key;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (siglen <= sizeof(*hdr))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid));
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return PTR_ERR(key);
+	pk = asymmetric_key_public_key(key);
+	if (!pk) {
+		ret = -ENOKEY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = asymmetric_verify_common(key, pk, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
+
+out:
+	key_put(key);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * calc_file_id_hash - calculate the hash of the ima_file_id struct data
+ * @type: xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type]
+ * @algo: hash algorithm [enum hash_algo]; caller must ensure valid value
+ * @digest: pointer to the digest to be hashed
+ * @hash: (out) pointer to the hash
+ *
+ * IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed by
+ * indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type,
+			     enum hash_algo algo, const u8 *digest,
+			     struct ima_max_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct ima_file_id file_id = {.hash_type = type, .hash_algorithm = algo};
+	size_t digest_size = hash_digest_size[algo];
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	size_t file_id_size;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG && type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+	    type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	memcpy(file_id.hash, digest, digest_size);
+
+	/* Calculate the ima_file_id struct hash on the portion used. */
+	file_id_size = sizeof(file_id) - (HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE - digest_size);
+
+	hash->hdr.algo = algo;
+	hash->hdr.length = digest_size;
+	rc = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, (const u8 *)&file_id, file_id_size,
+				     hash->digest);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * asymmetric_verify_v3_hashless - Use hashless signature verification on sigv3
+ * @key: The key to use for signature verification; caller must free it
+ * @pk: The associated public key; must not be NULL
+ * @encoding: The encoding the key type uses
+ * @sig: The xattr signature
+ * @siglen: The length of the xattr signature; must be at least
+ *          sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)
+ * @algo: hash algorithm [enum hash_algo]; caller must ensure valid value
+ * @digest: The file digest
+ *
+ * Create an ima_file_id structure and use it for signature verification
+ * directly. This can be used for ML-DSA in pure mode for example.
+ */
+static int asymmetric_verify_v3_hashless(struct key *key,
+					 const struct public_key *pk,
+					 const char *encoding,
+					 const char *sig, int siglen,
+					 u8 algo,
+					 const u8 *digest)
+{
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
+	struct ima_file_id file_id = {
+		.hash_type = hdr->type,
+		.hash_algorithm = algo,
+	};
+	size_t digest_size = hash_digest_size[algo];
+	struct public_key_signature pks = {
+		.m = (u8 *)&file_id,
+		.m_size = sizeof(file_id) - (HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE - digest_size),
+		.s = hdr->sig,
+		.s_size = siglen - sizeof(*hdr),
+		.pkey_algo = pk->pkey_algo,
+		.hash_algo = "none",
+		.encoding = encoding,
+	};
+	int ret;
+
+	if (hdr->type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG &&
+	    hdr->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+	    hdr->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (pks.s_size != be16_to_cpu(hdr->sig_size))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	memcpy(file_id.hash, digest, digest_size);
+
+	ret = verify_signature(key, &pks);
+	pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int asymmetric_verify_v3(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen,
+			 const char *data, int datalen, u8 algo)
+{
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
+	struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+	const struct public_key *pk;
+	struct key *key;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	if (siglen <= sizeof(*hdr))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid));
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return PTR_ERR(key);
+
+	pk = asymmetric_key_public_key(key);
+	if (!pk) {
+		rc = -ENOKEY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!strncmp(pk->pkey_algo, "mldsa", 5)) {
+		rc = asymmetric_verify_v3_hashless(key, pk, "raw",
+						   sig, siglen, algo, data);
+	} else {
+		rc = calc_file_id_hash(hdr->type, algo, data, &hash);
+		if (rc) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		rc = asymmetric_verify_common(key, pk, sig, siglen, hash.digest,
+					      hash.hdr.length);
+	}
+
+out:
+	key_put(key);
+
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c b/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bfd4260a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-1.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation
+ */
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/secure_boot.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+#ifndef arch_efi_boot_mode
+#define arch_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset
+#endif
+
+static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
+{
+	enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
+
+	if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
+		pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
+		return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+	}
+
+	mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable);
+	if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled)
+		pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode disabled\n");
+	else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown)
+		pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown\n");
+	else
+		pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode enabled\n");
+	return mode;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Query secure boot status
+ *
+ * Note don't call this function too early e.g. in __setup hook otherwise the
+ * kernel may hang when calling efi_get_secureboot_mode.
+ *
+ */
+bool arch_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+	static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;
+	static bool initialized;
+
+	if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+		sb_mode = arch_efi_boot_mode;
+
+		if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
+			sb_mode = get_sb_mode();
+		initialized = true;
+	}
+
+	if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+		return true;
+	else
+		return false;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..861b3baca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config EVM
+	bool "EVM support"
+	select KEYS
+	select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
+	select CRYPTO_HMAC
+	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	select SECURITY_PATH
+	default n
+	help
+	  EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
+	  integrity attacks.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
+	bool "FSUUID (version 2)"
+	default y
+	depends on EVM
+	help
+	  Include filesystem UUID for HMAC calculation.
+
+	  Default value is 'selected', which is former version 2.
+	  if 'not selected', it is former version 1
+
+	  WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding
+	  additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
+	  labeled file systems to be relabeled.
+
+config EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
+	bool "Additional SMACK xattrs"
+	depends on EVM && SECURITY_SMACK
+	default n
+	help
+	  Include additional SMACK xattrs for HMAC calculation.
+
+	  In addition to the original security xattrs (eg. security.selinux,
+	  security.SMACK64, security.capability, and security.ima) included
+	  in the HMAC calculation, enabling this option includes newly defined
+	  Smack xattrs: security.SMACK64EXEC, security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE and
+	  security.SMACK64MMAP.
+
+	  WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding
+	  additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
+	  labeled file systems to be relabeled.
+
+config EVM_ADD_XATTRS
+	bool "Add additional EVM extended attributes at runtime"
+	depends on EVM
+	default n
+	help
+	  Allow userland to provide additional xattrs for HMAC calculation.
+
+	  When this option is enabled, root can add additional xattrs to the
+	  list used by EVM by writing them into
+	  /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs.
+
+config EVM_LOAD_X509
+	bool "Load an X509 certificate onto the '.evm' trusted keyring"
+	depends on EVM && INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	default n
+	help
+	   Load an X509 certificate onto the '.evm' trusted keyring.
+
+	   This option enables X509 certificate loading from the kernel
+	   onto the '.evm' trusted keyring.  A public key can be used to
+	   verify EVM integrity starting from the 'init' process. The
+	   key must have digitalSignature usage set.
+
+config EVM_X509_PATH
+	string "EVM X509 certificate path"
+	depends on EVM_LOAD_X509
+	default "/etc/keys/x509_evm.der"
+	help
+	   This option defines X509 certificate path.
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Makefile b/security/integrity/evm/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a56f5613b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# Makefile for building the Extended Verification Module(EVM)
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o
+
+evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o
+evm-$(CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL) += evm_posix_acl.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..694552ace
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: evm.h
+ */
+
+#ifndef __INTEGRITY_EVM_H
+#define __INTEGRITY_EVM_H
+
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+
+#include "../integrity.h"
+
+#define EVM_INIT_HMAC	0x0001
+#define EVM_INIT_X509	0x0002
+#define EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES	0x0004
+#define EVM_SIGV3_REQUIRED		0x0008
+#define EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE 0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */
+
+#define EVM_KEY_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509)
+#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE | \
+		       EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES | EVM_SIGV3_REQUIRED)
+
+struct xattr_list {
+	struct list_head list;
+	char *name;
+	bool enabled;
+};
+
+#define EVM_NEW_FILE			0x00000001
+#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG		0x00000002
+
+/* EVM integrity metadata associated with an inode */
+struct evm_iint_cache {
+	unsigned long flags;
+	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
+	struct integrity_inode_attributes metadata_inode;
+};
+
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes evm_blob_sizes;
+
+static inline struct evm_iint_cache *evm_iint_inode(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return inode->i_security + evm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+}
+
+extern int evm_initialized;
+
+#define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID		0x0001
+
+extern int evm_hmac_attrs;
+
+/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
+extern struct list_head evm_config_xattrnames;
+
+struct evm_digest {
+	struct ima_digest_data_hdr hdr;
+	char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+} __packed;
+
+int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name);
+
+int evm_init_key(void);
+int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+			const char *req_xattr_name,
+			const char *req_xattr_value,
+			size_t req_xattr_value_len);
+int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+		  const char *req_xattr_value,
+		  size_t req_xattr_value_len, struct evm_digest *data,
+		  struct evm_iint_cache *iint);
+int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+		  const char *req_xattr_value,
+		  size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type,
+		  struct evm_digest *data, struct evm_iint_cache *iint);
+int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattrs,
+		  char *hmac_val);
+int evm_init_secfs(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c41af2f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,459 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: evm_crypto.c
+ *	 Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EVM: "fmt
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/hex.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include "evm.h"
+
+#define EVMKEY "evm-key"
+#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
+static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+static const int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
+
+static struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
+static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
+
+#define EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY 0
+
+static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags;
+
+static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)";
+
+/**
+ * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
+ * @key: pointer to a buffer with the key data
+ * @keylen: length of the key data
+ *
+ * This function allows setting the EVM HMAC key from the kernel
+ * without using the "encrypted" key subsystem keys. It can be used
+ * by the crypto HW kernel module which has its own way of managing
+ * keys.
+ *
+ * key length should be between 32 and 128 bytes long
+ */
+int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = -EBUSY;
+	if (test_and_set_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags))
+		goto busy;
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+		goto inval;
+	memcpy(evmkey, key, keylen);
+	evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_HMAC;
+	pr_info("key initialized\n");
+	return 0;
+inval:
+	clear_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags);
+busy:
+	pr_err("key initialization failed\n");
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_set_key);
+
+static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
+{
+	long rc;
+	const char *algo;
+	struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+
+	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
+		if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) {
+			pr_err_once("HMAC key is not set\n");
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		}
+		tfm = &hmac_tfm;
+		algo = evm_hmac;
+	} else {
+		if (hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+		tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
+		algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
+	}
+
+	if (*tfm)
+		goto alloc;
+	mutex_lock(&mutex);
+	if (*tfm)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	tmp_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
+	if (IS_ERR(tmp_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo,
+		       PTR_ERR(tmp_tfm));
+		mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+		return ERR_CAST(tmp_tfm);
+	}
+	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
+		rc = crypto_shash_setkey(tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
+		if (rc) {
+			crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
+			mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+			return ERR_PTR(rc);
+		}
+	}
+	*tfm = tmp_tfm;
+unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+alloc:
+	desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
+			GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	desc->tfm = *tfm;
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(desc);
+		return ERR_PTR(rc);
+	}
+	return desc;
+}
+
+/* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode
+ * specific info.
+ *
+ * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete
+ * protection.)
+ */
+static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
+			  char type, char *digest)
+{
+	struct h_misc {
+		/*
+		 * Although inode->i_ino is now u64, this field remains
+		 * unsigned long to allow existing HMAC and signatures from
+		 * 32-bit hosts to continue working when i_ino hasn't changed
+		 * and fits in a u32.
+		 */
+		unsigned long ino;
+		__u32 generation;
+		uid_t uid;
+		gid_t gid;
+		umode_t mode;
+	} hmac_misc;
+
+	memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
+	/* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable
+	 * signatures
+	 */
+	if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
+		hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
+		hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
+	}
+	/* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user
+	 * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding
+	 * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack
+	 * where first they are written in an unprivileged fuse mount
+	 * of a filesystem and then the system is tricked to mount the
+	 * filesystem for real on next boot and trust it because
+	 * everything is signed.
+	 */
+	hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
+	hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
+	hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
+	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
+	if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) &&
+	    type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+		crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE);
+	crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
+
+	pr_debug("hmac_misc: (%zu) [%*phN]\n", sizeof(struct h_misc),
+		 (int)sizeof(struct h_misc), &hmac_misc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Dump large security xattr values as a continuous ascii hexadecimal string.
+ * (pr_debug is limited to 64 bytes.)
+ */
+static void dump_security_xattr_l(const char *prefix, const void *src,
+				  size_t count)
+{
+#if defined(DEBUG) || defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG)
+	char *asciihex, *p;
+
+	p = asciihex = kmalloc(count * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!asciihex)
+		return;
+
+	p = bin2hex(p, src, count);
+	*p = 0;
+	pr_debug("%s: (%zu) %.*s\n", prefix, count, (int)count * 2, asciihex);
+	kfree(asciihex);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void dump_security_xattr(const char *name, const char *value,
+				size_t value_len)
+{
+	if (value_len < 64)
+		pr_debug("%s: (%zu) [%*phN]\n", name, value_len,
+			 (int)value_len, value);
+	else
+		dump_security_xattr_l(name, value, value_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
+ *
+ * Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate
+ * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
+ * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
+ */
+static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
+				 const char *req_xattr_name,
+				 const char *req_xattr_value,
+				 size_t req_xattr_value_len,
+				 uint8_t type, struct evm_digest *data,
+				 struct evm_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(d_real(dentry, D_REAL_METADATA));
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	size_t xattr_size = 0;
+	char *xattr_value = NULL;
+	int error;
+	int size, user_space_size;
+	bool ima_present = false;
+	u64 i_version = 0;
+
+	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) ||
+	    inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	desc = init_desc(type, data->hdr.algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(desc))
+		return PTR_ERR(desc);
+
+	data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+
+	error = -ENODATA;
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		bool is_ima = false;
+
+		if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
+			is_ima = true;
+
+		/*
+		 * Skip non-enabled xattrs for locally calculated
+		 * signatures/HMACs.
+		 */
+		if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !xattr->enabled)
+			continue;
+
+		if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
+		    && !strcmp(xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) {
+			error = 0;
+			crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
+					     req_xattr_value_len);
+			if (is_ima)
+				ima_present = true;
+
+			dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
+					    req_xattr_value,
+					    req_xattr_value_len);
+			continue;
+		}
+		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr->name,
+					  &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (size == -ENOMEM) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (size < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		user_space_size = vfs_getxattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry,
+					       xattr->name, NULL, 0);
+		if (user_space_size != size)
+			pr_debug("file %s: xattr %s size mismatch (kernel: %d, user: %d)\n",
+				 dentry->d_name.name, xattr->name, size,
+				 user_space_size);
+		error = 0;
+		xattr_size = size;
+		crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size);
+		if (is_ima)
+			ima_present = true;
+
+		dump_security_xattr(xattr->name, xattr_value, xattr_size);
+	}
+	hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, data->digest);
+
+	if (inode != d_backing_inode(dentry) && iint) {
+		if (IS_I_VERSION(inode))
+			i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
+		integrity_inode_attrs_store(&iint->metadata_inode, i_version,
+					    inode);
+	}
+
+	/* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */
+	if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present)
+		error = -EPERM;
+out:
+	kfree(xattr_value);
+	kfree(desc);
+	return error;
+}
+
+int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+		  const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
+		  struct evm_digest *data, struct evm_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
+				    req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, data,
+				    iint);
+}
+
+int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+		  const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
+		  char type, struct evm_digest *data, struct evm_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
+				     req_xattr_value_len, type, data, iint);
+}
+
+static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+	if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Do this the hard way */
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
+				(char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc <= 0) {
+		if (rc == -ENODATA)
+			rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+		rc = 1;
+	else
+		rc = 0;
+
+out:
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
+ *
+ * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
+ */
+int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+	struct evm_digest data;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't permit any transformation of the EVM xattr if the signature
+	 * is of an immutable type
+	 */
+	rc = evm_is_immutable(dentry, inode);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+	rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+			   xattr_value_len, &data, iint);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
+		rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry,
+					   XATTR_NAME_EVM,
+					   &data.hdr.xattr.data[1],
+					   SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
+	} else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+		rc = __vfs_removexattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattrs,
+		  char *hmac_val)
+{
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	const struct xattr *xattr;
+	struct xattr_list *xattr_entry;
+
+	desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1);
+	if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
+		pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
+		return PTR_ERR(desc);
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr_entry, &evm_config_xattrnames,
+				     list) {
+		for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->name; xattr++) {
+			if (strcmp(xattr_entry->name +
+				   XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, xattr->name) != 0)
+				continue;
+
+			crypto_shash_update(desc, xattr->value,
+					    xattr->value_len);
+		}
+	}
+
+	hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val);
+	kfree(desc);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
+ */
+int evm_init_key(void)
+{
+	struct key *evm_key;
+	struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
+	int rc;
+
+	evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	down_read(&evm_key->sem);
+	ekp = evm_key->payload.data[0];
+
+	rc = evm_set_key(ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
+
+	/* burn the original key contents */
+	memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
+	up_read(&evm_key->sem);
+	key_put(evm_key);
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b59e3f121
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1236 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: evm_main.c
+ *	implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr,
+ *	evm_inode_removexattr, evm_verifyxattr, and evm_inode_set_acl.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EVM: "fmt
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/utils.h>
+#include "evm.h"
+
+int evm_initialized;
+
+static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = {
+	"pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "fail_immutable", "no_label",
+	"no_xattrs", "unknown"
+};
+int evm_hmac_attrs;
+
+static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = {
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
+	 .enabled = true
+	},
+};
+
+LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames);
+
+static char *evm_cmdline __initdata;
+core_param(evm, evm_cmdline, charp, 0);
+
+static int evm_fixmode __ro_after_init;
+static void __init evm_set_fixmode(void)
+{
+	if (!evm_cmdline)
+		return;
+
+	if (strncmp(evm_cmdline, "fix", 3) == 0) {
+		if (arch_get_secureboot()) {
+			pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring evm=fix");
+			return;
+		}
+		evm_fixmode = 1;
+	} else {
+		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", evm_cmdline);
+	}
+}
+
+static void __init evm_init_config(void)
+{
+	int i, xattrs;
+
+	xattrs = ARRAY_SIZE(evm_config_default_xattrnames);
+
+	pr_info("Initialising EVM extended attributes:\n");
+	for (i = 0; i < xattrs; i++) {
+		pr_info("%s%s\n", evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].name,
+			!evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].enabled ?
+			" (disabled)" : "");
+		list_add_tail(&evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].list,
+			      &evm_config_xattrnames);
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
+	evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID;
+#endif
+	pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs);
+}
+
+static bool evm_key_loaded(void)
+{
+	return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function determines whether or not it is safe to ignore verification
+ * errors, based on the ability of EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key
+ * is not loaded, and it cannot be loaded in the future due to the
+ * EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag, allowing an operation despite the
+ * attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not make them valid.
+ */
+static bool evm_hmac_disabled(void)
+{
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool evm_sigv3_required(void)
+{
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_SIGV3_REQUIRED)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+	int error;
+	int count = 0;
+
+	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
+		if (error < 0) {
+			if (error == -ENODATA)
+				continue;
+			return error;
+		}
+		count++;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static int is_unsupported_hmac_fs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+	if (inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_EVM_HMAC_UNSUPPORTED) {
+		pr_info_once("%s not supported\n", inode->i_sb->s_type->name);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr
+ *
+ * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes
+ * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr.
+ *
+ * For performance:
+ * - use the previously retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the
+ *   HMAC.)
+ * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available.
+ *
+ * Returns integrity status
+ */
+static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
+					     const char *xattr_name,
+					     char *xattr_value,
+					     size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr;
+	enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+	struct evm_digest digest;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+	int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0;
+
+	if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
+		     iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE))
+		return iint->evm_status;
+
+	/*
+	 * On unsupported filesystems without EVM_INIT_X509 enabled, skip
+	 * signature verification.
+	 */
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_X509) &&
+	    is_unsupported_hmac_fs(dentry))
+		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
+	/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
+
+	/* first need to know the sig type */
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
+				(char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc <= 0) {
+		evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		if (rc == -ENODATA) {
+			rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
+			if (rc > 0)
+				evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+			else if (rc == 0)
+				evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
+		} else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	xattr_len = rc;
+
+	/* check value type */
+	switch (xattr_data->type) {
+	case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
+		if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				   xattr_value_len, &digest, iint);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, digest.digest,
+				   SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		if (rc)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
+		evm_immutable = 1;
+		fallthrough;
+	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+		/* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */
+		if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data;
+
+		if (evm_sigv3_required() && hdr->version != 3) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo;
+		rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				   xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, &digest,
+				   iint);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
+					(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
+					digest.digest, digest.hdr.length,
+					digest.hdr.algo);
+		if (!rc) {
+			if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
+				if (iint)
+					iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG;
+				evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE;
+			} else if (!IS_RDONLY(inode) &&
+				   !(inode->i_sb->s_readonly_remount) &&
+				   !IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) &&
+				   !is_unsupported_hmac_fs(dentry)) {
+				evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
+						    xattr_value,
+						    xattr_value_len);
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (rc) {
+		if (rc == -ENODATA)
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS;
+		else if (evm_immutable)
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE;
+		else
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+	}
+	pr_debug("digest: (%d) [%*phN]\n", digest.hdr.length, digest.hdr.length,
+		  digest.digest);
+out:
+	if (iint)
+		iint->evm_status = evm_status;
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return evm_status;
+}
+
+static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name,
+				      bool all_xattrs)
+{
+	int namelen;
+	int found = 0;
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+
+	namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		if (!all_xattrs && !xattr->enabled)
+			continue;
+
+		if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
+		    && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (strncmp(req_xattr_name,
+			    xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
+			    strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return found;
+}
+
+int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
+{
+	return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false);
+}
+
+int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name)
+{
+	return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, true);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_read_protected_xattrs - read EVM protected xattr names, lengths, values
+ * @dentry: dentry of the read xattrs
+ * @buffer: buffer xattr names, lengths or values are copied to
+ * @buffer_size: size of buffer
+ * @type: n: names, l: lengths, v: values
+ * @canonical_fmt: data format (true: little endian, false: native format)
+ *
+ * Read protected xattr names (separated by |), lengths (u32) or values for a
+ * given dentry and return the total size of copied data. If buffer is NULL,
+ * just return the total size.
+ *
+ * Returns the total size on success, a negative value on error.
+ */
+int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
+			      int buffer_size, char type, bool canonical_fmt)
+{
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+	int rc, size, total_size = 0;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, d_backing_inode(dentry),
+				    xattr->name, NULL, 0);
+		if (rc < 0 && rc == -ENODATA)
+			continue;
+		else if (rc < 0)
+			return rc;
+
+		switch (type) {
+		case 'n':
+			size = strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
+			if (buffer) {
+				if (total_size)
+					*(buffer + total_size - 1) = '|';
+
+				memcpy(buffer + total_size, xattr->name, size);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			size = sizeof(u32);
+			if (buffer) {
+				if (canonical_fmt)
+					rc = (__force int)cpu_to_le32(rc);
+
+				*(u32 *)(buffer + total_size) = rc;
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			size = rc;
+			if (buffer) {
+				rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry,
+					d_backing_inode(dentry), xattr->name,
+					buffer + total_size,
+					buffer_size - total_size);
+				if (rc < 0)
+					return rc;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		total_size += size;
+	}
+
+	return total_size;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr
+ * @dentry: object of the verify xattr
+ * @xattr_name: requested xattr
+ * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
+ * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
+ *
+ * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored
+ * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length
+ * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC.
+ *
+ * Returns the xattr integrity status.
+ *
+ * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
+ * is executed.
+ */
+enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				      const char *xattr_name,
+				      void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
+		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
+	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				 xattr_value_len);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr);
+
+/*
+ * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ *
+ * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are
+ * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode.
+ */
+static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
+		return INTEGRITY_PASS;
+	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_xattr_change - check if passed xattr value differs from current value
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: requested xattr
+ * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
+ * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
+ *
+ * Check if passed xattr value differs from current value.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if passed xattr value differs from current value, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int evm_xattr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			    struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			    const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	char *xattr_data = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_data,
+				0, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		rc = 1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (rc == xattr_value_len)
+		rc = !!memcmp(xattr_value, xattr_data, rc);
+	else
+		rc = 1;
+
+out:
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
+ *
+ * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the
+ * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid.
+ *
+ * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
+ * affect security.evm.  An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
+ * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.
+ * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently
+ * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable.
+ */
+static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			     struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	enum integrity_status evm_status;
+
+	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			return -EPERM;
+		if (is_unsupported_hmac_fs(dentry))
+			return -EPERM;
+	} else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) {
+		if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))
+			return 0;
+		if (is_unsupported_hmac_fs(dentry))
+			return 0;
+
+		evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+		if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
+		    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
+			return 0;
+		goto out;
+	} else if (is_unsupported_hmac_fs(dentry))
+		return 0;
+
+	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
+		struct evm_iint_cache *iint;
+
+		/* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
+		if (evm_hmac_disabled())
+			return 0;
+
+		iint = evm_iint_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+		if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_NEW_FILE))
+			return 0;
+
+		/* exception for pseudo filesystems */
+		if (dentry->d_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC
+		    || dentry->d_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC)
+			return 0;
+
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
+				    dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name,
+				    "update_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
+	}
+out:
+	/* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
+	if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
+	    evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable
+	 * signatures are immutable and can never be updated.
+	 */
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
+	    !evm_xattr_change(idmap, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+			      xattr_value_len))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS &&
+	    evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
+				    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
+	return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
+ * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ * @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations
+ *
+ * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
+ * verify the existing value is valid.  As only the kernel should have
+ * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent
+ * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
+ * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
+ */
+static int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			      const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+			      size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
+{
+	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
+
+	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
+	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
+		if (!xattr_value_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+		    xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+	return evm_protect_xattr(idmap, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				 xattr_value_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ *
+ * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
+ * the current value is valid.
+ */
+static int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
+	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+		return 0;
+
+	return evm_protect_xattr(idmap, dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
+static int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				    struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	umode_t mode;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+	if (!kacl)
+		return 1;
+
+	rc = posix_acl_update_mode(idmap, inode, &mode, &kacl);
+	if (rc || (inode->i_mode != mode))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+					   struct dentry *dentry,
+					   const char *name,
+					   struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_set_acl - protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the idmapped mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
+ *
+ * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
+ * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
+ * valid.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
+ */
+static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	enum integrity_status evm_status;
+
+	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
+	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+		return 0;
+
+	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+	if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
+	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
+	if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
+	    evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable
+	 * signatures are immutable and can never be updated.
+	 */
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
+	    !evm_inode_set_acl_change(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
+				    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ *
+ * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
+ * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
+ * valid.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
+ */
+static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				const char *acl_name)
+{
+	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
+}
+
+static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+	if (iint)
+		iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_metadata_changed: Detect changes to the metadata
+ * @inode: a file's inode
+ * @metadata_inode: metadata inode
+ *
+ * On a stacked filesystem detect whether the metadata has changed. If this is
+ * the case reset the evm_status associated with the inode that represents the
+ * file.
+ */
+bool evm_metadata_changed(struct inode *inode, struct inode *metadata_inode)
+{
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	if (iint) {
+		ret = (!IS_I_VERSION(metadata_inode) ||
+		       integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->metadata_inode,
+						     metadata_inode));
+		if (ret)
+			iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_revalidate_status - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ *
+ * Report whether callers of evm_verifyxattr() should re-validate the
+ * EVM status.
+ *
+ * Return true if re-validation is necessary, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	if (!evm_key_loaded())
+		return false;
+
+	/* evm_inode_post_setattr() passes NULL */
+	if (!xattr_name)
+		return true;
+
+	if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name) &&
+	    strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_fix_hmac - Calculate the HMAC and add it to security.evm for fix mode
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry which doesn't yet have security.evm
+ *          xattr
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
+ * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ *
+ * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -EPERM/-ENOMEM/-EOPNOTSUPP on failure
+ */
+int evm_fix_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+		 const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+
+{
+	if (!evm_fixmode || !evm_revalidate_status((xattr_name)))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (is_unsupported_hmac_fs(dentry))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	return evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
+ * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ * @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations
+ *
+ * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change.
+ *
+ * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
+ * __vfs_setxattr_noperm().  The caller of which has taken the inode's
+ * i_mutex lock.
+ */
+static void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				    const char *xattr_name,
+				    const void *xattr_value,
+				    size_t xattr_value_len,
+				    int flags)
+{
+	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
+		return;
+
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
+	if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
+		return;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
+		return;
+
+	if (is_unsupported_hmac_fs(dentry))
+		return;
+
+	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_set_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
+ *
+ * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after setting
+ * posix acls.
+ */
+static void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+				   struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ *
+ * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr.
+ *
+ * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
+ * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
+ */
+static void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				       const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
+		return;
+
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
+	if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
+		return;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
+		return;
+
+	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_remove_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ *
+ * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after
+ * removing posix acls.
+ */
+static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+					     struct dentry *dentry,
+					     const char *acl_name)
+{
+	evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
+static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
+
+	if (!i_uid_needs_update(idmap, attr, inode) &&
+	    !i_gid_needs_update(idmap, attr, inode) &&
+	    (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) || attr->ia_mode == inode->i_mode))
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @attr: iattr structure containing the new file attributes
+ *
+ * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
+ * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
+ */
+static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     struct iattr *attr)
+{
+	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
+	enum integrity_status evm_status;
+
+	/* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though
+	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (is_unsupported_hmac_fs(dentry))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
+		return 0;
+
+	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+	/*
+	 * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures
+	 * are immutable and can never be updated.
+	 */
+	if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
+	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) ||
+	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) ||
+	    (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
+	     evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
+	    !evm_attr_change(idmap, dentry, attr))
+		return 0;
+
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
+			    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+			    integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata
+ * @idmap: idmap of the idmapped mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
+ *
+ * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID
+ * changes.
+ *
+ * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
+ * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
+ */
+static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				   struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
+{
+	if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL))
+		return;
+
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
+		return;
+
+	if (is_unsupported_hmac_fs(dentry))
+		return;
+
+	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
+		evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name)
+{
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) != 0)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/* first need to know the sig type */
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, src, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
+				(char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (rc < offsetof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data, type) +
+		 sizeof(xattr_data->type))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	switch (xattr_data->type) {
+	case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
+		rc = 0; /* allow copy-up */
+		break;
+	case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
+	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+	default:
+		rc = -ECANCELED; /* discard */
+	}
+
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value
+ */
+int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs,
+			    int *xattr_count)
+{
+	struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
+	struct xattr *xattr, *evm_xattr;
+	bool evm_protected_xattrs = false;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || !xattrs)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * security_inode_init_security() makes sure that the xattrs array is
+	 * contiguous, there is enough space for security.evm, and that there is
+	 * a terminator at the end of the array.
+	 */
+	for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->name; xattr++) {
+		if (evm_protected_xattr(xattr->name))
+			evm_protected_xattrs = true;
+	}
+
+	/* EVM xattr not needed. */
+	if (!evm_protected_xattrs)
+		return 0;
+
+	evm_xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
+	/*
+	 * Array terminator (xattr name = NULL) must be the first non-filled
+	 * xattr slot.
+	 */
+	WARN_ONCE(evm_xattr != xattr,
+		  "%s: xattrs terminator is not the first non-filled slot\n",
+		  __func__);
+
+	xattr_data = kzalloc_obj(*xattr_data, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!xattr_data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
+	rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, xattrs, xattr_data->digest);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	evm_xattr->value = xattr_data;
+	evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data);
+	evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX;
+	return 0;
+out:
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
+
+static int evm_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+
+	/* Called by security_inode_alloc(), it cannot be NULL. */
+	iint->flags = 0UL;
+	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void evm_file_release(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
+		return;
+
+	if (iint && iint->flags & EVM_NEW_FILE &&
+	    atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1)
+		iint->flags &= ~EVM_NEW_FILE;
+}
+
+static void evm_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return;
+
+	if (iint)
+		iint->flags |= EVM_NEW_FILE;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
+void __init evm_load_x509(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH);
+	if (!rc)
+		evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int __init init_evm(void)
+{
+	int error;
+	struct list_head *pos, *q;
+
+	evm_init_config();
+
+	evm_set_fixmode();
+
+	error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM);
+	if (error)
+		goto error;
+
+	error = evm_init_secfs();
+	if (error < 0) {
+		pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+error:
+	if (error != 0) {
+		if (!list_empty(&evm_config_xattrnames)) {
+			list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames)
+				list_del(pos);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, evm_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, evm_inode_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, evm_file_release),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, evm_post_path_mknod),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id evm_lsmid = {
+	.name = "evm",
+	.id = LSM_ID_EVM,
+};
+
+static int __init init_evm_lsm(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks), &evm_lsmid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes evm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct evm_iint_cache),
+	.lbs_xattr_count = 1,
+};
+
+DEFINE_LSM(evm) = {
+	.id = &evm_lsmid,
+	.init = init_evm_lsm,
+	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+	.blobs = &evm_blob_sizes,
+	.initcall_late = init_evm,
+};
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..37275800c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+
+int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattr)
+{
+	int xattr_len = strlen(xattr);
+
+	if ((strlen(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == xattr_len)
+	     && (strncmp(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS, xattr, xattr_len) == 0))
+		return 1;
+	if ((strlen(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == xattr_len)
+	     && (strncmp(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT, xattr, xattr_len) == 0))
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4baf5e23b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: evm_secfs.c
+ *	- Used to signal when key is on keyring
+ *	- Get the key and enable EVM
+ */
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include "evm.h"
+
+static struct dentry *evm_dir;
+static struct dentry *evm_symlink;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ADD_XATTRS
+static struct dentry *evm_xattrs;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(xattr_list_mutex);
+static int evm_xattrs_locked;
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * evm_read_key - read() for <securityfs>/evm
+ *
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d", (evm_initialized & ~EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE));
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_write_key - write() for <securityfs>/evm
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Used to signal that key is on the kernel key ring.
+ * - get the integrity hmac key from the kernel key ring
+ * - create list of hmac protected extended attributes
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	ret = kstrtouint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i);
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Reject invalid values */
+	if (!i || (i & ~EVM_INIT_MASK) != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't allow a request to enable metadata writes if
+	 * an HMAC key is loaded.
+	 */
+	if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) &&
+	    (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) != 0)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (i & EVM_INIT_HMAC) {
+		ret = evm_init_key();
+		if (ret != 0)
+			return ret;
+		/* Forbid further writes after the symmetric key is loaded */
+		i |= EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE;
+	}
+
+	evm_initialized |= i;
+
+	/* Don't allow protected metadata modification if a symmetric key
+	 * is loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)
+		evm_initialized &= ~(EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES);
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations evm_key_ops = {
+	.read		= evm_read_key,
+	.write		= evm_write_key,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ADD_XATTRS
+/**
+ * evm_read_xattrs - read() for <securityfs>/evm_xattrs
+ *
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t evm_read_xattrs(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *temp;
+	size_t offset = 0, size = 0;
+	ssize_t rc;
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = mutex_lock_interruptible(&xattr_list_mutex);
+	if (rc)
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		if (!xattr->enabled)
+			continue;
+
+		size += strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
+	}
+
+	temp = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!temp) {
+		mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	temp[size] = '\0';
+
+	/*
+	 * No truncation possible: size is computed over the same enabled
+	 * xattrs under xattr_list_mutex, so offset never exceeds size.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		if (!xattr->enabled)
+			continue;
+
+		offset += snprintf(temp + offset, size + 1 - offset, "%s\n",
+				   xattr->name);
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, offset);
+
+	kfree(temp);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_write_xattrs - write() for <securityfs>/evm_xattrs
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int len, err;
+	struct xattr_list *xattr, *tmp;
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	struct iattr newattrs;
+	struct inode *inode;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_xattrs_locked)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (count > XATTR_NAME_MAX)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
+			     AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR);
+	if (!ab && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AUDIT))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	xattr = kmalloc_obj(struct xattr_list);
+	if (!xattr) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	xattr->enabled = true;
+	xattr->name = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(xattr->name)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(xattr->name);
+		xattr->name = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Remove any trailing newline */
+	len = strlen(xattr->name);
+	if (len && xattr->name[len-1] == '\n')
+		xattr->name[len-1] = '\0';
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "xattr=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, xattr->name);
+
+	if (strcmp(xattr->name, ".") == 0) {
+		evm_xattrs_locked = 1;
+		newattrs.ia_mode = S_IFREG | 0440;
+		newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
+		inode = evm_xattrs->d_inode;
+		inode_lock(inode);
+		err = simple_setattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, evm_xattrs, &newattrs);
+		inode_unlock(inode);
+		if (!err)
+			err = count;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (strncmp(xattr->name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+		    XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) != 0) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * xattr_list_mutex guards against races in evm_read_xattrs().
+	 * Entries are only added to the evm_config_xattrnames list
+	 * and never deleted. Therefore, the list is traversed
+	 * using list_for_each_entry_lockless() without holding
+	 * the mutex in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), evm_find_protected_xattrs()
+	 * and evm_protected_xattr().
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+	list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) {
+			err = -EEXIST;
+			if (!tmp->enabled) {
+				tmp->enabled = true;
+				err = count;
+			}
+			mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	list_add_tail_rcu(&xattr->list, &evm_config_xattrnames);
+	mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " res=0");
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+	return count;
+out:
+	audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", (err < 0) ? err : 0);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+	if (xattr) {
+		kfree(xattr->name);
+		kfree(xattr);
+	}
+	return err;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations evm_xattr_ops = {
+	.read		= evm_read_xattrs,
+	.write		= evm_write_xattrs,
+};
+
+static int evm_init_xattrs(void)
+{
+	evm_xattrs = securityfs_create_file("evm_xattrs", 0660, evm_dir, NULL,
+					    &evm_xattr_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(evm_xattrs))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+static int evm_init_xattrs(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int __init evm_init_secfs(void)
+{
+	int error = 0;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+
+	error = integrity_fs_init();
+	if (error < 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	evm_dir = securityfs_create_dir("evm", integrity_dir);
+	if (IS_ERR(evm_dir)) {
+		error = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_file("evm", 0660,
+				      evm_dir, NULL, &evm_key_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		error = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	evm_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("evm", NULL,
+						"integrity/evm/evm", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(evm_symlink)) {
+		error = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (evm_init_xattrs() != 0) {
+		error = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	securityfs_remove(evm_symlink);
+	securityfs_remove(evm_dir);
+	integrity_fs_fini();
+	return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8ec1a3436
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: integrity_iint.c
+ *	- initialize the integrity directory in securityfs
+ *	- load IMA and EVM keys
+ */
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "integrity.h"
+
+struct dentry *integrity_dir;
+
+/*
+ * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file
+ *
+ * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
+ * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
+ * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
+ *
+ */
+int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
+			  void *addr, unsigned long count)
+{
+	return __kernel_read(file, addr, count, &offset);
+}
+
+/*
+ * integrity_load_keys - load integrity keys hook
+ *
+ * Hooks is called from init/main.c:kernel_init_freeable()
+ * when rootfs is ready
+ */
+void __init integrity_load_keys(void)
+{
+	ima_load_x509();
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509))
+		evm_load_x509();
+}
+
+int __init integrity_fs_init(void)
+{
+	if (integrity_dir)
+		return 0;
+
+	integrity_dir = securityfs_create_dir("integrity", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(integrity_dir)) {
+		int ret = PTR_ERR(integrity_dir);
+
+		if (ret != -ENODEV)
+			pr_err("Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: %d\n",
+			       ret);
+		integrity_dir = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void __init integrity_fs_fini(void)
+{
+	if (!integrity_dir || !simple_empty(integrity_dir))
+		return;
+
+	securityfs_remove(integrity_dir);
+	integrity_dir = NULL;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f4d25e045
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+# IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture
+#
+config IMA
+	bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
+	select SECURITYFS
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_HMAC
+	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	select SECURITY_PATH
+	select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
+	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
+	select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
+	select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES
+	select INTEGRITY_AUDIT if AUDIT
+	help
+	  The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
+	  Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
+	  values of executables and other sensitive system files,
+	  as they are read or executed. If an attacker manages
+	  to change the contents of an important system file
+	  being measured, we can tell.
+
+	  If your system has a TPM chip, then IMA also maintains
+	  an aggregate integrity value over this list inside the
+	  TPM hardware, so that the TPM can prove to a third party
+	  whether or not critical system files have been modified.
+	  Read <https://www.usenix.org/events/sec04/tech/sailer.html>
+	  to learn more about IMA.
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+if IMA
+
+config IMA_KEXEC
+	bool "Enable carrying the IMA measurement list across a soft boot"
+	depends on TCG_TPM && HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
+	default n
+	help
+	   TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot.  In order to validate
+	   a TPM's quote after a soft boot, the IMA measurement list of the
+	   running kernel must be saved and restored on boot.
+
+	   Depending on the IMA policy, the measurement list can grow to
+	   be very large.
+
+config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
+	int
+	range 8 14
+	default 10
+	help
+	  IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX determines the TPM PCR register index
+	  that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the
+	  measurement list.  If unsure, use the default 10.
+
+config IMA_LSM_RULES
+	bool
+	depends on AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK || SECURITY_APPARMOR)
+	default y
+	help
+	  Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
+
+choice
+	prompt "Default template"
+	default IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+	help
+	  Select the default IMA measurement template.
+
+	  The original 'ima' measurement list template contains a
+	  hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname,
+	  limited to 255 characters.  The 'ima-ng' measurement list
+	  template permits both larger hash digests and longer
+	  pathnames. The configured default template can be replaced
+	  by specifying "ima_template=" on the boot command line.
+
+	config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+		bool "ima-ng (default)"
+	config IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
+		bool "ima-sig"
+endchoice
+
+config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
+	string
+	default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+	default "ima-sig" if IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
+
+choice
+	prompt "Default integrity hash algorithm"
+	default IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
+	help
+	   Select the default hash algorithm used for the measurement
+	   list, integrity appraisal and audit log.  The compiled default
+	   hash algorithm can be overwritten using the kernel command
+	   line 'ima_hash=' option.
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
+		bool "SHA1 (default)"
+		depends on CRYPTO_SHA1=y
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
+		bool "SHA256"
+		depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
+		bool "SHA512"
+		depends on CRYPTO_SHA512=y
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
+		bool "WP512"
+		depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3
+		bool "SM3"
+		depends on CRYPTO_SM3=y
+endchoice
+
+config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH
+	string
+	default "sha1" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
+	default "sha256" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
+	default "sha512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
+	default "wp512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
+	default "sm3" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3
+
+config IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+	bool "Enable multiple writes to the IMA policy"
+	default n
+	help
+	  IMA policy can now be updated multiple times.  The new rules get
+	  appended to the original policy.  Have in mind that the rules are
+	  scanned in FIFO order so be careful when you design and add new ones.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config IMA_READ_POLICY
+	bool "Enable reading back the current IMA policy"
+	default y if IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+	default n if !IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+	help
+	   It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy.  It is
+	   even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY.
+	   This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE
+	bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal.
+	  It requires the system to be labeled with a security extended
+	  attribute containing the file hash measurement.  To protect
+	  the security extended attributes from offline attack, enable
+	  and configure EVM.
+
+	  For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
+	  <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config IMA_ARCH_POLICY
+        bool "Enable loading an IMA architecture specific policy"
+        depends on (KEXEC_SIG && IMA) || IMA_APPRAISE \
+		   && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+        default n
+        help
+          This option enables loading an IMA architecture specific policy
+          based on run time secure boot flags.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+	bool "IMA build time configured policy rules"
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option defines an IMA appraisal policy at build time, which
+	  is enforced at run time without having to specify a builtin
+	  policy name on the boot command line.  The build time appraisal
+	  policy rules persist after loading a custom policy.
+
+	  Depending on the rules configured, this policy may require kernel
+	  modules, firmware, the kexec kernel image, and/or the IMA policy
+	  to be signed.  Unsigned files might prevent the system from
+	  booting or applications from working properly.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS
+	bool "Appraise firmware signatures"
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option defines a policy requiring all firmware to be signed,
+	  including the regulatory.db.  If both this option and
+	  CFG80211_REQUIRE_SIGNED_REGDB are enabled, then both signature
+	  verification methods are necessary.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS
+	bool "Appraise kexec kernel image signatures"
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+	default n
+	help
+	  Enabling this rule will require all kexec'ed kernel images to
+	  be signed and verified by a public key on the trusted IMA
+	  keyring.
+
+	  Kernel image signatures can not be verified by the original
+	  kexec_load syscall.  Enabling this rule will prevent its
+	  usage.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS
+	bool "Appraise kernel modules signatures"
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+	default n
+	help
+	  Enabling this rule will require all kernel modules to be signed
+	  and verified by a public key on the trusted IMA keyring.
+
+	  Kernel module signatures can only be verified by IMA-appraisal,
+	  via the finit_module syscall. Enabling this rule will prevent
+	  the usage of the init_module syscall.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
+	bool "Appraise IMA policy signature"
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+	default n
+	help
+	  Enabling this rule will require the IMA policy to be signed and
+	  and verified by a key on the trusted IMA keyring.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
+	bool "ima_appraise boot parameter"
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
+	  (eg. fix, log) from the boot command line.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+	bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal"
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE
+	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+	select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	default n
+	help
+	   Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the
+	   appended signature is the same used for signed kernel modules.
+	   The modsig keyword can be used in the IMA policy to allow a hook
+	   to accept such signatures.
+
+config IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
+	bool "Permit keys validly signed by a built-in, machine (if configured) or secondary"
+	depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	default n
+	help
+	  Keys may be added to the IMA or IMA blacklist keyrings, if the
+	  key is validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in,
+	  machine (if configured), or secondary trusted keyrings. The
+	  key must also have the digitalSignature usage set.
+
+	  Intermediate keys between those the kernel has compiled in and the
+	  IMA keys to be added may be added to the system secondary keyring,
+	  provided they are validly signed by a key already resident in the
+	  built-in, machine (if configured) or secondary trusted keyrings.
+
+config IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+	bool "Create IMA machine owner blacklist keyrings (EXPERIMENTAL)"
+	depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	depends on INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	default n
+	help
+	   This option creates an IMA blacklist keyring, which contains all
+	   revoked IMA keys.  It is consulted before any other keyring.  If
+	   the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and
+	   an error is returned to the caller.
+
+config IMA_LOAD_X509
+	bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
+	depends on INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	default n
+	help
+	   File signature verification is based on the public keys
+	   loaded on the .ima trusted keyring. These public keys are
+	   X509 certificates signed by a trusted key on the
+	   .system keyring.  This option enables X509 certificate
+	   loading from the kernel onto the '.ima' trusted keyring.
+
+config IMA_X509_PATH
+	string "IMA X509 certificate path"
+	depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
+	default "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
+	help
+	   This option defines IMA X509 certificate path.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
+	bool "Require signed user-space initialization"
+	depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
+	default n
+	help
+	   This option requires user-space init to be signed.
+
+config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	bool
+	depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y
+	default y
+
+config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS
+	bool
+	depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	default y
+
+config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
+       bool
+       depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
+       help
+          This option is selected by architectures to enable secure and/or
+          trusted boot based on IMA runtime policies.
+
+config IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE
+	bool "Disable htable to allow measurement of duplicate records"
+	default n
+	help
+	   This option disables htable to allow measurement of duplicate records.
+
+config IMA_KEXEC_EXTRA_MEMORY_KB
+	int "Extra memory for IMA measurements added during kexec soft reboot"
+	range 0 40
+	depends on IMA_KEXEC
+	default 0
+	help
+	  IMA_KEXEC_EXTRA_MEMORY_KB determines the extra memory to be
+	  allocated (in kb) for IMA measurements added during kexec soft reboot.
+	  If set to the default value of 0, an extra half page of memory for those
+	  additional measurements will be allocated.
+
+config IMA_STAGING
+	bool "Support for staging the measurements list"
+	default n
+	help
+	  Add support for staging the measurements list.
+
+	  It allows user space to stage the measurements list for deletion and
+	  to delete the staged measurements after confirmation.
+
+	  Or, alternatively, it allows user space to specify N measurements
+	  records to stage internally, so that they can be immediately deleted.
+
+	  On kexec, staging is aborted and any staged measurement records are
+	  copied to the secondary kernel.
+
+endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b376d38b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for building Trusted Computing Group's(TCG) runtime Integrity
+# Measurement Architecture(IMA).
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima_iint.o
+
+ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
+	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_EFI),y)
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_efi.o
+endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..caaedd4b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -0,0 +1,625 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: ima.h
+ *	internal Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) definitions
+ */
+
+#ifndef __LINUX_IMA_H
+#define __LINUX_IMA_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/hash.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
+#include "../integrity.h"
+
+enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN,
+		     IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
+enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 };
+
+/*
+ * BINARY: current binary measurements list
+ * BINARY_STAGED: staged binary measurements list
+ * BINARY_FULL: binary measurements list since IMA init (lost after kexec)
+ */
+enum binary_lists {
+	BINARY, BINARY_STAGED, BINARY_FULL, BINARY__LAST
+};
+
+/* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
+#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE		SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX	255
+
+#define IMA_HASH_BITS 10
+#define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS)
+
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN	16
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX	15
+
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME "ima"
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT "d|n"
+
+#define NR_BANKS(chip) ((chip != NULL) ? chip->nr_allocated_banks : 0)
+
+/* current content of the policy */
+extern int ima_policy_flag;
+
+/* bitset of digests algorithms allowed in the setxattr hook */
+extern atomic_t ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms;
+
+/* IMA hash algorithm description */
+struct ima_algo_desc {
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	enum hash_algo algo;
+	unsigned int digest_size;
+};
+
+/* set during initialization */
+extern int ima_hash_algo __ro_after_init;
+extern int ima_sha1_idx __ro_after_init;
+extern int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init;
+extern int ima_extra_slots __ro_after_init;
+extern struct ima_algo_desc *ima_algo_array __ro_after_init;
+
+extern int ima_appraise;
+extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
+extern const char boot_aggregate_name[];
+
+/* IMA event related data */
+struct ima_event_data {
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct file *file;
+	const unsigned char *filename;
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;
+	int xattr_len;
+	const struct modsig *modsig;
+	const char *violation;
+	const void *buf;
+	int buf_len;
+};
+
+/* IMA template field data definition */
+struct ima_field_data {
+	u8 *data;
+	u32 len;
+};
+
+/* IMA template field definition */
+struct ima_template_field {
+	const char field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN];
+	int (*field_init)(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+	void (*field_show)(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+};
+
+/* IMA template descriptor definition */
+struct ima_template_desc {
+	struct list_head list;
+	char *name;
+	char *fmt;
+	int num_fields;
+	const struct ima_template_field **fields;
+};
+
+struct ima_template_entry {
+	int pcr;
+	struct tpm_digest *digests;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc; /* template descriptor */
+	u32 template_data_len;
+	struct ima_field_data template_data[];	/* template related data */
+};
+
+struct ima_queue_entry {
+	struct hlist_node hnext;	/* place in hash collision list */
+	struct list_head later;		/* place in ima_measurements list */
+	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+};
+extern struct list_head ima_measurements;	/* list of all measurements */
+extern struct list_head ima_measurements_staged; /* list of staged meas. */
+
+/* Some details preceding the binary serialized measurement list */
+struct ima_kexec_hdr {
+	u16 version;
+	u16 _reserved0;
+	u32 _reserved1;
+	u64 buffer_size;
+	u64 count;
+};
+
+/* IMA iint action cache flags */
+#define IMA_MEASURE		0x00000001
+#define IMA_MEASURED		0x00000002
+#define IMA_APPRAISE		0x00000004
+#define IMA_APPRAISED		0x00000008
+/*#define IMA_COLLECT		0x00000010  do not use this flag */
+#define IMA_COLLECTED		0x00000020
+#define IMA_AUDIT		0x00000040
+#define IMA_AUDITED		0x00000080
+#define IMA_HASH		0x00000100
+#define IMA_HASHED		0x00000200
+
+/* IMA iint policy rule cache flags */
+#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS	0xff000000
+#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x01000000
+#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO	0x02000000
+#define IMA_NEW_FILE		0x04000000
+#define IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED	0x08000000
+#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS	0x10000000
+#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED	0x20000000
+#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST	0x40000000
+#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED	0x80000000
+
+/* Exclude non-action flags which are not rule-specific. */
+#define IMA_NONACTION_RULE_FLAGS	(IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS & ~IMA_NEW_FILE)
+
+#define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
+				 IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+#define IMA_DONE_MASK		(IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \
+				 IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \
+				 IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK)
+
+/* IMA iint subaction appraise cache flags */
+#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE	0x00001000
+#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED	0x00002000
+#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE	0x00004000
+#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED	0x00008000
+#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE	0x00010000
+#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED	0x00020000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE	0x00040000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED	0x00080000
+#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE	0x00100000
+#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED	0x00200000
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
+				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \
+				 IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE)
+#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
+				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \
+				 IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED)
+
+/*
+ * IMA iint cache atomic_flags
+ *
+ * IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown, chgrp)
+ * and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to clear
+ * iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions again.
+ *
+ * IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called and
+ * extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to clear
+ * iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise.
+ *
+ * IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated. It is
+ * cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed.
+ *
+ * IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file
+ * security.ima must not update on file close.
+ *
+ * IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU - indicates to add Time-of-Measure-Time-of-Use (ToMToU)
+ * integrity violation (a file that is already opened for read is opened for
+ * write) to the measurement list and to also emit an audit message.
+ *
+ * IMA_EMITTED_OPENWRITERS - indicates to add open-writers integrity violation
+ * (a file that is already opened for write is opened for read) to the
+ * measurement list and to also emit an audit message.
+ *
+ */
+#define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR	0
+#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR	1
+#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR		2
+#define IMA_DIGSIG		3
+#define IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU	4
+#define IMA_EMITTED_OPENWRITERS	5
+
+/* IMA integrity metadata associated with an inode */
+struct ima_iint_cache {
+	struct mutex mutex;	/* protects: version, flags, digest */
+	struct integrity_inode_attributes real_inode;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	unsigned long measured_pcrs;
+	unsigned long atomic_flags;
+	enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4;
+	struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
+};
+
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes ima_blob_sizes;
+
+static inline struct ima_iint_cache *
+ima_inode_get_iint(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache **iint_sec;
+
+	if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+		return NULL;
+
+	iint_sec = inode->i_security + ima_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+	return *iint_sec;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_inode_set_iint(const struct inode *inode,
+				      struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache **iint_sec;
+
+	if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+		return;
+
+	iint_sec = inode->i_security + ima_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+	*iint_sec = iint;
+}
+
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
+void ima_inode_free_rcu(void *inode_security);
+void __init ima_iintcache_init(void);
+
+extern const int read_idmap[];
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
+void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
+#else
+static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+				   const void *payload, size_t plen,
+				   unsigned long flags, bool create);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
+void ima_measure_kexec_event(const char *event_name);
+#else
+static inline void ima_measure_kexec_event(const char *event_name) {}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the
+ * platform native format.  The canonical format is defined as little-endian.
+ */
+extern bool ima_canonical_fmt;
+
+/* Internal IMA function definitions */
+int ima_init(void);
+int ima_fs_init(void);
+int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
+			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
+			   const unsigned char *filename);
+int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
+			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+			      struct ima_template_entry *entry);
+int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const char *op,
+		       const char *cause);
+int ima_init_crypto(void);
+void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size);
+int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
+			      const struct ima_template_field ***fields,
+			      int *num_fields);
+struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
+struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_buf(void);
+struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
+bool ima_template_has_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *ima_template);
+int ima_queue_stage(void);
+int ima_queue_staged_delete_all(void);
+int ima_queue_delete_partial(unsigned long req_value);
+int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
+int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t bufsize, void *buf);
+int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
+int __init ima_init_htable(void);
+unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(enum binary_lists binary_list);
+int ima_init_template(void);
+void ima_init_template_list(void);
+int __init ima_init_digests(void);
+void __init ima_init_reboot_notifier(void);
+int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
+			  void *lsm_data);
+
+/*
+ * used to protect h_table and sha_table
+ */
+extern spinlock_t ima_queue_lock;
+
+/* Total number of measurement list records since hard boot. */
+extern atomic_long_t ima_num_records[BINARY__LAST];
+/* Total number of violations since hard boot. */
+extern atomic_long_t ima_num_violations;
+extern struct hlist_head __rcu *ima_htable;
+extern bool ima_flush_htable;
+
+static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
+{
+	/* there is no point in taking a hash of part of a digest */
+	return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE;
+}
+
+#define __ima_hooks(hook)				\
+	hook(NONE, none)				\
+	hook(FILE_CHECK, file)				\
+	hook(MMAP_CHECK, mmap)				\
+	hook(MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, mmap_reqprot)		\
+	hook(BPRM_CHECK, bprm)				\
+	hook(CREDS_CHECK, creds)			\
+	hook(POST_SETATTR, post_setattr)		\
+	hook(MODULE_CHECK, module)			\
+	hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK, firmware)			\
+	hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, kexec_kernel)		\
+	hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, kexec_initramfs)	\
+	hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy)			\
+	hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline)		\
+	hook(KEY_CHECK, key)				\
+	hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data)		\
+	hook(SETXATTR_CHECK, setxattr_check)		\
+	hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
+
+#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str)	ENUM,
+#define __ima_stringify(arg) (#arg)
+#define __ima_hook_measuring_stringify(ENUM, str) \
+		(__ima_stringify(measuring_ ##str)),
+
+enum ima_hooks {
+	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify)
+};
+
+static const char * const ima_hooks_measure_str[] = {
+	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_measuring_stringify)
+};
+
+static inline const char *func_measure_str(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	if (func >= MAX_CHECK)
+		return ima_hooks_measure_str[NONE];
+
+	return ima_hooks_measure_str[func];
+}
+
+extern const char *const func_tokens[];
+
+struct modsig;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS
+/*
+ * To track keys that need to be measured.
+ */
+struct ima_key_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	void *payload;
+	size_t payload_len;
+	char *keyring_name;
+};
+void ima_init_key_queue(void);
+bool ima_should_queue_key(void);
+bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload,
+		   size_t payload_len);
+void ima_process_queued_keys(void);
+#else
+static inline void ima_init_key_queue(void) {}
+static inline bool ima_should_queue_key(void) { return false; }
+static inline bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring,
+				 const void *payload,
+				 size_t payload_len) { return false; }
+static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */
+
+/* LIM API function definitions */
+int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
+		   const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
+		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
+		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+		   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
+int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			    void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo,
+			    struct modsig *modsig);
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
+			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
+int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			       struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
+			       const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
+			       int pcr, const char *func_data,
+			       bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
+void ima_audit_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+			   const unsigned char *filename);
+int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_template_entry **entry,
+			    struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
+int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
+		       struct inode *inode,
+		       const unsigned char *filename, int pcr);
+void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
+const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
+
+/* IMA policy related functions */
+int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
+		     const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+		     const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
+void ima_init_policy(void);
+void ima_update_policy(void);
+void ima_update_policy_flags(void);
+ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
+void ima_delete_rules(void);
+int ima_check_policy(void);
+void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos);
+void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos);
+void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
+int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
+
+/* Appraise integrity measurements */
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE	0x01
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX	0x02
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_LOG	0x04
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES	0x08
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE	0x10
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY	0x20
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC	0x40
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
+int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+			const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr);
+int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			     int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig,
+			     bool bprm_is_check);
+int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
+		      int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
+void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
+enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+					   enum ima_hooks func);
+enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+				 int xattr_len);
+int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+		   struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, int xattr_len);
+void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid);
+
+#else
+static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				      const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
+					   struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+					   struct file *file,
+					   const unsigned char *filename,
+					   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+					   int xattr_len,
+					   const struct modsig *modsig,
+					   bool bprm_is_check)
+{
+	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct inode *inode, int mask,
+				    enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				    struct file *file)
+{
+}
+
+static inline enum integrity_status
+ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static inline enum hash_algo
+ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len)
+{
+	return ima_hash_algo;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				 struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
+				 int xattr_len)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
+		    struct modsig **modsig);
+void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
+int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig, enum hash_algo *algo,
+			  const u8 **digest, u32 *digest_size);
+int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
+		       u32 *data_len);
+void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
+#else
+static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
+				  loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf,
+				      loff_t size)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig,
+					enum hash_algo *algo, const u8 **digest,
+					u32 *digest_size)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig,
+				     const void **data, u32 *data_len)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
+
+/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
+
+#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
+#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
+#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
+
+#else
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+				       void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
+					void *lsmrule)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+
+#ifdef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
+#define	POLICY_FILE_FLAGS	(S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
+#else
+#define	POLICY_FILE_FLAGS	S_IWUSR
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
+
+#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..122d127e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -0,0 +1,470 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: ima_api.c
+ *	Implements must_appraise_or_measure, collect_measurement,
+ *	appraise_measurement, store_measurement and store_template.
+ */
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/hex.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/*
+ * ima_free_template_entry - free an existing template entry
+ */
+void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < entry->template_desc->num_fields; i++)
+		kfree(entry->template_data[i].data);
+
+	kfree(entry->digests);
+	kfree(entry);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
+ */
+int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_template_entry **entry,
+			    struct ima_template_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
+	struct tpm_digest *digests;
+	int i, result = 0;
+
+	if (desc)
+		template_desc = desc;
+	else
+		template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+
+	*entry = kzalloc_flex(**entry, template_data, template_desc->num_fields,
+			      GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!*entry)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	digests = kzalloc_objs(*digests,
+			       NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip) + ima_extra_slots,
+			       GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!digests) {
+		kfree(*entry);
+		*entry = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	(*entry)->digests = digests;
+	(*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
+	for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
+		const struct ima_template_field *field =
+			template_desc->fields[i];
+		u32 len;
+
+		result = field->field_init(event_data,
+					   &((*entry)->template_data[i]));
+		if (result != 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		len = (*entry)->template_data[i].len;
+		(*entry)->template_data_len += sizeof(len);
+		(*entry)->template_data_len += len;
+	}
+	return 0;
+out:
+	ima_free_template_entry(*entry);
+	*entry = NULL;
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_store_template - store ima template measurements
+ *
+ * Calculate the hash of a template entry, add the template entry
+ * to an ordered list of measurement entries maintained inside the kernel,
+ * and also update the aggregate integrity value (maintained inside the
+ * configured TPM PCR) over the hashes of the current list of measurement
+ * entries.
+ *
+ * Applications retrieve the current kernel-held measurement list through
+ * the securityfs entries in /sys/kernel/security/ima. The signed aggregate
+ * TPM PCR (called quote) can be retrieved using a TPM user space library
+ * and is used to validate the measurement list.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise
+ */
+int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
+		       int violation, struct inode *inode,
+		       const unsigned char *filename, int pcr)
+{
+	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
+	static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error";
+	char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name;
+	int result;
+
+	if (!violation) {
+		result = ima_calc_field_array_hash(&entry->template_data[0],
+						   entry);
+		if (result < 0) {
+			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
+					    template_name, op,
+					    audit_cause, result, 0);
+			return result;
+		}
+	}
+	entry->pcr = pcr;
+	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename);
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_add_violation - add violation to measurement list.
+ *
+ * Violations are flagged in the measurement list with zero hash values.
+ * By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR
+ * value is invalidated.
+ */
+void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const char *op,
+		       const char *cause)
+{
+	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
+					     .file = file,
+					     .filename = filename,
+					     .violation = cause };
+	int violation = 1;
+	int result;
+
+	/* can overflow, only indicator */
+	atomic_long_inc(&ima_num_violations);
+
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, NULL);
+	if (result < 0) {
+		result = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode,
+				    filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
+	if (result < 0)
+		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
+err_out:
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
+			    op, cause, result, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
+ * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
+ * @prop: properties of the task being validated
+ * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
+ *        MAY_APPEND)
+ * @func: caller identifier
+ * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
+ * @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template=
+ * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
+ * @allowed_algos: allowlist of hash algorithms for the IMA xattr
+ *
+ * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
+ *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
+ *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
+ *	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
+ *	| KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA | SETXATTR_CHECK
+ *	| MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT
+ *	mask: contains the permission mask
+ *	fsmagic: hex value
+ *
+ * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
+ *
+ */
+int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
+		   const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
+		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
+		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+		   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
+{
+	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
+
+	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
+
+	return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask,
+				flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
+				allowed_algos);
+}
+
+static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				  struct inode *inode,
+				  struct ima_max_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	enum hash_algo alg;
+	int digest_len;
+
+	/*
+	 * On failure, 'measure' policy rules will result in a file data
+	 * hash containing 0's.
+	 */
+	digest_len = fsverity_get_digest(inode, hash->digest, NULL, &alg);
+	if (digest_len == 0)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Unlike in the case of actually calculating the file hash, in
+	 * the fsverity case regardless of the hash algorithm, return
+	 * the verity digest to be included in the measurement list. A
+	 * mismatch between the verity algorithm and the xattr signature
+	 * algorithm, if one exists, will be detected later.
+	 */
+	hash->hdr.algo = alg;
+	hash->hdr.length = digest_len;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement
+ *
+ * Calculate the file hash, if it doesn't already exist,
+ * storing the measurement and i_version in the iint.
+ *
+ * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
+ */
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			    void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo,
+			    struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode *real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
+	struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+	struct ima_digest_data *hash_hdr = container_of(&hash.hdr,
+						struct ima_digest_data, hdr);
+	struct name_snapshot filename;
+	struct kstat stat;
+	int result = 0;
+	int length;
+	void *tmpbuf;
+	u64 i_version = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Always collect the modsig, because IMA might have already collected
+	 * the file digest without collecting the modsig in a previous
+	 * measurement rule.
+	 */
+	if (modsig)
+		ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
+
+	if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * Detect file change based on STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE, when supported,
+	 * and fallback to detecting file change based on i_version.
+	 *
+	 * On filesystems which did not support i_version, support was
+	 * originally limited to an initial measurement/appraisal/audit,
+	 * but was later modified to assume the file changed.
+	 */
+	result = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat, STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
+				   AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT);
+	if (!result && (stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE))
+		i_version = stat.change_cookie;
+	else if (IS_I_VERSION(real_inode))
+		i_version = inode_peek_iversion(real_inode);
+
+	hash.hdr.algo = algo;
+	hash.hdr.length = hash_digest_size[algo];
+
+	/* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
+	memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
+
+	if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) {
+		if (!ima_get_verity_digest(iint, inode, &hash)) {
+			audit_cause = "no-verity-digest";
+			result = -ENODATA;
+		}
+	} else if (buf) {
+		result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, hash_hdr);
+	} else {
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, hash_hdr);
+	}
+
+	if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
+	tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!tmpbuf) {
+		result = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
+	memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
+	if (real_inode == inode)
+		iint->real_inode.version = i_version;
+	else
+		integrity_inode_attrs_store(&iint->real_inode, i_version,
+					    real_inode);
+
+	/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
+	if (!result)
+		iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
+out:
+	if (result) {
+		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
+			audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
+
+		take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, file->f_path.dentry);
+
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
+				    filename.name.name, "collect_data",
+				    audit_cause, result, 0);
+
+		release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename);
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_store_measurement - store file measurement
+ *
+ * Create an "ima" template and then store the template by calling
+ * ima_store_template.
+ *
+ * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
+ * but the measurement could already exist:
+ *	- multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
+ *	  different filesystems.
+ *	- the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
+ *	  containing the hashing info.
+ *
+ * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
+ */
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
+			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc)
+{
+	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
+	static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM";
+	int result = -ENOMEM;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
+					     .file = file,
+					     .filename = filename,
+					     .xattr_value = xattr_value,
+					     .xattr_len = xattr_len,
+					     .modsig = modsig };
+	int violation = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * We still need to store the measurement in the case of MODSIG because
+	 * we only have its contents to put in the list at the time of
+	 * appraisal, but a file measurement from earlier might already exist in
+	 * the measurement list.
+	 */
+	if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr) && !modsig)
+		return;
+
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc);
+	if (result < 0) {
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
+				    op, audit_cause, result, 0);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr);
+	if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) {
+		iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
+		iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr);
+	}
+	if (result < 0)
+		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
+}
+
+void ima_audit_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+			   const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char *hash;
+	const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
+	int i;
+
+	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
+		return;
+
+	hash = kzalloc((iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!hash)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash->length; i++)
+		hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash->digest[i]);
+	hash[i * 2] = '\0';
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
+			     AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
+	if (!ab)
+		goto out;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "file=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " hash=\"%s:%s\"", algo_name, hash);
+
+	audit_log_task_info(ab);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+
+	iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
+out:
+	kfree(hash);
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_d_path - return a pointer to the full pathname
+ *
+ * Attempt to return a pointer to the full pathname for use in the
+ * IMA measurement list, IMA audit records, and auditing logs.
+ *
+ * On failure, return a pointer to a copy of the filename, not dname.
+ * Returning a pointer to dname, could result in using the pointer
+ * after the memory has been freed.
+ */
+const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf)
+{
+	struct name_snapshot filename;
+	char *pathname = NULL;
+
+	*pathbuf = __getname();
+	if (*pathbuf) {
+		pathname = d_absolute_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
+		if (IS_ERR(pathname)) {
+			__putname(*pathbuf);
+			*pathbuf = NULL;
+			pathname = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!pathname) {
+		take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, path->dentry);
+		strscpy(namebuf, filename.name.name, NAME_MAX);
+		release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename);
+
+		pathname = namebuf;
+	}
+
+	return pathname;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..18d0d9154
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -0,0 +1,831 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
+static char *ima_appraise_cmdline_default __initdata;
+core_param(ima_appraise, ima_appraise_cmdline_default, charp, 0);
+
+void __init ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+	const char *str = ima_appraise_cmdline_default;
+	bool sb_state = arch_get_secureboot();
+	int appraisal_state = ima_appraise;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return;
+
+	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
+		appraisal_state = 0;
+	else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
+	else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
+	else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0)
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+	else
+		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" appraise option", str);
+
+	/* If appraisal state was changed, but secure boot is enabled,
+	 * keep its default */
+	if (sb_state) {
+		if (!(appraisal_state & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+			pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s option",
+				str);
+	} else {
+		ima_appraise = appraisal_state;
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * is_ima_appraise_enabled - return appraise status
+ *
+ * Only return enabled, if not in ima_appraise="fix" or "log" modes.
+ */
+bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
+{
+	return ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_must_appraise - set appraise flag
+ *
+ * Return 1 to appraise or hash
+ */
+int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
+		      int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+
+	if (!ima_appraise)
+		return 0;
+
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), &prop,
+				func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
+				NULL, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	int rc, offset;
+	u8 algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
+
+	if (IS_RDONLY(d_inode(dentry)))
+		return -EROFS;
+	if (IS_IMMUTABLE(d_inode(dentry)))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (algo <= HASH_ALGO_SHA1) {
+		offset = 1;
+		iint->ima_hash->xattr.sha1.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
+	} else {
+		offset = 0;
+		iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG;
+		iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo;
+	}
+	rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+				   &iint->ima_hash->xattr.data[offset],
+				   (sizeof(iint->ima_hash->xattr) - offset) +
+				   iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Return specific func appraised cached result */
+enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+					   enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	switch (func) {
+	case MMAP_CHECK:
+	case MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT:
+		return iint->ima_mmap_status;
+	case BPRM_CHECK:
+		return iint->ima_bprm_status;
+	case CREDS_CHECK:
+		return iint->ima_creds_status;
+	case FILE_CHECK:
+	case POST_SETATTR:
+		return iint->ima_file_status;
+	case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
+	default:
+		return iint->ima_read_status;
+	}
+}
+
+static void ima_set_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				 enum ima_hooks func,
+				 enum integrity_status status)
+{
+	switch (func) {
+	case MMAP_CHECK:
+	case MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT:
+		iint->ima_mmap_status = status;
+		break;
+	case BPRM_CHECK:
+		iint->ima_bprm_status = status;
+		break;
+	case CREDS_CHECK:
+		iint->ima_creds_status = status;
+		break;
+	case FILE_CHECK:
+	case POST_SETATTR:
+		iint->ima_file_status = status;
+		break;
+	case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
+	default:
+		iint->ima_read_status = status;
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void ima_cache_flags(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	switch (func) {
+	case MMAP_CHECK:
+	case MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT:
+		iint->flags |= (IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+		break;
+	case BPRM_CHECK:
+		iint->flags |= (IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+		break;
+	case CREDS_CHECK:
+		iint->flags |= (IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+		break;
+	case FILE_CHECK:
+	case POST_SETATTR:
+		iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+		break;
+	case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
+	default:
+		iint->flags |= (IMA_READ_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+				 int xattr_len)
+{
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
+	enum hash_algo ret;
+
+	if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2)
+		/* return default hash algo */
+		return ima_hash_algo;
+
+	switch (xattr_value->type) {
+	case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG:
+		sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
+		if (sig->version != 3 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) ||
+		    sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			return ima_hash_algo;
+		return sig->hash_algo;
+	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+		sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
+		if ((sig->version != 2 && sig->version != 3) ||
+		    xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) ||
+		    sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			return ima_hash_algo;
+		return sig->hash_algo;
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
+		/* first byte contains algorithm id */
+		ret = xattr_value->data[0];
+		if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			return ret;
+		break;
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
+		/* this is for backward compatibility */
+		if (xattr_len == 21) {
+			unsigned int zero = 0;
+			if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4))
+				return HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+			else
+				return HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		} else if (xattr_len == 17)
+			return HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* return default hash algo */
+	return ima_hash_algo;
+}
+
+int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+		   struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, int xattr_len)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+				 (char **)xattr_value, xattr_len, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		ret = 0;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature
+ *
+ * Verify whether the hash or signature matches the file contents.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+			struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+			enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
+{
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
+	int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0;
+	int mask;
+
+	switch (xattr_value->type) {
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
+		/* first byte contains algorithm id */
+		hash_start = 1;
+		fallthrough;
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
+		if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) {
+			if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+				if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+					*cause = "verity-signature-required";
+				else
+					*cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+				*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+				break;
+			}
+			clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+		} else {
+			set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+		}
+		if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
+				iint->ima_hash->length)
+			/*
+			 * xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
+			 * version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
+			 */
+			rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start],
+				    iint->ima_hash->digest,
+				    iint->ima_hash->length);
+		else
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (rc) {
+			*cause = "invalid-hash";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			break;
+		}
+		*status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		break;
+	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+		set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
+		mask = IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED;
+		if ((iint->flags & mask) == mask) {
+			*cause = "verity-signature-required";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
+		if (sig->version > 3) {
+			*cause = "invalid-signature-version";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if ((iint->flags & IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED) && sig->version != 3) {
+			*cause = "IMA-sigv3-required";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
+					     (const char *)xattr_value,
+					     xattr_len,
+					     iint->ima_hash->digest,
+					     iint->ima_hash->length,
+					     iint->ima_hash->algo);
+		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+			*status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc &&
+		    func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+			rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
+						     (const char *)xattr_value,
+						     xattr_len,
+						     iint->ima_hash->digest,
+						     iint->ima_hash->length,
+						     iint->ima_hash->algo);
+
+		if (rc) {
+			*cause = "invalid-signature";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		} else {
+			*status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		}
+		break;
+	case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG:
+		set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+			if (!(iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)) {
+				*cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+				*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
+		if (sig->version != 3) {
+			*cause = "invalid-signature-version";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
+					     (const char *)xattr_value,
+					     xattr_len,
+					     iint->ima_hash->digest,
+					     iint->ima_hash->length,
+					     iint->ima_hash->algo);
+		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+			*status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+			break;
+		} else if (rc) {
+			*cause = "invalid-verity-signature";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		} else {
+			*status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		}
+
+		break;
+	default:
+		*status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+		*cause = "unknown-ima-data";
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * modsig_verify - verify modsig signature
+ *
+ * Verify whether the signature matches the file contents.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig,
+			 enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = integrity_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, modsig);
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc &&
+	    func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+		rc = integrity_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
+					     modsig);
+	if (rc) {
+		*cause = "invalid-signature";
+		*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+	} else {
+		*status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_check_blacklist - determine if the binary is blacklisted.
+ *
+ * Add the hash of the blacklisted binary to the measurement list, based
+ * on policy.
+ *
+ * Returns -EPERM if the hash is blacklisted.
+ */
+int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+			const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
+{
+	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
+	const u8 *digest = NULL;
+	u32 digestsize = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig) {
+		ima_get_modsig_digest(modsig, &hash_algo, &digest, &digestsize);
+
+		rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize);
+	} else if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED && iint->ima_hash)
+		rc = is_binary_blacklisted(iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length);
+
+	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
+		process_buffer_measurement(&nop_mnt_idmap, NULL, digest, digestsize,
+					   "blacklisted-hash", NONE,
+					   pcr, NULL, false, NULL, 0);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
+ *
+ * Call evm_verifyxattr() to verify the integrity of 'security.ima'.
+ * Assuming success, compare the xattr hash with the collected measurement.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
+ */
+int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			     int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig,
+			     bool bprm_is_check)
+{
+	static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
+	int audit_msgno = AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA;
+	const char *cause = "unknown";
+	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	int rc = xattr_len;
+	bool try_modsig = iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig;
+
+	/* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */
+	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) && !try_modsig)
+		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
+	/*
+	 * Unlike any of the other LSM hooks where the kernel enforces file
+	 * integrity, enforcing file integrity for the bprm_creds_for_exec()
+	 * LSM hook with the AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag is left up to the discretion
+	 * of the script interpreter(userspace). Differentiate kernel and
+	 * userspace enforced integrity audit messages.
+	 */
+	if (bprm_is_check)
+		audit_msgno = AUDIT_INTEGRITY_USERSPACE;
+
+	/* If reading the xattr failed and there's no modsig, error out. */
+	if (rc <= 0 && !try_modsig) {
+		if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+			if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+				cause = "verity-signature-required";
+			else
+				cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+		} else {
+			cause = "missing-hash";
+		}
+
+		status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+		if (file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED)
+			iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
+		if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) &&
+		    (!(iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) ||
+		     (inode->i_size == 0)))
+			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value,
+				 rc < 0 ? 0 : rc);
+	switch (status) {
+	case INTEGRITY_PASS:
+	case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE:
+	case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN:
+		break;
+	case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS:	/* No EVM protected xattrs. */
+		/* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */
+		if (try_modsig)
+			break;
+		fallthrough;
+	case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL:		/* No security.evm xattr. */
+		cause = "missing-HMAC";
+		goto out;
+	case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE:
+		set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+		cause = "invalid-fail-immutable";
+		goto out;
+	case INTEGRITY_FAIL:		/* Invalid HMAC/signature. */
+		cause = "invalid-HMAC";
+		goto out;
+	default:
+		WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected integrity status %d\n", status);
+	}
+
+	if (xattr_value)
+		rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status,
+				  &cause);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we have a modsig and either no imasig or the imasig's key isn't
+	 * known, then try verifying the modsig.
+	 */
+	if (try_modsig &&
+	    (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type == IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG ||
+	     rc == -ENOKEY))
+		rc = modsig_verify(func, modsig, &status, &cause);
+
+out:
+	/*
+	 * File signatures on some filesystems can not be properly verified.
+	 * When such filesystems are mounted by an untrusted mounter or on a
+	 * system not willing to accept such a risk, fail the file signature
+	 * verification.
+	 */
+	if ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) &&
+	    ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) ||
+	     (iint->flags & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) {
+		status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		cause = "unverifiable-signature";
+		integrity_audit_msg(audit_msgno, inode, filename,
+				    op, cause, rc, 0);
+	} else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
+		/* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */
+		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) && !try_modsig &&
+		    (!xattr_value ||
+		     xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
+			if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint))
+				status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		} else if (status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) {
+			if (!evm_fix_hmac(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+					  (const char *)xattr_value,
+					  xattr_len))
+				status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Permit new files with file/EVM portable signatures, but
+		 * without data.
+		 */
+		if (inode->i_size == 0 && iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE &&
+		    test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags)) {
+			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		}
+
+		integrity_audit_msg(audit_msgno, inode, filename,
+				    op, cause, rc, 0);
+	} else {
+		ima_cache_flags(iint, func);
+	}
+
+	ima_set_cache_status(iint, func, status);
+	return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value
+ */
+void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/* do not collect and update hash for digital signatures */
+	if (test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))
+		return;
+
+	if ((iint->ima_file_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) &&
+	    !(iint->flags & IMA_HASH))
+		return;
+
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo, NULL);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return;
+
+	inode_lock(file_inode(file));
+	ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
+	inode_unlock(file_inode(file));
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes
+ * @idmap:  idmap of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
+ *
+ * Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise.
+ *
+ * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
+ * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
+ */
+static void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				   struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+	int action;
+
+	if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
+	    || !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
+		return;
+
+	action = ima_must_appraise(idmap, inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+	if (iint) {
+		set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
+		if (!action)
+			clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_protect_xattr - protect 'security.ima'
+ *
+ * Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'.
+ */
+static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			return -EPERM;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_reset_appraise_flags - reset ima_iint_cache flags
+ *
+ * @digsig: whether to clear/set IMA_DIGSIG flag, tristate values
+ *          0: clear IMA_DIGSIG
+ *          1: set IMA_DIGSIG
+ *         -1: don't change IMA_DIGSIG
+ *
+ */
+static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return;
+
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return;
+	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+	set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
+	if (digsig == 1)
+		set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+	else if (digsig == 0)
+		clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * validate_hash_algo() - Block setxattr with unsupported hash algorithms
+ * @dentry: object of the setxattr()
+ * @xattr_value: userland supplied xattr value
+ * @xattr_value_len: length of xattr_value
+ *
+ * The xattr value is mapped to its hash algorithm, and this algorithm
+ * must be built in the kernel for the setxattr to be allowed.
+ *
+ * Emit an audit message when the algorithm is invalid.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, else an error.
+ */
+static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry,
+			      const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			      size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	char *path = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
+	enum hash_algo xattr_hash_algo;
+	const char *errmsg = "unavailable-hash-algorithm";
+	unsigned int allowed_hashes;
+
+	xattr_hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
+
+	allowed_hashes = atomic_read(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms);
+
+	if (allowed_hashes) {
+		/* success if the algorithm is allowed in the ima policy */
+		if (allowed_hashes & (1U << xattr_hash_algo))
+			return 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * We use a different audit message when the hash algorithm
+		 * is denied by a policy rule, instead of not being built
+		 * in the kernel image
+		 */
+		errmsg = "denied-hash-algorithm";
+	} else {
+		if (likely(xattr_hash_algo == ima_hash_algo))
+			return 0;
+
+		/* allow any xattr using an algorithm built in the kernel */
+		if (crypto_has_alg(hash_algo_name[xattr_hash_algo], 0, 0))
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!pathbuf)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	path = dentry_path(dentry, pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
+
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, d_inode(dentry), path,
+			    "set_data", errmsg, -EACCES, 0);
+
+	kfree(pathbuf);
+
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			      const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+			      size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
+{
+	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value;
+	int digsig = 0;
+	int result;
+	int err;
+
+	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				   xattr_value_len);
+	if (result == 1) {
+		if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		err = validate_hash_algo(dentry, xvalue, xattr_value_len);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
+	} else if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) {
+		digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG);
+	} else {
+		digsig = -1;
+	}
+	if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) {
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
+		if (result == 1)
+			result = 0;
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+static int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	if (evm_revalidate_status(acl_name))
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), -1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	int result, digsig = -1;
+
+	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
+	if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) {
+		if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA))
+			digsig = 0;
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
+		if (result == 1)
+			result = 0;
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+static int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				const char *acl_name)
+{
+	return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list ima_appraise_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, ima_inode_post_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, ima_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, ima_inode_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, ima_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, ima_inode_remove_acl),
+};
+
+void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(ima_appraise_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_appraise_hooks),
+			   lsmid);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..caacfe686
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com)
+ *
+ * File: ima_asymmetric_keys.c
+ *       Defines an IMA hook to measure asymmetric keys on key
+ *       create or update.
+ */
+
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/**
+ * ima_post_key_create_or_update - measure asymmetric keys
+ * @keyring: keyring to which the key is linked to
+ * @key: created or updated key
+ * @payload: The data used to instantiate or update the key.
+ * @payload_len: The length of @payload.
+ * @flags: key flags
+ * @create: flag indicating whether the key was created or updated
+ *
+ * Keys can only be measured, not appraised.
+ * The payload data used to instantiate or update the key is measured.
+ */
+void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+				   const void *payload, size_t payload_len,
+				   unsigned long flags, bool create)
+{
+	bool queued = false;
+
+	/* Only asymmetric keys are handled by this hook. */
+	if (key->type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return;
+
+	if (!payload || (payload_len == 0))
+		return;
+
+	if (ima_should_queue_key())
+		queued = ima_queue_key(keyring, payload, payload_len);
+
+	if (queued)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * keyring->description points to the name of the keyring
+	 * (such as ".builtin_trusted_keys", ".ima", etc.) to
+	 * which the given key is linked to.
+	 *
+	 * The name of the keyring is passed in the "eventname"
+	 * parameter to process_buffer_measurement() and is set
+	 * in the "eventname" field in ima_event_data for
+	 * the key measurement IMA event.
+	 *
+	 * The name of the keyring is also passed in the "keyring"
+	 * parameter to process_buffer_measurement() to check
+	 * if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked
+	 * to the given keyring.
+	 */
+	process_buffer_measurement(&nop_mnt_idmap, NULL, payload, payload_len,
+				   keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
+				   keyring->description, false, NULL, 0);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d72b4824
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,519 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: ima_crypto.c
+ *	Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
+
+int ima_sha1_idx __ro_after_init;
+int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init;
+/*
+ * Additional number of slots reserved, as needed, for SHA1
+ * and IMA default algo.
+ */
+int ima_extra_slots __ro_after_init;
+
+struct ima_algo_desc *ima_algo_array __ro_after_init;
+
+static int __init ima_init_ima_crypto(void)
+{
+	long rc;
+
+	ima_shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(ima_shash_tfm)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(ima_shash_tfm);
+		pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n",
+		       hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	pr_info("Allocated hash algorithm: %s\n",
+		hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo]);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct crypto_shash *ima_alloc_tfm(enum hash_algo algo)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	int rc, i;
+
+	if (algo < 0 || algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+		algo = ima_hash_algo;
+
+	if (algo == ima_hash_algo)
+		return tfm;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip) + ima_extra_slots; i++)
+		if (ima_algo_array[i].tfm && ima_algo_array[i].algo == algo)
+			return ima_algo_array[i].tfm;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+		pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %d)\n",
+		       hash_algo_name[algo], rc);
+	}
+	return tfm;
+}
+
+int __init ima_init_crypto(void)
+{
+	unsigned int digest_size;
+	enum hash_algo algo;
+	long rc;
+	int i;
+
+	rc = ima_init_ima_crypto();
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	ima_sha1_idx = -1;
+	ima_hash_algo_idx = -1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip); i++) {
+		algo = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].crypto_id;
+		if (algo == HASH_ALGO_SHA1)
+			ima_sha1_idx = i;
+
+		if (algo == ima_hash_algo)
+			ima_hash_algo_idx = i;
+	}
+
+	if (ima_sha1_idx < 0) {
+		ima_sha1_idx = NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip) + ima_extra_slots++;
+		if (ima_hash_algo == HASH_ALGO_SHA1)
+			ima_hash_algo_idx = ima_sha1_idx;
+	}
+
+	if (ima_hash_algo_idx < 0)
+		ima_hash_algo_idx = NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip) + ima_extra_slots++;
+
+	ima_algo_array = kzalloc_objs(*ima_algo_array,
+				      NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip) + ima_extra_slots);
+	if (!ima_algo_array) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip); i++) {
+		algo = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].crypto_id;
+		digest_size = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size;
+		ima_algo_array[i].algo = algo;
+		ima_algo_array[i].digest_size = digest_size;
+
+		/* unknown TPM algorithm */
+		if (algo == HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			continue;
+
+		if (algo == ima_hash_algo) {
+			ima_algo_array[i].tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		ima_algo_array[i].tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(algo);
+		if (IS_ERR(ima_algo_array[i].tfm)) {
+			if (algo == HASH_ALGO_SHA1) {
+				rc = PTR_ERR(ima_algo_array[i].tfm);
+				ima_algo_array[i].tfm = NULL;
+				goto out_array;
+			}
+
+			ima_algo_array[i].tfm = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ima_sha1_idx >= NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip)) {
+		if (ima_hash_algo == HASH_ALGO_SHA1) {
+			ima_algo_array[ima_sha1_idx].tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+		} else {
+			ima_algo_array[ima_sha1_idx].tfm =
+						ima_alloc_tfm(HASH_ALGO_SHA1);
+			if (IS_ERR(ima_algo_array[ima_sha1_idx].tfm)) {
+				rc = PTR_ERR(ima_algo_array[ima_sha1_idx].tfm);
+				goto out_array;
+			}
+		}
+
+		ima_algo_array[ima_sha1_idx].algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		ima_algo_array[ima_sha1_idx].digest_size = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	if (ima_hash_algo_idx >= NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip) &&
+	    ima_hash_algo_idx != ima_sha1_idx) {
+		digest_size = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+		ima_algo_array[ima_hash_algo_idx].tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+		ima_algo_array[ima_hash_algo_idx].algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		ima_algo_array[ima_hash_algo_idx].digest_size = digest_size;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+out_array:
+	for (i = 0; i < NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip) + ima_extra_slots; i++) {
+		if (!ima_algo_array[i].tfm ||
+		    ima_algo_array[i].tfm == ima_shash_tfm)
+			continue;
+
+		crypto_free_shash(ima_algo_array[i].tfm);
+	}
+	kfree(ima_algo_array);
+out:
+	crypto_free_shash(ima_shash_tfm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void ima_free_tfm(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (tfm == ima_shash_tfm)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip) + ima_extra_slots; i++)
+		if (ima_algo_array[i].tfm == tfm)
+			return;
+
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+}
+
+static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
+				  struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+				  struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+{
+	loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
+	char *rbuf;
+	int rc;
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
+
+	shash->tfm = tfm;
+
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(shash);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+
+	if (i_size == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rbuf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	while (offset < i_size) {
+		int rbuf_len;
+
+		rbuf_len = integrity_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (rbuf_len < 0) {
+			rc = rbuf_len;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (rbuf_len == 0) {	/* unexpected EOF */
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+		offset += rbuf_len;
+
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, rbuf, rbuf_len);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+	kfree(rbuf);
+out:
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = crypto_shash_final(shash, hash->digest);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_calc_file_hash - calculate file hash
+ */
+int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct file *f = file;
+	bool new_file_instance = false;
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+
+	/*
+	 * For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on
+	 * filesystems mounted with/without DAX option.
+	 */
+	if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
+		hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+		hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Open a new file instance in O_RDONLY if we cannot read */
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
+		int flags = file->f_flags & ~(O_WRONLY | O_APPEND |
+				O_TRUNC | O_CREAT | O_NOCTTY | O_EXCL);
+		flags |= O_RDONLY;
+		f = dentry_open(&file->f_path, flags, file->f_cred);
+		if (IS_ERR(f))
+			return PTR_ERR(f);
+
+		new_file_instance = true;
+	}
+
+	tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	} else {
+		rc = ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(f, hash, tfm);
+		ima_free_tfm(tfm);
+	}
+	if (new_file_instance)
+		fput(f);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the hash of template data
+ */
+static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+					 struct ima_template_entry *entry,
+					 int tfm_idx)
+{
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, ima_algo_array[tfm_idx].tfm);
+	struct ima_template_desc *td = entry->template_desc;
+	int num_fields = entry->template_desc->num_fields;
+	int rc, i;
+
+	shash->tfm = ima_algo_array[tfm_idx].tfm;
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(shash);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) {
+		u8 buffer[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1] = { 0 };
+		u8 *data_to_hash = field_data[i].data;
+		u32 datalen = field_data[i].len;
+		u32 datalen_to_hash = !ima_canonical_fmt ?
+				datalen : (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(datalen);
+
+		if (strcmp(td->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
+			rc = crypto_shash_update(shash,
+						(const u8 *) &datalen_to_hash,
+						sizeof(datalen_to_hash));
+			if (rc)
+				break;
+		} else if (strcmp(td->fields[i]->field_id, "n") == 0) {
+			memcpy(buffer, data_to_hash, datalen);
+			data_to_hash = buffer;
+			datalen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
+		}
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, data_to_hash, datalen);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = crypto_shash_final(shash, entry->digests[tfm_idx].digest);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+			      struct ima_template_entry *entry)
+{
+	u16 alg_id;
+	int rc, i;
+
+	rc = ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(field_data, entry, ima_sha1_idx);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	entry->digests[ima_sha1_idx].alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip) + ima_extra_slots; i++) {
+		if (i == ima_sha1_idx)
+			continue;
+
+		if (i < NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip)) {
+			alg_id = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id;
+			entry->digests[i].alg_id = alg_id;
+		}
+
+		/* for unmapped TPM algorithms digest is still a padded SHA1 */
+		if (!ima_algo_array[i].tfm) {
+			memcpy(entry->digests[i].digest,
+			       entry->digests[ima_sha1_idx].digest,
+			       TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		rc = ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(field_data, entry, i);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int calc_buffer_shash_tfm(const void *buf, loff_t size,
+				struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+				struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+{
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
+	unsigned int len;
+	int rc;
+
+	shash->tfm = tfm;
+
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(shash);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	while (size) {
+		len = size < PAGE_SIZE ? size : PAGE_SIZE;
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, len);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		buf += len;
+		size -= len;
+	}
+
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = crypto_shash_final(shash, hash->digest);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
+			 struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	int rc;
+
+	tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	rc = calc_buffer_shash_tfm(buf, len, hash, tfm);
+
+	ima_free_tfm(tfm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void ima_pcrread(u32 idx, struct tpm_digest *d)
+{
+	if (!ima_tpm_chip)
+		return;
+
+	if (tpm_pcr_read(ima_tpm_chip, idx, d) != 0)
+		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * The boot_aggregate is a cumulative hash over TPM registers 0 - 7.  With
+ * TPM 1.2 the boot_aggregate was based on reading the SHA1 PCRs, but with
+ * TPM 2.0 hash agility, TPM chips could support multiple TPM PCR banks,
+ * allowing firmware to configure and enable different banks.
+ *
+ * Knowing which TPM bank is read to calculate the boot_aggregate digest
+ * needs to be conveyed to a verifier.  For this reason, use the same
+ * hash algorithm for reading the TPM PCRs as for calculating the boot
+ * aggregate digest as stored in the measurement list.
+ */
+static int ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(char *digest, u16 alg_id,
+				       struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+{
+	struct tpm_digest d = { .alg_id = alg_id, .digest = {0} };
+	int rc;
+	u32 i;
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
+
+	shash->tfm = tfm;
+
+	pr_devel("calculating the boot-aggregate based on TPM bank: %04x\n",
+		 d.alg_id);
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(shash);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* cumulative digest over TPM registers 0-7 */
+	for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) {
+		ima_pcrread(i, &d);
+		/* now accumulate with current aggregate */
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, d.digest,
+					 crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm));
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Extend cumulative digest over TPM registers 8-9, which contain
+	 * measurement for the kernel command line (reg. 8) and image (reg. 9)
+	 * in a typical PCR allocation. Registers 8-9 are only included in
+	 * non-SHA1 boot_aggregate digests to avoid ambiguity.
+	 */
+	if (alg_id != TPM_ALG_SHA1) {
+		for (i = TPM_PCR8; i < TPM_PCR10; i++) {
+			ima_pcrread(i, &d);
+			rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, d.digest,
+						crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm));
+		}
+	}
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = crypto_shash_final(shash, digest);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	u16 crypto_id, alg_id;
+	int rc, i, bank_idx = -1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ima_tpm_chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) {
+		crypto_id = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].crypto_id;
+		if (crypto_id == hash->algo) {
+			bank_idx = i;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (crypto_id == HASH_ALGO_SHA256)
+			bank_idx = i;
+
+		if (bank_idx == -1 && crypto_id == HASH_ALGO_SHA1)
+			bank_idx = i;
+	}
+
+	if (bank_idx == -1) {
+		pr_err("No suitable TPM algorithm for boot aggregate\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	hash->algo = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[bank_idx].crypto_id;
+
+	tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	alg_id = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[bank_idx].alg_id;
+	rc = ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(hash->digest, alg_id, tfm);
+
+	ima_free_tfm(tfm);
+
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bca57d836
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/secure_boot.h>
+
+/* secureboot arch rules */
+static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
+	"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
+	"measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
+	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY)
+	"appraise func=POLICY_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
+#endif
+	"measure func=MODULE_CHECK",
+	NULL
+};
+
+const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_get_secureboot()) {
+		set_module_sig_enforced();
+		set_kexec_sig_enforced();
+		return sb_arch_rules;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..174a94740
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,849 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: ima_fs.c
+ *	implemenents security file system for reporting
+ *	current measurement list and IMA statistics
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/*
+ * Requests:
+ * 'A\n': stage the entire measurements list
+ * 'D\n': delete all staged measurements
+ * '[1, ULONG_MAX]\n' delete N measurements records
+ */
+#define STAGED_REQ_LENGTH 21
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_write_mutex);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
+static long ima_measure_users;
+static struct task_struct *measure_writer;
+static long measure_writer_extra_writes;
+
+bool ima_canonical_fmt;
+static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str)
+{
+#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
+	ima_canonical_fmt = true;
+#endif
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_canonical_fmt", default_canonical_fmt_setup);
+
+static int valid_policy = 1;
+
+static ssize_t ima_show_counter(char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
+				atomic_long_t *val)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[32];	/* greater than largest 'long' string value */
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ima_show_num_violations(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return ima_show_counter(buf, count, ppos, &ima_num_violations);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ima_num_violations_ops = {
+	.read = ima_show_num_violations,
+	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp,
+					   char __user *buf,
+					   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return ima_show_counter(buf, count, ppos, &ima_num_records[BINARY]);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = {
+	.read = ima_show_measurements_count,
+	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/* returns pointer to hlist_node */
+static void *_ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos,
+				     struct list_head *head)
+{
+	loff_t l = *pos;
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
+
+	/* we need a lock since pos could point beyond last element */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, head, later) {
+		if (!l--) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return qe;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return _ima_measurements_start(m, pos, &ima_measurements);
+}
+
+static void *ima_measurements_staged_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return _ima_measurements_start(m, pos, &ima_measurements_staged);
+}
+
+static void *_ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos,
+				    struct list_head *head)
+{
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
+
+	/* lock protects when reading beyond last element
+	 * against concurrent list-extension
+	 */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	qe = list_entry_rcu(qe->later.next, struct ima_queue_entry, later);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	(*pos)++;
+
+	return (&qe->later == head) ? NULL : qe;
+}
+
+static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return _ima_measurements_next(m, v, pos, &ima_measurements);
+}
+
+static void *ima_measurements_staged_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v,
+					  loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return _ima_measurements_next(m, v, pos, &ima_measurements_staged);
+}
+
+static void ima_measurements_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+}
+
+void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen)
+{
+	while (datalen--)
+		seq_putc(m, *(char *)data++);
+}
+
+/* print format:
+ *       32bit-le=pcr#
+ *       char[n]=template digest
+ *       32bit-le=template name size
+ *       char[n]=template name
+ *       [eventdata length]
+ *       eventdata[n]=template specific data
+ */
+int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+	/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
+	struct ima_template_entry *e;
+	char *template_name;
+	u32 pcr, namelen, template_data_len; /* temporary fields */
+	bool is_ima_template = false;
+	int i, algo_idx;
+
+	algo_idx = ima_sha1_idx;
+
+	if (m->file != NULL)
+		algo_idx = (unsigned long)file_inode(m->file)->i_private;
+
+	/* get entry */
+	e = qe->entry;
+	if (e == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	template_name = (e->template_desc->name[0] != '\0') ?
+	    e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
+
+	/*
+	 * 1st: PCRIndex
+	 * PCR used defaults to the same (config option) in
+	 * little-endian format, unless set in policy
+	 */
+	pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? e->pcr : (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(e->pcr);
+	ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(e->pcr));
+
+	/* 2nd: template digest */
+	ima_putc(m, e->digests[algo_idx].digest,
+		 ima_algo_array[algo_idx].digest_size);
+
+	/* 3rd: template name size */
+	namelen = !ima_canonical_fmt ? strlen(template_name) :
+		(__force u32)cpu_to_le32(strlen(template_name));
+	ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
+
+	/* 4th:  template name */
+	ima_putc(m, template_name, strlen(template_name));
+
+	/* 5th:  template length (except for 'ima' template) */
+	if (strcmp(template_name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0)
+		is_ima_template = true;
+
+	if (!is_ima_template) {
+		template_data_len = !ima_canonical_fmt ? e->template_data_len :
+			(__force u32)cpu_to_le32(e->template_data_len);
+		ima_putc(m, &template_data_len, sizeof(e->template_data_len));
+	}
+
+	/* 6th:  template specific data */
+	for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
+		enum ima_show_type show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY;
+		const struct ima_template_field *field =
+			e->template_desc->fields[i];
+
+		if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0)
+			show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN;
+		if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "n") == 0)
+			show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT;
+		field->field_show(m, show, &e->template_data[i]);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations ima_measurments_seqops = {
+	.start = ima_measurements_start,
+	.next = ima_measurements_next,
+	.stop = ima_measurements_stop,
+	.show = ima_measurements_show
+};
+
+static const struct seq_operations ima_measurments_staged_seqops = {
+	.start = ima_measurements_staged_start,
+	.next = ima_measurements_staged_next,
+	.stop = ima_measurements_stop,
+	.show = ima_measurements_show
+};
+
+static int ima_measure_lock(bool write)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+	/* Overflow check. */
+	if (!write && ima_measure_users == LONG_MAX) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+		return -ENFILE;
+	}
+
+	/* Same writer can do additional writes or read/writes. */
+	if (write && current == measure_writer) {
+		measure_writer_extra_writes++;
+		mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * ima_measure_users: > 0 open readers
+	 * ima_measure_users: == -1 open writer
+	 */
+	if ((write && ima_measure_users != 0) ||
+	    (!write && ima_measure_users < 0)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
+	if (write) {
+		ima_measure_users--;
+		/* Pointer valid, no reuse while the file descriptor is open. */
+		measure_writer = current;
+	} else {
+		ima_measure_users++;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ima_measure_unlock(bool write)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+	/* Decrement additional writes or read/writes. */
+	if (write && current == measure_writer &&
+	    measure_writer_extra_writes != 0) {
+		measure_writer_extra_writes--;
+		mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (write) {
+		ima_measure_users++;
+		measure_writer = NULL;
+	} else {
+		ima_measure_users--;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+}
+
+static int _ima_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
+				  const struct seq_operations *seq_ops)
+{
+	bool write = (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE);
+	int ret;
+
+	if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	ret = ima_measure_lock(write);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = seq_open(file, seq_ops);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		ima_measure_unlock(write);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ima_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return _ima_measurements_open(inode, file, &ima_measurments_seqops);
+}
+
+static int ima_measurements_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	bool write = (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE);
+	int ret;
+
+	/* seq_release() always returns zero. */
+	ret = seq_release(inode, file);
+
+	ima_measure_unlock(write);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ima_measurements_staged_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return _ima_measurements_open(inode, file,
+				      &ima_measurments_staged_seqops);
+}
+
+static ssize_t _ima_measurements_write(struct file *file,
+				       const char __user *buf, size_t datalen,
+				       loff_t *ppos, bool staged_interface)
+{
+	char req[STAGED_REQ_LENGTH];
+	unsigned long req_value;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (datalen < 2 || datalen > STAGED_REQ_LENGTH)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(req, buf, datalen) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (req[datalen - 1] != '\n')
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	req[datalen - 1] = '\0';
+
+	switch (req[0]) {
+	case 'A':
+		if (datalen != 2 || !staged_interface)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		ret = ima_queue_stage();
+		break;
+	case 'D':
+		if (datalen != 2 || !staged_interface)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		ret = ima_queue_staged_delete_all();
+		break;
+	default:
+		if (staged_interface)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (ima_flush_htable) {
+			pr_debug("Deleting staged N measurements not supported when flushing the hash table is requested\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		ret = kstrtoul(req, 10, &req_value);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		if (req_value == 0) {
+			pr_debug("Must delete at least one entry\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		ret = ima_queue_delete_partial(req_value);
+	}
+
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	return datalen;
+}
+
+static ssize_t ima_measurements_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				      size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return _ima_measurements_write(file, buf, datalen, ppos, false);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ima_measurements_staged_write(struct file *file,
+					     const char __user *buf,
+					     size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return _ima_measurements_write(file, buf, datalen, ppos, true);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = {
+	.open = ima_measurements_open,
+	.read = seq_read,
+	.write = ima_measurements_write,
+	.llseek = seq_lseek,
+	.release = ima_measurements_release,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_staged_ops = {
+	.open = ima_measurements_staged_open,
+	.read = seq_read,
+	.write = ima_measurements_staged_write,
+	.llseek = seq_lseek,
+	.release = ima_measurements_release,
+};
+
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+		seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i));
+}
+
+/* print in ascii */
+static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+	/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
+	struct ima_template_entry *e;
+	char *template_name;
+	int i, algo_idx;
+
+	algo_idx = ima_sha1_idx;
+
+	if (m->file != NULL)
+		algo_idx = (unsigned long)file_inode(m->file)->i_private;
+
+	/* get entry */
+	e = qe->entry;
+	if (e == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	template_name = (e->template_desc->name[0] != '\0') ?
+	    e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
+
+	/* 1st: PCR used (config option) */
+	seq_printf(m, "%2d ", e->pcr);
+
+	/* 2nd: template hash */
+	ima_print_digest(m, e->digests[algo_idx].digest,
+			 ima_algo_array[algo_idx].digest_size);
+
+	/* 3th:  template name */
+	seq_printf(m, " %s", template_name);
+
+	/* 4th:  template specific data */
+	for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+		if (e->template_data[i].len == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		e->template_desc->fields[i]->field_show(m, IMA_SHOW_ASCII,
+							&e->template_data[i]);
+	}
+	seq_puts(m, "\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations ima_ascii_measurements_seqops = {
+	.start = ima_measurements_start,
+	.next = ima_measurements_next,
+	.stop = ima_measurements_stop,
+	.show = ima_ascii_measurements_show
+};
+
+static int ima_ascii_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return _ima_measurements_open(inode, file,
+				      &ima_ascii_measurements_seqops);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
+	.open = ima_ascii_measurements_open,
+	.read = seq_read,
+	.write = ima_measurements_write,
+	.llseek = seq_lseek,
+	.release = ima_measurements_release,
+};
+
+static const struct seq_operations ima_ascii_measurements_staged_seqops = {
+	.start = ima_measurements_staged_start,
+	.next = ima_measurements_staged_next,
+	.stop = ima_measurements_stop,
+	.show = ima_ascii_measurements_show
+};
+
+static int ima_ascii_measurements_staged_open(struct inode *inode,
+					      struct file *file)
+{
+	return _ima_measurements_open(inode, file,
+				      &ima_ascii_measurements_staged_seqops);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_staged_ops = {
+	.open = ima_ascii_measurements_staged_open,
+	.read = seq_read,
+	.write = ima_measurements_staged_write,
+	.llseek = seq_lseek,
+	.release = ima_measurements_release,
+};
+
+static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
+{
+	void *data = NULL;
+	char *datap;
+	size_t size;
+	int rc, pathlen = strlen(path);
+
+	char *p;
+
+	/* remove \n */
+	datap = path;
+	strsep(&datap, "\n");
+
+	rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, 0, &data, INT_MAX, NULL,
+					READING_POLICY);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	size = rc;
+	rc = 0;
+
+	datap = data;
+	while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
+		pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p);
+		rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			break;
+		size -= rc;
+	}
+
+	vfree(data);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+	else if (size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	else
+		return pathlen;
+}
+
+static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	ssize_t result;
+
+	if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		datalen = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	result = -EINVAL;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, datalen);
+	if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		result = PTR_ERR(data);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex);
+	if (result < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	if (data[0] == '/') {
+		result = ima_read_policy(data);
+	} else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) {
+		pr_err("signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n");
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
+				    "policy_update", "signed policy required",
+				    1, 0);
+		result = -EACCES;
+	} else {
+		result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
+out_free:
+	kfree(data);
+out:
+	if (result < 0)
+		valid_policy = 0;
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *ima_dir;
+static struct dentry *ima_symlink;
+
+enum ima_fs_flags {
+	IMA_FS_BUSY,
+};
+
+static unsigned long ima_fs_flags;
+
+#ifdef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
+static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = {
+		.start = ima_policy_start,
+		.next = ima_policy_next,
+		.stop = ima_policy_stop,
+		.show = ima_policy_show,
+};
+#endif
+
+static int __init create_securityfs_measurement_lists(bool staging)
+{
+	const struct file_operations *ascii_ops = &ima_ascii_measurements_ops;
+	const struct file_operations *binary_ops = &ima_measurements_ops;
+	umode_t permissions = (S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP);
+	const char *file_suffix = "";
+	int count = NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip);
+
+	if (staging) {
+		ascii_ops = &ima_ascii_measurements_staged_ops;
+		binary_ops = &ima_measurements_staged_ops;
+		file_suffix = "_staged";
+	}
+
+	if (ima_sha1_idx >= NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip))
+		count++;
+
+	for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		u16 algo = ima_algo_array[i].algo;
+		char file_name[NAME_MAX + 1];
+		struct dentry *dentry;
+
+		if (algo == HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			snprintf(file_name, sizeof(file_name),
+				 "ascii_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_%x%s",
+				 ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id,
+				 file_suffix);
+		else
+			snprintf(file_name, sizeof(file_name),
+				 "ascii_runtime_measurements_%s%s",
+				 hash_algo_name[algo], file_suffix);
+		dentry = securityfs_create_file(file_name, permissions,
+						ima_dir, (void *)(uintptr_t)i,
+						ascii_ops);
+		if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+			return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+
+		if (algo == HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			snprintf(file_name, sizeof(file_name),
+				 "binary_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_%x%s",
+				 ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id,
+				 file_suffix);
+		else
+			snprintf(file_name, sizeof(file_name),
+				 "binary_runtime_measurements_%s%s",
+				 hash_algo_name[algo], file_suffix);
+
+		dentry = securityfs_create_file(file_name, permissions,
+						ima_dir, (void *)(uintptr_t)i,
+						binary_ops);
+		if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+			return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init create_securityfs_staging_links(void)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_symlink("binary_runtime_measurements_staged",
+		ima_dir, "binary_runtime_measurements_sha1_staged", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+		return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_symlink("ascii_runtime_measurements_staged",
+		ima_dir, "ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1_staged", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+		return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
+ */
+static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) {
+#ifndef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
+		return -EACCES;
+#else
+		if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY)
+			return -EACCES;
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			return -EPERM;
+		return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops);
+#endif
+	}
+	if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags))
+		return -EBUSY;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_release_policy - start using the new measure policy rules.
+ *
+ * Initially, ima_measure points to the default policy rules, now
+ * point to the new policy rules, and remove the securityfs policy file,
+ * assuming a valid policy.
+ */
+static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed";
+
+	if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
+		return seq_release(inode, file);
+
+	if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) {
+		cause = "failed";
+		valid_policy = 0;
+	}
+
+	pr_info("policy update %s\n", cause);
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
+			    "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0);
+
+	if (!valid_policy) {
+		ima_delete_rules();
+		valid_policy = 1;
+		clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ima_update_policy();
+#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
+	securityfs_remove(file->f_path.dentry);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
+	clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
+	inode->i_mode &= ~S_IWUSR;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
+	.open = ima_open_policy,
+	.write = ima_write_policy,
+	.read = seq_read,
+	.release = ima_release_policy,
+	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+int __init ima_fs_init(void)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = integrity_fs_init();
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir);
+	if (IS_ERR(ima_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(ima_dir);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", NULL, "integrity/ima",
+						NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(ima_symlink)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(ima_symlink);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = create_securityfs_measurement_lists(false);
+	if (ret == 0 && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_STAGING)) {
+		ret = create_securityfs_measurement_lists(true);
+		if (ret == 0)
+			ret = create_securityfs_staging_links();
+	}
+
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_symlink("binary_runtime_measurements", ima_dir,
+				      "binary_runtime_measurements_sha1", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_symlink("ascii_runtime_measurements", ima_dir,
+				      "ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count",
+				   S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
+				   &ima_measurements_count_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
+				   ima_dir, NULL, &ima_num_violations_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
+					    ima_dir, NULL,
+					    &ima_measure_policy_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	securityfs_remove(ima_symlink);
+	securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
+	integrity_fs_fini();
+
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..00b249101
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: ima_iint.c
+ *	- implements the IMA hook: ima_inode_free
+ *	- cache integrity information in the inode security blob
+ */
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *ima_iint_cache __ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * ima_iint_find - Return the iint associated with an inode
+ * @inode: Pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Return the IMA integrity information (iint) associated with an inode, if the
+ * inode was processed by IMA.
+ *
+ * Return: Found iint or NULL.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return ima_inode_get_iint(inode);
+}
+
+#define IMA_MAX_NESTING (FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH + 1)
+
+/*
+ * It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it measures
+ * files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to annotate the iint
+ * mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to IMA + overlayfs.
+ * See ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() for more details.
+ */
+static inline void ima_iint_lockdep_annotate(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+					     struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
+	static struct lock_class_key ima_iint_mutex_key[IMA_MAX_NESTING];
+
+	int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= IMA_MAX_NESTING))
+		depth = 0;
+
+	lockdep_set_class(&iint->mutex, &ima_iint_mutex_key[depth]);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void ima_iint_init_always(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				 struct inode *inode)
+{
+	iint->ima_hash = NULL;
+	iint->real_inode.version = 0;
+	iint->flags = 0UL;
+	iint->atomic_flags = 0UL;
+	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+	mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
+	ima_iint_lockdep_annotate(iint, inode);
+}
+
+static void ima_iint_free(struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	kfree(iint->ima_hash);
+	mutex_destroy(&iint->mutex);
+	kmem_cache_free(ima_iint_cache, iint);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_get - Find or allocate an iint associated with an inode
+ * @inode: Pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Find an iint associated with an inode, and allocate a new one if not found.
+ * Caller must lock i_mutex.
+ *
+ * Return: An iint on success, NULL on error.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+	if (iint)
+		return iint;
+
+	iint = kmem_cache_alloc(ima_iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!iint)
+		return NULL;
+
+	ima_iint_init_always(iint, inode);
+
+	inode->i_flags |= S_IMA;
+	ima_inode_set_iint(inode, iint);
+
+	return iint;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_free_rcu - Called to free an inode via a RCU callback
+ * @inode_security: The inode->i_security pointer
+ *
+ * Free the IMA data associated with an inode.
+ */
+void ima_inode_free_rcu(void *inode_security)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache **iint_p = inode_security + ima_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+
+	/* *iint_p should be NULL if !IS_IMA(inode) */
+	if (*iint_p)
+		ima_iint_free(*iint_p);
+}
+
+static void ima_iint_init_once(void *foo)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = (struct ima_iint_cache *)foo;
+
+	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
+}
+
+void __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
+{
+	ima_iint_cache =
+	    kmem_cache_create("ima_iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache),
+			      0, SLAB_PANIC, ima_iint_init_once);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7e0aa09a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Reiner Sailer      <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar         <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: ima_init.c
+ *             initialization and cleanup functions
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/* name for boot aggregate entry */
+const char boot_aggregate_name[] = "boot_aggregate";
+struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
+
+/* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend
+ * the PCR register.
+ *
+ * Calculate the boot aggregate, a hash over tpm registers 0-7,
+ * assuming a TPM chip exists, and zeroes if the TPM chip does not
+ * exist.  Add the boot aggregate measurement to the measurement
+ * list and extend the PCR register.
+ *
+ * If a tpm chip does not exist, indicate the core root of trust is
+ * not hardware based by invalidating the aggregate PCR value.
+ * (The aggregate PCR value is invalidated by adding one value to
+ * the measurement list and extending the aggregate PCR value with
+ * a different value.) Violations add a zero entry to the measurement
+ * list and extend the aggregate PCR value with ff...ff's.
+ */
+static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
+{
+	static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	struct ima_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
+					     .filename = boot_aggregate_name };
+	struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+	struct ima_digest_data *hash_hdr = container_of(&hash.hdr,
+						struct ima_digest_data, hdr);
+	int result = -ENOMEM;
+	int violation = 0;
+
+	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
+	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+	iint->ima_hash = hash_hdr;
+	iint->ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
+	iint->ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+
+	/*
+	 * With TPM 2.0 hash agility, TPM chips could support multiple TPM
+	 * PCR banks, allowing firmware to configure and enable different
+	 * banks.  The SHA1 bank is not necessarily enabled.
+	 *
+	 * Use the same hash algorithm for reading the TPM PCRs as for
+	 * calculating the boot aggregate digest.  Preference is given to
+	 * the configured IMA default hash algorithm.  Otherwise, use the
+	 * TCG required banks - SHA256 for TPM 2.0, SHA1 for TPM 1.2.
+	 * Ultimately select SHA1 also for TPM 2.0 if the SHA256 PCR bank
+	 * is not found.
+	 */
+	if (ima_tpm_chip) {
+		result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(hash_hdr);
+		if (result < 0) {
+			audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+			goto err_out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, NULL);
+	if (result < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
+				    boot_aggregate_name,
+				    CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
+	if (result < 0) {
+		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
+		audit_cause = "store_entry";
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+	return 0;
+err_out:
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, op,
+			    audit_cause, result, 0);
+	return result;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
+void __init ima_load_x509(void)
+{
+	int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
+
+	ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
+	integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH);
+
+	/* load also EVM key to avoid appraisal */
+	evm_load_x509();
+
+	ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
+}
+#endif
+
+int __init ima_init(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	ima_tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip();
+	if (!ima_tpm_chip)
+		pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
+
+	rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ima_init_crypto();
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = ima_init_template();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* It can be called before ima_init_digests(), it does not use TPM. */
+	ima_load_kexec_buffer();
+
+	rc = ima_init_digests();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ima_init_htable();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ima_add_boot_aggregate();	/* boot aggregate must be first entry */
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	ima_init_policy();
+
+	rc = ima_fs_init();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	ima_init_key_queue();
+
+	ima_init_reboot_notifier();
+
+	ima_measure_critical_data("kernel_info", "kernel_version",
+				  UTS_RELEASE, strlen(UTS_RELEASE), false,
+				  NULL, 0);
+
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d845693a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/of.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
+#include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
+#define IMA_KEXEC_EVENT_LEN 256
+
+static bool ima_kexec_update_registered;
+static struct seq_file ima_kexec_file;
+static size_t kexec_segment_size;
+static void *ima_kexec_buffer;
+
+static void ima_free_kexec_file_buf(struct seq_file *sf)
+{
+	vfree(sf->buf);
+	sf->buf = NULL;
+	sf->size = 0;
+	sf->read_pos = 0;
+	sf->count = 0;
+}
+
+void ima_measure_kexec_event(const char *event_name)
+{
+	char ima_kexec_event[IMA_KEXEC_EVENT_LEN];
+	size_t buf_size = 0;
+	long len;
+	int n;
+
+	buf_size = ima_get_binary_runtime_size(BINARY_FULL);
+	len = atomic_long_read(&ima_num_records[BINARY_FULL]);
+
+	n = scnprintf(ima_kexec_event, IMA_KEXEC_EVENT_LEN,
+		      "kexec_segment_size=%lu;ima_binary_runtime_size=%lu;"
+		      "ima_runtime_measurements_count=%ld;",
+		      kexec_segment_size, buf_size, len);
+
+	ima_measure_critical_data("ima_kexec", event_name, ima_kexec_event, n, false, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int ima_alloc_kexec_file_buf(size_t segment_size)
+{
+	/*
+	 * kexec 'load' may be called multiple times.
+	 * Free and realloc the buffer only if the segment_size is
+	 * changed from the previous kexec 'load' call.
+	 */
+	if (ima_kexec_file.buf && ima_kexec_file.size == segment_size)
+		goto out;
+
+	ima_free_kexec_file_buf(&ima_kexec_file);
+
+	/* segment size can't change between kexec load and execute */
+	ima_kexec_file.buf = vmalloc(segment_size);
+	if (!ima_kexec_file.buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ima_kexec_file.size = segment_size;
+
+out:
+	ima_kexec_file.read_pos = 0;
+	ima_kexec_file.count = sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr);	/* reserved space */
+	ima_measure_kexec_event("kexec_load");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ima_dump_measurement(struct ima_kexec_hdr *khdr,
+				struct ima_queue_entry *qe)
+{
+	if (ima_kexec_file.count >= ima_kexec_file.size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	khdr->count++;
+	ima_measurements_show(&ima_kexec_file, qe);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ima_dump_measurement_list(unsigned long *buffer_size, void **buffer,
+				     unsigned long segment_size)
+{
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
+	struct ima_kexec_hdr khdr;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/* segment size can't change between kexec load and execute */
+	if (!ima_kexec_file.buf) {
+		pr_err("Kexec file buf not allocated\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	memset(&khdr, 0, sizeof(khdr));
+	khdr.version = 1;
+	/*
+	 * Lockless walks possible due to strict ordering of the reboot
+	 * notifiers, suspending measurement before dump, and forbidding
+	 * staging/deleting (list mutations) after suspend.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry(qe, &ima_measurements_staged, later) {
+		ret = ima_dump_measurement(&khdr, qe);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry(qe, &ima_measurements, later) {
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = ima_dump_measurement(&khdr, qe);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * fill in reserved space with some buffer details
+	 * (eg. version, buffer size, number of measurements)
+	 */
+	khdr.buffer_size = ima_kexec_file.count;
+	if (ima_canonical_fmt) {
+		khdr.version = cpu_to_le16(khdr.version);
+		khdr.count = cpu_to_le64(khdr.count);
+		khdr.buffer_size = cpu_to_le64(khdr.buffer_size);
+	}
+	memcpy(ima_kexec_file.buf, &khdr, sizeof(khdr));
+
+	print_hex_dump_debug("ima dump: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
+			     ima_kexec_file.buf, ima_kexec_file.count < 100 ?
+			     ima_kexec_file.count : 100,
+			     true);
+
+	*buffer_size = ima_kexec_file.count;
+	*buffer = ima_kexec_file.buf;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called during kexec_file_load so that IMA can add a segment to the kexec
+ * image for the measurement list for the next kernel.
+ *
+ * This function assumes that kexec_lock is held.
+ */
+void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	struct kexec_buf kbuf = { .image = image, .buf_align = PAGE_SIZE,
+				  .buf_min = 0, .buf_max = ULONG_MAX,
+				  .top_down = true };
+	unsigned long binary_runtime_size;
+	unsigned long extra_memory;
+
+	/* use more understandable variable names than defined in kbuf */
+	size_t kexec_buffer_size = 0;
+	void *kexec_buffer = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Reserve extra memory for measurements added during kexec.
+	 */
+	if (CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC_EXTRA_MEMORY_KB <= 0)
+		extra_memory = PAGE_SIZE / 2;
+	else
+		extra_memory = CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC_EXTRA_MEMORY_KB * 1024;
+
+	binary_runtime_size = ima_get_binary_runtime_size(BINARY) +
+			      ima_get_binary_runtime_size(BINARY_STAGED) +
+			      extra_memory;
+
+	if (binary_runtime_size >= ULONG_MAX - PAGE_SIZE)
+		kexec_segment_size = ULONG_MAX;
+	else
+		kexec_segment_size = ALIGN(binary_runtime_size, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	if ((kexec_segment_size == ULONG_MAX) ||
+	    ((kexec_segment_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) > totalram_pages() / 2)) {
+		pr_err("Binary measurement list too large.\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ret = ima_alloc_kexec_file_buf(kexec_segment_size);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_err("Not enough memory for the kexec measurement buffer.\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	kbuf.buffer = kexec_buffer;
+	kbuf.bufsz = kexec_buffer_size;
+	kbuf.memsz = kexec_segment_size;
+	image->is_ima_segment_index_set = false;
+	ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("Error passing over kexec measurement buffer.\n");
+		vfree(kexec_buffer);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	image->ima_buffer_addr = kbuf.mem;
+	image->ima_buffer_size = kexec_segment_size;
+	image->ima_buffer = kexec_buffer;
+	image->ima_segment_index = image->nr_segments - 1;
+	image->is_ima_segment_index_set = true;
+
+	kexec_dprintk("kexec measurement buffer for the loaded kernel at 0x%lx.\n",
+		      kbuf.mem);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called during kexec execute so that IMA can update the measurement list.
+ */
+static int ima_update_kexec_buffer(struct notifier_block *self,
+				   unsigned long action, void *data)
+{
+	size_t buf_size = 0;
+	int ret = NOTIFY_OK;
+	void *buf = NULL;
+
+	if (!kexec_in_progress) {
+		pr_info("No kexec in progress.\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (!ima_kexec_buffer) {
+		pr_err("Kexec buffer not set.\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = ima_dump_measurement_list(&buf_size, &buf, kexec_segment_size);
+
+	if (ret)
+		pr_err("Dump measurements failed. Error:%d\n", ret);
+
+	if (buf_size != 0)
+		memcpy(ima_kexec_buffer, buf, buf_size);
+
+	kimage_unmap_segment(ima_kexec_buffer);
+	ima_kexec_buffer = NULL;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block update_buffer_nb = {
+	.notifier_call = ima_update_kexec_buffer,
+	.priority = INT_MIN
+};
+
+/*
+ * Create a mapping for the source pages that contain the IMA buffer
+ * so we can update it later.
+ */
+void ima_kexec_post_load(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	if (ima_kexec_buffer) {
+		kimage_unmap_segment(ima_kexec_buffer);
+		ima_kexec_buffer = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!image->ima_buffer_addr)
+		return;
+
+	ima_kexec_buffer = kimage_map_segment(image, image->ima_segment_index);
+	if (!ima_kexec_buffer) {
+		pr_err("Could not map measurements buffer.\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!ima_kexec_update_registered) {
+		register_reboot_notifier(&update_buffer_nb);
+		ima_kexec_update_registered = true;
+	}
+}
+
+#endif /* IMA_KEXEC */
+
+/*
+ * Restore the measurement list from the previous kernel.
+ */
+void __init ima_load_kexec_buffer(void)
+{
+	void *kexec_buffer = NULL;
+	size_t kexec_buffer_size = 0;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = ima_get_kexec_buffer(&kexec_buffer, &kexec_buffer_size);
+	switch (rc) {
+	case 0:
+		rc = ima_restore_measurement_list(kexec_buffer_size,
+						  kexec_buffer);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			pr_err("Failed to restore the measurement list: %d\n",
+				rc);
+
+		ima_free_kexec_buffer();
+		break;
+	case -ENOTSUPP:
+		pr_debug("Restoring the measurement list not supported\n");
+		break;
+	case -ENOENT:
+		pr_debug("No measurement list to restore\n");
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_debug("Error restoring the measurement list: %d\n", rc);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_validate_range - verify a physical buffer lies in addressable RAM
+ * @phys: physical start address of the buffer from previous kernel
+ * @size: size of the buffer
+ *
+ * On success return 0. On failure returns -EINVAL so callers can skip
+ * restoring.
+ */
+int ima_validate_range(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size)
+{
+	unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn;
+	phys_addr_t end_phys;
+
+	if (check_add_overflow(phys, (phys_addr_t)size - 1, &end_phys))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	start_pfn = PHYS_PFN(phys);
+	end_pfn = PHYS_PFN(end_phys);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+	if (!pfn_range_is_mapped(start_pfn, end_pfn))
+#else
+	if (!page_is_ram(start_pfn) || !page_is_ram(end_pfn))
+#endif
+	{
+		pr_warn("IMA: previous kernel measurement buffer %pa (size 0x%zx) lies outside available memory\n",
+			&phys, size);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5cea53fc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1341 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Integrity Measurement Architecture
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: ima_main.c
+ *	implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
+ *	and ima_file_check.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/iversion.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
+int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+#else
+int ima_appraise;
+#endif
+
+int __ro_after_init ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+static int hash_setup_done;
+static int ima_disabled __ro_after_init;
+
+static struct notifier_block ima_lsm_policy_notifier = {
+	.notifier_call = ima_lsm_policy_change,
+};
+
+static int __init ima_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (!is_kdump_kernel()) {
+		pr_info("Warning: ima setup option only permitted in kdump");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
+		ima_disabled = 1;
+	else if (strncmp(str, "on", 2) == 0)
+		ima_disabled = 0;
+	else
+		pr_err("Invalid ima setup option: \"%s\" , please specify ima=on|off.", str);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima=", ima_setup);
+
+static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
+{
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+	int i;
+
+	if (hash_setup_done)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
+		if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0) {
+			ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		} else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) {
+			ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+		} else {
+			pr_err("invalid hash algorithm \"%s\" for template \"%s\"",
+				str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, str);
+	if (i < 0) {
+		pr_err("invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", str);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	ima_hash_algo = i;
+out:
+	hash_setup_done = 1;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
+
+enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
+{
+	return ima_hash_algo;
+}
+
+/* Prevent mmap'ing a file execute that is already mmap'ed write */
+static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
+				char **pathbuf, const char **pathname,
+				char *filename)
+{
+	struct inode *inode;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if ((func == MMAP_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) &&
+	    mapping_writably_mapped(file->f_mapping)) {
+		rc = -ETXTBSY;
+		inode = file_inode(file);
+
+		if (!*pathbuf)	/* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
+			*pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf,
+					       filename);
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, *pathname,
+				    "mmap_file", "mmapped_writers", rc, 0);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_rdwr_violation_check
+ *
+ * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
+ *	- Opening a file for write when already open for read,
+ *	  results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ *	- Opening a file for read when already open for write,
+ *	  could result in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ */
+static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
+				     struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				     int must_measure,
+				     char **pathbuf,
+				     const char **pathname,
+				     char *filename)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+	bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
+
+	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+		if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
+			if (!iint)
+				iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+
+			/* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
+			if (iint && test_and_clear_bit(IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU,
+						       &iint->atomic_flags))
+				send_tomtou = true;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (must_measure)
+			set_bit(IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
+		/* Limit number of open_writers violations */
+		if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && must_measure) {
+			if (!test_and_set_bit(IMA_EMITTED_OPENWRITERS,
+					      &iint->atomic_flags))
+				send_writers = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
+		return;
+
+	*pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, filename);
+
+	if (send_tomtou)
+		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
+				  "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
+	if (send_writers)
+		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
+				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Detect file change based on STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE, when supported, and
+ * fallback to detecting file change based on i_version. On filesystems
+ * which do not support either, assume the file changed.
+ */
+static bool ima_detect_file_change(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				   struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct kstat stat;
+	int result;
+
+	result = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat, STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
+				   AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT);
+
+	if (!result && stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE)
+		return stat.change_cookie != iint->real_inode.version;
+
+	if (IS_I_VERSION(inode))
+		return !inode_eq_iversion(inode, iint->real_inode.version);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				  struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+	bool update;
+
+	if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
+		return;
+
+	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
+		clear_bit(IMA_EMITTED_OPENWRITERS, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
+		update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR,
+					    &iint->atomic_flags);
+
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE ||
+		    ima_detect_file_change(iint, inode, file)) {
+			iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
+			iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+			if (update)
+				ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
+ * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
+ *
+ * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
+ */
+static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return;
+
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return;
+
+	ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
+}
+
+static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct lsm_prop *prop, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+			       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+			       bool bprm_is_check)
+{
+	struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
+	struct inode *metadata_inode;
+	char *pathbuf = NULL;
+	char filename[NAME_MAX];
+	const char *pathname = NULL;
+	int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0;
+	int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
+	struct modsig *modsig = NULL;
+	int xattr_len = 0;
+	bool violation_check;
+	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
+	unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
+
+	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action
+	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
+	 * Included is the appraise submask.
+	 */
+	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, prop,
+				mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
+				&allowed_algos);
+	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||
+			    func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) &&
+			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE) &&
+			   ((action & IMA_MEASURE) ||
+			    (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)));
+	if (!action && !violation_check)
+		return 0;
+
+	must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
+
+	/*  Is the appraise rule hook specific?  */
+	if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE)
+		func = FILE_CHECK;
+
+	inode_lock(inode);
+
+	if (action) {
+		iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
+		if (!iint)
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (!rc && violation_check)
+		ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE,
+					 &pathbuf, &pathname, filename);
+
+	inode_unlock(inode);
+
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+	if (!action)
+		goto out;
+
+	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
+		/*
+		 * Reset appraisal flags (action and non-action rule-specific)
+		 * if ima_inode_post_setattr was called.
+		 */
+		iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
+				 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
+				 IMA_NONACTION_RULE_FLAGS);
+
+	/*
+	 * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the
+	 * kernel has no way of detecting file change on the filesystem.
+	 * (Limited to privileged mounted filesystems.)
+	 */
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) ||
+	    ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) &&
+	     !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) &&
+	     !(action & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) {
+		iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+		iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * On stacked filesystems, detect and re-evaluate file data and
+	 * metadata changes.
+	 */
+	real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
+	if (real_inode != inode &&
+	    (action & IMA_DO_MASK) && (iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK)) {
+		if (!IS_I_VERSION(real_inode) ||
+		    integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->real_inode,
+						  real_inode)) {
+			iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+			iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Reset the EVM status when metadata changed.
+		 */
+		metadata_inode = d_inode(d_real(file_dentry(file),
+					 D_REAL_METADATA));
+		if (evm_metadata_changed(inode, metadata_inode))
+			iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISED |
+					 IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK);
+	}
+
+	/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
+	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
+	 *  IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
+	 */
+	iint->flags |= action;
+	action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
+	action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
+
+	/* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */
+	if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)))
+		action ^= IMA_MEASURE;
+
+	/* HASH sets the digital signature and update flags, nothing else */
+	if ((action & IMA_HASH) &&
+	    !(test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))) {
+		xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file),
+					   &xattr_value, xattr_len);
+		if ((xattr_value && xattr_len > 2) &&
+		    (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
+			set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+		iint->flags |= IMA_HASHED;
+		action ^= IMA_HASH;
+		set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
+	}
+
+	/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
+	if (!action) {
+		if (must_appraise) {
+			rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf,
+						  &pathname, filename);
+			if (!rc)
+				rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, func);
+		}
+		goto out_locked;
+	}
+
+	if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
+	    strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
+		/* read 'security.ima' */
+		xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file),
+					   &xattr_value, xattr_len);
+
+		/*
+		 * Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy, and allow
+		 * an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the
+		 * template format and whether the file was already measured.
+		 */
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) {
+			rc = ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
+
+			if (!rc && ima_template_has_modsig(template_desc) &&
+			    iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
+				action |= IMA_MEASURE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
+
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
+	if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
+		goto out_locked;
+
+	/* Defer measuring/appraising kernel modules to READING_MODULE */
+	if (read_id == READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED) {
+		must_appraise = 0;
+		goto out_locked;
+	}
+
+	if (!pathbuf)	/* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
+		pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
+
+	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
+		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
+				      xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr,
+				      template_desc);
+	if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
+		rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr);
+		if (rc != -EPERM) {
+			inode_lock(inode);
+			rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file,
+						      pathname, xattr_value,
+						      xattr_len, modsig,
+						      bprm_is_check);
+			inode_unlock(inode);
+		}
+		if (!rc)
+			rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf,
+						  &pathname, filename);
+	}
+	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
+		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
+
+	if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
+		rc = 0;
+
+	/* Ensure the digest was generated using an allowed algorithm */
+	if (rc == 0 && must_appraise && allowed_algos != 0 &&
+	    (allowed_algos & (1U << hash_algo)) == 0) {
+		rc = -EACCES;
+
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, file_inode(file),
+				    pathname, "collect_data",
+				    "denied-hash-algorithm", rc, 0);
+	}
+out_locked:
+	if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) &&
+	     !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
+		rc = -EACCES;
+	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+	kfree(xattr_value);
+	ima_free_modsig(modsig);
+out:
+	if (pathbuf)
+		__putname(pathbuf);
+	if (must_appraise) {
+		if (rc && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+			return -EACCES;
+		if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+			set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
+ * @reqprot: protection requested by the application
+ * @prot: protection that will be applied by the kernel
+ * @flags: operational flags
+ *
+ * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
+ * policy decision.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!file)
+		return 0;
+
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+
+	if (reqprot & PROT_EXEC) {
+		ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
+					  0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, 0,
+					  false);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
+					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0, false);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_file_mprotect - based on policy, limit mprotect change
+ * @vma: vm_area_struct protection is set to
+ * @reqprot: protection requested by the application
+ * @prot: protection that will be applied by the kernel
+ *
+ * Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
+ * IMA's mmap appraisal policy rules.  Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
+ * would be taken before i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at
+ * this point.  Eliminate this integrity gap by denying the mprotect
+ * PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists.
+ *
+ * On mprotect change success, return 0.  On failure, return -EACESS.
+ */
+static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot)
+{
+	struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
+	struct file *file;
+	char filename[NAME_MAX];
+	char *pathbuf = NULL;
+	const char *pathname = NULL;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+	int result = 0;
+	int action;
+	int pcr;
+
+	/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
+	if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !vma->vm_file ||
+	    !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
+		return 0;
+
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
+	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
+				current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
+				&pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
+	action |= ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
+				 current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC,
+				 MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, &pcr, &template, NULL,
+				 NULL);
+
+	/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
+	if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+		result = -EPERM;
+
+	file = vma->vm_file;
+	pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, pathname,
+			    "collect_data", "failed-mprotect", result, 0);
+	if (pathbuf)
+		__putname(pathbuf);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
+ *
+ * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
+ * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
+ * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
+ * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
+ * what is being executed.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(),
+				   &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0,
+				   bprm->is_check);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_creds_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
+ * @file: contains the file descriptor of the binary being executed
+ *
+ * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
+ * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
+ * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
+ * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
+ * what is being executed.
+ *
+ * The difference from ima_bprm_check() is that ima_creds_check() is invoked
+ * only after determining the final binary to be executed without interpreter,
+ * and not when searching for intermediate binaries. The reason is that since
+ * commit 56305aa9b6fab ("exec: Compute file based creds only once"), the
+ * credentials to be applied to the process are calculated only at that stage
+ * (bprm_creds_from_file security hook instead of bprm_check_security).
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_creds_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
+{
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement((struct file *)file, bprm->cred, &prop, NULL,
+				   0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, 0, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_bprm_creds_for_exec - collect/store/appraise measurement.
+ * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
+ *
+ * Based on the IMA policy and the execveat(2) AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag, measure
+ * and appraise the integrity of a file to be executed by script interpreters.
+ * Unlike any of the other LSM hooks where the kernel enforces file integrity,
+ * enforcing file integrity is left up to the discretion of the script
+ * interpreter (userspace).
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * As security_bprm_check() is called multiple times, both
+	 * the script and the shebang interpreter are measured, appraised,
+	 * and audited. Limit usage of this LSM hook to just measuring,
+	 * appraising, and auditing the indirect script execution
+	 * (e.g. ./sh example.sh).
+	 */
+	if (!bprm->is_check)
+		return 0;
+
+	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_file_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
+ * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC or MAY_APPEND
+ *
+ * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
+				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
+					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, 0, false);
+}
+
+static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
+			    size_t buf_size)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL, tmp_iint;
+	int rc, hash_algo;
+
+	if (ima_policy_flag) {
+		iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+		if (iint)
+			mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+	}
+
+	if ((!iint || !(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) && file) {
+		if (iint)
+			mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+
+		memset(&tmp_iint, 0, sizeof(tmp_iint));
+		mutex_init(&tmp_iint.mutex);
+
+		rc = ima_collect_measurement(&tmp_iint, file, NULL, 0,
+					     ima_hash_algo, NULL);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			/* ima_hash could be allocated in case of failure. */
+			if (rc != -ENOMEM)
+				kfree(tmp_iint.ima_hash);
+
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		}
+
+		iint = &tmp_iint;
+		mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+	}
+
+	if (!iint)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/*
+	 * ima_file_hash can be called when ima_collect_measurement has still
+	 * not been called, we might not always have a hash.
+	 */
+	if (!iint->ima_hash || !(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	if (buf) {
+		size_t copied_size;
+
+		copied_size = min_t(size_t, iint->ima_hash->length, buf_size);
+		memcpy(buf, iint->ima_hash->digest, copied_size);
+	}
+	hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
+	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+
+	if (iint == &tmp_iint)
+		kfree(iint->ima_hash);
+
+	return hash_algo;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_file_hash - return a measurement of the file
+ * @file: pointer to the file
+ * @buf: buffer in which to store the hash
+ * @buf_size: length of the buffer
+ *
+ * On success, return the hash algorithm (as defined in the enum hash_algo).
+ * If buf is not NULL, this function also outputs the hash into buf.
+ * If the hash is larger than buf_size, then only buf_size bytes will be copied.
+ * It generally just makes sense to pass a buffer capable of holding the largest
+ * possible hash: IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE.
+ * The file hash returned is based on the entire file, including the appended
+ * signature.
+ *
+ * If the measurement cannot be performed, return -EOPNOTSUPP.
+ * If the parameters are incorrect, return -EINVAL.
+ */
+int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
+{
+	if (!file)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return __ima_inode_hash(file_inode(file), file, buf, buf_size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_hash);
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_hash - return the stored measurement if the inode has been hashed
+ * and is in the iint cache.
+ * @inode: pointer to the inode
+ * @buf: buffer in which to store the hash
+ * @buf_size: length of the buffer
+ *
+ * On success, return the hash algorithm (as defined in the enum hash_algo).
+ * If buf is not NULL, this function also outputs the hash into buf.
+ * If the hash is larger than buf_size, then only buf_size bytes will be copied.
+ * It generally just makes sense to pass a buffer capable of holding the largest
+ * possible hash: IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE.
+ * The hash returned is based on the entire contents, including the appended
+ * signature.
+ *
+ * If IMA is disabled or if no measurement is available, return -EOPNOTSUPP.
+ * If the parameters are incorrect, return -EINVAL.
+ */
+int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
+{
+	if (!inode)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return __ima_inode_hash(inode, NULL, buf, buf_size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
+
+/**
+ * ima_post_create_tmpfile - mark newly created tmpfile as new
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: inode of the newly created tmpfile
+ *
+ * No measuring, appraising or auditing of newly created tmpfiles is needed.
+ * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
+ * tmpfiles are in policy.
+ */
+static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct inode *inode)
+
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+	int must_appraise;
+
+	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return;
+
+	must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(idmap, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
+					  FILE_CHECK);
+	if (!must_appraise)
+		return;
+
+	/* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
+	iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return;
+
+	/* needed for writing the security xattrs */
+	set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
+	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dentry: newly created dentry
+ *
+ * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
+ * file data can be written later.
+ */
+static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	int must_appraise;
+
+	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return;
+
+	must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(idmap, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
+					  FILE_CHECK);
+	if (!must_appraise)
+		return;
+
+	/* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
+	iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return;
+
+	/* needed for re-opening empty files */
+	iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
+ * @read_id: caller identifier
+ * @contents: whether a subsequent call will be made to ima_post_read_file()
+ *
+ * Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written
+ * in terms of the policy identifier.  Appraising the integrity of
+ * a file requires a file descriptor.
+ *
+ * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+			 bool contents)
+{
+	enum ima_hooks func;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
+	 * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion
+	 * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two
+	 * buffers? It may be desirable to include the buffer address
+	 * in this API and walk all the dma_map_single() mappings to check.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * There will be a call made to ima_post_read_file() with
+	 * a filled buffer, so we don't need to perform an extra
+	 * read early here.
+	 */
+	if (contents)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
+	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
+				   MAY_READ, func, 0, false);
+}
+
+const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
+	[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
+	[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
+	[READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED] = MODULE_CHECK,
+	[READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
+	[READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
+	[READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK
+};
+
+/**
+ * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
+ * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
+ * @size: size of in memory file contents
+ * @read_id: caller identifier
+ *
+ * Measure/appraise/audit in memory file based on policy.  Policy rules
+ * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+{
+	enum ima_hooks func;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+
+	/* permit signed certs */
+	if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */
+		if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+			return -EACCES;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, buf, size,
+				   MAY_READ, func, read_id, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
+ * @id: kernel load data caller identifier
+ * @contents: whether the full contents will be available in a later
+ *	      call to ima_post_load_data().
+ *
+ * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the
+ * data provided by userspace.  Enforce policy rules requiring a file
+ * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image).
+ *
+ * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+{
+	bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
+
+	ima_enforce =
+		(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) == IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+
+	switch (id) {
+	case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG) && arch_get_secureboot()) {
+			pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+
+		if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC)) {
+			pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
+			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+		}
+		break;
+	case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
+		if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && !contents) {
+			pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
+			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+		}
+		break;
+	case LOADING_MODULE:
+		sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
+
+		if (ima_enforce && (!sig_enforce
+				    && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES))) {
+			pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
+			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_post_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
+ * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
+ * @size: size of in memory file contents
+ * @load_id: kernel load data caller identifier
+ * @description: @load_id-specific description of contents
+ *
+ * Measure/appraise/audit in memory buffer based on policy.  Policy rules
+ * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
+			      char *description)
+{
+	if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
+		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
+		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+			pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
+			return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Measure the init_module syscall buffer containing the ELF image.
+	 */
+	if (load_id == LOADING_MODULE)
+		ima_measure_critical_data("modules", "init_module",
+					  buf, size, true, NULL, 0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
+ * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
+ * @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
+ * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
+ * @func: IMA hook
+ * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement
+ * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
+ * @buf_hash: measure buffer data hash
+ * @digest: buffer digest will be written to
+ * @digest_len: buffer length
+ *
+ * Based on policy, either the buffer data or buffer data hash is measured
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, 1 if the digest
+ * has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry,
+ * a negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			       struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
+			       const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
+			       int pcr, const char *func_data,
+			       bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+	struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
+	struct ima_iint_cache iint = {};
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
+					    .filename = eventname,
+					    .buf = buf,
+					    .buf_len = size};
+	struct ima_template_desc *template;
+	struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+	struct ima_digest_data *hash_hdr = container_of(&hash.hdr,
+						struct ima_digest_data, hdr);
+	char digest_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+	int violation = 0;
+	int action = 0;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+
+	if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!ima_policy_flag && !digest)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	template = ima_template_desc_buf();
+	if (!template) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		audit_cause = "ima_template_desc_buf";
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Both LSM hooks and auxiliary based buffer measurements are
+	 * based on policy. To avoid code duplication, differentiate
+	 * between the LSM hooks and auxiliary buffer measurements,
+	 * retrieving the policy rule information only for the LSM hook
+	 * buffer measurements.
+	 */
+	if (func) {
+		security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+		action = ima_get_action(idmap, inode, current_cred(),
+					&prop, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+					func_data, NULL);
+		if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
+			return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (!pcr)
+		pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
+
+	iint.ima_hash = hash_hdr;
+	iint.ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
+	iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+
+	ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (buf_hash) {
+		memcpy(digest_hash, hash_hdr->digest, digest_hash_len);
+
+		ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(digest_hash, digest_hash_len,
+					   iint.ima_hash);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		event_data.buf = digest_hash;
+		event_data.buf_len = digest_hash_len;
+	}
+
+	if (digest)
+		memcpy(digest, iint.ima_hash->digest, digest_hash_len);
+
+	if (!ima_policy_flag || (func && !(action & IMA_MEASURE)))
+		return 1;
+
+	ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, event_data.buf, pcr);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "store_entry";
+		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (ret < 0)
+		integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname,
+					func_measure_str(func),
+					audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args
+ * @kernel_fd: file descriptor of the kexec kernel being loaded
+ * @buf: pointer to buffer
+ * @size: size of buffer
+ *
+ * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
+ */
+void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
+{
+	if (!buf || !size)
+		return;
+
+	CLASS(fd, f)(kernel_fd);
+	if (fd_empty(f))
+		return;
+
+	process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_idmap(fd_file(f)), file_inode(fd_file(f)),
+				   buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0,
+				   NULL, false, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data
+ * @event_label: unique event label for grouping and limiting critical data
+ * @event_name: event name for the record in the IMA measurement list
+ * @buf: pointer to buffer data
+ * @buf_len: length of buffer data (in bytes)
+ * @hash: measure buffer data hash
+ * @digest: buffer digest will be written to
+ * @digest_len: buffer length
+ *
+ * Measure data critical to the integrity of the kernel into the IMA log
+ * and extend the pcr.  Examples of critical data could be various data
+ * structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can
+ * impact the integrity of the system.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, 1 if the digest
+ * has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry,
+ * a negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
+			      const char *event_name,
+			      const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
+			      bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len)
+{
+	if (!event_name || !event_label || !buf || !buf_len)
+		return -ENOPARAM;
+
+	return process_buffer_measurement(&nop_mnt_idmap, NULL, buf, buf_len,
+					  event_name, CRITICAL_DATA, 0,
+					  event_label, hash, digest,
+					  digest_len);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+
+/**
+ * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1(rsa,*) requests
+ * @kmod_name: kernel module name
+ *
+ * Avoid a verification loop where verifying the signature of the modprobe
+ * binary requires executing modprobe itself. Since the modprobe iint->mutex
+ * is already held when the signature verification is performed, a deadlock
+ * occurs as soon as modprobe is executed within the critical region, since
+ * the same lock cannot be taken again.
+ *
+ * This happens when public_key_verify_signature(), in case of RSA algorithm,
+ * use alg_name to store internal information in order to construct an
+ * algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name
+ * in order to load a kernel module with same name.
+ *
+ * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
+ * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(), and
+ * avoid the verification loop.
+ *
+ * Return: Zero if it is safe to load the kernel module, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ */
+static int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+	if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1(rsa,", 17) == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
+
+static int __init init_ima(void)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	/*Note that turning IMA off is intentionally limited to kdump kernel.*/
+	if (ima_disabled && is_kdump_kernel()) {
+		pr_info("IMA functionality is disabled");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ima_appraise_parse_cmdline();
+	ima_init_template_list();
+	hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
+	error = ima_init();
+
+	if (error && strcmp(hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo],
+			    CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH) != 0) {
+		pr_info("Allocating %s failed, going to use default hash algorithm %s\n",
+			hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
+		hash_setup_done = 0;
+		hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
+		error = ima_init();
+	}
+
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	error = register_blocking_lsm_notifier(&ima_lsm_policy_notifier);
+	if (error)
+		pr_warn("Couldn't register LSM notifier, error %d\n", error);
+
+	if (!error)
+		ima_update_policy_flags();
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, ima_bprm_creds_for_exec),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_from_file, ima_creds_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request),
+#endif
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security_rcu, ima_inode_free_rcu),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.id = LSM_ID_IMA,
+};
+
+static int __init init_ima_lsm(void)
+{
+	ima_iintcache_init();
+	security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid);
+	init_ima_appraise_lsm(&ima_lsmid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes ima_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache *),
+};
+
+DEFINE_LSM(ima) = {
+	.id = &ima_lsmid,
+	.init = init_ima_lsm,
+	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+	.blobs = &ima_blob_sizes,
+	/* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
+	.initcall_late = init_ima,
+};
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..632c746fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * IMA support for appraising module-style appended signatures.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019  IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+struct modsig {
+	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_msg;
+
+	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
+
+	/* This digest will go in the 'd-modsig' field of the IMA template. */
+	const u8 *digest;
+	u32 digest_size;
+
+	/*
+	 * This is what will go to the measurement list if the template requires
+	 * storing the signature.
+	 */
+	int raw_pkcs7_len;
+	u8 raw_pkcs7[] __counted_by(raw_pkcs7_len);
+};
+
+/*
+ * ima_read_modsig - Read modsig from buf.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
+		    struct modsig **modsig)
+{
+	const size_t marker_len = strlen(MODULE_SIGNATURE_MARKER);
+	const struct module_signature *sig;
+	struct modsig *hdr;
+	size_t sig_len;
+	const void *p;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (buf_len <= marker_len + sizeof(*sig))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	p = buf + buf_len - marker_len;
+	if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIGNATURE_MARKER, marker_len))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	buf_len -= marker_len;
+	sig = (const struct module_signature *)(p - sizeof(*sig));
+
+	rc = mod_check_sig(sig, buf_len, func_tokens[func]);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
+	buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
+
+	/* Allocate sig_len additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data. */
+	hdr = kzalloc_flex(*hdr, raw_pkcs7, sig_len);
+	if (!hdr)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	hdr->raw_pkcs7_len = sig_len;
+	hdr->pkcs7_msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf + buf_len, sig_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg);
+		kfree(hdr);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(hdr->raw_pkcs7, buf + buf_len, sig_len);
+
+	/* We don't know the hash algorithm yet. */
+	hdr->hash_algo = HASH_ALGO__LAST;
+
+	*modsig = hdr;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_collect_modsig - Calculate the file hash without the appended signature.
+ * @modsig: parsed module signature
+ * @buf: data to verify the signature on
+ * @size: data size
+ *
+ * Since the modsig is part of the file contents, the hash used in its signature
+ * isn't the same one ordinarily calculated by IMA. Therefore PKCS7 code
+ * calculates a separate one for signature verification.
+ */
+void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Provide the file contents (minus the appended sig) so that the PKCS7
+	 * code can calculate the file hash.
+	 */
+	size -= modsig->raw_pkcs7_len + strlen(MODULE_SIGNATURE_MARKER) +
+		sizeof(struct module_signature);
+	rc = pkcs7_supply_detached_data(modsig->pkcs7_msg, buf, size);
+	if (rc)
+		return;
+
+	/* Ask the PKCS7 code to calculate the file hash. */
+	rc = pkcs7_get_digest(modsig->pkcs7_msg, &modsig->digest,
+			      &modsig->digest_size, &modsig->hash_algo);
+}
+
+int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+	return verify_pkcs7_message_sig(NULL, 0, modsig->pkcs7_msg, keyring,
+					VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig, enum hash_algo *algo,
+			  const u8 **digest, u32 *digest_size)
+{
+	*algo = modsig->hash_algo;
+	*digest = modsig->digest;
+	*digest_size = modsig->digest_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
+		       u32 *data_len)
+{
+	*data = &modsig->raw_pkcs7;
+	*data_len = modsig->raw_pkcs7_len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+	if (!modsig)
+		return;
+
+	pkcs7_free_message(modsig->pkcs7_msg);
+	kfree(modsig);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..14d93d573
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Juniper Networks, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Petko Manolov <petko.manolov@konsulko.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+
+
+struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring;
+
+/*
+ * Allocate the IMA blacklist keyring
+ */
+static __init int ima_mok_init(void)
+{
+	struct key_restriction *restriction;
+
+	pr_notice("Allocating IMA blacklist keyring.\n");
+
+	restriction = kzalloc_obj(struct key_restriction);
+	if (!restriction)
+		panic("Can't allocate IMA blacklist restriction.");
+
+	restriction->check = restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted;
+
+	ima_blacklist_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_blacklist",
+				KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
+				(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
+				KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
+				KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+				KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
+				restriction, NULL);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring))
+		panic("Can't allocate IMA blacklist keyring.");
+	return 0;
+}
+device_initcall(ima_mok_init);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b1c010e8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2382 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * ima_policy.c
+ *	- initialize default measure policy rules
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/* flags definitions */
+#define IMA_FUNC	0x0001
+#define IMA_MASK	0x0002
+#define IMA_FSMAGIC	0x0004
+#define IMA_UID		0x0008
+#define IMA_FOWNER	0x0010
+#define IMA_FSUUID	0x0020
+#define IMA_INMASK	0x0040
+#define IMA_EUID	0x0080
+#define IMA_PCR		0x0100
+#define IMA_FSNAME	0x0200
+#define IMA_KEYRINGS	0x0400
+#define IMA_LABEL	0x0800
+#define IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS	0x1000
+#define IMA_GID		0x2000
+#define IMA_EGID	0x4000
+#define IMA_FGROUP	0x8000
+#define IMA_FS_SUBTYPE	0x10000
+
+#define UNKNOWN		0
+#define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
+#define DONT_MEASURE	0x0002
+#define APPRAISE	0x0004	/* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
+#define DONT_APPRAISE	0x0008
+#define AUDIT		0x0040
+#define DONT_AUDIT	0x0080
+#define HASH		0x0100
+#define DONT_HASH	0x0200
+
+#define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
+	(a) >= (sizeof_field(struct ima_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
+
+int ima_policy_flag;
+static int temp_ima_appraise;
+static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init;
+
+atomic_t ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms;
+
+#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
+enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
+	LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
+};
+
+enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB };
+
+enum policy_rule_list { IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY = 1, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY };
+
+struct ima_rule_opt_list {
+	size_t count;
+	char *items[] __counted_by(count);
+};
+
+/*
+ * These comparators are needed nowhere outside of ima so just define them here.
+ * This pattern should hopefully never be needed outside of ima.
+ */
+static inline bool vfsuid_gt_kuid(vfsuid_t vfsuid, kuid_t kuid)
+{
+	return __vfsuid_val(vfsuid) > __kuid_val(kuid);
+}
+
+static inline bool vfsgid_gt_kgid(vfsgid_t vfsgid, kgid_t kgid)
+{
+	return __vfsgid_val(vfsgid) > __kgid_val(kgid);
+}
+
+static inline bool vfsuid_lt_kuid(vfsuid_t vfsuid, kuid_t kuid)
+{
+	return __vfsuid_val(vfsuid) < __kuid_val(kuid);
+}
+
+static inline bool vfsgid_lt_kgid(vfsgid_t vfsgid, kgid_t kgid)
+{
+	return __vfsgid_val(vfsgid) < __kgid_val(kgid);
+}
+
+struct ima_rule_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	int action;
+	unsigned int flags;
+	enum ima_hooks func;
+	int mask;
+	unsigned long fsmagic;
+	uuid_t fsuuid;
+	kuid_t uid;
+	kgid_t gid;
+	kuid_t fowner;
+	kgid_t fgroup;
+	bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t cred_uid, kuid_t rule_uid);    /* Handlers for operators       */
+	bool (*gid_op)(kgid_t cred_gid, kgid_t rule_gid);
+	bool (*fowner_op)(vfsuid_t vfsuid, kuid_t rule_uid); /* vfsuid_eq_kuid(), vfsuid_gt_kuid(), vfsuid_lt_kuid() */
+	bool (*fgroup_op)(vfsgid_t vfsgid, kgid_t rule_gid); /* vfsgid_eq_kgid(), vfsgid_gt_kgid(), vfsgid_lt_kgid() */
+	int pcr;
+	unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
+	struct {
+		void *rule;	/* LSM file metadata specific */
+		char *args_p;	/* audit value */
+		int type;	/* audit type */
+	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
+	char *fsname;
+	char *fs_subtype;
+	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
+	struct ima_rule_opt_list *label; /* Measure data grouped under this label */
+	struct ima_template_desc *template;
+};
+
+/*
+ * sanity check in case the kernels gains more hash algorithms that can
+ * fit in an unsigned int
+ */
+static_assert(
+	8 * sizeof(unsigned int) >= HASH_ALGO__LAST,
+	"The bitfield allowed_algos in ima_rule_entry is too small to contain all the supported hash algorithms, consider using a bigger type");
+
+/*
+ * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
+ * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, .gid,
+ * .fowner, and .fgroup
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage.  Measures all files
+ * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root.  Dangerous because
+ * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
+ * and running executables.
+ */
+static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .func = FILE_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_FUNC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SMACK_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = EFIVARFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+	 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+	 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+	 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SMACK_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = EFIVARFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
+	.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
+#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &vfsuid_eq_kuid,
+	 .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
+#else
+	/* force signature */
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &vfsuid_eq_kuid,
+	 .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
+		  IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST},
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+};
+
+/* An array of architecture specific rules */
+static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init;
+
+static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
+static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
+static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
+static struct list_head __rcu *ima_rules = (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ima_default_rules);
+
+static int ima_policy __initdata;
+
+static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (ima_policy)
+		return 1;
+
+	ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
+
+static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
+static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
+static bool ima_use_critical_data __initdata;
+static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init;
+static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+	char *p;
+
+	while ((p = strsep(&str, " |\n")) != NULL) {
+		if (*p == ' ')
+			continue;
+		if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy)
+			ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
+		else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0)
+			ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
+		else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
+			ima_use_secure_boot = true;
+		else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0)
+			ima_use_critical_data = true;
+		else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0)
+			ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true;
+		else
+			pr_err("policy \"%s\" not found", p);
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
+
+static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+	ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
+
+static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
+	size_t count = 0;
+	char *src_copy;
+	char *cur, *next;
+	size_t i;
+
+	src_copy = match_strdup(src);
+	if (!src_copy)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	next = src_copy;
+	while ((cur = strsep(&next, "|"))) {
+		/* Don't accept an empty list item */
+		if (!(*cur)) {
+			kfree(src_copy);
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		}
+		count++;
+	}
+
+	/* Don't accept an empty list */
+	if (!count) {
+		kfree(src_copy);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	opt_list = kzalloc_flex(*opt_list, items, count);
+	if (!opt_list) {
+		kfree(src_copy);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+	opt_list->count = count;
+
+	/*
+	 * strsep() has already replaced all instances of '|' with '\0',
+	 * leaving a byte sequence of NUL-terminated strings. Reference each
+	 * string with the array of items.
+	 *
+	 * IMPORTANT: Ownership of the allocated buffer is transferred from
+	 * src_copy to the first element in the items array. To free the
+	 * buffer, kfree() must only be called on the first element of the
+	 * array.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0, cur = src_copy; i < count; i++) {
+		opt_list->items[i] = cur;
+		cur = strchr(cur, '\0') + 1;
+	}
+
+	return opt_list;
+}
+
+static void ima_free_rule_opt_list(struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list)
+{
+	if (!opt_list)
+		return;
+
+	if (opt_list->count) {
+		kfree(opt_list->items[0]);
+		opt_list->count = 0;
+	}
+
+	kfree(opt_list);
+}
+
+static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+		ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+		kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+	}
+}
+
+static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	if (!entry)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * entry->template->fields may be allocated in ima_parse_rule() but that
+	 * reference is owned by the corresponding ima_template_desc element in
+	 * the defined_templates list and cannot be freed here
+	 */
+	kfree(entry->fsname);
+	kfree(entry->fs_subtype);
+	ima_free_rule_opt_list(entry->keyrings);
+	ima_lsm_free_rule(entry);
+	kfree(entry);
+}
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
+						gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only
+	 * lsm rules can change
+	 */
+	nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp);
+	if (!nentry)
+		return NULL;
+
+	memset(nentry->lsm, 0, sizeof_field(struct ima_rule_entry, lsm));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+		if (!entry->lsm[i].args_p)
+			continue;
+
+		nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
+		nentry->lsm[i].args_p = entry->lsm[i].args_p;
+
+		ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
+				     nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
+				     &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
+				     gfp);
+		if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
+			pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
+				nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
+	}
+	return nentry;
+}
+
+static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
+
+	nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!nentry)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
+	synchronize_rcu();
+	/*
+	 * ima_lsm_copy_rule() shallow copied all references, except for the
+	 * LSM references, from entry to nentry so we only want to free the LSM
+	 * references and the entry itself. All other memory references will now
+	 * be owned by nentry.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+		ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+	kfree(entry);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+		if (entry->lsm[i].args_p)
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
+ * to the old, stale LSM policy.  Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
+ * the reloaded LSM policy.
+ */
+static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *e;
+	int result;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
+		if (!ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+			continue;
+
+		result = ima_lsm_update_rule(entry);
+		if (result) {
+			pr_err("lsm rule update error %d\n", result);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
+			  void *lsm_data)
+{
+	if (event != LSM_POLICY_CHANGE)
+		return NOTIFY_DONE;
+
+	ima_lsm_update_rules();
+	return NOTIFY_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_match_rule_data - determine whether func_data matches the policy rule
+ * @rule: a pointer to a rule
+ * @func_data: data to match against the measure rule data
+ * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
+ *
+ * Returns true if func_data matches one in the rule, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
+				const char *func_data,
+				const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	const struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list = NULL;
+	bool matched = false;
+	size_t i;
+
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
+		return false;
+
+	switch (rule->func) {
+	case KEY_CHECK:
+		if (!rule->keyrings)
+			return true;
+
+		opt_list = rule->keyrings;
+		break;
+	case CRITICAL_DATA:
+		if (!rule->label)
+			return true;
+
+		opt_list = rule->label;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (!func_data)
+		return false;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opt_list->count; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(opt_list->items[i], func_data)) {
+			matched = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return matched;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the policy rule.
+ * @rule: a pointer to a rule
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: a pointer to an inode
+ * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
+ * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated
+ * @func: LIM hook identifier
+ * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
+ *
+ * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
+ */
+static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
+			    struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			    struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+			    struct lsm_prop *prop, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+			    const char *func_data)
+{
+	int i;
+	bool result = false;
+	struct ima_rule_entry *lsm_rule = rule;
+	bool rule_reinitialized = false;
+
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
+	    (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
+		return false;
+
+	switch (func) {
+	case KEY_CHECK:
+	case CRITICAL_DATA:
+		return ((rule->func == func) &&
+			ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred));
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
+	    (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
+		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
+	    (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
+		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
+	    && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
+		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSNAME)
+	    && strcmp(rule->fsname, inode->i_sb->s_type->name))
+		return false;
+	if (rule->flags & IMA_FS_SUBTYPE) {
+		if (!inode->i_sb->s_subtype)
+			return false;
+		if (strcmp(rule->fs_subtype, inode->i_sb->s_subtype))
+			return false;
+	}
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
+	    !uuid_equal(&rule->fsuuid, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid))
+		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
+		return false;
+	if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
+		if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
+			if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid)
+			    && !rule->uid_op(cred->suid, rule->uid)
+			    && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
+				return false;
+		} else if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid))
+			return false;
+	}
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_GID) && !rule->gid_op(cred->gid, rule->gid))
+		return false;
+	if (rule->flags & IMA_EGID) {
+		if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETGID)) {
+			if (!rule->gid_op(cred->egid, rule->gid)
+			    && !rule->gid_op(cred->sgid, rule->gid)
+			    && !rule->gid_op(cred->gid, rule->gid))
+				return false;
+		} else if (!rule->gid_op(cred->egid, rule->gid))
+			return false;
+	}
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) &&
+	    !rule->fowner_op(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode),
+			     rule->fowner))
+		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FGROUP) &&
+	    !rule->fgroup_op(i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode),
+			     rule->fgroup))
+		return false;
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+		int rc = 0;
+		struct lsm_prop inode_prop = { };
+
+		if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule) {
+			if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].args_p)
+				continue;
+			else
+				return false;
+		}
+
+retry:
+		switch (i) {
+		case LSM_OBJ_USER:
+		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
+		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
+			security_inode_getlsmprop(inode, &inode_prop);
+			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&inode_prop,
+						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
+						   Audit_equal,
+						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
+			break;
+		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
+		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
+			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(prop, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
+						   Audit_equal,
+						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) {
+			lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (lsm_rule) {
+				rule_reinitialized = true;
+				goto retry;
+			}
+		}
+		if (rc <= 0) {
+			result = false;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	result = true;
+
+out:
+	if (rule_reinitialized) {
+		for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+			ima_filter_rule_free(lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
+		kfree(lsm_rule);
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
+ * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
+ */
+static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
+		return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
+
+	switch (func) {
+	case MMAP_CHECK:
+	case MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT:
+		return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
+	case BPRM_CHECK:
+		return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
+	case CREDS_CHECK:
+		return IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE;
+	case FILE_CHECK:
+	case POST_SETATTR:
+		return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
+	case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
+	default:
+		return IMA_READ_APPRAISE;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
+ * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
+ *        being made
+ * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated
+ * @func: IMA hook identifier
+ * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ * @flags: IMA actions to consider (e.g. IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE)
+ * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
+ * @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
+ * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
+ * @allowed_algos: allowlist of hash algorithms for the IMA xattr
+ *
+ * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
+ * conditions.
+ *
+ * Since the IMA policy may be updated multiple times we need to lock the
+ * list when walking it.  Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
+ * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
+ */
+int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
+		     const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+		     const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
+	struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
+
+	if (template_desc && !*template_desc)
+		*template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
+
+		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, prop,
+				     func, mask, func_data))
+			continue;
+
+		action |= entry->flags & IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS;
+
+		action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
+		if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE) {
+			action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
+			action &= ~IMA_HASH;
+			if (ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs)
+				action |= IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS;
+
+			if (allowed_algos &&
+			    entry->flags & IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS)
+				*allowed_algos = entry->allowed_algos;
+		}
+
+		if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
+			actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
+		else
+			actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
+
+		if ((pcr) && (entry->flags & IMA_PCR))
+			*pcr = entry->pcr;
+
+		if (template_desc && entry->template)
+			*template_desc = entry->template;
+
+		if (!actmask)
+			break;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return action;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_update_policy_flags() - Update global IMA variables
+ *
+ * Update ima_policy_flag and ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms
+ * based on the currently loaded policy.
+ *
+ * With ima_policy_flag, the decision to short circuit out of a function
+ * or not call the function in the first place can be made earlier.
+ *
+ * With ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms, the policy can restrict the
+ * set of hash algorithms accepted when updating the security.ima xattr of
+ * a file.
+ *
+ * Context: called after a policy update and at system initialization.
+ */
+void ima_update_policy_flags(void)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+	int new_policy_flag = 0;
+	struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
+		/*
+		 * SETXATTR_CHECK rules do not implement a full policy check
+		 * because rule checking would probably have an important
+		 * performance impact on setxattr(). As a consequence, only one
+		 * SETXATTR_CHECK can be active at a given time.
+		 * Because we want to preserve that property, we set out to use
+		 * atomic_cmpxchg. Either:
+		 * - the atomic was non-zero: a setxattr hash policy is
+		 *   already enforced, we do nothing
+		 * - the atomic was zero: no setxattr policy was set, enable
+		 *   the setxattr hash policy
+		 */
+		if (entry->func == SETXATTR_CHECK) {
+			atomic_cmpxchg(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms,
+				       0, entry->allowed_algos);
+			/* SETXATTR_CHECK doesn't impact ima_policy_flag */
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
+			new_policy_flag |= entry->action;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	ima_appraise |= (build_ima_appraise | temp_ima_appraise);
+	if (!ima_appraise)
+		new_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
+
+	ima_policy_flag = new_policy_flag;
+}
+
+static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	if (func == MODULE_CHECK)
+		return IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
+	else if (func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
+		return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
+	else if (func == POLICY_CHECK)
+		return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+	else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+		return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count,
+		      enum policy_rule_list policy_rule)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+
+		if (policy_rule & IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY)
+			list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
+
+		if (policy_rule & IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY) {
+			entry = kmemdup(&entries[i], sizeof(*entry),
+					GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!entry)
+				continue;
+
+			list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
+		}
+		if (entries[i].action == APPRAISE) {
+			if (entries != build_appraise_rules)
+				temp_ima_appraise |=
+					ima_appraise_flag(entries[i].func);
+			else
+				build_ima_appraise |=
+					ima_appraise_flag(entries[i].func);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry);
+
+static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void)
+{
+	const char * const *arch_rules;
+	const char * const *rules;
+	int arch_entries = 0;
+	int i = 0;
+
+	arch_rules = arch_get_ima_policy();
+	if (!arch_rules)
+		return arch_entries;
+
+	/* Get number of rules */
+	for (rules = arch_rules; *rules != NULL; rules++)
+		arch_entries++;
+
+	arch_policy_entry = kzalloc_objs(*arch_policy_entry, arch_entries + 1);
+	if (!arch_policy_entry)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Convert each policy string rules to struct ima_rule_entry format */
+	for (rules = arch_rules, i = 0; *rules != NULL; rules++) {
+		char rule[255];
+		int result;
+
+		result = strscpy(rule, *rules, sizeof(rule));
+
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&arch_policy_entry[i].list);
+		result = ima_parse_rule(rule, &arch_policy_entry[i]);
+		if (result) {
+			pr_warn("Skipping unknown architecture policy rule: %s\n",
+				rule);
+			memset(&arch_policy_entry[i], 0,
+			       sizeof(*arch_policy_entry));
+			continue;
+		}
+		i++;
+	}
+	return i;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
+ *
+ * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the new ima_policy_rules.
+ */
+void __init ima_init_policy(void)
+{
+	int build_appraise_entries, arch_entries;
+
+	/* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */
+	if (ima_policy)
+		add_rules(dont_measure_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules),
+			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+
+	switch (ima_policy) {
+	case ORIGINAL_TCB:
+		add_rules(original_measurement_rules,
+			  ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules),
+			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+		break;
+	case DEFAULT_TCB:
+		add_rules(default_measurement_rules,
+			  ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules),
+			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Based on runtime secure boot flags, insert arch specific measurement
+	 * and appraise rules requiring file signatures for both the initial
+	 * and custom policies, prior to other appraise rules.
+	 * (Highest priority)
+	 */
+	arch_entries = ima_init_arch_policy();
+	if (!arch_entries)
+		pr_info("No architecture policies found\n");
+	else
+		add_rules(arch_policy_entry, arch_entries,
+			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
+
+	/*
+	 * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file
+	 * signatures, prior to other appraise rules.
+	 */
+	if (ima_use_secure_boot)
+		add_rules(secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules),
+			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+
+	/*
+	 * Insert the build time appraise rules requiring file signatures
+	 * for both the initial and custom policies, prior to other appraise
+	 * rules. As the secure boot rules includes all of the build time
+	 * rules, include either one or the other set of rules, but not both.
+	 */
+	build_appraise_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules);
+	if (build_appraise_entries) {
+		if (ima_use_secure_boot)
+			add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries,
+				  IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
+		else
+			add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries,
+				  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
+	}
+
+	if (ima_use_appraise_tcb)
+		add_rules(default_appraise_rules,
+			  ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules),
+			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+
+	if (ima_use_critical_data)
+		add_rules(critical_data_rules,
+			  ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules),
+			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+
+	atomic_set(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms, 0);
+
+	ima_update_policy_flags();
+}
+
+/* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
+int ima_check_policy(void)
+{
+	if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
+ *
+ * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
+ * policy.  What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so
+ * they make a queue.  The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the
+ * RCU updater.
+ *
+ * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when
+ * we switch from the default policy to user defined.
+ */
+void ima_update_policy(void)
+{
+	struct list_head *policy = &ima_policy_rules;
+
+	list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules, policy, synchronize_rcu);
+
+	if (ima_rules != (struct list_head __rcu *)policy) {
+		ima_policy_flag = 0;
+
+		rcu_assign_pointer(ima_rules, policy);
+		/*
+		 * IMA architecture specific policy rules are specified
+		 * as strings and converted to an array of ima_entry_rules
+		 * on boot.  After loading a custom policy, free the
+		 * architecture specific rules stored as an array.
+		 */
+		kfree(arch_policy_entry);
+	}
+	ima_update_policy_flags();
+
+	/* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */
+	ima_process_queued_keys();
+}
+
+/* Keep the enumeration in sync with the policy_tokens! */
+enum policy_opt {
+	Opt_measure, Opt_dont_measure,
+	Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
+	Opt_audit, Opt_dont_audit, Opt_hash, Opt_dont_hash,
+	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
+	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
+	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_fsname, Opt_fs_subtype, Opt_fsuuid,
+	Opt_uid_eq, Opt_euid_eq, Opt_gid_eq, Opt_egid_eq,
+	Opt_fowner_eq, Opt_fgroup_eq,
+	Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_gid_gt, Opt_egid_gt,
+	Opt_fowner_gt, Opt_fgroup_gt,
+	Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_gid_lt, Opt_egid_lt,
+	Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
+	Opt_digest_type,
+	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
+	Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
+	Opt_label, Opt_err
+};
+
+static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
+	{Opt_measure, "measure"},
+	{Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
+	{Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
+	{Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
+	{Opt_audit, "audit"},
+	{Opt_dont_audit, "dont_audit"},
+	{Opt_hash, "hash"},
+	{Opt_dont_hash, "dont_hash"},
+	{Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
+	{Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
+	{Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
+	{Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
+	{Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
+	{Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
+	{Opt_func, "func=%s"},
+	{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
+	{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
+	{Opt_fsname, "fsname=%s"},
+	{Opt_fs_subtype, "fs_subtype=%s"},
+	{Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
+	{Opt_uid_eq, "uid=%s"},
+	{Opt_euid_eq, "euid=%s"},
+	{Opt_gid_eq, "gid=%s"},
+	{Opt_egid_eq, "egid=%s"},
+	{Opt_fowner_eq, "fowner=%s"},
+	{Opt_fgroup_eq, "fgroup=%s"},
+	{Opt_uid_gt, "uid>%s"},
+	{Opt_euid_gt, "euid>%s"},
+	{Opt_gid_gt, "gid>%s"},
+	{Opt_egid_gt, "egid>%s"},
+	{Opt_fowner_gt, "fowner>%s"},
+	{Opt_fgroup_gt, "fgroup>%s"},
+	{Opt_uid_lt, "uid<%s"},
+	{Opt_euid_lt, "euid<%s"},
+	{Opt_gid_lt, "gid<%s"},
+	{Opt_egid_lt, "egid<%s"},
+	{Opt_fowner_lt, "fowner<%s"},
+	{Opt_fgroup_lt, "fgroup<%s"},
+	{Opt_digest_type, "digest_type=%s"},
+	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
+	{Opt_appraise_flag, "appraise_flag=%s"},
+	{Opt_appraise_algos, "appraise_algos=%s"},
+	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
+	{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
+	{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
+	{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
+	{Opt_label, "label=%s"},
+	{Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
+			     substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
+	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
+	result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
+				      entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
+				      &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
+				      GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
+		pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
+			entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+
+		if (ima_rules == (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ima_default_rules)) {
+			kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+			entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = NULL;
+			result = -EINVAL;
+		} else
+			result = 0;
+	}
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value,
+			      enum policy_opt rule_operator)
+{
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	switch (rule_operator) {
+	case Opt_uid_gt:
+	case Opt_euid_gt:
+	case Opt_gid_gt:
+	case Opt_egid_gt:
+	case Opt_fowner_gt:
+	case Opt_fgroup_gt:
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%s>", key);
+		break;
+	case Opt_uid_lt:
+	case Opt_euid_lt:
+	case Opt_gid_lt:
+	case Opt_egid_lt:
+	case Opt_fowner_lt:
+	case Opt_fgroup_lt:
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key);
+		break;
+	default:
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
+	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", value);
+}
+static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
+{
+	ima_log_string_op(ab, key, value, Opt_err);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validating the appended signature included in the measurement list requires
+ * the file hash calculated without the appended signature (i.e., the 'd-modsig'
+ * field). Therefore, notify the user if they have the 'modsig' field but not
+ * the 'd-modsig' field in the template.
+ */
+static void check_template_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *template)
+{
+#define MSG "template with 'modsig' field also needs 'd-modsig' field\n"
+	bool has_modsig, has_dmodsig;
+	static bool checked;
+	int i;
+
+	/* We only need to notify the user once. */
+	if (checked)
+		return;
+
+	has_modsig = has_dmodsig = false;
+	for (i = 0; i < template->num_fields; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(template->fields[i]->field_id, "modsig"))
+			has_modsig = true;
+		else if (!strcmp(template->fields[i]->field_id, "d-modsig"))
+			has_dmodsig = true;
+	}
+
+	if (has_modsig && !has_dmodsig)
+		pr_notice(MSG);
+
+	checked = true;
+#undef MSG
+}
+
+/*
+ * Warn if the template does not contain the given field.
+ */
+static void check_template_field(const struct ima_template_desc *template,
+				 const char *field, const char *msg)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < template->num_fields; i++)
+		if (!strcmp(template->fields[i]->field_id, field))
+			return;
+
+	pr_notice_once("%s", msg);
+}
+
+static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	/* Ensure that the action is set and is compatible with the flags */
+	if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
+		return false;
+
+	if (entry->action != MEASURE && entry->flags & IMA_PCR)
+		return false;
+
+	if (entry->action != APPRAISE &&
+	    entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
+			    IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * The IMA_FUNC bit must be set if and only if there's a valid hook
+	 * function specified, and vice versa. Enforcing this property allows
+	 * for the NONE case below to validate a rule without an explicit hook
+	 * function.
+	 */
+	if (((entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) && entry->func == NONE) ||
+	    (!(entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) && entry->func != NONE))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that the hook function is compatible with the other
+	 * components of the rule
+	 */
+	switch (entry->func) {
+	case NONE:
+	case FILE_CHECK:
+	case MMAP_CHECK:
+	case MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT:
+	case BPRM_CHECK:
+	case CREDS_CHECK:
+	case POST_SETATTR:
+	case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
+	case POLICY_CHECK:
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC |
+				     IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID |
+				     IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
+				     IMA_FSNAME | IMA_FS_SUBTYPE |
+				     IMA_GID | IMA_EGID |
+				     IMA_FGROUP | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
+				     IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS |
+				     IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED |
+				     IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
+	case MODULE_CHECK:
+	case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
+	case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC |
+				     IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID |
+				     IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
+				     IMA_FSNAME | IMA_FS_SUBTYPE |
+				     IMA_GID | IMA_EGID |
+				     IMA_FGROUP | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
+				     IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
+				     IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS |
+				     IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
+	case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
+		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+			return false;
+
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_UID |
+				     IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID | IMA_EUID |
+				     IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME | IMA_FS_SUBTYPE |
+				     IMA_GID | IMA_EGID |
+				     IMA_FGROUP))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
+	case KEY_CHECK:
+		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+			return false;
+
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_GID | IMA_PCR |
+				     IMA_KEYRINGS))
+			return false;
+
+		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
+	case CRITICAL_DATA:
+		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+			return false;
+
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_GID | IMA_PCR |
+				     IMA_LABEL))
+			return false;
+
+		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
+	case SETXATTR_CHECK:
+		/* any action other than APPRAISE is unsupported */
+		if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
+			return false;
+
+		/* SETXATTR_CHECK requires an appraise_algos parameter */
+		if (!(entry->flags & IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
+			return false;
+
+		/*
+		 * full policies are not supported, they would have too
+		 * much of a performance impact
+		 */
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Ensure that combinations of flags are compatible with each other */
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST &&
+	    !(entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Unlike for regular IMA 'appraise' policy rules where security.ima
+	 * xattr may contain either a file hash or signature, the security.ima
+	 * xattr for fsverity must contain a file signature (sigv3).  Ensure
+	 * that 'appraise' rules for fsverity require file signatures by
+	 * checking the IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED flag is set.
+	 */
+	if (entry->action == APPRAISE &&
+	    (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) &&
+	    !(entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static unsigned int ima_parse_appraise_algos(char *arg)
+{
+	unsigned int res = 0;
+	int idx;
+	char *token;
+
+	while ((token = strsep(&arg, ",")) != NULL) {
+		idx = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, token);
+
+		if (idx < 0) {
+			pr_err("unknown hash algorithm \"%s\"",
+			       token);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		if (!crypto_has_alg(hash_algo_name[idx], 0, 0)) {
+			pr_err("unavailable hash algorithm \"%s\", check your kernel configuration",
+			       token);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Add the hash algorithm to the 'allowed' bitfield */
+		res |= (1U << idx);
+	}
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char *from;
+	char *p;
+	bool eid_token; /* either euid or egid */
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
+	int result = 0;
+
+	ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
+				       AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
+
+	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
+	entry->gid = INVALID_GID;
+	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
+	entry->fgroup = INVALID_GID;
+	entry->uid_op = &uid_eq;
+	entry->gid_op = &gid_eq;
+	entry->fowner_op = &vfsuid_eq_kuid;
+	entry->fgroup_op = &vfsgid_eq_kgid;
+	entry->action = UNKNOWN;
+	while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
+		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+		int token;
+		unsigned long lnum;
+
+		if (result < 0 || *p == '#')  /* ignore suffixed comment */
+			break;
+		if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
+			continue;
+		token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
+		switch (token) {
+		case Opt_measure:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			entry->action = MEASURE;
+			break;
+		case Opt_dont_measure:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
+			break;
+		case Opt_appraise:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			entry->action = APPRAISE;
+			break;
+		case Opt_dont_appraise:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
+			break;
+		case Opt_audit:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			entry->action = AUDIT;
+			break;
+		case Opt_dont_audit:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_audit");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			entry->action = DONT_AUDIT;
+			break;
+		case Opt_hash:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "hash");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			entry->action = HASH;
+			break;
+		case Opt_dont_hash:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_hash");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			entry->action = DONT_HASH;
+			break;
+		case Opt_func:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->func)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
+			/* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
+			else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
+				|| (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
+				entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
+			else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT") == 0))
+				entry->func = MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CREDS_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = CREDS_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") ==
+				 0)
+				entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
+				 == 0)
+				entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0)
+				entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE;
+			else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) &&
+				 strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = KEY_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CRITICAL_DATA") == 0)
+				entry->func = CRITICAL_DATA;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "SETXATTR_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = SETXATTR_CHECK;
+			else
+				result = -EINVAL;
+			if (!result)
+				entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
+			break;
+		case Opt_mask:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->mask)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			from = args[0].from;
+			if (*from == '^')
+				from++;
+
+			if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
+				entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
+			else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
+				entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
+			else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
+				entry->mask = MAY_READ;
+			else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
+				entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
+			else
+				result = -EINVAL;
+			if (!result)
+				entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^')
+				     ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK;
+			break;
+		case Opt_fsmagic:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->fsmagic) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
+			if (!result)
+				entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
+			break;
+		case Opt_fsname:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "fsname", args[0].from);
+
+			entry->fsname = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!entry->fsname) {
+				result = -ENOMEM;
+				break;
+			}
+			result = 0;
+			entry->flags |= IMA_FSNAME;
+			break;
+		case Opt_fs_subtype:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "fs_subtype", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->fs_subtype) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			entry->fs_subtype = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!entry->fs_subtype) {
+				result = -ENOMEM;
+				break;
+			}
+			result = 0;
+			entry->flags |= IMA_FS_SUBTYPE;
+			break;
+		case Opt_keyrings:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "keyrings", args[0].from);
+
+			if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) ||
+			    entry->keyrings) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			entry->keyrings = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args);
+			if (IS_ERR(entry->keyrings)) {
+				result = PTR_ERR(entry->keyrings);
+				entry->keyrings = NULL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS;
+			break;
+		case Opt_label:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "label", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->label) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			entry->label = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args);
+			if (IS_ERR(entry->label)) {
+				result = PTR_ERR(entry->label);
+				entry->label = NULL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			entry->flags |= IMA_LABEL;
+			break;
+		case Opt_fsuuid:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
+
+			if (!uuid_is_null(&entry->fsuuid)) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			result = uuid_parse(args[0].from, &entry->fsuuid);
+			if (!result)
+				entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
+			break;
+		case Opt_uid_gt:
+		case Opt_euid_gt:
+			entry->uid_op = &uid_gt;
+			fallthrough;
+		case Opt_uid_lt:
+		case Opt_euid_lt:
+			if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt))
+				entry->uid_op = &uid_lt;
+			fallthrough;
+		case Opt_uid_eq:
+		case Opt_euid_eq:
+			eid_token = (token == Opt_euid_eq) ||
+				    (token == Opt_euid_gt) ||
+				    (token == Opt_euid_lt);
+
+			ima_log_string_op(ab, eid_token ? "euid" : "uid",
+					  args[0].from, token);
+
+			if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+			if (!result) {
+				entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
+						       (uid_t) lnum);
+				if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
+				    (uid_t)lnum != lnum)
+					result = -EINVAL;
+				else
+					entry->flags |= eid_token
+					    ? IMA_EUID : IMA_UID;
+			}
+			break;
+		case Opt_gid_gt:
+		case Opt_egid_gt:
+			entry->gid_op = &gid_gt;
+			fallthrough;
+		case Opt_gid_lt:
+		case Opt_egid_lt:
+			if ((token == Opt_gid_lt) || (token == Opt_egid_lt))
+				entry->gid_op = &gid_lt;
+			fallthrough;
+		case Opt_gid_eq:
+		case Opt_egid_eq:
+			eid_token = (token == Opt_egid_eq) ||
+				    (token == Opt_egid_gt) ||
+				    (token == Opt_egid_lt);
+
+			ima_log_string_op(ab, eid_token ? "egid" : "gid",
+					  args[0].from, token);
+
+			if (gid_valid(entry->gid)) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+			if (!result) {
+				entry->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(),
+						       (gid_t)lnum);
+				if (!gid_valid(entry->gid) ||
+				    (((gid_t)lnum) != lnum))
+					result = -EINVAL;
+				else
+					entry->flags |= eid_token
+					    ? IMA_EGID : IMA_GID;
+			}
+			break;
+		case Opt_fowner_gt:
+			entry->fowner_op = &vfsuid_gt_kuid;
+			fallthrough;
+		case Opt_fowner_lt:
+			if (token == Opt_fowner_lt)
+				entry->fowner_op = &vfsuid_lt_kuid;
+			fallthrough;
+		case Opt_fowner_eq:
+			ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from, token);
+
+			if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+			if (!result) {
+				entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
+							  (uid_t)lnum);
+				if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) ||
+				    (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
+					result = -EINVAL;
+				else
+					entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
+			}
+			break;
+		case Opt_fgroup_gt:
+			entry->fgroup_op = &vfsgid_gt_kgid;
+			fallthrough;
+		case Opt_fgroup_lt:
+			if (token == Opt_fgroup_lt)
+				entry->fgroup_op = &vfsgid_lt_kgid;
+			fallthrough;
+		case Opt_fgroup_eq:
+			ima_log_string_op(ab, "fgroup", args[0].from, token);
+
+			if (gid_valid(entry->fgroup)) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+			if (!result) {
+				entry->fgroup = make_kgid(current_user_ns(),
+							  (gid_t)lnum);
+				if (!gid_valid(entry->fgroup) ||
+				    (((gid_t)lnum) != lnum))
+					result = -EINVAL;
+				else
+					entry->flags |= IMA_FGROUP;
+			}
+			break;
+		case Opt_obj_user:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
+						   LSM_OBJ_USER,
+						   AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
+			break;
+		case Opt_obj_role:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
+						   LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
+						   AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
+			break;
+		case Opt_obj_type:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
+						   LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
+						   AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
+			break;
+		case Opt_subj_user:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
+						   LSM_SUBJ_USER,
+						   AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
+			break;
+		case Opt_subj_role:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
+						   LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
+						   AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
+			break;
+		case Opt_subj_type:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
+						   LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
+						   AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
+			break;
+		case Opt_digest_type:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "digest_type", args[0].from);
+			if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "verity")) == 0)
+				entry->flags |= IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED;
+			else
+				result = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		case Opt_appraise_type:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
+
+			if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0) {
+				if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+					result = -EINVAL;
+				else
+					entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
+			} else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "sigv3") == 0) {
+				entry->flags |= IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED |
+					IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
+					IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
+			} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
+				 strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0) {
+				if ((entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) ||
+				    (entry->flags & IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED))
+					result = -EINVAL;
+				else
+					entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
+						IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
+			} else {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+			}
+			break;
+		case Opt_appraise_flag:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
+			break;
+		case Opt_appraise_algos:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_algos", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->allowed_algos) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			entry->allowed_algos =
+				ima_parse_appraise_algos(args[0].from);
+			/* invalid or empty list of algorithms */
+			if (!entry->allowed_algos) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			entry->flags |= IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS;
+
+			break;
+		case Opt_permit_directio:
+			entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
+			break;
+		case Opt_pcr:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from);
+
+			result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr);
+			if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr))
+				result = -EINVAL;
+			else
+				entry->flags |= IMA_PCR;
+
+			break;
+		case Opt_template:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "template", args[0].from);
+			if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+			template_desc = lookup_template_desc(args[0].from);
+			if (!template_desc || entry->template) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * template_desc_init_fields() does nothing if
+			 * the template is already initialised, so
+			 * it's safe to do this unconditionally
+			 */
+			template_desc_init_fields(template_desc->fmt,
+						 &(template_desc->fields),
+						 &(template_desc->num_fields));
+			entry->template = template_desc;
+			break;
+		case Opt_err:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
+			result = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!result && !ima_validate_rule(entry))
+		result = -EINVAL;
+	else if (entry->action == APPRAISE)
+		temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func);
+
+	if (!result && entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) {
+		template_desc = entry->template ? entry->template :
+						  ima_template_desc_current();
+		check_template_modsig(template_desc);
+	}
+
+	/* d-ngv2 template field recommended for unsigned fs-verity digests */
+	if (!result && entry->action == MEASURE &&
+	    (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)) {
+		template_desc = entry->template ? entry->template :
+						  ima_template_desc_current();
+		check_template_field(template_desc, "d-ngv2",
+				     "verity rules should include d-ngv2");
+	}
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+	return result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
+ * @rule: ima measurement policy rule
+ *
+ * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy()
+ * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
+ */
+ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
+{
+	static const char op[] = "update_policy";
+	char *p;
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+	ssize_t result, len;
+	int audit_info = 0;
+
+	p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
+	len = strlen(p) + 1;
+	p += strspn(p, " \t");
+
+	if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
+		return len;
+
+	entry = kzalloc_obj(*entry);
+	if (!entry) {
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
+				    NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+
+	result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
+	if (result) {
+		ima_free_rule(entry);
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
+				    NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
+				    audit_info);
+		return result;
+	}
+
+	list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules);
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_delete_rules() - called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy.
+ *
+ * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is
+ * different from the active one.  There is also only one user of
+ * ima_delete_rules() at a time.
+ */
+void ima_delete_rules(void)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
+
+	temp_ima_appraise = 0;
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
+		list_del(&entry->list);
+		ima_free_rule(entry);
+	}
+}
+
+#define __ima_hook_stringify(func, str)	(#func),
+
+const char *const func_tokens[] = {
+	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
+};
+
+#ifdef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
+enum {
+	mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
+};
+
+static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
+	"^MAY_EXEC",
+	"^MAY_WRITE",
+	"^MAY_READ",
+	"^MAY_APPEND"
+};
+
+void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	loff_t l = *pos;
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+	struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
+		if (!l--) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return entry;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	entry = list_entry_rcu(entry->list.next, struct ima_rule_entry, list);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	(*pos)++;
+
+	return (&entry->list == &ima_default_rules ||
+		&entry->list == &ima_policy_rules) ? NULL : entry;
+}
+
+void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+}
+
+#define pt(token)	policy_tokens[token].pattern
+#define mt(token)	mask_tokens[token]
+
+/*
+ * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule
+ */
+static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	if (func > 0 && func < MAX_CHECK)
+		seq_printf(m, "func=%s ", func_tokens[func]);
+	else
+		seq_printf(m, "func=%d ", func);
+}
+
+static void ima_show_rule_opt_list(struct seq_file *m,
+				   const struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opt_list->count; i++)
+		seq_printf(m, "%s%s", i ? "|" : "", opt_list->items[i]);
+}
+
+static void ima_policy_show_appraise_algos(struct seq_file *m,
+					   unsigned int allowed_hashes)
+{
+	int idx, list_size = 0;
+
+	for (idx = 0; idx < HASH_ALGO__LAST; idx++) {
+		if (!(allowed_hashes & (1U << idx)))
+			continue;
+
+		/* only add commas if the list contains multiple entries */
+		if (list_size++)
+			seq_puts(m, ",");
+
+		seq_puts(m, hash_algo_name[idx]);
+	}
+}
+
+int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
+	int i;
+	char tbuf[64] = {0,};
+	int offset = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	/* Do not print rules with inactive LSM labels */
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+		if (entry->lsm[i].args_p && !entry->lsm[i].rule) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (entry->action & MEASURE)
+		seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_measure));
+	if (entry->action & DONT_MEASURE)
+		seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_measure));
+	if (entry->action & APPRAISE)
+		seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_appraise));
+	if (entry->action & DONT_APPRAISE)
+		seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise));
+	if (entry->action & AUDIT)
+		seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit));
+	if (entry->action & DONT_AUDIT)
+		seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_audit));
+	if (entry->action & HASH)
+		seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_hash));
+	if (entry->action & DONT_HASH)
+		seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_hash));
+
+	seq_puts(m, " ");
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC)
+		policy_func_show(m, entry->func);
+
+	if ((entry->flags & IMA_MASK) || (entry->flags & IMA_INMASK)) {
+		if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK)
+			offset = 1;
+		if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec) + offset);
+		if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write) + offset);
+		if (entry->mask & MAY_READ)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read) + offset);
+		if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append) + offset);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) {
+		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "0x%lx", entry->fsmagic);
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsmagic), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_FSNAME) {
+		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", entry->fsname);
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsname), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_FS_SUBTYPE) {
+		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", entry->fs_subtype);
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fs_subtype), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_KEYRINGS) {
+		seq_puts(m, "keyrings=");
+		ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->keyrings);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_LABEL) {
+		seq_puts(m, "label=");
+		ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->label);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
+		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) {
+		seq_printf(m, "fsuuid=%pU", &entry->fsuuid);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_UID) {
+		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
+		if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_gt), tbuf);
+		else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_lt), tbuf);
+		else
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_eq), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_EUID) {
+		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
+		if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_gt), tbuf);
+		else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_lt), tbuf);
+		else
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_eq), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_GID) {
+		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kgid_val(entry->gid));
+		if (entry->gid_op == &gid_gt)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_gid_gt), tbuf);
+		else if (entry->gid_op == &gid_lt)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_gid_lt), tbuf);
+		else
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_gid_eq), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_EGID) {
+		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kgid_val(entry->gid));
+		if (entry->gid_op == &gid_gt)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_egid_gt), tbuf);
+		else if (entry->gid_op == &gid_lt)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_egid_lt), tbuf);
+		else
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_egid_eq), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_FOWNER) {
+		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->fowner));
+		if (entry->fowner_op == &vfsuid_gt_kuid)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_gt), tbuf);
+		else if (entry->fowner_op == &vfsuid_lt_kuid)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_lt), tbuf);
+		else
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_eq), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_FGROUP) {
+		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kgid_val(entry->fgroup));
+		if (entry->fgroup_op == &vfsgid_gt_kgid)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fgroup_gt), tbuf);
+		else if (entry->fgroup_op == &vfsgid_lt_kgid)
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fgroup_lt), tbuf);
+		else
+			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fgroup_eq), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS) {
+		seq_puts(m, "appraise_algos=");
+		ima_policy_show_appraise_algos(m, entry->allowed_algos);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+		if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
+			switch (i) {
+			case LSM_OBJ_USER:
+				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+				break;
+			case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
+				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role),
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+				break;
+			case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
+				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type),
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+				break;
+			case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
+				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user),
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+				break;
+			case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
+				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role),
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+				break;
+			case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
+				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type),
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+				break;
+			}
+			seq_puts(m, " ");
+		}
+	}
+	if (entry->template)
+		seq_printf(m, "template=%s ", entry->template->name);
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+		if (entry->flags & IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED)
+			seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=sigv3 ");
+		else if (entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
+			seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig|modsig ");
+		else
+			seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
+	}
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+		seq_puts(m, "digest_type=verity ");
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
+		seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	seq_puts(m, "\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif	/* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
+/*
+ * ima_appraise_signature: whether IMA will appraise a given function using
+ * an IMA digital signature. This is restricted to cases where the kernel
+ * has a set of built-in trusted keys in order to avoid an attacker simply
+ * loading additional keys.
+ */
+bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+	bool found = false;
+	enum ima_hooks func;
+	struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
+
+	if (id >= READING_MAX_ID)
+		return false;
+
+	if (id == READING_KEXEC_IMAGE && !(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+	    && security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
+		return false;
+
+	func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
+		if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * A generic entry will match, but otherwise require that it
+		 * match the func we're looking for
+		 */
+		if (entry->func && entry->func != func)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * We require this to be a digital signature, not a raw IMA
+		 * hash.
+		 */
+		if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
+			found = true;
+
+		/*
+		 * We've found a rule that matches, so break now even if it
+		 * didn't require a digital signature - a later rule that does
+		 * won't override it, so would be a false positive.
+		 */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return found;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f89f0ca3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -0,0 +1,577 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: ima_queue.c
+ *       Implements queues that store template measurements and
+ *       maintains aggregate over the stored measurements
+ *       in the pre-configured TPM PCR (if available).
+ *       The measurement list is append-only. No entry is
+ *       ever removed or changed during the boot-cycle.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+#define AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX 32
+
+bool ima_flush_htable;
+
+static int __init ima_flush_htable_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE)) {
+		pr_warn("Hash table not enabled, ignoring request to flush\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	ima_flush_htable = true;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_flush_htable", ima_flush_htable_setup);
+
+/* pre-allocated array of tpm_digest structures to extend a PCR */
+static struct tpm_digest *digests;
+
+LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements);	/* list of all measurements */
+LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements_staged); /* list of staged measurements */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
+static unsigned long binary_runtime_size[BINARY__LAST];
+#else
+static unsigned long binary_runtime_size[BINARY__LAST] = {
+	[0 ... BINARY__LAST - 1] = ULONG_MAX
+};
+#endif
+
+atomic_long_t ima_num_records[BINARY__LAST] = {
+	[0 ... BINARY__LAST - 1] = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0)
+};
+atomic_long_t ima_num_violations = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0);
+
+/* key: inode (before secure-hashing a file) */
+struct hlist_head __rcu *ima_htable;
+
+/* mutex protects atomicity of extending and staging measurement list
+ * and extending the TPM PCR aggregate. Since tpm_extend can take
+ * long (and the tpm driver uses a mutex), we can't use the spinlock.
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_extend_list_mutex);
+
+/*
+ * Used internally by the kernel to suspend measurements.
+ * Protected by ima_extend_list_mutex.
+ */
+static bool ima_measurements_suspended;
+
+/* Callers must call synchronize_rcu() and free the hash table. */
+static struct hlist_head *ima_alloc_replace_htable(void)
+{
+	struct hlist_head *old_htable, *new_htable;
+
+	/* Initializing to zeros is equivalent to call HLIST_HEAD_INIT. */
+	new_htable = kcalloc(IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE, sizeof(struct hlist_head),
+			     GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new_htable)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	old_htable = rcu_replace_pointer(ima_htable, new_htable,
+				lockdep_is_held(&ima_extend_list_mutex));
+
+	return old_htable;
+}
+
+int __init ima_init_htable(void)
+{
+	struct hlist_head *old_htable;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+	old_htable = ima_alloc_replace_htable();
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(old_htable))
+		return PTR_ERR(old_htable);
+
+	/* Synchronize_rcu() and kfree() not necessary, only for robustness. */
+	synchronize_rcu();
+	kfree(old_htable);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* lookup up the digest value in the hash table, and return the entry */
+static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value,
+						       int pcr)
+{
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe, *ret = NULL;
+	struct hlist_head *htable;
+	unsigned int key;
+	int rc;
+
+	key = ima_hash_key(digest_value);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	htable = rcu_dereference(ima_htable);
+	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &htable[key], hnext) {
+		rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digests[ima_hash_algo_idx].digest,
+			    digest_value, hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]);
+		if ((rc == 0) && (qe->entry->pcr == pcr)) {
+			ret = qe;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the memory required for serializing a single
+ * binary_runtime_measurement list entry, which contains a
+ * couple of variable length fields (e.g template name and data).
+ */
+static int get_binary_runtime_size(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
+{
+	int size = 0;
+
+	size += sizeof(u32);	/* pcr */
+	size += TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	size += sizeof(int);	/* template name size field */
+	size += strlen(entry->template_desc->name);
+	size += sizeof(entry->template_data_len);
+	size += entry->template_data_len;
+	return size;
+}
+
+static void ima_update_binary_runtime_size(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
+					   enum binary_lists binary_list)
+{
+	int size;
+
+	if (binary_runtime_size[binary_list] == ULONG_MAX)
+		return;
+
+	size = get_binary_runtime_size(entry);
+	binary_runtime_size[binary_list] =
+		(binary_runtime_size[binary_list] < ULONG_MAX - size) ?
+		binary_runtime_size[binary_list] + size : ULONG_MAX;
+}
+
+/* ima_add_template_entry helper function:
+ * - Add template entry to the measurement list and hash table, for
+ *   all entries except those carried across kexec.
+ *
+ * (Called with ima_extend_list_mutex held.)
+ */
+static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
+				bool update_htable)
+{
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
+	struct hlist_head *htable;
+	unsigned int key;
+
+	qe = kmalloc_obj(*qe);
+	if (qe == NULL) {
+		pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	qe->entry = entry;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&qe->later);
+	list_add_tail_rcu(&qe->later, &ima_measurements);
+
+	htable = rcu_dereference_protected(ima_htable,
+				lockdep_is_held(&ima_extend_list_mutex));
+
+	atomic_long_inc(&ima_num_records[BINARY]);
+	atomic_long_inc(&ima_num_records[BINARY_FULL]);
+
+	if (update_htable) {
+		key = ima_hash_key(entry->digests[ima_hash_algo_idx].digest);
+		hlist_add_head_rcu(&qe->hnext, &htable[key]);
+	}
+
+	ima_update_binary_runtime_size(entry, BINARY);
+	ima_update_binary_runtime_size(entry, BINARY_FULL);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the amount of memory required for serializing the
+ * entire binary_runtime_measurement list, including the ima_kexec_hdr
+ * structure.
+ */
+unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(enum binary_lists binary_list)
+{
+	unsigned long val;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+	val = binary_runtime_size[binary_list];
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+
+	if (val >= (ULONG_MAX - sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr)))
+		return ULONG_MAX;
+	else
+		return val + sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr);
+}
+
+static int ima_pcr_extend(struct tpm_digest *digests_arg, int pcr)
+{
+	int result = 0;
+
+	if (!ima_tpm_chip)
+		return result;
+
+	result = tpm_pcr_extend(ima_tpm_chip, pcr, digests_arg);
+	if (result != 0)
+		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add template entry to the measurement list and hash table, and
+ * extend the pcr.
+ *
+ * On systems which support carrying the IMA measurement list across
+ * kexec, maintain the total memory size required for serializing the
+ * binary_runtime_measurements.
+ */
+int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
+			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
+			   const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+	u8 *digest = entry->digests[ima_hash_algo_idx].digest;
+	struct tpm_digest *digests_arg = entry->digests;
+	const char *audit_cause = "hash_added";
+	char tpm_audit_cause[AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX];
+	int audit_info = 1;
+	int result = 0, tpmresult = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+
+	/*
+	 * Avoid appending to the measurement log when the TPM subsystem has
+	 * been shut down while preparing for system reboot.
+	 */
+	if (ima_measurements_suspended) {
+		audit_cause = "measurements_suspended";
+		audit_info = 0;
+		result = -ENODEV;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!violation && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE)) {
+		if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest, entry->pcr)) {
+			audit_cause = "hash_exists";
+			result = -EEXIST;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	result = ima_add_digest_entry(entry,
+				      !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE));
+	if (result < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+		audit_info = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (violation)		/* invalidate pcr */
+		digests_arg = digests;
+
+	tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digests_arg, entry->pcr);
+	if (tpmresult != 0) {
+		snprintf(tpm_audit_cause, AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX, "TPM_error(%d)",
+			 tpmresult);
+		audit_cause = tpm_audit_cause;
+		audit_info = 0;
+	}
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
+			    op, audit_cause, result, audit_info);
+	return result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_queue_stage - Stage all measurements
+ *
+ * If the staged measurements list is empty, the current measurements list is
+ * not empty, and measurement is not suspended, move the measurements from the
+ * current list to the staged one, and update the number of records and binary
+ * run-time size accordingly.
+ *
+ * Do not allow staging after measurement is suspended, so that dumping
+ * measurements can be done in a lockless way.
+ *
+ * Return: Zero on success, a negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int ima_queue_stage(void)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+	if (!list_empty(&ima_measurements_staged)) {
+		ret = -EEXIST;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	if (list_empty(&ima_measurements)) {
+		ret = -ENOENT;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	if (ima_measurements_suspended) {
+		ret = -EACCES;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	list_replace(&ima_measurements, &ima_measurements_staged);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ima_measurements);
+
+	atomic_long_set(&ima_num_records[BINARY_STAGED],
+			atomic_long_read(&ima_num_records[BINARY]));
+	atomic_long_set(&ima_num_records[BINARY], 0);
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC)) {
+		binary_runtime_size[BINARY_STAGED] =
+					binary_runtime_size[BINARY];
+		binary_runtime_size[BINARY] = 0;
+	}
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void ima_queue_delete(struct list_head *head, bool flush_htable);
+
+/**
+ * ima_queue_staged_delete_all - Delete staged measurements
+ *
+ * Move staged measurements to a temporary list, ima_measurements_trim, update
+ * the number of records and the binary run-time size accordingly. Finally,
+ * delete measurements in the temporary list.
+ *
+ * Refuse to delete staged measurements if measurement is suspended, so that
+ * dump can be done in a lockless way and user space is notified about staged
+ * measurements being carried over to the secondary kernel, so that it does not
+ * save them twice.
+ *
+ * Return: Zero on success, a negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int ima_queue_staged_delete_all(void)
+{
+	struct hlist_head *old_queue = NULL;
+	LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements_trim);
+
+	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+	if (list_empty(&ima_measurements_staged)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (ima_measurements_suspended) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+		return -ESTALE;
+	}
+
+	list_replace(&ima_measurements_staged, &ima_measurements_trim);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ima_measurements_staged);
+
+	atomic_long_set(&ima_num_records[BINARY_STAGED], 0);
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC))
+		binary_runtime_size[BINARY_STAGED] = 0;
+
+	if (ima_flush_htable) {
+		old_queue = ima_alloc_replace_htable();
+		if (IS_ERR(old_queue)) {
+			mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+			return PTR_ERR(old_queue);
+		}
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+
+	if (ima_flush_htable) {
+		synchronize_rcu();
+		kfree(old_queue);
+	}
+
+	ima_queue_delete(&ima_measurements_trim, ima_flush_htable);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_queue_delete_partial - Delete current measurements
+ * @req_value: Number of measurements to delete
+ *
+ * Delete the requested number of measurements from the current measurements
+ * list, and update the number of records and the binary run-time size
+ * accordingly.
+ *
+ * Refuse to delete current measurements if measurement is suspended, so that
+ * dump can be done in a lockless way and user space is notified about current
+ * measurements being carried over to the secondary kernel, so that it does not
+ * save them twice.
+ *
+ * Return: Zero on success, a negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int ima_queue_delete_partial(unsigned long req_value)
+{
+	unsigned long req_value_copy = req_value;
+	unsigned long size_to_remove = 0, num_to_remove = 0;
+	LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements_trim);
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * list_for_each_entry_rcu() without rcu_read_lock() is fine because
+	 * only list append can happen concurrently. No list replace due to the
+	 * staging/delete writers mutual exclusion.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_measurements, later, true) {
+		size_to_remove += get_binary_runtime_size(qe->entry);
+		num_to_remove++;
+
+		if (--req_value_copy == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/* Not enough records to delete. */
+	if (req_value_copy > 0)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+	if (ima_measurements_suspended) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+		return -ESTALE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * qe remains valid because ima_fs.c enforces single-writer exclusion.
+	 */
+	__list_cut_position(&ima_measurements_trim, &ima_measurements,
+			    &qe->later);
+
+	atomic_long_sub(num_to_remove, &ima_num_records[BINARY]);
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC))
+		binary_runtime_size[BINARY] -= size_to_remove;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+
+	ima_queue_delete(&ima_measurements_trim, false);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_queue_delete - Delete measurements
+ * @head: List head measurements are deleted from
+ * @flush_htable: Whether or not the hash table is being flushed
+ *
+ * Delete the measurements from the passed list head completely if the
+ * hash table is not enabled or is being flushed, or partially (only the
+ * template data), if the hash table is used.
+ */
+static void ima_queue_delete(struct list_head *head, bool flush_htable)
+{
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe, *qe_tmp;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(qe, qe_tmp, head, later) {
+		/*
+		 * Safe to free template_data here without synchronize_rcu()
+		 * because the only htable reader, ima_lookup_digest_entry(),
+		 * accesses only entry->digests, not template_data. If new
+		 * htable readers are added that access template_data, a
+		 * synchronize_rcu() is required here.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < qe->entry->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
+			kfree(qe->entry->template_data[i].data);
+			qe->entry->template_data[i].data = NULL;
+			qe->entry->template_data[i].len = 0;
+		}
+
+		list_del(&qe->later);
+
+		/* No leak if condition is false, referenced by ima_htable. */
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE) || flush_htable) {
+			kfree(qe->entry->digests);
+			kfree(qe->entry);
+			kfree(qe);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
+{
+	int result = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+	result = ima_add_digest_entry(entry, 0);
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+	return result;
+}
+
+static void ima_measurements_suspend(void)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+	ima_measurements_suspended = true;
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+}
+
+static int ima_reboot_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
+			       unsigned long action,
+			       void *data)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
+	if (action == SYS_RESTART && data && !strcmp(data, "kexec reboot"))
+		ima_measure_kexec_event("kexec_execute");
+#endif
+
+	ima_measurements_suspend();
+
+	return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block ima_reboot_nb = {
+	.notifier_call = ima_reboot_notifier,
+};
+
+void __init ima_init_reboot_notifier(void)
+{
+	register_reboot_notifier(&ima_reboot_nb);
+}
+
+int __init ima_init_digests(void)
+{
+	u16 digest_size;
+	u16 crypto_id;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!ima_tpm_chip)
+		return 0;
+
+	digests = kzalloc_objs(*digests, ima_tpm_chip->nr_allocated_banks,
+			       GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!digests)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ima_tpm_chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) {
+		digests[i].alg_id = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id;
+		digest_size = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size;
+		crypto_id = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].crypto_id;
+
+		/* for unmapped TPM algorithms digest is still a padded SHA1 */
+		if (crypto_id == HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			digest_size = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+
+		memset(digests[i].digest, 0xff, digest_size);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b5ed33cbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com)
+ *
+ * File: ima_queue_keys.c
+ *       Enables deferred processing of keys
+ */
+
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/*
+ * Flag to indicate whether a key can be processed
+ * right away or should be queued for processing later.
+ */
+static bool ima_process_keys;
+
+/*
+ * To synchronize access to the list of keys that need to be measured
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_keys_lock);
+static LIST_HEAD(ima_keys);
+
+/*
+ * If custom IMA policy is not loaded then keys queued up
+ * for measurement should be freed. This worker is used
+ * for handling this scenario.
+ */
+static long ima_key_queue_timeout = 300000; /* 5 Minutes */
+static void ima_keys_handler(struct work_struct *work);
+static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(ima_keys_delayed_work, ima_keys_handler);
+static bool timer_expired;
+
+/*
+ * This worker function frees keys that may still be
+ * queued up in case custom IMA policy was not loaded.
+ */
+static void ima_keys_handler(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	timer_expired = true;
+	ima_process_queued_keys();
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function sets up a worker to free queued keys in case
+ * custom IMA policy was never loaded.
+ */
+void ima_init_key_queue(void)
+{
+	schedule_delayed_work(&ima_keys_delayed_work,
+			      msecs_to_jiffies(ima_key_queue_timeout));
+}
+
+static void ima_free_key_entry(struct ima_key_entry *entry)
+{
+	if (entry) {
+		kfree(entry->payload);
+		kfree(entry->keyring_name);
+		kfree(entry);
+	}
+}
+
+static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
+						 const void *payload,
+						 size_t payload_len)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+	struct ima_key_entry *entry;
+
+	entry = kzalloc_obj(*entry);
+	if (entry) {
+		entry->payload = kmemdup(payload, payload_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		entry->keyring_name = kstrdup(keyring->description,
+					      GFP_KERNEL);
+		entry->payload_len = payload_len;
+	}
+
+	if ((entry == NULL) || (entry->payload == NULL) ||
+	    (entry->keyring_name == NULL)) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+
+out:
+	if (rc) {
+		integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL,
+					keyring->description,
+					func_measure_str(KEY_CHECK),
+					audit_cause, rc, 0, rc);
+		ima_free_key_entry(entry);
+		entry = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return entry;
+}
+
+bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload,
+		   size_t payload_len)
+{
+	bool queued = false;
+	struct ima_key_entry *entry;
+
+	entry = ima_alloc_key_entry(keyring, payload, payload_len);
+	if (!entry)
+		return false;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ima_keys_lock);
+	if (!ima_process_keys) {
+		list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_keys);
+		queued = true;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_keys_lock);
+
+	if (!queued)
+		ima_free_key_entry(entry);
+
+	return queued;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_process_queued_keys() - process keys queued for measurement
+ *
+ * This function sets ima_process_keys to true and processes queued keys.
+ * From here on keys will be processed right away (not queued).
+ */
+void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
+{
+	struct ima_key_entry *entry, *tmp;
+	bool process = false;
+
+	if (ima_process_keys)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since ima_process_keys is set to true, any new key will be
+	 * processed immediately and not be queued to ima_keys list.
+	 * First one setting the ima_process_keys flag to true will
+	 * process the queued keys.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&ima_keys_lock);
+	if (!ima_process_keys) {
+		ima_process_keys = true;
+		process = true;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_keys_lock);
+
+	if (!process)
+		return;
+
+	if (!timer_expired)
+		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ima_keys_delayed_work);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) {
+		if (!timer_expired)
+			process_buffer_measurement(&nop_mnt_idmap, NULL,
+						   entry->payload,
+						   entry->payload_len,
+						   entry->keyring_name,
+						   KEY_CHECK, 0,
+						   entry->keyring_name,
+						   false, NULL, 0);
+		list_del(&entry->list);
+		ima_free_key_entry(entry);
+	}
+}
+
+inline bool ima_should_queue_key(void)
+{
+	return !ima_process_keys;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7034573fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- https://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * File: ima_template.c
+ *      Helpers to manage template descriptors.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+#include "ima_template_lib.h"
+
+enum header_fields { HDR_PCR, HDR_DIGEST, HDR_TEMPLATE_NAME,
+		     HDR_TEMPLATE_DATA, HDR__LAST };
+
+static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = {
+	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
+	{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
+	{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
+	{.name = "ima-ngv2", .fmt = "d-ngv2|n-ng"},
+	{.name = "ima-sigv2", .fmt = "d-ngv2|n-ng|sig"},
+	{.name = "ima-buf", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|buf"},
+	{.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"},
+	{.name = "evm-sig",
+	 .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|evmsig|xattrnames|xattrlengths|xattrvalues|iuid|igid|imode"},
+	{.name = "", .fmt = ""},	/* placeholder for a custom format */
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(defined_templates);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(template_list);
+static int template_setup_done;
+
+static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
+	{.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
+	{.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
+	{.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
+	{.field_id = "d-ngv2", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ngv2},
+	{.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
+	{.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
+	{.field_id = "buf", .field_init = ima_eventbuf_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_buf},
+	{.field_id = "d-modsig", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_modsig_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
+	{.field_id = "modsig", .field_init = ima_eventmodsig_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
+	{.field_id = "evmsig", .field_init = ima_eventevmsig_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
+	{.field_id = "iuid", .field_init = ima_eventinodeuid_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_uint},
+	{.field_id = "igid", .field_init = ima_eventinodegid_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_uint},
+	{.field_id = "imode", .field_init = ima_eventinodemode_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_uint},
+	{.field_id = "xattrnames",
+	 .field_init = ima_eventinodexattrnames_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
+	{.field_id = "xattrlengths",
+	 .field_init = ima_eventinodexattrlengths_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
+	{.field_id = "xattrvalues",
+	 .field_init = ima_eventinodexattrvalues_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
+};
+
+/*
+ * Used when restoring measurements carried over from a kexec. 'd' and 'n' don't
+ * need to be accounted for since they shouldn't be defined in the same template
+ * description as 'd-ng' and 'n-ng' respectively.
+ */
+#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN \
+	sizeof("d-ng|n-ng|evmsig|xattrnames|xattrlengths|xattrvalues|iuid|igid|imode")
+
+static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
+static struct ima_template_desc *ima_buf_template;
+
+/**
+ * ima_template_has_modsig - Check whether template has modsig-related fields.
+ * @ima_template: IMA template to check.
+ *
+ * Tells whether the given template has fields referencing a file's appended
+ * signature.
+ */
+bool ima_template_has_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *ima_template)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ima_template->num_fields; i++)
+		if (!strcmp(ima_template->fields[i]->field_id, "modsig") ||
+		    !strcmp(ima_template->fields[i]->field_id, "d-modsig"))
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
+{
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
+	int template_len = strlen(str);
+
+	if (template_setup_done)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!ima_template)
+		ima_init_template_list();
+
+	/*
+	 * Verify that a template with the supplied name exists.
+	 * If not, use CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE.
+	 */
+	template_desc = lookup_template_desc(str);
+	if (!template_desc) {
+		pr_err("template %s not found, using %s\n",
+		       str, CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Verify whether the current hash algorithm is supported
+	 * by the 'ima' template.
+	 */
+	if (template_len == 3 && strcmp(str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0 &&
+	    ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_MD5) {
+		pr_err("template does not support hash alg\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	ima_template = template_desc;
+	template_setup_done = 1;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_template=", ima_template_setup);
+
+static int __init ima_template_fmt_setup(char *str)
+{
+	int num_templates = ARRAY_SIZE(builtin_templates);
+
+	if (template_setup_done)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (template_desc_init_fields(str, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+		pr_err("format string '%s' not valid, using template %s\n",
+		       str, CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	builtin_templates[num_templates - 1].fmt = str;
+	ima_template = builtin_templates + num_templates - 1;
+	template_setup_done = 1;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_template_fmt=", ima_template_fmt_setup);
+
+struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
+{
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(template_desc, &defined_templates, list) {
+		if ((strcmp(template_desc->name, name) == 0) ||
+		    (strcmp(template_desc->fmt, name) == 0)) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return found ? template_desc : NULL;
+}
+
+static const struct ima_template_field *
+lookup_template_field(const char *field_id)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(supported_fields); i++)
+		if (strncmp(supported_fields[i].field_id, field_id,
+			    IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN) == 0)
+			return &supported_fields[i];
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int template_fmt_size(const char *template_fmt)
+{
+	char c;
+	int template_fmt_len = strlen(template_fmt);
+	int i = 0, j = 0;
+
+	while (i < template_fmt_len) {
+		c = template_fmt[i];
+		if (c == '|')
+			j++;
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	return j + 1;
+}
+
+int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
+			      const struct ima_template_field ***fields,
+			      int *num_fields)
+{
+	const char *template_fmt_ptr;
+	const struct ima_template_field *found_fields[IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX];
+	int template_num_fields;
+	int i, len;
+
+	if (num_fields && *num_fields > 0) /* already initialized? */
+		return 0;
+
+	template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
+
+	if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX) {
+		pr_err("format string '%s' contains too many fields\n",
+		       template_fmt);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0, template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt; i < template_num_fields;
+	     i++, template_fmt_ptr += len + 1) {
+		char tmp_field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN + 1];
+
+		len = strchrnul(template_fmt_ptr, '|') - template_fmt_ptr;
+		if (len == 0 || len > IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN) {
+			pr_err("Invalid field with length %d\n", len);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		memcpy(tmp_field_id, template_fmt_ptr, len);
+		tmp_field_id[len] = '\0';
+		found_fields[i] = lookup_template_field(tmp_field_id);
+		if (!found_fields[i]) {
+			pr_err("field '%s' not found\n", tmp_field_id);
+			return -ENOENT;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (fields && num_fields) {
+		*fields = kmalloc_objs(**fields, i);
+		if (*fields == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(**fields));
+		*num_fields = i;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void ima_init_template_list(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!list_empty(&defined_templates))
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock(&template_list);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(builtin_templates); i++) {
+		list_add_tail_rcu(&builtin_templates[i].list,
+				  &defined_templates);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&template_list);
+}
+
+struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
+{
+	if (!ima_template) {
+		ima_init_template_list();
+		ima_template =
+		    lookup_template_desc(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
+	}
+	return ima_template;
+}
+
+struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_buf(void)
+{
+	if (!ima_buf_template) {
+		ima_init_template_list();
+		ima_buf_template = lookup_template_desc("ima-buf");
+	}
+	return ima_buf_template;
+}
+
+int __init ima_init_template(void)
+{
+	struct ima_template_desc *template = ima_template_desc_current();
+	int result;
+
+	result = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
+					   &(template->fields),
+					   &(template->num_fields));
+	if (result < 0) {
+		pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n",
+		       (strlen(template->name) ?
+		       template->name : template->fmt), result);
+		return result;
+	}
+
+	template = ima_template_desc_buf();
+	if (!template) {
+		pr_err("Failed to get ima-buf template\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	result = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
+					   &(template->fields),
+					   &(template->num_fields));
+	if (result < 0)
+		pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n",
+		       (strlen(template->name) ?
+		       template->name : template->fmt), result);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+static struct ima_template_desc *restore_template_fmt(char *template_name)
+{
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = template_desc_init_fields(template_name, NULL, NULL);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_err("attempting to initialize the template \"%s\" failed\n",
+			template_name);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	template_desc = kzalloc_obj(*template_desc);
+	if (!template_desc)
+		goto out;
+
+	template_desc->name = "";
+	template_desc->fmt = kstrdup(template_name, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!template_desc->fmt) {
+		kfree(template_desc);
+		template_desc = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	spin_lock(&template_list);
+	list_add_tail_rcu(&template_desc->list, &defined_templates);
+	spin_unlock(&template_list);
+out:
+	return template_desc;
+}
+
+static int ima_restore_template_data(struct ima_template_desc *template_desc,
+				     void *template_data,
+				     int template_data_size,
+				     struct ima_template_entry **entry)
+{
+	struct tpm_digest *digests;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	*entry = kzalloc_flex(**entry, template_data, template_desc->num_fields,
+			      GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!*entry)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	digests = kzalloc_objs(*digests,
+			       NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip) + ima_extra_slots,
+			       GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!digests) {
+		kfree(*entry);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	(*entry)->digests = digests;
+
+	ret = ima_parse_buf(template_data, template_data + template_data_size,
+			    NULL, template_desc->num_fields,
+			    (*entry)->template_data, NULL, NULL,
+			    ENFORCE_FIELDS | ENFORCE_BUFEND, "template data");
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		kfree((*entry)->digests);
+		kfree(*entry);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	(*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
+	for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
+		struct ima_field_data *field_data = &(*entry)->template_data[i];
+		u8 *data = field_data->data;
+
+		(*entry)->template_data[i].data =
+			kzalloc(field_data->len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!(*entry)->template_data[i].data) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+		memcpy((*entry)->template_data[i].data, data, field_data->len);
+		(*entry)->template_data_len += sizeof(field_data->len);
+		(*entry)->template_data_len += field_data->len;
+	}
+
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		ima_free_template_entry(*entry);
+		*entry = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Restore the serialized binary measurement list without extending PCRs. */
+int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf)
+{
+	char template_name[MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN];
+	unsigned char zero[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
+
+	struct ima_kexec_hdr *khdr = buf;
+	struct ima_field_data hdr[HDR__LAST] = {
+		[HDR_PCR] = {.len = sizeof(u32)},
+		[HDR_DIGEST] = {.len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE},
+	};
+
+	void *bufp = buf + sizeof(*khdr);
+	void *bufendp;
+	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
+	DECLARE_BITMAP(hdr_mask, HDR__LAST);
+	unsigned long count = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (!buf || size < sizeof(*khdr))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (ima_canonical_fmt) {
+		khdr->version = le16_to_cpu((__force __le16)khdr->version);
+		khdr->count = le64_to_cpu((__force __le64)khdr->count);
+		khdr->buffer_size = le64_to_cpu((__force __le64)khdr->buffer_size);
+	}
+
+	if (khdr->version != 1) {
+		pr_err("attempting to restore a incompatible measurement list");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (khdr->count > ULONG_MAX - 1) {
+		pr_err("attempting to restore too many measurements");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	bitmap_zero(hdr_mask, HDR__LAST);
+	bitmap_set(hdr_mask, HDR_PCR, 1);
+	bitmap_set(hdr_mask, HDR_DIGEST, 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * ima kexec buffer prefix: version, buffer size, count
+	 * v1 format: pcr, digest, template-name-len, template-name,
+	 *	      template-data-size, template-data
+	 */
+	bufendp = buf + khdr->buffer_size;
+	while ((bufp < bufendp) && (count++ < khdr->count)) {
+		int enforce_mask = ENFORCE_FIELDS;
+
+		enforce_mask |= (count == khdr->count) ? ENFORCE_BUFEND : 0;
+		ret = ima_parse_buf(bufp, bufendp, &bufp, HDR__LAST, hdr, NULL,
+				    hdr_mask, enforce_mask, "entry header");
+		if (ret < 0)
+			break;
+
+		if (hdr[HDR_TEMPLATE_NAME].len >= MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN) {
+			pr_err("attempting to restore a template name that is too long\n");
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* template name is not null terminated */
+		memcpy(template_name, hdr[HDR_TEMPLATE_NAME].data,
+		       hdr[HDR_TEMPLATE_NAME].len);
+		template_name[hdr[HDR_TEMPLATE_NAME].len] = 0;
+
+		if (strcmp(template_name, "ima") == 0) {
+			pr_err("attempting to restore an unsupported template \"%s\" failed\n",
+			       template_name);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		template_desc = lookup_template_desc(template_name);
+		if (!template_desc) {
+			template_desc = restore_template_fmt(template_name);
+			if (!template_desc)
+				break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Only the running system's template format is initialized
+		 * on boot.  As needed, initialize the other template formats.
+		 */
+		ret = template_desc_init_fields(template_desc->fmt,
+						&(template_desc->fields),
+						&(template_desc->num_fields));
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			pr_err("attempting to restore the template fmt \"%s\" failed\n",
+			       template_desc->fmt);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		ret = ima_restore_template_data(template_desc,
+						hdr[HDR_TEMPLATE_DATA].data,
+						hdr[HDR_TEMPLATE_DATA].len,
+						&entry);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			break;
+
+		if (memcmp(hdr[HDR_DIGEST].data, zero, sizeof(zero))) {
+			ret = ima_calc_field_array_hash(
+						&entry->template_data[0],
+						entry);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				pr_err("cannot calculate template digest\n");
+				ret = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		entry->pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? *(u32 *)(hdr[HDR_PCR].data) :
+			     le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)(hdr[HDR_PCR].data));
+		ret = ima_restore_measurement_entry(entry);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			break;
+
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0e627eac9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,764 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- https://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * File: ima_template_lib.c
+ *      Library of supported template fields.
+ */
+
+#include "ima_template_lib.h"
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+
+static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo)
+{
+	if (algo == HASH_ALGO_SHA1 || algo == HASH_ALGO_MD5)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+enum data_formats {
+	DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
+	DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
+	DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO,
+	DATA_FMT_STRING,
+	DATA_FMT_HEX,
+	DATA_FMT_UINT
+};
+
+enum digest_type {
+	DIGEST_TYPE_IMA,
+	DIGEST_TYPE_VERITY,
+	DIGEST_TYPE__LAST
+};
+
+#define DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX 7	/* including NUL */
+static const char * const digest_type_name[DIGEST_TYPE__LAST] = {
+	[DIGEST_TYPE_IMA] = "ima",
+	[DIGEST_TYPE_VERITY] = "verity"
+};
+
+static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
+					 enum data_formats datafmt,
+					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	u8 *buf, *buf_ptr;
+	u32 buflen = datalen;
+
+	if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING)
+		buflen = datalen + 1;
+
+	buf = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memcpy(buf, data, datalen);
+
+	/*
+	 * Replace all space characters with underscore for event names and
+	 * strings. This avoid that, during the parsing of a measurements list,
+	 * filenames with spaces or that end with the suffix ' (deleted)' are
+	 * split into multiple template fields (the space is the delimitator
+	 * character for measurements lists in ASCII format).
+	 */
+	if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
+		for (buf_ptr = buf; buf_ptr - buf < datalen; buf_ptr++)
+			if (*buf_ptr == ' ')
+				*buf_ptr = '_';
+	}
+
+	field_data->data = buf;
+	field_data->len = buflen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
+					 enum ima_show_type show,
+					 enum data_formats datafmt,
+					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data;
+	u32 buflen = field_data->len;
+
+	switch (datafmt) {
+	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
+	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO:
+		buf_ptr = strrchr(field_data->data, ':');
+		if (buf_ptr != field_data->data)
+			seq_printf(m, "%s", field_data->data);
+
+		/* skip ':' and '\0' */
+		buf_ptr += 2;
+		buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
+		fallthrough;
+	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
+	case DATA_FMT_HEX:
+		if (!buflen)
+			break;
+		ima_print_digest(m, buf_ptr, buflen);
+		break;
+	case DATA_FMT_STRING:
+		seq_printf(m, "%s", buf_ptr);
+		break;
+	case DATA_FMT_UINT:
+		switch (field_data->len) {
+		case sizeof(u8):
+			seq_printf(m, "%u", *(u8 *)buf_ptr);
+			break;
+		case sizeof(u16):
+			if (ima_canonical_fmt)
+				seq_printf(m, "%u",
+					   le16_to_cpu(*(__le16 *)buf_ptr));
+			else
+				seq_printf(m, "%u", *(u16 *)buf_ptr);
+			break;
+		case sizeof(u32):
+			if (ima_canonical_fmt)
+				seq_printf(m, "%u",
+					   le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)buf_ptr));
+			else
+				seq_printf(m, "%u", *(u32 *)buf_ptr);
+			break;
+		case sizeof(u64):
+			if (ima_canonical_fmt)
+				seq_printf(m, "%llu",
+					   le64_to_cpu(*(__le64 *)buf_ptr));
+			else
+				seq_printf(m, "%llu", *(u64 *)buf_ptr);
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m,
+					  enum ima_show_type show,
+					  enum data_formats datafmt,
+					  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	u32 len = (show == IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT) ?
+	    strlen(field_data->data) : field_data->len;
+
+	if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN) {
+		u32 field_len = !ima_canonical_fmt ?
+				len : (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(len);
+
+		ima_putc(m, &field_len, sizeof(field_len));
+	}
+
+	if (!len)
+		return;
+
+	ima_putc(m, field_data->data, len);
+}
+
+static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
+					 enum ima_show_type show,
+					 enum data_formats datafmt,
+					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	switch (show) {
+	case IMA_SHOW_ASCII:
+		ima_show_template_data_ascii(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
+		break;
+	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
+	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN:
+	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT:
+		ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_DIGEST, field_data);
+}
+
+void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+				 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
+				     field_data);
+}
+
+void ima_show_template_digest_ngv2(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+				   struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show,
+				     DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO,
+				     field_data);
+}
+
+void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
+}
+
+void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data);
+}
+
+void ima_show_template_buf(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data);
+}
+
+void ima_show_template_uint(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_UINT, field_data);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_parse_buf() - Parses lengths and data from an input buffer
+ * @bufstartp:       Buffer start address.
+ * @bufendp:         Buffer end address.
+ * @bufcurp:         Pointer to remaining (non-parsed) data.
+ * @maxfields:       Length of fields array.
+ * @fields:          Array containing lengths and pointers of parsed data.
+ * @curfields:       Number of array items containing parsed data.
+ * @len_mask:        Bitmap (if bit is set, data length should not be parsed).
+ * @enforce_mask:    Check if curfields == maxfields and/or bufcurp == bufendp.
+ * @bufname:         String identifier of the input buffer.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -EINVAL on error.
+ */
+int ima_parse_buf(void *bufstartp, void *bufendp, void **bufcurp,
+		  int maxfields, struct ima_field_data *fields, int *curfields,
+		  unsigned long *len_mask, int enforce_mask, char *bufname)
+{
+	void *bufp = bufstartp;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < maxfields; i++) {
+		if (len_mask == NULL || !test_bit(i, len_mask)) {
+			if (bufp > (bufendp - sizeof(u32)))
+				break;
+
+			if (ima_canonical_fmt)
+				fields[i].len = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)bufp);
+			else
+				fields[i].len = *(u32 *)bufp;
+
+			bufp += sizeof(u32);
+		}
+
+		if (bufp > (bufendp - fields[i].len))
+			break;
+
+		fields[i].data = bufp;
+		bufp += fields[i].len;
+	}
+
+	if ((enforce_mask & ENFORCE_FIELDS) && i != maxfields) {
+		pr_err("%s: nr of fields mismatch: expected: %d, current: %d\n",
+		       bufname, maxfields, i);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((enforce_mask & ENFORCE_BUFEND) && bufp != bufendp) {
+		pr_err("%s: buf end mismatch: expected: %p, current: %p\n",
+		       bufname, bufendp, bufp);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (curfields)
+		*curfields = i;
+
+	if (bufcurp)
+		*bufcurp = bufp;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize,
+				       u8 digest_type, u8 hash_algo,
+				       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	/*
+	 * digest formats:
+	 *  - DATA_FMT_DIGEST: digest
+	 *  - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: <hash algo> + ':' + '\0' + digest,
+	 *  - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
+	 *	<digest type> + ':' + <hash algo> + ':' + '\0' + digest,
+	 *
+	 *    where 'DATA_FMT_DIGEST' is the original digest format ('d')
+	 *      with a hash size limitation of 20 bytes,
+	 *    where <digest type> is either "ima" or "verity",
+	 *    where <hash algo> is the hash_algo_name[] string.
+	 */
+	u8 buffer[DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX + CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 +
+		IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
+	enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST;
+	u32 offset = 0;
+
+	if (digest_type < DIGEST_TYPE__LAST && hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
+		fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO;
+		offset += 1 + sprintf(buffer, "%s:%s:",
+				      digest_type_name[digest_type],
+				      hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
+	} else if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
+		fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO;
+		offset += 1 + sprintf(buffer, "%s:",
+				      hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
+	}
+
+	if (digest) {
+		memcpy(buffer + offset, digest, digestsize);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * If digest is NULL, the event being recorded is a violation.
+		 * Make room for the digest by increasing the offset by the
+		 * hash algorithm digest size. If the hash algorithm is not
+		 * specified increase the offset by IMA_DIGEST_SIZE which
+		 * fits SHA1 or MD5
+		 */
+		if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			offset += hash_digest_size[hash_algo];
+		else
+			offset += IMA_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	return ima_write_template_field_data(buffer, offset + digestsize,
+					     fmt, field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the digest of an event (with size limit).
+ */
+int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+	struct ima_digest_data *hash_hdr = container_of(&hash.hdr,
+						struct ima_digest_data, hdr);
+	u8 *cur_digest = NULL;
+	u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	int result;
+
+	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+
+	if (event_data->violation)	/* recording a violation. */
+		goto out;
+
+	if (ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo)) {
+		cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
+		cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((const char *)event_data->filename == boot_aggregate_name) {
+		if (ima_tpm_chip) {
+			hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+			result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(hash_hdr);
+
+			/* algo can change depending on available PCR banks */
+			if (!result && hash.hdr.algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			if (result < 0)
+				memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+		}
+
+		cur_digest = hash_hdr->digest;
+		cur_digestsize = hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO_SHA1];
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!event_data->file)	/* missing info to re-calculate the digest */
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	inode = file_inode(event_data->file);
+	hash.hdr.algo = ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(ima_hash_algo) ?
+	    ima_hash_algo : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+	result = ima_calc_file_hash(event_data->file, hash_hdr);
+	if (result) {
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
+				    event_data->filename, "collect_data",
+				    "failed", result, 0);
+		return result;
+	}
+	cur_digest = hash_hdr->digest;
+	cur_digestsize = hash.hdr.length;
+out:
+	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
+					   DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, HASH_ALGO__LAST,
+					   field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit).
+ */
+int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = ima_hash_algo;
+	u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
+
+	if (event_data->violation)	/* recording a violation. */
+		goto out;
+
+	cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
+	cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
+
+	hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
+out:
+	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
+					   DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, hash_algo,
+					   field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit),
+ * prefixed with both the digest type and hash algorithm.
+ */
+int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = ima_hash_algo;
+	u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
+	u8 digest_type = DIGEST_TYPE_IMA;
+
+	if (event_data->violation)	/* recording a violation. */
+		goto out;
+
+	cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
+	cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
+
+	hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
+	if (event_data->iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+		digest_type = DIGEST_TYPE_VERITY;
+out:
+	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
+					   digest_type, hash_algo,
+					   field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the digest of the file which is expected to match the
+ * digest contained in the file's appended signature.
+ */
+int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+				struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
+	const u8 *cur_digest;
+	u32 cur_digestsize;
+
+	if (!event_data->modsig)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (event_data->violation) {
+		/* Recording a violation. */
+		hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		cur_digest = NULL;
+		cur_digestsize = 0;
+	} else {
+		int rc;
+
+		rc = ima_get_modsig_digest(event_data->modsig, &hash_algo,
+					   &cur_digest, &cur_digestsize);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		else if (hash_algo == HASH_ALGO__LAST || cur_digestsize == 0)
+			/* There was some error collecting the digest. */
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
+					   DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, hash_algo,
+					   field_data);
+}
+
+static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+				     struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+				     bool size_limit)
+{
+	const char *cur_filename = NULL;
+	struct name_snapshot filename;
+	u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
+	bool snapshot = false;
+	int ret;
+
+	BUG_ON(event_data->filename == NULL && event_data->file == NULL);
+
+	if (event_data->filename) {
+		cur_filename = event_data->filename;
+		cur_filename_len = strlen(event_data->filename);
+
+		if (!size_limit || cur_filename_len <= IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (event_data->file) {
+		take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename,
+					  event_data->file->f_path.dentry);
+		snapshot = true;
+		cur_filename = filename.name.name;
+		cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename);
+	} else
+		/*
+		 * Truncate filename if the latter is too long and
+		 * the file descriptor is not available.
+		 */
+		cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX;
+out:
+	ret = ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
+					    DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
+
+	if (snapshot)
+		release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the name of an event (with size limit).
+ */
+int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+		       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	return ima_eventname_init_common(event_data, field_data, true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the name of an event (without size limit).
+ */
+int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	return ima_eventname_init_common(event_data, field_data, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  ima_eventsig_init - include the file signature as part of the template data
+ */
+int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+		      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value;
+
+	if (!xattr_value ||
+	    (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+	     xattr_value->type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG))
+		return ima_eventevmsig_init(event_data, field_data);
+
+	return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,
+					     DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  ima_eventbuf_init - include the buffer(kexec-cmldine) as part of the
+ *  template data.
+ */
+int ima_eventbuf_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+		      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	if ((!event_data->buf) || (event_data->buf_len == 0))
+		return 0;
+
+	return ima_write_template_field_data(event_data->buf,
+					     event_data->buf_len, DATA_FMT_HEX,
+					     field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  ima_eventmodsig_init - include the appended file signature as part of the
+ *  template data
+ */
+int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	const void *data;
+	u32 data_len;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!event_data->modsig)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * modsig is a runtime structure containing pointers. Get its raw data
+	 * instead.
+	 */
+	rc = ima_get_raw_modsig(event_data->modsig, &data, &data_len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return ima_write_template_field_data(data, data_len, DATA_FMT_HEX,
+					     field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  ima_eventevmsig_init - include the EVM portable signature as part of the
+ *  template data
+ */
+int ima_eventevmsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!event_data->file)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, file_dentry(event_data->file),
+				XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
+				GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc <= 0 || xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
+		rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = ima_write_template_field_data((char *)xattr_data, rc, DATA_FMT_HEX,
+					   field_data);
+
+out:
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int ima_eventinodedac_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+					 struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+					 bool get_uid)
+{
+	unsigned int id;
+
+	if (!event_data->file)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (get_uid)
+		id = i_uid_read(file_inode(event_data->file));
+	else
+		id = i_gid_read(file_inode(event_data->file));
+
+	if (ima_canonical_fmt) {
+		if (sizeof(id) == sizeof(u16))
+			id = (__force u16)cpu_to_le16(id);
+		else
+			id = (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(id);
+	}
+
+	return ima_write_template_field_data((void *)&id, sizeof(id),
+					     DATA_FMT_UINT, field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  ima_eventinodeuid_init - include the inode UID as part of the template
+ *  data
+ */
+int ima_eventinodeuid_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	return ima_eventinodedac_init_common(event_data, field_data, true);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  ima_eventinodegid_init - include the inode GID as part of the template
+ *  data
+ */
+int ima_eventinodegid_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	return ima_eventinodedac_init_common(event_data, field_data, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  ima_eventinodemode_init - include the inode mode as part of the template
+ *  data
+ */
+int ima_eventinodemode_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	struct inode *inode;
+	u16 mode;
+
+	if (!event_data->file)
+		return 0;
+
+	inode = file_inode(event_data->file);
+	mode = inode->i_mode;
+	if (ima_canonical_fmt)
+		mode = (__force u16)cpu_to_le16(mode);
+
+	return ima_write_template_field_data((char *)&mode, sizeof(mode),
+					     DATA_FMT_UINT, field_data);
+}
+
+static int ima_eventinodexattrs_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+					    struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+					    char type)
+{
+	u8 *buffer = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!event_data->file)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = evm_read_protected_xattrs(file_dentry(event_data->file), NULL, 0,
+				       type, ima_canonical_fmt);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	buffer = kmalloc(rc, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = evm_read_protected_xattrs(file_dentry(event_data->file), buffer,
+				       rc, type, ima_canonical_fmt);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = ima_write_template_field_data((char *)buffer, rc, DATA_FMT_HEX,
+					   field_data);
+out:
+	kfree(buffer);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  ima_eventinodexattrnames_init - include a list of xattr names as part of the
+ *  template data
+ */
+int ima_eventinodexattrnames_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+				  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	return ima_eventinodexattrs_init_common(event_data, field_data, 'n');
+}
+
+/*
+ *  ima_eventinodexattrlengths_init - include a list of xattr lengths as part of
+ *  the template data
+ */
+int ima_eventinodexattrlengths_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+				    struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	return ima_eventinodexattrs_init_common(event_data, field_data, 'l');
+}
+
+/*
+ *  ima_eventinodexattrvalues_init - include a list of xattr values as part of
+ *  the template data
+ */
+int ima_eventinodexattrvalues_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+				   struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	return ima_eventinodexattrs_init_common(event_data, field_data, 'v');
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9f7c335f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- https://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * File: ima_template_lib.h
+ *      Header for the library of supported template fields.
+ */
+#ifndef __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H
+#define __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H
+
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+#define ENFORCE_FIELDS 0x00000001
+#define ENFORCE_BUFEND 0x00000002
+
+void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+				 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_digest_ngv2(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+				   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_buf(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_uint(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_parse_buf(void *bufstartp, void *bufendp, void **bufcurp,
+		  int maxfields, struct ima_field_data *fields, int *curfields,
+		  unsigned long *len_mask, int enforce_mask, char *bufname);
+int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+		       struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+				struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+		      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventbuf_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+		      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventevmsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventinodeuid_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventinodegid_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventinodemode_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventinodexattrnames_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+				  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventinodexattrlengths_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+				    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventinodexattrvalues_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+				   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0c581c03c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#ifdef pr_fmt
+#undef pr_fmt
+#endif
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
+#include <linux/secure_boot.h>
+#include <crypto/sha1.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
+	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
+	EVM_XATTR_HMAC,
+	EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
+	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
+	EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG,
+	IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG,
+	IMA_XATTR_LAST
+};
+
+struct evm_ima_xattr_data {
+	/* New members must be added within the __struct_group() macro below. */
+	__struct_group(evm_ima_xattr_data_hdr, hdr, __packed,
+		u8 type;
+	);
+	u8 data[];
+} __packed;
+static_assert(offsetof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data, data) == sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data_hdr),
+	      "struct member likely outside of __struct_group()");
+
+/* Only used in the EVM HMAC code. */
+struct evm_xattr {
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data_hdr data;
+	u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+} __packed;
+
+#define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE	HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE
+
+struct ima_digest_data {
+	/* New members must be added within the __struct_group() macro below. */
+	__struct_group(ima_digest_data_hdr, hdr, __packed,
+	u8 algo;
+	u8 length;
+	union {
+		struct {
+			u8 unused;
+			u8 type;
+		} sha1;
+		struct {
+			u8 type;
+			u8 algo;
+		} ng;
+		u8 data[2];
+	} xattr;
+	);
+	u8 digest[];
+} __packed;
+static_assert(offsetof(struct ima_digest_data, digest) == sizeof(struct ima_digest_data_hdr),
+	      "struct member likely outside of __struct_group()");
+
+/*
+ * Instead of wrapping the ima_digest_data struct inside a local structure
+ * with the maximum hash size, define ima_max_digest_data struct.
+ */
+struct ima_max_digest_data {
+	struct ima_digest_data_hdr hdr;
+	u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * signature header format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
+ *
+ * The signature_v2_hdr struct includes a signature format version
+ * to simplify defining new signature formats.
+ *
+ * signature format:
+ * version 2: regular file data hash based signature
+ * version 3: struct ima_file_id data based signature
+ */
+struct signature_v2_hdr {
+	uint8_t type;		/* xattr type */
+	uint8_t version;	/* signature format version */
+	uint8_t	hash_algo;	/* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
+	__be32 keyid;		/* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */
+	__be16 sig_size;	/* signature size */
+	uint8_t sig[];		/* signature payload */
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed, by
+ * indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data,
+ * containing either the fsverity_descriptor struct digest or, in the
+ * future, the regular IMA file hash.
+ *
+ * (The hash of the ima_file_id structure is only of the portion used.)
+ */
+struct ima_file_id {
+	__u8 hash_type;		/* xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type] */
+	__u8 hash_algorithm;	/* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
+	__u8 hash[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+} __packed;
+
+int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
+			  void *addr, unsigned long count);
+int __init integrity_fs_init(void);
+void __init integrity_fs_fini(void);
+
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM		0
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA		1
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM	2
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE	3
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX		4
+
+extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;
+
+struct modsig;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
+
+int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
+			    const char *digest, int digestlen, u8 algo);
+int integrity_modsig_verify(unsigned int id, const struct modsig *modsig);
+
+int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path);
+int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id, const char *source,
+			       const void *data, size_t len, key_perm_t perm);
+#else
+
+static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
+					  const char *sig, int siglen,
+					  const char *digest, int digestlen,
+					  u8 algo)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline int integrity_modsig_verify(unsigned int id,
+					  const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id,
+					     const char *source,
+					     const void *data, size_t len,
+					     key_perm_t perm)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
+		      int siglen, const char *data, int datalen);
+int asymmetric_verify_v3(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
+			 int siglen, const char *data, int datalen, u8 algo);
+#else
+static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
+				    int siglen, const char *data, int datalen)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline int asymmetric_verify_v3(struct key *keyring,
+				       const char *sig, int siglen,
+				       const char *data, int datalen, u8 algo)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const struct modsig *modsig);
+#else
+static inline int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring,
+				    const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
+void __init ima_load_x509(void);
+#else
+static inline void ima_load_x509(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
+void __init evm_load_x509(void);
+#else
+static inline void evm_load_x509(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
+/* declarations */
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+			 const char *cause, int result, int info);
+
+void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+			     const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+			     const char *cause, int result, int info,
+			     int errno);
+
+static inline struct audit_buffer *
+integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
+{
+	return audit_log_start(ctx, gfp_mask, type);
+}
+
+#else
+static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+				       const unsigned char *fname,
+				       const char *op, const char *cause,
+				       int result, int info)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno,
+					   struct inode *inode,
+					   const unsigned char *fname,
+					   const char *op, const char *cause,
+					   int result, int info, int errno)
+{
+}
+
+static inline struct audit_buffer *
+integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source, const void *data,
+				    size_t len);
+#else
+static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source,
+						  const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
+void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
+bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void);
+#else
+static inline void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source,
+						  const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+}
+
+static inline bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d8d9e5ff1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: integrity_audit.c
+ *	Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include "integrity.h"
+
+static int integrity_audit_info;
+
+/* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
+static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long audit;
+
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &audit))
+		integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("integrity_audit=", integrity_audit_setup);
+
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+			 const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
+{
+	integrity_audit_message(audit_msgno, inode, fname, op, cause,
+				result, audit_info, 0);
+}
+
+void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+			     const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+			     const char *cause, int result, int audit_info,
+			     int errno)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char name[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+
+	if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1)	/* Skip info messages */
+		return;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+	audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
+			 task_pid_nr(current),
+			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()),
+			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+			 audit_get_sessionid(current));
+	audit_log_task_context(ab);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s cause=%s comm=", op, cause);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(name, current));
+	if (fname) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname);
+	}
+	if (inode) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino);
+	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d errno=%d", !result, errno);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/efi_parser.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/efi_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d98260f84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/efi_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/* EFI signature/key/certificate list parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EFI: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+
+/**
+ * parse_efi_signature_list - Parse an EFI signature list for certificates
+ * @source: The source of the key
+ * @data: The data blob to parse
+ * @size: The size of the data blob
+ * @get_handler_for_guid: Get the handler func for the sig type (or NULL)
+ *
+ * Parse an EFI signature list looking for elements of interest.  A list is
+ * made up of a series of sublists, where all the elements in a sublist are of
+ * the same type, but sublists can be of different types.
+ *
+ * For each sublist encountered, the @get_handler_for_guid function is called
+ * with the type specifier GUID and returns either a pointer to a function to
+ * handle elements of that type or NULL if the type is not of interest.
+ *
+ * If the sublist is of interest, each element is passed to the handler
+ * function in turn.
+ *
+ * Error EBADMSG is returned if the list doesn't parse correctly and 0 is
+ * returned if the list was parsed correctly.  No error can be returned from
+ * the @get_handler_for_guid function or the element handler function it
+ * returns.
+ */
+int __init parse_efi_signature_list(
+	const char *source,
+	const void *data, size_t size,
+	efi_element_handler_t (*get_handler_for_guid)(const efi_guid_t *))
+{
+	efi_element_handler_t handler;
+	unsigned int offs = 0;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, size);
+
+	while (size > 0) {
+		const efi_signature_data_t *elem;
+		efi_signature_list_t list;
+		size_t lsize, esize, hsize, elsize;
+
+		if (size < sizeof(list))
+			return -EBADMSG;
+
+		memcpy(&list, data, sizeof(list));
+		pr_devel("LIST[%04x] guid=%pUl ls=%x hs=%x ss=%x\n",
+			 offs,
+			 &list.signature_type, list.signature_list_size,
+			 list.signature_header_size, list.signature_size);
+
+		lsize = list.signature_list_size;
+		hsize = list.signature_header_size;
+		esize = list.signature_size;
+		elsize = lsize - sizeof(list) - hsize;
+
+		if (lsize > size) {
+			pr_devel("<--%s() = -EBADMSG [overrun @%x]\n",
+				 __func__, offs);
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		}
+
+		if (lsize < sizeof(list) ||
+		    lsize - sizeof(list) < hsize ||
+		    esize < sizeof(*elem) ||
+		    elsize < esize ||
+		    elsize % esize != 0) {
+			pr_devel("- bad size combo @%x\n", offs);
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		}
+
+		handler = get_handler_for_guid(&list.signature_type);
+		if (!handler) {
+			data += lsize;
+			size -= lsize;
+			offs += lsize;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		data += sizeof(list) + hsize;
+		size -= sizeof(list) + hsize;
+		offs += sizeof(list) + hsize;
+
+		for (; elsize > 0; elsize -= esize) {
+			elem = data;
+
+			pr_devel("ELEM[%04x]\n", offs);
+			handler(source,
+				&elem->signature_data,
+				esize - sizeof(*elem));
+
+			data += esize;
+			size -= esize;
+			offs += esize;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..13ea17207
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include "../integrity.h"
+#include "keyring_handler.h"
+
+static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
+static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =
+	EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
+static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
+
+/*
+ * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
+ */
+static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
+					   const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	mark_hash_blacklisted(data, len, BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
+ */
+static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
+					 const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	mark_hash_blacklisted(data, len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add an X509 cert to the revocation list.
+ */
+static __init void uefi_revocation_list_x509(const char *source,
+					     const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	add_key_to_revocation_list(data, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
+ * the UEFI db tables.
+ */
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_platform_keyring;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
+ * the MokListRT tables.
+ */
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) &&
+		    imputed_trust_enabled())
+			return add_to_machine_keyring;
+		else
+			return add_to_platform_keyring;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_machine_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_secondary_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
+ * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
+ */
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0)
+		return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs;
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0)
+		return uefi_blacklist_binary;
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return uefi_revocation_list_x509;
+	return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f92895cc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H
+#define PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+
+void blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,
+		    size_t len, const char *type,
+		    size_t type_len);
+
+/*
+ * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
+ */
+void blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
+ */
+void blacklist_binary(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the db.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the mok.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for CA keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT
+#define UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT(vendor, product) \
+		 .matches = { \
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, vendor), \
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, product), \
+		},
+#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c7c381a9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <asm/boot_data.h>
+#include "../integrity.h"
+
+/*
+ * Load the certs contained in the IPL report created by the machine loader
+ * into the platform trusted keyring.
+ */
+static int __init load_ipl_certs(void)
+{
+	void *ptr, *end;
+	unsigned int len;
+
+	if (!ipl_cert_list_addr)
+		return 0;
+	/* Copy the certificates to the platform keyring */
+	ptr = __va(ipl_cert_list_addr);
+	end = ptr + ipl_cert_list_size;
+	while ((void *) ptr < end) {
+		len = *(unsigned int *) ptr;
+		ptr += sizeof(unsigned int);
+		add_to_platform_keyring("IPL:db", ptr, len);
+		ptr += len;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(load_ipl_certs);
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..714c961a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Nayna Jain
+ *
+ *      - loads keys and hashes stored and controlled by the firmware.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <asm/secure_boot.h>
+#include <asm/secvar.h>
+#include "keyring_handler.h"
+#include "../integrity.h"
+
+#define extract_esl(db, data, size, offset)	\
+	do { db = data + offset; size = size - offset; } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Get a certificate list blob from the named secure variable.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  - a pointer to a kmalloc'd buffer containing the cert list on success
+ *  - NULL if the key does not exist
+ *  - an ERR_PTR on error
+ */
+static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, u64 *size)
+{
+	int rc;
+	void *db;
+
+	rc = secvar_ops->get(key, keylen, NULL, size);
+	if (rc) {
+		if (rc == -ENOENT)
+			return NULL;
+		return ERR_PTR(rc);
+	}
+
+	db = kmalloc(*size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!db)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	rc = secvar_ops->get(key, keylen, db, size);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(db);
+		return ERR_PTR(rc);
+	}
+
+	return db;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the certs contained in the keys databases into the platform trusted
+ * keyring and the blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist
+ * keyring.
+ */
+static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
+{
+	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *data = NULL;
+	void *trustedca;
+	void *moduledb;
+	u64 dsize = 0;
+	u64 offset = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+	ssize_t len;
+	char buf[32];
+
+	if (!secvar_ops)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	len = secvar_ops->format(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	if (len <= 0)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	// Check for known secure boot implementations from OPAL or PLPKS
+	if (strcmp("ibm,edk2-compat-v1", buf) && strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) &&
+	    strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v0", buf)) {
+		pr_err("Unsupported secvar implementation \"%s\", not loading certs\n", buf);
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) == 0 || strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v0", buf) == 0)
+		/* PLPKS authenticated variables ESL data is prefixed with 8 bytes of timestamp */
+		offset = 8;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get db, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't an error if we
+	 * can't get them.
+	 */
+	data = get_cert_list("db", 3, &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get db list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading db from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(db, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:db", db, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_db);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
+	data = get_cert_list("dbx", 4,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get dbx list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading dbx from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(dbx, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:dbx", dbx, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_dbx);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
+	data = get_cert_list("trustedcadb", 12,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get trustedcadb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading trustedcadb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(trustedca, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:trustedca", trustedca, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_ca_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse trustedcadb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
+	data = get_cert_list("moduledb", 9,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(moduledb, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:moduledb", moduledb, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_code_signing_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c0d694844
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include "../integrity.h"
+#include "keyring_handler.h"
+
+/*
+ * On T2 Macs reading the db and dbx efi variables to load UEFI Secure Boot
+ * certificates causes occurrence of a page fault in Apple's firmware and
+ * a crash disabling EFI runtime services. The following quirk skips reading
+ * these variables.
+ */
+static const struct dmi_system_id uefi_skip_cert[] = {
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,1") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,2") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,3") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,4") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,1") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,2") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,3") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,4") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,1") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,2") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir9,1") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "Macmini8,1") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacPro7,1") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,1") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,2") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMacPro1,1") },
+	{ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if
+ * it does.
+ *
+ * This UEFI variable is set by the shim if a user tells the shim to not use
+ * the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable for verification purposes.  If it
+ * is set, we should ignore the db variable also and the true return indicates
+ * this.
+ */
+static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)
+{
+	efi_status_t status;
+	unsigned int db = 0;
+	unsigned long size = sizeof(db);
+	efi_guid_t guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+
+	status = efi.get_variable(L"MokIgnoreDB", &guid, NULL, &size, &db);
+	return status == EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
+ */
+static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
+				  unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status)
+{
+	unsigned long lsize = 4;
+	unsigned long tmpdb[4];
+	void *db;
+
+	*status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
+	if (*status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (*status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+		pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", *status);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!db)
+		return NULL;
+
+	*status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
+	if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+		kfree(db);
+		pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	*size = lsize;
+	return db;
+}
+
+/*
+ * load_moklist_certs() - Load MokList certs
+ *
+ * Load the certs contained in the UEFI MokListRT database into the
+ * platform trusted keyring.
+ *
+ * This routine checks the EFI MOK config table first. If and only if
+ * that fails, this routine uses the MokListRT ordinary UEFI variable.
+ *
+ * Return:	Status
+ */
+static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
+{
+	struct efi_mokvar_table_entry *mokvar_entry;
+	efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+	void *mok;
+	unsigned long moksize;
+	efi_status_t status;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* First try to load certs from the EFI MOKvar config table.
+	 * It's not an error if the MOKvar config table doesn't exist
+	 * or the MokListRT entry is not found in it.
+	 */
+	mokvar_entry = efi_mokvar_entry_find("MokListRT");
+	if (mokvar_entry) {
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT (MOKvar table)",
+					      mokvar_entry->data,
+					      mokvar_entry->data_size,
+					      get_handler_for_mok);
+		/* All done if that worked. */
+		if (!rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures from EFI MOKvar config table: %d\n",
+		       rc);
+	}
+
+	/* Get MokListRT. It might not exist, so it isn't an error
+	 * if we can't get it.
+	 */
+	mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
+	if (mok) {
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
+					      mok, moksize, get_handler_for_mok);
+		kfree(mok);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+		pr_debug("MokListRT variable wasn't found\n");
+	else
+		pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * load_uefi_certs() - Load certs from UEFI sources
+ *
+ * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the platform trusted
+ * keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist
+ * keyring.
+ */
+static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+{
+	efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
+	efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mokx = NULL;
+	unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, mokxsize = 0;
+	efi_status_t status;
+	int rc = 0;
+	const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id;
+
+	dmi_id = dmi_first_match(uefi_skip_cert);
+	if (dmi_id) {
+		pr_err("Reading UEFI Secure Boot Certs is not supported on T2 Macs.\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE))
+		return false;
+
+	/* Get db and dbx.  They might not exist, so it isn't an error
+	 * if we can't get them.
+	 */
+	if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
+		db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status);
+		if (!db) {
+			if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+				pr_debug("MODSIGN: db variable wasn't found\n");
+			else
+				pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
+		} else {
+			rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
+					db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
+			if (rc)
+				pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n",
+				       rc);
+			kfree(db);
+		}
+	}
+
+	dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status);
+	if (!dbx) {
+		if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+			pr_debug("dbx variable wasn't found\n");
+		else
+			pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
+	} else {
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:dbx",
+					      dbx, dbxsize,
+					      get_handler_for_dbx);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(dbx);
+	}
+
+	/* the MOK/MOKx can not be trusted when secure boot is disabled */
+	if (!arch_get_secureboot())
+		return 0;
+
+	mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status);
+	if (!mokx) {
+		if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+			pr_debug("mokx variable wasn't found\n");
+		else
+			pr_info("Couldn't get mokx list\n");
+	} else {
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListXRT",
+					      mokx, mokxsize,
+					      get_handler_for_dbx);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse mokx signatures %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(mokx);
+	}
+
+	/* Load the MokListRT certs */
+	rc = load_moklist_certs();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a401640a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Machine keyring routines.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include "../integrity.h"
+
+static __init int machine_keyring_init(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	pr_notice("Machine keyring initialized\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+device_initcall(machine_keyring_init);
+
+void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	key_perm_t perm;
+	int rc;
+
+	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW;
+	rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE, source, data, len, perm);
+
+	/*
+	 * Some MOKList keys may not pass the machine keyring restrictions.
+	 * If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring
+	 * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead.
+	 */
+	if (rc && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) &&
+	    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
+		rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, source,
+					 data, len, perm);
+
+	if (rc)
+		pr_info("Error adding keys to machine keyring %s\n", source);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Try to load the MokListTrustedRT MOK variable to see if we should trust
+ * the MOK keys within the kernel. It is not an error if this variable
+ * does not exist.  If it does not exist, MOK keys should not be trusted
+ * within the machine keyring.
+ */
+static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)
+{
+	struct efi_mokvar_table_entry *mokvar_entry;
+
+	mokvar_entry = efi_mokvar_entry_find("MokListTrustedRT");
+
+	if (mokvar_entry)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+{
+	static bool initialized;
+	static bool trust_mok;
+
+	if (!initialized) {
+		initialized = true;
+		trust_mok = false;
+
+		if (uefi_check_trust_mok_keys())
+			trust_mok = true;
+	}
+
+	return trust_mok;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Provides platform specific check for trusting imputed keys before loading
+ * on .machine keyring. UEFI systems enable this trust based on a variable,
+ * and for other platforms, it is always enabled.
+ */
+bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void)
+{
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+		return trust_moklist();
+
+	return true;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bcafd7387
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Platform keyring for firmware/platform keys
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2018
+ * Author(s): Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "../integrity.h"
+
+/**
+ * add_to_platform_keyring - Add to platform keyring without validation.
+ * @source: Source of key
+ * @data: The blob holding the key
+ * @len: The length of the data blob
+ *
+ * Add a key to the platform keyring without checking its trust chain.  This
+ * is available only during kernel initialisation.
+ */
+void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source, const void *data,
+				    size_t len)
+{
+	key_perm_t perm;
+	int rc;
+
+	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW;
+
+	rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, source, data, len,
+				 perm);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_info("Error adding keys to platform keyring %s\n", source);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create the trusted keyrings.
+ */
+static __init int platform_keyring_init(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	pr_notice("Platform Keyring initialized\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
+ */
+device_initcall(platform_keyring_init);
diff --git a/security/ipe/.gitignore b/security/ipe/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6e9939be1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+boot_policy.c
diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a110a6cd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) configuration
+#
+
+menuconfig SECURITY_IPE
+	bool "Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)"
+	depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS && AUDIT && AUDITSYSCALL
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
+	select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	select IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY if DM_VERITY
+	select IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE if DM_VERITY && DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG
+	select IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY if FS_VERITY
+	select IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG if FS_VERITY && FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES
+	help
+	  This option enables the Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM
+	  allowing users to define a policy to enforce a trust-based access
+	  control. A key feature of IPE is a customizable policy to allow
+	  admins to reconfigure trust requirements on the fly.
+
+	  If unsure, answer N.
+
+if SECURITY_IPE
+config IPE_BOOT_POLICY
+	string "Integrity policy to apply on system startup"
+	help
+	  This option specifies a filepath to an IPE policy that is compiled
+	  into the kernel. This policy will be enforced until a policy update
+	  is deployed via the $securityfs/ipe/policies/$policy_name/active
+	  interface.
+
+	  If unsure, leave blank.
+
+config IPE_POLICY_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING
+	bool "IPE policy update verification with secondary keyring"
+	default y
+	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	help
+	  Also allow the secondary trusted keyring to verify IPE policy
+	  updates.
+
+	  If unsure, answer Y.
+
+config IPE_POLICY_SIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+	bool "IPE policy update verification with platform keyring"
+	default y
+	depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+	help
+	  Also allow the platform keyring to verify IPE policy updates.
+
+	  If unsure, answer Y.
+
+menu "IPE Trust Providers"
+
+config IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
+	bool "Enable support for dm-verity based on root hash"
+	depends on DM_VERITY
+	help
+	  This option enables the 'dmverity_roothash' property within IPE
+	  policies. The property evaluates to TRUE when a file from a dm-verity
+	  volume is evaluated, and the volume's root hash matches the value
+	  supplied in the policy.
+
+config IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE
+	bool "Enable support for dm-verity based on root hash signature"
+	depends on DM_VERITY && DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG
+	help
+	  This option enables the 'dmverity_signature' property within IPE
+	  policies. The property evaluates to TRUE when a file from a dm-verity
+	  volume, which has been mounted with a valid signed root hash,
+	  is evaluated.
+
+	  If unsure, answer Y.
+
+config IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY
+	bool "Enable support for fs-verity based on file digest"
+	depends on FS_VERITY
+	help
+	  This option enables the 'fsverity_digest' property within IPE
+	  policies. The property evaluates to TRUE when a file is fsverity
+	  enabled and its digest matches the supplied digest value in the
+	  policy.
+
+	  if unsure, answer Y.
+
+config IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+	bool "Enable support for fs-verity based on builtin signature"
+	depends on FS_VERITY && FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES
+	help
+	  This option enables the 'fsverity_signature' property within IPE
+	  policies. The property evaluates to TRUE when a file is fsverity
+	  enabled and it has a valid builtin signature whose signing cert
+	  is in the .fs-verity keyring.
+
+	  if unsure, answer Y.
+
+endmenu
+
+config SECURITY_IPE_KUNIT_TEST
+	bool "Build KUnit tests for IPE" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	depends on KUNIT=y
+	default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	help
+	  This builds the IPE KUnit tests.
+
+	  KUnit tests run during boot and output the results to the debug log
+	  in TAP format (https://testanything.org/). Only useful for kernel devs
+	  running KUnit test harness and are not for inclusion into a
+	  production build.
+
+	  For more information on KUnit and unit tests in general please refer
+	  to the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+endif
diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ffabfa63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+#
+# Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree.
+#
+
+quiet_cmd_polgen = IPE_POL $(2)
+      cmd_polgen = scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen security/ipe/boot_policy.c $(2)
+
+targets += boot_policy.c
+
+$(obj)/boot_policy.c: scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen $(CONFIG_IPE_BOOT_POLICY) FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,polgen,$(CONFIG_IPE_BOOT_POLICY))
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \
+	boot_policy.o \
+	digest.o \
+	eval.o \
+	hooks.o \
+	fs.o \
+	ipe.o \
+	policy.o \
+	policy_fs.o \
+	policy_parser.o \
+	audit.o \
+
+clean-files := boot_policy.c \
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE_KUNIT_TEST) += \
+	policy_tests.o \
diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.c b/security/ipe/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..93fb59fbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+
+#include "ipe.h"
+#include "eval.h"
+#include "hooks.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#define ACTSTR(x) ((x) == IPE_ACTION_ALLOW ? "ALLOW" : "DENY")
+
+#define IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG "sha256" /* keep in sync with audit_policy() */
+
+#define AUDIT_POLICY_LOAD_FMT "policy_name=\"%s\" policy_version=%hu.%hu.%hu "\
+			      "policy_digest=" IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG ":"
+#define AUDIT_POLICY_LOAD_NULL_FMT "policy_name=? policy_version=? "\
+				   "policy_digest=?"
+#define AUDIT_OLD_ACTIVE_POLICY_FMT "old_active_pol_name=\"%s\" "\
+				    "old_active_pol_version=%hu.%hu.%hu "\
+				    "old_policy_digest=" IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG ":"
+#define AUDIT_OLD_ACTIVE_POLICY_NULL_FMT "old_active_pol_name=? "\
+					 "old_active_pol_version=? "\
+					 "old_policy_digest=?"
+#define AUDIT_NEW_ACTIVE_POLICY_FMT "new_active_pol_name=\"%s\" "\
+				    "new_active_pol_version=%hu.%hu.%hu "\
+				    "new_policy_digest=" IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG ":"
+
+static const char *const audit_op_names[__IPE_OP_MAX + 1] = {
+	"EXECUTE",
+	"FIRMWARE",
+	"KMODULE",
+	"KEXEC_IMAGE",
+	"KEXEC_INITRAMFS",
+	"POLICY",
+	"X509_CERT",
+	"UNKNOWN",
+};
+
+static const char *const audit_hook_names[__IPE_HOOK_MAX] = {
+	"BPRM_CHECK",
+	"BPRM_CREDS_FOR_EXEC",
+	"MMAP",
+	"MPROTECT",
+	"KERNEL_READ",
+	"KERNEL_LOAD",
+};
+
+static const char *const audit_prop_names[__IPE_PROP_MAX] = {
+	"boot_verified=FALSE",
+	"boot_verified=TRUE",
+	"dmverity_roothash=",
+	"dmverity_signature=FALSE",
+	"dmverity_signature=TRUE",
+	"fsverity_digest=",
+	"fsverity_signature=FALSE",
+	"fsverity_signature=TRUE",
+};
+
+/**
+ * audit_dmv_roothash() - audit the roothash of a dmverity_roothash property.
+ * @ab: Supplies a pointer to the audit_buffer to append to.
+ * @rh: Supplies a pointer to the digest structure.
+ */
+static void audit_dmv_roothash(struct audit_buffer *ab, const void *rh)
+{
+	audit_log_format(ab, "%s", audit_prop_names[IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH]);
+	ipe_digest_audit(ab, rh);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_fsv_digest() - audit the digest of a fsverity_digest property.
+ * @ab: Supplies a pointer to the audit_buffer to append to.
+ * @d: Supplies a pointer to the digest structure.
+ */
+static void audit_fsv_digest(struct audit_buffer *ab, const void *d)
+{
+	audit_log_format(ab, "%s", audit_prop_names[IPE_PROP_FSV_DIGEST]);
+	ipe_digest_audit(ab, d);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_rule() - audit an IPE policy rule.
+ * @ab: Supplies a pointer to the audit_buffer to append to.
+ * @r: Supplies a pointer to the ipe_rule to approximate a string form for.
+ */
+static void audit_rule(struct audit_buffer *ab, const struct ipe_rule *r)
+{
+	const struct ipe_prop *ptr;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " rule=\"op=%s ", audit_op_names[r->op]);
+
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &r->props, next) {
+		switch (ptr->type) {
+		case IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH:
+			audit_dmv_roothash(ab, ptr->value);
+			break;
+		case IPE_PROP_FSV_DIGEST:
+			audit_fsv_digest(ab, ptr->value);
+			break;
+		default:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "%s", audit_prop_names[ptr->type]);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+	}
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "action=%s\"", ACTSTR(r->action));
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_audit_match() - Audit a rule match in a policy evaluation.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the evaluation context that was used in the
+ *	 evaluation.
+ * @match_type: Supplies the scope of the match: rule, operation default,
+ *		global default.
+ * @act: Supplies the IPE's evaluation decision, deny or allow.
+ * @r: Supplies a pointer to the rule that was matched, if possible.
+ */
+void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx,
+		     enum ipe_match match_type,
+		     enum ipe_action_type act, const struct ipe_rule *const r)
+{
+	const char *op = audit_op_names[ctx->op];
+	char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	struct inode *inode;
+
+	if (act != IPE_ACTION_DENY && !READ_ONCE(success_audit))
+		return;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN,
+			     AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "ipe_op=%s ipe_hook=%s enforcing=%d pid=%d comm=",
+			 op, audit_hook_names[ctx->hook], READ_ONCE(enforce),
+			 task_tgid_nr(current));
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
+
+	if (ctx->file) {
+		audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &ctx->file->f_path);
+		inode = file_inode(ctx->file);
+		if (inode) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino);
+		} else {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=? ino=?");
+		}
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " path=? dev=? ino=?");
+	}
+
+	if (match_type == IPE_MATCH_RULE)
+		audit_rule(ab, r);
+	else if (match_type == IPE_MATCH_TABLE)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " rule=\"DEFAULT op=%s action=%s\"", op,
+				 ACTSTR(act));
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " rule=\"DEFAULT action=%s\"",
+				 ACTSTR(act));
+
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_policy() - Audit a policy's name, version and thumbprint to @ab.
+ * @ab: Supplies a pointer to the audit buffer to append to.
+ * @audit_format: Supplies a pointer to the audit format string
+ * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to audit.
+ */
+static void audit_policy(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+			 const char *audit_format,
+			 const struct ipe_policy *const p)
+{
+	u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+	sha256(p->pkcs7, p->pkcs7len, digest);
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, audit_format, p->parsed->name,
+			 p->parsed->version.major, p->parsed->version.minor,
+			 p->parsed->version.rev);
+	audit_log_n_hex(ab, digest, sizeof(digest));
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_audit_policy_activation() - Audit a policy being activated.
+ * @op: Supplies a pointer to the previously activated policy to audit.
+ * @np: Supplies a pointer to the newly activated policy to audit.
+ */
+void ipe_audit_policy_activation(const struct ipe_policy *const op,
+				 const struct ipe_policy *const np)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
+			     AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	if (op) {
+		audit_policy(ab, AUDIT_OLD_ACTIVE_POLICY_FMT, op);
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * old active policy can be NULL if there is no kernel
+		 * built-in policy
+		 */
+		audit_log_format(ab, AUDIT_OLD_ACTIVE_POLICY_NULL_FMT);
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+	}
+	audit_policy(ab, AUDIT_NEW_ACTIVE_POLICY_FMT, np);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " auid=%u ses=%u lsm=ipe res=1",
+			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+			 audit_get_sessionid(current));
+
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_audit_policy_load() - Audit a policy loading event.
+ * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to audit or an error pointer.
+ */
+void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
+			     AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	if (!IS_ERR(p)) {
+		audit_policy(ab, AUDIT_POLICY_LOAD_FMT, p);
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, AUDIT_POLICY_LOAD_NULL_FMT);
+		err = PTR_ERR(p);
+	}
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " auid=%u ses=%u lsm=ipe res=%d errno=%d",
+			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+			 audit_get_sessionid(current), !err, err);
+
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_audit_enforce() - Audit a change in IPE's enforcement state.
+ * @new_enforce: The new value enforce to be set.
+ * @old_enforce: The old value currently in enforce.
+ */
+void ipe_audit_enforce(bool new_enforce, bool old_enforce)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+		  "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
+		  " enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1",
+		  new_enforce, old_enforce,
+		  from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+		  audit_get_sessionid(current));
+
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.h b/security/ipe/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ed2620846
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _IPE_AUDIT_H
+#define _IPE_AUDIT_H
+
+#include "policy.h"
+
+void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx,
+		     enum ipe_match match_type,
+		     enum ipe_action_type act, const struct ipe_rule *const r);
+void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p);
+void ipe_audit_policy_activation(const struct ipe_policy *const op,
+				 const struct ipe_policy *const np);
+void ipe_audit_enforce(bool new_enforce, bool old_enforce);
+
+#endif /* _IPE_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/ipe/digest.c b/security/ipe/digest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6e597a6b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/digest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/hex.h>
+#include "digest.h"
+
+/**
+ * ipe_digest_parse() - parse a digest in IPE's policy.
+ * @valstr: Supplies the string parsed from the policy.
+ *
+ * Digests in IPE are defined in a standard way:
+ *	<alg_name>:<hex>
+ *
+ * Use this function to create a property to parse the digest
+ * consistently. The parsed digest will be saved in @value in IPE's
+ * policy.
+ *
+ * Return: The parsed digest_info structure on success. If an error occurs,
+ * the function will return the error value (via ERR_PTR).
+ */
+struct digest_info *ipe_digest_parse(const char *valstr)
+{
+	struct digest_info *info = NULL;
+	char *sep, *raw_digest;
+	size_t raw_digest_len;
+	u8 *digest = NULL;
+	char *alg = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	info = kzalloc_obj(*info);
+	if (!info)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	sep = strchr(valstr, ':');
+	if (!sep) {
+		rc = -EBADMSG;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	alg = kstrndup(valstr, sep - valstr, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!alg) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	raw_digest = sep + 1;
+	raw_digest_len = strlen(raw_digest);
+
+	info->digest_len = (raw_digest_len + 1) / 2;
+	digest = kzalloc(info->digest_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digest) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	rc = hex2bin(digest, raw_digest, info->digest_len);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	info->alg = alg;
+	info->digest = digest;
+	return info;
+
+err:
+	kfree(alg);
+	kfree(digest);
+	kfree(info);
+	return ERR_PTR(rc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_digest_eval() - evaluate an IPE digest against another digest.
+ * @expected: Supplies the policy-provided digest value.
+ * @digest: Supplies the digest to compare against the policy digest value.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %true	- digests match
+ * * %false	- digests do not match
+ */
+bool ipe_digest_eval(const struct digest_info *expected,
+		     const struct digest_info *digest)
+{
+	return (expected->digest_len == digest->digest_len) &&
+	       (!strcmp(expected->alg, digest->alg)) &&
+	       (!memcmp(expected->digest, digest->digest, expected->digest_len));
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_digest_free() - free an IPE digest.
+ * @info: Supplies a pointer the policy-provided digest to free.
+ */
+void ipe_digest_free(struct digest_info *info)
+{
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(info))
+		return;
+
+	kfree(info->alg);
+	kfree(info->digest);
+	kfree(info);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_digest_audit() - audit a digest that was sourced from IPE's policy.
+ * @ab: Supplies the audit_buffer to append the formatted result.
+ * @info: Supplies a pointer to source the audit record from.
+ *
+ * Digests in IPE are audited in this format:
+ *	<alg_name>:<hex>
+ */
+void ipe_digest_audit(struct audit_buffer *ab, const struct digest_info *info)
+{
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, info->alg);
+	audit_log_format(ab, ":");
+	audit_log_n_hex(ab, info->digest, info->digest_len);
+}
diff --git a/security/ipe/digest.h b/security/ipe/digest.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..52c9b3844
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/digest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _IPE_DIGEST_H
+#define _IPE_DIGEST_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+
+#include "policy.h"
+
+struct digest_info {
+	const char *alg;
+	const u8 *digest;
+	size_t digest_len;
+};
+
+struct digest_info *ipe_digest_parse(const char *valstr);
+void ipe_digest_free(struct digest_info *digest_info);
+void ipe_digest_audit(struct audit_buffer *ab, const struct digest_info *val);
+bool ipe_digest_eval(const struct digest_info *expected,
+		     const struct digest_info *digest);
+
+#endif /* _IPE_DIGEST_H */
diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21439c5be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/eval.c
@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
+
+#include "ipe.h"
+#include "eval.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy;
+bool success_audit;
+bool enforce = true;
+#define INO_BLOCK_DEV(ino) ((ino)->i_sb->s_bdev)
+
+#define FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f) ((f)->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb)
+
+/**
+ * build_ipe_sb_ctx() - Build initramfs field of an ipe evaluation context.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated.
+ * @file: Supplies the file struct of the file triggered IPE event.
+ */
+static void build_ipe_sb_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct file *const file)
+{
+	ctx->initramfs = ipe_sb(FILE_SUPERBLOCK(file))->initramfs;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
+/**
+ * build_ipe_bdev_ctx() - Build ipe_bdev field of an evaluation context.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated.
+ * @ino: Supplies the inode struct of the file triggered IPE event.
+ */
+static void build_ipe_bdev_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct inode *const ino)
+{
+	if (INO_BLOCK_DEV(ino))
+		ctx->ipe_bdev = ipe_bdev(INO_BLOCK_DEV(ino));
+}
+#else
+static void build_ipe_bdev_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct inode *const ino)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+static void build_ipe_inode_blob_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx,
+				     const struct inode *const ino)
+{
+	ctx->ipe_inode = ipe_inode(ctx->ino);
+}
+#else
+static inline void build_ipe_inode_blob_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx,
+					    const struct inode *const ino)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */
+
+/**
+ * build_ipe_inode_ctx() - Build inode fields of an evaluation context.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated.
+ * @ino: Supplies the inode struct of the file triggered IPE event.
+ */
+static void build_ipe_inode_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct inode *const ino)
+{
+	ctx->ino = ino;
+	build_ipe_inode_blob_ctx(ctx, ino);
+}
+#else
+static void build_ipe_inode_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct inode *const ino)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */
+
+/**
+ * ipe_build_eval_ctx() - Build an ipe evaluation context.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated.
+ * @file: Supplies a pointer to the file to associated with the evaluation.
+ * @op: Supplies the IPE policy operation associated with the evaluation.
+ * @hook: Supplies the LSM hook associated with the evaluation.
+ */
+void ipe_build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx,
+			const struct file *file,
+			enum ipe_op_type op,
+			enum ipe_hook_type hook)
+{
+	struct inode *ino;
+
+	ctx->file = file;
+	ctx->op = op;
+	ctx->hook = hook;
+
+	if (file) {
+		build_ipe_sb_ctx(ctx, file);
+		ino = d_real_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
+		build_ipe_bdev_ctx(ctx, ino);
+		build_ipe_inode_ctx(ctx, ino);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * evaluate_boot_verified() - Evaluate @ctx for the boot verified property.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %true	- The current @ctx match the @p
+ * * %false	- The current @ctx doesn't match the @p
+ */
+static bool evaluate_boot_verified(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx)
+{
+	return ctx->initramfs;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
+/**
+ * evaluate_dmv_roothash() - Evaluate @ctx against a dmv roothash property.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated.
+ * @p: Supplies a pointer to the property being evaluated.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %true	- The current @ctx match the @p
+ * * %false	- The current @ctx doesn't match the @p
+ */
+static bool evaluate_dmv_roothash(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx,
+				  struct ipe_prop *p)
+{
+	return !!ctx->ipe_bdev &&
+	       !!ctx->ipe_bdev->root_hash &&
+	       ipe_digest_eval(p->value,
+			       ctx->ipe_bdev->root_hash);
+}
+#else
+static bool evaluate_dmv_roothash(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx,
+				  struct ipe_prop *p)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE
+/**
+ * evaluate_dmv_sig_false() - Evaluate @ctx against a dmv sig false property.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %true	- The current @ctx match the property
+ * * %false	- The current @ctx doesn't match the property
+ */
+static bool evaluate_dmv_sig_false(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx)
+{
+	return !ctx->ipe_bdev || (!ctx->ipe_bdev->dm_verity_signed);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evaluate_dmv_sig_true() - Evaluate @ctx against a dmv sig true property.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %true	- The current @ctx match the property
+ * * %false	- The current @ctx doesn't match the property
+ */
+static bool evaluate_dmv_sig_true(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx)
+{
+	return !evaluate_dmv_sig_false(ctx);
+}
+#else
+static bool evaluate_dmv_sig_false(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool evaluate_dmv_sig_true(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY
+/**
+ * evaluate_fsv_digest() - Evaluate @ctx against a fsv digest property.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated.
+ * @p: Supplies a pointer to the property being evaluated.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %true	- The current @ctx match the @p
+ * * %false	- The current @ctx doesn't match the @p
+ */
+static bool evaluate_fsv_digest(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx,
+				struct ipe_prop *p)
+{
+	enum hash_algo alg;
+	u8 digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	struct digest_info info;
+
+	if (!ctx->ino)
+		return false;
+	if (!fsverity_get_digest((struct inode *)ctx->ino,
+				 digest,
+				 NULL,
+				 &alg))
+		return false;
+
+	info.alg = hash_algo_name[alg];
+	info.digest = digest;
+	info.digest_len = hash_digest_size[alg];
+
+	return ipe_digest_eval(p->value, &info);
+}
+#else
+static bool evaluate_fsv_digest(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx,
+				struct ipe_prop *p)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+/**
+ * evaluate_fsv_sig_false() - Evaluate @ctx against a fsv sig false property.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %true	- The current @ctx match the property
+ * * %false	- The current @ctx doesn't match the property
+ */
+static bool evaluate_fsv_sig_false(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx)
+{
+	return !ctx->ino ||
+	       !IS_VERITY(ctx->ino) ||
+	       !ctx->ipe_inode ||
+	       !ctx->ipe_inode->fs_verity_signed;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evaluate_fsv_sig_true() - Evaluate @ctx against a fsv sig true property.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %true - The current @ctx match the property
+ * * %false - The current @ctx doesn't match the property
+ */
+static bool evaluate_fsv_sig_true(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx)
+{
+	return !evaluate_fsv_sig_false(ctx);
+}
+#else
+static bool evaluate_fsv_sig_false(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool evaluate_fsv_sig_true(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */
+
+/**
+ * evaluate_property() - Analyze @ctx against a rule property.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be evaluated.
+ * @p: Supplies a pointer to the property to be evaluated.
+ *
+ * This function Determines whether the specified @ctx
+ * matches the conditions defined by a rule property @p.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %true	- The current @ctx match the @p
+ * * %false	- The current @ctx doesn't match the @p
+ */
+static bool evaluate_property(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx,
+			      struct ipe_prop *p)
+{
+	switch (p->type) {
+	case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE:
+		return !evaluate_boot_verified(ctx);
+	case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE:
+		return evaluate_boot_verified(ctx);
+	case IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH:
+		return evaluate_dmv_roothash(ctx, p);
+	case IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_FALSE:
+		return evaluate_dmv_sig_false(ctx);
+	case IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_TRUE:
+		return evaluate_dmv_sig_true(ctx);
+	case IPE_PROP_FSV_DIGEST:
+		return evaluate_fsv_digest(ctx, p);
+	case IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_FALSE:
+		return evaluate_fsv_sig_false(ctx);
+	case IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_TRUE:
+		return evaluate_fsv_sig_true(ctx);
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_evaluate_event() - Analyze @ctx against the current active policy.
+ * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be evaluated.
+ *
+ * This is the loop where all policy evaluations happen against the IPE policy.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- Success
+ * * %-EACCES	- @ctx did not pass evaluation
+ */
+int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx)
+{
+	const struct ipe_op_table *rules = NULL;
+	const struct ipe_rule *rule = NULL;
+	struct ipe_policy *pol = NULL;
+	struct ipe_prop *prop = NULL;
+	enum ipe_action_type action;
+	enum ipe_match match_type;
+	bool match = false;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	pol = rcu_dereference(ipe_active_policy);
+	if (!pol) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->op == IPE_OP_INVALID) {
+		if (pol->parsed->global_default_action == IPE_ACTION_INVALID) {
+			WARN(1, "no default rule set for unknown op, ALLOW it");
+			action = IPE_ACTION_ALLOW;
+		} else {
+			action = pol->parsed->global_default_action;
+		}
+		match_type = IPE_MATCH_GLOBAL;
+		goto eval;
+	}
+
+	rules = &pol->parsed->rules[ctx->op];
+
+	list_for_each_entry(rule, &rules->rules, next) {
+		match = true;
+
+		list_for_each_entry(prop, &rule->props, next) {
+			match = evaluate_property(ctx, prop);
+			if (!match)
+				break;
+		}
+
+		if (match)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (match) {
+		action = rule->action;
+		match_type = IPE_MATCH_RULE;
+	} else if (rules->default_action != IPE_ACTION_INVALID) {
+		action = rules->default_action;
+		match_type = IPE_MATCH_TABLE;
+	} else {
+		action = pol->parsed->global_default_action;
+		match_type = IPE_MATCH_GLOBAL;
+	}
+
+eval:
+	ipe_audit_match(ctx, match_type, action, rule);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (action == IPE_ACTION_DENY)
+		rc = -EACCES;
+
+	if (!READ_ONCE(enforce))
+		rc = 0;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Set the right module name */
+#ifdef KBUILD_MODNAME
+#undef KBUILD_MODNAME
+#define KBUILD_MODNAME "ipe"
+#endif
+
+module_param(success_audit, bool, 0400);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(success_audit, "Start IPE with success auditing enabled");
+module_param(enforce, bool, 0400);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Start IPE in enforce or permissive mode");
diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fef65a364
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/eval.h
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _IPE_EVAL_H
+#define _IPE_EVAL_H
+
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include "policy.h"
+#include "hooks.h"
+
+#define IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT ((struct ipe_eval_ctx){ 0 })
+
+extern struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy;
+extern bool success_audit;
+extern bool enforce;
+
+struct ipe_superblock {
+	bool initramfs;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
+struct ipe_bdev {
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE
+	bool dm_verity_signed;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE */
+	struct digest_info *root_hash;
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+struct ipe_inode {
+	bool fs_verity_signed;
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */
+
+struct ipe_eval_ctx {
+	enum ipe_op_type op;
+	enum ipe_hook_type hook;
+
+	const struct file *file;
+	bool initramfs;
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
+	const struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY
+	const struct inode *ino;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+	const struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */
+};
+
+enum ipe_match {
+	IPE_MATCH_RULE = 0,
+	IPE_MATCH_TABLE,
+	IPE_MATCH_GLOBAL,
+	__IPE_MATCH_MAX
+};
+
+void ipe_build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx,
+			const struct file *file,
+			enum ipe_op_type op,
+			enum ipe_hook_type hook);
+int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx);
+
+#endif /* _IPE_EVAL_H */
diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.c b/security/ipe/fs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..076c111c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/fs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+
+#include "ipe.h"
+#include "fs.h"
+#include "eval.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+
+static struct dentry *root __ro_after_init;
+struct dentry *policy_root __ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * setaudit() - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit"
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written	- Success
+ * * %-EPERM			- Insufficient permission
+ */
+static ssize_t setaudit(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
+			size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	bool value;
+
+	if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	WRITE_ONCE(success_audit, value);
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * getaudit() - Read handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit"
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the read syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * Return: Length of buffer written
+ */
+static ssize_t getaudit(struct file *f, char __user *data,
+			size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	const char *result;
+
+	result = ((READ_ONCE(success_audit)) ? "1" : "0");
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, result, 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * setenforce() - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/enforce"
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written	- Success
+ * * %-EPERM			- Insufficient permission
+ */
+static ssize_t setenforce(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
+			  size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	bool new_value, old_value;
+
+	if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	old_value = READ_ONCE(enforce);
+	rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &new_value);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (new_value != old_value) {
+		ipe_audit_enforce(new_value, old_value);
+		WRITE_ONCE(enforce, new_value);
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * getenforce() - Read handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/enforce"
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the read syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * Return: Length of buffer written
+ */
+static ssize_t getenforce(struct file *f, char __user *data,
+			  size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	const char *result;
+
+	result = ((READ_ONCE(enforce)) ? "1" : "0");
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, result, 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * new_policy() - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/new_policy".
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written	- Success
+ * * %-EPERM			- Insufficient permission
+ * * %-ENOMEM			- Out of memory (OOM)
+ * * %-EBADMSG			- Policy is invalid
+ * * %-ERANGE			- Policy version number overflow
+ * * %-EINVAL			- Policy version parsing error
+ * * %-EEXIST			- Same name policy already deployed
+ * * %-ENOKEY			- Policy signing key not found
+ * * %-EKEYREJECTED		- Policy signature verification failed
+ */
+static ssize_t new_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
+			  size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
+	char *copy = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+		rc = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	copy = memdup_user_nul(data, len);
+	if (IS_ERR(copy)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(copy);
+		copy = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	p = ipe_new_policy(NULL, 0, copy, len);
+	if (IS_ERR(p)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(p);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = ipe_new_policyfs_node(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+out:
+	kfree(copy);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		ipe_free_policy(p);
+		ipe_audit_policy_load(ERR_PTR(rc));
+	} else {
+		ipe_audit_policy_load(p);
+	}
+	return (rc < 0) ? rc : len;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations np_fops = {
+	.write = new_policy,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations audit_fops = {
+	.write = setaudit,
+	.read = getaudit,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations enforce_fops = {
+	.write = setenforce,
+	.read = getenforce,
+};
+
+/**
+ * ipe_init_securityfs() - Initialize IPE's securityfs tree at fsinit.
+ *
+ * Return: %0 on success. If an error occurs, the function will return
+ * the -errno.
+ */
+int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ipe_policy *ap;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+
+	if (!ipe_enabled)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	root = securityfs_create_dir("ipe", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(root))
+		return PTR_ERR(root);
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_file("success_audit", 0600, root,
+					    NULL, &audit_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_file("enforce", 0600, root, NULL,
+					      &enforce_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	policy_root = securityfs_create_dir("policies", root);
+	if (IS_ERR(policy_root)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(policy_root);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ap = rcu_access_pointer(ipe_active_policy);
+	if (ap) {
+		rc = ipe_new_policyfs_node(ap);
+		if (rc)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_file("new_policy", 0200, root, NULL, &np_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	securityfs_remove(root);
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.h b/security/ipe/fs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0141ae8e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/fs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _IPE_FS_H
+#define _IPE_FS_H
+
+#include "policy.h"
+
+extern struct dentry *policy_root __ro_after_init;
+
+int ipe_new_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p);
+void ipe_del_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p);
+
+#endif /* _IPE_FS_H */
diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0ae54a880
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/blk_types.h>
+
+#include "ipe.h"
+#include "hooks.h"
+#include "eval.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+/**
+ * ipe_bprm_check_security() - ipe security hook function for bprm check.
+ * @bprm: Supplies a pointer to a linux_binprm structure to source the file
+ *	  being evaluated.
+ *
+ * This LSM hook is called when a binary is loaded through the exec
+ * family of system calls.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- Success
+ * * %-EACCES	- Did not pass IPE policy
+ */
+int ipe_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;
+
+	ipe_build_eval_ctx(&ctx, bprm->file, IPE_OP_EXEC, IPE_HOOK_BPRM_CHECK);
+	return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_bprm_creds_for_exec() - ipe security hook function for bprm creds check.
+ * @bprm: Supplies a pointer to a linux_binprm structure to source the file
+ *	  being evaluated.
+ *
+ * This LSM hook is called when userspace signals the kernel to check a file
+ * for execution through the execveat syscall with the AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag.
+ * The hook triggers IPE policy evaluation on the script file and returns
+ * the policy decision to userspace. The userspace program receives the
+ * return code and can decide whether to proceed with script execution.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- Success
+ * * %-EACCES	- Did not pass IPE policy
+ */
+int ipe_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;
+
+	if (!bprm->is_check)
+		return 0;
+
+	ipe_build_eval_ctx(&ctx, bprm->file, IPE_OP_EXEC,
+			   IPE_HOOK_BPRM_CREDS_FOR_EXEC);
+	return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_mmap_file() - ipe security hook function for mmap check.
+ * @f: File being mmap'd. Can be NULL in the case of anonymous memory.
+ * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode.
+ * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and
+ *	  system configuration.
+ * @flags: Unused.
+ *
+ * This hook is called when a file is loaded through the mmap
+ * family of system calls.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- Success
+ * * %-EACCES	- Did not pass IPE policy
+ */
+int ipe_mmap_file(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
+		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;
+
+	if (prot & PROT_EXEC) {
+		ipe_build_eval_ctx(&ctx, f, IPE_OP_EXEC, IPE_HOOK_MMAP);
+		return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_file_mprotect() - ipe security hook function for mprotect check.
+ * @vma: Existing virtual memory area created by mmap or similar.
+ * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode.
+ * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and
+ *	  system configuration.
+ *
+ * This LSM hook is called when a mmap'd region of memory is changing
+ * its protections via mprotect.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- Success
+ * * %-EACCES	- Did not pass IPE policy
+ */
+int ipe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		      unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
+		      unsigned long prot)
+{
+	struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;
+
+	/* Already Executable */
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (prot & PROT_EXEC) {
+		ipe_build_eval_ctx(&ctx, vma->vm_file, IPE_OP_EXEC, IPE_HOOK_MPROTECT);
+		return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_kernel_read_file() - ipe security hook function for kernel read.
+ * @file: Supplies a pointer to the file structure being read in from disk.
+ * @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the read.
+ * @contents: Unused.
+ *
+ * This LSM hook is called when a file is read from disk in the kernel.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- Success
+ * * %-EACCES	- Did not pass IPE policy
+ */
+int ipe_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+			 bool contents)
+{
+	struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;
+	enum ipe_op_type op;
+
+	switch (id) {
+	case READING_FIRMWARE:
+		op = IPE_OP_FIRMWARE;
+		break;
+	case READING_MODULE:
+	case READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED:
+		op = IPE_OP_KERNEL_MODULE;
+		break;
+	case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
+		op = IPE_OP_KEXEC_INITRAMFS;
+		break;
+	case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
+		op = IPE_OP_KEXEC_IMAGE;
+		break;
+	case READING_POLICY:
+		op = IPE_OP_POLICY;
+		break;
+	case READING_X509_CERTIFICATE:
+		op = IPE_OP_X509;
+		break;
+	default:
+		op = IPE_OP_INVALID;
+		WARN(1, "no rule setup for kernel_read_file enum %d", id);
+	}
+
+	ipe_build_eval_ctx(&ctx, file, op, IPE_HOOK_KERNEL_READ);
+	return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_kernel_load_data() - ipe security hook function for kernel load data.
+ * @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the load.
+ * @contents: Unused.
+ *
+ * This LSM hook is called when a data buffer provided by userspace is loading
+ * into the kernel.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- Success
+ * * %-EACCES	- Did not pass IPE policy
+ */
+int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+{
+	struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;
+	enum ipe_op_type op;
+
+	switch (id) {
+	case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
+		op = IPE_OP_FIRMWARE;
+		break;
+	case LOADING_MODULE:
+		op = IPE_OP_KERNEL_MODULE;
+		break;
+	case LOADING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
+		op = IPE_OP_KEXEC_INITRAMFS;
+		break;
+	case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
+		op = IPE_OP_KEXEC_IMAGE;
+		break;
+	case LOADING_POLICY:
+		op = IPE_OP_POLICY;
+		break;
+	case LOADING_X509_CERTIFICATE:
+		op = IPE_OP_X509;
+		break;
+	default:
+		op = IPE_OP_INVALID;
+		WARN(1, "no rule setup for kernel_load_data enum %d", id);
+	}
+
+	ipe_build_eval_ctx(&ctx, NULL, op, IPE_HOOK_KERNEL_LOAD);
+	return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_unpack_initramfs() - Mark the current rootfs as initramfs.
+ */
+void ipe_unpack_initramfs(void)
+{
+	ipe_sb(current->fs->root.mnt->mnt_sb)->initramfs = true;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
+/**
+ * ipe_bdev_free_security() - Free IPE's LSM blob of block_devices.
+ * @bdev: Supplies a pointer to a block_device that contains the structure
+ *	  to free.
+ */
+void ipe_bdev_free_security(struct block_device *bdev)
+{
+	struct ipe_bdev *blob = ipe_bdev(bdev);
+
+	ipe_digest_free(blob->root_hash);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE
+static void ipe_set_dmverity_signature(struct ipe_bdev *blob,
+				       const void *value,
+				       size_t size)
+{
+	blob->dm_verity_signed = size > 0 && value;
+}
+#else
+static inline void ipe_set_dmverity_signature(struct ipe_bdev *blob,
+					      const void *value,
+					      size_t size)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE */
+
+/**
+ * ipe_bdev_setintegrity() - Save integrity data from a bdev to IPE's LSM blob.
+ * @bdev: Supplies a pointer to a block_device that contains the LSM blob.
+ * @type: Supplies the integrity type.
+ * @value: Supplies the value to store.
+ * @size: The size of @value.
+ *
+ * This hook is currently used to save dm-verity's root hash or the existence
+ * of a validated signed dm-verity root hash into LSM blob.
+ *
+ * Return: %0 on success. If an error occurs, the function will return the
+ * -errno.
+ */
+int ipe_bdev_setintegrity(struct block_device *bdev, enum lsm_integrity_type type,
+			  const void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	const struct dm_verity_digest *digest = NULL;
+	struct ipe_bdev *blob = ipe_bdev(bdev);
+	struct digest_info *info = NULL;
+
+	if (type == LSM_INT_DMVERITY_SIG_VALID) {
+		ipe_set_dmverity_signature(blob, value, size);
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (type != LSM_INT_DMVERITY_ROOTHASH)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!value) {
+		ipe_digest_free(blob->root_hash);
+		blob->root_hash = NULL;
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+	digest = value;
+
+	info = kzalloc_obj(*info);
+	if (!info)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	info->digest = kmemdup(digest->digest, digest->digest_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!info->digest)
+		goto err;
+
+	info->alg = kstrdup(digest->alg, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!info->alg)
+		goto err;
+
+	info->digest_len = digest->digest_len;
+
+	ipe_digest_free(blob->root_hash);
+	blob->root_hash = info;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	ipe_digest_free(info);
+
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+/**
+ * ipe_inode_setintegrity() - save integrity data from a inode to IPE's LSM blob.
+ * @inode: The inode to source the security blob from.
+ * @type: Supplies the integrity type.
+ * @value: The value to be stored.
+ * @size: The size of @value.
+ *
+ * This hook is currently used to save the existence of a validated fs-verity
+ * builtin signature into LSM blob.
+ *
+ * Return: %0 on success. If an error occurs, the function will return the
+ * -errno.
+ */
+int ipe_inode_setintegrity(const struct inode *inode,
+			   enum lsm_integrity_type type,
+			   const void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	struct ipe_inode *inode_sec = ipe_inode(inode);
+
+	if (type == LSM_INT_FSVERITY_BUILTINSIG_VALID) {
+		inode_sec->fs_verity_signed = size > 0 && value;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */
diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..07db37332
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+#ifndef _IPE_HOOKS_H
+#define _IPE_HOOKS_H
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/blk_types.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
+
+enum ipe_hook_type {
+	IPE_HOOK_BPRM_CHECK = 0,
+	IPE_HOOK_BPRM_CREDS_FOR_EXEC,
+	IPE_HOOK_MMAP,
+	IPE_HOOK_MPROTECT,
+	IPE_HOOK_KERNEL_READ,
+	IPE_HOOK_KERNEL_LOAD,
+	__IPE_HOOK_MAX
+};
+
+#define IPE_HOOK_INVALID __IPE_HOOK_MAX
+
+int ipe_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+
+int ipe_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+
+int ipe_mmap_file(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
+		  unsigned long flags);
+
+int ipe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+		      unsigned long prot);
+
+int ipe_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+			 bool contents);
+
+int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
+
+void ipe_unpack_initramfs(void);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
+void ipe_bdev_free_security(struct block_device *bdev);
+
+int ipe_bdev_setintegrity(struct block_device *bdev, enum lsm_integrity_type type,
+			  const void *value, size_t len);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+int ipe_inode_setintegrity(const struct inode *inode, enum lsm_integrity_type type,
+			   const void *value, size_t size);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */
+
+#endif /* _IPE_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..495bb765d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+#include "ipe.h"
+#include "eval.h"
+#include "hooks.h"
+
+extern const char *const ipe_boot_policy;
+bool ipe_enabled;
+
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct ipe_superblock),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
+	.lbs_bdev = sizeof(struct ipe_bdev),
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct ipe_inode),
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id ipe_lsmid = {
+	.name = "ipe",
+	.id = LSM_ID_IPE,
+};
+
+struct ipe_superblock *ipe_sb(const struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	return sb->s_security + ipe_blobs.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
+struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b)
+{
+	return b->bd_security + ipe_blobs.lbs_bdev;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return inode->i_security + ipe_blobs.lbs_inode;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */
+
+static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ipe_bprm_check_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, ipe_bprm_creds_for_exec),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ipe_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ipe_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ipe_kernel_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ipe_kernel_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(initramfs_populated, ipe_unpack_initramfs),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bdev_free_security, ipe_bdev_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bdev_setintegrity, ipe_bdev_setintegrity),
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setintegrity, ipe_inode_setintegrity),
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */
+};
+
+/**
+ * ipe_init() - Entry point of IPE.
+ *
+ * This is called at LSM init, which happens occurs early during kernel
+ * start up. During this phase, IPE registers its hooks and loads the
+ * builtin boot policy.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- OK
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Out of memory (OOM)
+ */
+static int __init ipe_init(void)
+{
+	struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
+
+	security_add_hooks(ipe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ipe_hooks), &ipe_lsmid);
+	ipe_enabled = true;
+
+	if (ipe_boot_policy) {
+		p = ipe_new_policy(ipe_boot_policy, strlen(ipe_boot_policy),
+				   NULL, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(p))
+			return PTR_ERR(p);
+
+		rcu_assign_pointer(ipe_active_policy, p);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(ipe) = {
+	.id = &ipe_lsmid,
+	.init = ipe_init,
+	.blobs = &ipe_blobs,
+	.initcall_fs = ipe_init_securityfs,
+};
diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..25cfdb8f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _IPE_H
+#define _IPE_H
+
+#ifdef pr_fmt
+#undef pr_fmt
+#endif
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ipe: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+struct ipe_superblock *ipe_sb(const struct super_block *sb);
+
+extern bool ipe_enabled;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
+struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode(const struct inode *inode);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */
+
+int ipe_init_securityfs(void);
+
+#endif /* _IPE_H */
diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.c b/security/ipe/policy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..827867be4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/policy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
+
+#include "ipe.h"
+#include "eval.h"
+#include "fs.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+#include "policy_parser.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+
+/* lock for synchronizing writers across ipe policy */
+DEFINE_MUTEX(ipe_policy_lock);
+
+/**
+ * ver_to_u64() - Convert an internal ipe_policy_version to a u64.
+ * @p: Policy to extract the version from.
+ *
+ * Bits (LSB is index 0):
+ *	[48,32] -> Major
+ *	[32,16] -> Minor
+ *	[16, 0] -> Revision
+ *
+ * Return: u64 version of the embedded version structure.
+ */
+static inline u64 ver_to_u64(const struct ipe_policy *const p)
+{
+	u64 r;
+
+	r = (((u64)p->parsed->version.major) << 32)
+	  | (((u64)p->parsed->version.minor) << 16)
+	  | ((u64)(p->parsed->version.rev));
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_free_policy() - Deallocate a given IPE policy.
+ * @p: Supplies the policy to free.
+ *
+ * Safe to call on IS_ERR/NULL.
+ */
+void ipe_free_policy(struct ipe_policy *p)
+{
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(p))
+		return;
+
+	ipe_del_policyfs_node(p);
+	ipe_free_parsed_policy(p->parsed);
+	/*
+	 * p->text is allocated only when p->pkcs7 is not NULL
+	 * otherwise it points to the plaintext data inside the pkcs7
+	 */
+	if (!p->pkcs7)
+		kfree(p->text);
+	kfree(p->pkcs7);
+	kfree(p);
+}
+
+static int set_pkcs7_data(void *ctx, const void *data, size_t len,
+			  size_t asn1hdrlen __always_unused)
+{
+	struct ipe_policy *p = ctx;
+
+	p->text = (const char *)data;
+	p->textlen = len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_update_policy() - parse a new policy and replace old with it.
+ * @root: Supplies a pointer to the securityfs inode saved the policy.
+ * @text: Supplies a pointer to the plain text policy.
+ * @textlen: Supplies the length of @text.
+ * @pkcs7: Supplies a pointer to a buffer containing a pkcs7 message.
+ * @pkcs7len: Supplies the length of @pkcs7len.
+ *
+ * @text/@textlen is mutually exclusive with @pkcs7/@pkcs7len - see
+ * ipe_new_policy.
+ *
+ * Context: Requires root->i_rwsem to be held.
+ * Return:
+ * * %0	- Success
+ * * %-ENOENT	- Policy was deleted while updating
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Policy name mismatch
+ * * %-ESTALE	- Policy version too old
+ */
+int ipe_update_policy(struct inode *root, const char *text, size_t textlen,
+		      const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len)
+{
+	struct ipe_policy *old, *ap, *new = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	old = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
+	if (!old)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	new = ipe_new_policy(text, textlen, pkcs7, pkcs7len);
+	if (IS_ERR(new))
+		return PTR_ERR(new);
+
+	if (strcmp(new->parsed->name, old->parsed->name)) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (ver_to_u64(old) >= ver_to_u64(new)) {
+		rc = -ESTALE;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	root->i_private = new;
+	swap(new->policyfs, old->policyfs);
+	ipe_audit_policy_load(new);
+
+	mutex_lock(&ipe_policy_lock);
+	ap = rcu_dereference_protected(ipe_active_policy,
+				       lockdep_is_held(&ipe_policy_lock));
+	if (old == ap) {
+		rcu_assign_pointer(ipe_active_policy, new);
+		mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock);
+		ipe_audit_policy_activation(old, new);
+	} else {
+		mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock);
+	}
+	synchronize_rcu();
+	ipe_free_policy(old);
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	ipe_free_policy(new);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_new_policy() - Allocate and parse an ipe_policy structure.
+ *
+ * @text: Supplies a pointer to the plain-text policy to parse.
+ * @textlen: Supplies the length of @text.
+ * @pkcs7: Supplies a pointer to a pkcs7-signed IPE policy.
+ * @pkcs7len: Supplies the length of @pkcs7.
+ *
+ * @text/@textlen Should be NULL/0 if @pkcs7/@pkcs7len is set.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * a pointer to the ipe_policy structure	- Success
+ * * %-EBADMSG				- Policy is invalid
+ * * %-ENOMEM				- Out of memory (OOM)
+ * * %-ERANGE				- Policy version number overflow
+ * * %-EINVAL				- Policy version parsing error
+ * * %-ENOKEY				- Policy signing key not found
+ * * %-EKEYREJECTED			- Policy signature verification failed
+ */
+struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen,
+				  const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len)
+{
+	struct ipe_policy *new = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	new = kzalloc_obj(*new);
+	if (!new)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	if (!text) {
+		new->pkcs7len = pkcs7len;
+		new->pkcs7 = kmemdup(pkcs7, pkcs7len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!new->pkcs7) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		rc = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0, new->pkcs7, pkcs7len,
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_POLICY_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING
+					    VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+#else
+					    NULL,
+#endif
+					    VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
+					    set_pkcs7_data, new);
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_POLICY_SIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+		if (rc == -ENOKEY || rc == -EKEYREJECTED)
+			rc = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0, new->pkcs7, pkcs7len,
+						    VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+						    VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
+						    set_pkcs7_data, new);
+#endif
+		if (rc)
+			goto err;
+	} else {
+		new->textlen = textlen;
+		new->text = kstrdup(text, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!new->text) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = ipe_parse_policy(new);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	return new;
+err:
+	ipe_free_policy(new);
+	return ERR_PTR(rc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_set_active_pol() - Make @p the active policy.
+ * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to make active.
+ *
+ * Context: Requires root->i_rwsem, which i_private has the policy, to be held.
+ * Return:
+ * * %0	- Success
+ * * %-EINVAL	- New active policy version is invalid
+ */
+int ipe_set_active_pol(const struct ipe_policy *p)
+{
+	struct ipe_policy *ap = NULL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ipe_policy_lock);
+
+	ap = rcu_dereference_protected(ipe_active_policy,
+				       lockdep_is_held(&ipe_policy_lock));
+	if (ap == p) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (ap && ver_to_u64(ap) > ver_to_u64(p)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	rcu_assign_pointer(ipe_active_policy, p);
+	ipe_audit_policy_activation(ap, p);
+	mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.h b/security/ipe/policy.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5bfbdbdde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/policy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+#ifndef _IPE_POLICY_H
+#define _IPE_POLICY_H
+
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+
+enum ipe_op_type {
+	IPE_OP_EXEC = 0,
+	IPE_OP_FIRMWARE,
+	IPE_OP_KERNEL_MODULE,
+	IPE_OP_KEXEC_IMAGE,
+	IPE_OP_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
+	IPE_OP_POLICY,
+	IPE_OP_X509,
+	__IPE_OP_MAX,
+};
+
+#define IPE_OP_INVALID __IPE_OP_MAX
+
+enum ipe_action_type {
+	IPE_ACTION_ALLOW = 0,
+	IPE_ACTION_DENY,
+	__IPE_ACTION_MAX
+};
+
+#define IPE_ACTION_INVALID __IPE_ACTION_MAX
+
+enum ipe_prop_type {
+	IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE,
+	IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE,
+	IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH,
+	IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_FALSE,
+	IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_TRUE,
+	IPE_PROP_FSV_DIGEST,
+	IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_FALSE,
+	IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_TRUE,
+	__IPE_PROP_MAX
+};
+
+#define IPE_PROP_INVALID __IPE_PROP_MAX
+
+struct ipe_prop {
+	struct list_head next;
+	enum ipe_prop_type type;
+	void *value;
+};
+
+struct ipe_rule {
+	enum ipe_op_type op;
+	enum ipe_action_type action;
+	struct list_head props;
+	struct list_head next;
+};
+
+struct ipe_op_table {
+	struct list_head rules;
+	enum ipe_action_type default_action;
+};
+
+struct ipe_parsed_policy {
+	const char *name;
+	struct {
+		u16 major;
+		u16 minor;
+		u16 rev;
+	} version;
+
+	enum ipe_action_type global_default_action;
+
+	struct ipe_op_table rules[__IPE_OP_MAX];
+};
+
+struct ipe_policy {
+	const char *pkcs7;
+	size_t pkcs7len;
+
+	const char *text;
+	size_t textlen;
+
+	struct ipe_parsed_policy *parsed;
+
+	struct dentry *policyfs;
+};
+
+struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen,
+				  const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len);
+void ipe_free_policy(struct ipe_policy *pol);
+int ipe_update_policy(struct inode *root, const char *text, size_t textlen,
+		      const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len);
+int ipe_set_active_pol(const struct ipe_policy *p);
+extern struct mutex ipe_policy_lock;
+
+#endif /* _IPE_POLICY_H */
diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_fs.c b/security/ipe/policy_fs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9d92d8a14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/policy_fs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+
+#include "ipe.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+#include "eval.h"
+#include "fs.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+
+#define MAX_VERSION_SIZE ARRAY_SIZE("65535.65535.65535")
+
+/**
+ * struct ipefs_file - defines a file in securityfs.
+ *
+ * @name: file name inside the policy subdirectory
+ * @access: file permissions
+ * @fops: &file_operations specific to this file
+ */
+struct ipefs_file {
+	const char *name;
+	umode_t access;
+	const struct file_operations *fops;
+};
+
+/**
+ * read_pkcs7() - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/pkcs7".
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * @data will be populated with the pkcs7 blob representing the policy
+ * on success. If the policy is unsigned (like the boot policy), this
+ * will return -ENOENT.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written	- Success
+ * * %-ENOENT			- Policy initializing/deleted or is unsigned
+ */
+static ssize_t read_pkcs7(struct file *f, char __user *data,
+			  size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
+	struct inode *root = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
+
+	inode_lock_shared(root);
+	p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
+	if (!p) {
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!p->pkcs7) {
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, p->pkcs7, p->pkcs7len);
+
+out:
+	inode_unlock_shared(root);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_policy() - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/policy".
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * @data will be populated with the plain-text version of the policy
+ * on success.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written	- Success
+ * * %-ENOENT			- Policy initializing/deleted
+ */
+static ssize_t read_policy(struct file *f, char __user *data,
+			   size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
+	struct inode *root = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
+
+	inode_lock_shared(root);
+	p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
+	if (!p) {
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, p->text, p->textlen);
+
+out:
+	inode_unlock_shared(root);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_name() - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/name".
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * @data will be populated with the policy_name attribute on success.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written	- Success
+ * * %-ENOENT			- Policy initializing/deleted
+ */
+static ssize_t read_name(struct file *f, char __user *data,
+			 size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
+	struct inode *root = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
+
+	inode_lock_shared(root);
+	p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
+	if (!p) {
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, p->parsed->name,
+				     strlen(p->parsed->name));
+
+out:
+	inode_unlock_shared(root);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_version() - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/version".
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * @data will be populated with the version string on success.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written	- Success
+ * * %-ENOENT			- Policy initializing/deleted
+ */
+static ssize_t read_version(struct file *f, char __user *data,
+			    size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	char buffer[MAX_VERSION_SIZE] = { 0 };
+	const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
+	struct inode *root = NULL;
+	size_t strsize = 0;
+	ssize_t rc = 0;
+
+	root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
+
+	inode_lock_shared(root);
+	p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
+	if (!p) {
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	strsize = scnprintf(buffer, ARRAY_SIZE(buffer), "%hu.%hu.%hu",
+			    p->parsed->version.major, p->parsed->version.minor,
+			    p->parsed->version.rev);
+
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, buffer, strsize);
+
+out:
+	inode_unlock_shared(root);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * setactive() - Write handler for "ipe/policies/$name/active".
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written	- Success
+ * * %-EPERM			- Insufficient permission
+ * * %-EINVAL			- Invalid input
+ * * %-ENOENT			- Policy initializing/deleted
+ */
+static ssize_t setactive(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
+			 size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
+	struct inode *root = NULL;
+	bool value = false;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (!value)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
+	inode_lock(root);
+
+	p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
+	if (!p) {
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = ipe_set_active_pol(p);
+
+out:
+	inode_unlock(root);
+	return (rc < 0) ? rc : len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * getactive() - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/active".
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * @data will be populated with the 1 or 0 depending on if the
+ * corresponding policy is active.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written	- Success
+ * * %-ENOENT			- Policy initializing/deleted
+ */
+static ssize_t getactive(struct file *f, char __user *data,
+			 size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
+	struct inode *root = NULL;
+	const char *str;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
+
+	inode_lock_shared(root);
+	p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
+	if (!p) {
+		inode_unlock_shared(root);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+	inode_unlock_shared(root);
+
+	str = (p == rcu_access_pointer(ipe_active_policy)) ? "1" : "0";
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, str, 1);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * update_policy() - Write handler for "ipe/policies/$name/update".
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * On success this updates the policy represented by $name,
+ * in-place.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written		- Success
+ * * %-EPERM				- Insufficient permission
+ * * %-ENOMEM				- Out of memory (OOM)
+ * * %-ENOENT				- Policy was deleted while updating
+ * * %-EINVAL				- Policy name mismatch
+ * * %-ESTALE				- Policy version too old
+ */
+static ssize_t update_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
+			     size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	struct inode *root = NULL;
+	char *copy = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+		rc = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	copy = memdup_user(data, len);
+	if (IS_ERR(copy)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(copy);
+		copy = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
+	inode_lock(root);
+	rc = ipe_update_policy(root, NULL, 0, copy, len);
+	inode_unlock(root);
+
+out:
+	kfree(copy);
+	if (rc) {
+		ipe_audit_policy_load(ERR_PTR(rc));
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * delete_policy() - write handler for  "ipe/policies/$name/delete".
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * On success this deletes the policy represented by $name.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written	- Success
+ * * %-EPERM			- Insufficient permission/deleting active policy
+ * * %-EINVAL			- Invalid input
+ * * %-ENOENT			- Policy initializing/deleted
+ */
+static ssize_t delete_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
+			     size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+	struct ipe_policy *ap = NULL;
+	struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
+	struct inode *root = NULL;
+	bool value = false;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (!value)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
+	inode_lock(root);
+	p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
+	if (!p) {
+		inode_unlock(root);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&ipe_policy_lock);
+	ap = rcu_dereference_protected(ipe_active_policy,
+				       lockdep_is_held(&ipe_policy_lock));
+	if (p == ap) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock);
+		inode_unlock(root);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock);
+
+	root->i_private = NULL;
+	inode_unlock(root);
+
+	synchronize_rcu();
+	ipe_free_policy(p);
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations content_fops = {
+	.read = read_policy,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations pkcs7_fops = {
+	.read = read_pkcs7,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations name_fops = {
+	.read = read_name,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations ver_fops = {
+	.read = read_version,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations active_fops = {
+	.write = setactive,
+	.read = getactive,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations update_fops = {
+	.write = update_policy,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations delete_fops = {
+	.write = delete_policy,
+};
+
+/*
+ * policy_subdir - files under a policy subdirectory
+ */
+static const struct ipefs_file policy_subdir[] = {
+	{ "pkcs7", 0444, &pkcs7_fops },
+	{ "policy", 0444, &content_fops },
+	{ "name", 0444, &name_fops },
+	{ "version", 0444, &ver_fops },
+	{ "active", 0600, &active_fops },
+	{ "update", 0200, &update_fops },
+	{ "delete", 0200, &delete_fops },
+};
+
+/**
+ * ipe_del_policyfs_node() - Delete a securityfs entry for @p.
+ * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to delete a securityfs entry for.
+ */
+void ipe_del_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p)
+{
+	securityfs_remove(p->policyfs);
+	p->policyfs = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_new_policyfs_node() - Create a securityfs entry for @p.
+ * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to create a securityfs entry for.
+ *
+ * Return: %0 on success. If an error occurs, the function will return
+ * the -errno.
+ */
+int ipe_new_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p)
+{
+	const struct ipefs_file *f = NULL;
+	struct dentry *policyfs = NULL;
+	struct inode *root = NULL;
+	struct dentry *d = NULL;
+	size_t i = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (p->policyfs)
+		return 0;
+
+	policyfs = securityfs_create_dir(p->parsed->name, policy_root);
+	if (IS_ERR(policyfs))
+		return PTR_ERR(policyfs);
+
+	root = d_inode(policyfs);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policy_subdir); ++i) {
+		f = &policy_subdir[i];
+
+		d = securityfs_create_file(f->name, f->access, policyfs,
+					   NULL, f->fops);
+		if (IS_ERR(d)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(d);
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	inode_lock(root);
+	p->policyfs = policyfs;
+	root->i_private = p;
+	inode_unlock(root);
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	securityfs_remove(policyfs);
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_parser.c b/security/ipe/policy_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6fa5bebf8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/policy_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,559 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+
+#include "policy.h"
+#include "policy_parser.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#define START_COMMENT	'#'
+#define IPE_POLICY_DELIM " \t"
+#define IPE_LINE_DELIM "\n\r"
+
+/**
+ * new_parsed_policy() - Allocate and initialize a parsed policy.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * a pointer to the ipe_parsed_policy structure	- Success
+ * * %-ENOMEM						- Out of memory (OOM)
+ */
+static struct ipe_parsed_policy *new_parsed_policy(void)
+{
+	struct ipe_parsed_policy *p = NULL;
+	struct ipe_op_table *t = NULL;
+	size_t i = 0;
+
+	p = kzalloc_obj(*p);
+	if (!p)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	p->global_default_action = IPE_ACTION_INVALID;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p->rules); ++i) {
+		t = &p->rules[i];
+
+		t->default_action = IPE_ACTION_INVALID;
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&t->rules);
+	}
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * remove_comment() - Truncate all chars following START_COMMENT in a string.
+ *
+ * @line: Supplies a policy line string for preprocessing.
+ */
+static void remove_comment(char *line)
+{
+	line = strchr(line, START_COMMENT);
+
+	if (line)
+		*line = '\0';
+}
+
+/**
+ * remove_trailing_spaces() - Truncate all trailing spaces in a string.
+ *
+ * @line: Supplies a policy line string for preprocessing.
+ *
+ * Return: The length of truncated string.
+ */
+static size_t remove_trailing_spaces(char *line)
+{
+	size_t i = 0;
+
+	i = strlen(line);
+	while (i > 0 && isspace(line[i - 1]))
+		i--;
+
+	line[i] = '\0';
+
+	return i;
+}
+
+/**
+ * parse_version() - Parse policy version.
+ * @ver: Supplies a version string to be parsed.
+ * @p: Supplies the partial parsed policy.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- Success
+ * * %-EBADMSG	- Version string is invalid
+ * * %-ERANGE	- Version number overflow
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Parsing error
+ */
+static int parse_version(char *ver, struct ipe_parsed_policy *p)
+{
+	u16 *const cv[] = { &p->version.major, &p->version.minor, &p->version.rev };
+	size_t sep_count = 0;
+	char *token;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	while ((token = strsep(&ver, ".")) != NULL) {
+		/* prevent overflow */
+		if (sep_count >= ARRAY_SIZE(cv))
+			return -EBADMSG;
+
+		rc = kstrtou16(token, 10, cv[sep_count]);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		++sep_count;
+	}
+
+	/* prevent underflow */
+	if (sep_count != ARRAY_SIZE(cv))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+enum header_opt {
+	IPE_HEADER_POLICY_NAME = 0,
+	IPE_HEADER_POLICY_VERSION,
+	__IPE_HEADER_MAX
+};
+
+static const match_table_t header_tokens = {
+	{IPE_HEADER_POLICY_NAME,	"policy_name=%s"},
+	{IPE_HEADER_POLICY_VERSION,	"policy_version=%s"},
+	{__IPE_HEADER_MAX,		NULL}
+};
+
+/**
+ * parse_header() - Parse policy header information.
+ * @line: Supplies header line to be parsed.
+ * @p: Supplies the partial parsed policy.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- Success
+ * * %-EBADMSG	- Header string is invalid
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Out of memory (OOM)
+ * * %-ERANGE	- Version number overflow
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Version parsing error
+ */
+static int parse_header(char *line, struct ipe_parsed_policy *p)
+{
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+	char *t, *ver = NULL;
+	size_t idx = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	while ((t = strsep(&line, IPE_POLICY_DELIM)) != NULL) {
+		int token;
+
+		if (*t == '\0')
+			continue;
+		if (idx >= __IPE_HEADER_MAX) {
+			rc = -EBADMSG;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		token = match_token(t, header_tokens, args);
+		if (token != idx) {
+			rc = -EBADMSG;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		switch (token) {
+		case IPE_HEADER_POLICY_NAME:
+			p->name = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!p->name)
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		case IPE_HEADER_POLICY_VERSION:
+			ver = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!ver) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				break;
+			}
+			rc = parse_version(ver, p);
+			break;
+		default:
+			rc = -EBADMSG;
+		}
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		++idx;
+	}
+
+	if (idx != __IPE_HEADER_MAX)
+		rc = -EBADMSG;
+
+out:
+	kfree(ver);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * token_default() - Determine if the given token is "DEFAULT".
+ * @token: Supplies the token string to be compared.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %false	- The token is not "DEFAULT"
+ * * %true	- The token is "DEFAULT"
+ */
+static bool token_default(char *token)
+{
+	return !strcmp(token, "DEFAULT");
+}
+
+/**
+ * free_rule() - Free the supplied ipe_rule struct.
+ * @r: Supplies the ipe_rule struct to be freed.
+ *
+ * Free a ipe_rule struct @r. Note @r must be removed from any lists before
+ * calling this function.
+ */
+static void free_rule(struct ipe_rule *r)
+{
+	struct ipe_prop *p, *t;
+
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(r))
+		return;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(p, t, &r->props, next) {
+		list_del(&p->next);
+		ipe_digest_free(p->value);
+		kfree(p);
+	}
+
+	kfree(r);
+}
+
+static const match_table_t operation_tokens = {
+	{IPE_OP_EXEC,			"op=EXECUTE"},
+	{IPE_OP_FIRMWARE,		"op=FIRMWARE"},
+	{IPE_OP_KERNEL_MODULE,		"op=KMODULE"},
+	{IPE_OP_KEXEC_IMAGE,		"op=KEXEC_IMAGE"},
+	{IPE_OP_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,	"op=KEXEC_INITRAMFS"},
+	{IPE_OP_POLICY,			"op=POLICY"},
+	{IPE_OP_X509,			"op=X509_CERT"},
+	{IPE_OP_INVALID,		NULL}
+};
+
+/**
+ * parse_operation() - Parse the operation type given a token string.
+ * @t: Supplies the token string to be parsed.
+ *
+ * Return: The parsed operation type.
+ */
+static enum ipe_op_type parse_operation(char *t)
+{
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+
+	return match_token(t, operation_tokens, args);
+}
+
+static const match_table_t action_tokens = {
+	{IPE_ACTION_ALLOW,	"action=ALLOW"},
+	{IPE_ACTION_DENY,	"action=DENY"},
+	{IPE_ACTION_INVALID,	NULL}
+};
+
+/**
+ * parse_action() - Parse the action type given a token string.
+ * @t: Supplies the token string to be parsed.
+ *
+ * Return: The parsed action type.
+ */
+static enum ipe_action_type parse_action(char *t)
+{
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+
+	return match_token(t, action_tokens, args);
+}
+
+static const match_table_t property_tokens = {
+	{IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE,	"boot_verified=FALSE"},
+	{IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE,	"boot_verified=TRUE"},
+	{IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH,		"dmverity_roothash=%s"},
+	{IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_FALSE,	"dmverity_signature=FALSE"},
+	{IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_TRUE,		"dmverity_signature=TRUE"},
+	{IPE_PROP_FSV_DIGEST,		"fsverity_digest=%s"},
+	{IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_FALSE,	"fsverity_signature=FALSE"},
+	{IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_TRUE,		"fsverity_signature=TRUE"},
+	{IPE_PROP_INVALID,		NULL}
+};
+
+/**
+ * parse_property() - Parse a rule property given a token string.
+ * @t: Supplies the token string to be parsed.
+ * @r: Supplies the ipe_rule the parsed property will be associated with.
+ *
+ * This function parses and associates a property with an IPE rule based
+ * on a token string.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- Success
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Out of memory (OOM)
+ * * %-EBADMSG	- The supplied token cannot be parsed
+ */
+static int parse_property(char *t, struct ipe_rule *r)
+{
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+	struct ipe_prop *p = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+	int token;
+	char *dup = NULL;
+
+	p = kzalloc_obj(*p);
+	if (!p)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	token = match_token(t, property_tokens, args);
+
+	switch (token) {
+	case IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH:
+	case IPE_PROP_FSV_DIGEST:
+		dup = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+		if (!dup) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		p->value = ipe_digest_parse(dup);
+		if (IS_ERR(p->value)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(p->value);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		fallthrough;
+	case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE:
+	case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE:
+	case IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_FALSE:
+	case IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_TRUE:
+	case IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_FALSE:
+	case IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_TRUE:
+		p->type = token;
+		break;
+	default:
+		rc = -EBADMSG;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+	list_add_tail(&p->next, &r->props);
+
+out:
+	kfree(dup);
+	return rc;
+err:
+	kfree(p);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * parse_rule() - parse a policy rule line.
+ * @line: Supplies rule line to be parsed.
+ * @p: Supplies the partial parsed policy.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0		- Success
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Out of memory (OOM)
+ * * %-EBADMSG	- Policy syntax error
+ */
+static int parse_rule(char *line, struct ipe_parsed_policy *p)
+{
+	enum ipe_action_type action = IPE_ACTION_INVALID;
+	enum ipe_op_type op = IPE_OP_INVALID;
+	bool is_default_rule = false;
+	struct ipe_rule *r = NULL;
+	bool first_token = true;
+	bool op_parsed = false;
+	int rc = 0;
+	char *t;
+
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(line))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	r = kzalloc_obj(*r);
+	if (!r)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&r->next);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&r->props);
+
+	while (t = strsep(&line, IPE_POLICY_DELIM), line) {
+		if (*t == '\0')
+			continue;
+		if (first_token && token_default(t)) {
+			is_default_rule = true;
+		} else {
+			if (!op_parsed) {
+				op = parse_operation(t);
+				if (op == IPE_OP_INVALID)
+					rc = -EBADMSG;
+				else
+					op_parsed = true;
+			} else {
+				rc = parse_property(t, r);
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (rc)
+			goto err;
+		first_token = false;
+	}
+
+	action = parse_action(t);
+	if (action == IPE_ACTION_INVALID) {
+		rc = -EBADMSG;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (is_default_rule) {
+		if (!list_empty(&r->props)) {
+			rc = -EBADMSG;
+		} else if (op == IPE_OP_INVALID) {
+			if (p->global_default_action != IPE_ACTION_INVALID)
+				rc = -EBADMSG;
+			else
+				p->global_default_action = action;
+		} else {
+			if (p->rules[op].default_action != IPE_ACTION_INVALID)
+				rc = -EBADMSG;
+			else
+				p->rules[op].default_action = action;
+		}
+	} else if (op != IPE_OP_INVALID && action != IPE_ACTION_INVALID) {
+		r->op = op;
+		r->action = action;
+	} else {
+		rc = -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+	if (!is_default_rule)
+		list_add_tail(&r->next, &p->rules[op].rules);
+	else
+		free_rule(r);
+
+	return rc;
+err:
+	free_rule(r);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_free_parsed_policy() - free a parsed policy structure.
+ * @p: Supplies the parsed policy.
+ */
+void ipe_free_parsed_policy(struct ipe_parsed_policy *p)
+{
+	struct ipe_rule *pp, *t;
+	size_t i = 0;
+
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(p))
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p->rules); ++i)
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(pp, t, &p->rules[i].rules, next) {
+			list_del(&pp->next);
+			free_rule(pp);
+		}
+
+	kfree(p->name);
+	kfree(p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * validate_policy() - validate a parsed policy.
+ * @p: Supplies the fully parsed policy.
+ *
+ * Given a policy structure that was just parsed, validate that all
+ * operations have their default rules or a global default rule is set.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- Success
+ * * %-EBADMSG	- Policy is invalid
+ */
+static int validate_policy(const struct ipe_parsed_policy *p)
+{
+	size_t i = 0;
+
+	if (p->global_default_action != IPE_ACTION_INVALID)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p->rules); ++i) {
+		if (p->rules[i].default_action == IPE_ACTION_INVALID)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_parse_policy() - Given a string, parse the string into an IPE policy.
+ * @p: partially filled ipe_policy structure to populate with the result.
+ *     it must have text and textlen set.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0		- Success
+ * * %-EBADMSG	- Policy is invalid
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Out of Memory
+ * * %-ERANGE	- Policy version number overflow
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Policy version parsing error
+ */
+int ipe_parse_policy(struct ipe_policy *p)
+{
+	struct ipe_parsed_policy *pp = NULL;
+	char *policy = NULL, *dup = NULL;
+	bool header_parsed = false;
+	char *line = NULL;
+	size_t len;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!p->textlen)
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	policy = kmemdup_nul(p->text, p->textlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!policy)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	dup = policy;
+
+	pp = new_parsed_policy();
+	if (IS_ERR(pp)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(pp);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	while ((line = strsep(&policy, IPE_LINE_DELIM)) != NULL) {
+		remove_comment(line);
+		len = remove_trailing_spaces(line);
+		if (!len)
+			continue;
+
+		if (!header_parsed) {
+			rc = parse_header(line, pp);
+			if (rc)
+				goto err;
+			header_parsed = true;
+		} else {
+			rc = parse_rule(line, pp);
+			if (rc)
+				goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!header_parsed || validate_policy(pp)) {
+		rc = -EBADMSG;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	p->parsed = pp;
+
+out:
+	kfree(dup);
+	return rc;
+err:
+	ipe_free_parsed_policy(pp);
+	goto out;
+}
diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_parser.h b/security/ipe/policy_parser.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..62b620901
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/policy_parser.h
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+#ifndef _IPE_POLICY_PARSER_H
+#define _IPE_POLICY_PARSER_H
+
+int ipe_parse_policy(struct ipe_policy *p);
+void ipe_free_parsed_policy(struct ipe_parsed_policy *p);
+
+#endif /* _IPE_POLICY_PARSER_H */
diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_tests.c b/security/ipe/policy_tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5f1654dee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/policy_tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include "policy.h"
+struct policy_case {
+	const char *const policy;
+	int errno;
+	const char *const desc;
+};
+
+static const struct policy_case policy_cases[] = {
+	{
+		"policy_name=allowall policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW",
+		0,
+		"basic",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=trailing_comment policy_version=152.0.0 #This is comment\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW",
+		0,
+		"trailing comment",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=allowallnewline policy_version=0.2.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"\n",
+		0,
+		"trailing newline",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=carriagereturnlinefeed policy_version=0.0.1\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"\r\n",
+		0,
+		"clrf newline",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=whitespace policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT\taction=ALLOW\n"
+		"     \t     DEFAULT \t    op=EXECUTE      action=DENY\n"
+		"op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW\n"
+		"# this is a\tcomment\t\t\t\t\n"
+		"DEFAULT \t op=KMODULE\t\t\t  action=DENY\r\n"
+		"op=KMODULE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW\n",
+		0,
+		"various whitespaces and nested default",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=boot_verified policy_version=-1236.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT\taction=ALLOW\n",
+		-EINVAL,
+		"negative version",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=$@!*&^%%\\:;{}() policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW",
+		0,
+		"special characters",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=999999.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW",
+		-ERANGE,
+		"overflow version",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=255.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"incomplete version",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=111.0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"extra version",
+	},
+	{
+		"",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"0-length policy",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test\0policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"random null in header",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"\0DEFAULT action=ALLOW",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"incomplete policy from NULL",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=DENY\n\0"
+		"op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n",
+		0,
+		"NULL truncates policy",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=abc action=ALLOW",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"invalid property type",
+	},
+	{
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"missing policy header",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"missing default definition",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"dmverity_signature=TRUE op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"invalid rule ordering"
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"action=ALLOW op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"invalid rule ordering (2)",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"invalid version",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"op=UNKNOWN dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"unknown operation",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=asdvpolicy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"missing space after policy name",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test\xFF\xEF policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW",
+		0,
+		"expanded ascii",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test\xFF\xEF policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=GOOD_DOG action=ALLOW",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"invalid property value (2)",
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.1.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"double header"
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"double default"
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=DENY\n"
+		"DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW\n",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"double operation default"
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=DEN\n",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"invalid action value"
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action\n",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"invalid action value (2)"
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"UNKNOWN value=true\n",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"unrecognized statement"
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=1c0d7ee1f8343b7fbe418378e8eb22c061d7dec7 action=DENY\n",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"old-style digest"
+	},
+	{
+		"policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+		"DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n"
+		"op=EXECUTE fsverity_digest=1c0d7ee1f8343b7fbe418378e8eb22c061d7dec7 action=DENY\n",
+		-EBADMSG,
+		"old-style digest"
+	}
+};
+
+static void pol_to_desc(const struct policy_case *c, char *desc)
+{
+	strscpy(desc, c->desc, KUNIT_PARAM_DESC_SIZE);
+}
+
+KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(ipe_policies, policy_cases, pol_to_desc);
+
+/**
+ * ipe_parser_unsigned_test - Test the parser by passing unsigned policies.
+ * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure.
+ *
+ * This is called by the kunit harness. This test does not check the correctness
+ * of the policy, but ensures that errors are handled correctly.
+ */
+static void ipe_parser_unsigned_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const struct policy_case *p = test->param_value;
+	struct ipe_policy *pol;
+
+	pol = ipe_new_policy(p->policy, strlen(p->policy), NULL, 0);
+
+	if (p->errno) {
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, PTR_ERR(pol), p->errno);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, pol);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, pol->parsed);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, pol->text, p->policy);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, NULL, pol->pkcs7);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, pol->pkcs7len);
+
+	ipe_free_policy(pol);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipe_parser_widestring_test - Ensure parser fail on a wide string policy.
+ * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure.
+ *
+ * This is called by the kunit harness.
+ */
+static void ipe_parser_widestring_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const unsigned short policy[] = L"policy_name=Test policy_version=0.0.0\n"
+					L"DEFAULT action=ALLOW";
+	struct ipe_policy *pol = NULL;
+
+	pol = ipe_new_policy((const char *)policy, (ARRAY_SIZE(policy) - 1) * 2, NULL, 0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pol));
+
+	ipe_free_policy(pol);
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case ipe_parser_test_cases[] = {
+	KUNIT_CASE_PARAM(ipe_parser_unsigned_test, ipe_policies_gen_params),
+	KUNIT_CASE(ipe_parser_widestring_test),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite ipe_parser_test_suite = {
+	.name = "ipe-parser",
+	.test_cases = ipe_parser_test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suite(ipe_parser_test_suite);
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f4510d8cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# Key management configuration
+#
+
+menuconfig KEYS
+	bool "Enable access key retention support"
+	select ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY
+	help
+	  This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and
+	  access keys in the kernel.
+
+	  It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be
+	  associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption
+	  support and the like can find them.
+
+	  Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring:
+	  a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access
+	  to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session,
+	  process and thread.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+if KEYS
+
+config KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE
+	bool "Enable temporary caching of the last request_key() result"
+	help
+	  This option causes the result of the last successful request_key()
+	  call that didn't upcall to the kernel to be cached temporarily in the
+	  task_struct.  The cache is cleared by exit and just prior to the
+	  resumption of userspace.
+
+	  This allows the key used for multiple step processes where each step
+	  wants to request a key that is likely the same as the one requested
+	  by the last step to save on the searching.
+
+	  An example of such a process is a pathwalk through a network
+	  filesystem in which each method needs to request an authentication
+	  key.  Pathwalk will call multiple methods for each dentry traversed
+	  (permission, d_revalidate, lookup, getxattr, getacl, ...).
+
+config PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
+	bool "Enable register of persistent per-UID keyrings"
+	help
+	  This option provides a register of persistent per-UID keyrings,
+	  primarily aimed at Kerberos key storage.  The keyrings are persistent
+	  in the sense that they stay around after all processes of that UID
+	  have exited, not that they survive the machine being rebooted.
+
+	  A particular keyring may be accessed by either the user whose keyring
+	  it is or by a process with administrative privileges.  The active
+	  LSMs gets to rule on which admin-level processes get to access the
+	  cache.
+
+	  Keyrings are created and added into the register upon demand and get
+	  removed if they expire (a default timeout is set upon creation).
+
+config BIG_KEYS
+	bool "Large payload keys"
+	depends on TMPFS
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
+	help
+	  This option provides support for holding large keys within the kernel
+	  (for example Kerberos ticket caches).  The data may be stored out to
+	  swapspace by tmpfs.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS
+	tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
+	help
+	  This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
+	  keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
+	  generated and sealed by a trust source selected at kernel boot-time.
+	  Userspace will only ever see encrypted blobs.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+if TRUSTED_KEYS
+source "security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig"
+endif
+
+config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
+	tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_AES
+	select CRYPTO_CBC
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
+	help
+	  This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
+	  in the kernel.  Encrypted keys are instantiated using kernel
+	  generated random numbers or provided decrypted data, and are
+	  encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The 'master'
+	  key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type. Only encrypted
+	  blobs are ever output to Userspace.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config USER_DECRYPTED_DATA
+	bool "Allow encrypted keys with user decrypted data"
+	depends on ENCRYPTED_KEYS
+	help
+	  This option provides support for instantiating encrypted keys using
+	  user-provided decrypted data.  The decrypted data must be hex-ascii
+	  encoded.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
+       bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
+       select CRYPTO
+       select CRYPTO_KDF800108_CTR
+       select CRYPTO_DH
+       help
+	 This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman
+	 public keys and shared secrets using values stored as keys
+	 in the kernel.
+
+	 If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+	bool "Provide key/keyring change notifications"
+	depends on WATCH_QUEUE
+	help
+	  This option provides support for getting change notifications
+	  on keys and keyrings on which the caller has View permission.
+	  This makes use of pipes to handle the notification buffer and
+	  provides KEYCTL_WATCH_KEY to enable/disable watches.
+
+endif # KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5f40807f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for key management
+#
+
+#
+# Core
+#
+obj-y := \
+	gc.o \
+	key.o \
+	keyring.o \
+	keyctl.o \
+	permission.o \
+	process_keys.o \
+	request_key.o \
+	request_key_auth.o \
+	user_defined.o
+compat-obj-$(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS) += compat_dh.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o $(compat-obj-y)
+obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS) += persistent.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS) += dh.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += keyctl_pkey.o
+
+#
+# Key types
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS) += big_key.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted-keys/
+obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..268f702df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Large capacity key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2020 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "big_key: "fmt
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/big_key-type.h>
+#include <crypto/chacha20poly1305.h>
+
+/*
+ * Layout of key payload words.
+ */
+struct big_key_payload {
+	u8 *data;
+	struct path path;
+	size_t length;
+};
+#define to_big_key_payload(payload)			\
+	(struct big_key_payload *)((payload).data)
+
+/*
+ * If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
+ * hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at
+ * least as large as the data.
+ */
+#define BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD (sizeof(struct inode) + sizeof(struct dentry))
+
+/*
+ * big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
+ * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
+ */
+struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
+	.name			= "big_key",
+	.preparse		= big_key_preparse,
+	.free_preparse		= big_key_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
+	.revoke			= big_key_revoke,
+	.destroy		= big_key_destroy,
+	.describe		= big_key_describe,
+	.read			= big_key_read,
+	.update			= big_key_update,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Preparse a big key
+ */
+int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(prep->payload);
+	struct file *file;
+	u8 *buf, *enckey;
+	ssize_t written;
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+	size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
+	int ret;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*payload) != sizeof(prep->payload.data));
+
+	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Set an arbitrary quota */
+	prep->quotalen = 16;
+
+	payload->length = datalen;
+
+	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+		/* Create a shmem file to store the data in.  This will permit the data
+		 * to be swapped out if needed.
+		 *
+		 * File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key.
+		 * Since the key is random for each file, we can set the nonce
+		 * to zero, provided we never define a ->update() call.
+		 */
+		loff_t pos = 0;
+
+		buf = kvmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!buf)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		/* generate random key */
+		enckey = kmalloc(CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!enckey) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto error;
+		}
+		ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE);
+		if (unlikely(ret))
+			goto err_enckey;
+
+		/* encrypt data */
+		chacha20poly1305_encrypt(buf, prep->data, datalen, NULL, 0,
+					 0, enckey);
+
+		/* save aligned data to file */
+		file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", enclen, EMPTY_VMA_FLAGS);
+		if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(file);
+			goto err_enckey;
+		}
+
+		written = kernel_write(file, buf, enclen, &pos);
+		if (written != enclen) {
+			ret = written;
+			if (written >= 0)
+				ret = -EIO;
+			goto err_fput;
+		}
+
+		/* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again
+		 * later
+		 */
+		payload->data = enckey;
+		payload->path = file->f_path;
+		path_get(&payload->path);
+		fput(file);
+		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
+	} else {
+		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
+		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+		if (!data)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		payload->data = data;
+		memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+err_fput:
+	fput(file);
+err_enckey:
+	kfree_sensitive(enckey);
+error:
+	kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear preparsement.
+ */
+void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(prep->payload);
+
+	if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
+		path_put(&payload->path);
+	kfree_sensitive(payload->data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
+ * - called with the key sem write-locked
+ */
+void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
+
+	/* clear the quota */
+	key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
+	if (key_is_positive(key) && payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
+		vfs_truncate(&payload->path, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a big_key key
+ */
+void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
+
+	if (payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+		path_put(&payload->path);
+		payload->path.mnt = NULL;
+		payload->path.dentry = NULL;
+	}
+	kfree_sensitive(payload->data);
+	payload->data = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update a big key
+ */
+int big_key_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->datalen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (key_is_positive(key))
+		big_key_destroy(key);
+
+	return generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
+}
+
+/*
+ * describe the big_key key
+ */
+void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
+{
+	struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
+
+	seq_puts(m, key->description);
+
+	if (key_is_positive(key))
+		seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]",
+			   payload->length,
+			   payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
+}
+
+/*
+ * read the key data
+ * - the key's semaphore is read-locked
+ */
+long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+	struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
+	size_t datalen = payload->length;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (!buffer || buflen < datalen)
+		return datalen;
+
+	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+		struct file *file;
+		u8 *buf, *enckey = payload->data;
+		size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
+		loff_t pos = 0;
+
+		buf = kvmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!buf)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		file = dentry_open(&payload->path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
+		if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(file);
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		/* read file to kernel and decrypt */
+		ret = kernel_read(file, buf, enclen, &pos);
+		if (ret != enclen) {
+			if (ret >= 0)
+				ret = -EIO;
+			goto err_fput;
+		}
+
+		ret = chacha20poly1305_decrypt(buf, buf, enclen, NULL, 0, 0,
+					       enckey) ? 0 : -EBADMSG;
+		if (unlikely(ret))
+			goto err_fput;
+
+		ret = datalen;
+
+		/* copy out decrypted data */
+		memcpy(buffer, buf, datalen);
+
+err_fput:
+		fput(file);
+error:
+		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
+	} else {
+		ret = datalen;
+		memcpy(buffer, payload->data, datalen);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Register key type
+ */
+static int __init big_key_init(void)
+{
+	return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
+}
+
+late_initcall(big_key_init);
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1545efdca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* 32-bit compatibility syscall for 64-bit systems
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * The key control system call, 32-bit compatibility version for 64-bit archs
+ */
+COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
+		       u32, arg2, u32, arg3, u32, arg4, u32, arg5)
+{
+	switch (option) {
+	case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID:
+		return keyctl_get_keyring_ID(arg2, arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING:
+		return keyctl_join_session_keyring(compat_ptr(arg2));
+
+	case KEYCTL_UPDATE:
+		return keyctl_update_key(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_REVOKE:
+		return keyctl_revoke_key(arg2);
+
+	case KEYCTL_DESCRIBE:
+		return keyctl_describe_key(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_CLEAR:
+		return keyctl_keyring_clear(arg2);
+
+	case KEYCTL_LINK:
+		return keyctl_keyring_link(arg2, arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_UNLINK:
+		return keyctl_keyring_unlink(arg2, arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_SEARCH:
+		return keyctl_keyring_search(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3),
+					     compat_ptr(arg4), arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_READ:
+		return keyctl_read_key(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_CHOWN:
+		return keyctl_chown_key(arg2, arg3, arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_SETPERM:
+		return keyctl_setperm_key(arg2, arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE:
+		return keyctl_instantiate_key(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4,
+					      arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_NEGATE:
+		return keyctl_negate_key(arg2, arg3, arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING:
+		return keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(arg2);
+
+	case KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT:
+		return keyctl_set_timeout(arg2, arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY:
+		return keyctl_assume_authority(arg2);
+
+	case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
+		return keyctl_get_security(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+		return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
+	case KEYCTL_REJECT:
+		return keyctl_reject_key(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
+		return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4,
+						  arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
+		return keyctl_invalidate_key(arg2);
+
+	case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
+		return keyctl_get_persistent(arg2, arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
+		return compat_keyctl_dh_compute(compat_ptr(arg2),
+						compat_ptr(arg3),
+						arg4, compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+	case KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING:
+		return keyctl_restrict_keyring(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3),
+					       compat_ptr(arg4));
+
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY:
+		if (arg3 != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return keyctl_pkey_query(arg2,
+					 compat_ptr(arg4),
+					 compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+		return keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(option,
+					 compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
+					 compat_ptr(arg4), compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
+		return keyctl_pkey_verify(compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
+					  compat_ptr(arg4), compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+	case KEYCTL_MOVE:
+		return keyctl_keyring_move(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_CAPABILITIES:
+		return keyctl_capabilities(compat_ptr(arg2), arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_WATCH_KEY:
+		return keyctl_watch_key(arg2, arg3, arg4);
+
+	default:
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/compat_dh.c b/security/keys/compat_dh.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..19384e7e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/compat_dh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* 32-bit compatibility syscall for 64-bit systems for DH operations
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Perform the DH computation or DH based key derivation.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+			      char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+			      struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+	struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
+	struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params compat_kdfcopy;
+
+	if (!kdf)
+		return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&compat_kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(compat_kdfcopy)) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	kdfcopy.hashname = compat_ptr(compat_kdfcopy.hashname);
+	kdfcopy.otherinfo = compat_ptr(compat_kdfcopy.otherinfo);
+	kdfcopy.otherinfolen = compat_kdfcopy.otherinfolen;
+	memcpy(kdfcopy.__spare, compat_kdfcopy.__spare,
+	       sizeof(kdfcopy.__spare));
+
+	return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..da64c3584
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/dh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Crypto operations using stored keys
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/kpp.h>
+#include <crypto/dh.h>
+#include <crypto/kdf_sp800108.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static ssize_t dh_data_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, const void **data)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	long status;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, KEY_NEED_READ);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = -ENOKEY;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+	ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (key->type == &key_type_user) {
+		down_read(&key->sem);
+		status = key_validate(key);
+		if (status == 0) {
+			const struct user_key_payload *payload;
+			uint8_t *duplicate;
+
+			payload = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+
+			duplicate = kmemdup(payload->data, payload->datalen,
+					    GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (duplicate) {
+				*data = duplicate;
+				ret = payload->datalen;
+			} else {
+				ret = -ENOMEM;
+			}
+		}
+		up_read(&key->sem);
+	}
+
+	key_put(key);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void dh_free_data(struct dh *dh)
+{
+	kfree_sensitive(dh->key);
+	kfree_sensitive(dh->p);
+	kfree_sensitive(dh->g);
+}
+
+static int kdf_alloc(struct crypto_shash **hash, char *hashname)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+
+	/* allocate synchronous hash */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hashname, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_info("could not allocate digest TFM handle %s\n", hashname);
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+
+	if (crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm) == 0) {
+		crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*hash = tfm;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kdf_dealloc(struct crypto_shash *hash)
+{
+	if (hash)
+		crypto_free_shash(hash);
+}
+
+static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct crypto_shash *hash,
+				 char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+				 uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen)
+{
+	struct kvec kbuf_iov = { .iov_base = kbuf, .iov_len = kbuflen };
+	uint8_t *outbuf = NULL;
+	int ret;
+	size_t outbuf_len = roundup(buflen, crypto_shash_digestsize(hash));
+
+	outbuf = kmalloc(outbuf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!outbuf) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = crypto_kdf108_ctr_generate(hash, &kbuf_iov, 1, outbuf, outbuf_len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	ret = buflen;
+	if (copy_to_user(buffer, outbuf, buflen) != 0)
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+err:
+	kfree_sensitive(outbuf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+			 char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+			 struct keyctl_kdf_params *kdfcopy)
+{
+	long ret;
+	ssize_t dlen;
+	int secretlen;
+	int outlen;
+	struct keyctl_dh_params pcopy;
+	struct dh dh_inputs;
+	struct scatterlist outsg;
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(compl);
+	struct crypto_kpp *tfm;
+	struct kpp_request *req;
+	uint8_t *secret;
+	uint8_t *outbuf;
+	struct crypto_shash *hash = NULL;
+
+	if (!params || (!buffer && buflen)) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out1;
+	}
+	if (copy_from_user(&pcopy, params, sizeof(pcopy)) != 0) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto out1;
+	}
+
+	if (kdfcopy) {
+		char *hashname;
+
+		if (memchr_inv(kdfcopy->__spare, 0, sizeof(kdfcopy->__spare))) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out1;
+		}
+
+		if (buflen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN ||
+		    kdfcopy->otherinfolen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OI_LEN) {
+			ret = -EMSGSIZE;
+			goto out1;
+		}
+
+		/* get KDF name string */
+		hashname = strndup_user(kdfcopy->hashname, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
+		if (IS_ERR(hashname)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(hashname);
+			goto out1;
+		}
+
+		/* allocate KDF from the kernel crypto API */
+		ret = kdf_alloc(&hash, hashname);
+		kfree(hashname);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out1;
+	}
+
+	memset(&dh_inputs, 0, sizeof(dh_inputs));
+
+	dlen = dh_data_from_key(pcopy.prime, &dh_inputs.p);
+	if (dlen < 0) {
+		ret = dlen;
+		goto out1;
+	}
+	dh_inputs.p_size = dlen;
+
+	dlen = dh_data_from_key(pcopy.base, &dh_inputs.g);
+	if (dlen < 0) {
+		ret = dlen;
+		goto out2;
+	}
+	dh_inputs.g_size = dlen;
+
+	dlen = dh_data_from_key(pcopy.private, &dh_inputs.key);
+	if (dlen < 0) {
+		ret = dlen;
+		goto out2;
+	}
+	dh_inputs.key_size = dlen;
+
+	secretlen = crypto_dh_key_len(&dh_inputs);
+	secret = kmalloc(secretlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!secret) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out2;
+	}
+	ret = crypto_dh_encode_key(secret, secretlen, &dh_inputs);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out3;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp("dh", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+		goto out3;
+	}
+
+	ret = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, secret, secretlen);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out4;
+
+	outlen = crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm);
+
+	if (!kdfcopy) {
+		/*
+		 * When not using a KDF, buflen 0 is used to read the
+		 * required buffer length
+		 */
+		if (buflen == 0) {
+			ret = outlen;
+			goto out4;
+		} else if (outlen > buflen) {
+			ret = -EOVERFLOW;
+			goto out4;
+		}
+	}
+
+	outbuf = kzalloc(kdfcopy ? (outlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen) : outlen,
+			 GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!outbuf) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out4;
+	}
+
+	sg_init_one(&outsg, outbuf, outlen);
+
+	req = kpp_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out5;
+	}
+
+	kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
+	kpp_request_set_output(req, &outsg, outlen);
+	kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+				 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+				 crypto_req_done, &compl);
+
+	/*
+	 * For DH, generate_public_key and generate_shared_secret are
+	 * the same calculation
+	 */
+	ret = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
+	ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &compl);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out6;
+
+	if (kdfcopy) {
+		/*
+		 * Concatenate SP800-56A otherinfo past DH shared secret -- the
+		 * input to the KDF is (DH shared secret || otherinfo)
+		 */
+		if (copy_from_user(outbuf + req->dst_len, kdfcopy->otherinfo,
+				   kdfcopy->otherinfolen) != 0) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto out6;
+		}
+
+		ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(hash, buffer, buflen, outbuf,
+					    req->dst_len + kdfcopy->otherinfolen);
+	} else if (copy_to_user(buffer, outbuf, req->dst_len) == 0) {
+		ret = req->dst_len;
+	} else {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+out6:
+	kpp_request_free(req);
+out5:
+	kfree_sensitive(outbuf);
+out4:
+	crypto_free_kpp(tfm);
+out3:
+	kfree_sensitive(secret);
+out2:
+	dh_free_data(&dh_inputs);
+out1:
+	kdf_dealloc(hash);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+		       char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+		       struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+	struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
+
+	if (!kdf)
+		return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(kdfcopy)) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a44dce6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for encrypted keys
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys.o
+
+encrypted-keys-y := encrypted.o ecryptfs_format.o
+masterkey-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) := masterkey_trusted.o
+masterkey-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS)-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) := masterkey_trusted.o
+encrypted-keys-y += $(masterkey-y) $(masterkey-m-m)
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2fc6f3a66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * ecryptfs_format.c: helper functions for the encrypted key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 International Business Machines Corp.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- https://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Michael A. Halcrow <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
+ * Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@ou.edu>
+ * Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include "ecryptfs_format.h"
+
+u8 *ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok)
+{
+	return auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_key);
+
+/*
+ * ecryptfs_get_versions()
+ *
+ * Source code taken from the software 'ecryptfs-utils' version 83.
+ *
+ */
+void ecryptfs_get_versions(int *major, int *minor, int *file_version)
+{
+	*major = ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR;
+	*minor = ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR;
+	if (file_version)
+		*file_version = ECRYPTFS_SUPPORTED_FILE_VERSION;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ecryptfs_get_versions);
+
+/*
+ * ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok - fill the ecryptfs_auth_tok structure
+ *
+ * Fill the ecryptfs_auth_tok structure with required ecryptfs data.
+ * The source code is inspired to the original function generate_payload()
+ * shipped with the software 'ecryptfs-utils' version 83.
+ *
+ */
+int ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
+			   const char *key_desc)
+{
+	int major, minor;
+
+	ecryptfs_get_versions(&major, &minor, NULL);
+	auth_tok->version = (((uint16_t)(major << 8) & 0xFF00)
+			     | ((uint16_t)minor & 0x00FF));
+	auth_tok->token_type = ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD;
+	strscpy_pad(auth_tok->token.password.signature, key_desc);
+	auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes =
+		ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES;
+	/*
+	 * Removed auth_tok->token.password.salt and
+	 * auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key
+	 * initialization from the original code
+	 */
+	/* TODO: Make the hash parameterizable via policy */
+	auth_tok->token.password.flags |=
+		ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET;
+	/* The kernel code will encrypt the session key. */
+	auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[0] = 0;
+	auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = 0;
+	/* Default; subject to change by kernel eCryptfs */
+	auth_tok->token.password.hash_algo = PGP_DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512;
+	auth_tok->token.password.flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_PERSISTENT_PASSWORD);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok);
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.h b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ed8466578
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * ecryptfs_format.h: helper functions for the encrypted key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 International Business Machines Corp.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- https://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Michael A. Halcrow <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
+ * Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@ou.edu>
+ * Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ */
+
+#ifndef __KEYS_ECRYPTFS_H
+#define __KEYS_ECRYPTFS_H
+
+#include <linux/ecryptfs.h>
+
+#define PGP_DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512   10
+
+u8 *ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok);
+void ecryptfs_get_versions(int *major, int *minor, int *file_version);
+int ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
+			   const char *key_desc);
+
+#endif /* __KEYS_ECRYPTFS_H */
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..59cb77b23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1002 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- https://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/hex.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/utils.h>
+
+#include "encrypted.h"
+#include "ecryptfs_format.h"
+
+static const char KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX[] = "trusted:";
+static const char KEY_USER_PREFIX[] = "user:";
+static const char blkcipher_alg[] = "cbc(aes)";
+static const char key_format_default[] = "default";
+static const char key_format_ecryptfs[] = "ecryptfs";
+static const char key_format_enc32[] = "enc32";
+static unsigned int ivsize;
+static int blksize;
+
+#define KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1)
+#define KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
+#define KEY_ECRYPTFS_DESC_LEN 16
+#define HASH_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define MAX_DATA_SIZE 4096
+#define MIN_DATA_SIZE  20
+#define KEY_ENC32_PAYLOAD_LEN 32
+
+enum {
+	Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, Opt_err
+};
+
+enum {
+	Opt_default, Opt_ecryptfs, Opt_enc32, Opt_error
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_format_tokens = {
+	{Opt_default, "default"},
+	{Opt_ecryptfs, "ecryptfs"},
+	{Opt_enc32, "enc32"},
+	{Opt_error, NULL}
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+	{Opt_new, "new"},
+	{Opt_load, "load"},
+	{Opt_update, "update"},
+	{Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+static bool user_decrypted_data = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USER_DECRYPTED_DATA);
+module_param(user_decrypted_data, bool, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(user_decrypted_data,
+	"Allow instantiation of encrypted keys using provided decrypted data");
+
+static int aes_get_sizes(void)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to alloc_cipher (%ld)\n",
+		       PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+	ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+	blksize = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+	crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * valid_ecryptfs_desc - verify the description of a new/loaded encrypted key
+ *
+ * The description of a encrypted key with format 'ecryptfs' must contain
+ * exactly 16 hexadecimal characters.
+ *
+ */
+static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (strlen(ecryptfs_desc) != KEY_ECRYPTFS_DESC_LEN) {
+		pr_err("encrypted_key: key description must be %d hexadecimal "
+		       "characters long\n", KEY_ECRYPTFS_DESC_LEN);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KEY_ECRYPTFS_DESC_LEN; i++) {
+		if (!isxdigit(ecryptfs_desc[i])) {
+			pr_err("encrypted_key: key description must contain "
+			       "only hexadecimal characters\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * valid_master_desc - verify the 'key-type:desc' of a new/updated master-key
+ *
+ * key-type:= "trusted:" | "user:"
+ * desc:= master-key description
+ *
+ * Verify that 'key-type' is valid and that 'desc' exists. On key update,
+ * only the master key description is permitted to change, not the key-type.
+ * The key-type remains constant.
+ *
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
+{
+	int prefix_len;
+
+	if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!new_desc[prefix_len])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data
+ *
+ * datablob format:
+ * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length> [<decrypted data>]
+ * load [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
+ *     <encrypted iv + data>
+ * update <new-master-key name>
+ *
+ * Tokenizes a copy of the keyctl data, returning a pointer to each token,
+ * which is null terminated.
+ *
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
+			  char **master_desc, char **decrypted_datalen,
+			  char **hex_encoded_iv, char **decrypted_data)
+{
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	int key_cmd;
+	int key_format;
+	char *p, *keyword;
+
+	keyword = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+	if (!keyword) {
+		pr_info("encrypted_key: insufficient parameters specified\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+	key_cmd = match_token(keyword, key_tokens, args);
+
+	/* Get optional format: default | ecryptfs */
+	p = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+	if (!p) {
+		pr_err("encrypted_key: insufficient parameters specified\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	key_format = match_token(p, key_format_tokens, args);
+	switch (key_format) {
+	case Opt_ecryptfs:
+	case Opt_enc32:
+	case Opt_default:
+		*format = p;
+		*master_desc = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+		break;
+	case Opt_error:
+		*master_desc = p;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (!*master_desc) {
+		pr_info("encrypted_key: master key parameter is missing\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (valid_master_desc(*master_desc, NULL) < 0) {
+		pr_info("encrypted_key: master key parameter \'%s\' "
+			"is invalid\n", *master_desc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (decrypted_datalen) {
+		*decrypted_datalen = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+		if (!*decrypted_datalen) {
+			pr_info("encrypted_key: keylen parameter is missing\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	switch (key_cmd) {
+	case Opt_new:
+		if (!decrypted_datalen) {
+			pr_info("encrypted_key: keyword \'%s\' not allowed "
+				"when called from .update method\n", keyword);
+			break;
+		}
+		*decrypted_data = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	case Opt_load:
+		if (!decrypted_datalen) {
+			pr_info("encrypted_key: keyword \'%s\' not allowed "
+				"when called from .update method\n", keyword);
+			break;
+		}
+		*hex_encoded_iv = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+		if (!*hex_encoded_iv) {
+			pr_info("encrypted_key: hex blob is missing\n");
+			break;
+		}
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	case Opt_update:
+		if (decrypted_datalen) {
+			pr_info("encrypted_key: keyword \'%s\' not allowed "
+				"when called from .instantiate method\n",
+				keyword);
+			break;
+		}
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	case Opt_err:
+		pr_info("encrypted_key: keyword \'%s\' not recognized\n",
+			keyword);
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * datablob_format - format as an ascii string, before copying to userspace
+ */
+static char *datablob_format(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+			     size_t asciiblob_len)
+{
+	char *ascii_buf, *bufp;
+	u8 *iv = epayload->iv;
+	int len;
+	int i;
+
+	ascii_buf = kmalloc(asciiblob_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ascii_buf)
+		goto out;
+
+	ascii_buf[asciiblob_len] = '\0';
+
+	/* copy datablob master_desc and datalen strings */
+	len = sprintf(ascii_buf, "%s %s %s ", epayload->format,
+		      epayload->master_desc, epayload->datalen);
+
+	/* convert the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data and HMAC to ascii */
+	bufp = &ascii_buf[len];
+	for (i = 0; i < (asciiblob_len - len) / 2; i++)
+		bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, iv[i]);
+out:
+	return ascii_buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * request_user_key - request the user key
+ *
+ * Use a user provided key to encrypt/decrypt an encrypted-key.
+ */
+static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, const u8 **master_key,
+				    size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+	const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
+	struct key *ukey;
+
+	ukey = request_key(&key_type_user, master_desc, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(ukey))
+		goto error;
+
+	down_read(&ukey->sem);
+	upayload = user_key_payload_locked(ukey);
+	if (!upayload) {
+		/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
+		up_read(&ukey->sem);
+		key_put(ukey);
+		ukey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+		goto error;
+	}
+	*master_key = upayload->data;
+	*master_keylen = upayload->datalen;
+error:
+	return ukey;
+}
+
+enum derived_key_type { ENC_KEY, AUTH_KEY };
+
+/* Derive authentication/encryption key from trusted key */
+static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
+			   const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
+{
+	u8 *derived_buf;
+	unsigned int derived_buf_len;
+
+	derived_buf_len = strlen("AUTH_KEY") + 1 + master_keylen;
+	if (derived_buf_len < HASH_SIZE)
+		derived_buf_len = HASH_SIZE;
+
+	derived_buf = kzalloc(derived_buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!derived_buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (key_type)
+		strscpy(derived_buf, "AUTH_KEY", HASH_SIZE);
+	else
+		strscpy(derived_buf, "ENC_KEY", HASH_SIZE);
+
+	memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key,
+	       master_keylen);
+	sha256(derived_buf, derived_buf_len, derived_key);
+	kfree_sensitive(derived_buf);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_request *init_skcipher_req(const u8 *key,
+						  unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct skcipher_request *req;
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
+	int ret;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to load %s transform (%ld)\n",
+		       blkcipher_alg, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return ERR_CAST(tfm);
+	}
+
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to setkey (%d)\n", ret);
+		crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
+
+	req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req) {
+		pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to allocate request for %s\n",
+		       blkcipher_alg);
+		crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+	return req;
+}
+
+static struct key *request_master_key(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+				      const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+	struct key *mkey = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	if (!strncmp(epayload->master_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
+		     KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
+		mkey = request_trusted_key(epayload->master_desc +
+					   KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN,
+					   master_key, master_keylen);
+	} else if (!strncmp(epayload->master_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX,
+			    KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
+		mkey = request_user_key(epayload->master_desc +
+					KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN,
+					master_key, master_keylen);
+	} else
+		goto out;
+
+	if (IS_ERR(mkey)) {
+		int ret = PTR_ERR(mkey);
+
+		if (ret == -ENOTSUPP)
+			pr_info("encrypted_key: key %s not supported",
+				epayload->master_desc);
+		else
+			pr_info("encrypted_key: key %s not found",
+				epayload->master_desc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dump_master_key(*master_key, *master_keylen);
+out:
+	return mkey;
+}
+
+/* Before returning data to userspace, encrypt decrypted data. */
+static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+			       const u8 *derived_key,
+			       unsigned int derived_keylen)
+{
+	struct scatterlist sg_in[2];
+	struct scatterlist sg_out[1];
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
+	struct skcipher_request *req;
+	unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
+	u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	int ret;
+
+	encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
+
+	req = init_skcipher_req(derived_key, derived_keylen);
+	ret = PTR_ERR(req);
+	if (IS_ERR(req))
+		goto out;
+	dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
+
+	sg_init_table(sg_in, 2);
+	sg_set_buf(&sg_in[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
+		   epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+	sg_set_page(&sg_in[1], ZERO_PAGE(0), AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
+
+	sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
+	sg_set_buf(sg_out, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
+
+	memcpy(iv, epayload->iv, sizeof(iv));
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, encrypted_datalen, iv);
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+	tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	skcipher_request_free(req);
+	crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to encrypt (%d)\n", ret);
+	else
+		dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int datablob_hmac_append(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+				const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
+{
+	u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
+	u8 *digest;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, AUTH_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	digest = epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len;
+	hmac_sha256_usingrawkey(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key),
+				epayload->format, epayload->datablob_len,
+				digest);
+	dump_hmac(NULL, digest, HASH_SIZE);
+out:
+	memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* verify HMAC before decrypting encrypted key */
+static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+				const u8 *format, const u8 *master_key,
+				size_t master_keylen)
+{
+	u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
+	u8 digest[HASH_SIZE];
+	int ret;
+	char *p;
+	unsigned short len;
+
+	ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, AUTH_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	len = epayload->datablob_len;
+	if (!format) {
+		p = epayload->master_desc;
+		len -= strlen(epayload->format) + 1;
+	} else
+		p = epayload->format;
+
+	hmac_sha256_usingrawkey(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), p, len,
+				digest);
+	ret = crypto_memneq(digest, epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len,
+			    sizeof(digest));
+	if (ret) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		dump_hmac("datablob",
+			  epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len,
+			  HASH_SIZE);
+		dump_hmac("calc", digest, HASH_SIZE);
+	}
+out:
+	memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+			       const u8 *derived_key,
+			       unsigned int derived_keylen)
+{
+	struct scatterlist sg_in[1];
+	struct scatterlist sg_out[2];
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
+	struct skcipher_request *req;
+	unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
+	u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 *pad;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Throwaway buffer to hold the unused zero padding at the end */
+	pad = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!pad)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
+	req = init_skcipher_req(derived_key, derived_keylen);
+	ret = PTR_ERR(req);
+	if (IS_ERR(req))
+		goto out;
+	dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen);
+
+	sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
+	sg_init_table(sg_out, 2);
+	sg_set_buf(sg_in, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
+	sg_set_buf(&sg_out[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
+		   epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+	sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	memcpy(iv, epayload->iv, sizeof(iv));
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, encrypted_datalen, iv);
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+	tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	skcipher_request_free(req);
+	crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
+out:
+	kfree(pad);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Allocate memory for decrypted key and datablob. */
+static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
+							 const char *format,
+							 const char *master_desc,
+							 const char *datalen,
+							 const char *decrypted_data)
+{
+	struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
+	unsigned short datablob_len;
+	unsigned short decrypted_datalen;
+	unsigned short payload_datalen;
+	unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
+	unsigned int format_len;
+	long dlen;
+	int i;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = kstrtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
+	if (ret < 0 || dlen < MIN_DATA_SIZE || dlen > MAX_DATA_SIZE)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	format_len = (!format) ? strlen(key_format_default) : strlen(format);
+	decrypted_datalen = dlen;
+	payload_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
+
+	if (decrypted_data) {
+		if (!user_decrypted_data) {
+			pr_err("encrypted key: instantiation of keys using provided decrypted data is disabled since CONFIG_USER_DECRYPTED_DATA is set to false\n");
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		}
+		if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen * 2) {
+			pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n");
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < strlen(decrypted_data); i++) {
+			if (!isxdigit(decrypted_data[i])) {
+				pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided must contain only hexadecimal characters\n");
+				return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (format) {
+		if (!strcmp(format, key_format_ecryptfs)) {
+			if (dlen != ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES) {
+				pr_err("encrypted_key: keylen for the ecryptfs format must be equal to %d bytes\n",
+					ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES);
+				return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+			}
+			decrypted_datalen = ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES;
+			payload_datalen = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok);
+		} else if (!strcmp(format, key_format_enc32)) {
+			if (decrypted_datalen != KEY_ENC32_PAYLOAD_LEN) {
+				pr_err("encrypted_key: enc32 key payload incorrect length: %d\n",
+						decrypted_datalen);
+				return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	encrypted_datalen = roundup(decrypted_datalen, blksize);
+
+	datablob_len = format_len + 1 + strlen(master_desc) + 1
+	    + strlen(datalen) + 1 + ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen;
+
+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, payload_datalen + datablob_len
+				  + HASH_SIZE + 1);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+
+	epayload = kzalloc(sizeof(*epayload) + payload_datalen +
+			   datablob_len + HASH_SIZE + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!epayload)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	epayload->payload_datalen = payload_datalen;
+	epayload->decrypted_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
+	epayload->datablob_len = datablob_len;
+	return epayload;
+}
+
+static int encrypted_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+				 const char *format, const char *hex_encoded_iv)
+{
+	struct key *mkey;
+	u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
+	const u8 *master_key;
+	u8 *hmac;
+	const char *hex_encoded_data;
+	unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
+	size_t master_keylen;
+	size_t asciilen;
+	int ret;
+
+	encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
+	asciilen = (ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen + HASH_SIZE) * 2;
+	if (strlen(hex_encoded_iv) != asciilen)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hex_encoded_data = hex_encoded_iv + (2 * ivsize) + 2;
+	ret = hex2bin(epayload->iv, hex_encoded_iv, ivsize);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	ret = hex2bin(epayload->encrypted_data, hex_encoded_data,
+		      encrypted_datalen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hmac = epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len;
+	ret = hex2bin(hmac, hex_encoded_data + (encrypted_datalen * 2),
+		      HASH_SIZE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mkey = request_master_key(epayload, &master_key, &master_keylen);
+	if (IS_ERR(mkey))
+		return PTR_ERR(mkey);
+
+	ret = datablob_hmac_verify(epayload, format, master_key, master_keylen);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_err("encrypted_key: bad hmac (%d)\n", ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, ENC_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = derived_key_decrypt(epayload, derived_key, sizeof derived_key);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to decrypt key (%d)\n", ret);
+out:
+	up_read(&mkey->sem);
+	key_put(mkey);
+	memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __ekey_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+			const char *format, const char *master_desc,
+			const char *datalen)
+{
+	unsigned int format_len;
+
+	format_len = (!format) ? strlen(key_format_default) : strlen(format);
+	epayload->format = epayload->payload_data + epayload->payload_datalen;
+	epayload->master_desc = epayload->format + format_len + 1;
+	epayload->datalen = epayload->master_desc + strlen(master_desc) + 1;
+	epayload->iv = epayload->datalen + strlen(datalen) + 1;
+	epayload->encrypted_data = epayload->iv + ivsize + 1;
+	epayload->decrypted_data = epayload->payload_data;
+
+	if (!format)
+		memcpy(epayload->format, key_format_default, format_len);
+	else {
+		if (!strcmp(format, key_format_ecryptfs))
+			epayload->decrypted_data =
+				ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_key((struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)epayload->payload_data);
+
+		memcpy(epayload->format, format, format_len);
+	}
+
+	memcpy(epayload->master_desc, master_desc, strlen(master_desc));
+	memcpy(epayload->datalen, datalen, strlen(datalen));
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_init - initialize an encrypted key
+ *
+ * For a new key, use either a random number or user-provided decrypted data in
+ * case it is provided. A random number is used for the iv in both cases. For
+ * an old key, decrypt the hex encoded data.
+ */
+static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+			  const char *key_desc, const char *format,
+			  const char *master_desc, const char *datalen,
+			  const char *hex_encoded_iv, const char *decrypted_data)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (format && !strcmp(format, key_format_ecryptfs)) {
+		ret = valid_ecryptfs_desc(key_desc);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok((struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)epayload->payload_data,
+				       key_desc);
+	}
+
+	__ekey_init(epayload, format, master_desc, datalen);
+	if (hex_encoded_iv) {
+		ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, format, hex_encoded_iv);
+	} else if (decrypted_data) {
+		get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
+		ret = hex2bin(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data,
+			      epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+	} else {
+		get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
+		get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_instantiate - instantiate an encrypted key
+ *
+ * Instantiates the key:
+ * - by decrypting an existing encrypted datablob, or
+ * - by creating a new encrypted key based on a kernel random number, or
+ * - using provided decrypted data.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
+				 struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
+	char *datablob = NULL;
+	const char *format = NULL;
+	char *master_desc = NULL;
+	char *decrypted_datalen = NULL;
+	char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL;
+	char *decrypted_data = NULL;
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!datablob)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	datablob[datalen] = 0;
+	memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
+	ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc,
+			     &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv, &decrypted_data);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, format, master_desc,
+				       decrypted_datalen, decrypted_data);
+	if (IS_ERR(epayload)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(epayload);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = encrypted_init(epayload, key->description, format, master_desc,
+			     decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv, decrypted_data);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		kfree_sensitive(epayload);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, epayload);
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(datablob);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+	struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
+
+	epayload = container_of(rcu, struct encrypted_key_payload, rcu);
+	kfree_sensitive(epayload);
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_update - update the master key description
+ *
+ * Change the master key description for an existing encrypted key.
+ * The next read will return an encrypted datablob using the new
+ * master key description.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data[0];
+	struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload;
+	char *buf;
+	char *new_master_desc = NULL;
+	const char *format = NULL;
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (key_is_negative(key))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	buf[datalen] = 0;
+	memcpy(buf, prep->data, datalen);
+	ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = valid_master_desc(new_master_desc, epayload->master_desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, epayload->format,
+					   new_master_desc, epayload->datalen, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(new_epayload)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(new_epayload);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	__ekey_init(new_epayload, epayload->format, new_master_desc,
+		    epayload->datalen);
+
+	memcpy(new_epayload->iv, epayload->iv, ivsize);
+	memcpy(new_epayload->payload_data, epayload->payload_data,
+	       epayload->payload_datalen);
+
+	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_epayload);
+	call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free);
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_read - format and copy out the encrypted data
+ *
+ * The resulting datablob format is:
+ * <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv> <encrypted data>
+ *
+ * On success, return to userspace the encrypted key datablob size.
+ */
+static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
+			   size_t buflen)
+{
+	struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
+	struct key *mkey;
+	const u8 *master_key;
+	size_t master_keylen;
+	char derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
+	char *ascii_buf;
+	size_t asciiblob_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	epayload = dereference_key_locked(key);
+
+	/* returns the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data, and hmac as ascii */
+	asciiblob_len = epayload->datablob_len + ivsize + 1
+	    + roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize)
+	    + (HASH_SIZE * 2);
+
+	if (!buffer || buflen < asciiblob_len)
+		return asciiblob_len;
+
+	mkey = request_master_key(epayload, &master_key, &master_keylen);
+	if (IS_ERR(mkey))
+		return PTR_ERR(mkey);
+
+	ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, ENC_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = derived_key_encrypt(epayload, derived_key, sizeof derived_key);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = datablob_hmac_append(epayload, master_key, master_keylen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ascii_buf = datablob_format(epayload, asciiblob_len);
+	if (!ascii_buf) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	up_read(&mkey->sem);
+	key_put(mkey);
+	memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
+
+	memcpy(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len);
+	kfree_sensitive(ascii_buf);
+
+	return asciiblob_len;
+out:
+	up_read(&mkey->sem);
+	key_put(mkey);
+	memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
+ */
+static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+	kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
+	.name = "encrypted",
+	.instantiate = encrypted_instantiate,
+	.update = encrypted_update,
+	.destroy = encrypted_destroy,
+	.describe = user_describe,
+	.read = encrypted_read,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_encrypted);
+
+static int __init init_encrypted(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = aes_get_sizes();
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	return register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_encrypted(void)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_encrypted);
+module_exit(cleanup_encrypted);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Encrypted key type");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1809995db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H
+#define __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H
+
+#define ENCRYPTED_DEBUG 0
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) || \
+  (defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_MODULE) && defined(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS_MODULE))
+extern struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
+				       const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen);
+#else
+static inline struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
+					      const u8 **master_key,
+					      size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+	return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if ENCRYPTED_DEBUG
+static inline void dump_master_key(const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
+{
+	print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "master key: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1,
+		       master_key, master_keylen, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_decrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload)
+{
+	print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "decrypted data: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1,
+		       epayload->decrypted_data,
+		       epayload->decrypted_datalen, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_encrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+				       unsigned int encrypted_datalen)
+{
+	print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "encrypted data: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1,
+		       epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_hmac(const char *str, const u8 *digest,
+			     unsigned int hmac_size)
+{
+	if (str)
+		pr_info("encrypted_key: %s", str);
+	print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "hmac: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1, digest,
+		       hmac_size, 0);
+}
+#else
+static inline void dump_master_key(const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_decrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_encrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+				       unsigned int encrypted_datalen)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_hmac(const char *str, const u8 *digest,
+			     unsigned int hmac_size)
+{
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e6d22ce77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- https://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
+#include "encrypted.h"
+
+/*
+ * request_trusted_key - request the trusted key
+ *
+ * Trusted keys are sealed to PCRs and other metadata. Although userspace
+ * manages both trusted/encrypted key-types, like the encrypted key type
+ * data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace.
+ */
+struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
+				const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload;
+	struct key *tkey;
+
+	tkey = request_key(&key_type_trusted, trusted_desc, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(tkey))
+		goto error;
+
+	down_read(&tkey->sem);
+	tpayload = tkey->payload.data[0];
+	*master_key = tpayload->key;
+	*master_keylen = tpayload->key_len;
+error:
+	return tkey;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..748e83818
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Key garbage collector
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <keys/keyring-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Delay between key revocation/expiry in seconds
+ */
+unsigned key_gc_delay = 5 * 60;
+
+/*
+ * Reaper for unused keys.
+ */
+static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work);
+DECLARE_WORK(key_gc_work, key_garbage_collector);
+
+/*
+ * Reaper for links from keyrings to dead keys.
+ */
+static void key_gc_timer_func(struct timer_list *);
+static DEFINE_TIMER(key_gc_timer, key_gc_timer_func);
+
+static time64_t key_gc_next_run = TIME64_MAX;
+static struct key_type *key_gc_dead_keytype;
+
+static unsigned long key_gc_flags;
+#define KEY_GC_KEY_EXPIRED	0	/* A key expired and needs unlinking */
+#define KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE	1	/* A keytype is being unregistered */
+#define KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE	2	/* Cleared when keytype reaped */
+
+
+/*
+ * Any key whose type gets unregistered will be re-typed to this if it can't be
+ * immediately unlinked.
+ */
+struct key_type key_type_dead = {
+	.name = ".dead",
+};
+
+/*
+ * Schedule a garbage collection run.
+ * - time precision isn't particularly important
+ */
+void key_schedule_gc(time64_t gc_at)
+{
+	unsigned long expires;
+	time64_t now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+
+	kenter("%lld", gc_at - now);
+
+	if (gc_at <= now || test_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags)) {
+		kdebug("IMMEDIATE");
+		schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+	} else if (gc_at < key_gc_next_run) {
+		kdebug("DEFERRED");
+		key_gc_next_run = gc_at;
+		expires = jiffies + (gc_at - now) * HZ;
+		mod_timer(&key_gc_timer, expires);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the expiration time on a key.
+ */
+void key_set_expiry(struct key *key, time64_t expiry)
+{
+	key->expiry = expiry;
+	if (expiry != TIME64_MAX) {
+		if (!(key->type->flags & KEY_TYPE_INSTANT_REAP))
+			expiry += key_gc_delay;
+		key_schedule_gc(expiry);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Schedule a dead links collection run.
+ */
+void key_schedule_gc_links(void)
+{
+	set_bit(KEY_GC_KEY_EXPIRED, &key_gc_flags);
+	schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Some key's cleanup time was met after it expired, so we need to get the
+ * reaper to go through a cycle finding expired keys.
+ */
+static void key_gc_timer_func(struct timer_list *unused)
+{
+	kenter("");
+	key_gc_next_run = TIME64_MAX;
+	key_schedule_gc_links();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reap keys of dead type.
+ *
+ * We use three flags to make sure we see three complete cycles of the garbage
+ * collector: the first to mark keys of that type as being dead, the second to
+ * collect dead links and the third to clean up the dead keys.  We have to be
+ * careful as there may already be a cycle in progress.
+ *
+ * The caller must be holding key_types_sem.
+ */
+void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype)
+{
+	kenter("%s", ktype->name);
+
+	key_gc_dead_keytype = ktype;
+	set_bit(KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags);
+	smp_mb();
+	set_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags);
+
+	kdebug("schedule");
+	schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+
+	kdebug("sleep");
+	wait_on_bit(&key_gc_flags, KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE,
+		    TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
+
+	key_gc_dead_keytype = NULL;
+	kleave("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collect a list of unreferenced, detached keys
+ */
+static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
+{
+	while (!list_empty(keys)) {
+		struct key *key =
+			list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link);
+		short state = key->state;
+
+		list_del(&key->graveyard_link);
+
+		kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
+		key_check(key);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+		remove_watch_list(key->watchers, key->serial);
+		key->watchers = NULL;
+#endif
+
+		/* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */
+		if (state == KEY_IS_POSITIVE && key->type->destroy)
+			key->type->destroy(key);
+
+		security_key_free(key);
+
+		atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
+		if (state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED)
+			atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
+
+		key_user_put(key->user);
+		key_put_tag(key->domain_tag);
+		kfree(key->description);
+
+		memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(*key));
+		kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collector for unused keys.
+ *
+ * This is done in process context so that we don't have to disable interrupts
+ * all over the place.  key_put() schedules this rather than trying to do the
+ * cleanup itself, which means key_put() doesn't have to sleep.
+ */
+static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	static LIST_HEAD(graveyard);
+	static u8 gc_state;		/* Internal persistent state */
+#define KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN	0x01	/* - Need another cycle */
+#define KEY_GC_REAPING_LINKS	0x02	/* - We need to reap links */
+#define KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1	0x10	/* - We need to mark dead keys */
+#define KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2	0x20	/* - We need to reap dead key links */
+#define KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_3	0x40	/* - We need to reap dead keys */
+#define KEY_GC_FOUND_DEAD_KEY	0x80	/* - We found at least one dead key */
+
+	struct rb_node *cursor;
+	struct key *key;
+	time64_t new_timer, limit, expiry;
+
+	kenter("[%lx,%x]", key_gc_flags, gc_state);
+
+	limit = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+
+	/* Work out what we're going to be doing in this pass */
+	gc_state &= KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1 | KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2;
+	gc_state <<= 1;
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_GC_KEY_EXPIRED, &key_gc_flags))
+		gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAPING_LINKS;
+
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags))
+		gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1;
+	kdebug("new pass %x", gc_state);
+
+	new_timer = TIME64_MAX;
+
+	/* As only this function is permitted to remove things from the key
+	 * serial tree, if cursor is non-NULL then it will always point to a
+	 * valid node in the tree - even if lock got dropped.
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
+	cursor = rb_first(&key_serial_tree);
+
+continue_scanning:
+	while (cursor) {
+		key = rb_entry(cursor, struct key, serial_node);
+		cursor = rb_next(cursor);
+
+		if (!test_bit_acquire(KEY_FLAG_USER_ALIVE, &key->flags)) {
+			/* Clobber key->user after final put seen. */
+			goto found_unreferenced_key;
+		}
+
+		if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1)) {
+			if (key->type == key_gc_dead_keytype) {
+				gc_state |= KEY_GC_FOUND_DEAD_KEY;
+				set_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags);
+				key->perm = 0;
+				goto skip_dead_key;
+			} else if (key->type == &key_type_keyring &&
+				   key->restrict_link) {
+				goto found_restricted_keyring;
+			}
+		}
+
+		expiry = key->expiry;
+		if (expiry != TIME64_MAX) {
+			if (!(key->type->flags & KEY_TYPE_INSTANT_REAP))
+				expiry += key_gc_delay;
+			if (expiry > limit && expiry < new_timer) {
+				kdebug("will expire %x in %lld",
+				       key_serial(key), key->expiry - limit);
+				new_timer = key->expiry;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2))
+			if (key->type == key_gc_dead_keytype)
+				gc_state |= KEY_GC_FOUND_DEAD_KEY;
+
+		if ((gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_LINKS) ||
+		    unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2)) {
+			if (key->type == &key_type_keyring)
+				goto found_keyring;
+		}
+
+		if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_3))
+			if (key->type == key_gc_dead_keytype)
+				goto destroy_dead_key;
+
+	skip_dead_key:
+		if (spin_is_contended(&key_serial_lock) || need_resched())
+			goto contended;
+	}
+
+contended:
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+
+maybe_resched:
+	if (cursor) {
+		cond_resched();
+		spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
+		goto continue_scanning;
+	}
+
+	/* We've completed the pass.  Set the timer if we need to and queue a
+	 * new cycle if necessary.  We keep executing cycles until we find one
+	 * where we didn't reap any keys.
+	 */
+	kdebug("pass complete");
+
+	if (new_timer != TIME64_MAX) {
+		new_timer += key_gc_delay;
+		key_schedule_gc(new_timer);
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2) ||
+	    !list_empty(&graveyard)) {
+		/* Make sure that all pending keyring payload destructions are
+		 * fulfilled and that people aren't now looking at dead or
+		 * dying keys that they don't have a reference upon or a link
+		 * to.
+		 */
+		kdebug("gc sync");
+		synchronize_rcu();
+	}
+
+	if (!list_empty(&graveyard)) {
+		kdebug("gc keys");
+		key_gc_unused_keys(&graveyard);
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(gc_state & (KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1 |
+				 KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2))) {
+		if (!(gc_state & KEY_GC_FOUND_DEAD_KEY)) {
+			/* No remaining dead keys: short circuit the remaining
+			 * keytype reap cycles.
+			 */
+			kdebug("dead short");
+			gc_state &= ~(KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1 | KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2);
+			gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_3;
+		} else {
+			gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_3)) {
+		kdebug("dead wake");
+		smp_mb();
+		clear_bit(KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags);
+		wake_up_bit(&key_gc_flags, KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE);
+	}
+
+	if (gc_state & KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN)
+		schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+	kleave(" [end %x]", gc_state);
+	return;
+
+	/* We found an unreferenced key - once we've removed it from the tree,
+	 * we can safely drop the lock.
+	 */
+found_unreferenced_key:
+	kdebug("unrefd key %d", key->serial);
+	rb_erase(&key->serial_node, &key_serial_tree);
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+
+	list_add_tail(&key->graveyard_link, &graveyard);
+	gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN;
+	goto maybe_resched;
+
+	/* We found a restricted keyring and need to update the restriction if
+	 * it is associated with the dead key type.
+	 */
+found_restricted_keyring:
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+	keyring_restriction_gc(key, key_gc_dead_keytype);
+	goto maybe_resched;
+
+	/* We found a keyring and we need to check the payload for links to
+	 * dead or expired keys.  We don't flag another reap immediately as we
+	 * have to wait for the old payload to be destroyed by RCU before we
+	 * can reap the keys to which it refers.
+	 */
+found_keyring:
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+	keyring_gc(key, limit);
+	goto maybe_resched;
+
+	/* We found a dead key that is still referenced.  Reset its type and
+	 * destroy its payload with its semaphore held.
+	 */
+destroy_dead_key:
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+	kdebug("destroy key %d", key->serial);
+	down_write(&key->sem);
+	key->type = &key_type_dead;
+	if (key_gc_dead_keytype->destroy)
+		key_gc_dead_keytype->destroy(key);
+	memset(&key->payload, KEY_DESTROY, sizeof(key->payload));
+	up_write(&key->sem);
+	goto maybe_resched;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b7b622bc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/* Authentication token and access key management internal defs
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003-5, 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#ifndef _INTERNAL_H
+#define _INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/wait_bit.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/task_work.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/watch_queue.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
+struct iovec;
+
+#ifdef __KDEBUG
+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "   "FMT"\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
+	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
+	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG FMT"\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#endif
+
+extern struct key_type key_type_dead;
+extern struct key_type key_type_user;
+extern struct key_type key_type_logon;
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+/*
+ * Keep track of keys for a user.
+ *
+ * This needs to be separate to user_struct to avoid a refcount-loop
+ * (user_struct pins some keyrings which pin this struct).
+ *
+ * We also keep track of keys under request from userspace for this UID here.
+ */
+struct key_user {
+	struct rb_node		node;
+	struct mutex		cons_lock;	/* construction initiation lock */
+	spinlock_t		lock;
+	refcount_t		usage;		/* for accessing qnkeys & qnbytes */
+	atomic_t		nkeys;		/* number of keys */
+	atomic_t		nikeys;		/* number of instantiated keys */
+	kuid_t			uid;
+	int			qnkeys;		/* number of keys allocated to this user */
+	int			qnbytes;	/* number of bytes allocated to this user */
+};
+
+extern struct rb_root	key_user_tree;
+extern spinlock_t	key_user_lock;
+extern struct key_user	root_key_user;
+
+extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid);
+extern void key_user_put(struct key_user *user);
+
+/*
+ * Key quota limits.
+ * - root has its own separate limits to everyone else
+ */
+extern unsigned key_quota_root_maxkeys;
+extern unsigned key_quota_root_maxbytes;
+extern unsigned key_quota_maxkeys;
+extern unsigned key_quota_maxbytes;
+
+#define KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES	4		/* a link in a keyring is worth 4 bytes */
+
+
+extern struct kmem_cache *key_jar;
+extern struct rb_root key_serial_tree;
+extern spinlock_t key_serial_lock;
+extern struct mutex key_construction_mutex;
+extern wait_queue_head_t request_key_conswq;
+
+extern void key_set_index_key(struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
+extern struct key_type *key_type_lookup(const char *type);
+extern void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype);
+
+extern int __key_link_lock(struct key *keyring,
+			   const struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
+extern int __key_move_lock(struct key *l_keyring, struct key *u_keyring,
+			   const struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
+extern int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
+			    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
+			    struct assoc_array_edit **_edit);
+extern int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key);
+extern void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+		       struct assoc_array_edit **_edit);
+extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
+			   const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
+			   struct assoc_array_edit *edit);
+
+extern key_ref_t find_key_to_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
+				    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
+
+struct keyring_search_context {
+	struct keyring_index_key index_key;
+	const struct cred	*cred;
+	struct key_match_data	match_data;
+	unsigned		flags;
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK	0x0001	/* Skip state checks */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK	0x0002	/* Override NO_STATE_CHECK */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME	0x0004	/* Don't update times */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM	0x0008	/* Don't check permissions */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP	0x0010	/* Give an error on excessive depth */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED	0x0020	/* Ignore expired keys (intention to replace) */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE		0x0040	/* Search child keyrings also */
+
+	int (*iterator)(const void *object, void *iterator_data);
+
+	/* Internal stuff */
+	int			skipped_ret;
+	bool			possessed;
+	key_ref_t		result;
+	time64_t		now;
+};
+
+extern bool key_default_cmp(const struct key *key,
+			    const struct key_match_data *match_data);
+extern key_ref_t keyring_search_rcu(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
+				    struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
+
+extern key_ref_t search_cred_keyrings_rcu(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
+extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings_rcu(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
+
+extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring);
+
+extern int look_up_user_keyrings(struct key **, struct key **);
+extern struct key *get_user_session_keyring_rcu(const struct cred *);
+extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *);
+extern int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *);
+extern int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *, struct key *);
+
+extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
+					const char *description,
+					struct key_tag *domain_tag,
+					const void *callout_info,
+					size_t callout_len,
+					void *aux,
+					struct key *dest_keyring,
+					unsigned long flags);
+
+extern bool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key,
+				      const struct key_match_data *match_data);
+
+extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
+extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork);
+
+extern struct work_struct key_gc_work;
+extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
+extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time64_t limit);
+extern void keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring,
+				   struct key_type *dead_type);
+void key_set_expiry(struct key *key, time64_t expiry);
+extern void key_schedule_gc(time64_t gc_at);
+extern void key_schedule_gc_links(void);
+extern void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype);
+
+extern int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
+			       const struct cred *cred,
+			       enum key_need_perm need_perm);
+
+static inline void notify_key(struct key *key,
+			      enum key_notification_subtype subtype, u32 aux)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+	struct key_notification n = {
+		.watch.type	= WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY,
+		.watch.subtype	= subtype,
+		.watch.info	= watch_sizeof(n),
+		.key_id		= key_serial(key),
+		.aux		= aux,
+	};
+
+	post_watch_notification(key->watchers, &n.watch, current_cred(),
+				n.key_id);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way.
+ */
+static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
+				 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
+{
+	return key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(), need_perm);
+}
+
+extern struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth;
+extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target,
+					const char *op,
+					const void *callout_info,
+					size_t callout_len,
+					struct key *dest_keyring);
+struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey);
+void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka);
+
+extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id);
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether a key is dead.
+ */
+static inline bool key_is_dead(const struct key *key, time64_t limit)
+{
+	time64_t expiry = key->expiry;
+
+	if (expiry != TIME64_MAX) {
+		if (!(key->type->flags & KEY_TYPE_INSTANT_REAP))
+			expiry += key_gc_delay;
+		if (expiry <= limit)
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return
+		key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD) |
+			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED)) ||
+		key->domain_tag->removed;
+}
+
+/*
+ * keyctl() functions
+ */
+extern long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t, int);
+extern long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *);
+extern long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t, const void __user *, size_t);
+extern long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t, key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_keyring_move(key_serial_t, key_serial_t, key_serial_t, unsigned int);
+extern long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t, key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t, char __user *, size_t);
+extern long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t, const char __user *,
+				  const char __user *, key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t, char __user *, size_t);
+extern long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t, uid_t, gid_t);
+extern long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t, key_perm_t);
+extern long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t, const void __user *,
+				   size_t, key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t, unsigned, key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int);
+extern long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t, unsigned);
+extern long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer,
+				size_t buflen);
+extern long keyctl_session_to_parent(void);
+extern long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t, unsigned, unsigned, key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t,
+				       const struct iovec __user *,
+				       unsigned, key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id,
+				    const char __user *_type,
+				    const char __user *_restriction);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
+extern long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t, key_serial_t);
+extern unsigned persistent_keyring_expiry;
+#else
+static inline long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t destring)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
+extern long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *,
+			      size_t, struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *);
+extern long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *,
+				size_t, struct keyctl_kdf_params *);
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+extern long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+				char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+				struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf);
+#endif
+#define KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN	1024	/* max length of KDF output */
+#define KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OI_LEN		64	/* max length of otherinfo */
+#else
+static inline long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+				     char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+				     struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+static inline long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(
+				struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+				char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+				struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+extern long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t,
+			      const char __user *,
+			      struct keyctl_pkey_query __user *);
+
+extern long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *,
+			       const char __user *,
+			       const void __user *, const void __user *);
+
+extern long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int,
+			      const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *,
+			      const char __user *,
+			      const void __user *, void __user *);
+#else
+static inline long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t id,
+				     const char __user *_info,
+				     struct keyctl_pkey_query __user *_res)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *params,
+				      const char __user *_info,
+				      const void __user *_in,
+				      const void __user *_in2)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
+				     const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *params,
+				     const char __user *_info,
+				     const void __user *_in,
+				     void __user *_out)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
+extern long keyctl_capabilities(unsigned char __user *_buffer, size_t buflen);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+extern long keyctl_watch_key(key_serial_t, int, int);
+#else
+static inline long keyctl_watch_key(key_serial_t key_id, int watch_fd, int watch_id)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Debugging key validation
+ */
+#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
+extern void __key_check(const struct key *);
+
+static inline void key_check(const struct key *key)
+{
+	if (key && (IS_ERR(key) || key->magic != KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC))
+		__key_check(key);
+}
+
+#else
+
+#define key_check(key) do {} while(0)
+
+#endif
+#endif /* _INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b34a64d81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1293 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Basic authentication token and access key management
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/poison.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+struct kmem_cache *key_jar;
+struct rb_root		key_serial_tree; /* tree of keys indexed by serial */
+DEFINE_SPINLOCK(key_serial_lock);
+
+struct rb_root	key_user_tree; /* tree of quota records indexed by UID */
+DEFINE_SPINLOCK(key_user_lock);
+
+unsigned int key_quota_root_maxkeys = 1000000;	/* root's key count quota */
+unsigned int key_quota_root_maxbytes = 25000000; /* root's key space quota */
+unsigned int key_quota_maxkeys = 200;		/* general key count quota */
+unsigned int key_quota_maxbytes = 20000;	/* general key space quota */
+
+static LIST_HEAD(key_types_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(key_types_sem);
+
+/* We serialise key instantiation and link */
+DEFINE_MUTEX(key_construction_mutex);
+
+#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
+void __key_check(const struct key *key)
+{
+	printk("__key_check: key %p {%08x} should be {%08x}\n",
+	       key, key->magic, KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC);
+	BUG();
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Get the key quota record for a user, allocating a new record if one doesn't
+ * already exist.
+ */
+struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid)
+{
+	struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user;
+	struct rb_node *parent, **p;
+
+try_again:
+	parent = NULL;
+	p = &key_user_tree.rb_node;
+	spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
+
+	/* search the tree for a user record with a matching UID */
+	while (*p) {
+		parent = *p;
+		user = rb_entry(parent, struct key_user, node);
+
+		if (uid_lt(uid, user->uid))
+			p = &(*p)->rb_left;
+		else if (uid_gt(uid, user->uid))
+			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
+		else
+			goto found;
+	}
+
+	/* if we get here, we failed to find a match in the tree */
+	if (!candidate) {
+		/* allocate a candidate user record if we don't already have
+		 * one */
+		spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
+
+		user = NULL;
+		candidate = kmalloc_obj(struct key_user);
+		if (unlikely(!candidate))
+			goto out;
+
+		/* the allocation may have scheduled, so we need to repeat the
+		 * search lest someone else added the record whilst we were
+		 * asleep */
+		goto try_again;
+	}
+
+	/* if we get here, then the user record still hadn't appeared on the
+	 * second pass - so we use the candidate record */
+	refcount_set(&candidate->usage, 1);
+	atomic_set(&candidate->nkeys, 0);
+	atomic_set(&candidate->nikeys, 0);
+	candidate->uid = uid;
+	candidate->qnkeys = 0;
+	candidate->qnbytes = 0;
+	spin_lock_init(&candidate->lock);
+	mutex_init(&candidate->cons_lock);
+
+	rb_link_node(&candidate->node, parent, p);
+	rb_insert_color(&candidate->node, &key_user_tree);
+	spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
+	user = candidate;
+	goto out;
+
+	/* okay - we found a user record for this UID */
+found:
+	refcount_inc(&user->usage);
+	spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
+	kfree(candidate);
+out:
+	return user;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Dispose of a user structure
+ */
+void key_user_put(struct key_user *user)
+{
+	if (refcount_dec_and_lock(&user->usage, &key_user_lock)) {
+		rb_erase(&user->node, &key_user_tree);
+		spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
+
+		kfree(user);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a serial number for a key.  These are assigned randomly to avoid
+ * security issues through covert channel problems.
+ */
+static inline void key_alloc_serial(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct rb_node *parent, **p;
+	struct key *xkey;
+
+	/* propose a random serial number and look for a hole for it in the
+	 * serial number tree */
+	do {
+		get_random_bytes(&key->serial, sizeof(key->serial));
+
+		key->serial >>= 1; /* negative numbers are not permitted */
+	} while (key->serial < 3);
+
+	spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
+
+attempt_insertion:
+	parent = NULL;
+	p = &key_serial_tree.rb_node;
+
+	while (*p) {
+		parent = *p;
+		xkey = rb_entry(parent, struct key, serial_node);
+
+		if (key->serial < xkey->serial)
+			p = &(*p)->rb_left;
+		else if (key->serial > xkey->serial)
+			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
+		else
+			goto serial_exists;
+	}
+
+	/* we've found a suitable hole - arrange for this key to occupy it */
+	rb_link_node(&key->serial_node, parent, p);
+	rb_insert_color(&key->serial_node, &key_serial_tree);
+
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+	return;
+
+	/* we found a key with the proposed serial number - walk the tree from
+	 * that point looking for the next unused serial number */
+serial_exists:
+	for (;;) {
+		key->serial++;
+		if (key->serial < 3) {
+			key->serial = 3;
+			goto attempt_insertion;
+		}
+
+		parent = rb_next(parent);
+		if (!parent)
+			goto attempt_insertion;
+
+		xkey = rb_entry(parent, struct key, serial_node);
+		if (key->serial < xkey->serial)
+			goto attempt_insertion;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * key_alloc - Allocate a key of the specified type.
+ * @type: The type of key to allocate.
+ * @desc: The key description to allow the key to be searched out.
+ * @uid: The owner of the new key.
+ * @gid: The group ID for the new key's group permissions.
+ * @cred: The credentials specifying UID namespace.
+ * @perm: The permissions mask of the new key.
+ * @flags: Flags specifying quota properties.
+ * @restrict_link: Optional link restriction for new keyrings.
+ *
+ * Allocate a key of the specified type with the attributes given.  The key is
+ * returned in an uninstantiated state and the caller needs to instantiate the
+ * key before returning.
+ *
+ * The restrict_link structure (if not NULL) will be freed when the
+ * keyring is destroyed, so it must be dynamically allocated.
+ *
+ * The user's key count quota is updated to reflect the creation of the key and
+ * the user's key data quota has the default for the key type reserved.  The
+ * instantiation function should amend this as necessary.  If insufficient
+ * quota is available, -EDQUOT will be returned.
+ *
+ * The LSM security modules can prevent a key being created, in which case
+ * -EACCES will be returned.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the new key if successful and an error code otherwise.
+ *
+ * Note that the caller needs to ensure the key type isn't uninstantiated.
+ * Internally this can be done by locking key_types_sem.  Externally, this can
+ * be done by either never unregistering the key type, or making sure
+ * key_alloc() calls don't race with module unloading.
+ */
+struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
+		      kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
+		      key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags,
+		      struct key_restriction *restrict_link)
+{
+	struct key_user *user = NULL;
+	struct key *key;
+	size_t desclen, quotalen;
+	int ret;
+	unsigned long irqflags;
+
+	key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	if (!desc || !*desc)
+		goto error;
+
+	if (type->vet_description) {
+		ret = type->vet_description(desc);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	desclen = strlen(desc);
+	quotalen = desclen + 1 + type->def_datalen;
+
+	/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
+	user = key_user_lookup(uid);
+	if (!user)
+		goto no_memory_1;
+
+	/* check that the user's quota permits allocation of another key and
+	 * its description */
+	if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
+		unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
+			key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
+		unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
+			key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
+
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&user->lock, irqflags);
+		if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN)) {
+			if (user->qnkeys + 1 > maxkeys ||
+			    user->qnbytes + quotalen > maxbytes ||
+			    user->qnbytes + quotalen < user->qnbytes)
+				goto no_quota;
+		}
+
+		user->qnkeys++;
+		user->qnbytes += quotalen;
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&user->lock, irqflags);
+	}
+
+	/* allocate and initialise the key and its description */
+	key = kmem_cache_zalloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key)
+		goto no_memory_2;
+
+	key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
+	key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key->index_key.description)
+		goto no_memory_3;
+	key->index_key.type = type;
+	key_set_index_key(&key->index_key);
+
+	refcount_set(&key->usage, 1);
+	init_rwsem(&key->sem);
+	lockdep_set_class(&key->sem, &type->lock_class);
+	key->user = user;
+	key->quotalen = quotalen;
+	key->datalen = type->def_datalen;
+	key->uid = uid;
+	key->gid = gid;
+	key->perm = perm;
+	key->expiry = TIME64_MAX;
+	key->restrict_link = restrict_link;
+	key->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+
+	key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_USER_ALIVE;
+	if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
+		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
+	if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN)
+		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
+	if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING)
+		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING;
+	if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP)
+		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_KEEP;
+
+#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
+	key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
+#endif
+
+	/* let the security module know about the key */
+	ret = security_key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto security_error;
+
+	/* publish the key by giving it a serial number */
+	refcount_inc(&key->domain_tag->usage);
+	atomic_inc(&user->nkeys);
+	key_alloc_serial(key);
+
+error:
+	return key;
+
+security_error:
+	kfree(key->description);
+	kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
+	if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&user->lock, irqflags);
+		user->qnkeys--;
+		user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&user->lock, irqflags);
+	}
+	key_user_put(user);
+	key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+	goto error;
+
+no_memory_3:
+	kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
+no_memory_2:
+	if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&user->lock, irqflags);
+		user->qnkeys--;
+		user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&user->lock, irqflags);
+	}
+	key_user_put(user);
+no_memory_1:
+	key = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	goto error;
+
+no_quota:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&user->lock, irqflags);
+	key_user_put(user);
+	key = ERR_PTR(-EDQUOT);
+	goto error;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_alloc);
+
+/**
+ * key_payload_reserve - Adjust data quota reservation for the key's payload
+ * @key: The key to make the reservation for.
+ * @datalen: The amount of data payload the caller now wants.
+ *
+ * Adjust the amount of the owning user's key data quota that a key reserves.
+ * If the amount is increased, then -EDQUOT may be returned if there isn't
+ * enough free quota available.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned.
+ */
+int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen)
+{
+	int delta = (int)datalen - key->datalen;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	key_check(key);
+
+	/* contemplate the quota adjustment */
+	if (delta != 0 && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
+		unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(key->user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
+			key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
+		unsigned long flags;
+
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&key->user->lock, flags);
+
+		if (delta > 0 &&
+		    (key->user->qnbytes + delta > maxbytes ||
+		     key->user->qnbytes + delta < key->user->qnbytes)) {
+			ret = -EDQUOT;
+		}
+		else {
+			key->user->qnbytes += delta;
+			key->quotalen += delta;
+		}
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->user->lock, flags);
+	}
+
+	/* change the recorded data length if that didn't generate an error */
+	if (ret == 0)
+		key->datalen = datalen;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve);
+
+/*
+ * Change the key state to being instantiated.
+ */
+static void mark_key_instantiated(struct key *key, int reject_error)
+{
+	/* Commit the payload before setting the state; barrier versus
+	 * key_read_state().
+	 */
+	smp_store_release(&key->state,
+			  (reject_error < 0) ? reject_error : KEY_IS_POSITIVE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically.  Must be
+ * called with the target keyring's semaphore writelocked.  The target key's
+ * semaphore need not be locked as instantiation is serialised by
+ * key_construction_mutex.
+ */
+static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
+				      struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
+				      struct key *keyring,
+				      struct key *authkey,
+				      struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
+{
+	int ret, awaken;
+
+	key_check(key);
+	key_check(keyring);
+
+	awaken = 0;
+	ret = -EBUSY;
+
+	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
+
+	/* can't instantiate twice */
+	if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
+		/* instantiate the key */
+		ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep);
+
+		if (ret == 0) {
+			/* mark the key as being instantiated */
+			atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
+			mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
+			notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_INSTANTIATED, 0);
+
+			if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
+				awaken = 1;
+
+			/* and link it into the destination keyring */
+			if (keyring) {
+				if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags))
+					set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags);
+
+				__key_link(keyring, key, _edit);
+			}
+
+			/* disable the authorisation key */
+			if (authkey)
+				key_invalidate(authkey);
+
+			if (prep->expiry != TIME64_MAX)
+				key_set_expiry(key, prep->expiry);
+		}
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
+
+	/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
+	if (awaken)
+		wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * key_instantiate_and_link - Instantiate a key and link it into the keyring.
+ * @key: The key to instantiate.
+ * @data: The data to use to instantiate the keyring.
+ * @datalen: The length of @data.
+ * @keyring: Keyring to create a link in on success (or NULL).
+ * @authkey: The authorisation token permitting instantiation.
+ *
+ * Instantiate a key that's in the uninstantiated state using the provided data
+ * and, if successful, link it in to the destination keyring if one is
+ * supplied.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned, the authorisation token is revoked and anyone
+ * waiting for the key is woken up.  If the key was already instantiated,
+ * -EBUSY will be returned.
+ */
+int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
+			     const void *data,
+			     size_t datalen,
+			     struct key *keyring,
+			     struct key *authkey)
+{
+	struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
+	prep.orig_description = key->description;
+	prep.data = data;
+	prep.datalen = datalen;
+	prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
+	prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX;
+	if (key->type->preparse) {
+		ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (keyring) {
+		ret = __key_link_lock(keyring, &key->index_key);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+
+		ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error_link_end;
+
+		if (keyring->restrict_link && keyring->restrict_link->check) {
+			struct key_restriction *keyres = keyring->restrict_link;
+
+			ret = keyres->check(keyring, key->type, &prep.payload,
+					    keyres->key);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				goto error_link_end;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, &edit);
+
+error_link_end:
+	if (keyring)
+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
+
+error:
+	if (key->type->preparse)
+		key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_instantiate_and_link);
+
+/**
+ * key_reject_and_link - Negatively instantiate a key and link it into the keyring.
+ * @key: The key to instantiate.
+ * @timeout: The timeout on the negative key.
+ * @error: The error to return when the key is hit.
+ * @keyring: Keyring to create a link in on success (or NULL).
+ * @authkey: The authorisation token permitting instantiation.
+ *
+ * Negatively instantiate a key that's in the uninstantiated state and, if
+ * successful, set its timeout and stored error and link it in to the
+ * destination keyring if one is supplied.  The key and any links to the key
+ * will be automatically garbage collected after the timeout expires.
+ *
+ * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
+ * them to return the stored error code (typically ENOKEY) until the negative
+ * key expires.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned, the authorisation token is revoked and anyone
+ * waiting for the key is woken up.  If the key was already instantiated,
+ * -EBUSY will be returned.
+ */
+int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
+			unsigned timeout,
+			unsigned error,
+			struct key *keyring,
+			struct key *authkey)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit = NULL;
+	int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0;
+
+	key_check(key);
+	key_check(keyring);
+
+	awaken = 0;
+	ret = -EBUSY;
+
+	if (keyring) {
+		if (keyring->restrict_link)
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		link_ret = __key_link_lock(keyring, &key->index_key);
+		if (link_ret == 0) {
+			link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
+			if (link_ret < 0)
+				__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
+		}
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
+
+	/* can't instantiate twice */
+	if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
+		/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
+		atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
+		mark_key_instantiated(key, -error);
+		notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_INSTANTIATED, -error);
+		key_set_expiry(key, ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout);
+
+		if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
+			awaken = 1;
+
+		ret = 0;
+
+		/* and link it into the destination keyring */
+		if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
+			__key_link(keyring, key, &edit);
+
+		/* disable the authorisation key */
+		if (authkey)
+			key_invalidate(authkey);
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
+
+	if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
+
+	/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
+	if (awaken)
+		wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
+
+	return ret == 0 ? link_ret : ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_reject_and_link);
+
+/**
+ * key_put - Discard a reference to a key.
+ * @key: The key to discard a reference from.
+ *
+ * Discard a reference to a key, and when all the references are gone, we
+ * schedule the cleanup task to come and pull it out of the tree in process
+ * context at some later time.
+ */
+void key_put(struct key *key)
+{
+	if (key) {
+		key_check(key);
+
+		if (refcount_dec_and_test(&key->usage)) {
+			unsigned long flags;
+
+			/* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
+			if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
+				spin_lock_irqsave(&key->user->lock, flags);
+				key->user->qnkeys--;
+				key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
+				spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->user->lock, flags);
+			}
+			/* Mark key as safe for GC after key->user done. */
+			clear_bit_unlock(KEY_FLAG_USER_ALIVE, &key->flags);
+			schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+		}
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_put);
+
+/*
+ * Find a key by its serial number.
+ */
+struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id)
+{
+	struct rb_node *n;
+	struct key *key;
+
+	spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
+
+	/* search the tree for the specified key */
+	n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
+	while (n) {
+		key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+
+		if (id < key->serial)
+			n = n->rb_left;
+		else if (id > key->serial)
+			n = n->rb_right;
+		else
+			goto found;
+	}
+
+not_found:
+	key = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+	goto error;
+
+found:
+	/* A key is allowed to be looked up only if someone still owns a
+	 * reference to it - otherwise it's awaiting the gc.
+	 */
+	if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&key->usage))
+		goto not_found;
+
+error:
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+	return key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_lookup);
+
+/*
+ * Find and lock the specified key type against removal.
+ *
+ * We return with the sem read-locked if successful.  If the type wasn't
+ * available -ENOKEY is returned instead.
+ */
+struct key_type *key_type_lookup(const char *type)
+{
+	struct key_type *ktype;
+
+	down_read(&key_types_sem);
+
+	/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
+	 * types */
+	list_for_each_entry(ktype, &key_types_list, link) {
+		if (strcmp(ktype->name, type) == 0)
+			goto found_kernel_type;
+	}
+
+	up_read(&key_types_sem);
+	ktype = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+
+found_kernel_type:
+	return ktype;
+}
+
+void key_set_timeout(struct key *key, unsigned timeout)
+{
+	time64_t expiry = TIME64_MAX;
+
+	/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent races */
+	down_write(&key->sem);
+
+	if (timeout > 0)
+		expiry = ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout;
+	key_set_expiry(key, expiry);
+
+	up_write(&key->sem);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_set_timeout);
+
+/*
+ * Unlock a key type locked by key_type_lookup().
+ */
+void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype)
+{
+	up_read(&key_types_sem);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to update an existing key.
+ *
+ * The key is given to us with an incremented refcount that we need to discard
+ * if we get an error.
+ */
+static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
+				     struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	int ret;
+
+	/* need write permission on the key to update it */
+	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = -EEXIST;
+	if (!key->type->update)
+		goto error;
+
+	down_write(&key->sem);
+
+	ret = key->type->update(key, prep);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		/* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */
+		mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
+		notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_UPDATED, 0);
+	}
+
+	up_write(&key->sem);
+
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+out:
+	return key_ref;
+
+error:
+	key_put(key);
+	key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create or potentially update a key. The combined logic behind
+ * key_create_or_update() and key_create()
+ */
+static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
+					const char *type,
+					const char *description,
+					const void *payload,
+					size_t plen,
+					key_perm_t perm,
+					unsigned long flags,
+					bool allow_update)
+{
+	struct keyring_index_key index_key = {
+		.description	= description,
+	};
+	struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit = NULL;
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	int ret;
+	struct key_restriction *restrict_link = NULL;
+
+	/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
+	 * types */
+	index_key.type = key_type_lookup(type);
+	if (IS_ERR(index_key.type)) {
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	if (!index_key.type->instantiate ||
+	    (!index_key.description && !index_key.type->preparse))
+		goto error_put_type;
+
+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
+
+	key_check(keyring);
+
+	if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION))
+		restrict_link = keyring->restrict_link;
+
+	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
+	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		goto error_put_type;
+
+	memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
+	prep.orig_description = description;
+	prep.data = payload;
+	prep.datalen = plen;
+	prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
+	prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX;
+	if (index_key.type->preparse) {
+		ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+			goto error_free_prep;
+		}
+		if (!index_key.description)
+			index_key.description = prep.description;
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		if (!index_key.description)
+			goto error_free_prep;
+	}
+	index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
+	key_set_index_key(&index_key);
+
+	ret = __key_link_lock(keyring, &index_key);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+		goto error_free_prep;
+	}
+
+	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+		goto error_link_end;
+	}
+
+	if (restrict_link && restrict_link->check) {
+		ret = restrict_link->check(keyring, index_key.type,
+					   &prep.payload, restrict_link->key);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+			goto error_link_end;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
+	 * to modify the keyring */
+	ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+		goto error_link_end;
+	}
+
+	/* if it's requested and possible to update this type of key, search
+	 * for an existing key of the same type and description in the
+	 * destination keyring and update that instead if possible
+	 */
+	if (allow_update) {
+		if (index_key.type->update) {
+			key_ref = find_key_to_update(keyring_ref, &index_key);
+			if (key_ref)
+				goto found_matching_key;
+		}
+	} else {
+		key_ref = find_key_to_update(keyring_ref, &index_key);
+		if (key_ref) {
+			key_ref_put(key_ref);
+			key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
+			goto error_link_end;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* if the client doesn't provide, decide on the permissions we want */
+	if (perm == KEY_PERM_UNDEF) {
+		perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
+		perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
+
+		if (index_key.type->read)
+			perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
+
+		if (index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
+		    index_key.type->update)
+			perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
+	}
+
+	/* allocate a new key */
+	key = key_alloc(index_key.type, index_key.description,
+			cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
+		goto error_link_end;
+	}
+
+	/* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
+	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &edit);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		key_put(key);
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+		goto error_link_end;
+	}
+
+	security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags,
+					   true);
+
+	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
+
+error_link_end:
+	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
+error_free_prep:
+	if (index_key.type->preparse)
+		index_key.type->free_preparse(&prep);
+error_put_type:
+	key_type_put(index_key.type);
+error:
+	return key_ref;
+
+ found_matching_key:
+	/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it
+	 * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
+	 */
+	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) {
+		ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			key_ref_put(key_ref);
+			key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+			goto error_free_prep;
+		}
+	}
+
+	key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
+
+	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+		security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
+						   flags, false);
+
+	goto error_free_prep;
+}
+
+/**
+ * key_create_or_update - Update or create and instantiate a key.
+ * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the destination keyring with possession flag.
+ * @type: The type of key.
+ * @description: The searchable description for the key.
+ * @payload: The data to use to instantiate or update the key.
+ * @plen: The length of @payload.
+ * @perm: The permissions mask for a new key.
+ * @flags: The quota flags for a new key.
+ *
+ * Search the destination keyring for a key of the same description and if one
+ * is found, update it, otherwise create and instantiate a new one and create a
+ * link to it from that keyring.
+ *
+ * If perm is KEY_PERM_UNDEF then an appropriate key permissions mask will be
+ * concocted.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the new key if successful, -ENODEV if the key type
+ * wasn't available, -ENOTDIR if the keyring wasn't a keyring, -EACCES if the
+ * caller isn't permitted to modify the keyring or the LSM did not permit
+ * creation of the key.
+ *
+ * On success, the possession flag from the keyring ref will be tacked on to
+ * the key ref before it is returned.
+ */
+key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
+			       const char *type,
+			       const char *description,
+			       const void *payload,
+			       size_t plen,
+			       key_perm_t perm,
+			       unsigned long flags)
+{
+	return __key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description, payload,
+				      plen, perm, flags, true);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update);
+
+/**
+ * key_create - Create and instantiate a key.
+ * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the destination keyring with possession flag.
+ * @type: The type of key.
+ * @description: The searchable description for the key.
+ * @payload: The data to use to instantiate or update the key.
+ * @plen: The length of @payload.
+ * @perm: The permissions mask for a new key.
+ * @flags: The quota flags for a new key.
+ *
+ * Create and instantiate a new key and link to it from the destination keyring.
+ *
+ * If perm is KEY_PERM_UNDEF then an appropriate key permissions mask will be
+ * concocted.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the new key if successful, -EEXIST if a key with the
+ * same description already exists, -ENODEV if the key type wasn't available,
+ * -ENOTDIR if the keyring wasn't a keyring, -EACCES if the caller isn't
+ * permitted to modify the keyring or the LSM did not permit creation of the
+ * key.
+ *
+ * On success, the possession flag from the keyring ref will be tacked on to
+ * the key ref before it is returned.
+ */
+key_ref_t key_create(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
+		     const char *type,
+		     const char *description,
+		     const void *payload,
+		     size_t plen,
+		     key_perm_t perm,
+		     unsigned long flags)
+{
+	return __key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description, payload,
+				      plen, perm, flags, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create);
+
+/**
+ * key_update - Update a key's contents.
+ * @key_ref: The pointer (plus possession flag) to the key.
+ * @payload: The data to be used to update the key.
+ * @plen: The length of @payload.
+ *
+ * Attempt to update the contents of a key with the given payload data.  The
+ * caller must be granted Write permission on the key.  Negative keys can be
+ * instantiated by this method.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if not permitted and -EOPNOTSUPP if the key
+ * type does not support updating.  The key type may return other errors.
+ */
+int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
+{
+	struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
+	struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	int ret;
+
+	key_check(key);
+
+	/* the key must be writable */
+	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* attempt to update it if supported */
+	if (!key->type->update)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
+	prep.data = payload;
+	prep.datalen = plen;
+	prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
+	prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX;
+	if (key->type->preparse) {
+		ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+	}
+
+	down_write(&key->sem);
+
+	ret = key->type->update(key, &prep);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		/* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */
+		mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
+		notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_UPDATED, 0);
+	}
+
+	up_write(&key->sem);
+
+error:
+	if (key->type->preparse)
+		key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
+
+/**
+ * key_revoke - Revoke a key.
+ * @key: The key to be revoked.
+ *
+ * Mark a key as being revoked and ask the type to free up its resources.  The
+ * revocation timeout is set and the key and all its links will be
+ * automatically garbage collected after key_gc_delay amount of time if they
+ * are not manually dealt with first.
+ */
+void key_revoke(struct key *key)
+{
+	time64_t time;
+
+	key_check(key);
+
+	/* make sure no one's trying to change or use the key when we mark it
+	 * - we tell lockdep that we might nest because we might be revoking an
+	 *   authorisation key whilst holding the sem on a key we've just
+	 *   instantiated
+	 */
+	down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1);
+	if (!test_and_set_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags)) {
+		notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_REVOKED, 0);
+		if (key->type->revoke)
+			key->type->revoke(key);
+
+		/* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */
+		time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+		if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) {
+			key->revoked_at = time;
+			key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at + key_gc_delay);
+		}
+	}
+
+	up_write(&key->sem);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_revoke);
+
+/**
+ * key_invalidate - Invalidate a key.
+ * @key: The key to be invalidated.
+ *
+ * Mark a key as being invalidated and have it cleaned up immediately.  The key
+ * is ignored by all searches and other operations from this point.
+ */
+void key_invalidate(struct key *key)
+{
+	kenter("%d", key_serial(key));
+
+	key_check(key);
+
+	if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags)) {
+		down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1);
+		if (!test_and_set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags)) {
+			notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_INVALIDATED, 0);
+			key_schedule_gc_links();
+		}
+		up_write(&key->sem);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_invalidate);
+
+/**
+ * generic_key_instantiate - Simple instantiation of a key from preparsed data
+ * @key: The key to be instantiated
+ * @prep: The preparsed data to load.
+ *
+ * Instantiate a key from preparsed data.  We assume we can just copy the data
+ * in directly and clear the old pointers.
+ *
+ * This can be pointed to directly by the key type instantiate op pointer.
+ */
+int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]);
+		key->payload.data[1] = prep->payload.data[1];
+		key->payload.data[2] = prep->payload.data[2];
+		key->payload.data[3] = prep->payload.data[3];
+		prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
+		prep->payload.data[1] = NULL;
+		prep->payload.data[2] = NULL;
+		prep->payload.data[3] = NULL;
+	}
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_key_instantiate);
+
+/**
+ * register_key_type - Register a type of key.
+ * @ktype: The new key type.
+ *
+ * Register a new key type.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -EEXIST if a type of this name already exists.
+ */
+int register_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
+{
+	struct key_type *p;
+	int ret;
+
+	memset(&ktype->lock_class, 0, sizeof(ktype->lock_class));
+
+	ret = -EEXIST;
+	down_write(&key_types_sem);
+
+	/* disallow key types with the same name */
+	list_for_each_entry(p, &key_types_list, link) {
+		if (strcmp(p->name, ktype->name) == 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* store the type */
+	list_add(&ktype->link, &key_types_list);
+
+	pr_notice("Key type %s registered\n", ktype->name);
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	up_write(&key_types_sem);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_key_type);
+
+/**
+ * unregister_key_type - Unregister a type of key.
+ * @ktype: The key type.
+ *
+ * Unregister a key type and mark all the extant keys of this type as dead.
+ * Those keys of this type are then destroyed to get rid of their payloads and
+ * they and their links will be garbage collected as soon as possible.
+ */
+void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
+{
+	down_write(&key_types_sem);
+	list_del_init(&ktype->link);
+	downgrade_write(&key_types_sem);
+	key_gc_keytype(ktype);
+	pr_notice("Key type %s unregistered\n", ktype->name);
+	up_read(&key_types_sem);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_key_type);
+
+/*
+ * Initialise the key management state.
+ */
+void __init key_init(void)
+{
+	/* allocate a slab in which we can store keys */
+	key_jar = kmem_cache_create("key_jar", sizeof(struct key),
+			0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_NO_MERGE, NULL);
+
+	/* add the special key types */
+	list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list);
+	list_add_tail(&key_type_dead.link, &key_types_list);
+	list_add_tail(&key_type_user.link, &key_types_list);
+	list_add_tail(&key_type_logon.link, &key_types_list);
+
+	/* record the root user tracking */
+	rb_link_node(&root_key_user.node,
+		     NULL,
+		     &key_user_tree.rb_node);
+
+	rb_insert_color(&root_key_user.node,
+			&key_user_tree);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d14ace88e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2038 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Userspace key control operations
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE 4096
+
+static const unsigned char keyrings_capabilities[2] = {
+	[0] = (KEYCTL_CAPS0_CAPABILITIES |
+	       (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS)	? KEYCTL_CAPS0_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS : 0) |
+	       (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS)	? KEYCTL_CAPS0_DIFFIE_HELLMAN : 0) |
+	       (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE)	? KEYCTL_CAPS0_PUBLIC_KEY : 0) |
+	       (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS)		? KEYCTL_CAPS0_BIG_KEY : 0) |
+	       KEYCTL_CAPS0_INVALIDATE |
+	       KEYCTL_CAPS0_RESTRICT_KEYRING |
+	       KEYCTL_CAPS0_MOVE
+	       ),
+	[1] = (KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME |
+	       KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG |
+	       (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS)	? KEYCTL_CAPS1_NOTIFICATIONS : 0)
+	       ),
+};
+
+static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
+				  const char __user *_type,
+				  unsigned len)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = strncpy_from_user(type, _type, len);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	if (ret == 0 || ret >= len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (type[0] == '.')
+		return -EPERM;
+	type[len - 1] = '\0';
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a
+ * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring.
+ *
+ * If the description is NULL or an empty string, the key type is asked to
+ * generate one from the payload.
+ *
+ * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it.
+ *
+ * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error
+ * code is returned.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
+		const char __user *, _description,
+		const void __user *, _payload,
+		size_t, plen,
+		key_serial_t, ringid)
+{
+	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
+	char type[32], *description;
+	void *payload;
+	long ret;
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
+		goto error;
+
+	/* draw all the data into kernel space */
+	ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	description = NULL;
+	if (_description) {
+		description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
+		if (IS_ERR(description)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(description);
+			goto error;
+		}
+		if (!*description) {
+			kfree(description);
+			description = NULL;
+		} else if ((description[0] == '.') &&
+			   (strncmp(type, "keyring", 7) == 0)) {
+			ret = -EPERM;
+			goto error2;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
+	payload = NULL;
+
+	if (plen) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!payload)
+			goto error2;
+
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
+			goto error3;
+	}
+
+	/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
+		goto error3;
+	}
+
+	/* create or update the requested key and add it to the target
+	 * keyring */
+	key_ref = key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description,
+				       payload, plen, KEY_PERM_UNDEF,
+				       KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
+		key_ref_put(key_ref);
+	}
+	else {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+	}
+
+	key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
+ error3:
+	kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
+ error2:
+	kfree(description);
+ error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search the process keyrings and keyring trees linked from those for a
+ * matching key.  Keyrings must have appropriate Search permission to be
+ * searched.
+ *
+ * If a key is found, it will be attached to the destination keyring if there's
+ * one specified and the serial number of the key will be returned.
+ *
+ * If no key is found, /sbin/request-key will be invoked if _callout_info is
+ * non-NULL in an attempt to create a key.  The _callout_info string will be
+ * passed to /sbin/request-key to aid with completing the request.  If the
+ * _callout_info string is "" then it will be changed to "-".
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
+		const char __user *, _description,
+		const char __user *, _callout_info,
+		key_serial_t, destringid)
+{
+	struct key_type *ktype;
+	struct key *key;
+	key_ref_t dest_ref;
+	size_t callout_len;
+	char type[32], *description, *callout_info;
+	long ret;
+
+	/* pull the type into kernel space */
+	ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	/* pull the description into kernel space */
+	description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(description)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(description);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/* pull the callout info into kernel space */
+	callout_info = NULL;
+	callout_len = 0;
+	if (_callout_info) {
+		callout_info = strndup_user(_callout_info, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (IS_ERR(callout_info)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(callout_info);
+			goto error2;
+		}
+		callout_len = strlen(callout_info);
+	}
+
+	/* get the destination keyring if specified */
+	dest_ref = NULL;
+	if (destringid) {
+		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
+					   KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+		if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
+			goto error3;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* find the key type */
+	ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
+	if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(ktype);
+		goto error4;
+	}
+
+	/* do the search */
+	key = request_key_and_link(ktype, description, NULL, callout_info,
+				   callout_len, NULL, key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref),
+				   KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key);
+		goto error5;
+	}
+
+	/* wait for the key to finish being constructed */
+	ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, 1);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error6;
+
+	ret = key->serial;
+
+error6:
+ 	key_put(key);
+error5:
+	key_type_put(ktype);
+error4:
+	key_ref_put(dest_ref);
+error3:
+	kfree(callout_info);
+error2:
+	kfree(description);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the ID of the specified process keyring.
+ *
+ * The requested keyring must have search permission to be found.
+ *
+ * If successful, the ID of the requested keyring will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
+{
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	unsigned long lflags;
+	long ret;
+
+	lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Join a (named) session keyring.
+ *
+ * Create and join an anonymous session keyring or join a named session
+ * keyring, creating it if necessary.  A named session keyring must have Search
+ * permission for it to be joined.  Session keyrings without this permit will
+ * be skipped over.  It is not permitted for userspace to create or join
+ * keyrings whose name begin with a dot.
+ *
+ * If successful, the ID of the joined session keyring will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name)
+{
+	char *name;
+	long ret;
+
+	/* fetch the name from userspace */
+	name = NULL;
+	if (_name) {
+		name = strndup_user(_name, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
+		if (IS_ERR(name)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(name);
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		ret = -EPERM;
+		if (name[0] == '.')
+			goto error_name;
+	}
+
+	/* join the session */
+	ret = join_session_keyring(name);
+error_name:
+	kfree(name);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update a key's data payload from the given data.
+ *
+ * The key must grant the caller Write permission and the key type must support
+ * updating for this to work.  A negative key can be positively instantiated
+ * with this call.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.  If the key type does not support
+ * updating, then -EOPNOTSUPP will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
+		       const void __user *_payload,
+		       size_t plen)
+{
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	void *payload;
+	long ret;
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (plen > PAGE_SIZE)
+		goto error;
+
+	/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
+	payload = NULL;
+	if (plen) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!payload)
+			goto error;
+
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
+			goto error2;
+	}
+
+	/* find the target key (which must be writable) */
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+		goto error2;
+	}
+
+	/* update the key */
+	ret = key_update(key_ref, payload, plen);
+
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+error2:
+	kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Revoke a key.
+ *
+ * The key must be grant the caller Write or Setattr permission for this to
+ * work.  The key type should give up its quota claim when revoked.  The key
+ * and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected after a
+ * certain amount of time (/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay).
+ *
+ * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be revoked.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
+{
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	struct key *key;
+	long ret;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+		if (ret != -EACCES)
+			goto error;
+		key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
+		if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	ret = 0;
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else
+		key_revoke(key);
+
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Invalidate a key.
+ *
+ * The key must be grant the caller Invalidate permission for this to work.
+ * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
+ * immediately.
+ *
+ * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be invalidated.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
+{
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	struct key *key;
+	long ret;
+
+	kenter("%d", id);
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+
+		/* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keys */
+		if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+			key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE);
+			if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+				goto error;
+			if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL,
+				     &key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->flags))
+				goto invalidate;
+			goto error_put;
+		}
+
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+invalidate:
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	ret = 0;
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else
+		key_invalidate(key);
+error_put:
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+error:
+	kleave(" = %ld", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear the specified keyring, creating an empty process keyring if one of the
+ * special keyring IDs is used.
+ *
+ * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission and not have
+ * KEY_FLAG_KEEP set for this to work.  If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	key_ref_t keyring_ref;
+	struct key *keyring;
+	long ret;
+
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
+
+		/* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keyrings */
+		if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+			keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0,
+						      KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE);
+			if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref))
+				goto error;
+			if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR,
+				     &key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref)->flags))
+				goto clear;
+			goto error_put;
+		}
+
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+clear:
+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else
+		ret = keyring_clear(keyring);
+error_put:
+	key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a link from a keyring to a key if there's no matching key in the
+ * keyring, otherwise replace the link to the matching key with a link to the
+ * new key.
+ *
+ * The key must grant the caller Link permission and the keyring must grant
+ * the caller Write permission.  Furthermore, if an additional link is created,
+ * the keyring's quota will be extended.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
+	long ret;
+
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_LINK);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+		goto error2;
+	}
+
+	ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
+
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+error2:
+	key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unlink a key from a keyring.
+ *
+ * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work; the key
+ * itself need not grant the caller anything.  If the last link to a key is
+ * removed then that key will be scheduled for destruction.
+ *
+ * Keys or keyrings with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be unlinked.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
+	struct key *keyring, *key;
+	long ret;
+
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_UNLINK);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+		goto error2;
+	}
+
+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags) &&
+	    test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else
+		ret = key_unlink(keyring, key);
+
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+error2:
+	key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Move a link to a key from one keyring to another, displacing any matching
+ * key from the destination keyring.
+ *
+ * The key must grant the caller Link permission and both keyrings must grant
+ * the caller Write permission.  There must also be a link in the from keyring
+ * to the key.  If both keyrings are the same, nothing is done.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_keyring_move(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t from_ringid,
+			 key_serial_t to_ringid, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	key_ref_t key_ref, from_ref, to_ref;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (flags & ~KEYCTL_MOVE_EXCL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_LINK);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+		return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+
+	from_ref = lookup_user_key(from_ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+	if (IS_ERR(from_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(from_ref);
+		goto error2;
+	}
+
+	to_ref = lookup_user_key(to_ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+	if (IS_ERR(to_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(to_ref);
+		goto error3;
+	}
+
+	ret = key_move(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(from_ref),
+		       key_ref_to_ptr(to_ref), flags);
+
+	key_ref_put(to_ref);
+error3:
+	key_ref_put(from_ref);
+error2:
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a description of a key to userspace.
+ *
+ * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work.
+ *
+ * If there's a buffer, we place up to buflen bytes of data into it formatted
+ * in the following way:
+ *
+ *	type;uid;gid;perm;description<NUL>
+ *
+ * If successful, we return the amount of description available, irrespective
+ * of how much we may have copied into the buffer.
+ */
+long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
+			 char __user *buffer,
+			 size_t buflen)
+{
+	struct key *key, *instkey;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	char *infobuf;
+	long ret;
+	int desclen, infolen;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		/* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
+		 * authorisation token handy */
+		if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) {
+			instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
+			if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
+				key_put(instkey);
+				key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid,
+							  KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+							  KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE);
+				if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+					goto okay;
+			}
+		}
+
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+okay:
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	desclen = strlen(key->description);
+
+	/* calculate how much information we're going to return */
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	infobuf = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL,
+			    "%s;%d;%d;%08x;",
+			    key->type->name,
+			    from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->uid),
+			    from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->gid),
+			    key->perm);
+	if (!infobuf)
+		goto error2;
+	infolen = strlen(infobuf);
+	ret = infolen + desclen + 1;
+
+	/* consider returning the data */
+	if (buffer && buflen >= ret) {
+		if (copy_to_user(buffer, infobuf, infolen) != 0 ||
+		    copy_to_user(buffer + infolen, key->description,
+				 desclen + 1) != 0)
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	kfree(infobuf);
+error2:
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search the specified keyring and any keyrings it links to for a matching
+ * key.  Only keyrings that grant the caller Search permission will be searched
+ * (this includes the starting keyring).  Only keys with Search permission can
+ * be found.
+ *
+ * If successful, the found key will be linked to the destination keyring if
+ * supplied and the key has Link permission, and the found key ID will be
+ * returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
+			   const char __user *_type,
+			   const char __user *_description,
+			   key_serial_t destringid)
+{
+	struct key_type *ktype;
+	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref, dest_ref;
+	char type[32], *description;
+	long ret;
+
+	/* pull the type and description into kernel space */
+	ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(description)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(description);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
+		goto error2;
+	}
+
+	/* get the destination keyring if specified */
+	dest_ref = NULL;
+	if (destringid) {
+		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
+					   KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+		if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
+			goto error3;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* find the key type */
+	ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
+	if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(ktype);
+		goto error4;
+	}
+
+	/* do the search */
+	key_ref = keyring_search(keyring_ref, ktype, description, true);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+
+		/* treat lack or presence of a negative key the same */
+		if (ret == -EAGAIN)
+			ret = -ENOKEY;
+		goto error5;
+	}
+
+	/* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
+	if (dest_ref) {
+		ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_LINK);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error6;
+
+		ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error6;
+	}
+
+	ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
+
+error6:
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+error5:
+	key_type_put(ktype);
+error4:
+	key_ref_put(dest_ref);
+error3:
+	key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
+error2:
+	kfree(description);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call the read method
+ */
+static long __keyctl_read_key(struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+	long ret;
+
+	down_read(&key->sem);
+	ret = key_validate(key);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
+	up_read(&key->sem);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a key's payload.
+ *
+ * The key must either grant the caller Read permission, or it must grant the
+ * caller Search permission when searched for from the process keyrings.
+ *
+ * If successful, we place up to buflen bytes of data into the buffer, if one
+ * is provided, and return the amount of data that is available in the key,
+ * irrespective of how much we copied into the buffer.
+ */
+long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	long ret;
+	char *key_data = NULL;
+	size_t key_data_len;
+
+	/* find the key first */
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = -ENOKEY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+	ret = key_read_state(key);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto key_put_out; /* Negatively instantiated */
+
+	/* see if we can read it directly */
+	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		goto can_read_key;
+	if (ret != -EACCES)
+		goto key_put_out;
+
+	/* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings
+	 * - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be
+	 *   dangling off an instantiation key
+	 */
+	if (!is_key_possessed(key_ref)) {
+		ret = -EACCES;
+		goto key_put_out;
+	}
+
+	/* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
+can_read_key:
+	if (!key->type->read) {
+		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		goto key_put_out;
+	}
+
+	if (!buffer || !buflen) {
+		/* Get the key length from the read method */
+		ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, NULL, 0);
+		goto key_put_out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
+	 * to protect against the key being updated or revoked.
+	 *
+	 * Allocating a temporary buffer to hold the keys before
+	 * transferring them to user buffer to avoid potential
+	 * deadlock involving page fault and mmap_lock.
+	 *
+	 * key_data_len = (buflen <= PAGE_SIZE)
+	 *		? buflen : actual length of key data
+	 *
+	 * This prevents allocating arbitrary large buffer which can
+	 * be much larger than the actual key length. In the latter case,
+	 * at least 2 passes of this loop is required.
+	 */
+	key_data_len = (buflen <= PAGE_SIZE) ? buflen : 0;
+	for (;;) {
+		if (key_data_len) {
+			key_data = kvmalloc(key_data_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!key_data) {
+				ret = -ENOMEM;
+				goto key_put_out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, key_data, key_data_len);
+
+		/*
+		 * Read methods will just return the required length without
+		 * any copying if the provided length isn't large enough.
+		 */
+		if (ret <= 0 || ret > buflen)
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * The key may change (unlikely) in between 2 consecutive
+		 * __keyctl_read_key() calls. In this case, we reallocate
+		 * a larger buffer and redo the key read when
+		 * key_data_len < ret <= buflen.
+		 */
+		if (ret > key_data_len) {
+			if (unlikely(key_data))
+				kvfree_sensitive(key_data, key_data_len);
+			key_data_len = ret;
+			continue;	/* Allocate buffer */
+		}
+
+		if (copy_to_user(buffer, key_data, ret))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+		break;
+	}
+	kvfree_sensitive(key_data, key_data_len);
+
+key_put_out:
+	key_put(key);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Change the ownership of a key
+ *
+ * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though
+ * the key need not be fully instantiated yet.  For the UID to be changed, or
+ * for the GID to be changed to a group the caller is not a member of, the
+ * caller must have sysadmin capability.  If either uid or gid is -1 then that
+ * attribute is not changed.
+ *
+ * If the UID is to be changed, the new user must have sufficient quota to
+ * accept the key.  The quota deduction will be removed from the old user to
+ * the new user should the attribute be changed.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
+{
+	struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL;
+	struct key *key;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	long ret;
+	kuid_t uid;
+	kgid_t gid;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user);
+	gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group);
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if ((user != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid))
+		goto error;
+	if ((group != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid))
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = 0;
+	if (user == (uid_t) -1 && group == (gid_t) -1)
+		goto error;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+				  KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+	/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */
+	ret = -EACCES;
+	down_write(&key->sem);
+
+	{
+		bool is_privileged_op = false;
+
+		/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
+		if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
+			is_privileged_op = true;
+
+		/* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
+		 * than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
+		if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid))
+			is_privileged_op = true;
+
+		if (is_privileged_op && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			goto error_put;
+	}
+
+	/* change the UID */
+	if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(uid, key->uid)) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		newowner = key_user_lookup(uid);
+		if (!newowner)
+			goto error_put;
+
+		/* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
+		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
+			unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
+				key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
+			unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
+				key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
+
+			spin_lock_irqsave(&newowner->lock, flags);
+			if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 > maxkeys ||
+			    newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen > maxbytes ||
+			    newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen <
+			    newowner->qnbytes)
+				goto quota_overrun;
+
+			newowner->qnkeys++;
+			newowner->qnbytes += key->quotalen;
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&newowner->lock, flags);
+
+			spin_lock_irqsave(&key->user->lock, flags);
+			key->user->qnkeys--;
+			key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->user->lock, flags);
+		}
+
+		atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
+		atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys);
+
+		if (key->state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
+			atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
+			atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
+		}
+
+		zapowner = key->user;
+		key->user = newowner;
+		key->uid = uid;
+	}
+
+	/* change the GID */
+	if (group != (gid_t) -1)
+		key->gid = gid;
+
+	notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_SETATTR, 0);
+	ret = 0;
+
+error_put:
+	up_write(&key->sem);
+	key_put(key);
+	if (zapowner)
+		key_user_put(zapowner);
+error:
+	return ret;
+
+quota_overrun:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&newowner->lock, flags);
+	zapowner = newowner;
+	ret = -EDQUOT;
+	goto error_put;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Change the permission mask on a key.
+ *
+ * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though
+ * the key need not be fully instantiated yet.  If the caller does not have
+ * sysadmin capability, it may only change the permission on keys that it owns.
+ */
+long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	long ret;
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
+		goto error;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+				  KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+	/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chmod races */
+	ret = -EACCES;
+	down_write(&key->sem);
+
+	/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
+	if (uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid()) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+		key->perm = perm;
+		notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_SETATTR, 0);
+		ret = 0;
+	}
+
+	up_write(&key->sem);
+	key_put(key);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the destination keyring for instantiation and check that the caller has
+ * Write permission on it.
+ */
+static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
+				      struct request_key_auth *rka,
+				      struct key **_dest_keyring)
+{
+	key_ref_t dkref;
+
+	*_dest_keyring = NULL;
+
+	/* just return a NULL pointer if we weren't asked to make a link */
+	if (ringid == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
+	if (ringid > 0) {
+		dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+		if (IS_ERR(dkref))
+			return PTR_ERR(dkref);
+		*_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (ringid == KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* otherwise specify the destination keyring recorded in the
+	 * authorisation key (any KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING) */
+	if (ringid >= KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING) {
+		*_dest_keyring = key_get(rka->dest_keyring);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -ENOKEY;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Change the request_key authorisation key on the current process.
+ */
+static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	key_put(new->request_key_auth);
+	new->request_key_auth = key_get(key);
+
+	return commit_creds(new);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
+ * destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
+				   struct iov_iter *from,
+				   key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
+	struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
+	size_t plen = from ? iov_iter_count(from) : 0;
+	void *payload;
+	long ret;
+
+	kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id, plen, ringid);
+
+	if (!plen)
+		from = NULL;
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
+		goto error;
+
+	/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
+	 * assumed before calling this */
+	ret = -EPERM;
+	instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
+	if (!instkey)
+		goto error;
+
+	rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey);
+	if (!rka) {
+		ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
+		goto error;
+	}
+	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+		goto error_put_rka;
+
+	/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
+	payload = NULL;
+
+	if (from) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!payload)
+			goto error_put_rka;
+
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		if (!copy_from_iter_full(payload, plen, from))
+			goto error2;
+	}
+
+	/* find the destination keyring amongst those belonging to the
+	 * requesting task */
+	ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error2;
+
+	/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
+	ret = key_instantiate_and_link(rka->target_key, payload, plen,
+				       dest_keyring, instkey);
+
+	key_put(dest_keyring);
+
+	/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
+	 * instantiation of the key */
+	if (ret == 0)
+		keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
+
+error2:
+	kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
+error_put_rka:
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
+ * destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
+			    const void __user *_payload,
+			    size_t plen,
+			    key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	if (_payload && plen) {
+		struct iov_iter from;
+		int ret;
+
+		ret = import_ubuf(ITER_SOURCE, (void __user *)_payload, plen,
+				  &from);
+		if (unlikely(ret))
+			return ret;
+
+		return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, &from, ringid);
+	}
+
+	return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, ringid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Instantiate a key with the specified multipart payload and link the key into
+ * the destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
+				const struct iovec __user *_payload_iov,
+				unsigned ioc,
+				key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
+	struct iov_iter from;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (!_payload_iov)
+		ioc = 0;
+
+	ret = import_iovec(ITER_SOURCE, _payload_iov, ioc,
+				    ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), &iov, &from);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, &from, ringid);
+	kfree(iov);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and link
+ * the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
+ * after the timeout expires.
+ *
+ * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
+ * them to return -ENOKEY until the negative key expires.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	return keyctl_reject_key(id, timeout, ENOKEY, ringid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and error
+ * code and link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
+ * after the timeout expires.
+ *
+ * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
+ * them to return the specified error code until the negative key expires.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
+		       key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
+	struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
+	long ret;
+
+	kenter("%d,%u,%u,%d", id, timeout, error, ringid);
+
+	/* must be a valid error code and mustn't be a kernel special */
+	if (error <= 0 ||
+	    error >= MAX_ERRNO ||
+	    error == ERESTARTSYS ||
+	    error == ERESTARTNOINTR ||
+	    error == ERESTARTNOHAND ||
+	    error == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
+	 * assumed before calling this */
+	ret = -EPERM;
+	instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
+	if (!instkey)
+		goto error;
+
+	rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey);
+	if (!rka) {
+		ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
+		goto error;
+	}
+	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+		goto error_put_rka;
+
+	/* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
+	 * writable) */
+	ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_put_rka;
+
+	/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
+	ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error,
+				  dest_keyring, instkey);
+
+	key_put(dest_keyring);
+
+	/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
+	 * instantiation of the key */
+	if (ret == 0)
+		keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
+
+error_put_rka:
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read or set the default keyring in which request_key() will cache keys and
+ * return the old setting.
+ *
+ * If a thread or process keyring is specified then it will be created if it
+ * doesn't yet exist.  The old setting will be returned if successful.
+ */
+long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
+{
+	struct cred *new;
+	int ret, old_setting;
+
+	old_setting = current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring);
+
+	if (reqkey_defl == KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE)
+		return old_setting;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	switch (reqkey_defl) {
+	case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
+		ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		goto set;
+
+	case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
+		ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		goto set;
+
+	case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
+	case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
+	case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
+	case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
+	case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
+		goto set;
+
+	case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE:
+	case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
+	default:
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+set:
+	new->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return old_setting;
+error:
+	abort_creds(new);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set or clear the timeout on a key.
+ *
+ * Either the key must grant the caller Setattr permission or else the caller
+ * must hold an instantiation authorisation token for the key.
+ *
+ * The timeout is either 0 to clear the timeout, or a number of seconds from
+ * the current time.  The key and any links to the key will be automatically
+ * garbage collected after the timeout expires.
+ *
+ * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be timed out.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
+{
+	struct key *key, *instkey;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	long ret;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+				  KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		/* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
+		 * if we have the authorisation token handy */
+		if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) {
+			instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id);
+			if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
+				key_put(instkey);
+				key_ref = lookup_user_key(id,
+							  KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+							  KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE);
+				if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+					goto okay;
+			}
+		}
+
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+okay:
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	ret = 0;
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags)) {
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	} else {
+		key_set_timeout(key, timeout);
+		notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_SETATTR, 0);
+	}
+	key_put(key);
+
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Assume (or clear) the authority to instantiate the specified key.
+ *
+ * This sets the authoritative token currently in force for key instantiation.
+ * This must be done for a key to be instantiated.  It has the effect of making
+ * available all the keys from the caller of the request_key() that created a
+ * key to request_key() calls made by the caller of this function.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the instantiation key in their process keyrings with a
+ * Search permission grant available to the caller.
+ *
+ * If the ID given is 0, then the setting will be cleared and 0 returned.
+ *
+ * If the ID given has a matching an authorisation key, then that key will be
+ * set and its ID will be returned.  The authorisation key can be read to get
+ * the callout information passed to request_key().
+ */
+long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
+{
+	struct key *authkey;
+	long ret;
+
+	/* special key IDs aren't permitted */
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (id < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	/* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */
+	if (id == 0) {
+		ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/* attempt to assume the authority temporarily granted to us whilst we
+	 * instantiate the specified key
+	 * - the authorisation key must be in the current task's keyrings
+	 *   somewhere
+	 */
+	authkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id);
+	if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		ret = authkey->serial;
+	key_put(authkey);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a key's the LSM security label.
+ *
+ * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work.
+ *
+ * If there's a buffer, then up to buflen bytes of data will be placed into it.
+ *
+ * If successful, the amount of information available will be returned,
+ * irrespective of how much was copied (including the terminal NUL).
+ */
+long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
+			 char __user *buffer,
+			 size_t buflen)
+{
+	struct key *key, *instkey;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	char *context;
+	long ret;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
+			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+
+		/* viewing a key under construction is also permitted if we
+		 * have the authorisation token handy */
+		instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
+		if (IS_ERR(instkey))
+			return PTR_ERR(instkey);
+		key_put(instkey);
+
+		key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+					  KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE);
+		if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+	}
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	ret = security_key_getsecurity(key, &context);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		/* if no information was returned, give userspace an empty
+		 * string */
+		ret = 1;
+		if (buffer && buflen > 0 &&
+		    copy_to_user(buffer, "", 1) != 0)
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	} else if (ret > 0) {
+		/* return as much data as there's room for */
+		if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
+			if (buflen > ret)
+				buflen = ret;
+
+			if (copy_to_user(buffer, context, buflen) != 0)
+				ret = -EFAULT;
+		}
+
+		kfree(context);
+	}
+
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's
+ * parent process.
+ *
+ * The keyring must exist and must grant the caller LINK permission, and the
+ * parent process must be single-threaded and must have the same effective
+ * ownership as this process and mustn't be SUID/SGID.
+ *
+ * The keyring will be emplaced on the parent when it next resumes userspace.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
+{
+	struct task_struct *me, *parent;
+	const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
+	struct callback_head *newwork, *oldwork;
+	key_ref_t keyring_r;
+	struct cred *cred;
+	int ret;
+
+	keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
+		return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
+	 * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
+	 * our parent */
+	cred = cred_alloc_blank();
+	if (!cred)
+		goto error_keyring;
+	newwork = &cred->rcu;
+
+	cred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
+	keyring_r = NULL;
+	init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring);
+
+	me = current;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+	ret = -EPERM;
+	oldwork = NULL;
+	parent = rcu_dereference_protected(me->real_parent,
+					   lockdep_is_held(&tasklist_lock));
+
+	/* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
+	if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	/* the parent must be single threaded */
+	if (!thread_group_empty(parent))
+		goto unlock;
+
+	/* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
+	 * there's no point */
+	mycred = current_cred();
+	pcred = __task_cred(parent);
+	if (mycred == pcred ||
+	    mycred->session_keyring == pcred->session_keyring) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	/* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
+	 * SUID/SGID */
+	if (!uid_eq(pcred->uid,	 mycred->euid) ||
+	    !uid_eq(pcred->euid, mycred->euid) ||
+	    !uid_eq(pcred->suid, mycred->euid) ||
+	    !gid_eq(pcred->gid,	 mycred->egid) ||
+	    !gid_eq(pcred->egid, mycred->egid) ||
+	    !gid_eq(pcred->sgid, mycred->egid))
+		goto unlock;
+
+	/* the keyrings must have the same UID */
+	if ((pcred->session_keyring &&
+	     !uid_eq(pcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) ||
+	    !uid_eq(mycred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid))
+		goto unlock;
+
+	/* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */
+	oldwork = task_work_cancel_func(parent, key_change_session_keyring);
+
+	/* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
+	 * restarting */
+	ret = task_work_add(parent, newwork, TWA_RESUME);
+	if (!ret)
+		newwork = NULL;
+unlock:
+	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (oldwork)
+		put_cred(container_of(oldwork, struct cred, rcu));
+	if (newwork)
+		put_cred(cred);
+	return ret;
+
+error_keyring:
+	key_ref_put(keyring_r);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Apply a restriction to a given keyring.
+ *
+ * The caller must have Setattr permission to change keyring restrictions.
+ *
+ * The requested type name may be a NULL pointer to reject all attempts
+ * to link to the keyring.  In this case, _restriction must also be NULL.
+ * Otherwise, both _type and _restriction must be non-NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful.
+ */
+long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id, const char __user *_type,
+			     const char __user *_restriction)
+{
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	char type[32];
+	char *restriction = NULL;
+	long ret;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+		return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (_type) {
+		if (!_restriction)
+			goto error;
+
+		ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+
+		restriction = strndup_user(_restriction, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (IS_ERR(restriction)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(restriction);
+			goto error;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (_restriction)
+			goto error;
+	}
+
+	ret = keyring_restrict(key_ref, _type ? type : NULL, restriction);
+	kfree(restriction);
+error:
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+/*
+ * Watch for changes to a key.
+ *
+ * The caller must have View permission to watch a key or keyring.
+ */
+long keyctl_watch_key(key_serial_t id, int watch_queue_fd, int watch_id)
+{
+	struct watch_queue *wqueue;
+	struct watch_list *wlist = NULL;
+	struct watch *watch = NULL;
+	struct key *key;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (watch_id < -1 || watch_id > 0xff)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+		return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+	wqueue = get_watch_queue(watch_queue_fd);
+	if (IS_ERR(wqueue)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(wqueue);
+		goto err_key;
+	}
+
+	if (watch_id >= 0) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		if (!key->watchers) {
+			wlist = kzalloc_obj(*wlist);
+			if (!wlist)
+				goto err_wqueue;
+			init_watch_list(wlist, NULL);
+		}
+
+		watch = kzalloc_obj(*watch);
+		if (!watch)
+			goto err_wlist;
+
+		init_watch(watch, wqueue);
+		watch->id	= key->serial;
+		watch->info_id	= (u32)watch_id << WATCH_INFO_ID__SHIFT;
+
+		ret = security_watch_key(key);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto err_watch;
+
+		down_write(&key->sem);
+		if (!key->watchers) {
+			key->watchers = wlist;
+			wlist = NULL;
+		}
+
+		ret = add_watch_to_object(watch, key->watchers);
+		up_write(&key->sem);
+
+		if (ret == 0)
+			watch = NULL;
+	} else {
+		ret = -EBADSLT;
+		if (key->watchers) {
+			down_write(&key->sem);
+			ret = remove_watch_from_object(key->watchers,
+						       wqueue, key_serial(key),
+						       false);
+			up_write(&key->sem);
+		}
+	}
+
+err_watch:
+	kfree(watch);
+err_wlist:
+	kfree(wlist);
+err_wqueue:
+	put_watch_queue(wqueue);
+err_key:
+	key_put(key);
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
+
+/*
+ * Get keyrings subsystem capabilities.
+ */
+long keyctl_capabilities(unsigned char __user *_buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+	size_t size = buflen;
+
+	if (size > 0) {
+		if (size > sizeof(keyrings_capabilities))
+			size = sizeof(keyrings_capabilities);
+		if (copy_to_user(_buffer, keyrings_capabilities, size) != 0)
+			return -EFAULT;
+		if (size < buflen &&
+		    clear_user(_buffer + size, buflen - size) != 0)
+			return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	return sizeof(keyrings_capabilities);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The key control system call
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
+		unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
+{
+	switch (option) {
+	case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID:
+		return keyctl_get_keyring_ID((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					     (int) arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING:
+		return keyctl_join_session_keyring((const char __user *) arg2);
+
+	case KEYCTL_UPDATE:
+		return keyctl_update_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					 (const void __user *) arg3,
+					 (size_t) arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_REVOKE:
+		return keyctl_revoke_key((key_serial_t) arg2);
+
+	case KEYCTL_DESCRIBE:
+		return keyctl_describe_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					   (char __user *) arg3,
+					   (unsigned) arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_CLEAR:
+		return keyctl_keyring_clear((key_serial_t) arg2);
+
+	case KEYCTL_LINK:
+		return keyctl_keyring_link((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					   (key_serial_t) arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_UNLINK:
+		return keyctl_keyring_unlink((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					     (key_serial_t) arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_SEARCH:
+		return keyctl_keyring_search((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					     (const char __user *) arg3,
+					     (const char __user *) arg4,
+					     (key_serial_t) arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_READ:
+		return keyctl_read_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
+				       (char __user *) arg3,
+				       (size_t) arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_CHOWN:
+		return keyctl_chown_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					(uid_t) arg3,
+					(gid_t) arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_SETPERM:
+		return keyctl_setperm_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					  (key_perm_t) arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE:
+		return keyctl_instantiate_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					      (const void __user *) arg3,
+					      (size_t) arg4,
+					      (key_serial_t) arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_NEGATE:
+		return keyctl_negate_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					 (unsigned) arg3,
+					 (key_serial_t) arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING:
+		return keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(arg2);
+
+	case KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT:
+		return keyctl_set_timeout((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					  (unsigned) arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY:
+		return keyctl_assume_authority((key_serial_t) arg2);
+
+	case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
+		return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					   (char __user *) arg3,
+					   (size_t) arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+		return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
+	case KEYCTL_REJECT:
+		return keyctl_reject_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					 (unsigned) arg3,
+					 (unsigned) arg4,
+					 (key_serial_t) arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
+		return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+			(key_serial_t) arg2,
+			(const struct iovec __user *) arg3,
+			(unsigned) arg4,
+			(key_serial_t) arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
+		return keyctl_invalidate_key((key_serial_t) arg2);
+
+	case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
+		return keyctl_get_persistent((uid_t)arg2, (key_serial_t)arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
+		return keyctl_dh_compute((struct keyctl_dh_params __user *) arg2,
+					 (char __user *) arg3, (size_t) arg4,
+					 (struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *) arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING:
+		return keyctl_restrict_keyring((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					       (const char __user *) arg3,
+					       (const char __user *) arg4);
+
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY:
+		if (arg3 != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return keyctl_pkey_query((key_serial_t)arg2,
+					 (const char __user *)arg4,
+					 (struct keyctl_pkey_query __user *)arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+		return keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(
+			option,
+			(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *)arg2,
+			(const char __user *)arg3,
+			(const void __user *)arg4,
+			(void __user *)arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
+		return keyctl_pkey_verify(
+			(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *)arg2,
+			(const char __user *)arg3,
+			(const void __user *)arg4,
+			(const void __user *)arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_MOVE:
+		return keyctl_keyring_move((key_serial_t)arg2,
+					   (key_serial_t)arg3,
+					   (key_serial_t)arg4,
+					   (unsigned int)arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_CAPABILITIES:
+		return keyctl_capabilities((unsigned char __user *)arg2, (size_t)arg3);
+
+	case KEYCTL_WATCH_KEY:
+		return keyctl_watch_key((key_serial_t)arg2, (int)arg3, (int)arg4);
+
+	default:
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..15b6bf639
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Public-key operation keyctls
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static void keyctl_pkey_params_free(struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+{
+	kfree(params->info);
+	key_put(params->key);
+}
+
+enum {
+	Opt_err,
+	Opt_enc,		/* "enc=<encoding>" eg. "enc=oaep" */
+	Opt_hash,		/* "hash=<digest-name>" eg. "hash=sha1" */
+};
+
+static const match_table_t param_keys = {
+	{ Opt_enc,	"enc=%s" },
+	{ Opt_hash,	"hash=%s" },
+	{ Opt_err,	NULL }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Parse the information string which consists of key=val pairs.
+ */
+static int keyctl_pkey_params_parse(struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+{
+	unsigned long token_mask = 0;
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+	char *c = params->info, *p, *q;
+	int token;
+
+	while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
+		if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
+			continue;
+		token = match_token(p, param_keys, args);
+		if (token == Opt_err)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (__test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		q = args[0].from;
+		if (!q[0])
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		switch (token) {
+		case Opt_enc:
+			params->encoding = q;
+			break;
+
+		case Opt_hash:
+			params->hash_algo = q;
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Interpret parameters.  Callers must always call the free function
+ * on params, even if an error is returned.
+ */
+static int keyctl_pkey_params_get(key_serial_t id,
+				  const char __user *_info,
+				  struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+{
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	void *p;
+	int ret;
+
+	memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
+	params->encoding = "raw";
+
+	p = strndup_user(_info, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		return PTR_ERR(p);
+	params->info = p;
+
+	ret = keyctl_pkey_params_parse(params);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+		return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+	params->key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+	if (!params->key->type->asym_query)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get parameters from userspace.  Callers must always call the free function
+ * on params, even if an error is returned.
+ */
+static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
+				    const char __user *_info,
+				    int op,
+				    struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+{
+	struct keyctl_pkey_params uparams;
+	struct kernel_pkey_query info;
+	int ret;
+
+	memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
+	params->encoding = "raw";
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&uparams, _params, sizeof(uparams)) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get(uparams.key_id, _info, params);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = params->key->type->asym_query(params, &info);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	switch (op) {
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_dec_size ||
+		    uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_enc_size;
+		break;
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_enc_size ||
+		    uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_dec_size;
+		break;
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
+		    uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
+		break;
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
+		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
+		    uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	params->in_len  = uparams.in_len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Query information about an asymmetric key.
+ */
+long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t id,
+		       const char __user *_info,
+		       struct keyctl_pkey_query __user *_res)
+{
+	struct kernel_pkey_params params;
+	struct kernel_pkey_query res;
+	long ret;
+
+	ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get(id, _info, &params);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = params.key->type->asym_query(&params, &res);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_to_user(_res, &res, sizeof(res)) == 0 &&
+	    clear_user(_res->__spare, sizeof(_res->__spare)) == 0)
+		ret = 0;
+
+error:
+	keyctl_pkey_params_free(&params);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt/decrypt/sign
+ *
+ * Encrypt data, decrypt data or sign data using a public key.
+ *
+ * _info is a string of supplementary information in key=val format.  For
+ * instance, it might contain:
+ *
+ *	"enc=pkcs1 hash=sha256"
+ *
+ * where enc= specifies the encoding and hash= selects the OID to go in that
+ * particular encoding if required.  If enc= isn't supplied, it's assumed that
+ * the caller is supplying raw values.
+ *
+ * If successful, the amount of data written into the output buffer is
+ * returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
+		       const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
+		       const char __user *_info,
+		       const void __user *_in,
+		       void __user *_out)
+{
+	struct kernel_pkey_params params;
+	void *in, *out;
+	long ret;
+
+	ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, op, &params);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_params;
+
+	ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (!params.key->type->asym_eds_op)
+		goto error_params;
+
+	switch (op) {
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+		params.op = kernel_pkey_encrypt;
+		break;
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+		params.op = kernel_pkey_decrypt;
+		break;
+	case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+		params.op = kernel_pkey_sign;
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		goto error_params;
+	}
+
+	in = memdup_user(_in, params.in_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(in)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(in);
+		goto error_params;
+	}
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	out = kmalloc(params.out_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!out)
+		goto error_in;
+
+	ret = params.key->type->asym_eds_op(&params, in, out);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_out;
+
+	if (copy_to_user(_out, out, ret) != 0)
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+error_out:
+	kfree(out);
+error_in:
+	kfree(in);
+error_params:
+	keyctl_pkey_params_free(&params);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a signature.
+ *
+ * Verify a public key signature using the given key, or if not given, search
+ * for a matching key.
+ *
+ * _info is a string of supplementary information in key=val format.  For
+ * instance, it might contain:
+ *
+ *	"enc=pkcs1 hash=sha256"
+ *
+ * where enc= specifies the signature blob encoding and hash= selects the OID
+ * to go in that particular encoding.  If enc= isn't supplied, it's assumed
+ * that the caller is supplying raw values.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
+			const char __user *_info,
+			const void __user *_in,
+			const void __user *_in2)
+{
+	struct kernel_pkey_params params;
+	void *in, *in2;
+	long ret;
+
+	ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
+				       &params);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_params;
+
+	ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (!params.key->type->asym_verify_signature)
+		goto error_params;
+
+	in = memdup_user(_in, params.in_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(in)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(in);
+		goto error_params;
+	}
+
+	in2 = memdup_user(_in2, params.in2_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(in2)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(in2);
+		goto error_in;
+	}
+
+	params.op = kernel_pkey_verify;
+	ret = params.key->type->asym_verify_signature(&params, in, in2);
+
+	kfree(in2);
+error_in:
+	kfree(in);
+error_params:
+	keyctl_pkey_params_free(&params);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a2ee0ded
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1798 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Keyring handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008, 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <keys/keyring-type.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <linux/assoc_array_priv.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * When plumbing the depths of the key tree, this sets a hard limit
+ * set on how deep we're willing to go.
+ */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH 6
+
+/*
+ * We mark pointers we pass to the associative array with bit 1 set if
+ * they're keyrings and clear otherwise.
+ */
+#define KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE	0x2UL
+
+static inline bool keyring_ptr_is_keyring(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
+{
+	return (unsigned long)x & KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE;
+}
+static inline struct key *keyring_ptr_to_key(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
+{
+	void *object = assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(x);
+	return (struct key *)((unsigned long)object & ~KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE);
+}
+static inline void *keyring_key_to_ptr(struct key *key)
+{
+	if (key->type == &key_type_keyring)
+		return (void *)((unsigned long)key | KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE);
+	return key;
+}
+
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(keyring_name_lock);
+
+/*
+ * Clean up the bits of user_namespace that belong to us.
+ */
+void key_free_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	write_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
+	list_del_init(&ns->keyring_name_list);
+	write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
+
+	key_put(ns->user_keyring_register);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
+	key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * The keyring key type definition.  Keyrings are simply keys of this type and
+ * can be treated as ordinary keys in addition to having their own special
+ * operations.
+ */
+static int keyring_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+static void keyring_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
+			       struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring);
+static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring);
+static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m);
+static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
+			 char *buffer, size_t buflen);
+
+struct key_type key_type_keyring = {
+	.name		= "keyring",
+	.def_datalen	= 0,
+	.preparse	= keyring_preparse,
+	.free_preparse	= keyring_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate	= keyring_instantiate,
+	.revoke		= keyring_revoke,
+	.destroy	= keyring_destroy,
+	.describe	= keyring_describe,
+	.read		= keyring_read,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_type_keyring);
+
+/*
+ * Semaphore to serialise link/link calls to prevent two link calls in parallel
+ * introducing a cycle.
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(keyring_serialise_link_lock);
+
+/*
+ * Publish the name of a keyring so that it can be found by name (if it has
+ * one and it doesn't begin with a dot).
+ */
+static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
+
+	if (keyring->description &&
+	    keyring->description[0] &&
+	    keyring->description[0] != '.') {
+		write_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
+		list_add_tail(&keyring->name_link, &ns->keyring_name_list);
+		write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Preparse a keyring payload
+ */
+static int keyring_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	return prep->datalen != 0 ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free a preparse of a user defined key payload
+ */
+static void keyring_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a keyring.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if given any data.
+ */
+static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
+			       struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	assoc_array_init(&keyring->keys);
+	/* make the keyring available by name if it has one */
+	keyring_publish_name(keyring);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply 64-bits by 32-bits to 96-bits and fold back to 64-bit.  Ideally we'd
+ * fold the carry back too, but that requires inline asm.
+ */
+static u64 mult_64x32_and_fold(u64 x, u32 y)
+{
+	u64 hi = (u64)(u32)(x >> 32) * y;
+	u64 lo = (u64)(u32)(x) * y;
+	return lo + ((u64)(u32)hi << 32) + (u32)(hi >> 32);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Hash a key type and description.
+ */
+static void hash_key_type_and_desc(struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
+{
+	const unsigned level_shift = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
+	const unsigned long fan_mask = ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
+	const char *description = index_key->description;
+	unsigned long hash, type;
+	u32 piece;
+	u64 acc;
+	int n, desc_len = index_key->desc_len;
+
+	type = (unsigned long)index_key->type;
+	acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(type, desc_len + 13);
+	acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207);
+	piece = (unsigned long)index_key->domain_tag;
+	acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, piece);
+	acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		n = desc_len;
+		if (n <= 0)
+			break;
+		if (n > 4)
+			n = 4;
+		piece = 0;
+		memcpy(&piece, description, n);
+		description += n;
+		desc_len -= n;
+		acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, piece);
+		acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207);
+	}
+
+	/* Fold the hash down to 32 bits if need be. */
+	hash = acc;
+	if (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE == 32)
+		hash ^= acc >> 32;
+
+	/* Squidge all the keyrings into a separate part of the tree to
+	 * ordinary keys by making sure the lowest level segment in the hash is
+	 * zero for keyrings and non-zero otherwise.
+	 */
+	if (index_key->type != &key_type_keyring && (hash & fan_mask) == 0)
+		hash |= (hash >> (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - level_shift)) | 1;
+	else if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring && (hash & fan_mask) != 0)
+		hash = (hash + (hash << level_shift)) & ~fan_mask;
+	index_key->hash = hash;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalise an index key to include a part of the description actually in the
+ * index key, to set the domain tag and to calculate the hash.
+ */
+void key_set_index_key(struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
+{
+	static struct key_tag default_domain_tag = { .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1), };
+	size_t n = min_t(size_t, index_key->desc_len, sizeof(index_key->desc));
+
+	memcpy(index_key->desc, index_key->description, n);
+
+	if (!index_key->domain_tag) {
+		if (index_key->type->flags & KEY_TYPE_NET_DOMAIN)
+			index_key->domain_tag = current->nsproxy->net_ns->key_domain;
+		else
+			index_key->domain_tag = &default_domain_tag;
+	}
+
+	hash_key_type_and_desc(index_key);
+}
+
+/**
+ * key_put_tag - Release a ref on a tag.
+ * @tag: The tag to release.
+ *
+ * This releases a reference the given tag and returns true if that ref was the
+ * last one.
+ */
+bool key_put_tag(struct key_tag *tag)
+{
+	if (refcount_dec_and_test(&tag->usage)) {
+		kfree_rcu(tag, rcu);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * key_remove_domain - Kill off a key domain and gc its keys
+ * @domain_tag: The domain tag to release.
+ *
+ * This marks a domain tag as being dead and releases a ref on it.  If that
+ * wasn't the last reference, the garbage collector is poked to try and delete
+ * all keys that were in the domain.
+ */
+void key_remove_domain(struct key_tag *domain_tag)
+{
+	domain_tag->removed = true;
+	if (!key_put_tag(domain_tag))
+		key_schedule_gc_links();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Build the next index key chunk.
+ *
+ * We return it one word-sized chunk at a time.
+ */
+static unsigned long keyring_get_key_chunk(const void *data, int level)
+{
+	const struct keyring_index_key *index_key = data;
+	unsigned long chunk = 0;
+	const u8 *d;
+	int desc_len = index_key->desc_len, n = sizeof(chunk);
+
+	level /= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE;
+	switch (level) {
+	case 0:
+		return index_key->hash;
+	case 1:
+		return index_key->x;
+	case 2:
+		return (unsigned long)index_key->type;
+	case 3:
+		return (unsigned long)index_key->domain_tag;
+	default:
+		level -= 4;
+		if (desc_len <= sizeof(index_key->desc))
+			return 0;
+
+		d = index_key->description + sizeof(index_key->desc);
+		d += level * sizeof(long);
+		desc_len -= sizeof(index_key->desc);
+		if (desc_len > n)
+			desc_len = n;
+		do {
+			chunk <<= 8;
+			chunk |= *d++;
+		} while (--desc_len > 0);
+		return chunk;
+	}
+}
+
+static unsigned long keyring_get_object_key_chunk(const void *object, int level)
+{
+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+	return keyring_get_key_chunk(&key->index_key, level);
+}
+
+static bool keyring_compare_object(const void *object, const void *data)
+{
+	const struct keyring_index_key *index_key = data;
+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+
+	return key->index_key.type == index_key->type &&
+		key->index_key.domain_tag == index_key->domain_tag &&
+		key->index_key.desc_len == index_key->desc_len &&
+		memcmp(key->index_key.description, index_key->description,
+		       index_key->desc_len) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare the index keys of a pair of objects and determine the bit position
+ * at which they differ - if they differ.
+ */
+static int keyring_diff_objects(const void *object, const void *data)
+{
+	const struct key *key_a = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+	const struct keyring_index_key *a = &key_a->index_key;
+	const struct keyring_index_key *b = data;
+	unsigned long seg_a, seg_b;
+	int level, i;
+
+	level = 0;
+	seg_a = a->hash;
+	seg_b = b->hash;
+	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
+		goto differ;
+	level += ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE / 8;
+
+	/* The number of bits contributed by the hash is controlled by a
+	 * constant in the assoc_array headers.  Everything else thereafter we
+	 * can deal with as being machine word-size dependent.
+	 */
+	seg_a = a->x;
+	seg_b = b->x;
+	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
+		goto differ;
+	level += sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	/* The next bit may not work on big endian */
+	seg_a = (unsigned long)a->type;
+	seg_b = (unsigned long)b->type;
+	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
+		goto differ;
+	level += sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	seg_a = (unsigned long)a->domain_tag;
+	seg_b = (unsigned long)b->domain_tag;
+	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
+		goto differ;
+	level += sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	i = sizeof(a->desc);
+	if (a->desc_len <= i)
+		goto same;
+
+	for (; i < a->desc_len; i++) {
+		seg_a = *(unsigned char *)(a->description + i);
+		seg_b = *(unsigned char *)(b->description + i);
+		if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
+			goto differ_plus_i;
+	}
+
+same:
+	return -1;
+
+differ_plus_i:
+	level += i;
+differ:
+	i = level * 8 + __ffs(seg_a ^ seg_b);
+	return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free an object after stripping the keyring flag off of the pointer.
+ */
+static void keyring_free_object(void *object)
+{
+	key_put(keyring_ptr_to_key(object));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Operations for keyring management by the index-tree routines.
+ */
+static const struct assoc_array_ops keyring_assoc_array_ops = {
+	.get_key_chunk		= keyring_get_key_chunk,
+	.get_object_key_chunk	= keyring_get_object_key_chunk,
+	.compare_object		= keyring_compare_object,
+	.diff_objects		= keyring_diff_objects,
+	.free_object		= keyring_free_object,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Clean up a keyring when it is destroyed.  Unpublish its name if it had one
+ * and dispose of its data.
+ *
+ * The garbage collector detects the final key_put(), removes the keyring from
+ * the serial number tree and then does RCU synchronisation before coming here,
+ * so we shouldn't need to worry about code poking around here with the RCU
+ * readlock held by this time.
+ */
+static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
+{
+	if (keyring->description) {
+		write_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
+
+		if (keyring->name_link.next != NULL &&
+		    !list_empty(&keyring->name_link))
+			list_del(&keyring->name_link);
+
+		write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
+	}
+
+	if (keyring->restrict_link) {
+		struct key_restriction *keyres = keyring->restrict_link;
+
+		key_put(keyres->key);
+		kfree(keyres);
+	}
+
+	assoc_array_destroy(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Describe a keyring for /proc.
+ */
+static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
+{
+	if (keyring->description)
+		seq_puts(m, keyring->description);
+	else
+		seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
+
+	if (key_is_positive(keyring)) {
+		if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0)
+			seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree);
+		else
+			seq_puts(m, ": empty");
+	}
+}
+
+struct keyring_read_iterator_context {
+	size_t			buflen;
+	size_t			count;
+	key_serial_t		*buffer;
+};
+
+static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data)
+{
+	struct keyring_read_iterator_context *ctx = data;
+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+
+	kenter("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}",
+	       key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->buflen);
+
+	if (ctx->count >= ctx->buflen)
+		return 1;
+
+	*ctx->buffer++ = key->serial;
+	ctx->count += sizeof(key->serial);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a list of key IDs from the keyring's contents in binary form
+ *
+ * The keyring's semaphore is read-locked by the caller.  This prevents someone
+ * from modifying it under us - which could cause us to read key IDs multiple
+ * times.
+ */
+static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
+			 char *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+	struct keyring_read_iterator_context ctx;
+	long ret;
+
+	kenter("{%d},,%zu", key_serial(keyring), buflen);
+
+	if (buflen & (sizeof(key_serial_t) - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Copy as many key IDs as fit into the buffer */
+	if (buffer && buflen) {
+		ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t *)buffer;
+		ctx.buflen = buflen;
+		ctx.count = 0;
+		ret = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys,
+					  keyring_read_iterator, &ctx);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			kleave(" = %ld [iterate]", ret);
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Return the size of the buffer needed */
+	ret = keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree * sizeof(key_serial_t);
+	if (ret <= buflen)
+		kleave("= %ld [ok]", ret);
+	else
+		kleave("= %ld [buffer too small]", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a keyring and link into the destination keyring.
+ */
+struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
+			  const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm,
+			  unsigned long flags,
+			  struct key_restriction *restrict_link,
+			  struct key *dest)
+{
+	struct key *keyring;
+	int ret;
+
+	keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, description,
+			    uid, gid, cred, perm, flags, restrict_link);
+	if (!IS_ERR(keyring)) {
+		ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, dest, NULL);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			key_put(keyring);
+			keyring = ERR_PTR(ret);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return keyring;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_reject - Give -EPERM to restrict link
+ * @keyring: The keyring being added to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the key intended to be added.
+ * @restriction_key: Keys providing additional data for evaluating restriction.
+ *
+ * Reject the addition of any links to a keyring.  It can be overridden by
+ * passing KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to key_instantiate_and_link() when
+ * adding a key to a keyring.
+ *
+ * This is meant to be stored in a key_restriction structure which is passed
+ * in the restrict_link parameter to keyring_alloc().
+ */
+int restrict_link_reject(struct key *keyring,
+			 const struct key_type *type,
+			 const union key_payload *payload,
+			 struct key *restriction_key)
+{
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/*
+ * By default, we keys found by getting an exact match on their descriptions.
+ */
+bool key_default_cmp(const struct key *key,
+		     const struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+	return strcmp(key->description, match_data->raw_data) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Iteration function to consider each key found.
+ */
+static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
+{
+	struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data;
+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+	unsigned long kflags = READ_ONCE(key->flags);
+	short state = key_read_state(key);
+
+	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
+
+	/* ignore keys not of this type */
+	if (key->type != ctx->index_key.type) {
+		kleave(" = 0 [!type]");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */
+	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) {
+		time64_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
+
+		if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) {
+			ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+			kleave(" = %d [invrev]", ctx->skipped_ret);
+			goto skipped;
+		}
+
+		if (expiry && ctx->now >= expiry) {
+			if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED))
+				ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED);
+			kleave(" = %d [expire]", ctx->skipped_ret);
+			goto skipped;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* keys that don't match */
+	if (!ctx->match_data.cmp(key, &ctx->match_data)) {
+		kleave(" = 0 [!match]");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* key must have search permissions */
+	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
+	    key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
+				ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) {
+		ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+		kleave(" = %d [!perm]", ctx->skipped_ret);
+		goto skipped;
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) {
+		/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
+		if (state < 0) {
+			ctx->result = ERR_PTR(state);
+			kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret);
+			goto skipped;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Found */
+	ctx->result = make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed);
+	kleave(" = 1 [found]");
+	return 1;
+
+skipped:
+	return ctx->skipped_ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search inside a keyring for a key.  We can search by walking to it
+ * directly based on its index-key or we can iterate over the entire
+ * tree looking for it, based on the match function.
+ */
+static int search_keyring(struct key *keyring, struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->match_data.lookup_type == KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT) {
+		const void *object;
+
+		object = assoc_array_find(&keyring->keys,
+					  &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
+					  &ctx->index_key);
+		return object ? ctx->iterator(object, ctx) : 0;
+	}
+	return assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, ctx->iterator, ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search a tree of keyrings that point to other keyrings up to the maximum
+ * depth.
+ */
+static bool search_nested_keyrings(struct key *keyring,
+				   struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct {
+		struct key *keyring;
+		struct assoc_array_node *node;
+		int slot;
+	} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
+
+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
+	struct assoc_array_node *node;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
+	struct key *key;
+	int sp = 0, slot;
+
+	kenter("{%d},{%s,%s}",
+	       keyring->serial,
+	       ctx->index_key.type->name,
+	       ctx->index_key.description);
+
+#define STATE_CHECKS (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK | KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK)
+	BUG_ON((ctx->flags & STATE_CHECKS) == 0 ||
+	       (ctx->flags & STATE_CHECKS) == STATE_CHECKS);
+
+	if (ctx->index_key.description)
+		key_set_index_key(&ctx->index_key);
+
+	/* Check to see if this top-level keyring is what we are looking for
+	 * and whether it is valid or not.
+	 */
+	if (ctx->match_data.lookup_type == KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE ||
+	    keyring_compare_object(keyring, &ctx->index_key)) {
+		ctx->skipped_ret = 2;
+		switch (ctx->iterator(keyring_key_to_ptr(keyring), ctx)) {
+		case 1:
+			goto found;
+		case 2:
+			return false;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ctx->skipped_ret = 0;
+
+	/* Start processing a new keyring */
+descend_to_keyring:
+	kdebug("descend to %d", keyring->serial);
+	if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
+		goto not_this_keyring;
+
+	/* Search through the keys in this keyring before its searching its
+	 * subtrees.
+	 */
+	if (search_keyring(keyring, ctx))
+		goto found;
+
+	/* Then manually iterate through the keyrings nested in this one.
+	 *
+	 * Start from the root node of the index tree.  Because of the way the
+	 * hash function has been set up, keyrings cluster on the leftmost
+	 * branch of the root node (root slot 0) or in the root node itself.
+	 * Non-keyrings avoid the leftmost branch of the root entirely (root
+	 * slots 1-15).
+	 */
+	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE))
+		goto not_this_keyring;
+
+	ptr = READ_ONCE(keyring->keys.root);
+	if (!ptr)
+		goto not_this_keyring;
+
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
+		/* If the root is a shortcut, either the keyring only contains
+		 * keyring pointers (everything clusters behind root slot 0) or
+		 * doesn't contain any keyring pointers.
+		 */
+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+		if ((shortcut->index_key[0] & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) != 0)
+			goto not_this_keyring;
+
+		ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
+		node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
+		goto begin_node;
+	}
+
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
+	ptr = node->slots[0];
+	if (!assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr))
+		goto begin_node;
+
+descend_to_node:
+	/* Descend to a more distal node in this keyring's content tree and go
+	 * through that.
+	 */
+	kdebug("descend");
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+		ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
+		BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr));
+	}
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
+
+begin_node:
+	kdebug("begin_node");
+	slot = 0;
+ascend_to_node:
+	/* Go through the slots in a node */
+	for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
+		ptr = READ_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
+
+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
+			if (node->back_pointer ||
+			    assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr))
+				goto descend_to_node;
+		}
+
+		if (!keyring_ptr_is_keyring(ptr))
+			continue;
+
+		key = keyring_ptr_to_key(ptr);
+
+		if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH) {
+			if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP) {
+				ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
+				return false;
+			}
+			goto not_this_keyring;
+		}
+
+		/* Search a nested keyring */
+		if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
+		    key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
+					ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/* stack the current position */
+		stack[sp].keyring = keyring;
+		stack[sp].node = node;
+		stack[sp].slot = slot;
+		sp++;
+
+		/* begin again with the new keyring */
+		keyring = key;
+		goto descend_to_keyring;
+	}
+
+	/* We've dealt with all the slots in the current node, so now we need
+	 * to ascend to the parent and continue processing there.
+	 */
+	ptr = READ_ONCE(node->back_pointer);
+	slot = node->parent_slot;
+
+	if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+		ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer);
+		slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
+	}
+	if (!ptr)
+		goto not_this_keyring;
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
+	slot++;
+
+	/* If we've ascended to the root (zero backpointer), we must have just
+	 * finished processing the leftmost branch rather than the root slots -
+	 * so there can't be any more keyrings for us to find.
+	 */
+	if (node->back_pointer) {
+		kdebug("ascend %d", slot);
+		goto ascend_to_node;
+	}
+
+	/* The keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a
+	 * matching key.
+	 */
+not_this_keyring:
+	kdebug("not_this_keyring %d", sp);
+	if (sp <= 0) {
+		kleave(" = false");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Resume the processing of a keyring higher up in the tree */
+	sp--;
+	keyring = stack[sp].keyring;
+	node = stack[sp].node;
+	slot = stack[sp].slot + 1;
+	kdebug("ascend to %d [%d]", keyring->serial, slot);
+	goto ascend_to_node;
+
+	/* We found a viable match */
+found:
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result);
+	key_check(key);
+	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME)) {
+		key->last_used_at = ctx->now;
+		keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now;
+		while (sp > 0)
+			stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now;
+	}
+	kleave(" = true");
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * keyring_search_rcu - Search a keyring tree for a matching key under RCU
+ * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the keyring with possession indicator.
+ * @ctx: The keyring search context.
+ *
+ * Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given.
+ * The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the
+ * caller to be searchable and keys can only be found if they too grant Search
+ * to the caller. The possession flag on the root keyring pointer controls use
+ * of the possessor bits in permissions checking of the entire tree.  In
+ * addition, the LSM gets to forbid keyring searches and key matches.
+ *
+ * The search is performed as a breadth-then-depth search up to the prescribed
+ * limit (KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH).  The caller must hold the RCU read lock to
+ * prevent keyrings from being destroyed or rearranged whilst they are being
+ * searched.
+ *
+ * Keys are matched to the type provided and are then filtered by the match
+ * function, which is given the description to use in any way it sees fit.  The
+ * match function may use any attributes of a key that it wishes to
+ * determine the match.  Normally the match function from the key type would be
+ * used.
+ *
+ * RCU can be used to prevent the keyring key lists from disappearing without
+ * the need to take lots of locks.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the found key and increments the key usage count if
+ * successful; -EAGAIN if no matching keys were found, or if expired or revoked
+ * keys were found; -ENOKEY if only negative keys were found; -ENOTDIR if the
+ * specified keyring wasn't a keyring.
+ *
+ * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute from
+ * @keyring_ref is propagated to the returned key reference.
+ */
+key_ref_t keyring_search_rcu(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
+			     struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct key *keyring;
+	long err;
+
+	ctx->iterator = keyring_search_iterator;
+	ctx->possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
+	ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
+
+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
+	key_check(keyring);
+
+	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
+
+	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM)) {
+		err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
+		if (err < 0)
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
+	}
+
+	ctx->now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+	if (search_nested_keyrings(keyring, ctx))
+		__key_get(key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result));
+	return ctx->result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * keyring_search - Search the supplied keyring tree for a matching key
+ * @keyring: The root of the keyring tree to be searched.
+ * @type: The type of keyring we want to find.
+ * @description: The name of the keyring we want to find.
+ * @recurse: True to search the children of @keyring also
+ *
+ * As keyring_search_rcu() above, but using the current task's credentials and
+ * type's default matching function and preferred search method.
+ */
+key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
+			 struct key_type *type,
+			 const char *description,
+			 bool recurse)
+{
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.index_key.type		= type,
+		.index_key.description	= description,
+		.index_key.desc_len	= strlen(description),
+		.cred			= current_cred(),
+		.match_data.cmp		= key_default_cmp,
+		.match_data.raw_data	= description,
+		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,
+	};
+	key_ref_t key;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (recurse)
+		ctx.flags |= KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE;
+	if (type->match_preparse) {
+		ret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	key = keyring_search_rcu(keyring, &ctx);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (type->match_free)
+		type->match_free(&ctx.match_data);
+	return key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
+
+static struct key_restriction *keyring_restriction_alloc(
+	key_restrict_link_func_t check)
+{
+	struct key_restriction *keyres =
+		kzalloc_obj(struct key_restriction);
+
+	if (!keyres)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	keyres->check = check;
+
+	return keyres;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Semaphore to serialise restriction setup to prevent reference count
+ * cycles through restriction key pointers.
+ */
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(keyring_serialise_restrict_sem);
+
+/*
+ * Check for restriction cycles that would prevent keyring garbage collection.
+ * keyring_serialise_restrict_sem must be held.
+ */
+static bool keyring_detect_restriction_cycle(const struct key *dest_keyring,
+					     struct key_restriction *keyres)
+{
+	while (keyres && keyres->key &&
+	       keyres->key->type == &key_type_keyring) {
+		if (keyres->key == dest_keyring)
+			return true;
+
+		keyres = keyres->key->restrict_link;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * keyring_restrict - Look up and apply a restriction to a keyring
+ * @keyring_ref: The keyring to be restricted
+ * @type: The key type that will provide the restriction checker.
+ * @restriction: The restriction options to apply to the keyring
+ *
+ * Look up a keyring and apply a restriction to it.  The restriction is managed
+ * by the specific key type, but can be configured by the options specified in
+ * the restriction string.
+ */
+int keyring_restrict(key_ref_t keyring_ref, const char *type,
+		     const char *restriction)
+{
+	struct key *keyring;
+	struct key_type *restrict_type = NULL;
+	struct key_restriction *restrict_link;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
+	key_check(keyring);
+
+	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		return -ENOTDIR;
+
+	if (!type) {
+		restrict_link = keyring_restriction_alloc(restrict_link_reject);
+	} else {
+		restrict_type = key_type_lookup(type);
+
+		if (IS_ERR(restrict_type))
+			return PTR_ERR(restrict_type);
+
+		if (!restrict_type->lookup_restriction) {
+			ret = -ENOENT;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		restrict_link = restrict_type->lookup_restriction(restriction);
+	}
+
+	if (IS_ERR(restrict_link)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(restrict_link);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
+	down_write(&keyring_serialise_restrict_sem);
+
+	if (keyring->restrict_link) {
+		ret = -EEXIST;
+	} else if (keyring_detect_restriction_cycle(keyring, restrict_link)) {
+		ret = -EDEADLK;
+	} else {
+		keyring->restrict_link = restrict_link;
+		notify_key(keyring, NOTIFY_KEY_SETATTR, 0);
+	}
+
+	up_write(&keyring_serialise_restrict_sem);
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		key_put(restrict_link->key);
+		kfree(restrict_link);
+	}
+
+error:
+	if (restrict_type)
+		key_type_put(restrict_type);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_restrict);
+
+/*
+ * Search the given keyring for a key that might be updated.
+ *
+ * The caller must guarantee that the keyring is a keyring and that the
+ * permission is granted to modify the keyring as no check is made here.  The
+ * caller must also hold a lock on the keyring semaphore.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the found key with usage count incremented if
+ * successful and returns NULL if not found.  Revoked and invalidated keys are
+ * skipped over.
+ *
+ * If successful, the possession indicator is propagated from the keyring ref
+ * to the returned key reference.
+ */
+key_ref_t find_key_to_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
+			     const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
+{
+	struct key *keyring, *key;
+	const void *object;
+
+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
+
+	kenter("{%d},{%s,%s}",
+	       keyring->serial, index_key->type->name, index_key->description);
+
+	guard(rcu)();
+	object = assoc_array_find(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
+				  index_key);
+
+	if (object)
+		goto found;
+
+	kleave(" = NULL");
+	return NULL;
+
+found:
+	key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+	if (key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+			  (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) {
+		kleave(" = NULL [x]");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	__key_get(key);
+	kleave(" = {%d}", key->serial);
+	return make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find a keyring with the specified name.
+ *
+ * Only keyrings that have nonzero refcount, are not revoked, and are owned by a
+ * user in the current user namespace are considered.  If @uid_keyring is %true,
+ * the keyring additionally must have been allocated as a user or user session
+ * keyring; otherwise, it must grant Search permission directly to the caller.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the keyring with the keyring's refcount having being
+ * incremented on success.  -ENOKEY is returned if a key could not be found.
+ */
+struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
+	struct key *keyring;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	read_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
+
+	/* Search this hash bucket for a keyring with a matching name that
+	 * grants Search permission and that hasn't been revoked
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry(keyring, &ns->keyring_name_list, name_link) {
+		if (!kuid_has_mapping(ns, keyring->user->uid))
+			continue;
+
+		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
+			continue;
+
+		if (strcmp(keyring->description, name) != 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (uid_keyring) {
+			if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING,
+				      &keyring->flags))
+				continue;
+		} else {
+			if (key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
+					   KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
+				continue;
+		}
+
+		/* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
+		 * key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead'
+		 * (ie. it has a zero usage count) */
+		if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&keyring->usage))
+			continue;
+		keyring->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	keyring = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+out:
+	read_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
+	return keyring;
+}
+
+static int keyring_detect_cycle_iterator(const void *object,
+					 void *iterator_data)
+{
+	struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data;
+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+
+	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
+
+	/* We might get a keyring with matching index-key that is nonetheless a
+	 * different keyring. */
+	if (key != ctx->match_data.raw_data)
+		return 0;
+
+	ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EDEADLK);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * See if a cycle will be created by inserting acyclic tree B in acyclic
+ * tree A at the topmost level (ie: as a direct child of A).
+ *
+ * Since we are adding B to A at the top level, checking for cycles should just
+ * be a matter of seeing if node A is somewhere in tree B.
+ */
+static int keyring_detect_cycle(struct key *A, struct key *B)
+{
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.index_key		= A->index_key,
+		.match_data.raw_data	= A,
+		.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.iterator		= keyring_detect_cycle_iterator,
+		.flags			= (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE),
+	};
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	search_nested_keyrings(B, &ctx);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return PTR_ERR(ctx.result) == -EAGAIN ? 0 : PTR_ERR(ctx.result);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Lock keyring for link.
+ */
+int __key_link_lock(struct key *keyring,
+		    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
+	__acquires(&keyring->sem)
+	__acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_lock)
+{
+	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		return -ENOTDIR;
+
+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	/* Serialise link/link calls to prevent parallel calls causing a cycle
+	 * when linking two keyring in opposite orders.
+	 */
+	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
+		mutex_lock(&keyring_serialise_link_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Lock keyrings for move (link/unlink combination).
+ */
+int __key_move_lock(struct key *l_keyring, struct key *u_keyring,
+		    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
+	__acquires(&l_keyring->sem)
+	__acquires(&u_keyring->sem)
+	__acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_lock)
+{
+	if (l_keyring->type != &key_type_keyring ||
+	    u_keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		return -ENOTDIR;
+
+	/* We have to be very careful here to take the keyring locks in the
+	 * right order, lest we open ourselves to deadlocking against another
+	 * move operation.
+	 */
+	if (l_keyring < u_keyring) {
+		down_write(&l_keyring->sem);
+		down_write_nested(&u_keyring->sem, 1);
+	} else {
+		down_write(&u_keyring->sem);
+		down_write_nested(&l_keyring->sem, 1);
+	}
+
+	/* Serialise link/link calls to prevent parallel calls causing a cycle
+	 * when linking two keyring in opposite orders.
+	 */
+	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
+		mutex_lock(&keyring_serialise_link_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Preallocate memory so that a key can be linked into to a keyring.
+ */
+int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
+		     const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
+		     struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("%d,%s,%s,",
+	       keyring->serial, index_key->type->name, index_key->description);
+
+	BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);
+	BUG_ON(*_edit != NULL);
+
+	*_edit = NULL;
+
+	ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
+		goto error;
+
+	/* Create an edit script that will insert/replace the key in the
+	 * keyring tree.
+	 */
+	edit = assoc_array_insert(&keyring->keys,
+				  &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
+				  index_key,
+				  NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(edit)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(edit);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/* If we're not replacing a link in-place then we're going to need some
+	 * extra quota.
+	 */
+	if (!edit->dead_leaf) {
+		ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring,
+					  keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error_cancel;
+	}
+
+	*_edit = edit;
+	kleave(" = 0");
+	return 0;
+
+error_cancel:
+	assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
+error:
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check already instantiated keys aren't going to be a problem.
+ *
+ * The caller must have called __key_link_begin(). Don't need to call this for
+ * keys that were created since __key_link_begin() was called.
+ */
+int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
+{
+	if (key->type == &key_type_keyring)
+		/* check that we aren't going to create a cycle by linking one
+		 * keyring to another */
+		return keyring_detect_cycle(keyring, key);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Link a key into to a keyring.
+ *
+ * Must be called with __key_link_begin() having being called.  Discards any
+ * already extant link to matching key if there is one, so that each keyring
+ * holds at most one link to any given key of a particular type+description
+ * combination.
+ */
+void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+		struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
+{
+	__key_get(key);
+	assoc_array_insert_set_object(*_edit, keyring_key_to_ptr(key));
+	assoc_array_apply_edit(*_edit);
+	*_edit = NULL;
+	notify_key(keyring, NOTIFY_KEY_LINKED, key_serial(key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finish linking a key into to a keyring.
+ *
+ * Must be called with __key_link_begin() having being called.
+ */
+void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
+		    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
+		    struct assoc_array_edit *edit)
+	__releases(&keyring->sem)
+	__releases(&keyring_serialise_link_lock)
+{
+	BUG_ON(index_key->type == NULL);
+	kenter("%d,%s,", keyring->serial, index_key->type->name);
+
+	if (edit) {
+		if (!edit->dead_leaf) {
+			key_payload_reserve(keyring,
+				keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
+		}
+		assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
+	}
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
+		mutex_unlock(&keyring_serialise_link_lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check addition of keys to restricted keyrings.
+ */
+static int __key_link_check_restriction(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
+{
+	if (!keyring->restrict_link || !keyring->restrict_link->check)
+		return 0;
+	return keyring->restrict_link->check(keyring, key->type, &key->payload,
+					     keyring->restrict_link->key);
+}
+
+/**
+ * key_link - Link a key to a keyring
+ * @keyring: The keyring to make the link in.
+ * @key: The key to link to.
+ *
+ * Make a link in a keyring to a key, such that the keyring holds a reference
+ * on that key and the key can potentially be found by searching that keyring.
+ *
+ * This function will write-lock the keyring's semaphore and will consume some
+ * of the user's key data quota to hold the link.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -ENOTDIR if the keyring isn't a keyring,
+ * -EKEYREVOKED if the keyring has been revoked, -ENFILE if the keyring is
+ * full, -EDQUOT if there is insufficient key data quota remaining to add
+ * another link or -ENOMEM if there's insufficient memory.
+ *
+ * It is assumed that the caller has checked that it is permitted for a link to
+ * be made (the keyring should have Write permission and the key Link
+ * permission).
+ */
+int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("{%d,%d}", keyring->serial, refcount_read(&keyring->usage));
+
+	key_check(keyring);
+	key_check(key);
+
+	ret = __key_link_lock(keyring, &key->index_key);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_end;
+
+	kdebug("begun {%d,%d}", keyring->serial, refcount_read(&keyring->usage));
+	ret = __key_link_check_restriction(keyring, key);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		__key_link(keyring, key, &edit);
+
+error_end:
+	__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
+error:
+	kleave(" = %d {%d,%d}", ret, keyring->serial, refcount_read(&keyring->usage));
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_link);
+
+/*
+ * Lock a keyring for unlink.
+ */
+static int __key_unlink_lock(struct key *keyring)
+	__acquires(&keyring->sem)
+{
+	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		return -ENOTDIR;
+
+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Begin the process of unlinking a key from a keyring.
+ */
+static int __key_unlink_begin(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+			      struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
+
+	BUG_ON(*_edit != NULL);
+
+	edit = assoc_array_delete(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
+				  &key->index_key);
+	if (IS_ERR(edit))
+		return PTR_ERR(edit);
+
+	if (!edit)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	*_edit = edit;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Apply an unlink change.
+ */
+static void __key_unlink(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+			 struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
+{
+	assoc_array_apply_edit(*_edit);
+	notify_key(keyring, NOTIFY_KEY_UNLINKED, key_serial(key));
+	*_edit = NULL;
+	key_payload_reserve(keyring, keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finish unlinking a key from to a keyring.
+ */
+static void __key_unlink_end(struct key *keyring,
+			     struct key *key,
+			     struct assoc_array_edit *edit)
+	__releases(&keyring->sem)
+{
+	if (edit)
+		assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+}
+
+/**
+ * key_unlink - Unlink the first link to a key from a keyring.
+ * @keyring: The keyring to remove the link from.
+ * @key: The key the link is to.
+ *
+ * Remove a link from a keyring to a key.
+ *
+ * This function will write-lock the keyring's semaphore.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -ENOTDIR if the keyring isn't a keyring, -ENOENT if
+ * the key isn't linked to by the keyring or -ENOMEM if there's insufficient
+ * memory.
+ *
+ * It is assumed that the caller has checked that it is permitted for a link to
+ * be removed (the keyring should have Write permission; no permissions are
+ * required on the key).
+ */
+int key_unlink(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	key_check(keyring);
+	key_check(key);
+
+	ret = __key_unlink_lock(keyring);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = __key_unlink_begin(keyring, key, &edit);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		__key_unlink(keyring, key, &edit);
+	__key_unlink_end(keyring, key, edit);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_unlink);
+
+/**
+ * key_move - Move a key from one keyring to another
+ * @key: The key to move
+ * @from_keyring: The keyring to remove the link from.
+ * @to_keyring: The keyring to make the link in.
+ * @flags: Qualifying flags, such as KEYCTL_MOVE_EXCL.
+ *
+ * Make a link in @to_keyring to a key, such that the keyring holds a reference
+ * on that key and the key can potentially be found by searching that keyring
+ * whilst simultaneously removing a link to the key from @from_keyring.
+ *
+ * This function will write-lock both keyring's semaphores and will consume
+ * some of the user's key data quota to hold the link on @to_keyring.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -ENOTDIR if either keyring isn't a keyring,
+ * -EKEYREVOKED if either keyring has been revoked, -ENFILE if the second
+ * keyring is full, -EDQUOT if there is insufficient key data quota remaining
+ * to add another link or -ENOMEM if there's insufficient memory.  If
+ * KEYCTL_MOVE_EXCL is set, then -EEXIST will be returned if there's already a
+ * matching key in @to_keyring.
+ *
+ * It is assumed that the caller has checked that it is permitted for a link to
+ * be made (the keyring should have Write permission and the key Link
+ * permission).
+ */
+int key_move(struct key *key,
+	     struct key *from_keyring,
+	     struct key *to_keyring,
+	     unsigned int flags)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_edit *from_edit = NULL, *to_edit = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("%d,%d,%d", key->serial, from_keyring->serial, to_keyring->serial);
+
+	if (from_keyring == to_keyring)
+		return 0;
+
+	key_check(key);
+	key_check(from_keyring);
+	key_check(to_keyring);
+
+	ret = __key_move_lock(from_keyring, to_keyring, &key->index_key);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	ret = __key_unlink_begin(from_keyring, key, &from_edit);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+	ret = __key_link_begin(to_keyring, &key->index_key, &to_edit);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = -EEXIST;
+	if (to_edit->dead_leaf && (flags & KEYCTL_MOVE_EXCL))
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = __key_link_check_restriction(to_keyring, key);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+	ret = __key_link_check_live_key(to_keyring, key);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	__key_unlink(from_keyring, key, &from_edit);
+	__key_link(to_keyring, key, &to_edit);
+error:
+	__key_link_end(to_keyring, &key->index_key, to_edit);
+	__key_unlink_end(from_keyring, key, from_edit);
+out:
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_move);
+
+/**
+ * keyring_clear - Clear a keyring
+ * @keyring: The keyring to clear.
+ *
+ * Clear the contents of the specified keyring.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful or -ENOTDIR if the keyring isn't a keyring.
+ */
+int keyring_clear(struct key *keyring)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		return -ENOTDIR;
+
+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	edit = assoc_array_clear(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(edit)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(edit);
+	} else {
+		if (edit)
+			assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
+		notify_key(keyring, NOTIFY_KEY_CLEARED, 0);
+		key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0);
+		ret = 0;
+	}
+
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_clear);
+
+/*
+ * Dispose of the links from a revoked keyring.
+ *
+ * This is called with the key sem write-locked.
+ */
+static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
+
+	edit = assoc_array_clear(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops);
+	if (!IS_ERR(edit)) {
+		if (edit)
+			assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
+		key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+static bool keyring_gc_select_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data)
+{
+	struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+	time64_t *limit = iterator_data;
+
+	if (key_is_dead(key, *limit))
+		return false;
+	key_get(key);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int keyring_gc_check_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
+{
+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+	time64_t *limit = iterator_data;
+
+	key_check(key);
+	return key_is_dead(key, *limit);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collect pointers from a keyring.
+ *
+ * Not called with any locks held.  The keyring's key struct will not be
+ * deallocated under us as only our caller may deallocate it.
+ */
+void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time64_t limit)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	kenter("%x{%s}", keyring->serial, keyring->description ?: "");
+
+	if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
+		goto dont_gc;
+
+	/* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	result = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys,
+				     keyring_gc_check_iterator, &limit);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (result == true)
+		goto do_gc;
+
+dont_gc:
+	kleave(" [no gc]");
+	return;
+
+do_gc:
+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
+	assoc_array_gc(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
+		       keyring_gc_select_iterator, &limit);
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+	kleave(" [gc]");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collect restriction pointers from a keyring.
+ *
+ * Keyring restrictions are associated with a key type, and must be cleaned
+ * up if the key type is unregistered. The restriction is altered to always
+ * reject additional keys so a keyring cannot be opened up by unregistering
+ * a key type.
+ *
+ * Not called with any keyring locks held. The keyring's key struct will not
+ * be deallocated under us as only our caller may deallocate it.
+ *
+ * The caller is required to hold key_types_sem and dead_type->sem. This is
+ * fulfilled by key_gc_keytype() holding the locks on behalf of
+ * key_garbage_collector(), which it invokes on a workqueue.
+ */
+void keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *dead_type)
+{
+	struct key_restriction *keyres;
+
+	kenter("%x{%s}", keyring->serial, keyring->description ?: "");
+
+	/*
+	 * keyring->restrict_link is only assigned at key allocation time
+	 * or with the key type locked, so the only values that could be
+	 * concurrently assigned to keyring->restrict_link are for key
+	 * types other than dead_type. Given this, it's ok to check
+	 * the key type before acquiring keyring->sem.
+	 */
+	if (!dead_type || !keyring->restrict_link ||
+	    keyring->restrict_link->keytype != dead_type) {
+		kleave(" [no restriction gc]");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Lock the keyring to ensure that a link is not in progress */
+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	keyres = keyring->restrict_link;
+
+	keyres->check = restrict_link_reject;
+
+	key_put(keyres->key);
+	keyres->key = NULL;
+	keyres->keytype = NULL;
+
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	kleave(" [restriction gc]");
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4a61f804e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Key permission checking
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/**
+ * key_task_permission - Check a key can be used
+ * @key_ref: The key to check.
+ * @cred: The credentials to use.
+ * @need_perm: The permission required.
+ *
+ * Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way,
+ * but permit the security modules to override.
+ *
+ * The caller must hold either a ref on cred or must hold the RCU readlock.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -EACCES if access is denied based on the
+ * permissions bits or the LSM check.
+ */
+int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
+			enum key_need_perm need_perm)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	key_perm_t kperm, mask;
+	int ret;
+
+	switch (need_perm) {
+	default:
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		return -EACCES;
+	case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
+	case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
+	case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
+	case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
+		goto lsm;
+
+	case KEY_NEED_VIEW:	mask = KEY_OTH_VIEW;	break;
+	case KEY_NEED_READ:	mask = KEY_OTH_READ;	break;
+	case KEY_NEED_WRITE:	mask = KEY_OTH_WRITE;	break;
+	case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:	mask = KEY_OTH_SEARCH;	break;
+	case KEY_NEED_LINK:	mask = KEY_OTH_LINK;	break;
+	case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:	mask = KEY_OTH_SETATTR;	break;
+	}
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+	/* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */
+	if (uid_eq(key->uid, cred->fsuid)) {
+		kperm = key->perm >> 16;
+		goto use_these_perms;
+	}
+
+	/* use the third 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller has a group
+	 * membership in common with */
+	if (gid_valid(key->gid) && key->perm & KEY_GRP_ALL) {
+		if (gid_eq(key->gid, cred->fsgid)) {
+			kperm = key->perm >> 8;
+			goto use_these_perms;
+		}
+
+		ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid);
+		if (ret) {
+			kperm = key->perm >> 8;
+			goto use_these_perms;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* otherwise use the least-significant 8-bits */
+	kperm = key->perm;
+
+use_these_perms:
+
+	/* use the top 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller possesses
+	 * - possessor permissions are additive with other permissions
+	 */
+	if (is_key_possessed(key_ref))
+		kperm |= key->perm >> 24;
+
+	if ((kperm & mask) != mask)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	/* let LSM be the final arbiter */
+lsm:
+	return security_key_permission(key_ref, cred, need_perm);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission);
+
+/**
+ * key_validate - Validate a key.
+ * @key: The key to be validated.
+ *
+ * Check that a key is valid, returning 0 if the key is okay, -ENOKEY if the
+ * key is invalidated, -EKEYREVOKED if the key's type has been removed or if
+ * the key has been revoked or -EKEYEXPIRED if the key has expired.
+ */
+int key_validate(const struct key *key)
+{
+	unsigned long flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags);
+	time64_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
+
+	if (flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	/* check it's still accessible */
+	if (flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
+		     (1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD)))
+		return -EKEYREVOKED;
+
+	/* check it hasn't expired */
+	if (expiry) {
+		if (ktime_get_real_seconds() >= expiry)
+			return -EKEYEXPIRED;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_validate);
diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..97af230aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/persistent.c
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* General persistent per-UID keyrings register
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+unsigned persistent_keyring_expiry = 3 * 24 * 3600; /* Expire after 3 days of non-use */
+
+/*
+ * Create the persistent keyring register for the current user namespace.
+ *
+ * Called with the namespace's sem locked for writing.
+ */
+static int key_create_persistent_register(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	struct key *reg = keyring_alloc(".persistent_register",
+					KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
+					current_cred(),
+					((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+					 KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+					KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(reg))
+		return PTR_ERR(reg);
+
+	ns->persistent_keyring_register = reg;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create the persistent keyring for the specified user.
+ *
+ * Called with the namespace's sem locked for writing.
+ */
+static key_ref_t key_create_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
+				       struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
+{
+	struct key *persistent;
+	key_ref_t reg_ref, persistent_ref;
+
+	if (!ns->persistent_keyring_register) {
+		long err = key_create_persistent_register(ns);
+		if (err < 0)
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
+	} else {
+		reg_ref = make_key_ref(ns->persistent_keyring_register, true);
+		persistent_ref = find_key_to_update(reg_ref, index_key);
+		if (persistent_ref)
+			return persistent_ref;
+	}
+
+	persistent = keyring_alloc(index_key->description,
+				   uid, INVALID_GID, current_cred(),
+				   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				    KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL,
+				   ns->persistent_keyring_register);
+	if (IS_ERR(persistent))
+		return ERR_CAST(persistent);
+
+	return make_key_ref(persistent, true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the persistent keyring for a specific UID and link it to the nominated
+ * keyring.
+ */
+static long key_get_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
+			       key_ref_t dest_ref)
+{
+	struct keyring_index_key index_key;
+	struct key *persistent;
+	key_ref_t reg_ref, persistent_ref;
+	char buf[32];
+	long ret;
+
+	/* Look in the register if it exists */
+	memset(&index_key, 0, sizeof(index_key));
+	index_key.type = &key_type_keyring;
+	index_key.description = buf;
+	index_key.desc_len = sprintf(buf, "_persistent.%u", from_kuid(ns, uid));
+	key_set_index_key(&index_key);
+
+	if (ns->persistent_keyring_register) {
+		reg_ref = make_key_ref(ns->persistent_keyring_register, true);
+		down_read(&ns->keyring_sem);
+		persistent_ref = find_key_to_update(reg_ref, &index_key);
+		up_read(&ns->keyring_sem);
+
+		if (persistent_ref)
+			goto found;
+	}
+
+	/* It wasn't in the register, so we'll need to create it.  We might
+	 * also need to create the register.
+	 */
+	down_write(&ns->keyring_sem);
+	persistent_ref = key_create_persistent(ns, uid, &index_key);
+	up_write(&ns->keyring_sem);
+	if (!IS_ERR(persistent_ref))
+		goto found;
+
+	return PTR_ERR(persistent_ref);
+
+found:
+	ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_NEED_LINK);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		persistent = key_ref_to_ptr(persistent_ref);
+		ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), persistent);
+		if (ret == 0) {
+			key_set_timeout(persistent, persistent_keyring_expiry);
+			ret = persistent->serial;
+		}
+	}
+
+	key_ref_put(persistent_ref);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the persistent keyring for a specific UID and link it to the nominated
+ * keyring.
+ */
+long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t _uid, key_serial_t destid)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
+	key_ref_t dest_ref;
+	kuid_t uid;
+	long ret;
+
+	/* -1 indicates the current user */
+	if (_uid == (uid_t)-1) {
+		uid = current_uid();
+	} else {
+		uid = make_kuid(ns, _uid);
+		if (!uid_valid(uid))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* You can only see your own persistent cache if you're not
+		 * sufficiently privileged.
+		 */
+		if (!uid_eq(uid, current_uid()) &&
+		    !uid_eq(uid, current_euid()) &&
+		    !ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETUID))
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	/* There must be a destination keyring */
+	dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+	if (IS_ERR(dest_ref))
+		return PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
+	if (key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref)->type != &key_type_keyring) {
+		ret = -ENOTDIR;
+		goto out_put_dest;
+	}
+
+	ret = key_get_persistent(ns, uid, dest_ref);
+
+out_put_dest:
+	key_ref_put(dest_ref);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4f4e2c182
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* procfs files for key database enumeration
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <asm/errno.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);
+static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);
+static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v);
+static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
+
+static const struct seq_operations proc_keys_ops = {
+	.start	= proc_keys_start,
+	.next	= proc_keys_next,
+	.stop	= proc_keys_stop,
+	.show	= proc_keys_show,
+};
+
+static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);
+static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);
+static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v);
+static int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
+
+static const struct seq_operations proc_key_users_ops = {
+	.start	= proc_key_users_start,
+	.next	= proc_key_users_next,
+	.stop	= proc_key_users_stop,
+	.show	= proc_key_users_show,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Declare the /proc files.
+ */
+static int __init key_proc_init(void)
+{
+	struct proc_dir_entry *p;
+
+	p = proc_create_seq("keys", 0, NULL, &proc_keys_ops);
+	if (!p)
+		panic("Cannot create /proc/keys\n");
+
+	p = proc_create_seq("key-users", 0, NULL, &proc_key_users_ops);
+	if (!p)
+		panic("Cannot create /proc/key-users\n");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(key_proc_init);
+
+/*
+ * Implement "/proc/keys" to provide a list of the keys on the system that
+ * grant View permission to the caller.
+ */
+static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);
+
+	n = rb_next(n);
+	while (n) {
+		struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+		if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, key->user->uid))
+			break;
+		n = rb_next(n);
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);
+	struct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
+	struct key *minkey = NULL;
+
+	while (n) {
+		struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+		if (id < key->serial) {
+			if (!minkey || minkey->serial > key->serial)
+				minkey = key;
+			n = n->rb_left;
+		} else if (id > key->serial) {
+			n = n->rb_right;
+		} else {
+			minkey = key;
+			break;
+		}
+		key = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!minkey)
+		return NULL;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, minkey->user->uid))
+			return minkey;
+		n = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node);
+		if (!n)
+			return NULL;
+		minkey = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+	}
+}
+
+static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
+	__acquires(key_serial_lock)
+{
+	key_serial_t pos = *_pos;
+	struct key *key;
+
+	spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
+
+	if (*_pos > INT_MAX)
+		return NULL;
+	key = find_ge_key(p, pos);
+	if (!key)
+		return NULL;
+	*_pos = key->serial;
+	return &key->serial_node;
+}
+
+static inline key_serial_t key_node_serial(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+	struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+	return key->serial;
+}
+
+static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
+{
+	struct rb_node *n;
+
+	n = key_serial_next(p, v);
+	if (n)
+		*_pos = key_node_serial(n);
+	else
+		(*_pos)++;
+	return n;
+}
+
+static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
+	__releases(key_serial_lock)
+{
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+}
+
+static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+	struct rb_node *_p = v;
+	struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
+	unsigned long flags;
+	key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
+	time64_t now, expiry;
+	char xbuf[16];
+	short state;
+	u64 timo;
+	int rc;
+
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.index_key		= key->index_key,
+		.cred			= m->file->f_cred,
+		.match_data.cmp		= lookup_user_key_possessed,
+		.match_data.raw_data	= key,
+		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.flags			= (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE),
+	};
+
+	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
+
+	/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can
+	 * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it
+	 */
+	if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		skey_ref = search_cred_keyrings_rcu(&ctx);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
+			key_ref_put(skey_ref);
+			key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */
+	rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	/* come up with a suitable timeout value */
+	expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
+	if (expiry == TIME64_MAX) {
+		memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5);
+	} else if (now >= expiry) {
+		memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5);
+	} else {
+		timo = expiry - now;
+
+		if (timo < 60)
+			sprintf(xbuf, "%llus", timo);
+		else if (timo < 60*60)
+			sprintf(xbuf, "%llum", div_u64(timo, 60));
+		else if (timo < 60*60*24)
+			sprintf(xbuf, "%lluh", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60));
+		else if (timo < 60*60*24*7)
+			sprintf(xbuf, "%llud", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60 * 24));
+		else
+			sprintf(xbuf, "%lluw", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60 * 24 * 7));
+	}
+
+	state = key_read_state(key);
+
+#define showflag(FLAGS, LETTER, FLAG) \
+	((FLAGS & (1 << FLAG)) ? LETTER : '-')
+
+	flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags);
+	seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ",
+		   key->serial,
+		   state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED ? 'I' : '-',
+		   showflag(flags, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),
+		   showflag(flags, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD),
+		   showflag(flags, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),
+		   showflag(flags, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),
+		   state < 0 ? 'N' : '-',
+		   showflag(flags, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),
+		   refcount_read(&key->usage),
+		   xbuf,
+		   key->perm,
+		   from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid),
+		   from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid),
+		   key->type->name);
+
+#undef showflag
+
+	if (key->type->describe)
+		key->type->describe(key, m);
+	seq_putc(m, '\n');
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)
+{
+	while (n) {
+		struct key_user *user = rb_entry(n, struct key_user, node);
+		if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, user->uid))
+			break;
+		n = rb_next(n);
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+static struct rb_node *key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)
+{
+	return __key_user_next(user_ns, rb_next(n));
+}
+
+static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_root *r)
+{
+	struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
+	return __key_user_next(user_ns, n);
+}
+
+static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
+	__acquires(key_user_lock)
+{
+	struct rb_node *_p;
+	loff_t pos = *_pos;
+
+	spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
+
+	_p = key_user_first(seq_user_ns(p), &key_user_tree);
+	while (pos > 0 && _p) {
+		pos--;
+		_p = key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), _p);
+	}
+
+	return _p;
+}
+
+static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
+{
+	(*_pos)++;
+	return key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), (struct rb_node *)v);
+}
+
+static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
+	__releases(key_user_lock)
+{
+	spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
+}
+
+static int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+	struct rb_node *_p = v;
+	struct key_user *user = rb_entry(_p, struct key_user, node);
+	unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
+		key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
+	unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
+		key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
+
+	seq_printf(m, "%5u: %5d %d/%d %d/%d %d/%d\n",
+		   from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), user->uid),
+		   refcount_read(&user->usage),
+		   atomic_read(&user->nkeys),
+		   atomic_read(&user->nikeys),
+		   user->qnkeys,
+		   maxkeys,
+		   user->qnbytes,
+		   maxbytes);
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a63c46bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,965 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Manage a process's keyrings
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/user.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/init_task.h>
+#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/* Session keyring create vs join semaphore */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex);
+
+/* The root user's tracking struct */
+struct key_user root_key_user = {
+	.usage		= REFCOUNT_INIT(3),
+	.cons_lock	= __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(root_key_user.cons_lock),
+	.lock		= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock),
+	.nkeys		= ATOMIC_INIT(2),
+	.nikeys		= ATOMIC_INIT(2),
+	.uid		= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Get or create a user register keyring.
+ */
+static struct key *get_user_register(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
+{
+	struct key *reg_keyring = READ_ONCE(user_ns->user_keyring_register);
+
+	if (reg_keyring)
+		return reg_keyring;
+
+	down_write(&user_ns->keyring_sem);
+
+	/* Make sure there's a register keyring.  It gets owned by the
+	 * user_namespace's owner.
+	 */
+	reg_keyring = user_ns->user_keyring_register;
+	if (!reg_keyring) {
+		reg_keyring = keyring_alloc(".user_reg",
+					    user_ns->owner, INVALID_GID,
+					    kernel_cred(),
+					    KEY_POS_WRITE | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
+					    KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+					    0,
+					    NULL, NULL);
+		if (!IS_ERR(reg_keyring))
+			smp_store_release(&user_ns->user_keyring_register,
+					  reg_keyring);
+	}
+
+	up_write(&user_ns->keyring_sem);
+
+	/* We don't return a ref since the keyring is pinned by the user_ns */
+	return reg_keyring;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Look up the user and user session keyrings for the current process's UID,
+ * creating them if they don't exist.
+ */
+int look_up_user_keyrings(struct key **_user_keyring,
+			  struct key **_user_session_keyring)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+	struct key *reg_keyring, *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
+	key_perm_t user_keyring_perm;
+	key_ref_t uid_keyring_r, session_keyring_r;
+	uid_t uid = from_kuid(user_ns, cred->user->uid);
+	char buf[20];
+	int ret;
+
+	user_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL;
+
+	kenter("%u", uid);
+
+	reg_keyring = get_user_register(user_ns);
+	if (IS_ERR(reg_keyring))
+		return PTR_ERR(reg_keyring);
+
+	down_write(&user_ns->keyring_sem);
+	ret = 0;
+
+	/* Get the user keyring.  Note that there may be one in existence
+	 * already as it may have been pinned by a session, but the user_struct
+	 * pointing to it may have been destroyed by setuid.
+	 */
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "_uid.%u", uid);
+	uid_keyring_r = keyring_search(make_key_ref(reg_keyring, true),
+				       &key_type_keyring, buf, false);
+	kdebug("_uid %p", uid_keyring_r);
+	if (uid_keyring_r == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN)) {
+		uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, cred->user->uid, INVALID_GID,
+					    cred, user_keyring_perm,
+					    KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |
+					    KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+					    NULL, reg_keyring);
+		if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
+			goto error;
+		}
+	} else if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring_r)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring_r);
+		goto error;
+	} else {
+		uid_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(uid_keyring_r);
+	}
+
+	/* Get a default session keyring (which might also exist already) */
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "_uid_ses.%u", uid);
+	session_keyring_r = keyring_search(make_key_ref(reg_keyring, true),
+					   &key_type_keyring, buf, false);
+	kdebug("_uid_ses %p", session_keyring_r);
+	if (session_keyring_r == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN)) {
+		session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, cred->user->uid, INVALID_GID,
+						cred, user_keyring_perm,
+						KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |
+						KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+						NULL, NULL);
+		if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
+			goto error_release;
+		}
+
+		/* We install a link from the user session keyring to
+		 * the user keyring.
+		 */
+		ret = key_link(session_keyring, uid_keyring);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error_release_session;
+
+		/* And only then link the user-session keyring to the
+		 * register.
+		 */
+		ret = key_link(reg_keyring, session_keyring);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error_release_session;
+	} else if (IS_ERR(session_keyring_r)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring_r);
+		goto error_release;
+	} else {
+		session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(session_keyring_r);
+	}
+
+	up_write(&user_ns->keyring_sem);
+
+	if (_user_session_keyring)
+		*_user_session_keyring = session_keyring;
+	else
+		key_put(session_keyring);
+	if (_user_keyring)
+		*_user_keyring = uid_keyring;
+	else
+		key_put(uid_keyring);
+	kleave(" = 0");
+	return 0;
+
+error_release_session:
+	key_put(session_keyring);
+error_release:
+	key_put(uid_keyring);
+error:
+	up_write(&user_ns->keyring_sem);
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the user session keyring if it exists, but don't create it if it
+ * doesn't.
+ */
+struct key *get_user_session_keyring_rcu(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct key *reg_keyring = READ_ONCE(cred->user_ns->user_keyring_register);
+	key_ref_t session_keyring_r;
+	char buf[20];
+
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.index_key.type		= &key_type_keyring,
+		.index_key.description	= buf,
+		.cred			= cred,
+		.match_data.cmp		= key_default_cmp,
+		.match_data.raw_data	= buf,
+		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,
+	};
+
+	if (!reg_keyring)
+		return NULL;
+
+	ctx.index_key.desc_len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "_uid_ses.%u",
+					  from_kuid(cred->user_ns,
+						    cred->user->uid));
+
+	session_keyring_r = keyring_search_rcu(make_key_ref(reg_keyring, true),
+					       &ctx);
+	if (IS_ERR(session_keyring_r))
+		return NULL;
+	return key_ref_to_ptr(session_keyring_r);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Install a thread keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have
+ * one already.  This is allowed to overrun the quota.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
+ */
+int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
+{
+	struct key *keyring;
+
+	if (new->thread_keyring)
+		return 0;
+
+	keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
+				KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
+				KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
+				NULL, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+		return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
+	new->thread_keyring = keyring;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Install a thread keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
+ */
+static int install_thread_keyring(void)
+{
+	struct cred *new;
+	int ret;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		abort_creds(new);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return commit_creds(new);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Install a process keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have
+ * one already.  This is allowed to overrun the quota.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
+ */
+int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
+{
+	struct key *keyring;
+
+	if (new->process_keyring)
+		return 0;
+
+	keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
+				KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
+				KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
+				NULL, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+		return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
+	new->process_keyring = keyring;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Install a process keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
+ */
+static int install_process_keyring(void)
+{
+	struct cred *new;
+	int ret;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		abort_creds(new);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return commit_creds(new);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the given credentials
+ * struct, replacing the existing one if any.  If the given keyring is NULL,
+ * then install a new anonymous session keyring.
+ * @cred can not be in use by any task yet.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.
+ */
+int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct key *old;
+
+	might_sleep();
+
+	/* create an empty session keyring */
+	if (!keyring) {
+		flags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;
+		if (cred->session_keyring)
+			flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
+
+		keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred,
+					KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+					flags, NULL, NULL);
+		if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+			return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+	} else {
+		__key_get(keyring);
+	}
+
+	/* install the keyring */
+	old = cred->session_keyring;
+	cred->session_keyring = keyring;
+
+	if (old)
+		key_put(old);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the current task,
+ * replacing the existing one if any.  If the given keyring is NULL, then
+ * install a new anonymous session keyring.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.
+ */
+static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
+{
+	struct cred *new;
+	int ret;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		abort_creds(new);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return commit_creds(new);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the fsuid changing.
+ */
+void key_fsuid_changed(struct cred *new_cred)
+{
+	/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
+	if (new_cred->thread_keyring) {
+		down_write(&new_cred->thread_keyring->sem);
+		new_cred->thread_keyring->uid = new_cred->fsuid;
+		up_write(&new_cred->thread_keyring->sem);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the fsgid changing.
+ */
+void key_fsgid_changed(struct cred *new_cred)
+{
+	/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
+	if (new_cred->thread_keyring) {
+		down_write(&new_cred->thread_keyring->sem);
+		new_cred->thread_keyring->gid = new_cred->fsgid;
+		up_write(&new_cred->thread_keyring->sem);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first
+ * matching key under RCU conditions (the caller must be holding the RCU read
+ * lock).
+ *
+ * The search criteria are the type and the match function.  The description is
+ * given to the match function as a parameter, but doesn't otherwise influence
+ * the search.  Typically the match function will compare the description
+ * parameter to the key's description.
+ *
+ * This can only search keyrings that grant Search permission to the supplied
+ * credentials.  Keyrings linked to searched keyrings will also be searched if
+ * they grant Search permission too.  Keys can only be found if they grant
+ * Search permission to the credentials.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the key with the key usage count incremented if
+ * successful, -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key or -ENOKEY if we only
+ * matched negative keys.
+ *
+ * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the
+ * returned key reference.
+ */
+key_ref_t search_cred_keyrings_rcu(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct key *user_session;
+	key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
+	const struct cred *cred = ctx->cred;
+
+	/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were
+	 * searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;
+	 * otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if
+	 * none of the keyrings were searchable
+	 *
+	 * in terms of priority: success > -ENOKEY > -EAGAIN > other error
+	 */
+	key_ref = NULL;
+	ret = NULL;
+	err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
+
+	/* search the thread keyring first */
+	if (cred->thread_keyring) {
+		key_ref = keyring_search_rcu(
+			make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1), ctx);
+		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+			goto found;
+
+		switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
+		case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
+			ret = key_ref;
+			break;
+		default:
+			err = key_ref;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* search the process keyring second */
+	if (cred->process_keyring) {
+		key_ref = keyring_search_rcu(
+			make_key_ref(cred->process_keyring, 1), ctx);
+		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+			goto found;
+
+		switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
+			if (ret)
+				break;
+			fallthrough;
+		case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
+			ret = key_ref;
+			break;
+		default:
+			err = key_ref;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* search the session keyring */
+	if (cred->session_keyring) {
+		key_ref = keyring_search_rcu(
+			make_key_ref(cred->session_keyring, 1), ctx);
+
+		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+			goto found;
+
+		switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
+			if (ret)
+				break;
+			fallthrough;
+		case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
+			ret = key_ref;
+			break;
+		default:
+			err = key_ref;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	/* or search the user-session keyring */
+	else if ((user_session = get_user_session_keyring_rcu(cred))) {
+		key_ref = keyring_search_rcu(make_key_ref(user_session, 1),
+					     ctx);
+		key_put(user_session);
+
+		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+			goto found;
+
+		switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
+			if (ret)
+				break;
+			fallthrough;
+		case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
+			ret = key_ref;
+			break;
+		default:
+			err = key_ref;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
+	key_ref = ret ? ret : err;
+
+found:
+	return key_ref;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first
+ * matching key in the manner of search_my_process_keyrings(), but also search
+ * the keys attached to the assumed authorisation key using its credentials if
+ * one is available.
+ *
+ * The caller must be holding the RCU read lock.
+ *
+ * Return same as search_cred_keyrings_rcu().
+ */
+key_ref_t search_process_keyrings_rcu(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
+	key_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err;
+
+	key_ref = search_cred_keyrings_rcu(ctx);
+	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+		goto found;
+	err = key_ref;
+
+	/* if this process has an instantiation authorisation key, then we also
+	 * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there
+	 * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
+	 */
+	if (ctx->cred->request_key_auth &&
+	    ctx->cred == current_cred() &&
+	    ctx->index_key.type != &key_type_request_key_auth
+	    ) {
+		const struct cred *cred = ctx->cred;
+
+		if (key_validate(cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
+			rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];
+
+			//// was search_process_keyrings() [ie. recursive]
+			ctx->cred = rka->cred;
+			key_ref = search_cred_keyrings_rcu(ctx);
+			ctx->cred = cred;
+
+			if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+				goto found;
+			ret = key_ref;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
+	if (err == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) || ret == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY))
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+	else if (err == ERR_PTR(-EACCES))
+		key_ref = ret;
+	else
+		key_ref = err;
+
+found:
+	return key_ref;
+}
+/*
+ * See if the key we're looking at is the target key.
+ */
+bool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key,
+			       const struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+	return key == match_data->raw_data;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Look up a key ID given us by userspace with a given permissions mask to get
+ * the key it refers to.
+ *
+ * Flags can be passed to request that special keyrings be created if referred
+ * to directly, to permit partially constructed keys to be found and to skip
+ * validity and permission checks on the found key.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the key with an incremented usage count if successful;
+ * -EINVAL if the key ID is invalid; -ENOKEY if the key ID does not correspond
+ * to a key or the best found key was a negative key; -EKEYREVOKED or
+ * -EKEYEXPIRED if the best found key was revoked or expired; -EACCES if the
+ * found key doesn't grant the requested permit or the LSM denied access to it;
+ * or -ENOMEM if a special keyring couldn't be created.
+ *
+ * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the
+ * returned key reference.
+ */
+key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
+			  enum key_need_perm need_perm)
+{
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.match_data.cmp		= lookup_user_key_possessed,
+		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.flags			= (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE),
+	};
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
+	struct key *key, *user_session;
+	key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
+	int ret;
+
+try_again:
+	ctx.cred = get_current_cred();
+	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+
+	switch (id) {
+	case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
+		if (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) {
+			if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
+				goto error;
+
+			ret = install_thread_keyring();
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+				goto error;
+			}
+			goto reget_creds;
+		}
+
+		key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;
+		__key_get(key);
+		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
+		break;
+
+	case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
+		if (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) {
+			if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
+				goto error;
+
+			ret = install_process_keyring();
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+				goto error;
+			}
+			goto reget_creds;
+		}
+
+		key = ctx.cred->process_keyring;
+		__key_get(key);
+		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
+		break;
+
+	case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
+		if (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {
+			/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
+			 * doesn't exist yet */
+			ret = look_up_user_keyrings(NULL, &user_session);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				goto error;
+			if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)
+				ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
+			else
+				ret = install_session_keyring(user_session);
+
+			key_put(user_session);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				goto error;
+			goto reget_creds;
+		} else if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING,
+				    &ctx.cred->session_keyring->flags) &&
+			   lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
+			ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				goto error;
+			goto reget_creds;
+		}
+
+		key = ctx.cred->session_keyring;
+		__key_get(key);
+		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
+		break;
+
+	case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
+		ret = look_up_user_keyrings(&key, NULL);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
+		break;
+
+	case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
+		ret = look_up_user_keyrings(NULL, &key);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
+		break;
+
+	case KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:
+		/* group keyrings are not yet supported */
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		goto error;
+
+	case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
+		key = ctx.cred->request_key_auth;
+		if (!key)
+			goto error;
+
+		__key_get(key);
+		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
+		break;
+
+	case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
+		if (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth)
+			goto error;
+
+		down_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
+			     &ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
+			key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+			key = NULL;
+		} else {
+			rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];
+			key = rka->dest_keyring;
+			__key_get(key);
+		}
+		up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+		if (!key)
+			goto error;
+		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		if (id < 1)
+			goto error;
+
+		key = key_lookup(id);
+		if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+			key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
+
+		/* check to see if we possess the key */
+		ctx.index_key			= key->index_key;
+		ctx.match_data.raw_data		= key;
+		kdebug("check possessed");
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		skey_ref = search_process_keyrings_rcu(&ctx);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		kdebug("possessed=%p", skey_ref);
+
+		if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
+			key_put(key);
+			key_ref = skey_ref;
+		}
+
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all
+	 * the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */
+	if (need_perm != KEY_NEED_UNLINK) {
+		if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
+			ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
+			switch (ret) {
+			case -ERESTARTSYS:
+				goto invalid_key;
+			default:
+				if (need_perm != KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE &&
+				    need_perm != KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK)
+					goto invalid_key;
+				break;
+			case 0:
+				break;
+			}
+		} else if (need_perm != KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK) {
+			ret = key_validate(key);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				goto invalid_key;
+		}
+
+		ret = -EIO;
+		if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
+		    key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED)
+			goto invalid_key;
+	}
+
+	/* check the permissions */
+	ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, need_perm);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto invalid_key;
+
+	key->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+
+error:
+	put_cred(ctx.cred);
+	return key_ref;
+
+invalid_key:
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+	key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+	goto error;
+
+	/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new
+	 * creds to be installed */
+reget_creds:
+	put_cred(ctx.cred);
+	goto try_again;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(lookup_user_key);
+
+/*
+ * Join the named keyring as the session keyring if possible else attempt to
+ * create a new one of that name and join that.
+ *
+ * If the name is NULL, an empty anonymous keyring will be installed as the
+ * session keyring.
+ *
+ * Named session keyrings are joined with a semaphore held to prevent the
+ * keyrings from going away whilst the attempt is made to going them and also
+ * to prevent a race in creating compatible session keyrings.
+ */
+long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
+{
+	const struct cred *old;
+	struct cred *new;
+	struct key *keyring;
+	long ret, serial;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	old = current_cred();
+
+	/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
+	if (!name) {
+		ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+
+		serial = new->session_keyring->serial;
+		ret = commit_creds(new);
+		if (ret == 0)
+			ret = serial;
+		goto okay;
+	}
+
+	/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
+	mutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);
+
+	/* look for an existing keyring of this name */
+	keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
+	if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
+		/* not found - try and create a new one */
+		keyring = keyring_alloc(
+			name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
+			KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,
+			KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
+		if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
+			goto error2;
+		}
+	} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
+		goto error2;
+	} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto error3;
+	}
+
+	/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
+	ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error3;
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
+
+	ret = keyring->serial;
+	key_put(keyring);
+okay:
+	return ret;
+
+error3:
+	key_put(keyring);
+error2:
+	mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
+error:
+	abort_creds(new);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when
+ * the target  process is about to resume userspace execution.
+ */
+void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
+{
+	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+	struct cred *new = container_of(twork, struct cred, rcu);
+
+	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
+		put_cred(new);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* If get_ucounts fails more bits are needed in the refcount */
+	if (unlikely(!get_ucounts(old->ucounts))) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "In %s get_ucounts failed\n", __func__);
+		put_cred(new);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	new->  uid	= old->  uid;
+	new-> euid	= old-> euid;
+	new-> suid	= old-> suid;
+	new->fsuid	= old->fsuid;
+	new->  gid	= old->  gid;
+	new-> egid	= old-> egid;
+	new-> sgid	= old-> sgid;
+	new->fsgid	= old->fsgid;
+	new->user	= get_uid(old->user);
+	new->ucounts	= old->ucounts;
+	new->user_ns	= get_user_ns(old->user_ns);
+	new->group_info	= get_group_info(old->group_info);
+
+	new->securebits	= old->securebits;
+	new->cap_inheritable	= old->cap_inheritable;
+	new->cap_permitted	= old->cap_permitted;
+	new->cap_effective	= old->cap_effective;
+	new->cap_ambient	= old->cap_ambient;
+	new->cap_bset		= old->cap_bset;
+
+	new->jit_keyring	= old->jit_keyring;
+	new->thread_keyring	= key_get(old->thread_keyring);
+	new->process_keyring	= key_get(old->process_keyring);
+
+	security_transfer_creds(new, old);
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make sure that root's user and user-session keyrings exist.
+ */
+static int __init init_root_keyring(void)
+{
+	return look_up_user_keyrings(NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_root_keyring);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fa2bb9f2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,821 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Request a key from userspace
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/kmod.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h>
+
+#define key_negative_timeout	60	/* default timeout on a negative key's existence */
+
+static struct key *check_cached_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE
+	struct key *key = current->cached_requested_key;
+
+	if (key &&
+	    ctx->match_data.cmp(key, &ctx->match_data) &&
+	    !(key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+			    (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))))
+		return key_get(key);
+#endif
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void cache_requested_key(struct key *key)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE
+	struct task_struct *t = current;
+
+	/* Do not cache key if it is a kernel thread */
+	if (!(t->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
+		key_put(t->cached_requested_key);
+		t->cached_requested_key = key_get(key);
+		set_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+/**
+ * complete_request_key - Complete the construction of a key.
+ * @authkey: The authorisation key.
+ * @error: The success or failute of the construction.
+ *
+ * Complete the attempt to construct a key.  The key will be negated
+ * if an error is indicated.  The authorisation key will be revoked
+ * unconditionally.
+ */
+void complete_request_key(struct key *authkey, int error)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(authkey);
+	struct key *key = rka->target_key;
+
+	kenter("%d{%d},%d", authkey->serial, key->serial, error);
+
+	if (error < 0)
+		key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, authkey);
+	else
+		key_revoke(authkey);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(complete_request_key);
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a usermode helper that is going to have a specific session
+ * keyring.
+ *
+ * This is called in context of freshly forked kthread before kernel_execve(),
+ * so we can simply install the desired session_keyring at this point.
+ */
+static int umh_keys_init(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct key *keyring = info->data;
+
+	return install_session_keyring_to_cred(cred, keyring);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean up a usermode helper with session keyring.
+ */
+static void umh_keys_cleanup(struct subprocess_info *info)
+{
+	struct key *keyring = info->data;
+	key_put(keyring);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call a usermode helper with a specific session keyring.
+ */
+static int call_usermodehelper_keys(const char *path, char **argv, char **envp,
+					struct key *session_keyring, int wait)
+{
+	struct subprocess_info *info;
+
+	info = call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, GFP_KERNEL,
+					  umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,
+					  session_keyring);
+	if (!info)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	key_get(session_keyring);
+	return call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request userspace finish the construction of a key
+ * - execute "/sbin/request-key <op> <key> <uid> <gid> <keyring> <keyring> <keyring>"
+ */
+static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key *authkey, void *aux)
+{
+	static char const request_key[] = "/sbin/request-key";
+	struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(authkey);
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	key_serial_t prkey, sskey;
+	struct key *key = rka->target_key, *keyring, *session, *user_session;
+	char *argv[9], *envp[3], uid_str[12], gid_str[12];
+	char key_str[12], keyring_str[3][12];
+	char desc[20];
+	int ret, i;
+
+	kenter("{%d},{%d},%s", key->serial, authkey->serial, rka->op);
+
+	ret = look_up_user_keyrings(NULL, &user_session);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_us;
+
+	/* allocate a new session keyring */
+	sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial);
+
+	cred = get_current_cred();
+	keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
+				KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+				KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL, NULL);
+	put_cred(cred);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
+		goto error_alloc;
+	}
+
+	/* attach the auth key to the session keyring */
+	ret = key_link(keyring, authkey);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_link;
+
+	/* record the UID and GID */
+	sprintf(uid_str, "%d", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid));
+	sprintf(gid_str, "%d", from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
+
+	/* we say which key is under construction */
+	sprintf(key_str, "%d", key->serial);
+
+	/* we specify the process's default keyrings */
+	sprintf(keyring_str[0], "%d",
+		cred->thread_keyring ? cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
+
+	prkey = 0;
+	if (cred->process_keyring)
+		prkey = cred->process_keyring->serial;
+	sprintf(keyring_str[1], "%d", prkey);
+
+	session = cred->session_keyring;
+	if (!session)
+		session = user_session;
+	sskey = session->serial;
+
+	sprintf(keyring_str[2], "%d", sskey);
+
+	/* set up a minimal environment */
+	i = 0;
+	envp[i++] = "HOME=/";
+	envp[i++] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin";
+	envp[i] = NULL;
+
+	/* set up the argument list */
+	i = 0;
+	argv[i++] = (char *)request_key;
+	argv[i++] = (char *)rka->op;
+	argv[i++] = key_str;
+	argv[i++] = uid_str;
+	argv[i++] = gid_str;
+	argv[i++] = keyring_str[0];
+	argv[i++] = keyring_str[1];
+	argv[i++] = keyring_str[2];
+	argv[i] = NULL;
+
+	/* do it */
+	ret = call_usermodehelper_keys(request_key, argv, envp, keyring,
+				       UMH_WAIT_PROC);
+	kdebug("usermode -> 0x%x", ret);
+	if (ret >= 0) {
+		/* ret is the exit/wait code */
+		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags) ||
+		    key_validate(key) < 0)
+			ret = -ENOKEY;
+		else
+			/* ignore any errors from userspace if the key was
+			 * instantiated */
+			ret = 0;
+	}
+
+error_link:
+	key_put(keyring);
+
+error_alloc:
+	key_put(user_session);
+error_us:
+	complete_request_key(authkey, ret);
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call out to userspace for key construction.
+ *
+ * Program failure is ignored in favour of key status.
+ */
+static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,
+			 size_t callout_len, void *aux,
+			 struct key *dest_keyring)
+{
+	request_key_actor_t actor;
+	struct key *authkey;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("%d,%p,%zu,%p", key->serial, callout_info, callout_len, aux);
+
+	/* allocate an authorisation key */
+	authkey = request_key_auth_new(key, "create", callout_info, callout_len,
+				       dest_keyring);
+	if (IS_ERR(authkey))
+		return PTR_ERR(authkey);
+
+	/* Make the call */
+	actor = call_sbin_request_key;
+	if (key->type->request_key)
+		actor = key->type->request_key;
+
+	ret = actor(authkey, aux);
+
+	/* check that the actor called complete_request_key() prior to
+	 * returning an error */
+	WARN_ON(ret < 0 &&
+		!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &authkey->flags));
+
+	key_put(authkey);
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the appropriate destination keyring for the request.
+ *
+ * The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the
+ * caller must release.
+ */
+static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("%p", dest_keyring);
+
+	/* find the appropriate keyring */
+	if (dest_keyring) {
+		/* the caller supplied one */
+		key_get(dest_keyring);
+	} else {
+		bool do_perm_check = true;
+
+		/* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we
+		 * find one that we actually have */
+		switch (cred->jit_keyring) {
+		case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
+		case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
+			if (cred->request_key_auth) {
+				authkey = cred->request_key_auth;
+				down_read(&authkey->sem);
+				rka = get_request_key_auth(authkey);
+				if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
+					      &authkey->flags))
+					dest_keyring =
+						key_get(rka->dest_keyring);
+				up_read(&authkey->sem);
+				if (dest_keyring) {
+					do_perm_check = false;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+
+			fallthrough;
+		case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
+			dest_keyring = key_get(cred->thread_keyring);
+			if (dest_keyring)
+				break;
+
+			fallthrough;
+		case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
+			dest_keyring = key_get(cred->process_keyring);
+			if (dest_keyring)
+				break;
+
+			fallthrough;
+		case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
+			dest_keyring = key_get(cred->session_keyring);
+
+			if (dest_keyring)
+				break;
+
+			fallthrough;
+		case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
+			ret = look_up_user_keyrings(NULL, &dest_keyring);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				return ret;
+			break;
+
+		case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
+			ret = look_up_user_keyrings(&dest_keyring, NULL);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				return ret;
+			break;
+
+		case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Require Write permission on the keyring.  This is essential
+		 * because the default keyring may be the session keyring, and
+		 * joining a keyring only requires Search permission.
+		 *
+		 * However, this check is skipped for the "requestor keyring" so
+		 * that /sbin/request-key can itself use request_key() to add
+		 * keys to the original requestor's destination keyring.
+		 */
+		if (dest_keyring && do_perm_check) {
+			ret = key_permission(make_key_ref(dest_keyring, 1),
+					     KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+			if (ret) {
+				key_put(dest_keyring);
+				return ret;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	*_dest_keyring = dest_keyring;
+	kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a new key in under-construction state and attempt to link it in to
+ * the requested keyring.
+ *
+ * May return a key that's already under construction instead if there was a
+ * race between two thread calling request_key().
+ */
+static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
+			       struct key *dest_keyring,
+			       unsigned long flags,
+			       struct key_user *user,
+			       struct key **_key)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit = NULL;
+	struct key *key;
+	key_perm_t perm;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("%s,%s,,,",
+	       ctx->index_key.type->name, ctx->index_key.description);
+
+	*_key = NULL;
+	mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);
+
+	perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
+	perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
+	if (ctx->index_key.type->read)
+		perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
+	if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
+	    ctx->index_key.type->update)
+		perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
+
+	key = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description,
+			ctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred,
+			perm, flags, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		goto alloc_failed;
+
+	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
+
+	if (dest_keyring) {
+		ret = __key_link_lock(dest_keyring, &key->index_key);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto link_lock_failed;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need
+	 * to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we
+	 * waited for locks.
+	 *
+	 * The caller might specify a comparison function which looks for keys
+	 * that do not exactly match but are still equivalent from the caller's
+	 * perspective. The __key_link_begin() operation must be done only after
+	 * an actual key is determined.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	key_ref = search_process_keyrings_rcu(ctx);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+		goto key_already_present;
+
+	if (dest_keyring) {
+		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto link_alloc_failed;
+		__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &edit);
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
+	if (dest_keyring)
+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
+	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+	*_key = key;
+	kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
+	return 0;
+
+	/* the key is now present - we tell the caller that we found it by
+	 * returning -EINPROGRESS  */
+key_already_present:
+	key_put(key);
+	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	if (dest_keyring) {
+		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto link_alloc_failed_unlocked;
+		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
+		if (ret == 0)
+			__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &edit);
+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto link_check_failed;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+	*_key = key;
+	kleave(" = -EINPROGRESS [%d]", key_serial(key));
+	return -EINPROGRESS;
+
+link_check_failed:
+	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+	key_put(key);
+	kleave(" = %d [linkcheck]", ret);
+	return ret;
+
+link_alloc_failed:
+	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
+link_alloc_failed_unlocked:
+	__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
+link_lock_failed:
+	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+	key_put(key);
+	kleave(" = %d [prelink]", ret);
+	return ret;
+
+alloc_failed:
+	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+	kleave(" = %ld", PTR_ERR(key));
+	return PTR_ERR(key);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Commence key construction.
+ */
+static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
+					  const char *callout_info,
+					  size_t callout_len,
+					  void *aux,
+					  struct key *dest_keyring,
+					  unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct key_user *user;
+	struct key *key;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
+	ret = construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
+	if (ret)
+		goto error;
+
+	user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
+	if (!user) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error_put_dest_keyring;
+	}
+
+	ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);
+	key_user_put(user);
+
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		ret = construct_key(key, callout_info, callout_len, aux,
+				    dest_keyring);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			kdebug("cons failed");
+			goto construction_failed;
+		}
+	} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
+		ret = 0;
+	} else {
+		goto error_put_dest_keyring;
+	}
+
+	key_put(dest_keyring);
+	kleave(" = key %d", key_serial(key));
+	return key;
+
+construction_failed:
+	key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);
+	key_put(key);
+error_put_dest_keyring:
+	key_put(dest_keyring);
+error:
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+
+/**
+ * request_key_and_link - Request a key and cache it in a keyring.
+ * @type: The type of key we want.
+ * @description: The searchable description of the key.
+ * @domain_tag: The domain in which the key operates.
+ * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
+ * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.
+ * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.
+ * @dest_keyring: Where to cache the key.
+ * @flags: Flags to key_alloc().
+ *
+ * A key matching the specified criteria (type, description, domain_tag) is
+ * searched for in the process's keyrings and returned with its usage count
+ * incremented if found.  Otherwise, if callout_info is not NULL, a key will be
+ * allocated and some service (probably in userspace) will be asked to
+ * instantiate it.
+ *
+ * If successfully found or created, the key will be linked to the destination
+ * keyring if one is provided.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the key if successful; -EACCES, -ENOKEY, -EKEYREVOKED
+ * or -EKEYEXPIRED if an inaccessible, negative, revoked or expired key was
+ * found; -ENOKEY if no key was found and no @callout_info was given; -EDQUOT
+ * if insufficient key quota was available to create a new key; or -ENOMEM if
+ * insufficient memory was available.
+ *
+ * If the returned key was created, then it may still be under construction,
+ * and wait_for_key_construction() should be used to wait for that to complete.
+ */
+struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
+				 const char *description,
+				 struct key_tag *domain_tag,
+				 const void *callout_info,
+				 size_t callout_len,
+				 void *aux,
+				 struct key *dest_keyring,
+				 unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.index_key.type		= type,
+		.index_key.domain_tag	= domain_tag,
+		.index_key.description	= description,
+		.index_key.desc_len	= strlen(description),
+		.cred			= current_cred(),
+		.match_data.cmp		= key_default_cmp,
+		.match_data.raw_data	= description,
+		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.flags			= (KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE),
+	};
+	struct key *key;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx",
+	       ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description,
+	       callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags);
+
+	if (type->match_preparse) {
+		ret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	key = check_cached_key(&ctx);
+	if (key)
+		goto error_free;
+
+	/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	key_ref = search_process_keyrings_rcu(&ctx);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		if (dest_keyring) {
+			ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(),
+						  KEY_NEED_LINK);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				key_ref_put(key_ref);
+				key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+				goto error_free;
+			}
+		}
+
+		key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+		if (dest_keyring) {
+			ret = key_link(dest_keyring, key);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				key_put(key);
+				key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+				goto error_free;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Only cache the key on immediate success */
+		cache_requested_key(key);
+	} else if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EAGAIN) {
+		key = ERR_CAST(key_ref);
+	} else  {
+		/* the search failed, but the keyrings were searchable, so we
+		 * should consult userspace if we can */
+		key = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		if (!callout_info)
+			goto error_free;
+
+		key = construct_key_and_link(&ctx, callout_info, callout_len,
+					     aux, dest_keyring, flags);
+	}
+
+error_free:
+	if (type->match_free)
+		type->match_free(&ctx.match_data);
+error:
+	kleave(" = %p", key);
+	return key;
+}
+
+/**
+ * wait_for_key_construction - Wait for construction of a key to complete
+ * @key: The key being waited for.
+ * @intr: Whether to wait interruptibly.
+ *
+ * Wait for a key to finish being constructed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful; -ERESTARTSYS if the wait was interrupted; -ENOKEY
+ * if the key was negated; or -EKEYREVOKED or -EKEYEXPIRED if the key was
+ * revoked or expired.
+ */
+int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,
+			  intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
+	if (ret)
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+	ret = key_read_state(key);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	return key_validate(key);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);
+
+/**
+ * request_key_tag - Request a key and wait for construction
+ * @type: Type of key.
+ * @description: The searchable description of the key.
+ * @domain_tag: The domain in which the key operates.
+ * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
+ *
+ * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key
+ * to a keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota,
+ * the callout_info must be a NUL-terminated string and no auxiliary data can
+ * be passed.
+ *
+ * Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the
+ * completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.
+ */
+struct key *request_key_tag(struct key_type *type,
+			    const char *description,
+			    struct key_tag *domain_tag,
+			    const char *callout_info)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	size_t callout_len = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (callout_info)
+		callout_len = strlen(callout_info);
+	key = request_key_and_link(type, description, domain_tag,
+				   callout_info, callout_len,
+				   NULL, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
+		ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			key_put(key);
+			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+		}
+	}
+	return key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_tag);
+
+/**
+ * request_key_with_auxdata - Request a key with auxiliary data for the upcaller
+ * @type: The type of key we want.
+ * @description: The searchable description of the key.
+ * @domain_tag: The domain in which the key operates.
+ * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
+ * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.
+ * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.
+ *
+ * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key
+ * to a keyring if found and new keys are always allocated in the user's quota.
+ *
+ * Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the
+ * completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.
+ */
+struct key *request_key_with_auxdata(struct key_type *type,
+				     const char *description,
+				     struct key_tag *domain_tag,
+				     const void *callout_info,
+				     size_t callout_len,
+				     void *aux)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	int ret;
+
+	key = request_key_and_link(type, description, domain_tag,
+				   callout_info, callout_len,
+				   aux, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
+		ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			key_put(key);
+			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+		}
+	}
+	return key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_with_auxdata);
+
+/**
+ * request_key_rcu - Request key from RCU-read-locked context
+ * @type: The type of key we want.
+ * @description: The name of the key we want.
+ * @domain_tag: The domain in which the key operates.
+ *
+ * Request a key from a context that we may not sleep in (such as RCU-mode
+ * pathwalk).  Keys under construction are ignored.
+ *
+ * Return a pointer to the found key if successful, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find
+ * a key or some other error if the key found was unsuitable or inaccessible.
+ */
+struct key *request_key_rcu(struct key_type *type,
+			    const char *description,
+			    struct key_tag *domain_tag)
+{
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.index_key.type		= type,
+		.index_key.domain_tag	= domain_tag,
+		.index_key.description	= description,
+		.index_key.desc_len	= strlen(description),
+		.cred			= current_cred(),
+		.match_data.cmp		= key_default_cmp,
+		.match_data.raw_data	= description,
+		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.flags			= (KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED),
+	};
+	struct key *key;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+
+	kenter("%s,%s", type->name, description);
+
+	key = check_cached_key(&ctx);
+	if (key)
+		return key;
+
+	/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
+	key_ref = search_process_keyrings_rcu(&ctx);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		key = ERR_CAST(key_ref);
+		if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EAGAIN)
+			key = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+	} else {
+		key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+		cache_requested_key(key);
+	}
+
+	kleave(" = %p", key);
+	return key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_rcu);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..282e09d8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Request key authorisation token key definition.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst
+ */
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h>
+
+static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,
+					struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
+static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);
+static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
+static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t);
+static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *);
+
+/*
+ * The request-key authorisation key type definition.
+ */
+struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
+	.name		= ".request_key_auth",
+	.def_datalen	= sizeof(struct request_key_auth),
+	.preparse	= request_key_auth_preparse,
+	.free_preparse	= request_key_auth_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate	= request_key_auth_instantiate,
+	.describe	= request_key_auth_describe,
+	.revoke		= request_key_auth_revoke,
+	.destroy	= request_key_auth_destroy,
+	.read		= request_key_auth_read,
+};
+
+static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key.
+ */
+static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,
+					struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Describe an authorisation token.
+ */
+static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
+				      struct seq_file *m)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_rcu(key);
+
+	if (!rka)
+		return;
+
+	seq_puts(m, "key:");
+	seq_puts(m, key->description);
+	if (key_is_positive(key))
+		seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the callout_info data (retrieves the callout information).
+ * - the key's semaphore is read-locked
+ */
+static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,
+				  char *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_locked(key);
+	size_t datalen;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (!rka)
+		return -EKEYREVOKED;
+
+	datalen = rka->callout_len;
+	ret = datalen;
+
+	/* we can return the data as is */
+	if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
+		if (buflen > datalen)
+			buflen = datalen;
+
+		memcpy(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka)
+{
+	if (!rka)
+		return;
+	key_put(rka->target_key);
+	key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
+	if (rka->cred)
+		put_cred(rka->cred);
+	kfree(rka->callout_info);
+	kfree(rka);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Take a reference to the request-key authorisation payload so callers can
+ * drop authkey->sem before doing operations that may sleep.
+ */
+struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
+
+	down_read(&authkey->sem);
+	rka = dereference_key_locked(authkey);
+	if (rka && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags))
+		refcount_inc(&rka->usage);
+	else
+		rka = NULL;
+	up_read(&authkey->sem);
+
+	return rka;
+}
+
+void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka)
+{
+	if (rka && refcount_dec_and_test(&rka->usage))
+		call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Dispose of the request_key_auth record under RCU conditions
+ */
+static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka =
+		container_of(rcu, struct request_key_auth, rcu);
+
+	free_request_key_auth(rka);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle revocation of an authorisation token key.
+ *
+ * Called with the key sem write-locked.
+ */
+static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_locked(key);
+
+	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
+	if (!rka)
+		return;
+	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy an instantiation authorisation token key.
+ */
+static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka = rcu_access_pointer(key->payload.rcu_data0);
+
+	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
+	if (rka) {
+		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
+		request_key_auth_put(rka);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an authorisation token for /sbin/request-key or whoever to gain
+ * access to the caller's security data.
+ */
+struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op,
+				 const void *callout_info, size_t callout_len,
+				 struct key *dest_keyring)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct key *authkey = NULL;
+	char desc[20];
+	int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+	kenter("%d,", target->serial);
+
+	/* allocate a auth record */
+	rka = kzalloc_obj(*rka);
+	if (!rka)
+		goto error;
+	refcount_set(&rka->usage, 1);
+	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rka->callout_info)
+		goto error_free_rka;
+	rka->callout_len = callout_len;
+	strscpy(rka->op, op, sizeof(rka->op));
+
+	/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
+	 * another process */
+	if (cred->request_key_auth) {
+		/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */
+		down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+
+		/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're
+		 * servicing is already instantiated */
+		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
+			     &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
+			up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+			ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
+			goto error_free_rka;
+		}
+
+		irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];
+		rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);
+		rka->pid = irka->pid;
+
+		up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+	}
+	else {
+		/* it isn't - use this process as the context */
+		rka->cred = get_cred(cred);
+		rka->pid = current->pid;
+	}
+
+	rka->target_key = key_get(target);
+	rka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring);
+
+	/* allocate the auth key */
+	sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial);
+
+	authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,
+			    cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
+			    KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK |
+			    KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
+		goto error_free_rka;
+	}
+
+	/* construct the auth key */
+	ret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_put_authkey;
+
+	kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, refcount_read(&authkey->usage));
+	return authkey;
+
+error_put_authkey:
+	key_put(authkey);
+error_free_rka:
+	free_request_key_auth(rka);
+error:
+	kleave("= %d", ret);
+	return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search the current process's keyrings for the authorisation key for
+ * instantiation of a key.
+ */
+struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
+{
+	char description[16];
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.index_key.type		= &key_type_request_key_auth,
+		.index_key.description	= description,
+		.cred			= current_cred(),
+		.match_data.cmp		= key_default_cmp,
+		.match_data.raw_data	= description,
+		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.flags			= (KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE),
+	};
+	struct key *authkey;
+	key_ref_t authkey_ref;
+
+	ctx.index_key.desc_len = sprintf(description, "%x", target_id);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings_rcu(&ctx);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
+		authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
+		if (authkey == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN))
+			authkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	authkey = key_ref_to_ptr(authkey_ref);
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) {
+		key_put(authkey);
+		authkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+	}
+
+error:
+	return authkey;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/sysctl.c b/security/keys/sysctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cde08c478
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/sysctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Key management controls
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static const struct ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
+	{
+		.procname = "maxkeys",
+		.data = &key_quota_maxkeys,
+		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
+		.mode = 0644,
+		.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) SYSCTL_ONE,
+		.extra2 = (void *) SYSCTL_INT_MAX,
+	},
+	{
+		.procname = "maxbytes",
+		.data = &key_quota_maxbytes,
+		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
+		.mode = 0644,
+		.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) SYSCTL_ONE,
+		.extra2 = (void *) SYSCTL_INT_MAX,
+	},
+	{
+		.procname = "root_maxkeys",
+		.data = &key_quota_root_maxkeys,
+		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
+		.mode = 0644,
+		.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) SYSCTL_ONE,
+		.extra2 = (void *) SYSCTL_INT_MAX,
+	},
+	{
+		.procname = "root_maxbytes",
+		.data = &key_quota_root_maxbytes,
+		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
+		.mode = 0644,
+		.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) SYSCTL_ONE,
+		.extra2 = (void *) SYSCTL_INT_MAX,
+	},
+	{
+		.procname = "gc_delay",
+		.data = &key_gc_delay,
+		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
+		.mode = 0644,
+		.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) SYSCTL_ZERO,
+		.extra2 = (void *) SYSCTL_INT_MAX,
+	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
+	{
+		.procname = "persistent_keyring_expiry",
+		.data = &persistent_keyring_expiry,
+		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
+		.mode = 0644,
+		.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) SYSCTL_ZERO,
+		.extra2 = (void *) SYSCTL_INT_MAX,
+	},
+#endif
+};
+
+static int __init init_security_keys_sysctls(void)
+{
+	register_sysctl_init("kernel/keys", key_sysctls);
+	return 0;
+}
+early_initcall(init_security_keys_sysctls);
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e5a4a53ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+	bool
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+	bool "Debug trusted keys"
+	depends on HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+	default n
+	help
+	  Trusted key backends and core code that support debug traces can
+	  opt-in that feature here. Traces must only use debug level output, as
+	  sensitive data may pass by. In the kernel-command line traces can be
+	  enabled via trusted.dyndbg='+p'.
+
+	  SAFETY: Debug dumps are inactive at runtime until trusted.debug is set
+	  to a true value on the kernel command-line. Use at your utmost
+	  consideration when enabling this feature on a production build. The
+	  general advice is not to do this.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
+	bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
+	depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+	default y
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS
+	select ASN1_ENCODER
+	select OID_REGISTRY
+	select ASN1
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
+	help
+	  Enable use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as trusted key
+	  backend. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
+	  which will be generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM.
+	  The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other
+	  criteria match.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE
+	bool "TEE-based trusted keys"
+	depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+	default y
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
+	help
+	  Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted
+	  key backend.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
+	bool "CAAM-based trusted keys"
+	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+	select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN
+	default y
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
+	help
+	  Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module
+	  (CAAM) as trusted key backend.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP
+	bool "DCP-based trusted keys"
+	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+	default y
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
+	help
+	  Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_PKWM
+	bool "PKWM-based trusted keys"
+	depends on PSERIES_PLPKS >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+	default y
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
+	help
+	  Enable use of IBM PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) as a trusted key backend.
+
+if !HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
+	comment "No trust source selected!"
+endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5fc053a21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for trusted keys
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
+trusted-y += trusted_core.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm1.o
+
+$(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm2.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o
+
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o
+
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) += trusted_caam.o
+
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP) += trusted_dcp.o
+
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_PKWM) += trusted_pkwm.o
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f57f869ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+---
+--- ASN.1 for TPM 2.0 keys
+---
+
+TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+	type		OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({tpm2_key_type}),
+	emptyAuth	[0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
+	parent		INTEGER ({tpm2_key_parent}),
+	pubkey		OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_pub}),
+	privkey		OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv})
+	}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6a33dbf2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum <kernel@pengutronix.de>
+ * Copyright 2025 NXP
+ */
+
+#include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <soc/fsl/caam-blob.h>
+
+static struct caam_blob_priv *blobifier;
+
+#define KEYMOD "SECURE_KEY"
+
+static_assert(MAX_KEY_SIZE + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN);
+static_assert(MAX_BLOB_SIZE <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN);
+
+enum {
+	opt_err,
+	opt_key_enc_algo,
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+	{opt_key_enc_algo, "key_enc_algo=%s"},
+	{opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info)
+{
+	if (!trusted_debug)
+		return;
+
+	pr_debug("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo);
+}
+#else
+static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static int get_pkey_options(char *c,
+			    struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info)
+{
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+	unsigned long token_mask = 0;
+	u16 key_enc_algo;
+	char *p = c;
+	int token;
+	int res;
+
+	if (!c)
+		return 0;
+
+	while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
+		if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
+			continue;
+		token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+		if (test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		switch (token) {
+		case opt_key_enc_algo:
+			res = kstrtou16(args[0].from, 16, &key_enc_algo);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			pkey_info->key_enc_algo = key_enc_algo;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool is_key_pkey(char **datablob)
+{
+	char *c = NULL;
+
+	do {
+		/* Second argument onwards,
+		 * determine if tied to HW
+		 */
+		c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
+		if (c && (strcmp(c, "pk") == 0))
+			return true;
+	} while (c);
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int trusted_caam_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct caam_blob_info info = {
+		.input  = p->key,  .input_len   = p->key_len,
+		.output = p->blob, .output_len  = MAX_BLOB_SIZE,
+		.key_mod = KEYMOD, .key_mod_len = sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1,
+	};
+
+	/*
+	 * If it is to be treated as protected key,
+	 * read next arguments too.
+	 */
+	if (is_key_pkey(&datablob)) {
+		info.pkey_info.plain_key_sz = p->key_len;
+		info.pkey_info.is_pkey = 1;
+		ret = get_pkey_options(datablob, &info.pkey_info);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return 0;
+		dump_options(&info.pkey_info);
+	}
+
+	ret = caam_encap_blob(blobifier, &info);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	p->blob_len = info.output_len;
+	if (info.pkey_info.is_pkey) {
+		p->key_len = p->blob_len + sizeof(struct caam_pkey_info);
+		memcpy(p->key, &info.pkey_info, sizeof(struct caam_pkey_info));
+		memcpy(p->key + sizeof(struct caam_pkey_info), p->blob, p->blob_len);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int trusted_caam_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct caam_blob_info info = {
+		.input   = p->blob,  .input_len  = p->blob_len,
+		.output  = p->key,   .output_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+		.key_mod = KEYMOD,  .key_mod_len = sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1,
+	};
+
+	if (is_key_pkey(&datablob)) {
+		info.pkey_info.plain_key_sz = p->blob_len - CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD;
+		info.pkey_info.is_pkey = 1;
+		ret = get_pkey_options(datablob, &info.pkey_info);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return 0;
+		dump_options(&info.pkey_info);
+
+		p->key_len = p->blob_len + sizeof(struct caam_pkey_info);
+		memcpy(p->key, &info.pkey_info, sizeof(struct caam_pkey_info));
+		memcpy(p->key + sizeof(struct caam_pkey_info), p->blob, p->blob_len);
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = caam_decap_blob(blobifier, &info);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	p->key_len = info.output_len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int trusted_caam_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	blobifier = caam_blob_gen_init();
+	if (IS_ERR(blobifier))
+		return PTR_ERR(blobifier);
+
+	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	if (ret)
+		caam_blob_gen_exit(blobifier);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_caam_exit(void)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	caam_blob_gen_exit(blobifier);
+}
+
+struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_caam_ops = {
+	.migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
+	.init = trusted_caam_init,
+	.seal = trusted_caam_seal,
+	.unseal = trusted_caam_unseal,
+	.exit = trusted_caam_exit,
+};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0509d9955
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2021, Linaro Limited
+ *
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+ */
+
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_tee.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_dcp.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_pkwm.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/hex.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/static_call.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+static char *trusted_rng = "default";
+module_param_named(rng, trusted_rng, charp, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG");
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+bool trusted_debug;
+module_param_named(debug, trusted_debug, bool, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Enable trusted keys debug traces (default: 0)");
+#endif
+
+static char *trusted_key_source;
+module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee, caam, dcp or pkwm)");
+
+static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM)
+	{ "tpm", &trusted_key_tpm_ops },
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE)
+	{ "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops },
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM)
+	{ "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops },
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP)
+	{ "dcp", &dcp_trusted_key_ops },
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_PKWM)
+	{ "pkwm", &pkwm_trusted_key_ops },
+#endif
+};
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_seal, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->seal);
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_unseal,
+			*trusted_key_sources[0].ops->unseal);
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_get_random,
+			*trusted_key_sources[0].ops->get_random);
+static void (*trusted_key_exit)(void);
+static unsigned char migratable __ro_after_init;
+
+enum {
+	Opt_err,
+	Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+	{Opt_new, "new"},
+	{Opt_load, "load"},
+	{Opt_update, "update"},
+	{Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
+ *                  payload structure
+ *
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int datablob_parse(char **datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+	long keylen;
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	int key_cmd;
+	char *c;
+
+	/* main command */
+	c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
+	if (!c)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
+	switch (key_cmd) {
+	case Opt_new:
+		/* first argument is key size */
+		c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
+		if (!c)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);
+		if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		p->key_len = keylen;
+		ret = Opt_new;
+		break;
+	case Opt_load:
+		/* first argument is sealed blob */
+		c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
+		if (!c)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
+		if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		ret = Opt_load;
+		break;
+	case Opt_update:
+		ret = Opt_update;
+		break;
+	case Opt_err:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*p));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto err;
+	p = kzalloc_obj(*p);
+	if (!p)
+		goto err;
+
+	p->migratable = migratable;
+err:
+	return p;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
+ *
+ * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
+ * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
+ * adding it to the specified keyring.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
+			       struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+	char *datablob, *orig_datablob;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int key_cmd;
+	size_t key_len;
+
+	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	orig_datablob = datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!datablob)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
+	datablob[datalen] = '\0';
+
+	payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
+	if (!payload) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	key_cmd = datablob_parse(&datablob, payload);
+	if (key_cmd < 0) {
+		ret = key_cmd;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dump_payload(payload);
+
+	switch (key_cmd) {
+	case Opt_load:
+		ret = static_call(trusted_key_unseal)(payload, datablob);
+		dump_payload(payload);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		break;
+	case Opt_new:
+		key_len = payload->key_len;
+		ret = static_call(trusted_key_get_random)(payload->key,
+							  key_len);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (ret != key_len) {
+			pr_info("key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
+			ret = -EIO;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		ret = static_call(trusted_key_seal)(payload, datablob);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(orig_datablob);
+	if (!ret)
+		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
+	else
+		kfree_sensitive(payload);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+
+	p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
+	kfree_sensitive(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
+ */
+static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+	struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+	char *datablob, *orig_datablob;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (key_is_negative(key))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	p = key->payload.data[0];
+	if (!p->migratable)
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	orig_datablob = datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!datablob)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
+	if (!new_p) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
+	datablob[datalen] = '\0';
+	ret = datablob_parse(&datablob, new_p);
+	if (ret != Opt_update) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		kfree_sensitive(new_p);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
+	new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
+	new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
+	memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
+	dump_payload(p);
+	dump_payload(new_p);
+
+	ret = static_call(trusted_key_seal)(new_p, datablob);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		kfree_sensitive(new_p);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
+	call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(orig_datablob);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
+ * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
+ */
+static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
+			 size_t buflen)
+{
+	const struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+	char *bufp;
+	int i;
+
+	p = dereference_key_locked(key);
+	if (!p)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
+		bufp = buffer;
+		for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+			bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+	}
+	return 2 * p->blob_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
+ */
+static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+	kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
+	.name = "trusted",
+	.instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
+	.update = trusted_update,
+	.destroy = trusted_destroy,
+	.describe = user_describe,
+	.read = trusted_read,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
+
+static int kernel_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+	return get_random_bytes_wait(key, key_len) ?: key_len;
+}
+
+static int __init init_trusted(void)
+{
+	int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
+	int i, ret = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(trusted_key_sources); i++) {
+		if (trusted_key_source &&
+		    strncmp(trusted_key_source, trusted_key_sources[i].name,
+			    strlen(trusted_key_sources[i].name)))
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * We always support trusted.rng="kernel" and "default" as
+		 * well as trusted.rng=$trusted.source if the trust source
+		 * defines its own get_random callback.
+		 */
+		get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random;
+		if (trusted_rng && strcmp(trusted_rng, "default")) {
+			if (!strcmp(trusted_rng, "kernel")) {
+				get_random = kernel_get_random;
+			} else if (strcmp(trusted_rng, trusted_key_sources[i].name) ||
+				   !get_random) {
+				pr_warn("Unsupported RNG. Supported: kernel");
+				if (get_random)
+					pr_cont(", %s", trusted_key_sources[i].name);
+				pr_cont(", default\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (!get_random)
+			get_random = kernel_get_random;
+
+		ret = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init();
+		if (!ret) {
+			static_call_update(trusted_key_seal, trusted_key_sources[i].ops->seal);
+			static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal, trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal);
+			static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random, get_random);
+
+			trusted_key_exit = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit;
+			migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable;
+		}
+
+		if (!ret || ret != -ENODEV)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if
+	 * trusted key implementation is not found.
+	 */
+	if (ret == -ENODEV)
+		return 0;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
+{
+	if (trusted_key_exit)
+		(*trusted_key_exit)();
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_trusted);
+module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Trusted Key type");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7b6eb655d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/gcm.h>
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <soc/fsl/dcp.h>
+
+#define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1
+#define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16
+
+/**
+ * DOC: dcp blob format
+ *
+ * The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its
+ * AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing.
+ * To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define
+ * our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing
+ * key stored in the key blob.
+ *
+ * Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit
+ * blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are used to
+ * encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM.
+ *
+ * The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the DCP's AES
+ * encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated nonce,
+ * BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob format together
+ * with a version number, payload length and authentication tag.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format.
+ *
+ * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1.
+ * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload,
+ *            @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in
+ *            AES-128-ECB mode by DCP.
+ * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption.
+ * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload.
+ * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key,
+ *           GCM auth tag of size DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN is attached at the end of it.
+ *
+ * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len +
+ * DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN.
+ */
+struct dcp_blob_fmt {
+	__u8 fmt_version;
+	__u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
+	__u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
+	__le32 payload_len;
+	__u8 payload[];
+} __packed;
+
+static bool use_otp_key;
+module_param_named(dcp_use_otp_key, use_otp_key, bool, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_use_otp_key, "Use OTP instead of UNIQUE key for sealing");
+
+static bool skip_zk_test;
+module_param_named(dcp_skip_zk_test, skip_zk_test, bool, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_skip_zk_test, "Don't test whether device keys are zero'ed");
+
+static unsigned int calc_blob_len(unsigned int payload_len)
+{
+	return sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + payload_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN;
+}
+
+static int do_dcp_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, bool do_encrypt)
+{
+	struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
+	struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
+	u8 paes_key[DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE];
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+	int res = 0;
+
+	if (use_otp_key)
+		paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP;
+	else
+		paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb-paes-dcp", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
+				    CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		res = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+		tfm = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!req) {
+		res = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+				      CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+				      crypto_req_done, &wait);
+	res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, paes_key, sizeof(paes_key));
+	if (res < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
+	sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, AES_KEYSIZE_128,
+				   NULL);
+
+	if (do_encrypt)
+		res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
+	else
+		res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
+
+out:
+	skcipher_request_free(req);
+	crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce,
+			  bool do_encrypt)
+{
+	struct aead_request *aead_req = NULL;
+	struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
+	struct crypto_aead *aead;
+	int ret;
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+
+	aead = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(aead)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(aead);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(aead, DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret);
+		goto free_aead;
+	}
+
+	aead_req = aead_request_alloc(aead, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!aead_req) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_aead;
+	}
+
+	sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, len);
+	if (do_encrypt) {
+		/*
+		 * If we encrypt our buffer has extra space for the auth tag.
+		 */
+		sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN);
+	} else {
+		sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len);
+	}
+
+	aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, len, nonce);
+	aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+				  crypto_req_done, &wait);
+	aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
+
+	if (crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, AES_KEYSIZE_128)) {
+		pr_err("Can't set crypto AEAD key\n");
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto free_req;
+	}
+
+	if (do_encrypt)
+		ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req), &wait);
+	else
+		ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req), &wait);
+
+free_req:
+	aead_request_free(aead_req);
+free_aead:
+	crypto_free_aead(aead);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *encrypted_key, u8 *plain_key)
+{
+	return do_dcp_crypto(encrypted_key, plain_key, false);
+}
+
+static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *plain_key, u8 *encrypted_key)
+{
+	return do_dcp_crypto(plain_key, encrypted_key, true);
+}
+
+static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
+	int blen, ret;
+	u8 *plain_blob_key;
+
+	blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
+	if (blen > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	plain_blob_key = kmalloc(AES_KEYSIZE_128, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!plain_blob_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	b->fmt_version = DCP_BLOB_VERSION;
+	get_random_bytes(b->nonce, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
+	get_random_bytes(plain_blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
+
+	ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, plain_blob_key,
+			     b->nonce, true);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob payload: %i\n", ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = encrypt_blob_key(plain_blob_key, b->blob_key);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	put_unaligned_le32(p->key_len, &b->payload_len);
+	p->blob_len = blen;
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	memzero_explicit(plain_blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
+	kfree(plain_blob_key);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
+	int blen, ret;
+	u8 *plain_blob_key = NULL;
+
+	if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) {
+		pr_err("DCP blob has bad version: %i, expected %i\n",
+		       b->fmt_version, DCP_BLOB_VERSION);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	p->key_len = le32_to_cpu(b->payload_len);
+	blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
+	if (blen != p->blob_len) {
+		pr_err("DCP blob has bad length: %i != %i\n", blen,
+		       p->blob_len);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	plain_blob_key = kmalloc(AES_KEYSIZE_128, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!plain_blob_key) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key, plain_blob_key);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("Unable to decrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = do_aead_crypto(b->payload, p->key, p->key_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN,
+			     plain_blob_key, b->nonce, false);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("Unwrap of DCP payload failed: %i\n", ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+out:
+	if (plain_blob_key) {
+		memzero_explicit(plain_blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
+		kfree(plain_blob_key);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_for_zero_key(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Encrypting a plaintext of all 0x55 bytes will yield
+	 * this ciphertext in case the DCP test key is used.
+	 */
+	static const u8 bad[] = {0x9a, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xf6, 0x3d, 0xfa, 0xff,
+				 0x5e, 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x45, 0xed, 0xf6, 0xea, 0x6f};
+	void *buf = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (skip_zk_test)
+		goto out;
+
+	buf = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memset(buf, 0x55, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	ret = do_dcp_crypto(buf, buf, true);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (memcmp(buf, bad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
+		pr_warn("Device neither in secure nor trusted mode!\n");
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+out:
+	kfree(buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int trusted_dcp_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (use_otp_key)
+		pr_info("Using DCP OTP key\n");
+
+	ret = test_for_zero_key();
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_warn("Test for zero'ed keys failed: %i\n", ret);
+
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+}
+
+static void trusted_dcp_exit(void)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+}
+
+struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops = {
+	.exit = trusted_dcp_exit,
+	.init = trusted_dcp_init,
+	.seal = trusted_dcp_seal,
+	.unseal = trusted_dcp_unseal,
+	.migratable = 0,
+};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bf42c6679
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2025 IBM Corporation, Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <keys/trusted_pkwm.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <asm/plpks.h>
+
+enum {
+	Opt_err,
+	Opt_wrap_flags,
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+	{Opt_wrap_flags, "wrap_flags=%s"},
+	{Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+static int getoptions(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_options *opt)
+{
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+	char *p = datablob;
+	int token;
+	int res;
+	u16 wrap_flags;
+	unsigned long token_mask = 0;
+	struct trusted_pkwm_options *pkwm;
+
+	if (!datablob)
+		return 0;
+
+	pkwm = opt->private;
+
+	while ((p = strsep(&datablob, " \t"))) {
+		if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
+			continue;
+
+		token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+		if (test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		switch (token) {
+		case Opt_wrap_flags:
+			res = kstrtou16(args[0].from, 16, &wrap_flags);
+			if (res < 0 || wrap_flags > 2)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			pkwm->wrap_flags = wrap_flags;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_options *options;
+	struct trusted_pkwm_options *pkwm;
+
+	options = kzalloc_obj(*options);
+
+	if (options) {
+		pkwm = kzalloc_obj(*pkwm);
+
+		if (!pkwm) {
+			kfree_sensitive(options);
+			options = NULL;
+		} else {
+			options->private = pkwm;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return options;
+}
+
+static int trusted_pkwm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
+	struct trusted_pkwm_options *pkwm = NULL;
+	u8 *input_buf, *output_buf;
+	u32 output_len, input_len;
+	int rc;
+
+	options = trusted_options_alloc();
+
+	if (!options)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = getoptions(datablob, options);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+	dump_options(options);
+
+	input_len = p->key_len;
+	input_buf = kmalloc(ALIGN(input_len, 4096), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!input_buf) {
+		pr_err("Input buffer allocation failed. Returning -ENOMEM.");
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(input_buf, p->key, p->key_len);
+
+	pkwm = options->private;
+
+	rc = plpks_wrap_object(&input_buf, input_len, pkwm->wrap_flags,
+			       &output_buf, &output_len);
+	if (!rc) {
+		memcpy(p->blob, output_buf, output_len);
+		p->blob_len = output_len;
+		dump_payload(p);
+	} else {
+		pr_err("Wrapping of payload key failed: %d\n", rc);
+	}
+
+	kfree(input_buf);
+	kfree(output_buf);
+
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(options->private);
+	kfree_sensitive(options);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int trusted_pkwm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	u8 *input_buf, *output_buf;
+	u32 input_len, output_len;
+	int rc;
+
+	input_len = p->blob_len;
+	input_buf = kmalloc(ALIGN(input_len, 4096), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!input_buf) {
+		pr_err("Input buffer allocation failed. Returning -ENOMEM.");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(input_buf, p->blob, p->blob_len);
+
+	rc = plpks_unwrap_object(&input_buf, input_len, &output_buf,
+				 &output_len);
+	if (!rc) {
+		memcpy(p->key, output_buf, output_len);
+		p->key_len = output_len;
+		dump_payload(p);
+	} else {
+		pr_err("Unwrapping of payload failed: %d\n", rc);
+	}
+
+	kfree(input_buf);
+	kfree(output_buf);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int trusted_pkwm_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!plpks_wrapping_is_supported()) {
+		pr_err("H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT interface not supported\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	ret = plpks_gen_wrapping_key();
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("Failed to generate default wrapping key\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+}
+
+static void trusted_pkwm_exit(void)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+}
+
+struct trusted_key_ops pkwm_trusted_key_ops = {
+	.migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
+	.init = trusted_pkwm_init,
+	.seal = trusted_pkwm_seal,
+	.unseal = trusted_pkwm_unseal,
+	.exit = trusted_pkwm_exit,
+};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6e465c8be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Linaro Ltd.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/tee_drv.h>
+#include <linux/uuid.h>
+
+#include <keys/trusted_tee.h>
+
+#define DRIVER_NAME "trusted-key-tee"
+
+/*
+ * Get random data for symmetric key
+ *
+ * [out]     memref[0]        Random data
+ */
+#define TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM	0x0
+
+/*
+ * Seal trusted key using hardware unique key
+ *
+ * [in]      memref[0]        Plain key
+ * [out]     memref[1]        Sealed key datablob
+ */
+#define TA_CMD_SEAL		0x1
+
+/*
+ * Unseal trusted key using hardware unique key
+ *
+ * [in]      memref[0]        Sealed key datablob
+ * [out]     memref[1]        Plain key
+ */
+#define TA_CMD_UNSEAL		0x2
+
+/**
+ * struct trusted_key_tee_private - TEE Trusted key private data
+ * @dev:		TEE based Trusted key device.
+ * @ctx:		TEE context handler.
+ * @session_id:		Trusted key TA session identifier.
+ * @shm_pool:		Memory pool shared with TEE device.
+ */
+struct trusted_key_tee_private {
+	struct device *dev;
+	struct tee_context *ctx;
+	u32 session_id;
+	struct tee_shm *shm_pool;
+};
+
+static struct trusted_key_tee_private pvt_data;
+
+/*
+ * Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg;
+	struct tee_param param[4];
+	struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
+
+	memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
+	memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+
+	reg_shm = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->key,
+					      sizeof(p->key) + sizeof(p->blob));
+	if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "shm register failed\n");
+		return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+	}
+
+	inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL;
+	inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id;
+	inv_arg.num_params = 4;
+
+	param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
+	param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+	param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
+	param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
+	param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob);
+	param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = sizeof(p->key);
+
+	ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
+	if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_SEAL invoke err: %x\n",
+			inv_arg.ret);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+	} else {
+		p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size;
+	}
+
+	tee_shm_free(reg_shm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TEE unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg;
+	struct tee_param param[4];
+	struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
+
+	memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
+	memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+
+	reg_shm = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->key,
+					      sizeof(p->key) + sizeof(p->blob));
+	if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "shm register failed\n");
+		return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+	}
+
+	inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL;
+	inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id;
+	inv_arg.num_params = 4;
+
+	param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
+	param[0].u.memref.size = p->blob_len;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = sizeof(p->key);
+	param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
+	param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
+	param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->key);
+	param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+
+	ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
+	if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_UNSEAL invoke err: %x\n",
+			inv_arg.ret);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+	} else {
+		p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size;
+	}
+
+	tee_shm_free(reg_shm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TEE generate random symmetric key
+ */
+static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg;
+	struct tee_param param[4];
+	struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
+
+	memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
+	memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+
+	reg_shm = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, key, key_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n");
+		return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+	}
+
+	inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM;
+	inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id;
+	inv_arg.num_params = 4;
+
+	param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
+	param[0].u.memref.size = key_len;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+
+	ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
+	if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM invoke err: %x\n",
+			inv_arg.ret);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+	} else {
+		ret = param[0].u.memref.size;
+	}
+
+	tee_shm_free(reg_shm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data)
+{
+	if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE &&
+	    ver->gen_caps & TEE_GEN_CAP_REG_MEM)
+		return 1;
+	else
+		return 0;
+}
+
+static int trusted_key_probe(struct tee_client_device *rng_device)
+{
+	struct device *dev = &rng_device->dev;
+	int ret;
+	struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg;
+
+	memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg));
+
+	pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL,
+					       NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN);
+	sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL;
+	sess_arg.num_params = 0;
+
+	ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL);
+	if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n",
+			sess_arg.ret);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_ctx;
+	}
+	pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session;
+
+	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out_sess;
+
+	pvt_data.dev = dev;
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_sess:
+	tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id);
+out_ctx:
+	tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_key_remove(struct tee_client_device *dev)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id);
+	tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx);
+}
+
+static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = {
+	{UUID_INIT(0xf04a0fe7, 0x1f5d, 0x4b9b,
+		   0xab, 0xf7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x85, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x8c)},
+	{}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, trusted_key_id_table);
+
+static struct tee_client_driver trusted_key_driver = {
+	.probe		= trusted_key_probe,
+	.remove		= trusted_key_remove,
+	.id_table	= trusted_key_id_table,
+	.driver		= {
+		.name		= DRIVER_NAME,
+	},
+};
+
+static int trusted_tee_init(void)
+{
+	return tee_client_driver_register(&trusted_key_driver);
+}
+
+static void trusted_tee_exit(void)
+{
+	tee_client_driver_unregister(&trusted_key_driver);
+}
+
+struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tee_ops = {
+	.migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
+	.init = trusted_tee_init,
+	.seal = trusted_tee_seal,
+	.unseal = trusted_tee_unseal,
+	.get_random = trusted_tee_get_random,
+	.exit = trusted_tee_exit,
+};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..135138199
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1003 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2021, Linaro Limited
+ *
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/sha1.h>
+#include <crypto/utils.h>
+#include <linux/hex.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
+
+#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
+
+static struct tpm_chip *chip;
+static struct tpm_digest *digests;
+
+/* implementation specific TPM constants */
+#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET			2
+#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET		6
+#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET			10
+
+#define LOAD32(buffer, offset)	(ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
+#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset)	(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
+#define LOAD16(buffer, offset)	(ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
+
+struct osapsess {
+	uint32_t handle;
+	unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+};
+
+/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */
+enum {
+	SEAL_keytype = 1,
+	SRK_keytype = 4
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+	if (!trusted_debug)
+		return;
+
+	pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
+	pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
+	pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
+	pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+	print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
+{
+	if (!trusted_debug)
+		return;
+
+	print_hex_dump_debug("trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
+	pr_debug("secret:\n");
+	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+	pr_debug("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
+	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+	int len;
+
+	if (!trusted_debug)
+		return;
+	pr_debug("\ntpm buffer\n");
+	len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
+}
+#else
+static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
+		       unsigned int keylen, ...)
+{
+	struct hmac_sha1_ctx hmac_ctx;
+	va_list argp;
+	unsigned int dlen;
+	unsigned char *data;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	hmac_sha1_init_usingrawkey(&hmac_ctx, key, keylen);
+
+	va_start(argp, keylen);
+	for (;;) {
+		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+		if (dlen == 0)
+			break;
+		data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
+		if (data == NULL) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+		hmac_sha1_update(&hmac_ctx, data, dlen);
+	}
+	va_end(argp);
+	if (!ret)
+		hmac_sha1_final(&hmac_ctx, digest);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
+ */
+static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
+			unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
+			unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...)
+{
+	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
+	unsigned int dlen;
+	unsigned char *data;
+	unsigned char c;
+	int ret = 0;
+	va_list argp;
+
+	if (!chip)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	c = !!h3;
+	sha1_init(&sha_ctx);
+	va_start(argp, h3);
+	for (;;) {
+		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+		if (dlen == 0)
+			break;
+		data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
+		if (!data) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+		sha1_update(&sha_ctx, data, dlen);
+	}
+	va_end(argp);
+	if (!ret)
+		sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+				  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
+				  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM
+ */
+static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
+			  const uint32_t command,
+			  const unsigned char *ononce,
+			  const unsigned char *key,
+			  unsigned int keylen, ...)
+{
+	uint32_t bufsize;
+	uint16_t tag;
+	uint32_t ordinal;
+	uint32_t result;
+	unsigned char *enonce;
+	unsigned char *continueflag;
+	unsigned char *authdata;
+	unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
+	unsigned int dlen;
+	unsigned int dpos;
+	va_list argp;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!chip)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+	tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
+	ordinal = command;
+	result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
+	if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
+		return 0;
+	if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	continueflag = authdata - 1;
+	enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+
+	sha1_init(&sha_ctx);
+	sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result, sizeof(result));
+	sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal, sizeof(ordinal));
+	va_start(argp, keylen);
+	for (;;) {
+		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+		if (dlen == 0)
+			break;
+		dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+		sha1_update(&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen);
+	}
+	va_end(argp);
+	sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest);
+
+	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest,
+			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce,
+			  1, continueflag, 0, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
+ */
+static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
+			  const uint32_t command,
+			  const unsigned char *ononce,
+			  const unsigned char *key1,
+			  unsigned int keylen1,
+			  const unsigned char *key2,
+			  unsigned int keylen2, ...)
+{
+	uint32_t bufsize;
+	uint16_t tag;
+	uint32_t ordinal;
+	uint32_t result;
+	unsigned char *enonce1;
+	unsigned char *continueflag1;
+	unsigned char *authdata1;
+	unsigned char *enonce2;
+	unsigned char *continueflag2;
+	unsigned char *authdata2;
+	unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
+	unsigned int dlen;
+	unsigned int dpos;
+	va_list argp;
+	int ret;
+
+	bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+	tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
+	ordinal = command;
+	result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
+
+	if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
+		return 0;
+	if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1
+			+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1;
+	continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1;
+	enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+	enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+
+	sha1_init(&sha_ctx);
+	sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result, sizeof(result));
+	sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal, sizeof(ordinal));
+
+	va_start(argp, keylen2);
+	for (;;) {
+		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+		if (dlen == 0)
+			break;
+		dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+		sha1_update(&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen);
+	}
+	va_end(argp);
+	sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest);
+
+	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+			  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
+			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	if (crypto_memneq(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+			  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
+			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	if (crypto_memneq(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
+ * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
+ */
+static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
+{
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!chip)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	buf.flags = 0;
+	buf.length = buflen;
+	buf.data = cmd;
+	dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sending data");
+	dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+
+	if (rc > 0)
+		/* TPM error */
+		rc = -EPERM;
+
+	tpm_put_ops(chip);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
+ *
+ * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed.
+ * This uses the tpm driver's extend function.
+ */
+static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session
+ */
+static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
+		const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle)
+{
+	unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+	unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(tb, type);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+
+	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, tb->length);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+	memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]),
+	       TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
+				  TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	return TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+			   enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session
+ */
+static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!chip)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
+	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, tb->length);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	*handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+	memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)],
+	       TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct tpm_digests {
+	unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2];
+	unsigned char xorhash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on
+ * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key.
+ */
+static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
+		    uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth,
+		    const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen,
+		    unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen,
+		    const unsigned char *blobauth,
+		    const unsigned char *pcrinfo, uint32_t pcrinfosize)
+{
+	struct osapsess sess;
+	struct tpm_digests *td;
+	unsigned char cont;
+	uint32_t ordinal;
+	uint32_t pcrsize;
+	uint32_t datsize;
+	int sealinfosize;
+	int encdatasize;
+	int storedsize;
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+
+	/* alloc some work space for all the hashes */
+	td = kmalloc_obj(*td);
+	if (!td)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* get session for sealing key */
+	ret = osap(tb, &sess, keyauth, keytype, keyhandle);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	dump_sess(&sess);
+
+	/* calculate encrypted authorization value */
+	memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash);
+
+	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
+		ret = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
+	datsize = htonl(datalen);
+	pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize);
+	cont = 0;
+
+	/* encrypt data authorization key */
+	for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i)
+		td->encauth[i] = td->xorhash[i] ^ blobauth[i];
+
+	/* calculate authorization HMAC value */
+	if (pcrinfosize == 0) {
+		/* no pcr info specified */
+		ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+				   sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
+				   sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+				   td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
+				   sizeof(uint32_t), &datsize, datalen, data, 0,
+				   0);
+	} else {
+		/* pcr info specified */
+		ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+				   sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
+				   sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+				   td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
+				   pcrinfosize, pcrinfo, sizeof(uint32_t),
+				   &datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0);
+	}
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* build and send the TPM request packet */
+	tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_SEAL);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, pcrinfosize);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, datalen);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, data, datalen);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, sess.handle);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, tb->length);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* calculate the size of the returned Blob */
+	sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t));
+	encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
+			     sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize);
+	storedsize = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize +
+	    sizeof(uint32_t) + encdatasize;
+
+	/* check the HMAC in the response */
+	ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, td->nonceodd, sess.secret,
+			     SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0,
+			     0);
+
+	/* copy the returned blob to caller */
+	if (!ret) {
+		memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize);
+		*bloblen = storedsize;
+	}
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(td);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob
+ */
+static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
+		      uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth,
+		      const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen,
+		      const unsigned char *blobauth,
+		      unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen)
+{
+	unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+	unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+	unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+	unsigned char authdata1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char authdata2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	uint32_t authhandle1 = 0;
+	uint32_t authhandle2 = 0;
+	unsigned char cont = 0;
+	uint32_t ordinal;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* sessions for unsealing key and data */
+	ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+	ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
+	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
+		pr_info("tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+	ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+			   enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
+			   &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+			   enonce2, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
+			   &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* build and send TPM request packet */
+	tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, blob, bloblen);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle1);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle2);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, tb->length);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_info("authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	*datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+	ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd,
+			     keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+			     blobauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+			     sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET,
+			     *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0,
+			     0);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_info("TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+	memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+		    struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+	struct tpm_buf tb;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
+	p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
+
+	ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
+		       p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
+		       o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&tb);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+		      struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+	struct tpm_buf tb;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
+			 o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+	else
+		/* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
+		p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
+
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&tb);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+enum {
+	Opt_err,
+	Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth,
+	Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable,
+	Opt_hash,
+	Opt_policydigest,
+	Opt_policyhandle,
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+	{Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"},
+	{Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"},
+	{Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"},
+	{Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"},
+	{Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"},
+	{Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"},
+	{Opt_hash, "hash=%s"},
+	{Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"},
+	{Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"},
+	{Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+/* can have zero or more token= options */
+static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
+		      struct trusted_key_options *opt)
+{
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+	char *p = c;
+	int token;
+	int res;
+	unsigned long handle;
+	unsigned long lock;
+	unsigned long token_mask = 0;
+	unsigned int digest_len;
+	int i;
+	int tpm2;
+
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
+	if (tpm2 < 0)
+		return tpm2;
+
+	opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+
+	if (!c)
+		return 0;
+
+	while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
+		if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
+			continue;
+		token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+		if (test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		switch (token) {
+		case Opt_pcrinfo:
+			opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
+			if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
+				      opt->pcrinfo_len);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		case Opt_keyhandle:
+			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
+			opt->keyhandle = handle;
+			break;
+		case Opt_keyauth:
+			if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
+				      SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		case Opt_blobauth:
+			/*
+			 * TPM 1.2 authorizations are sha1 hashes passed in as
+			 * hex strings.  TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
+			 * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
+			 */
+			opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
+
+			if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+				res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
+					      TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+				if (res < 0)
+					return -EINVAL;
+
+				opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
+				memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
+				       opt->blobauth_len);
+				break;
+			}
+
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+			break;
+
+		case Opt_migratable:
+			if (*args[0].from == '0')
+				pay->migratable = 0;
+			else if (*args[0].from != '1')
+				return -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		case Opt_pcrlock:
+			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			opt->pcrlock = lock;
+			break;
+		case Opt_hash:
+			if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
+				if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
+					opt->hash = i;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			if  (!tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) {
+				pr_info("TPM 1.x only supports SHA-1.\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			break;
+		case Opt_policydigest:
+			digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
+			if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
+				      digest_len);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
+			break;
+		case Opt_policyhandle:
+			if (!tpm2)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			opt->policyhandle = handle;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_options *options;
+	int tpm2;
+
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
+	if (tpm2 < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	options = kzalloc_obj(*options);
+	if (options) {
+		/* set any non-zero defaults */
+		options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
+
+		if (!tpm2)
+			options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+	}
+	return options;
+}
+
+static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int tpm2;
+
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
+	if (tpm2 < 0)
+		return tpm2;
+
+	options = trusted_options_alloc();
+	if (!options)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	dump_options(options);
+
+	if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (tpm2)
+		ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, p, options);
+	else
+		ret = key_seal(p, options);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (options->pcrlock) {
+		ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(options);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int tpm2;
+
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
+	if (tpm2 < 0)
+		return tpm2;
+
+	options = trusted_options_alloc();
+	if (!options)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	dump_options(options);
+
+	if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (tpm2)
+		ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, p, options);
+	else
+		ret = key_unseal(p, options);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+
+	if (options->pcrlock) {
+		ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(options);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int trusted_tpm_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+	return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len);
+}
+
+static int __init init_digests(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	digests = kzalloc_objs(*digests, chip->nr_allocated_banks);
+	if (!digests)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++)
+		digests[i].alg_id = chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	chip = tpm_default_chip();
+	if (!chip)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	ret = init_digests();
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto err_put;
+	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto err_free;
+	return 0;
+err_free:
+	kfree(digests);
+err_put:
+	put_device(&chip->dev);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_tpm_exit(void)
+{
+	if (chip) {
+		put_device(&chip->dev);
+		kfree(digests);
+		unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	}
+}
+
+struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops = {
+	.migratable = 1, /* migratable by default */
+	.init = trusted_tpm_init,
+	.seal = trusted_tpm_seal,
+	.unseal = trusted_tpm_unseal,
+	.get_random = trusted_tpm_get_random,
+	.exit = trusted_tpm_exit,
+};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6340823f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/asn1_encoder.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
+
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
+
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+
+#include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
+
+static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 };
+
+static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
+			   u8 *src, u32 len)
+{
+	const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
+	u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
+	u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE;
+	u8 *priv, *pub;
+	u16 priv_len, pub_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
+	priv = src;
+
+	src += priv_len;
+
+	pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
+	pub = src;
+
+	if (!scratch)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
+			       asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
+
+	if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
+		unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
+		/* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
+		w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
+		if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(w);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length
+	 *
+	 * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never
+	 * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on
+	 */
+	if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE,
+		 "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
+	work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
+	work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
+
+	work1 = payload->blob;
+	work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob),
+				     scratch, work - scratch);
+	if (IS_ERR(work1)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(work1);
+		pr_err("BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed with %d\n", ret);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	kfree(scratch);
+	return work1 - payload->blob;
+
+err:
+	kfree(scratch);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+struct tpm2_key_context {
+	u32 parent;
+	const u8 *pub;
+	u32 pub_len;
+	const u8 *priv;
+	u32 priv_len;
+};
+
+static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
+			   u8 **buf)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
+	u8 *blob;
+
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+
+	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob,
+			       payload->blob_len);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!blob)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	*buf = blob;
+	options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
+
+	memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
+	blob += ctx.priv_len;
+
+	memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		  unsigned char tag,
+		  const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+	const u8 *v = value;
+	int i;
+
+	ctx->parent = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) {
+		ctx->parent <<= 8;
+		ctx->parent |= v[i];
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		unsigned char tag,
+		const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+
+	if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) {
+		char buffer[50];
+
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n",
+			 buffer);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+	       unsigned char tag,
+	       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->pub = value;
+	ctx->pub_len = vlen;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		unsigned char tag,
+		const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->priv = value;
+	ctx->priv_len = vlen;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer.
+ *
+ * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance
+ * @session_handle: session handle
+ * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used
+ * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used
+ * @attributes: the session attributes
+ * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used
+ * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used
+ */
+static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle,
+				 const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len,
+				 u8 attributes,
+				 const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len)
+{
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len);
+
+	if (nonce && nonce_len)
+		tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len);
+
+	tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len);
+
+	if (hmac && hmac_len)
+		tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key
+ *
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ *
+ * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success.
+ */
+int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+		      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+		      struct trusted_key_options *options)
+{
+	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+	struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
+	int blob_len = 0;
+	int hash;
+	u32 flags;
+	int rc;
+
+	hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
+	if (hash < 0)
+		return hash;
+
+	if (!options->keyhandle)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_put;
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+		goto out_put;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init_sized(&sized);
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+		goto out_put;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
+				    options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	/* sensitive */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len);
+
+	if (options->blobauth_len)
+		tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len);
+	tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, sized.data, sized.length);
+
+	/* public */
+	tpm_buf_reset_sized(&sized);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, hash);
+
+	/* key properties */
+	flags = 0;
+	flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
+	flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags);
+
+	/* policy */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len);
+	if (options->policydigest_len)
+		tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
+
+	/* public parameters */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, 0);
+
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, sized.data, sized.length);
+
+	/* outside info */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+	/* creation PCR */
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
+
+	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
+		rc = -E2BIG;
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data");
+	rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset);
+	if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) {
+		rc = -E2BIG;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (buf.length - offset < blob_len) {
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf.data[offset], blob_len);
+	if (blob_len < 0)
+		rc = blob_len;
+
+out:
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&sized);
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+	if (!rc)
+		payload->blob_len = blob_len;
+
+out_put:
+	tpm_put_ops(chip);
+	return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command
+ *
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ * @blob_handle: returned blob handle
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success.
+ *        -E2BIG on wrong payload size.
+ *        -EPERM on tpm error status.
+ *        < 0 error from tpm_send.
+ */
+static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+			 struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+			 struct trusted_key_options *options,
+			 u32 *blob_handle)
+{
+	u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
+	unsigned int private_len;
+	unsigned int public_len;
+	unsigned int blob_len;
+	u8 *blob, *pub;
+	int rc;
+	u32 attrs;
+
+	rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
+	if (rc) {
+		/* old form */
+		blob = payload->blob;
+		payload->old_format = 1;
+	} else {
+		/* Bind for cleanup: */
+		blob_ref = blob;
+	}
+
+	/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
+	if (!options->keyhandle)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
+	if (payload->blob_len < 4)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob);
+
+	/* must be big enough for following public_len */
+	if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len))
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len);
+	if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2;
+	/* key attributes are always at offset 4 */
+	attrs = get_unaligned_be32(pub + 4);
+
+	if ((attrs & (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) ==
+	    (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT))
+		payload->migratable = 0;
+	else
+		payload->migratable = 1;
+
+	blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4;
+	if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth,
+				    TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
+
+	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
+		rc = -E2BIG;
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob");
+	rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
+	if (!rc)
+		*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
+			(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
+
+out:
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+	return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unseal command
+ *
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ * @blob_handle: blob handle
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success
+ *         -EPERM on tpm error status
+ *         < 0 error from tpm_send
+ */
+static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+			   struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
+			   u32 blob_handle)
+{
+	struct tpm_header *head;
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
+	u16 data_len;
+	int offset;
+	u8 *data;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL);
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!options->policyhandle) {
+		tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
+					    options->blobauth,
+					    options->blobauth_len);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
+		 * kernel so we don't known the nonce and thus can't
+		 * calculate a HMAC on it.  Therefore, the user can
+		 * only really use TPM2_PolicyPassword and we must
+		 * send down the plain text password, which could be
+		 * intercepted.  We can still encrypt the returned
+		 * key, but that's small comfort since the interposer
+		 * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
+		 * password.
+		 */
+		tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
+				     NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
+				     options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+		if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
+			tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
+		} else  {
+			offset = buf.handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+			head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+			if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) == offset)
+				head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing");
+	rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
+
+	if (!rc) {
+		data_len = be16_to_cpup(
+			(__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]);
+		if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE ||  data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
+			rc = -EFAULT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + data_len) {
+			rc = -EFAULT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6];
+
+		if (payload->old_format) {
+			/* migratable flag is at the end of the key */
+			memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1);
+			payload->key_len = data_len - 1;
+			payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1];
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * migratable flag already collected from key
+			 * attributes
+			 */
+			memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len);
+			payload->key_len = data_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+	return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key
+ *
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ *
+ * Return: Same as with tpm_send.
+ */
+int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+			struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+			struct trusted_key_options *options)
+{
+	u32 blob_handle;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
+	tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
+
+out:
+	tpm_put_ops(chip);
+	return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6f88b507f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* user_defined.c: user defined key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc);
+
+/*
+ * user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
+ * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
+ */
+struct key_type key_type_user = {
+	.name			= "user",
+	.preparse		= user_preparse,
+	.free_preparse		= user_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
+	.update			= user_update,
+	.revoke			= user_revoke,
+	.destroy		= user_destroy,
+	.describe		= user_describe,
+	.read			= user_read,
+};
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user);
+
+/*
+ * This key type is essentially the same as key_type_user, but it does
+ * not define a .read op. This is suitable for storing username and
+ * password pairs in the keyring that you do not want to be readable
+ * from userspace.
+ */
+struct key_type key_type_logon = {
+	.name			= "logon",
+	.preparse		= user_preparse,
+	.free_preparse		= user_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
+	.update			= user_update,
+	.revoke			= user_revoke,
+	.destroy		= user_destroy,
+	.describe		= user_describe,
+	.vet_description	= logon_vet_description,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon);
+
+/*
+ * Preparse a user defined key payload
+ */
+int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct user_key_payload *upayload;
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+
+	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	upayload = kmalloc_flex(*upayload, data, datalen);
+	if (!upayload)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* attach the data */
+	prep->quotalen = datalen;
+	prep->payload.data[0] = upayload;
+	upayload->datalen = datalen;
+	memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse);
+
+/*
+ * Free a preparse of a user defined key payload
+ */
+void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[0]);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
+
+static void user_free_payload_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct user_key_payload *payload;
+
+	payload = container_of(head, struct user_key_payload, rcu);
+	kfree_sensitive(payload);
+}
+
+/*
+ * update a user defined key
+ * - the key's semaphore is write-locked
+ */
+int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct user_key_payload *zap = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* check the quota and attach the new data */
+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->datalen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* attach the new data, displacing the old */
+	key->expiry = prep->expiry;
+	if (key_is_positive(key))
+		zap = dereference_key_locked(key);
+	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]);
+	prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
+
+	if (zap)
+		call_rcu(&zap->rcu, user_free_payload_rcu);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_update);
+
+/*
+ * dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
+ * - called with the key sem write-locked
+ */
+void user_revoke(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct user_key_payload *upayload = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+
+	/* clear the quota */
+	key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
+
+	if (upayload) {
+		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
+		call_rcu(&upayload->rcu, user_free_payload_rcu);
+	}
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_revoke);
+
+/*
+ * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a user key
+ */
+void user_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0];
+
+	kfree_sensitive(upayload);
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy);
+
+/*
+ * describe the user key
+ */
+void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
+{
+	seq_puts(m, key->description);
+	if (key_is_positive(key))
+		seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe);
+
+/*
+ * read the key data
+ * - the key's semaphore is read-locked
+ */
+long user_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+	const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
+	long ret;
+
+	upayload = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+	ret = upayload->datalen;
+
+	/* we can return the data as is */
+	if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
+		if (buflen > upayload->datalen)
+			buflen = upayload->datalen;
+
+		memcpy(buffer, upayload->data, buflen);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_read);
+
+/* Vet the description for a "logon" key */
+static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc)
+{
+	char *p;
+
+	/* require a "qualified" description string */
+	p = strchr(desc, ':');
+	if (!p)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* also reject description with ':' as first char */
+	if (p == desc)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/.kunitconfig b/security/landlock/.kunitconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f9423f01a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/.kunitconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+CONFIG_AUDIT=y
+CONFIG_KUNIT=y
+CONFIG_NET=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST=y
diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3f1493402
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+config SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+	bool "Landlock support"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	select SECURITY_NETWORK
+	select SECURITY_PATH
+	help
+	  Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict
+	  themselves (and their future children) by gradually enforcing
+	  tailored access control policies.  A Landlock security policy is a
+	  set of access rights (e.g. open a file in read-only, make a
+	  directory, etc.) tied to a file hierarchy.  Such policy can be
+	  configured and enforced by any processes for themselves using the
+	  dedicated system calls: landlock_create_ruleset(),
+	  landlock_add_rule(), and landlock_restrict_self().
+
+	  See Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst for further information.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.  Otherwise,
+	  you should also prepend "landlock," to the content of CONFIG_LSM to
+	  enable Landlock at boot time.
+
+config SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+	bool "KUnit tests for Landlock" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	depends on KUNIT=y
+	depends on SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+	default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	help
+	  Build KUnit tests for Landlock.
+
+	  See the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit
+
+	  Run all KUnit tests for Landlock with:
+	  ./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --kunitconfig security/landlock
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ffa7646d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
+
+landlock-y := \
+	setup.o \
+	syscalls.o \
+	object.o \
+	ruleset.o \
+	cred.o \
+	task.o \
+	fs.o \
+	tsync.o
+
+landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o
+
+landlock-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += \
+	id.o \
+	audit.o \
+	domain.o
diff --git a/security/landlock/access.h b/security/landlock/access.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d926078bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/access.h
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock - Access types and helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_H
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
+
+#include "limits.h"
+
+/*
+ * All access rights that are denied by default whether they are handled or not
+ * by a ruleset/layer.  This must be ORed with all ruleset->access_masks[]
+ * entries when we need to get the absolute handled access masks, see
+ * landlock_upgrade_handled_access_masks().
+ */
+/* clang-format off */
+#define _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED ( \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
+/* clang-format on */
+
+/* clang-format off */
+#define _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL ( \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
+/* clang-format on */
+
+typedef u32 access_mask_t;
+
+/* Makes sure all filesystem access rights can be stored. */
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
+/* Makes sure all network access rights can be stored. */
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
+/* Makes sure all scoped rights can be stored. */
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE);
+/* Makes sure for_each_set_bit() and for_each_clear_bit() calls are OK. */
+static_assert(sizeof(unsigned long) >= sizeof(access_mask_t));
+
+/* Ruleset access masks. */
+struct access_masks {
+	access_mask_t fs : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS;
+	access_mask_t net : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET;
+	access_mask_t scope : LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE;
+} __packed __aligned(sizeof(u32));
+
+union access_masks_all {
+	struct access_masks masks;
+	u32 all;
+};
+
+/* Makes sure all fields are covered. */
+static_assert(sizeof(typeof_member(union access_masks_all, masks)) ==
+	      sizeof(typeof_member(union access_masks_all, all)));
+
+/**
+ * struct layer_mask - The access rights and rule flags for a layer.
+ *
+ * This has a bit for each access rights and rule flags.  During access checks,
+ * it is used to represent the access rights for each layer which still need to
+ * be fulfilled.  When all bits are 0, the access request is considered to be
+ * fulfilled.
+ */
+struct layer_mask {
+	/**
+	 * @access: The unfulfilled access rights for this layer.
+	 */
+	access_mask_t access : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_MAX;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	/**
+	 * @quiet: Whether we have encountered a rule with the quiet flag for
+	 * this layer.  Used to control logging.
+	 */
+	access_mask_t quiet : 1;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+} __packed __aligned(sizeof(access_mask_t));
+
+/*
+ * Make sure that we don't increase the size of struct layer_mask when storing
+ * rule flags.
+ */
+static_assert(sizeof(struct layer_mask) == sizeof(access_mask_t));
+
+/**
+ * struct layer_masks - An array of struct layer_mask, one per layer.
+ */
+struct layer_masks {
+	/**
+	 * @layers: The unfulfilled access rights for each layer.
+	 */
+	struct layer_mask layers[LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Tracks domains responsible of a denied access.  This avoids storing in each
+ * object the full matrix of per-layer unfulfilled access rights, which is
+ * required by update_request().
+ *
+ * Each nibble represents the layer index of the newest layer which denied a
+ * certain access right.  For file system access rights, the upper four bits are
+ * the index of the layer which denies LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV and the
+ * lower nibble represents LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE.
+ */
+typedef u8 deny_masks_t;
+
+/*
+ * Makes sure all optional access rights can be tied to a layer index (cf.
+ * get_deny_mask).
+ */
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(deny_masks_t) >=
+	      (HWEIGHT(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1) *
+	       HWEIGHT(_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL)));
+
+/* LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS must be a power of two (cf. deny_masks_t assert). */
+static_assert(HWEIGHT(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS) == 1);
+
+/* Upgrades with all initially denied by default access rights. */
+static inline struct access_masks
+landlock_upgrade_handled_access_masks(struct access_masks access_masks)
+{
+	/*
+	 * All access rights that are denied by default whether they are
+	 * explicitly handled or not.
+	 */
+	if (access_masks.fs)
+		access_masks.fs |= _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
+
+	return access_masks;
+}
+
+/* Checks the subset relation between access masks. */
+static inline bool access_mask_subset(access_mask_t subset,
+				      access_mask_t superset)
+{
+	return (subset | superset) == superset;
+}
+
+/* A bitmask that is large enough to hold set of optional accesses. */
+typedef u8 optional_access_t;
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(optional_access_t) >=
+	      HWEIGHT(_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL));
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.c b/security/landlock/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..50536c568
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,734 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock - Audit helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2023-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/pid.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
+
+#include "access.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "limits.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+
+static const char *const fs_access_strings[] = {
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = "fs.execute",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)] = "fs.write_file",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)] = "fs.read_file",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR)] = "fs.read_dir",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR)] = "fs.remove_dir",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE)] = "fs.remove_file",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR)] = "fs.make_char",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR)] = "fs.make_dir",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG)] = "fs.make_reg",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK)] = "fs.make_sock",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO)] = "fs.make_fifo",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK)] = "fs.make_block",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM)] = "fs.make_sym",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)] = "fs.refer",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)] = "fs.truncate",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)] = "fs.ioctl_dev",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX)] = "fs.resolve_unix",
+};
+
+static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
+
+static const char *const net_access_strings[] = {
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)] = "net.bind_tcp",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)] = "net.connect_tcp",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP)] = "net.bind_udp",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SEND_UDP)] =
+		"net.connect_send_udp",
+};
+
+static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
+
+static __attribute_const__ const char *
+get_blocker(const enum landlock_request_type type,
+	    const unsigned long access_bit)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
+		return "ptrace";
+
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
+		return "fs.change_topology";
+
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS:
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit >= ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings)))
+			return "unknown";
+		return fs_access_strings[access_bit];
+
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS:
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit >= ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings)))
+			return "unknown";
+		return net_access_strings[access_bit];
+
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
+		return "scope.abstract_unix_socket";
+
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
+		return "scope.signal";
+	}
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+	return "unknown";
+}
+
+static void log_blockers(struct audit_buffer *const ab,
+			 const enum landlock_request_type type,
+			 const access_mask_t access)
+{
+	const unsigned long access_mask = access;
+	unsigned long access_bit;
+	bool is_first = true;
+
+	for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_mask, BITS_PER_TYPE(access)) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s", is_first ? "" : ",",
+				 get_blocker(type, access_bit));
+		is_first = false;
+	}
+	if (is_first)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%s", get_blocker(type, -1));
+}
+
+static void log_domain(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+	/* Ignores already logged domains.  */
+	if (READ_ONCE(hierarchy->log_status) == LANDLOCK_LOG_RECORDED)
+		return;
+
+	/* Uses consistent allocation flags wrt common_lsm_audit(). */
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN,
+			     AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(hierarchy->id == 0);
+	audit_log_format(
+		ab,
+		"domain=%llx status=allocated mode=enforcing pid=%d uid=%u exe=",
+		hierarchy->id, pid_nr(hierarchy->details->pid),
+		hierarchy->details->uid);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hierarchy->details->exe_path);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hierarchy->details->comm);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+
+	/*
+	 * There may be race condition leading to logging of the same domain
+	 * several times but that is OK.
+	 */
+	WRITE_ONCE(hierarchy->log_status, LANDLOCK_LOG_RECORDED);
+}
+
+static struct landlock_hierarchy *
+get_hierarchy(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, const size_t layer)
+{
+	struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy = domain->hierarchy;
+	ssize_t i;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(layer >= domain->num_layers))
+		return hierarchy;
+
+	for (i = domain->num_layers - 1; i > layer; i--) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hierarchy->parent))
+			break;
+
+		hierarchy = hierarchy->parent;
+	}
+
+	return hierarchy;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_get_hierarchy(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	struct landlock_hierarchy dom0_hierarchy = {
+		.id = 10,
+	};
+	struct landlock_hierarchy dom1_hierarchy = {
+		.parent = &dom0_hierarchy,
+		.id = 20,
+	};
+	struct landlock_hierarchy dom2_hierarchy = {
+		.parent = &dom1_hierarchy,
+		.id = 30,
+	};
+	struct landlock_ruleset dom2 = {
+		.hierarchy = &dom2_hierarchy,
+		.num_layers = 3,
+	};
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 10, get_hierarchy(&dom2, 0)->id);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 20, get_hierarchy(&dom2, 1)->id);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 30, get_hierarchy(&dom2, 2)->id);
+	/* KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 30, get_hierarchy(&dom2, -1)->id); */
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+/* Get the youngest layer that denied the access_request. */
+static size_t get_denied_layer(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+			       access_mask_t *const access_request,
+			       const struct layer_masks *masks)
+{
+	for (ssize_t i = ARRAY_SIZE(masks->layers) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+		if (masks->layers[i].access & *access_request) {
+			*access_request &= masks->layers[i].access;
+			return i;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Not found - fall back to default values */
+	*access_request = 0;
+	return domain->num_layers - 1;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_get_denied_layer(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset dom = {
+		.num_layers = 5,
+	};
+	const struct layer_masks masks = {
+		.layers[0].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
+				    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
+		.layers[1].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+				    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
+		.layers[2].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR,
+	};
+	access_mask_t access;
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &masks));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &masks));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &masks));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &masks));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access,
+			LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &masks));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 4, get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &masks));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, 0);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+static size_t
+get_layer_from_deny_masks(access_mask_t *const access_request,
+			  const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access,
+			  const deny_masks_t deny_masks,
+			  optional_access_t quiet_optional_accesses,
+			  bool *quiet)
+{
+	const unsigned long access_opt = all_existing_optional_access;
+	const unsigned long access_req = *access_request;
+	access_mask_t missing = 0;
+	size_t youngest_layer = 0;
+	size_t access_index = 0;
+	unsigned long access_bit;
+	bool should_quiet = false;
+
+	/* This will require change with new object types. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(access_opt != _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL);
+
+	for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_opt,
+			 BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t)) {
+		if (access_req & BIT(access_bit)) {
+			const size_t layer =
+				(deny_masks >>
+				 (access_index *
+				  HWEIGHT(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1))) &
+				(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1);
+			const bool layer_has_quiet =
+				!!(quiet_optional_accesses & BIT(access_index));
+
+			if (layer > youngest_layer) {
+				youngest_layer = layer;
+				missing = BIT(access_bit);
+				should_quiet = layer_has_quiet;
+			} else if (layer == youngest_layer) {
+				missing |= BIT(access_bit);
+				/*
+				 * Whether the layer has rules with quiet flag
+				 * covering the file accessed does not depend on
+				 * the access, and so the following
+				 * WARN_ON_ONCE() should not fail.
+				 */
+				WARN_ON_ONCE(should_quiet && !layer_has_quiet);
+				should_quiet = layer_has_quiet;
+			}
+		}
+		access_index++;
+	}
+
+	*access_request = missing;
+	*quiet = should_quiet;
+	return youngest_layer;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_get_layer_from_deny_masks(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	deny_masks_t deny_mask;
+	access_mask_t access;
+	optional_access_t quiet_optional_accesses;
+	bool quiet;
+
+	/* truncate:0 ioctl_dev:2 */
+	deny_mask = 0x20;
+	quiet_optional_accesses = 0;
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	/* layer denying truncate: quiet, ioctl: not quiet */
+	quiet_optional_accesses = 0b01;
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, true);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	/* Reverse order - truncate:2 ioctl_dev:0 */
+	deny_mask = 0x02;
+	quiet_optional_accesses = 0;
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	/* layer denying truncate: quiet, ioctl: not quiet */
+	quiet_optional_accesses = 0b01;
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, true);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, true);
+
+	/* layer denying truncate: not quiet, ioctl: quiet */
+	quiet_optional_accesses = 0b10;
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, true);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	/* truncate:15 ioctl_dev:15 */
+	deny_mask = 0xff;
+	quiet_optional_accesses = 0;
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 15,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 15,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access,
+			LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, false);
+
+	/* Both quiet (same layer so quietness must be the same) */
+	quiet_optional_accesses = 0b11;
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 15,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, true);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 15,
+			get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&access, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				deny_mask, quiet_optional_accesses, &quiet));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access,
+			LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, quiet, true);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+static bool is_valid_request(const struct landlock_request *const request)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(request->layer_plus_one > LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS))
+		return false;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(!!request->layer_plus_one ^ !!request->access)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (request->access) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(!!request->layer_masks ^
+				   !!request->all_existing_optional_access)))
+			return false;
+	} else {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(request->layer_masks ||
+				 request->all_existing_optional_access))
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	if (request->deny_masks) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!request->all_existing_optional_access))
+			return false;
+		static_assert(sizeof(request->all_existing_optional_access) ==
+			      sizeof(u32));
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(
+			    request->quiet_optional_accesses >=
+			    BIT(hweight32(
+				    request->all_existing_optional_access))))
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static access_mask_t
+pick_access_mask_for_request_type(const enum landlock_request_type type,
+				  const struct access_masks access_masks)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS:
+		return access_masks.fs;
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS:
+		return access_masks.net;
+	default:
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Invalid request type %d passed to %s", type,
+			  __func__);
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * landlock_log_denial - Create audit records related to a denial
+ *
+ * @subject: The Landlock subject's credential denying an action.
+ * @request: Detail of the user space request.
+ */
+void landlock_log_denial(const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject,
+			 const struct landlock_request *const request)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	struct landlock_hierarchy *youngest_denied;
+	size_t youngest_layer;
+	access_mask_t missing;
+	bool object_quiet_flag = false, quiet_applicable_to_access = false;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!subject || !subject->domain ||
+			 !subject->domain->hierarchy || !request))
+		return;
+
+	if (!is_valid_request(request))
+		return;
+
+	missing = request->access;
+	if (missing) {
+		/* Gets the nearest domain that denies the request. */
+		if (request->layer_masks) {
+			youngest_layer = get_denied_layer(subject->domain,
+							  &missing,
+							  request->layer_masks);
+			object_quiet_flag =
+				request->layer_masks->layers[youngest_layer]
+					.quiet;
+		} else {
+			youngest_layer = get_layer_from_deny_masks(
+				&missing, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+				request->deny_masks,
+				request->quiet_optional_accesses,
+				&object_quiet_flag);
+		}
+		youngest_denied =
+			get_hierarchy(subject->domain, youngest_layer);
+	} else {
+		youngest_layer = request->layer_plus_one - 1;
+		youngest_denied =
+			get_hierarchy(subject->domain, youngest_layer);
+	}
+
+	if (READ_ONCE(youngest_denied->log_status) == LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Consistently keeps track of the number of denied access requests
+	 * even if audit is currently disabled, or if audit rules currently
+	 * exclude this record type, or if landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags
+	 * quiet logs.
+	 */
+	atomic64_inc(&youngest_denied->num_denials);
+
+	if (!audit_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	/* Checks if the current exec was restricting itself. */
+	if (subject->domain_exec & BIT(youngest_layer)) {
+		/* Ignores denials for the same execution. */
+		if (!youngest_denied->log_same_exec)
+			return;
+	} else {
+		/* Ignores denials after a new execution. */
+		if (!youngest_denied->log_new_exec)
+			return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks if the object is marked quiet by the layer that denied the
+	 * request.  If it's a different layer that marked it as quiet, but that
+	 * layer is not the one that denied the request, we should still audit
+	 * log the denial.
+	 */
+	if (object_quiet_flag) {
+		/*
+		 * We now check if the denied requests are all covered by the
+		 * layer's quiet access bits.
+		 */
+		const access_mask_t quiet_mask =
+			pick_access_mask_for_request_type(
+				request->type, youngest_denied->quiet_masks);
+
+		quiet_applicable_to_access = (quiet_mask & missing) == missing;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Either the object is not quiet, or this is a scope request.
+		 * We check request->type to distinguish between the two cases.
+		 */
+		const access_mask_t quiet_mask =
+			youngest_denied->quiet_masks.scope;
+
+		switch (request->type) {
+		case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL:
+			quiet_applicable_to_access =
+				!!(quiet_mask & LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL);
+			break;
+		case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET:
+			quiet_applicable_to_access =
+				!!(quiet_mask &
+				   LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET);
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * Leave LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE and
+		 * LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY unhandled for now - they
+		 * are never quiet.
+		 */
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (quiet_applicable_to_access)
+		return;
+
+	/* Uses consistent allocation flags wrt common_lsm_audit(). */
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN,
+			     AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "domain=%llx blockers=", youngest_denied->id);
+	log_blockers(ab, request->type, missing);
+	audit_log_lsm_data(ab, &request->audit);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+
+	/* Logs this domain the first time it shows in log. */
+	log_domain(youngest_denied);
+}
+
+/**
+ * landlock_log_drop_domain - Create an audit record on domain deallocation
+ *
+ * @hierarchy: The domain's hierarchy being deallocated.
+ *
+ * Only domains which previously appeared in the audit logs are logged again.
+ * This is useful to know when a domain will never show again in the audit log.
+ *
+ * Called in a work queue scheduled by landlock_put_ruleset_deferred() called
+ * by hook_cred_free().
+ */
+void landlock_log_drop_domain(const struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hierarchy))
+		return;
+
+	if (!audit_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	/* Ignores domains that were not logged.  */
+	if (READ_ONCE(hierarchy->log_status) != LANDLOCK_LOG_RECORDED)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If logging of domain allocation succeeded, warns about failure to log
+	 * domain deallocation to highlight unbalanced domain lifetime logs.
+	 */
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
+			     AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "domain=%llx status=deallocated denials=%llu",
+			 hierarchy->id, atomic64_read(&hierarchy->num_denials));
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static struct kunit_case test_cases[] = {
+	/* clang-format off */
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_get_hierarchy),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_get_denied_layer),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_get_layer_from_deny_masks),
+	{}
+	/* clang-format on */
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite test_suite = {
+	.name = "landlock_audit",
+	.test_cases = test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suite(test_suite);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.h b/security/landlock/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..620f8a242
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock - Audit helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2023-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_AUDIT_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_AUDIT_H
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+
+#include "access.h"
+#include "cred.h"
+
+enum landlock_request_type {
+	LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE = 1,
+	LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY,
+	LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS,
+	LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS,
+	LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
+	LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+};
+
+/*
+ * We should be careful to only use a variable of this type for
+ * landlock_log_denial().  This way, the compiler can remove it entirely if
+ * CONFIG_AUDIT is not set.
+ */
+struct landlock_request {
+	/* Mandatory fields. */
+	enum landlock_request_type type;
+	struct common_audit_data audit;
+
+	/**
+	 * layer_plus_one: First layer level that denies the request + 1.  The
+	 * extra one is useful to detect uninitialized field.
+	 */
+	size_t layer_plus_one;
+
+	/* Required field for configurable access control. */
+	access_mask_t access;
+
+	/* Required fields for requests with layer masks. */
+	const struct layer_masks *layer_masks;
+
+	/* Required fields for requests with deny masks. */
+	const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access;
+	deny_masks_t deny_masks;
+	optional_access_t quiet_optional_accesses;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+void landlock_log_drop_domain(const struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy);
+
+void landlock_log_denial(const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject,
+			 const struct landlock_request *const request);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+static inline void
+landlock_log_drop_domain(const struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void
+landlock_log_denial(const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject,
+		    const struct landlock_request *const request)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/common.h b/security/landlock/common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0eb1d34c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Common constants and helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H
+
+#define LANDLOCK_NAME "landlock"
+
+#ifdef pr_fmt
+#undef pr_fmt
+#endif
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) LANDLOCK_NAME ": " fmt
+
+#define BIT_INDEX(bit) HWEIGHT(bit - 1)
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cc419de75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock - Credential hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+
+static void hook_cred_transfer(struct cred *const new,
+			       const struct cred *const old)
+{
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const old_llcred =
+		landlock_cred(old);
+
+	landlock_get_ruleset(old_llcred->domain);
+	*landlock_cred(new) = *old_llcred;
+}
+
+static int hook_cred_prepare(struct cred *const new,
+			     const struct cred *const old, const gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	hook_cred_transfer(new, old);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void hook_cred_free(struct cred *const cred)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = landlock_cred(cred)->domain;
+
+	if (dom)
+		landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(dom);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+static int hook_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *const bprm)
+{
+	/* Resets for each execution. */
+	landlock_cred(bprm->cred)->domain_exec = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, hook_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, hook_cred_transfer),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, hook_cred_free),
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, hook_bprm_creds_for_exec),
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+};
+
+__init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
+			   &landlock_lsmid);
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.h b/security/landlock/cred.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f287c56b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/cred.h
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock - Credential hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2019-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2021-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_CRED_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_CRED_H
+
+#include <linux/container_of.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+#include "access.h"
+#include "limits.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_cred_security - Credential security blob
+ *
+ * This structure is packed to minimize the size of struct
+ * landlock_file_security.  However, it is always aligned in the LSM cred blob,
+ * see lsm_set_blob_size().
+ *
+ * When updating this, also update landlock_cred_copy() if needed.
+ */
+struct landlock_cred_security {
+	/**
+	 * @domain: Immutable ruleset enforced on a task.
+	 */
+	struct landlock_ruleset *domain;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	/**
+	 * @domain_exec: Bitmask identifying the domain layers that were enforced by
+	 * the current task's executed file (i.e. no new execve(2) since
+	 * landlock_restrict_self(2)).
+	 */
+	u16 domain_exec;
+	/**
+	 * @log_subdomains_off: Set if the domain descendants's log_status should be
+	 * set to %LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED.  This is not a landlock_hierarchy
+	 * configuration because it applies to future descendant domains and it does
+	 * not require a current domain.
+	 */
+	u8 log_subdomains_off : 1;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+} __packed;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/* Makes sure all layer executions can be stored. */
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(typeof_member(struct landlock_cred_security,
+					  domain_exec)) >=
+	      LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+static inline struct landlock_cred_security *
+landlock_cred(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	return cred->security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
+}
+
+static inline void landlock_cred_copy(struct landlock_cred_security *dst,
+				      const struct landlock_cred_security *src)
+{
+	landlock_put_ruleset(dst->domain);
+
+	*dst = *src;
+
+	landlock_get_ruleset(src->domain);
+}
+
+static inline struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_get_current_domain(void)
+{
+	return landlock_cred(current_cred())->domain;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The call needs to come from an RCU read-side critical section.
+ */
+static inline const struct landlock_ruleset *
+landlock_get_task_domain(const struct task_struct *const task)
+{
+	return landlock_cred(__task_cred(task))->domain;
+}
+
+static inline bool landlocked(const struct task_struct *const task)
+{
+	bool has_dom;
+
+	if (task == current)
+		return !!landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	has_dom = !!landlock_get_task_domain(task);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return has_dom;
+}
+
+/**
+ * landlock_get_applicable_subject - Return the subject's Landlock credential
+ *                                   if its enforced domain applies to (i.e.
+ *                                   handles) at least one of the access rights
+ *                                   specified in @masks
+ *
+ * @cred: credential
+ * @masks: access masks
+ * @handle_layer: returned youngest layer handling a subset of @masks.  Not set
+ *                if the function returns NULL.
+ *
+ * Return: landlock_cred(@cred) if any access rights specified in @masks is
+ * handled, or NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static inline const struct landlock_cred_security *
+landlock_get_applicable_subject(const struct cred *const cred,
+				const struct access_masks masks,
+				size_t *const handle_layer)
+{
+	const union access_masks_all masks_all = {
+		.masks = masks,
+	};
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *domain;
+	ssize_t layer_level;
+
+	if (!cred)
+		return NULL;
+
+	domain = landlock_cred(cred)->domain;
+	if (!domain)
+		return NULL;
+
+	for (layer_level = domain->num_layers - 1; layer_level >= 0;
+	     layer_level--) {
+		union access_masks_all layer = {
+			.masks = domain->access_masks[layer_level],
+		};
+
+		if (layer.all & masks_all.all) {
+			if (handle_layer)
+				*handle_layer = layer_level;
+
+			return landlock_cred(cred);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+__init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void);
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_CRED_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/domain.c b/security/landlock/domain.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9a8355fcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/domain.c
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock - Domain management
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/pid.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/signal.h>
+#include <linux/uidgid.h>
+
+#include "access.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "id.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/**
+ * get_current_exe - Get the current's executable path, if any
+ *
+ * @exe_str: Returned pointer to a path string with a lifetime tied to the
+ *           returned buffer, if any.
+ * @exe_size: Returned size of @exe_str (including the trailing null
+ *            character), if any.
+ *
+ * Return: A pointer to an allocated buffer where @exe_str point to, %NULL if
+ * there is no executable path, or an error otherwise.
+ */
+static const void *get_current_exe(const char **const exe_str,
+				   size_t *const exe_size)
+{
+	const size_t buffer_size = LANDLOCK_PATH_MAX_SIZE;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct file *file __free(fput) = NULL;
+	char *buffer __free(kfree) = NULL;
+	const char *exe;
+	ssize_t size;
+
+	if (!mm)
+		return NULL;
+
+	file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
+	if (!file)
+		return NULL;
+
+	buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	exe = d_path(&file->f_path, buffer, buffer_size);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ERR(exe)))
+		/* Should never happen according to LANDLOCK_PATH_MAX_SIZE. */
+		return ERR_CAST(exe);
+
+	size = buffer + buffer_size - exe;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(size <= 0))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
+
+	*exe_size = size;
+	*exe_str = exe;
+	return no_free_ptr(buffer);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return: A newly allocated object describing a domain, or an error
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+static struct landlock_details *get_current_details(void)
+{
+	/* Cf. audit_log_d_path_exe() */
+	static const char null_path[] = "(null)";
+	const char *path_str = null_path;
+	size_t path_size = sizeof(null_path);
+	const void *buffer __free(kfree) = NULL;
+	struct landlock_details *details;
+
+	buffer = get_current_exe(&path_str, &path_size);
+	if (IS_ERR(buffer))
+		return ERR_CAST(buffer);
+
+	/*
+	 * Create the new details according to the path's length.  Account to
+	 * the calling task's memcg, like the other Landlock per-domain
+	 * allocations, even if it may not control the related size.
+	 */
+	details =
+		kzalloc_flex(*details, exe_path, path_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!details)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	memcpy(details->exe_path, path_str, path_size);
+	details->pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
+	details->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid());
+	get_task_comm(details->comm, current);
+	return details;
+}
+
+/**
+ * landlock_init_hierarchy_log - Partially initialize landlock_hierarchy
+ *
+ * @hierarchy: The hierarchy to initialize.
+ *
+ * The current task is referenced as the domain that is enforcing the
+ * restriction.  The subjective credentials must not be in an overridden state.
+ *
+ * @hierarchy->parent and @hierarchy->usage should already be set.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure.
+ */
+int landlock_init_hierarchy_log(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
+{
+	struct landlock_details *details;
+
+	details = get_current_details();
+	if (IS_ERR(details))
+		return PTR_ERR(details);
+
+	hierarchy->details = details;
+	hierarchy->id = landlock_get_id_range(1);
+	hierarchy->log_status = LANDLOCK_LOG_PENDING;
+	hierarchy->log_same_exec = true;
+	hierarchy->log_new_exec = false;
+	atomic64_set(&hierarchy->num_denials, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static deny_masks_t
+get_layer_deny_mask(const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access,
+		    const unsigned long access_bit, const size_t layer)
+{
+	unsigned long access_weight;
+
+	/* This may require change with new object types. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(all_existing_optional_access !=
+		     _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL);
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(layer >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS))
+		return 0;
+
+	access_weight = hweight_long(all_existing_optional_access &
+				     GENMASK(access_bit, 0));
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_weight < 1))
+		return 0;
+
+	return layer
+	       << ((access_weight - 1) * HWEIGHT(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * landlock_get_quiet_optional_accesses - Get optional accesses which are
+ *                                        covered by quiet rule flags.
+ *
+ * @all_existing_optional_access: Bitmask of valid optional accesses.
+ * @deny_masks: Domain layer levels that denied each optional access (the
+ *              deny_masks field on struct landlock_file_security).
+ * @masks: The struct layer_masks collected during the path walk.
+ *
+ * Return: a bitmask of which optional accesses are denied by layers for which
+ * the quiet flag was collected during the path walk.
+ */
+optional_access_t landlock_get_quiet_optional_accesses(
+	const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access,
+	const deny_masks_t deny_masks, const struct layer_masks *const masks)
+{
+	const unsigned long access_opt = all_existing_optional_access;
+	size_t access_index = 0;
+	unsigned long access_bit;
+	optional_access_t quiet_optional_accesses = 0;
+
+	/* This will require change with new object types. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(access_opt != _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL);
+
+	for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_opt,
+			 BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t)) {
+		const u8 layer =
+			(deny_masks >> (access_index *
+					HWEIGHT(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1))) &
+			(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1);
+
+		if (masks->layers[layer].quiet)
+			quiet_optional_accesses |= BIT(access_index);
+		access_index++;
+	}
+	return quiet_optional_accesses;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_get_layer_deny_mask(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const unsigned long truncate = BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	const unsigned long ioctl_dev = BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			get_layer_deny_mask(_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+					    truncate, 0));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0x3,
+			get_layer_deny_mask(_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+					    truncate, 3));
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			get_layer_deny_mask(_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+					    ioctl_dev, 0));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0xf0,
+			get_layer_deny_mask(_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+					    ioctl_dev, 15));
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+deny_masks_t
+landlock_get_deny_masks(const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access,
+			const access_mask_t optional_access,
+			const struct layer_masks *const masks)
+{
+	const unsigned long access_opt = optional_access;
+	unsigned long access_bit;
+	deny_masks_t deny_masks = 0;
+	access_mask_t all_denied = 0;
+
+	/* This may require change with new object types. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!access_mask_subset(optional_access,
+					 all_existing_optional_access));
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!masks))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!access_opt))
+		return 0;
+
+	for (ssize_t i = ARRAY_SIZE(masks->layers) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+		const access_mask_t denied = masks->layers[i].access &
+					     optional_access;
+		const unsigned long newly_denied = denied & ~all_denied;
+
+		if (!newly_denied)
+			continue;
+
+		for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &newly_denied,
+				 8 * sizeof(access_mask_t)) {
+			deny_masks |= get_layer_deny_mask(
+				all_existing_optional_access, access_bit, i);
+		}
+		all_denied |= denied;
+	}
+	return deny_masks;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_landlock_get_deny_masks(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const struct layer_masks layers1 = {
+		.layers[0].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
+				    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+		.layers[1].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+		.layers[2].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+		.layers[9].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+	};
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0x1,
+			landlock_get_deny_masks(_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+						LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+						&layers1));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0x20,
+			landlock_get_deny_masks(_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+						LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+						&layers1));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(
+		test, 0x21,
+		landlock_get_deny_masks(_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
+						LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+					&layers1));
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static struct kunit_case test_cases[] = {
+	/* clang-format off */
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_get_layer_deny_mask),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_landlock_get_deny_masks),
+	{}
+	/* clang-format on */
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite test_suite = {
+	.name = "landlock_domain",
+	.test_cases = test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suite(test_suite);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/landlock/domain.h b/security/landlock/domain.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2a1660e3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/domain.h
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock - Domain management
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN_H
+
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/pid.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "access.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+
+enum landlock_log_status {
+	LANDLOCK_LOG_PENDING = 0,
+	LANDLOCK_LOG_RECORDED,
+	LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED,
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_details - Domain's creation information
+ *
+ * Rarely accessed, mainly when logging the first domain's denial.
+ *
+ * The contained pointers are initialized at the domain creation time and never
+ * changed again.
+ */
+struct landlock_details {
+	/**
+	 * @pid: PID of the task that initially restricted itself.  It still
+	 * identifies the same task.  Keeping a reference to this PID ensures that
+	 * it will not be recycled.
+	 */
+	struct pid *pid;
+	/**
+	 * @uid: UID of the task that initially restricted itself, at creation time.
+	 */
+	uid_t uid;
+	/**
+	 * @comm: Command line of the task that initially restricted itself, at
+	 * creation time.  Always NULL terminated.
+	 */
+	char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+	/**
+	 * @exe_path: Executable path of the task that initially restricted
+	 * itself, at creation time.  Always NULL terminated, and never greater
+	 * than LANDLOCK_PATH_MAX_SIZE.
+	 */
+	char exe_path[];
+};
+
+/* Adds 11 extra characters for the potential " (deleted)" suffix. */
+#define LANDLOCK_PATH_MAX_SIZE (PATH_MAX + 11)
+
+/* Makes sure the greatest landlock_details can be allocated. */
+static_assert(struct_size_t(struct landlock_details, exe_path,
+			    LANDLOCK_PATH_MAX_SIZE) <= KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE);
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_hierarchy - Node in a domain hierarchy
+ */
+struct landlock_hierarchy {
+	/**
+	 * @parent: Pointer to the parent node, or NULL if it is a root
+	 * Landlock domain.
+	 */
+	struct landlock_hierarchy *parent;
+	/**
+	 * @usage: Number of potential children domains plus their parent
+	 * domain.
+	 */
+	refcount_t usage;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	/**
+	 * @log_status: Whether this domain should be logged or not.  Because
+	 * concurrent log entries may be created at the same time, it is still
+	 * possible to have several domain records of the same domain.
+	 */
+	enum landlock_log_status log_status;
+	/**
+	 * @num_denials: Number of access requests denied by this domain.
+	 * Masked (i.e. never logged) denials are still counted.
+	 */
+	atomic64_t num_denials;
+	/**
+	 * @id: Landlock domain ID, set once at domain creation time.
+	 */
+	u64 id;
+	/**
+	 * @details: Information about the related domain.
+	 */
+	const struct landlock_details *details;
+	/**
+	 * @log_same_exec: Set if the domain is *not* configured with
+	 * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF.  Set to true by default.
+	 */
+	u32 log_same_exec : 1,
+		/**
+		 * @log_new_exec: Set if the domain is configured with
+		 * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON.  Set to false by default.
+		 */
+		log_new_exec : 1;
+	/**
+	 * @quiet_masks: Bitmasks of access that should be quieted (i.e. not
+	 * logged) if the related object is marked as quiet.
+	 */
+	struct access_masks quiet_masks;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+deny_masks_t
+landlock_get_deny_masks(const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access,
+			const access_mask_t optional_access,
+			const struct layer_masks *const masks);
+
+optional_access_t landlock_get_quiet_optional_accesses(
+	const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access,
+	const deny_masks_t deny_masks, const struct layer_masks *const masks);
+
+int landlock_init_hierarchy_log(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy);
+
+static inline void
+landlock_free_hierarchy_details(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
+{
+	if (!hierarchy || !hierarchy->details)
+		return;
+
+	put_pid(hierarchy->details->pid);
+	kfree(hierarchy->details);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+static inline int
+landlock_init_hierarchy_log(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void
+landlock_free_hierarchy_details(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+static inline void
+landlock_get_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
+{
+	if (hierarchy)
+		refcount_inc(&hierarchy->usage);
+}
+
+static inline void landlock_put_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy)
+{
+	while (hierarchy && refcount_dec_and_test(&hierarchy->usage)) {
+		const struct landlock_hierarchy *const freeme = hierarchy;
+
+		landlock_log_drop_domain(hierarchy);
+		landlock_free_hierarchy_details(hierarchy);
+		hierarchy = hierarchy->parent;
+		kfree(freeme);
+	}
+}
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/errata.h b/security/landlock/errata.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8e626acca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/errata.h
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock - Errata information
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ERRATA_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ERRATA_H
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+
+struct landlock_erratum {
+	const int abi;
+	const u8 number;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+#define LANDLOCK_ERRATUM(NUMBER) \
+	{ \
+		.abi = LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI, \
+		.number = NUMBER, \
+	},
+/* clang-format on */
+
+/*
+ * Some fixes may require user space to check if they are applied on the running
+ * kernel before using a specific feature.  For instance, this applies when a
+ * restriction was previously too restrictive and is now getting relaxed (for
+ * compatibility or semantic reasons).  However, non-visible changes for
+ * legitimate use (e.g. security fixes) do not require an erratum.
+ */
+static const struct landlock_erratum landlock_errata_init[] __initconst = {
+
+/*
+ * Only Sparse may not implement __has_include.  If a compiler does not
+ * implement __has_include, a warning will be printed at boot time (see
+ * setup.c).
+ */
+#ifdef __has_include
+
+#define LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI 1
+#if __has_include("errata/abi-1.h")
+#include "errata/abi-1.h"
+#endif
+#undef LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI
+
+#define LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI 2
+#if __has_include("errata/abi-2.h")
+#include "errata/abi-2.h"
+#endif
+#undef LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI
+
+#define LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI 3
+#if __has_include("errata/abi-3.h")
+#include "errata/abi-3.h"
+#endif
+#undef LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI
+
+#define LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI 4
+#if __has_include("errata/abi-4.h")
+#include "errata/abi-4.h"
+#endif
+#undef LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI
+
+#define LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI 5
+#if __has_include("errata/abi-5.h")
+#include "errata/abi-5.h"
+#endif
+#undef LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI
+
+#define LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI 6
+#if __has_include("errata/abi-6.h")
+#include "errata/abi-6.h"
+#endif
+#undef LANDLOCK_ERRATA_ABI
+
+/*
+ * For each new erratum, we need to include all the ABI files up to the impacted
+ * ABI to make all potential future intermediate errata easy to backport.
+ *
+ * If such change involves more than one ABI addition, then it must be in a
+ * dedicated commit with the same Fixes tag as used for the actual fix.
+ *
+ * Each commit creating a new security/landlock/errata/abi-*.h file must have a
+ * Depends-on tag to reference the commit that previously added the line to
+ * include this new file, except if the original Fixes tag is enough.
+ *
+ * Each erratum must be documented in its related ABI file, and a dedicated
+ * commit must update Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst to include this
+ * erratum.  This commit will not be backported.
+ */
+
+#endif
+
+	{}
+};
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ERRATA_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/errata/abi-1.h b/security/landlock/errata/abi-1.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3f099555f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/errata/abi-1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+
+/**
+ * DOC: erratum_3
+ *
+ * Erratum 3: Disconnected directory handling
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ *
+ * This fix addresses an issue with disconnected directories that occur when a
+ * directory is moved outside the scope of a bind mount.  The change ensures
+ * that evaluated access rights include both those from the disconnected file
+ * hierarchy down to its filesystem root and those from the related mount point
+ * hierarchy.  This prevents access right widening through rename or link
+ * actions.
+ *
+ * Impact:
+ *
+ * Without this fix, it was possible to widen access rights through rename or
+ * link actions involving disconnected directories, potentially bypassing
+ * ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` restrictions.  This could allow privilege
+ * escalation in complex mount scenarios where directories become disconnected
+ * from their original mount points.
+ */
+LANDLOCK_ERRATUM(3)
diff --git a/security/landlock/errata/abi-4.h b/security/landlock/errata/abi-4.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fe11ec7d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/errata/abi-4.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+
+/**
+ * DOC: erratum_1
+ *
+ * Erratum 1: TCP socket identification
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ *
+ * This fix addresses an issue where IPv4 and IPv6 stream sockets (e.g., SMC,
+ * MPTCP, or SCTP) were incorrectly restricted by TCP access rights during
+ * :manpage:`bind(2)` and :manpage:`connect(2)` operations. This change ensures
+ * that only TCP sockets are subject to TCP access rights, allowing other
+ * protocols to operate without unnecessary restrictions.
+ *
+ * Impact:
+ *
+ * In kernels without this fix, using ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP`` or
+ * ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP`` would incorrectly restrict non-TCP
+ * stream protocols (SMC, MPTCP, SCTP), potentially breaking applications
+ * that rely on these protocols while using Landlock network restrictions.
+ */
+LANDLOCK_ERRATUM(1)
diff --git a/security/landlock/errata/abi-6.h b/security/landlock/errata/abi-6.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5cb1475c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/errata/abi-6.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+
+/**
+ * DOC: erratum_2
+ *
+ * Erratum 2: Scoped signal handling
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ *
+ * This fix addresses an issue where signal scoping was overly restrictive,
+ * preventing sandboxed threads from signaling other threads within the same
+ * process if they belonged to different domains.  Because threads are not
+ * security boundaries, user space might assume that all threads within the same
+ * process can send signals between themselves (see :manpage:`nptl(7)` and
+ * :manpage:`libpsx(3)`).  Consistent with :manpage:`ptrace(2)` behavior, direct
+ * interaction between threads of the same process should always be allowed.
+ * This change ensures that any thread is allowed to send signals to any other
+ * thread within the same process, regardless of their domain.
+ *
+ * Impact:
+ *
+ * This problem only manifests when the userspace process is itself using
+ * :manpage:`libpsx(3)` or an equivalent mechanism to enforce a Landlock policy
+ * on multiple already-running threads at once.  Programs which enforce a
+ * Landlock policy at startup time and only then become multithreaded are not
+ * affected.  Without this fix, signal scoping could break multi-threaded
+ * applications that expect threads within the same process to freely signal
+ * each other.
+ */
+LANDLOCK_ERRATUM(2)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f7e5e4ef9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2037 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock - Filesystem management and hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2021-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ * Copyright © 2022 Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
+ * Copyright © 2023-2024 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/falloc.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/pid.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/wait_bit.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/fiemap.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
+
+#include "access.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "fs.h"
+#include "limits.h"
+#include "object.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+
+/* Underlying object management */
+
+static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object)
+	__releases(object->lock)
+{
+	struct inode *const inode = object->underobj;
+	struct super_block *sb;
+
+	if (!inode) {
+		spin_unlock(&object->lock);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Protects against concurrent use by hook_sb_delete() of the reference
+	 * to the underlying inode.
+	 */
+	object->underobj = NULL;
+	/*
+	 * Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted,
+	 * hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput().
+	 */
+	sb = inode->i_sb;
+	atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
+	spin_unlock(&object->lock);
+	/*
+	 * Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and
+	 * get_inode_object() guarantee that it is safe to reset
+	 * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.  It is therefore
+	 * not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
+	 */
+	rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
+	/*
+	 * Now, new rules can safely be tied to @inode with get_inode_object().
+	 */
+
+	iput(inode);
+	if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs))
+		wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
+}
+
+static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = {
+	.release = release_inode
+};
+
+/* IOCTL helpers */
+
+/**
+ * is_masked_device_ioctl - Determine whether an IOCTL command is always
+ * permitted with Landlock for device files.  These commands can not be
+ * restricted on device files by enforcing a Landlock policy.
+ *
+ * @cmd: The IOCTL command that is supposed to be run.
+ *
+ * By default, any IOCTL on a device file requires the
+ * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right.  However, we blanket-permit some
+ * commands, if:
+ *
+ * 1. The command is implemented in fs/ioctl.c's do_vfs_ioctl(),
+ *    not in f_ops->unlocked_ioctl() or f_ops->compat_ioctl().
+ *
+ * 2. The command is harmless when invoked on devices.
+ *
+ * We also permit commands that do not make sense for devices, but where the
+ * do_vfs_ioctl() implementation returns a more conventional error code.
+ *
+ * Any new IOCTL commands that are implemented in fs/ioctl.c's do_vfs_ioctl()
+ * should be considered for inclusion here.
+ *
+ * Return: True if the IOCTL @cmd can not be restricted with Landlock for
+ * device files, false otherwise.
+ */
+static __attribute_const__ bool is_masked_device_ioctl(const unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	switch (cmd) {
+	/*
+	 * FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX, FIONBIO and FIOASYNC manipulate the FD's
+	 * close-on-exec and the file's buffered-IO and async flags.  These
+	 * operations are also available through fcntl(2), and are
+	 * unconditionally permitted in Landlock.
+	 */
+	case FIOCLEX:
+	case FIONCLEX:
+	case FIONBIO:
+	case FIOASYNC:
+	/*
+	 * FIOQSIZE queries the size of a regular file, directory, or link.
+	 *
+	 * We still permit it, because it always returns -ENOTTY for
+	 * other file types.
+	 */
+	case FIOQSIZE:
+	/*
+	 * FIFREEZE and FITHAW freeze and thaw the file system which the
+	 * given file belongs to.  Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+	 *
+	 * These commands operate on the file system's superblock rather
+	 * than on the file itself.  The same operations can also be
+	 * done through any other file or directory on the same file
+	 * system, so it is safe to permit these.
+	 */
+	case FIFREEZE:
+	case FITHAW:
+	/*
+	 * FS_IOC_FIEMAP queries information about the allocation of
+	 * blocks within a file.
+	 *
+	 * This IOCTL command only makes sense for regular files and is
+	 * not implemented by devices. It is harmless to permit.
+	 */
+	case FS_IOC_FIEMAP:
+	/*
+	 * FIGETBSZ queries the file system's block size for a file or
+	 * directory.
+	 *
+	 * This command operates on the file system's superblock rather
+	 * than on the file itself.  The same operation can also be done
+	 * through any other file or directory on the same file system,
+	 * so it is safe to permit it.
+	 */
+	case FIGETBSZ:
+	/*
+	 * FICLONE, FICLONERANGE and FIDEDUPERANGE make files share
+	 * their underlying storage ("reflink") between source and
+	 * destination FDs, on file systems which support that.
+	 *
+	 * These IOCTL commands only apply to regular files
+	 * and are harmless to permit for device files.
+	 */
+	case FICLONE:
+	case FICLONERANGE:
+	case FIDEDUPERANGE:
+	/*
+	 * FS_IOC_GETFSUUID and FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH both operate on
+	 * the file system superblock, not on the specific file, so
+	 * these operations are available through any other file on the
+	 * same file system as well.
+	 */
+	case FS_IOC_GETFSUUID:
+	case FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH:
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * FIONREAD, FS_IOC_GETFLAGS, FS_IOC_SETFLAGS, FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR and
+	 * FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR are forwarded to device implementations.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * file_ioctl() commands (FIBMAP, FS_IOC_RESVSP, FS_IOC_RESVSP64,
+	 * FS_IOC_UNRESVSP, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64 and FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE) are
+	 * forwarded to device implementations, so not permitted.
+	 */
+
+	/* Other commands are guarded by the access right. */
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * is_masked_device_ioctl_compat - same as the helper above, but checking the
+ * "compat" IOCTL commands.
+ *
+ * The IOCTL commands with special handling in compat-mode should behave the
+ * same as their non-compat counterparts.
+ */
+static __attribute_const__ bool
+is_masked_device_ioctl_compat(const unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	switch (cmd) {
+	/* FICLONE is permitted, same as in the non-compat variant. */
+	case FICLONE:
+		return true;
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
+	/*
+	 * FS_IOC_RESVSP_32, FS_IOC_RESVSP64_32, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP_32,
+	 * FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64_32, FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE_32: not blanket-permitted,
+	 * for consistency with their non-compat variants.
+	 */
+	case FS_IOC_RESVSP_32:
+	case FS_IOC_RESVSP64_32:
+	case FS_IOC_UNRESVSP_32:
+	case FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64_32:
+	case FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE_32:
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS, FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS are forwarded to their device
+	 * implementations.
+	 */
+	case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
+	case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
+		return false;
+	default:
+		return is_masked_device_ioctl(cmd);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Ruleset management */
+
+static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
+{
+	struct landlock_object *object, *new_object;
+	struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec = landlock_inode(inode);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+retry:
+	object = rcu_dereference(inode_sec->object);
+	if (object) {
+		if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&object->usage))) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return object;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * We are racing with release_inode(), the object is going
+		 * away.  Wait for release_inode(), then retry.
+		 */
+		spin_lock(&object->lock);
+		spin_unlock(&object->lock);
+		goto retry;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/*
+	 * If there is no object tied to @inode, then create a new one (without
+	 * holding any locks).
+	 */
+	new_object = landlock_create_object(&landlock_fs_underops, inode);
+	if (IS_ERR(new_object))
+		return new_object;
+
+	/*
+	 * Protects against concurrent calls to get_inode_object() or
+	 * hook_sb_delete().
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
+	if (unlikely(rcu_access_pointer(inode_sec->object))) {
+		/* Someone else just created the object, bail out and retry. */
+		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+		kfree(new_object);
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		goto retry;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * @inode will be released by hook_sb_delete() on its superblock
+	 * shutdown, or by release_inode() when no more ruleset references the
+	 * related object.
+	 */
+	ihold(inode);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(inode_sec->object, new_object);
+	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+	return new_object;
+}
+
+/* All access rights that can be tied to files. */
+/* clang-format off */
+#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX)
+/* clang-format on */
+
+/*
+ * @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd().
+ */
+int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			    const struct path *const path,
+			    access_mask_t access_rights, const u32 flags)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct landlock_id id = {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
+	};
+
+	/* Files only get access rights that make sense. */
+	if (!d_is_dir(path->dentry) &&
+	    !access_mask_subset(access_rights, ACCESS_FILE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
+	access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS &
+			 ~landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
+	id.key.object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
+	if (IS_ERR(id.key.object))
+		return PTR_ERR(id.key.object);
+	mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
+	err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights, flags);
+	mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
+	/*
+	 * No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule()
+	 * increments the refcount for the new object if needed.
+	 */
+	landlock_put_object(id.key.object);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* Access-control management */
+
+/*
+ * The lifetime of the returned rule is tied to @domain.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if no rule is found or if @dentry is negative.
+ */
+static const struct landlock_rule *
+find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+	  const struct dentry *const dentry)
+{
+	const struct landlock_rule *rule;
+	const struct inode *inode;
+	struct landlock_id id = {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
+	};
+
+	/* Ignores nonexistent leafs. */
+	if (d_is_negative(dentry))
+		return NULL;
+
+	inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	id.key.object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
+	rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rule;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable (e.g.
+ * sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through
+ * /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor>
+ */
+static bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return (dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
+	       (d_is_positive(dentry) &&
+		unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))));
+}
+
+static const struct access_masks any_fs = {
+	.fs = ~0,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Returns true iff the child file with the given src_child access rights under
+ * src_parent would result in having the same or fewer access rights if it were
+ * moved under new_parent.
+ */
+static bool may_refer(const struct layer_masks *const src_parent,
+		      const struct layer_masks *const src_child,
+		      const struct layer_masks *const new_parent,
+		      const bool child_is_dir)
+{
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(new_parent->layers); i++) {
+		access_mask_t child_access = src_parent->layers[i].access &
+					     src_child->layers[i].access;
+		access_mask_t parent_access = new_parent->layers[i].access;
+
+		if (!child_is_dir) {
+			child_access &= ACCESS_FILE;
+			parent_access &= ACCESS_FILE;
+		}
+
+		if (!access_mask_subset(child_access, parent_access))
+			return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a destination file hierarchy has more restrictions than a source
+ * file hierarchy.  This is only used for link and rename actions.
+ *
+ * Return: True if child1 may be moved from parent1 to parent2 without
+ * increasing its access rights (if child2 is set, an additional condition is
+ * that child2 may be used from parent2 to parent1 without increasing its access
+ * rights), false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool no_more_access(const struct layer_masks *const parent1,
+			   const struct layer_masks *const child1,
+			   const bool child1_is_dir,
+			   const struct layer_masks *const parent2,
+			   const struct layer_masks *const child2,
+			   const bool child2_is_dir)
+{
+	if (!may_refer(parent1, child1, parent2, child1_is_dir))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!child2)
+		return true;
+
+	return may_refer(parent2, child2, parent1, child2_is_dir);
+}
+
+#define NMA_TRUE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, no_more_access(__VA_ARGS__))
+#define NMA_FALSE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, no_more_access(__VA_ARGS__))
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_no_more_access(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const struct layer_masks rx0 = {
+		.layers[0].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
+				    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
+	};
+	const struct layer_masks mx0 = {
+		.layers[0].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
+				    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG,
+	};
+	const struct layer_masks x0 = {
+		.layers[0].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+	};
+	const struct layer_masks x1 = {
+		.layers[1].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+	};
+	const struct layer_masks x01 = {
+		.layers[0].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+		.layers[1].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+	};
+	const struct layer_masks allows_all = {};
+
+	/* Checks without restriction. */
+	NMA_TRUE(&x0, &allows_all, false, &allows_all, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&allows_all, &x0, false, &allows_all, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x0, &x0, false, &allows_all, NULL, false);
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks that we can only refer a file if no more access could be
+	 * inherited.
+	 */
+	NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x0, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x1, NULL, false);
+
+	/* Checks allowed referring with different nested domains. */
+	NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x1, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&x1, &x0, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x01, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x01, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&x01, &x0, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&x01, &x0, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x01, &x01, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+
+	/* Checks that file access rights are also enforced for a directory. */
+	NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, true, &x0, NULL, false);
+
+	/* Checks that directory access rights don't impact file referring... */
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	/* ...but only directory referring. */
+	NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x0, NULL, false);
+
+	/* Checks directory exchange. */
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &mx0, &mx0, true);
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &mx0, &x0, true);
+	NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x0, &mx0, true);
+	NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x0, &x0, true);
+	NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x1, &x1, true);
+
+	/* Checks file exchange with directory access rights... */
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &mx0, &mx0, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &mx0, &x0, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &x0, &mx0, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &x0, &x0, false);
+	/* ...and with file access rights. */
+	NMA_TRUE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &rx0, &rx0, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &rx0, &x0, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x0, &rx0, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x0, &x0, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x1, &x1, false);
+
+	/*
+	 * Allowing the following requests should not be a security risk
+	 * because domain 0 denies execute access, and domain 1 is always
+	 * nested with domain 0.  However, adding an exception for this case
+	 * would mean to check all nested domains to make sure none can get
+	 * more privileges (e.g. processes only sandboxed by domain 0).
+	 * Moreover, this behavior (i.e. composition of N domains) could then
+	 * be inconsistent compared to domain 1's ruleset alone (e.g. it might
+	 * be denied to link/rename with domain 1's ruleset, whereas it would
+	 * be allowed if nested on top of domain 0).  Another drawback would be
+	 * to create a cover channel that could enable sandboxed processes to
+	 * infer most of the filesystem restrictions from their domain.  To
+	 * make it simple, efficient, safe, and more consistent, this case is
+	 * always denied.
+	 */
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &rx0, NULL, false);
+
+	/* Checks the same case of exclusive domains with a file... */
+	NMA_TRUE(&x1, &x1, false, &x01, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x01, &x0, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x01, &x01, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x0, &x0, false);
+	/* ...and with a directory. */
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x0, &x0, true);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &x0, &x0, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &x0, &x0, true);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+#undef NMA_TRUE
+#undef NMA_FALSE
+
+static bool is_layer_masks_allowed(const struct layer_masks *masks)
+{
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(masks->layers); i++) {
+		if (masks->layers[i].access)
+			return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes @masks accesses that are not requested.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the request is allowed, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool scope_to_request(const access_mask_t access_request,
+			     struct layer_masks *masks)
+{
+	bool saw_unfulfilled_access = false;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!masks))
+		return true;
+
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(masks->layers); i++) {
+		masks->layers[i].access &= access_request;
+		if (masks->layers[i].access)
+			saw_unfulfilled_access = true;
+	}
+	return !saw_unfulfilled_access;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_scope_to_request_with_exec_none(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	/* Allows everything. */
+	struct layer_masks masks = {};
+
+	/* Checks and scopes with execute. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test,
+			  scope_to_request(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, &masks));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, (access_mask_t)masks.layers[0].access);
+}
+
+static void test_scope_to_request_with_exec_some(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	/* Denies execute and write. */
+	struct layer_masks masks = {
+		.layers[0].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+		.layers[1].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+	};
+
+	/* Checks and scopes with execute. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, scope_to_request(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+						  &masks));
+	/*
+	 * These casts to access_mask_t are needed because typeof(), used in
+	 * KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(), does not work on bitfields.
+	 */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+			(access_mask_t)masks.layers[0].access);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, (access_mask_t)masks.layers[1].access);
+}
+
+static void test_scope_to_request_without_access(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	/* Denies execute and write. */
+	struct layer_masks masks = {
+		.layers[0].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+		.layers[1].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+	};
+
+	/* Checks and scopes without access request. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, scope_to_request(0, &masks));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, (access_mask_t)masks.layers[0].access);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, (access_mask_t)masks.layers[1].access);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if there is at least one access right different than
+ * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER.
+ */
+static bool is_eacces(const struct layer_masks *masks,
+		      const access_mask_t access_request)
+{
+	if (!masks)
+		return false;
+
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(masks->layers); i++) {
+		/* LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER alone must return -EXDEV. */
+		if (masks->layers[i].access & access_request &
+		    ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+#define IE_TRUE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, is_eacces(__VA_ARGS__))
+#define IE_FALSE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, is_eacces(__VA_ARGS__))
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_is_eacces_with_none(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const struct layer_masks masks = {};
+
+	IE_FALSE(&masks, 0);
+	IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER);
+	IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE);
+	IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE);
+}
+
+static void test_is_eacces_with_refer(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const struct layer_masks masks = {
+		.layers[0].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+	};
+
+	IE_FALSE(&masks, 0);
+	IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER);
+	IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE);
+	IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE);
+}
+
+static void test_is_eacces_with_write(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const struct layer_masks masks = {
+		.layers[0].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+	};
+
+	IE_FALSE(&masks, 0);
+	IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER);
+	IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE);
+
+	IE_TRUE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+#undef IE_TRUE
+#undef IE_FALSE
+
+/**
+ * is_access_to_paths_allowed - Check accesses for requests with a common path
+ *
+ * @domain: Domain to check against.
+ * @path: File hierarchy to walk through.  For refer checks, this would be
+ *     the common mountpoint.
+ * @access_request_parent1: Accesses to check, once @layer_masks_parent1 is
+ *     equal to @layer_masks_parent2 (if any).  This is tied to the unique
+ *     requested path for most actions, or the source in case of a refer action
+ *     (i.e. rename or link), or the source and destination in case of
+ *     RENAME_EXCHANGE.
+ * @layer_masks_parent1: Pointer to a matrix of layer masks per access
+ *     masks, identifying the layers that forbid a specific access.  Bits from
+ *     this matrix can be unset according to the @path walk.  An empty matrix
+ *     means that @domain allows all possible Landlock accesses (i.e. not only
+ *     those identified by @access_request_parent1).  This matrix can
+ *     initially refer to domain layer masks and, when the accesses for the
+ *     destination and source are the same, to requested layer masks.
+ * @log_request_parent1: Audit request to fill if the related access is denied.
+ * @dentry_child1: Dentry to the initial child of the parent1 path.  This
+ *     pointer must be NULL for non-refer actions (i.e. not link nor rename).
+ * @access_request_parent2: Similar to @access_request_parent1 but for a
+ *     request involving a source and a destination.  This refers to the
+ *     destination, except in case of RENAME_EXCHANGE where it also refers to
+ *     the source.  Must be set to 0 when using a simple path request.
+ * @layer_masks_parent2: Similar to @layer_masks_parent1 but for a refer
+ *     action.  This must be NULL otherwise.
+ * @log_request_parent2: Audit request to fill if the related access is denied.
+ * @dentry_child2: Dentry to the initial child of the parent2 path.  This
+ *     pointer is only set for RENAME_EXCHANGE actions and must be NULL
+ *     otherwise.
+ *
+ * This helper first checks that the destination has a superset of restrictions
+ * compared to the source (if any) for a common path.  Because of
+ * RENAME_EXCHANGE actions, source and destinations may be swapped.  It then
+ * checks that the collected accesses and the remaining ones are enough to
+ * allow the request.
+ *
+ * Return: True if the access request is granted, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool
+is_access_to_paths_allowed(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+			   const struct path *const path,
+			   const access_mask_t access_request_parent1,
+			   struct layer_masks *layer_masks_parent1,
+			   struct landlock_request *const log_request_parent1,
+			   struct dentry *const dentry_child1,
+			   const access_mask_t access_request_parent2,
+			   struct layer_masks *layer_masks_parent2,
+			   struct landlock_request *const log_request_parent2,
+			   struct dentry *const dentry_child2)
+{
+	bool allowed_parent1 = false, allowed_parent2 = false, is_dom_check,
+	     child1_is_directory = true, child2_is_directory = true;
+	struct path walker_path;
+	access_mask_t access_masked_parent1, access_masked_parent2;
+	struct layer_masks _layer_masks_child1, _layer_masks_child2;
+	struct layer_masks *layer_masks_child1 = NULL,
+			   *layer_masks_child2 = NULL;
+
+	if (!access_request_parent1 && !access_request_parent2)
+		return true;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!path))
+		return true;
+
+	if (is_nouser_or_private(path->dentry))
+		return true;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!layer_masks_parent1))
+		return false;
+
+	allowed_parent1 = is_layer_masks_allowed(layer_masks_parent1);
+
+	if (unlikely(layer_masks_parent2)) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dentry_child1))
+			return false;
+
+		allowed_parent2 = is_layer_masks_allowed(layer_masks_parent2);
+
+		/*
+		 * For a double request, first check for potential privilege
+		 * escalation by looking at domain handled accesses (which are
+		 * a superset of the meaningful requested accesses).
+		 */
+		access_masked_parent1 = access_masked_parent2 =
+			landlock_union_access_masks(domain).fs;
+		is_dom_check = true;
+	} else {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dentry_child1 || dentry_child2))
+			return false;
+		/* For a simple request, only check for requested accesses. */
+		access_masked_parent1 = access_request_parent1;
+		access_masked_parent2 = access_request_parent2;
+		is_dom_check = false;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(dentry_child1)) {
+		/*
+		 * Get the layer masks for the child dentries for use by domain
+		 * check later.
+		 */
+		if (landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
+					      &_layer_masks_child1,
+					      LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE))
+			landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dentry_child1),
+					       &_layer_masks_child1);
+		layer_masks_child1 = &_layer_masks_child1;
+		child1_is_directory = d_is_dir(dentry_child1);
+	}
+	if (unlikely(dentry_child2)) {
+		if (landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
+					      &_layer_masks_child2,
+					      LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE))
+			landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dentry_child2),
+					       &_layer_masks_child2);
+		layer_masks_child2 = &_layer_masks_child2;
+		child2_is_directory = d_is_dir(dentry_child2);
+	}
+
+	walker_path = *path;
+	path_get(&walker_path);
+	/*
+	 * We need to walk through all the hierarchy to not miss any relevant
+	 * restriction.
+	 */
+	while (true) {
+		const struct landlock_rule *rule;
+
+		/*
+		 * If at least all accesses allowed on the destination are
+		 * already allowed on the source, respectively if there is at
+		 * least as much as restrictions on the destination than on the
+		 * source, then we can safely refer files from the source to
+		 * the destination without risking a privilege escalation.
+		 * This also applies in the case of RENAME_EXCHANGE, which
+		 * implies checks on both direction.  This is crucial for
+		 * standalone multilayered security policies.  Furthermore,
+		 * this helps avoid policy writers to shoot themselves in the
+		 * foot.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(is_dom_check &&
+			     no_more_access(
+				     layer_masks_parent1, layer_masks_child1,
+				     child1_is_directory, layer_masks_parent2,
+				     layer_masks_child2,
+				     child2_is_directory))) {
+			/*
+			 * Now, downgrades the remaining checks from domain
+			 * handled accesses to requested accesses.
+			 */
+			is_dom_check = false;
+			access_masked_parent1 = access_request_parent1;
+			access_masked_parent2 = access_request_parent2;
+
+			allowed_parent1 =
+				allowed_parent1 ||
+				scope_to_request(access_masked_parent1,
+						 layer_masks_parent1);
+			allowed_parent2 =
+				allowed_parent2 ||
+				scope_to_request(access_masked_parent2,
+						 layer_masks_parent2);
+
+			/* Stops when all accesses are granted. */
+			if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2)
+				break;
+		}
+
+		rule = find_rule(domain, walker_path.dentry);
+		allowed_parent1 =
+			allowed_parent1 ||
+			landlock_unmask_layers(rule, layer_masks_parent1);
+		allowed_parent2 =
+			allowed_parent2 ||
+			landlock_unmask_layers(rule, layer_masks_parent2);
+
+		/* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */
+		if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2)
+			break;
+
+jump_up:
+		if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) {
+			if (follow_up(&walker_path)) {
+				/* Ignores hidden mount points. */
+				goto jump_up;
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 * Stops at the real root.  Denies access
+				 * because not all layers have granted access.
+				 */
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(walker_path.dentry))) {
+			if (likely(walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL)) {
+				/*
+				 * Stops and allows access when reaching disconnected root
+				 * directories that are part of internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs,
+				 * which is reachable through /proc/<pid>/ns/<namespace>).
+				 */
+				allowed_parent1 = true;
+				allowed_parent2 = true;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * We reached a disconnected root directory from a bind mount.
+			 * Let's continue the walk with the mount point we missed.
+			 */
+			dput(walker_path.dentry);
+			walker_path.dentry = walker_path.mnt->mnt_root;
+			dget(walker_path.dentry);
+		} else {
+			struct dentry *const parent_dentry =
+				dget_parent(walker_path.dentry);
+
+			dput(walker_path.dentry);
+			walker_path.dentry = parent_dentry;
+		}
+	}
+	path_put(&walker_path);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check CONFIG_AUDIT to enable elision of log_request_parent* and
+	 * associated caller's stack variables thanks to dead code elimination.
+	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	if (!allowed_parent1 && log_request_parent1) {
+		log_request_parent1->type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS;
+		log_request_parent1->audit.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+		log_request_parent1->audit.u.path = *path;
+		log_request_parent1->access = access_masked_parent1;
+		log_request_parent1->layer_masks = layer_masks_parent1;
+	}
+
+	if (!allowed_parent2 && log_request_parent2) {
+		log_request_parent2->type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS;
+		log_request_parent2->audit.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+		log_request_parent2->audit.u.path = *path;
+		log_request_parent2->access = access_masked_parent2;
+		log_request_parent2->layer_masks = layer_masks_parent2;
+	}
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+	return allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2;
+}
+
+static int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
+				     access_mask_t access_request)
+{
+	const struct access_masks masks = {
+		.fs = access_request,
+	};
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+		landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), masks, NULL);
+	struct layer_masks layer_masks;
+	struct landlock_request request = {};
+
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain,
+						   access_request, &layer_masks,
+						   LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+	if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(subject->domain, path, access_request,
+				       &layer_masks, &request, NULL, 0, NULL,
+				       NULL, NULL))
+		return 0;
+
+	landlock_log_denial(subject, &request);
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static __attribute_const__ access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
+{
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFLNK:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM;
+	case S_IFDIR:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR;
+	case S_IFCHR:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR;
+	case S_IFBLK:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK;
+	case S_IFIFO:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO;
+	case S_IFSOCK:
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK;
+	case S_IFREG:
+	case 0:
+		/* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */
+	default:
+		/* Treats weird files as regular files. */
+		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG;
+	}
+}
+
+static access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
+{
+	if (d_is_negative(dentry))
+		return 0;
+	return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR :
+				  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * collect_domain_accesses - Walk through a file path and collect accesses
+ *
+ * @domain: Domain to check against.
+ * @mnt_root: Last directory to check.
+ * @dir: Directory to start the walk from.
+ * @layer_masks_dom: Where to store the collected accesses.
+ *
+ * This helper is useful to begin a path walk from the @dir directory to a
+ * @mnt_root directory used as a mount point.  This mount point is the common
+ * ancestor between the source and the destination of a renamed and linked
+ * file.  While walking from @dir to @mnt_root, we record all the domain's
+ * allowed accesses in @layer_masks_dom.
+ *
+ * Because of disconnected directories, this walk may not reach @mnt_dir.  In
+ * this case, the walk will continue to @mnt_dir after this call.
+ *
+ * This is similar to is_access_to_paths_allowed() but much simpler because it
+ * only handles walking on the same mount point and only checks one set of
+ * accesses.
+ *
+ * Return: True if all the domain access rights are allowed for @dir, false if
+ * the walk reached @mnt_root.
+ */
+static bool collect_domain_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+				    const struct dentry *const mnt_root,
+				    struct dentry *dir,
+				    struct layer_masks *layer_masks_dom)
+{
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !mnt_root || !dir || !layer_masks_dom))
+		return true;
+	if (is_nouser_or_private(dir))
+		return true;
+
+	if (!landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
+				       layer_masks_dom, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE))
+		return true;
+
+	dget(dir);
+	while (true) {
+		struct dentry *parent_dentry;
+
+		/* Gets all layers allowing all domain accesses. */
+		if (landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dir),
+					   layer_masks_dom)) {
+			/*
+			 * Stops when all handled accesses are allowed by at
+			 * least one rule in each layer.
+			 */
+			ret = true;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Stops at the mount point or the filesystem root for a disconnected
+		 * directory.
+		 */
+		if (dir == mnt_root || unlikely(IS_ROOT(dir)))
+			break;
+
+		parent_dentry = dget_parent(dir);
+		dput(dir);
+		dir = parent_dentry;
+	}
+	dput(dir);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * current_check_refer_path - Check if a rename or link action is allowed
+ *
+ * @old_dentry: File or directory requested to be moved or linked.
+ * @new_dir: Destination parent directory.
+ * @new_dentry: Destination file or directory.
+ * @removable: Sets to true if it is a rename operation.
+ * @exchange: Sets to true if it is a rename operation with RENAME_EXCHANGE.
+ *
+ * Because of its unprivileged constraints, Landlock relies on file hierarchies
+ * (and not only inodes) to tie access rights to files.  Being able to link or
+ * rename a file hierarchy brings some challenges.  Indeed, moving or linking a
+ * file (i.e. creating a new reference to an inode) can have an impact on the
+ * actions allowed for a set of files if it would change its parent directory
+ * (i.e. reparenting).
+ *
+ * To avoid trivial access right bypasses, Landlock first checks if the file or
+ * directory requested to be moved would gain new access rights inherited from
+ * its new hierarchy.  Before returning any error, Landlock then checks that
+ * the parent source hierarchy and the destination hierarchy would allow the
+ * link or rename action.  If it is not the case, an error with EACCES is
+ * returned to inform user space that there is no way to remove or create the
+ * requested source file type.  If it should be allowed but the new inherited
+ * access rights would be greater than the source access rights, then the
+ * kernel returns an error with EXDEV.  Prioritizing EACCES over EXDEV enables
+ * user space to abort the whole operation if there is no way to do it, or to
+ * manually copy the source to the destination if this remains allowed, e.g.
+ * because file creation is allowed on the destination directory but not direct
+ * linking.
+ *
+ * To achieve this goal, the kernel needs to compare two file hierarchies: the
+ * one identifying the source file or directory (including itself), and the
+ * destination one.  This can be seen as a multilayer partial ordering problem.
+ * The kernel walks through these paths and collects in a matrix the access
+ * rights that are denied per layer.  These matrices are then compared to see
+ * if the destination one has more (or the same) restrictions as the source
+ * one.  If this is the case, the requested action will not return EXDEV, which
+ * doesn't mean the action is allowed.  The parent hierarchy of the source
+ * (i.e. parent directory), and the destination hierarchy must also be checked
+ * to verify that they explicitly allow such action (i.e.  referencing,
+ * creation and potentially removal rights).  The kernel implementation is then
+ * required to rely on potentially four matrices of access rights: one for the
+ * source file or directory (i.e. the child), a potentially other one for the
+ * other source/destination (in case of RENAME_EXCHANGE), one for the source
+ * parent hierarchy and a last one for the destination hierarchy.  These
+ * ephemeral matrices take some space on the stack, which limits the number of
+ * layers to a deemed reasonable number: 16.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if access is allowed, -EXDEV if @old_dentry would inherit new
+ * access rights from @new_dir, or -EACCES if file removal or creation is
+ * denied.
+ */
+static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
+				    const struct path *const new_dir,
+				    struct dentry *const new_dentry,
+				    const bool removable, const bool exchange)
+{
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+		landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs, NULL);
+	bool allow_parent1, allow_parent2;
+	access_mask_t access_request_parent1, access_request_parent2;
+	struct path mnt_dir;
+	struct dentry *old_parent;
+	struct layer_masks layer_masks_parent1 = {}, layer_masks_parent2 = {};
+	struct landlock_request request1 = {}, request2 = {};
+
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry)))
+		return -ENOENT;
+	if (exchange) {
+		if (unlikely(d_is_negative(new_dentry)))
+			return -ENOENT;
+		access_request_parent1 =
+			get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_mode);
+	} else {
+		access_request_parent1 = 0;
+	}
+	access_request_parent2 =
+		get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode);
+	if (removable) {
+		access_request_parent1 |= maybe_remove(old_dentry);
+		access_request_parent2 |= maybe_remove(new_dentry);
+	}
+
+	/* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */
+	if (old_dentry->d_parent == new_dir->dentry) {
+		/*
+		 * The LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right is not required
+		 * for same-directory referer (i.e. no reparenting).
+		 */
+		access_request_parent1 = landlock_init_layer_masks(
+			subject->domain,
+			access_request_parent1 | access_request_parent2,
+			&layer_masks_parent1, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+		if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(subject->domain, new_dir,
+					       access_request_parent1,
+					       &layer_masks_parent1, &request1,
+					       NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+			return 0;
+
+		landlock_log_denial(subject, &request1);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	access_request_parent1 |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER;
+	access_request_parent2 |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER;
+
+	/* Saves the common mount point. */
+	mnt_dir.mnt = new_dir->mnt;
+	mnt_dir.dentry = new_dir->mnt->mnt_root;
+
+	/*
+	 * old_dentry may be the root of the common mount point and
+	 * !IS_ROOT(old_dentry) at the same time (e.g. with open_tree() and
+	 * OPEN_TREE_CLONE).  We do not need to call dget(old_parent) because
+	 * we keep a reference to old_dentry.
+	 */
+	old_parent = (old_dentry == mnt_dir.dentry) ? old_dentry :
+						      old_dentry->d_parent;
+
+	/* new_dir->dentry is equal to new_dentry->d_parent */
+	allow_parent1 = collect_domain_accesses(subject->domain, mnt_dir.dentry,
+						old_parent,
+						&layer_masks_parent1);
+	allow_parent2 = collect_domain_accesses(subject->domain, mnt_dir.dentry,
+						new_dir->dentry,
+						&layer_masks_parent2);
+	if (allow_parent1 && allow_parent2)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * To be able to compare source and destination domain access rights,
+	 * take into account the @old_dentry access rights aggregated with its
+	 * parent access rights.  This will be useful to compare with the
+	 * destination parent access rights.
+	 */
+	if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
+		    subject->domain, &mnt_dir, access_request_parent1,
+		    &layer_masks_parent1, &request1, old_dentry,
+		    access_request_parent2, &layer_masks_parent2, &request2,
+		    exchange ? new_dentry : NULL))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (request1.access) {
+		request1.audit.u.path.dentry = old_parent;
+		landlock_log_denial(subject, &request1);
+	}
+	if (request2.access) {
+		request2.audit.u.path.dentry = new_dir->dentry;
+		landlock_log_denial(subject, &request2);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This prioritizes EACCES over EXDEV for all actions, including
+	 * renames with RENAME_EXCHANGE.
+	 */
+	if (likely(is_eacces(&layer_masks_parent1, access_request_parent1) ||
+		   is_eacces(&layer_masks_parent2, access_request_parent2)))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	/*
+	 * Gracefully forbids reparenting if the destination directory
+	 * hierarchy is not a superset of restrictions of the source directory
+	 * hierarchy, or if LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is not allowed by the
+	 * source or the destination.
+	 */
+	return -EXDEV;
+}
+
+/* Inode hooks */
+
+static void hook_inode_free_security_rcu(void *inode_security)
+{
+	struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec;
+
+	/*
+	 * All inodes must already have been untied from their object by
+	 * release_inode() or hook_sb_delete().
+	 */
+	inode_sec = inode_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(inode_sec->object);
+}
+
+/* Super-block hooks */
+
+/*
+ * Release the inodes used in a security policy.
+ *
+ * Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and evict_inodes()
+ */
+static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb)
+{
+	struct inode *inode, *prev_inode = NULL;
+
+	if (!landlock_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
+		struct landlock_object *object;
+
+		/* Only handles referenced inodes. */
+		if (!icount_read_once(inode))
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * Protects against concurrent modification of inode (e.g.
+		 * from get_inode_object()).
+		 */
+		spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
+		/*
+		 * Checks I_FREEING and I_WILL_FREE  to protect against a race
+		 * condition when release_inode() just called iput(), which
+		 * could lead to a NULL dereference of inode->security or a
+		 * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object.  Also
+		 * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object.
+		 */
+		if (inode_state_read(inode) &
+		    (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) {
+			spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
+		if (!object) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Keeps a reference to this inode until the next loop walk. */
+		__iget(inode);
+		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+
+		/*
+		 * If there is no concurrent release_inode() ongoing, then we
+		 * are in charge of calling iput() on this inode, otherwise we
+		 * will just wait for it to finish.
+		 */
+		spin_lock(&object->lock);
+		if (object->underobj == inode) {
+			object->underobj = NULL;
+			spin_unlock(&object->lock);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+
+			/*
+			 * Because object->underobj was not NULL,
+			 * release_inode() and get_inode_object() guarantee
+			 * that it is safe to reset
+			 * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.
+			 * It is therefore not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
+			 */
+			rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
+			/*
+			 * At this point, we own the ihold() reference that was
+			 * originally set up by get_inode_object() and the
+			 * __iget() reference that we just set in this loop
+			 * walk.  Therefore there are at least two references
+			 * on the inode.
+			 */
+			iput_not_last(inode);
+		} else {
+			spin_unlock(&object->lock);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+		}
+
+		if (prev_inode) {
+			/*
+			 * At this point, we still own the __iget() reference
+			 * that we just set in this loop walk.  Therefore we
+			 * can drop the list lock and know that the inode won't
+			 * disappear from under us until the next loop walk.
+			 */
+			spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
+			/*
+			 * We can now actually put the inode reference from the
+			 * previous loop walk, which is not needed anymore.
+			 */
+			iput(prev_inode);
+			cond_resched();
+			spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
+		}
+		prev_inode = inode;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
+
+	/* Puts the inode reference from the last loop walk, if any. */
+	if (prev_inode)
+		iput(prev_inode);
+	/* Waits for pending iput() in release_inode(). */
+	wait_var_event(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs,
+		       !atomic_long_read(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs));
+}
+
+static void
+log_fs_change_topology_path(const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject,
+			    size_t handle_layer, const struct path *const path)
+{
+	landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH,
+			.u.path = *path,
+		},
+		.layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
+	});
+}
+
+static void log_fs_change_topology_dentry(
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject, size_t handle_layer,
+	struct dentry *const dentry)
+{
+	landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY,
+			.u.dentry = dentry,
+		},
+		.layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
+	});
+}
+
+/*
+ * Because a Landlock security policy is defined according to the filesystem
+ * topology (i.e. the mount namespace), changing it may grant access to files
+ * not previously allowed.
+ *
+ * To make it simple, deny any filesystem topology modification by landlocked
+ * processes.  Non-landlocked processes may still change the namespace of a
+ * landlocked process, but this kind of threat must be handled by a system-wide
+ * access-control security policy.
+ *
+ * This could be lifted in the future if Landlock can safely handle mount
+ * namespace updates requested by a landlocked process.  Indeed, we could
+ * update the current domain (which is currently read-only) by taking into
+ * account the accesses of the source and the destination of a new mount point.
+ * However, it would also require to make all the child domains dynamically
+ * inherit these new constraints.  Anyway, for backward compatibility reasons,
+ * a dedicated user space option would be required (e.g. as a ruleset flag).
+ */
+static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name,
+			 const struct path *const path, const char *const type,
+			 const unsigned long flags, void *const data)
+{
+	size_t handle_layer;
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+		landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs,
+						&handle_layer);
+
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	log_fs_change_topology_path(subject, handle_layer, path);
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path,
+			   const struct path *const to_path)
+{
+	size_t handle_layer;
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+		landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs,
+						&handle_layer);
+
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	log_fs_change_topology_path(subject, handle_layer, to_path);
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removing a mount point may reveal a previously hidden file hierarchy, which
+ * may then grant access to files, which may have previously been forbidden.
+ */
+static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags)
+{
+	size_t handle_layer;
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+		landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs,
+						&handle_layer);
+
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	log_fs_change_topology_dentry(subject, handle_layer, mnt->mnt_root);
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts)
+{
+	size_t handle_layer;
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+		landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs,
+						&handle_layer);
+
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	log_fs_change_topology_dentry(subject, handle_layer, sb->s_root);
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pivot_root(2), like mount(2), changes the current mount namespace.  It must
+ * then be forbidden for a landlocked process.
+ *
+ * However, chroot(2) may be allowed because it only changes the relative root
+ * directory of the current process.  Moreover, it can be used to restrict the
+ * view of the filesystem.
+ */
+static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path,
+			     const struct path *const new_path)
+{
+	size_t handle_layer;
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+		landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs,
+						&handle_layer);
+
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	log_fs_change_topology_path(subject, handle_layer, new_path);
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/* Path hooks */
+
+static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
+			  const struct path *const new_dir,
+			  struct dentry *const new_dentry)
+{
+	return current_check_refer_path(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry, false,
+					false);
+}
+
+static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir,
+			    struct dentry *const old_dentry,
+			    const struct path *const new_dir,
+			    struct dentry *const new_dentry,
+			    const unsigned int flags)
+{
+	/* old_dir refers to old_dentry->d_parent and new_dir->mnt */
+	return current_check_refer_path(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry, true,
+					!!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE));
+}
+
+static int hook_path_mkdir(const struct path *const dir,
+			   struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode)
+{
+	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR);
+}
+
+static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir,
+			   struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode,
+			   const unsigned int dev)
+{
+	return current_check_access_path(dir, get_mode_access(mode));
+}
+
+static int hook_path_symlink(const struct path *const dir,
+			     struct dentry *const dentry,
+			     const char *const old_name)
+{
+	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM);
+}
+
+static int hook_path_unlink(const struct path *const dir,
+			    struct dentry *const dentry)
+{
+	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE);
+}
+
+static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,
+			   struct dentry *const dentry)
+{
+	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR);
+}
+
+static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path)
+{
+	return current_check_access_path(path, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * unmask_scoped_access - Remove access right bits in @masks in all layers
+ *                        where @client and @server have the same domain
+ *
+ * This does the same as domain_is_scoped(), but unmasks bits in @masks.
+ * It can not return early as domain_is_scoped() does.
+ *
+ * A scoped access for a given access right bit is allowed iff, for all layer
+ * depths where the access bit is set, the client and server domain are the
+ * same.  This function clears the access rights @access in @masks at all layer
+ * depths where the client and server domain are the same, so that, when they
+ * are all cleared, the access is allowed.
+ *
+ * @client: Client domain
+ * @server: Server domain
+ * @masks: Layer access masks to unmask
+ * @access: Access bits that control scoping
+ */
+static void unmask_scoped_access(const struct landlock_ruleset *const client,
+				 const struct landlock_ruleset *const server,
+				 struct layer_masks *const masks,
+				 const access_mask_t access)
+{
+	int client_layer, server_layer;
+	const struct landlock_hierarchy *client_walker, *server_walker;
+
+	/* This should not happen. */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!client))
+		return;
+
+	/* Server has no Landlock domain; nothing to clear. */
+	if (!server)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * client_layer must be able to represent all numbers from
+	 * LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1 to -1 for the loop below to terminate.
+	 * (It must be large enough, and it must be signed.)
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(!is_signed_type(typeof(client_layer)));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1 >
+		     type_max(typeof(client_layer)));
+
+	client_layer = client->num_layers - 1;
+	client_walker = client->hierarchy;
+	server_layer = server->num_layers - 1;
+	server_walker = server->hierarchy;
+
+	/*
+	 * Clears the access bits at all layers where the client domain is the
+	 * same as the server domain.  We start the walk at min(client_layer,
+	 * server_layer).  The layer bits until there can not be cleared because
+	 * either the client or the server domain is missing.
+	 */
+	for (; client_layer > server_layer; client_layer--)
+		client_walker = client_walker->parent;
+
+	for (; server_layer > client_layer; server_layer--)
+		server_walker = server_walker->parent;
+
+	for (; client_layer >= 0; client_layer--) {
+		if (masks->layers[client_layer].access & access &&
+		    client_walker == server_walker)
+			masks->layers[client_layer].access &= ~access;
+
+		client_walker = client_walker->parent;
+		server_walker = server_walker->parent;
+	}
+}
+
+static int hook_unix_find(const struct path *const path, struct sock *other,
+			  int flags)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *dom_other;
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *subject;
+	struct layer_masks layer_masks;
+	struct landlock_request request = {};
+	static const struct access_masks fs_resolve_unix = {
+		.fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	};
+
+	/* Lookup for the purpose of saving coredumps is OK. */
+	if (unlikely(flags & SOCK_COREDUMP))
+		return 0;
+
+	subject = landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(),
+						  fs_resolve_unix, NULL);
+
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ignoring return value: that the domains apply was already checked in
+	 * landlock_get_applicable_subject() above.
+	 */
+	landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain, fs_resolve_unix.fs,
+				  &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+
+	/* Checks the layers in which we are connecting within the same domain. */
+	unix_state_lock(other);
+	if (unlikely(sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD) || !other->sk_socket ||
+		     !other->sk_socket->file)) {
+		unix_state_unlock(other);
+		/*
+		 * We rely on the caller to catch the (non-reversible) SOCK_DEAD
+		 * condition and retry the lookup.  If we returned an error
+		 * here, the lookup would not get retried.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	}
+	dom_other = landlock_cred(other->sk_socket->file->f_cred)->domain;
+
+	/* Access to the same (or a lower) domain is always allowed. */
+	unmask_scoped_access(subject->domain, dom_other, &layer_masks,
+			     fs_resolve_unix.fs);
+	unix_state_unlock(other);
+
+	/* Checks the connections to allow-listed paths. */
+	if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(subject->domain, path,
+				       fs_resolve_unix.fs, &layer_masks,
+				       &request, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+		return 0;
+
+	landlock_log_denial(subject, &request);
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+/* File hooks */
+
+/**
+ * get_required_file_open_access - Get access needed to open a file
+ *
+ * @file: File being opened.
+ *
+ * Return: The access rights that are required for opening the given file,
+ * depending on the file type and open mode.
+ */
+static access_mask_t
+get_required_file_open_access(const struct file *const file)
+{
+	access_mask_t access = 0;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
+		/* A directory can only be opened in read mode. */
+		if (S_ISDIR(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+			return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
+		access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE;
+	}
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
+	/* __FMODE_EXEC is indeed part of f_flags, not f_mode. */
+	if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC)
+		access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
+	return access;
+}
+
+static int hook_file_alloc_security(struct file *const file)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Grants all access rights, even if most of them are not checked later
+	 * on. It is more consistent.
+	 *
+	 * Notably, file descriptors for regular files can also be acquired
+	 * without going through the file_open hook, for example when using
+	 * memfd_create(2).
+	 */
+	landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool is_device(const struct file *const file)
+{
+	const struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	return S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode);
+}
+
+static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
+{
+	struct layer_masks layer_masks = {};
+	access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access,
+		optional_access;
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+		landlock_get_applicable_subject(file->f_cred, any_fs, NULL);
+	struct landlock_request request = {};
+
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_required_file_open_access()
+	 * may return 0.  This case will be handled with a future Landlock
+	 * evolution.
+	 */
+	open_access_request = get_required_file_open_access(file);
+
+	/*
+	 * We look up more access than what we immediately need for open(), so
+	 * that we can later authorize operations on opened files.
+	 */
+	optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+	if (is_device(file))
+		optional_access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+
+	full_access_request = open_access_request | optional_access;
+
+	if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
+		    subject->domain, &file->f_path,
+		    landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain,
+					      full_access_request, &layer_masks,
+					      LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE),
+		    &layer_masks, &request, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
+		allowed_access = full_access_request;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Calculate the actual allowed access rights from layer_masks.
+		 * Remove the access rights from the full access request which
+		 * are still unfulfilled in any of the layers.
+		 */
+		allowed_access = full_access_request;
+		for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks.layers); i++)
+			allowed_access &= ~layer_masks.layers[i].access;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * For operations on already opened files (i.e. ftruncate()), it is the
+	 * access rights at the time of open() which decide whether the
+	 * operation is permitted. Therefore, we record the relevant subset of
+	 * file access rights in the opened struct file.
+	 */
+	landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = allowed_access;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	landlock_file(file)->deny_masks = landlock_get_deny_masks(
+		_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL, optional_access, &layer_masks);
+	landlock_file(file)->quiet_optional_accesses =
+		landlock_get_quiet_optional_accesses(
+			_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+			landlock_file(file)->deny_masks, &layer_masks);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+	if (access_mask_subset(open_access_request, allowed_access))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Sets access to reflect the actual request. */
+	request.access = open_access_request;
+	landlock_log_denial(subject, &request);
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Allows truncation if the truncate right was available at the time of
+	 * opening the file, to get a consistent access check as for read, write
+	 * and execute operations.
+	 *
+	 * Note: For checks done based on the file's Landlock allowed access, we
+	 * enforce them independently of whether the current thread is in a
+	 * Landlock domain, so that open files passed between independent
+	 * processes retain their behaviour.
+	 */
+	if (landlock_file(file)->allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
+		return 0;
+
+	landlock_log_denial(landlock_cred(file->f_cred), &(struct landlock_request) {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE,
+			.u.file = file,
+		},
+		.all_existing_optional_access = _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+		.access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		.deny_masks = landlock_file(file)->deny_masks,
+		.quiet_optional_accesses = landlock_file(file)->quiet_optional_accesses,
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+	});
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int hook_file_ioctl_common(const struct file *const file,
+				  const unsigned int cmd, const bool is_compat)
+{
+	access_mask_t allowed_access = landlock_file(file)->allowed_access;
+
+	/*
+	 * It is the access rights at the time of opening the file which
+	 * determine whether IOCTL can be used on the opened file later.
+	 *
+	 * The access right is attached to the opened file in hook_file_open().
+	 */
+	if (allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!is_device(file))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (unlikely(is_compat) ? is_masked_device_ioctl_compat(cmd) :
+				  is_masked_device_ioctl(cmd))
+		return 0;
+
+	landlock_log_denial(landlock_cred(file->f_cred), &(struct landlock_request) {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP,
+			.u.op = &(struct lsm_ioctlop_audit) {
+				.path = file->f_path,
+				.cmd = cmd,
+			},
+		},
+		.all_existing_optional_access = _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+		.access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		.deny_masks = landlock_file(file)->deny_masks,
+		.quiet_optional_accesses = landlock_file(file)->quiet_optional_accesses,
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+	});
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int hook_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			   unsigned long arg)
+{
+	return hook_file_ioctl_common(file, cmd, false);
+}
+
+static int hook_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+				  unsigned long arg)
+{
+	return hook_file_ioctl_common(file, cmd, true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Always allow sending signals between threads of the same process.  This
+ * ensures consistency with hook_task_kill().
+ */
+static bool control_current_fowner(struct fown_struct *const fown)
+{
+	struct task_struct *p;
+
+	/*
+	 * Lock already held by __f_setown(), see commit 26f204380a3c ("fs: Fix
+	 * file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies").
+	 */
+	lockdep_assert_held(&fown->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * A process-group or session owner (PIDTYPE_PGID/PIDTYPE_SID) fans the
+	 * signal out to every member at delivery time, so record the domain and
+	 * let hook_file_send_sigiotask() check the live scope per recipient.
+	 */
+	if (fown->pid_type != PIDTYPE_PID && fown->pid_type != PIDTYPE_TGID)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Some callers (e.g. fcntl_dirnotify) may not be in an RCU read-side
+	 * critical section.
+	 */
+	guard(rcu)();
+	p = pid_task(fown->pid, fown->pid_type);
+	if (!p)
+		return true;
+
+	return !same_thread_group(p, current);
+}
+
+static void hook_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset *prev_dom;
+	struct landlock_cred_security fown_subject = {};
+	struct pid *prev_tg, *fown_tg = NULL;
+	size_t fown_layer = 0;
+
+	if (control_current_fowner(file_f_owner(file))) {
+		static const struct access_masks signal_scope = {
+			.scope = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+		};
+		const struct landlock_cred_security *new_subject =
+			landlock_get_applicable_subject(
+				current_cred(), signal_scope, &fown_layer);
+		if (new_subject) {
+			landlock_get_ruleset(new_subject->domain);
+			fown_subject = *new_subject;
+			fown_tg = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
+		}
+	}
+
+	prev_dom = landlock_file(file)->fown_subject.domain;
+	prev_tg = landlock_file(file)->fown_tg;
+	landlock_file(file)->fown_subject = fown_subject;
+	landlock_file(file)->fown_tg = fown_tg;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	landlock_file(file)->fown_layer = fown_layer;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT*/
+
+	/* May be called in an RCU read-side critical section. */
+	landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(prev_dom);
+	put_pid(prev_tg);
+}
+
+static void hook_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	put_pid(landlock_file(file)->fown_tg);
+	landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(landlock_file(file)->fown_subject.domain);
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security_rcu, hook_inode_free_security_rcu),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, hook_move_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, hook_sb_umount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, hook_sb_remount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, hook_sb_pivotroot),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, hook_path_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, hook_path_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, hook_path_mkdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, hook_path_mknod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, hook_path_truncate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_find, hook_unix_find),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, hook_file_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, hook_file_truncate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, hook_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, hook_file_ioctl_compat),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, hook_file_set_fowner),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, hook_file_free_security),
+};
+
+__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
+			   &landlock_lsmid);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+/* clang-format off */
+static struct kunit_case test_cases[] = {
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_no_more_access),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_scope_to_request_with_exec_none),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_scope_to_request_with_exec_some),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_scope_to_request_without_access),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_is_eacces_with_none),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_is_eacces_with_refer),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_is_eacces_with_write),
+	{}
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+static struct kunit_suite test_suite = {
+	.name = "landlock_fs",
+	.test_cases = test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suite(test_suite);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b4421d9df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock - Filesystem management and hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H
+
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+#include "access.h"
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_inode_security - Inode security blob
+ *
+ * Enable to reference a &struct landlock_object tied to an inode (i.e.
+ * underlying object).
+ */
+struct landlock_inode_security {
+	/**
+	 * @object: Weak pointer to an allocated object.  All assignments of a
+	 * new object are protected by the underlying inode->i_lock.  However,
+	 * atomically disassociating @object from the inode is only protected
+	 * by @object->lock, from the time @object's usage refcount drops to
+	 * zero to the time this pointer is nulled out (cf. release_inode() and
+	 * hook_sb_delete()).  Indeed, such disassociation doesn't require
+	 * inode->i_lock thanks to the careful rcu_access_pointer() check
+	 * performed by get_inode_object().
+	 */
+	struct landlock_object __rcu *object;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_file_security - File security blob
+ *
+ * This information is populated when opening a file in hook_file_open, and
+ * tracks the relevant Landlock access rights that were available at the time
+ * of opening the file. Other LSM hooks use these rights in order to authorize
+ * operations on already opened files.
+ */
+struct landlock_file_security {
+	/**
+	 * @allowed_access: Access rights that were available at the time of
+	 * opening the file. This is not necessarily the full set of access
+	 * rights available at that time, but it's the necessary subset as
+	 * needed to authorize later operations on the open file.
+	 */
+	access_mask_t allowed_access;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	/**
+	 * @deny_masks: Domain layer levels that deny an optional access (see
+	 * _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL).
+	 */
+	deny_masks_t deny_masks;
+	/**
+	 * @quiet_optional_accesses: Stores which optional accesses are covered
+	 * by quiet rules within the layer referred to in deny_masks, one access
+	 * per bit.  Does not take into account whether the quiet access bits
+	 * are actually set in the layer's corresponding landlock_hierarchy.
+	 */
+	optional_access_t quiet_optional_accesses;
+	/**
+	 * @fown_layer: Layer level of @fown_subject->domain with
+	 * LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL.
+	 */
+	u8 fown_layer;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+	/**
+	 * @fown_subject: Landlock credential of the task that set the PID that
+	 * may receive a signal e.g., SIGURG when writing MSG_OOB to the
+	 * related socket.  This pointer is protected by the related
+	 * file->f_owner->lock, as for fown_struct's members: pid, uid, and
+	 * euid.
+	 */
+	struct landlock_cred_security fown_subject;
+	/**
+	 * @fown_tg: Thread group of the task that set the file owner, pinned
+	 * while @fown_subject holds a domain.  It lets
+	 * hook_file_send_sigiotask() always allow a SIGIO delivered to the
+	 * owner's own process -- e.g. the thread-group leader reached through a
+	 * process-group owner -- matching the same-process exemption of
+	 * hook_task_kill().  NULL when no domain is recorded.  Protected by
+	 * file->f_owner->lock, like @fown_subject.
+	 */
+	struct pid *fown_tg;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/* Makes sure all layers can be identified. */
+/* clang-format off */
+static_assert((typeof_member(struct landlock_file_security, fown_layer))~0 >=
+	      LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
+/* clang-format on */
+
+/*
+ * Make sure quiet_optional_accesses has enough bits to cover all optional
+ * accesses.
+ */
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(typeof_member(struct landlock_file_security,
+					  quiet_optional_accesses)) >=
+	      HWEIGHT(_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL));
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_superblock_security - Superblock security blob
+ *
+ * Enable hook_sb_delete() to wait for concurrent calls to release_inode().
+ */
+struct landlock_superblock_security {
+	/**
+	 * @inode_refs: Number of pending inodes (from this superblock) that
+	 * are being released by release_inode().
+	 * Cf. struct super_block->s_fsnotify_inode_refs .
+	 */
+	atomic_long_t inode_refs;
+};
+
+static inline struct landlock_file_security *
+landlock_file(const struct file *const file)
+{
+	return file->f_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
+}
+
+static inline struct landlock_inode_security *
+landlock_inode(const struct inode *const inode)
+{
+	return inode->i_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+}
+
+static inline struct landlock_superblock_security *
+landlock_superblock(const struct super_block *const superblock)
+{
+	return superblock->s_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
+__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void);
+
+int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			    const struct path *const path,
+			    access_mask_t access_hierarchy, const u32 flags);
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/id.c b/security/landlock/id.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6c8769777
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/id.c
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock - Unique identification number generator
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "id.h"
+
+#define COUNTER_PRE_INIT 0
+
+static atomic64_t next_id = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+
+static void __init init_id(atomic64_t *const counter, const u32 random_32bits)
+{
+	u64 init;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensures sure 64-bit values are always used by user space (or may
+	 * fail with -EOVERFLOW), and makes this testable.
+	 */
+	init = BIT_ULL(32);
+
+	/*
+	 * Makes a large (2^32) boot-time value to limit ID collision in logs
+	 * from different boots, and to limit info leak about the number of
+	 * initially (relative to the reader) created elements (e.g. domains).
+	 */
+	init += random_32bits;
+
+	/* Sets first or ignores.  This will be the first ID. */
+	atomic64_cmpxchg(counter, COUNTER_PRE_INIT, init);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void __init test_init_min(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	atomic64_t counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+
+	init_id(&counter, 0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, atomic64_read(&counter), 1ULL + U32_MAX);
+}
+
+static void __init test_init_max(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	atomic64_t counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+
+	init_id(&counter, ~0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, atomic64_read(&counter), 1 + (2ULL * U32_MAX));
+}
+
+static void __init test_init_once(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const u64 first_init = 1ULL + U32_MAX;
+	atomic64_t counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+
+	init_id(&counter, 0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, atomic64_read(&counter), first_init);
+
+	init_id(&counter, ~0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(
+		test, atomic64_read(&counter), first_init,
+		"Should still have the same value after the subsequent init_id()");
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+void __init landlock_init_id(void)
+{
+	return init_id(&next_id, get_random_u32());
+}
+
+/*
+ * It's not worth it to try to hide the monotonic counter because it can still
+ * be inferred (with N counter ranges), and if we are allowed to read the inode
+ * number we should also be allowed to read the time creation anyway, and it
+ * can be handy to store and sort domain IDs for user space.
+ *
+ * Returns the value of next_id and increment it to let some space for the next
+ * one.
+ */
+static u64 get_id_range(size_t number_of_ids, atomic64_t *const counter,
+			u8 random_4bits)
+{
+	u64 id, step;
+
+	/*
+	 * We should return at least 1 ID, and we may need a set of consecutive
+	 * ones (e.g. to generate a set of inodes).
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(number_of_ids <= 0))
+		number_of_ids = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Blurs the next ID guess with 1/16 ratio.  We get 2^(64 - 4) -
+	 * (2 * 2^32), so a bit less than 2^60 available IDs, which should be
+	 * much more than enough considering the number of CPU cycles required
+	 * to get a new ID (e.g. a full landlock_restrict_self() call), and the
+	 * cost of draining all available IDs during the system's uptime.
+	 */
+	random_4bits &= 0b1111;
+	step = number_of_ids + random_4bits;
+
+	/* It is safe to cast a signed atomic to an unsigned value. */
+	id = atomic64_fetch_add(step, counter);
+
+	/* Warns if landlock_init_id() was not called. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(id == COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+	return id;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static u8 get_random_u8_positive(void)
+{
+	/* max() evaluates its arguments once. */
+	return max(1, get_random_u8());
+}
+
+static void test_range1_rand0(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	atomic64_t counter;
+	u64 init;
+
+	init = get_random_u32();
+	atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 0), init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+			get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+				     get_random_u8()),
+			init + 1);
+}
+
+static void test_range1_rand1(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	atomic64_t counter;
+	u64 init;
+
+	init = get_random_u32();
+	atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 1), init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+			get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+				     get_random_u8()),
+			init + 2);
+}
+
+static void test_range1_rand15(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	atomic64_t counter;
+	u64 init;
+
+	init = get_random_u32();
+	atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 15), init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+			get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+				     get_random_u8()),
+			init + 16);
+}
+
+static void test_range1_rand16(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	atomic64_t counter;
+	u64 init;
+
+	init = get_random_u32();
+	atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 16), init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+			get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+				     get_random_u8()),
+			init + 1);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand0(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	atomic64_t counter;
+	u64 init;
+
+	init = get_random_u32();
+	atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 0), init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+			get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+				     get_random_u8()),
+			init + 2);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand1(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	atomic64_t counter;
+	u64 init;
+
+	init = get_random_u32();
+	atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 1), init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+			get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+				     get_random_u8()),
+			init + 3);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand2(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	atomic64_t counter;
+	u64 init;
+
+	init = get_random_u32();
+	atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 2), init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+			get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+				     get_random_u8()),
+			init + 4);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand15(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	atomic64_t counter;
+	u64 init;
+
+	init = get_random_u32();
+	atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 15), init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+			get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+				     get_random_u8()),
+			init + 17);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand16(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	atomic64_t counter;
+	u64 init;
+
+	init = get_random_u32();
+	atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 16), init);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+			get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+				     get_random_u8()),
+			init + 2);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+/**
+ * landlock_get_id_range - Get a range of unique IDs
+ *
+ * @number_of_ids: Number of IDs to hold.  Must be greater than one.
+ *
+ * Return: The first ID in the range.
+ */
+u64 landlock_get_id_range(size_t number_of_ids)
+{
+	return get_id_range(number_of_ids, &next_id, get_random_u8());
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static struct kunit_case __refdata test_cases[] = {
+	/* clang-format off */
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_init_min),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_init_max),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_init_once),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_range1_rand0),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_range1_rand1),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_range1_rand15),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_range1_rand16),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand0),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand1),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand2),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand15),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand16),
+	{}
+	/* clang-format on */
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite test_suite = {
+	.name = "landlock_id",
+	.test_cases = test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_init_section_suite(test_suite);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
diff --git a/security/landlock/id.h b/security/landlock/id.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..45dcfb9e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/id.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock - Unique identification number generator
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ID_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ID_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+void __init landlock_init_id(void);
+
+u64 landlock_get_id_range(size_t number_of_ids);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+static inline void __init landlock_init_id(void)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ID_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..08d5f2f6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock - Limits for different components
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2021-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
+
+/* clang-format off */
+
+#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS		16
+#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES		U32_MAX
+
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS		LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
+#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS		((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
+#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
+
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SEND_UDP
+#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET	((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1)
+#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
+
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_SCOPE		LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL
+#define LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE		((LANDLOCK_LAST_SCOPE << 1) - 1)
+#define LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE)
+
+#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_MAX \
+	MAX(MAX(LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS, LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET), LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE)
+
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_RESTRICT_SELF	LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC
+#define LANDLOCK_MASK_RESTRICT_SELF	((LANDLOCK_LAST_RESTRICT_SELF << 1) - 1)
+
+/* clang-format on */
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cbff59ec3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock - Network management and hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2022-2023 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
+ * Copyright © 2022-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "limits.h"
+#include "net.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+
+int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			     const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights,
+			     const u32 flags)
+{
+	int err;
+	const struct landlock_id id = {
+		.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)htons(port),
+		.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
+	};
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
+
+	/* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
+	access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET &
+			 ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
+
+	mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
+	err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights, flags);
+	mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
+				       struct sockaddr *const address,
+				       const int addrlen,
+				       access_mask_t access_request,
+				       bool connecting)
+{
+	unsigned short sock_family;
+	__be16 port;
+	struct layer_masks layer_masks = {};
+	const struct landlock_rule *rule;
+	struct landlock_id id = {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
+	};
+	const struct access_masks masks = {
+		.net = access_request,
+	};
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+		landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), masks, NULL);
+	struct lsm_network_audit audit_net = {};
+
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Checks for minimal header length to safely read sa_family. */
+	if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * The socket is not locked, so sk_family can change concurrently due to
+	 * e.g. setsockopt(IPV6_ADDRFORM).
+	 */
+	sock_family = READ_ONCE(sock->sk->sk_family);
+
+	switch (address->sa_family) {
+	case AF_UNSPEC:
+		if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP ||
+		    (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SEND_UDP &&
+		     connecting)) {
+			/*
+			 * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the
+			 * remote association while retaining the socket object
+			 * (i.e., the file descriptor). For TCP, it has the same
+			 * effect as closing the connection. For UDP, it removes
+			 * any preset remote address. As for dropping
+			 * privileges, these actions are always allowed.  Let
+			 * the network stack handle potential inconsistencies
+			 * and return -EINVAL if needed.
+			 */
+			return 0;
+		} else if (access_request ==
+			   LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SEND_UDP) {
+			if (sock_family == AF_INET6) {
+				/*
+				 * We cannot allow sending UDP datagrams to an
+				 * explicit AF_UNSPEC address on IPv6 sockets,
+				 * even if AF_UNSPEC is treated as "no address"
+				 * on such sockets (so it should always be
+				 * allowed).  That's because the socket's family
+				 * can change under our feet (if another thread
+				 * calls setsockopt(IPV6_ADDRFORM)) to IPv4,
+				 * which would then treat AF_UNSPEC as AF_INET.
+				 */
+				audit_net.family = AF_UNSPEC;
+				audit_net.sk = sock->sk;
+				landlock_init_layer_masks(
+					subject->domain, access_request,
+					&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
+				landlock_log_denial(
+					subject,
+					&(struct landlock_request){
+						.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS,
+						.audit.type =
+							LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET,
+						.audit.u.net = &audit_net,
+						.access = access_request,
+						.layer_masks = &layer_masks,
+					});
+				return -EACCES;
+			}
+		} else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP ||
+			   access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP) {
+			/*
+			 * Binding to an AF_UNSPEC address is treated
+			 * differently by IPv4 and IPv6 sockets. The socket's
+			 * family may change under our feet due to
+			 * setsockopt(IPV6_ADDRFORM), but that's ok: we either
+			 * reject entirely for IPv6 or require
+			 * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP or
+			 * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP for IPv4, so it cannot
+			 * be used to bypass the policy.
+			 *
+			 * IPv4 sockets map AF_UNSPEC to AF_INET for
+			 * retrocompatibility for bind accesses, only if the
+			 * address is INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). IPv6
+			 * sockets always reject it.
+			 *
+			 * Checking the address is required to not wrongfully
+			 * return -EACCES instead of -EAFNOSUPPORT or -EINVAL.
+			 * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle
+			 * these checks, but it is safer to return a proper
+			 * error and test consistency thanks to kselftest.
+			 */
+			if (sock_family == AF_INET) {
+				const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
+					(struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+
+				if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+					return -EINVAL;
+
+				if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr !=
+				    htonl(INADDR_ANY))
+					return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+			} else {
+				if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				else
+					return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+			}
+		} else {
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * AF_UNSPEC is treated as AF_INET only in
+		 * bind(AF_UNSPEC+INADDR_ANY) on IPv4 sockets and when sending
+		 * to AF_UNSPEC addresses on IPv4 sockets.
+		 */
+		fallthrough;
+	case AF_INET: {
+		const struct sockaddr_in *addr4;
+
+		if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+		port = addr4->sin_port;
+
+		if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP ||
+		    access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SEND_UDP) {
+			audit_net.dport = port;
+			audit_net.v4info.daddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+		} else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP ||
+			   access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP) {
+			audit_net.sport = port;
+			audit_net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+		} else {
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	case AF_INET6: {
+		const struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
+
+		if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+		port = addr6->sin6_port;
+
+		if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP ||
+		    access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SEND_UDP) {
+			audit_net.dport = port;
+			audit_net.v6info.daddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+		} else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP ||
+			   access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP) {
+			audit_net.sport = port;
+			audit_net.v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+		} else {
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
+
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks sa_family consistency to not wrongfully return
+	 * -EACCES instead of -EINVAL.  Valid sa_family changes are
+	 * only (from AF_INET or AF_INET6) to AF_UNSPEC.
+	 *
+	 * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle this
+	 * check, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
+	 * consistency thanks to kselftest.
+	 */
+	if (address->sa_family != sock_family &&
+	    address->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port;
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
+
+	rule = landlock_find_rule(subject->domain, id);
+	access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain,
+						   access_request, &layer_masks,
+						   LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
+	if (!access_request)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, &layer_masks))
+		return 0;
+
+	audit_net.family = address->sa_family;
+	audit_net.sk = sock->sk;
+	landlock_log_denial(subject,
+			    &(struct landlock_request){
+				    .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS,
+				    .audit.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET,
+				    .audit.u.net = &audit_net,
+				    .access = access_request,
+				    .layer_masks = &layer_masks,
+			    });
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int current_check_autobind_udp_socket(struct socket *const sock)
+{
+	const struct access_masks bind_udp = {
+		.net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP,
+	};
+	struct sockaddr_storage port0 = {};
+	unsigned short num;
+	bool slow;
+
+	/* Quick return for non-Landlocked tasks. */
+	if (!landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), bind_udp, NULL))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * On UDP sockets, if a local port has not already been bound, calling
+	 * connect() or sending a first datagram has the side effect of
+	 * autobinding an ephemeral port: we also have to check that the process
+	 * would have had the right to bind(0) explicitly.  Hold the socket lock
+	 * around the inet_num read to exclude udp_lib_get_port()'s transient
+	 * inet_num = snum write that is reverted to 0 on a failing reuseport
+	 * bind.
+	 */
+	slow = lock_sock_fast(sock->sk);
+	num = inet_sk(sock->sk)->inet_num;
+	unlock_sock_fast(sock->sk, slow);
+	if (num != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Construct a struct sockaddr* with port 0 to pretend the process tried
+	 * to bind() on that address.
+	 */
+	port0.ss_family = READ_ONCE(sock->sk->sk_family);
+
+	return current_check_access_socket(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&port0,
+					   sizeof(port0), bind_udp.net, false);
+}
+
+static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock,
+			    struct sockaddr *const address, const int addrlen)
+{
+	access_mask_t access_request;
+
+	if (sk_is_tcp(sock->sk))
+		access_request = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP;
+	else if (sk_is_udp(sock->sk))
+		access_request = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP;
+	else
+		return 0;
+
+	return current_check_access_socket(sock, address, addrlen,
+					   access_request, false);
+}
+
+static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *const sock,
+			       struct sockaddr *const address,
+			       const int addrlen)
+{
+	access_mask_t access_request;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sk_is_tcp(sock->sk))
+		access_request = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP;
+	else if (sk_is_udp(sock->sk))
+		access_request = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SEND_UDP;
+	else
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = current_check_access_socket(sock, address, addrlen,
+					  access_request, true);
+
+	/*
+	 * connect()ing to an AF_UNSPEC address does not trigger an autobind and
+	 * should never be restricted.
+	 */
+	if (ret == 0 && sk_is_udp(sock->sk) &&
+	    addrlen >= offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family) &&
+	    address->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC)
+		ret = current_check_autobind_udp_socket(sock);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int hook_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *const sock,
+			       struct msghdr *const msg, const int size)
+{
+	struct sockaddr *const address = msg->msg_name;
+	const int addrlen = msg->msg_namelen;
+	access_mask_t access_request;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sk_is_udp(sock->sk))
+		access_request = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SEND_UDP;
+	else
+		return 0;
+
+	if (address != NULL)
+		ret = current_check_access_socket(sock, address, addrlen,
+						  access_request, false);
+
+	if (ret == 0)
+		ret = current_check_autobind_udp_socket(sock);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, hook_socket_sendmsg),
+};
+
+__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
+			   &landlock_lsmid);
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.h b/security/landlock/net.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5c0e3b409
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2022-2023 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void);
+
+int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			     const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights,
+			     const u32 flags);
+#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+static inline void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int
+landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, const u16 port,
+			 access_mask_t access_rights, const u32 flags)
+{
+	return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+}
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/object.c b/security/landlock/object.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d6e159ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/object.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Object management
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+#include "object.h"
+
+struct landlock_object *
+landlock_create_object(const struct landlock_object_underops *const underops,
+		       void *const underobj)
+{
+	struct landlock_object *new_object;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!underops || !underobj))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+	new_object = kzalloc_obj(*new_object, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!new_object)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	refcount_set(&new_object->usage, 1);
+	spin_lock_init(&new_object->lock);
+	new_object->underops = underops;
+	new_object->underobj = underobj;
+	return new_object;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The caller must own the object (i.e. thanks to object->usage) to safely put
+ * it.
+ */
+void landlock_put_object(struct landlock_object *const object)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The call to @object->underops->release(object) might sleep, e.g.
+	 * because of iput().
+	 */
+	might_sleep();
+	if (!object)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the @object's refcount cannot drop to zero, we can just decrement
+	 * the refcount without holding a lock. Otherwise, the decrement must
+	 * happen under @object->lock for synchronization with things like
+	 * get_inode_object().
+	 */
+	if (refcount_dec_and_lock(&object->usage, &object->lock)) {
+		__acquire(&object->lock);
+		/*
+		 * With @object->lock initially held, remove the reference from
+		 * @object->underobj to @object (if it still exists).
+		 */
+		object->underops->release(object);
+		kfree_rcu(object, rcu_free);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/object.h b/security/landlock/object.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5f28c35e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/object.h
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Object management
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H
+
+#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+struct landlock_object;
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_object_underops - Operations on an underlying object
+ */
+struct landlock_object_underops {
+	/**
+	 * @release: Releases the underlying object (e.g. iput() for an inode).
+	 */
+	void (*release)(struct landlock_object *const object)
+		__releases(object->lock);
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_object - Security blob tied to a kernel object
+ *
+ * The goal of this structure is to enable to tie a set of ephemeral access
+ * rights (pertaining to different domains) to a kernel object (e.g an inode)
+ * in a safe way.  This implies to handle concurrent use and modification.
+ *
+ * The lifetime of a &struct landlock_object depends on the rules referring to
+ * it.
+ */
+struct landlock_object {
+	/**
+	 * @usage: This counter is used to tie an object to the rules matching
+	 * it or to keep it alive while adding a new rule.  If this counter
+	 * reaches zero, this struct must not be modified, but this counter can
+	 * still be read from within an RCU read-side critical section.  When
+	 * adding a new rule to an object with a usage counter of zero, we must
+	 * wait until the pointer to this object is set to NULL (or recycled).
+	 */
+	refcount_t usage;
+	/**
+	 * @lock: Protects against concurrent modifications.  This lock must be
+	 * held from the time @usage drops to zero until any weak references
+	 * from @underobj to this object have been cleaned up.
+	 *
+	 * Lock ordering: inode->i_lock nests inside this.
+	 */
+	spinlock_t lock;
+	/**
+	 * @underobj: Used when cleaning up an object and to mark an object as
+	 * tied to its underlying kernel structure.  This pointer is protected
+	 * by @lock.  Cf. landlock_release_inodes() and release_inode().
+	 */
+	void *underobj;
+	union {
+		/**
+		 * @rcu_free: Enables lockless use of @usage, @lock and
+		 * @underobj from within an RCU read-side critical section.
+		 * @rcu_free and @underops are only used by
+		 * landlock_put_object().
+		 */
+		struct rcu_head rcu_free;
+		/**
+		 * @underops: Enables landlock_put_object() to release the
+		 * underlying object (e.g. inode).
+		 */
+		const struct landlock_object_underops *underops;
+	};
+};
+
+struct landlock_object *
+landlock_create_object(const struct landlock_object_underops *const underops,
+		       void *const underobj);
+
+void landlock_put_object(struct landlock_object *const object);
+
+static inline void landlock_get_object(struct landlock_object *const object)
+{
+	if (object)
+		refcount_inc(&object->usage);
+}
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4dd09ea22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -0,0 +1,744 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Ruleset management
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/lockdep.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
+#include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
+
+#include "access.h"
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "limits.h"
+#include "object.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+
+static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset;
+
+	new_ruleset = kzalloc_flex(*new_ruleset, access_masks, num_layers,
+				   GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!new_ruleset)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	refcount_set(&new_ruleset->usage, 1);
+	mutex_init(&new_ruleset->lock);
+	new_ruleset->root_inode = RB_ROOT;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+	new_ruleset->root_net_port = RB_ROOT;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+
+	new_ruleset->num_layers = num_layers;
+	/*
+	 * hierarchy = NULL
+	 * num_rules = 0
+	 * access_masks[] = 0
+	 */
+	return new_ruleset;
+}
+
+struct landlock_ruleset *
+landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
+			const access_mask_t net_access_mask,
+			const access_mask_t scope_mask)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset;
+
+	/* Informs about useless ruleset. */
+	if (!fs_access_mask && !net_access_mask && !scope_mask)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG);
+	new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1);
+	if (IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
+		return new_ruleset;
+	if (fs_access_mask)
+		landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0);
+	if (net_access_mask)
+		landlock_add_net_access_mask(new_ruleset, net_access_mask, 0);
+	if (scope_mask)
+		landlock_add_scope_mask(new_ruleset, scope_mask, 0);
+	return new_ruleset;
+}
+
+static void build_check_rule(void)
+{
+	const struct landlock_rule rule = {
+		.num_layers = ~0,
+	};
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks that .num_layers is large enough for at least
+	 * LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS layers.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(rule.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
+}
+
+static bool is_object_pointer(const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
+{
+	switch (key_type) {
+	case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE:
+		return true;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+	case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT:
+		return false;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+static struct landlock_rule *
+create_rule(const struct landlock_id id,
+	    const struct landlock_layer (*layers)[], const u32 num_layers,
+	    const struct landlock_layer *const new_layer)
+{
+	struct landlock_rule *new_rule;
+	u32 new_num_layers;
+
+	build_check_rule();
+	if (new_layer) {
+		/* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset(). */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(num_layers >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS))
+			return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
+		new_num_layers = num_layers + 1;
+	} else {
+		new_num_layers = num_layers;
+	}
+	new_rule = kzalloc_flex(*new_rule, layers, new_num_layers,
+				GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!new_rule)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	RB_CLEAR_NODE(&new_rule->node);
+	if (is_object_pointer(id.type)) {
+		/* This should have been caught by insert_rule(). */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!id.key.object);
+		landlock_get_object(id.key.object);
+	}
+
+	new_rule->key = id.key;
+	new_rule->num_layers = new_num_layers;
+	/* Copies the original layer stack. */
+	memcpy(new_rule->layers, layers,
+	       flex_array_size(new_rule, layers, num_layers));
+	if (new_layer)
+		/* Adds a copy of @new_layer on the layer stack. */
+		new_rule->layers[new_rule->num_layers - 1] = *new_layer;
+	return new_rule;
+}
+
+static struct rb_root *get_root(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+				const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
+{
+	switch (key_type) {
+	case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE:
+		return &ruleset->root_inode;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+	case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT:
+		return &ruleset->root_net_port;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+}
+
+static void free_rule(struct landlock_rule *const rule,
+		      const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
+{
+	might_sleep();
+	if (!rule)
+		return;
+	if (is_object_pointer(key_type))
+		landlock_put_object(rule->key.object);
+	kfree(rule);
+}
+
+static void build_check_ruleset(void)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset ruleset = {
+		.num_rules = ~0,
+		.num_layers = ~0,
+	};
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
+}
+
+/**
+ * insert_rule - Create and insert a rule in a ruleset
+ *
+ * @ruleset: The ruleset to be updated.
+ * @id: The ID to build the new rule with.  The underlying kernel object, if
+ *      any, must be held by the caller.
+ * @layers: One or multiple layers to be copied into the new rule.
+ * @num_layers: The number of @layers entries.
+ *
+ * When user space requests to add a new rule to a ruleset, @layers only
+ * contains one entry and this entry is not assigned to any level.  In this
+ * case, the new rule will extend @ruleset, similarly to a boolean OR between
+ * access rights.
+ *
+ * When merging a ruleset in a domain, or copying a domain, @layers will be
+ * added to @ruleset as new constraints, similarly to a boolean AND between
+ * access rights.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure.
+ */
+static int insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+		       const struct landlock_id id,
+		       const struct landlock_layer (*layers)[],
+		       const size_t num_layers)
+{
+	struct rb_node **walker_node;
+	struct rb_node *parent_node = NULL;
+	struct landlock_rule *new_rule;
+	struct rb_root *root;
+
+	might_sleep();
+	lockdep_assert_held(&ruleset->lock);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!layers))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (is_object_pointer(id.type) && WARN_ON_ONCE(!id.key.object))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	root = get_root(ruleset, id.type);
+	if (IS_ERR(root))
+		return PTR_ERR(root);
+
+	walker_node = &root->rb_node;
+	while (*walker_node) {
+		struct landlock_rule *const this =
+			rb_entry(*walker_node, struct landlock_rule, node);
+
+		if (this->key.data != id.key.data) {
+			parent_node = *walker_node;
+			if (this->key.data < id.key.data)
+				walker_node = &((*walker_node)->rb_right);
+			else
+				walker_node = &((*walker_node)->rb_left);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Only a single-level layer should match an existing rule. */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(num_layers != 1))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* If there is a matching rule, updates it. */
+		if ((*layers)[0].level == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Extends access rights when the request comes from
+			 * landlock_add_rule(2), i.e. @ruleset is not a domain.
+			 */
+			if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->num_layers != 1))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->layers[0].level != 0))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			this->layers[0].access |= (*layers)[0].access;
+			this->layers[0].flags.quiet |= (*layers)[0].flags.quiet;
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->layers[0].level == 0))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/*
+		 * Intersects access rights when it is a merge between a
+		 * ruleset and a domain.
+		 */
+		new_rule = create_rule(id, &this->layers, this->num_layers,
+				       &(*layers)[0]);
+		if (IS_ERR(new_rule))
+			return PTR_ERR(new_rule);
+		rb_replace_node(&this->node, &new_rule->node, root);
+		free_rule(this, id.type);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* There is no match for @id. */
+	build_check_ruleset();
+	if (ruleset->num_rules >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES)
+		return -E2BIG;
+	new_rule = create_rule(id, layers, num_layers, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(new_rule))
+		return PTR_ERR(new_rule);
+	rb_link_node(&new_rule->node, parent_node, walker_node);
+	rb_insert_color(&new_rule->node, root);
+	ruleset->num_rules++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void build_check_layer(void)
+{
+	const struct landlock_layer layer = {
+		.level = ~0,
+		.access = ~0,
+	};
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks that .level and .access are large enough to contain their expected
+	 * maximum values.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.level < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.access < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS);
+}
+
+/* @ruleset must be locked by the caller. */
+int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			 const struct landlock_id id,
+			 const access_mask_t access, const u32 flags)
+{
+	struct landlock_layer layers[] = { {
+		.access = access,
+		/* When @level is zero, insert_rule() extends @ruleset. */
+		.level = 0,
+		.flags = {
+			.quiet = !!(flags & LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET),
+		},
+	} };
+
+	build_check_layer();
+	return insert_rule(ruleset, id, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
+}
+
+static int merge_tree(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
+		      struct landlock_ruleset *const src,
+		      const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
+{
+	struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule;
+	struct rb_root *src_root;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	might_sleep();
+	lockdep_assert_held(&dst->lock);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&src->lock);
+
+	src_root = get_root(src, key_type);
+	if (IS_ERR(src_root))
+		return PTR_ERR(src_root);
+
+	/* Merges the @src tree. */
+	rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule, src_root,
+					     node) {
+		struct landlock_layer layers[] = { {
+			.level = dst->num_layers,
+		} };
+		const struct landlock_id id = {
+			.key = walker_rule->key,
+			.type = key_type,
+		};
+
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->num_layers != 1))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->layers[0].level != 0))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		layers[0].access = walker_rule->layers[0].access;
+		layers[0].flags = walker_rule->layers[0].flags;
+
+		err = insert_rule(dst, id, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
+			 struct landlock_ruleset *const src)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	might_sleep();
+	/* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset() */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!src))
+		return 0;
+	/* Only merge into a domain. */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dst || !dst->hierarchy))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Locks @dst first because we are its only owner. */
+	mutex_lock(&dst->lock);
+	mutex_lock_nested(&src->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
+
+	/* Stacks the new layer. */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(src->num_layers != 1 || dst->num_layers < 1)) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	dst->access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] =
+		landlock_upgrade_handled_access_masks(src->access_masks[0]);
+
+	/* Merges the @src inode tree. */
+	err = merge_tree(dst, src, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+	/* Merges the @src network port tree. */
+	err = merge_tree(dst, src, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_unlock;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&src->lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&dst->lock);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int inherit_tree(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
+			struct landlock_ruleset *const child,
+			const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
+{
+	struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule;
+	struct rb_root *parent_root;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	might_sleep();
+	lockdep_assert_held(&parent->lock);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&child->lock);
+
+	parent_root = get_root(parent, key_type);
+	if (IS_ERR(parent_root))
+		return PTR_ERR(parent_root);
+
+	/* Copies the @parent inode or network tree. */
+	rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule,
+					     parent_root, node) {
+		const struct landlock_id id = {
+			.key = walker_rule->key,
+			.type = key_type,
+		};
+
+		err = insert_rule(child, id, &walker_rule->layers,
+				  walker_rule->num_layers);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
+			   struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	might_sleep();
+	if (!parent)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Locks @child first because we are its only owner. */
+	mutex_lock(&child->lock);
+	mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
+
+	/* Copies the @parent inode tree. */
+	err = inherit_tree(parent, child, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+	/* Copies the @parent network port tree. */
+	err = inherit_tree(parent, child, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_unlock;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(child->num_layers <= parent->num_layers)) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	/* Copies the parent layer stack and leaves a space for the new layer. */
+	memcpy(child->access_masks, parent->access_masks,
+	       flex_array_size(parent, access_masks, parent->num_layers));
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!parent->hierarchy)) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	landlock_get_hierarchy(parent->hierarchy);
+	child->hierarchy->parent = parent->hierarchy;
+
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&parent->lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&child->lock);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void free_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
+{
+	struct landlock_rule *freeme, *next;
+
+	might_sleep();
+	rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next, &ruleset->root_inode,
+					     node)
+		free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+	rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next,
+					     &ruleset->root_net_port, node)
+		free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+
+	landlock_put_hierarchy(ruleset->hierarchy);
+	kfree(ruleset);
+}
+
+void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
+{
+	might_sleep();
+	if (ruleset && refcount_dec_and_test(&ruleset->usage))
+		free_ruleset(ruleset);
+}
+
+static void free_ruleset_work(struct work_struct *const work)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
+
+	ruleset = container_of(work, struct landlock_ruleset, work_free);
+	free_ruleset(ruleset);
+}
+
+/* Only called by hook_cred_free(). */
+void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
+{
+	if (ruleset && refcount_dec_and_test(&ruleset->usage)) {
+		INIT_WORK(&ruleset->work_free, free_ruleset_work);
+		schedule_work(&ruleset->work_free);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * landlock_merge_ruleset - Merge a ruleset with a domain
+ *
+ * @parent: Parent domain.
+ * @ruleset: New ruleset to be merged.
+ *
+ * The current task is requesting to be restricted.  The subjective credentials
+ * must not be in an overridden state. cf. landlock_init_hierarchy_log().
+ *
+ * Return: A new domain merging @parent and @ruleset on success, or ERR_PTR()
+ * on failure.  If @parent is NULL, the new domain duplicates @ruleset.
+ */
+struct landlock_ruleset *
+landlock_merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
+		       struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset *new_dom __free(landlock_put_ruleset) = NULL;
+	u32 num_layers;
+	int err;
+
+	might_sleep();
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ruleset || parent == ruleset))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	if (parent) {
+		if (parent->num_layers >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS)
+			return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
+		num_layers = parent->num_layers + 1;
+	} else {
+		num_layers = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Creates a new domain... */
+	new_dom = create_ruleset(num_layers);
+	if (IS_ERR(new_dom))
+		return new_dom;
+
+	new_dom->hierarchy =
+		kzalloc_obj(*new_dom->hierarchy, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!new_dom->hierarchy)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	refcount_set(&new_dom->hierarchy->usage, 1);
+
+	/* ...as a child of @parent... */
+	err = inherit_ruleset(parent, new_dom);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
+	/* ...and including @ruleset. */
+	err = merge_ruleset(new_dom, ruleset);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
+	err = landlock_init_hierarchy_log(new_dom->hierarchy);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	new_dom->hierarchy->quiet_masks = ruleset->quiet_masks;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+	return no_free_ptr(new_dom);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The returned access has the same lifetime as @ruleset.
+ */
+const struct landlock_rule *
+landlock_find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+		   const struct landlock_id id)
+{
+	const struct rb_root *root;
+	const struct rb_node *node;
+
+	root = get_root((struct landlock_ruleset *)ruleset, id.type);
+	if (IS_ERR(root))
+		return NULL;
+	node = root->rb_node;
+
+	while (node) {
+		struct landlock_rule *this =
+			rb_entry(node, struct landlock_rule, node);
+
+		if (this->key.data == id.key.data)
+			return this;
+		if (this->key.data < id.key.data)
+			node = node->rb_right;
+		else
+			node = node->rb_left;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * landlock_unmask_layers - Remove the access rights in @masks
+ *                          which are granted in @rule
+ *
+ * Updates the set of (per-layer) unfulfilled access rights @masks
+ * so that all the access rights granted in @rule are removed from it
+ * (because they are now fulfilled).
+ *
+ * @rule: A rule that grants a set of access rights for each layer
+ * @masks: A matrix of unfulfilled access rights for each layer
+ *
+ * Return: True if the request is allowed (i.e. the access rights granted all
+ * remaining unfulfilled access rights and masks has no leftover set bits).
+ */
+bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
+			    struct layer_masks *masks)
+{
+	if (!masks)
+		return true;
+	if (!rule)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least one rule
+	 * encountered on the pathwalk grants the requested access,
+	 * regardless of its position in the layer stack.  We must then check
+	 * the remaining layers for each inode, from the first added layer to
+	 * the last one.  When there is multiple requested accesses, for each
+	 * policy layer, the full set of requested accesses may not be granted
+	 * by only one rule, but by the union (binary OR) of multiple rules.
+	 * E.g. /a/b <execute> + /a <read> => /a/b <execute + read>
+	 */
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < rule->num_layers; i++) {
+		const struct landlock_layer *const layer = &rule->layers[i];
+
+		/* Clear the bits where the layer in the rule grants access. */
+		masks->layers[layer->level - 1].access &= ~layer->access;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		/* Collect rule flags for each layer. */
+		if (layer->flags.quiet)
+			masks->layers[layer->level - 1].quiet = true;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+	}
+
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(masks->layers); i++) {
+		if (masks->layers[i].access)
+			return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+typedef access_mask_t
+get_access_mask_t(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+		  const u16 layer_level);
+
+/**
+ * landlock_init_layer_masks - Initialize layer masks from an access request
+ *
+ * Populates @masks such that for each access right in @access_request, the bits
+ * for all the layers are set where this access right is handled.  Rule flags
+ * are also zeroed.
+ *
+ * @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions.
+ * @access_request: The requested access rights to check.
+ * @masks: Layer access masks to populate.
+ * @key_type: The key type to switch between access masks of different types.
+ *
+ * Return: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
+ * in any of the active layers in @domain.
+ */
+access_mask_t
+landlock_init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+			  const access_mask_t access_request,
+			  struct layer_masks *const masks,
+			  const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
+{
+	access_mask_t handled_accesses = 0;
+	get_access_mask_t *get_access_mask;
+
+	switch (key_type) {
+	case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE:
+		get_access_mask = landlock_get_fs_access_mask;
+		break;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+	case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT:
+		get_access_mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask;
+		break;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* An empty access request can happen because of O_WRONLY | O_RDWR. */
+	if (!access_request)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < domain->num_layers; i++) {
+		const access_mask_t handled = get_access_mask(domain, i);
+
+		masks->layers[i].access = access_request & handled;
+		handled_accesses |= masks->layers[i].access;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		masks->layers[i].quiet = false;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+	}
+	for (size_t i = domain->num_layers; i < ARRAY_SIZE(masks->layers);
+	     i++) {
+		masks->layers[i].access = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		masks->layers[i].quiet = false;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+	}
+
+	return handled_accesses;
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..61f3c253d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Ruleset management
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H
+
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+
+#include "access.h"
+#include "limits.h"
+#include "object.h"
+
+struct landlock_hierarchy;
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_layer - Access rights for a given layer
+ */
+struct landlock_layer {
+	/**
+	 * @level: Position of this layer in the layer stack.  Starts from 1.
+	 */
+	u8 level;
+	/**
+	 * @flags: Bitfield for special flags attached to this rule.
+	 */
+	struct {
+		/**
+		 * @quiet: Suppresses denial logs for the object covered by this
+		 * rule in this domain.  For filesystem rules, this inherits
+		 * down the file hierarchy.
+		 */
+		u8 quiet : 1;
+	} flags;
+	/**
+	 * @access: Bitfield of allowed actions on the kernel object.  They are
+	 * relative to the object type (e.g. %LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_READ).
+	 */
+	access_mask_t access;
+};
+
+/**
+ * union landlock_key - Key of a ruleset's red-black tree
+ */
+union landlock_key {
+	/**
+	 * @object: Pointer to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode).
+	 */
+	struct landlock_object *object;
+	/**
+	 * @data: Raw data to identify an arbitrary 32-bit value
+	 * (e.g. a TCP port).
+	 */
+	uintptr_t data;
+};
+
+/**
+ * enum landlock_key_type - Type of &union landlock_key
+ */
+enum landlock_key_type {
+	/**
+	 * @LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE: Type of &landlock_ruleset.root_inode's node
+	 * keys.
+	 */
+	LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE = 1,
+	/**
+	 * @LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT: Type of &landlock_ruleset.root_net_port's
+	 * node keys.
+	 */
+	LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_id - Unique rule identifier for a ruleset
+ */
+struct landlock_id {
+	/**
+	 * @key: Identifies either a kernel object (e.g. an inode) or
+	 * a raw value (e.g. a TCP port).
+	 */
+	union landlock_key key;
+	/**
+	 * @type: Type of a landlock_ruleset's root tree.
+	 */
+	const enum landlock_key_type type;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_rule - Access rights tied to an object
+ */
+struct landlock_rule {
+	/**
+	 * @node: Node in the ruleset's red-black tree.
+	 */
+	struct rb_node node;
+	/**
+	 * @key: A union to identify either a kernel object (e.g. an inode) or
+	 * a raw data value (e.g. a network socket port). This is used as a key
+	 * for this ruleset element.  The pointer is set once and never
+	 * modified.  It always points to an allocated object because each rule
+	 * increments the refcount of its object.
+	 */
+	union landlock_key key;
+	/**
+	 * @num_layers: Number of entries in @layers.
+	 */
+	u32 num_layers;
+	/**
+	 * @layers: Stack of layers, from the latest to the newest, implemented
+	 * as a flexible array member (FAM).
+	 */
+	struct landlock_layer layers[] __counted_by(num_layers);
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_ruleset - Landlock ruleset
+ *
+ * This data structure must contain unique entries, be updatable, and quick to
+ * match an object.
+ */
+struct landlock_ruleset {
+	/**
+	 * @root_inode: Root of a red-black tree containing &struct
+	 * landlock_rule nodes with inode object.  Once a ruleset is tied to a
+	 * process (i.e. as a domain), this tree is immutable until @usage
+	 * reaches zero.
+	 */
+	struct rb_root root_inode;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+	/**
+	 * @root_net_port: Root of a red-black tree containing &struct
+	 * landlock_rule nodes with network port. Once a ruleset is tied to a
+	 * process (i.e. as a domain), this tree is immutable until @usage
+	 * reaches zero.
+	 */
+	struct rb_root root_net_port;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+
+	/**
+	 * @hierarchy: Enables hierarchy identification even when a parent
+	 * domain vanishes.  This is needed for the ptrace protection.
+	 */
+	struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy;
+	union {
+		/**
+		 * @work_free: Enables to free a ruleset within a lockless
+		 * section.  This is only used by
+		 * landlock_put_ruleset_deferred() when @usage reaches zero.
+		 * The fields @lock, @usage, @num_rules, @num_layers,
+		 * @quiet_masks and @access_masks are then unused.
+		 */
+		struct work_struct work_free;
+		struct {
+			/**
+			 * @lock: Protects against concurrent modifications of
+			 * @root, if @usage is greater than zero.
+			 */
+			struct mutex lock;
+			/**
+			 * @usage: Number of processes (i.e. domains) or file
+			 * descriptors referencing this ruleset.
+			 */
+			refcount_t usage;
+			/**
+			 * @num_rules: Number of non-overlapping (i.e. not for
+			 * the same object) rules in this ruleset.
+			 */
+			u32 num_rules;
+			/**
+			 * @num_layers: Number of layers that are used in this
+			 * ruleset.  This enables to check that all the layers
+			 * allow an access request.  A value of 0 identifies a
+			 * non-merged ruleset (i.e. not a domain).
+			 */
+			u32 num_layers;
+			/**
+			 * @quiet_masks: Stores the quiet flags for an unmerged
+			 * ruleset.  For a merged domain, this is stored in each
+			 * layer's struct landlock_hierarchy instead.
+			 */
+			struct access_masks quiet_masks;
+			/**
+			 * @access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem and
+			 * network actions that are restricted by a ruleset.
+			 * A domain saves all layers of merged rulesets in a
+			 * stack (FAM), starting from the first layer to the
+			 * last one.  These layers are used when merging
+			 * rulesets, for user space backward compatibility
+			 * (i.e. future-proof), and to properly handle merged
+			 * rulesets without overlapping access rights.  These
+			 * layers are set once and never changed for the
+			 * lifetime of the ruleset.
+			 */
+			struct access_masks access_masks[];
+		};
+	};
+};
+
+struct landlock_ruleset *
+landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask_fs,
+			const access_mask_t access_mask_net,
+			const access_mask_t scope_mask);
+
+void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
+void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
+
+DEFINE_FREE(landlock_put_ruleset, struct landlock_ruleset *,
+	    if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(_T)) landlock_put_ruleset(_T))
+
+int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			 const struct landlock_id id,
+			 const access_mask_t access, const u32 flags);
+
+struct landlock_ruleset *
+landlock_merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
+		       struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
+
+const struct landlock_rule *
+landlock_find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+		   const struct landlock_id id);
+
+static inline void landlock_get_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
+{
+	if (ruleset)
+		refcount_inc(&ruleset->usage);
+}
+
+/**
+ * landlock_union_access_masks - Return all access rights handled in the
+ *				 domain
+ *
+ * @domain: Landlock ruleset (used as a domain)
+ *
+ * Return: An access_masks result of the OR of all the domain's access masks.
+ */
+static inline struct access_masks
+landlock_union_access_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
+{
+	union access_masks_all matches = {};
+	size_t layer_level;
+
+	for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++) {
+		union access_masks_all layer = {
+			.masks = domain->access_masks[layer_level],
+		};
+
+		matches.all |= layer.all;
+	}
+
+	return matches.masks;
+}
+
+static inline void
+landlock_add_fs_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			    const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
+			    const u16 layer_level)
+{
+	access_mask_t fs_mask = fs_access_mask & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
+
+	/* Should already be checked in sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(fs_access_mask != fs_mask);
+	ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].fs |= fs_mask;
+}
+
+static inline void
+landlock_add_net_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			     const access_mask_t net_access_mask,
+			     const u16 layer_level)
+{
+	access_mask_t net_mask = net_access_mask & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET;
+
+	/* Should already be checked in sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(net_access_mask != net_mask);
+	ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].net |= net_mask;
+}
+
+static inline void
+landlock_add_scope_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			const access_mask_t scope_mask, const u16 layer_level)
+{
+	access_mask_t mask = scope_mask & LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE;
+
+	/* Should already be checked in sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(scope_mask != mask);
+	ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].scope |= mask;
+}
+
+static inline access_mask_t
+landlock_get_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			    const u16 layer_level)
+{
+	/* Handles all initially denied by default access rights. */
+	return ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].fs |
+	       _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
+}
+
+static inline access_mask_t
+landlock_get_net_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			     const u16 layer_level)
+{
+	return ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].net;
+}
+
+static inline access_mask_t
+landlock_get_scope_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			const u16 layer_level)
+{
+	return ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].scope;
+}
+
+bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
+			    struct layer_masks *masks);
+
+access_mask_t
+landlock_init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+			  const access_mask_t access_request,
+			  struct layer_masks *masks,
+			  const enum landlock_key_type key_type);
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..47dac1736
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Security framework setup
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "errata.h"
+#include "fs.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "net.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+#include "task.h"
+
+bool landlock_initialized __ro_after_init = false;
+
+const struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid = {
+	.name = LANDLOCK_NAME,
+	.id = LSM_ID_LANDLOCK,
+};
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security),
+	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct landlock_file_security),
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security),
+	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
+};
+
+int landlock_errata __ro_after_init;
+
+static void __init compute_errata(void)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+#ifndef __has_include
+	/*
+	 * This is a safeguard to make sure the compiler implements
+	 * __has_include (see errata.h).
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+	return;
+#endif
+
+	for (i = 0; landlock_errata_init[i].number; i++) {
+		const int prev_errata = landlock_errata;
+
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(landlock_errata_init[i].abi >
+				 landlock_abi_version))
+			continue;
+
+		landlock_errata |= BIT(landlock_errata_init[i].number - 1);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(prev_errata == landlock_errata);
+	}
+}
+
+static int __init landlock_init(void)
+{
+	compute_errata();
+	landlock_add_cred_hooks();
+	landlock_add_task_hooks();
+	landlock_add_fs_hooks();
+	landlock_add_net_hooks();
+	landlock_init_id();
+	landlock_initialized = true;
+	pr_info("Up and running.\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(LANDLOCK_NAME) = {
+	.id = &landlock_lsmid,
+	.init = landlock_init,
+	.blobs = &landlock_blob_sizes,
+};
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fca307c35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Security framework setup
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+extern const int landlock_abi_version;
+
+extern bool landlock_initialized;
+extern int landlock_errata;
+
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
+extern const struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid;
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..36b02892c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,631 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock - System call implementations and user space interfaces
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2021-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
+
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "fs.h"
+#include "limits.h"
+#include "net.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+#include "tsync.h"
+
+static bool is_initialized(void)
+{
+	if (likely(landlock_initialized))
+		return true;
+
+	pr_warn_once(
+		"Disabled but requested by user space. "
+		"You should enable Landlock at boot time: "
+		"https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html#boot-time-configuration\n");
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * copy_min_struct_from_user - Safe future-proof argument copying
+ *
+ * Extend copy_struct_from_user() to check for consistent user buffer.
+ *
+ * @dst: Kernel space pointer or NULL.
+ * @ksize: Actual size of the data pointed to by @dst.
+ * @ksize_min: Minimal required size to be copied.
+ * @src: User space pointer or NULL.
+ * @usize: (Alleged) size of the data pointed to by @src.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure.
+ */
+static __always_inline int
+copy_min_struct_from_user(void *const dst, const size_t ksize,
+			  const size_t ksize_min, const void __user *const src,
+			  const size_t usize)
+{
+	/* Checks buffer inconsistencies. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(!dst);
+	if (!src)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* Checks size ranges. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ksize <= 0);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ksize < ksize_min);
+	if (usize < ksize_min)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (usize > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	/* Copies user buffer and fills with zeros. */
+	return copy_struct_from_user(dst, ksize, src, usize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function only contains arithmetic operations with constants, leading to
+ * BUILD_BUG_ON().  The related code is evaluated and checked at build time,
+ * but it is then ignored thanks to compiler optimizations.
+ */
+static void build_check_abi(void)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr;
+	struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr;
+	struct landlock_net_port_attr net_port_attr;
+	size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size, net_port_size;
+
+	/*
+	 * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no
+	 * hole in them, then checks that all architectures have the same
+	 * struct size.
+	 */
+	ruleset_size = sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs);
+	ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_net);
+	ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.scoped);
+	ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.quiet_access_fs);
+	ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.quiet_access_net);
+	ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.quiet_scoped);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != ruleset_size);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 48);
+
+	path_beneath_size = sizeof(path_beneath_attr.allowed_access);
+	path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12);
+
+	net_port_size = sizeof(net_port_attr.allowed_access);
+	net_port_size += sizeof(net_port_attr.port);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_port_attr) != net_port_size);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_port_attr) != 16);
+}
+
+/* Ruleset handling */
+
+static int fop_ruleset_release(struct inode *const inode,
+			       struct file *const filp)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset = filp->private_data;
+
+	landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t fop_dummy_read(struct file *const filp, char __user *const buf,
+			      const size_t size, loff_t *const ppos)
+{
+	/* Dummy handler to enable FMODE_CAN_READ. */
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static ssize_t fop_dummy_write(struct file *const filp,
+			       const char __user *const buf, const size_t size,
+			       loff_t *const ppos)
+{
+	/* Dummy handler to enable FMODE_CAN_WRITE. */
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A ruleset file descriptor enables to build a ruleset by adding (i.e.
+ * writing) rule after rule, without relying on the task's context.  This
+ * reentrant design is also used in a read way to enforce the ruleset on the
+ * current task.
+ */
+static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
+	.release = fop_ruleset_release,
+	.read = fop_dummy_read,
+	.write = fop_dummy_write,
+};
+
+/*
+ * The Landlock ABI version should be incremented for each new Landlock-related
+ * user space visible change (e.g. Landlock syscalls).  This version should
+ * only be incremented once per Linux release.  When incrementing, the date in
+ * Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst should be updated to reflect the
+ * UAPI change.
+ * If the change involves a fix that requires userspace awareness, also update
+ * the errata documentation in Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst .
+ */
+const int landlock_abi_version = 10;
+
+/**
+ * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
+ *
+ * @attr: Pointer to a &struct landlock_ruleset_attr identifying the scope of
+ *        the new ruleset.
+ * @size: Size of the pointed &struct landlock_ruleset_attr (needed for
+ *        backward and forward compatibility).
+ * @flags: Supported values:
+ *
+ *         - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION
+ *         - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA
+ *
+ * This system call enables to create a new Landlock ruleset.
+ *
+ * If %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION or %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA is
+ * set, then @attr must be NULL and @size must be 0.
+ *
+ * Return: The ruleset file descriptor on success, the Landlock ABI version if
+ * %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION is set, the errata value if
+ * %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA is set, or -errno on failure.  Possible
+ * returned errors are:
+ *
+ * - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
+ * - %EINVAL: unknown @flags, or unknown access, or unknown scope, or too small
+ *   @size;
+ * - %EINVAL: quiet_access_fs, quiet_access_net, or quiet_scoped is not a
+ *   subset of the corresponding handled_access_fs, handled_access_net, or
+ *   scoped;
+ * - %E2BIG: @attr or @size inconsistencies;
+ * - %EFAULT: @attr or @size inconsistencies;
+ * - %ENOMSG: empty &landlock_ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs.
+ *
+ * .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+ *     :identifiers: landlock_create_ruleset_flags
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset,
+		const struct landlock_ruleset_attr __user *const, attr,
+		const size_t, size, const __u32, flags)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr;
+	struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
+	int err, ruleset_fd;
+
+	/* Build-time checks. */
+	build_check_abi();
+
+	if (!is_initialized())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (flags) {
+		if (attr || size)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (flags == LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)
+			return landlock_abi_version;
+
+		if (flags == LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA)
+			return landlock_errata;
+
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Copies raw user space buffer. */
+	err = copy_min_struct_from_user(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr),
+					offsetofend(typeof(ruleset_attr),
+						    handled_access_fs),
+					attr, size);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* Checks content (and 32-bits cast). */
+	if ((ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs | LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS) !=
+	    LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Checks network content (and 32-bits cast). */
+	if ((ruleset_attr.handled_access_net | LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET) !=
+	    LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Checks IPC scoping content (and 32-bits cast). */
+	if ((ruleset_attr.scoped | LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE) != LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that quiet masks are subsets of the respective handled masks.
+	 * Because of the checks above this is sufficient to also ensure that
+	 * the quiet masks are valid access masks.
+	 */
+	if ((ruleset_attr.quiet_access_fs | ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs) !=
+	    ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((ruleset_attr.quiet_access_net | ruleset_attr.handled_access_net) !=
+	    ruleset_attr.handled_access_net)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((ruleset_attr.quiet_scoped | ruleset_attr.scoped) !=
+	    ruleset_attr.scoped)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Checks arguments and transforms to kernel struct. */
+	ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs,
+					  ruleset_attr.handled_access_net,
+					  ruleset_attr.scoped);
+	if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
+		return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
+
+	ruleset->quiet_masks.fs = ruleset_attr.quiet_access_fs;
+	ruleset->quiet_masks.net = ruleset_attr.quiet_access_net;
+	ruleset->quiet_masks.scope = ruleset_attr.quiet_scoped;
+
+	/* Creates anonymous FD referring to the ruleset. */
+	ruleset_fd = anon_inode_getfd("[landlock-ruleset]", &ruleset_fops,
+				      ruleset, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
+	if (ruleset_fd < 0)
+		landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
+	return ruleset_fd;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns an owned ruleset from a FD. It is thus needed to call
+ * landlock_put_ruleset() on the return value.
+ */
+static struct landlock_ruleset *get_ruleset_from_fd(const int fd,
+						    const fmode_t mode)
+{
+	CLASS(fd, ruleset_f)(fd);
+	struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
+
+	if (fd_empty(ruleset_f))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
+
+	/* Checks FD type and access right. */
+	if (fd_file(ruleset_f)->f_op != &ruleset_fops)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EBADFD);
+	if (!(fd_file(ruleset_f)->f_mode & mode))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+	ruleset = fd_file(ruleset_f)->private_data;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	landlock_get_ruleset(ruleset);
+	return ruleset;
+}
+
+/* Path handling */
+
+/*
+ * @path: Must call put_path(@path) after the call if it succeeded.
+ */
+static int get_path_from_fd(const s32 fd, struct path *const path)
+{
+	CLASS(fd_raw, f)(fd);
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(
+		fd, ((struct landlock_path_beneath_attr *)NULL)->parent_fd));
+
+	if (fd_empty(f))
+		return -EBADF;
+	/*
+	 * Forbids ruleset FDs, internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs), including
+	 * pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable (e.g. sockfs,
+	 * pipefs).
+	 */
+	if ((fd_file(f)->f_op == &ruleset_fops) ||
+	    (fd_file(f)->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) ||
+	    (fd_file(f)->f_path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
+	    IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(fd_file(f)->f_path.dentry)))
+		return -EBADFD;
+
+	*path = fd_file(f)->f_path;
+	path_get(path);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+				 const void __user *const rule_attr, u32 flags)
+{
+	struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr;
+	struct path path;
+	int res, err;
+	access_mask_t mask;
+
+	/* Copies raw user space buffer. */
+	res = copy_from_user(&path_beneath_attr, rule_attr,
+			     sizeof(path_beneath_attr));
+	if (res)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/*
+	 * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
+	 * are ignored in path walks.  However, the rule is not useless if it is
+	 * there to hold a quiet flag.
+	 */
+	if (!flags && !path_beneath_attr.allowed_access)
+		return -ENOMSG;
+
+	/* Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints. */
+	mask = ruleset->access_masks[0].fs;
+	if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Checks for useless quiet flag. */
+	if (flags & LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET && !ruleset->quiet_masks.fs)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Gets and checks the new rule. */
+	err = get_path_from_fd(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd, &path);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* Imports the new rule. */
+	err = landlock_append_fs_rule(ruleset, &path,
+				      path_beneath_attr.allowed_access, flags);
+	path_put(&path);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int add_rule_net_port(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset,
+			     const void __user *const rule_attr, u32 flags)
+{
+	struct landlock_net_port_attr net_port_attr;
+	int res;
+	access_mask_t mask;
+
+	/* Copies raw user space buffer. */
+	res = copy_from_user(&net_port_attr, rule_attr, sizeof(net_port_attr));
+	if (res)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/*
+	 * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
+	 * are ignored by network actions.  However, the rule is not useless if
+	 * it is there to hold a quiet flag.
+	 */
+	if (!flags && !net_port_attr.allowed_access)
+		return -ENOMSG;
+
+	/* Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints. */
+	mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
+	if ((net_port_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Checks for useless quiet flag. */
+	if (flags & LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET && !ruleset->quiet_masks.net)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Denies inserting a rule with port greater than 65535. */
+	if (net_port_attr.port > U16_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Imports the new rule. */
+	return landlock_append_net_rule(ruleset, net_port_attr.port,
+					net_port_attr.allowed_access, flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset
+ *
+ * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended
+ *		with the new rule.
+ * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr:
+ *             %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT.
+ * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (matching the @rule_type).
+ * @flags: Must be 0 or %LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET.
+ *
+ * This system call enables to define a new rule and add it to an existing
+ * ruleset.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, or -errno on failure.  Possible returned errors are:
+ *
+ * - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
+ * - %EAFNOSUPPORT: @rule_type is %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT but TCP/IP is not
+ *   supported by the running kernel;
+ * - %EINVAL: @flags is not valid;
+ * - %EINVAL: The rule accesses are inconsistent (i.e.
+ *   &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access or
+ *   &landlock_net_port_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the ruleset
+ *   handled accesses)
+ * - %EINVAL: &landlock_net_port_attr.port is greater than 65535;
+ * - %EINVAL: LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET is passed but the ruleset has no
+ *   quiet access bits set for the corresponding rule type.
+ * - %ENOMSG: Empty accesses (e.g. &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is
+ *   0) and no flags;
+ * - %EBADF: @ruleset_fd is not a file descriptor for the current thread, or a
+ *   member of @rule_attr is not a file descriptor as expected;
+ * - %EBADFD: @ruleset_fd is not a ruleset file descriptor, or a member of
+ *   @rule_attr is not the expected file descriptor type;
+ * - %EPERM: @ruleset_fd has no write access to the underlying ruleset;
+ * - %EFAULT: @rule_attr was not a valid address.
+ *
+ * .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+ *     :identifiers: landlock_add_rule_flags
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
+		const enum landlock_rule_type, rule_type,
+		const void __user *const, rule_attr, const __u32, flags)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset __free(landlock_put_ruleset) = NULL;
+
+	if (!is_initialized())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (flags && flags != LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Gets and checks the ruleset. */
+	ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_WRITE);
+	if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
+		return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
+
+	switch (rule_type) {
+	case LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH:
+		return add_rule_path_beneath(ruleset, rule_attr, flags);
+	case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT:
+		return add_rule_net_port(ruleset, rule_attr, flags);
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Enforcement */
+
+/**
+ * sys_landlock_restrict_self - Enforce a ruleset on the calling thread
+ *
+ * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset to merge with the target.
+ * @flags: Supported values:
+ *
+ *         - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF
+ *         - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON
+ *         - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF
+ *         - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC
+ *
+ * This system call enforces a Landlock ruleset on the current thread.
+ * Enforcing a ruleset requires that the task has %CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its
+ * namespace or is running with no_new_privs.  This avoids scenarios where
+ * unprivileged tasks can affect the behavior of privileged children.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, or -errno on failure.  Possible returned errors are:
+ *
+ * - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
+ * - %EINVAL: @flags contains an unknown bit.
+ * - %EBADF: @ruleset_fd is not a file descriptor for the current thread;
+ * - %EBADFD: @ruleset_fd is not a ruleset file descriptor;
+ * - %EPERM: @ruleset_fd has no read access to the underlying ruleset, or the
+ *   current thread is not running with no_new_privs, or it doesn't have
+ *   %CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace.
+ * - %E2BIG: The maximum number of stacked rulesets is reached for the current
+ *   thread.
+ *
+ * .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+ *     :identifiers: landlock_restrict_self_flags
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
+		flags)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset __free(landlock_put_ruleset) = NULL;
+	struct cred *new_cred;
+	struct landlock_cred_security *new_llcred;
+	bool __maybe_unused log_same_exec, log_new_exec, log_subdomains,
+		prev_log_subdomains;
+
+	if (!is_initialized())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/*
+	 * Similar checks as for seccomp(2), except that an -EPERM may be
+	 * returned.
+	 */
+	if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
+	    !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if ((flags | LANDLOCK_MASK_RESTRICT_SELF) !=
+	    LANDLOCK_MASK_RESTRICT_SELF)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Translates "off" flag to boolean. */
+	log_same_exec = !(flags & LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF);
+	/* Translates "on" flag to boolean. */
+	log_new_exec = !!(flags & LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON);
+	/* Translates "off" flag to boolean. */
+	log_subdomains = !(flags & LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF);
+
+	/*
+	 * It is allowed to set LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with
+	 * -1 as ruleset_fd, optionally combined with
+	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC to propagate this configuration to all
+	 * threads.  No other flag must be set.
+	 */
+	if (!(ruleset_fd == -1 &&
+	      (flags & ~LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC) ==
+		      LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF)) {
+		/* Gets and checks the ruleset. */
+		ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_READ);
+		if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
+			return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
+	}
+
+	/* Prepares new credentials. */
+	new_cred = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new_cred)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new_llcred = landlock_cred(new_cred);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	prev_log_subdomains = !new_llcred->log_subdomains_off;
+	new_llcred->log_subdomains_off = !prev_log_subdomains ||
+					 !log_subdomains;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+	/*
+	 * The only case when a ruleset may not be set is if
+	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF is set (optionally with
+	 * LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC) and ruleset_fd is -1.  We could
+	 * optimize this case by not calling commit_creds() if this flag was
+	 * already set, but it is not worth the complexity.
+	 */
+	if (ruleset) {
+		/*
+		 * There is no possible race condition while copying and
+		 * manipulating the current credentials because they are
+		 * dedicated per thread.
+		 */
+		struct landlock_ruleset *const new_dom =
+			landlock_merge_ruleset(new_llcred->domain, ruleset);
+		if (IS_ERR(new_dom)) {
+			abort_creds(new_cred);
+			return PTR_ERR(new_dom);
+		}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		new_dom->hierarchy->log_same_exec = log_same_exec;
+		new_dom->hierarchy->log_new_exec = log_new_exec;
+		if ((!log_same_exec && !log_new_exec) || !prev_log_subdomains)
+			new_dom->hierarchy->log_status = LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+		/* Replaces the old (prepared) domain. */
+		landlock_put_ruleset(new_llcred->domain);
+		new_llcred->domain = new_dom;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		new_llcred->domain_exec |= BIT(new_dom->num_layers - 1);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+	}
+
+	if (flags & LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC) {
+		const int err = landlock_restrict_sibling_threads(
+			current_cred(), new_cred);
+		if (err) {
+			abort_creds(new_cred);
+			return err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return commit_creds(new_cred);
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/task.c b/security/landlock/task.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7ddf211f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/task.c
@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock - Ptrace and scope hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "fs.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+#include "task.h"
+
+/**
+ * domain_scope_le - Checks domain ordering for scoped ptrace
+ *
+ * @parent: Parent domain.
+ * @child: Potential child of @parent.
+ *
+ * Checks if the @parent domain is less or equal to (i.e. an ancestor, which
+ * means a subset of) the @child domain.
+ *
+ * Return: True if @parent is an ancestor of or equal to @child, false
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+static bool domain_scope_le(const struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
+			    const struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
+{
+	const struct landlock_hierarchy *walker;
+
+	/* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */
+	if (!parent)
+		return true;
+
+	if (!child)
+		return false;
+
+	for (walker = child->hierarchy; walker; walker = walker->parent) {
+		if (walker == parent->hierarchy)
+			/* @parent is in the scoped hierarchy of @child. */
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	/* There is no relationship between @parent and @child. */
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int domain_ptrace(const struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
+			 const struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
+{
+	if (domain_scope_le(parent, child))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * hook_ptrace_access_check - Determines whether the current process may access
+ *			      another
+ *
+ * @child: Process to be accessed.
+ * @mode: Mode of attachment.
+ *
+ * If the current task has Landlock rules, then the child must have at least
+ * the same rules.  Else denied.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -errno if denied.
+ */
+static int hook_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *const child,
+				    const unsigned int mode)
+{
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *parent_subject;
+	int err;
+
+	/* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */
+	parent_subject = landlock_cred(current_cred());
+	if (!parent_subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	scoped_guard(rcu)
+	{
+		const struct landlock_ruleset *const child_dom =
+			landlock_get_task_domain(child);
+		err = domain_ptrace(parent_subject->domain, child_dom);
+	}
+
+	if (!err)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * For the ptrace_access_check case, we log the current/parent domain
+	 * and the child task.
+	 */
+	if (!(mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT))
+		landlock_log_denial(parent_subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+			.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE,
+			.audit = {
+				.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK,
+				.u.tsk = child,
+			},
+			.layer_plus_one = parent_subject->domain->num_layers,
+		});
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/**
+ * hook_ptrace_traceme - Determines whether another process may trace the
+ *			 current one
+ *
+ * @parent: Task proposed to be the tracer.
+ *
+ * If the parent has Landlock rules, then the current task must have the same
+ * or more rules.  Else denied.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -errno if denied.
+ */
+static int hook_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *const parent)
+{
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *parent_subject;
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *child_dom;
+	int err;
+
+	child_dom = landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+	guard(rcu)();
+	parent_subject = landlock_cred(__task_cred(parent));
+	err = domain_ptrace(parent_subject->domain, child_dom);
+
+	if (!err)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * For the ptrace_traceme case, we log the domain which is the cause of
+	 * the denial, which means the parent domain instead of the current
+	 * domain.  This may look unusual because the ptrace_traceme action is a
+	 * request to be traced, but the semantic is consistent with
+	 * hook_ptrace_access_check().
+	 */
+	landlock_log_denial(parent_subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK,
+			.u.tsk = current,
+		},
+		.layer_plus_one = parent_subject->domain->num_layers,
+	});
+	return err;
+}
+
+/**
+ * domain_is_scoped - Check if an interaction from a client/sender to a
+ *		      server/receiver should be restricted based on scope controls.
+ *
+ * @client: IPC sender domain.
+ * @server: IPC receiver domain.
+ * @scope: The scope restriction criteria.
+ *
+ * Return: True if @server is in a different domain from @client and @client
+ * is scoped to access @server (i.e. access should be denied), false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool domain_is_scoped(const struct landlock_ruleset *const client,
+			     const struct landlock_ruleset *const server,
+			     access_mask_t scope)
+{
+	int client_layer, server_layer;
+	const struct landlock_hierarchy *client_walker, *server_walker;
+
+	/* Quick return if client has no domain */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!client))
+		return false;
+
+	client_layer = client->num_layers - 1;
+	client_walker = client->hierarchy;
+	/*
+	 * client_layer must be able to represent all numbers from
+	 * LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1 to -1 for the loop below to terminate.
+	 * (It must be large enough, and it must be signed.)
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(!is_signed_type(typeof(client_layer)));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1 >
+		     type_max(typeof(client_layer)));
+
+	server_layer = server ? (server->num_layers - 1) : -1;
+	server_walker = server ? server->hierarchy : NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Walks client's parent domains down to the same hierarchy level
+	 * as the server's domain, and checks that none of these client's
+	 * parent domains are scoped.
+	 */
+	for (; client_layer > server_layer; client_layer--) {
+		if (landlock_get_scope_mask(client, client_layer) & scope)
+			return true;
+
+		client_walker = client_walker->parent;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Walks server's parent domains down to the same hierarchy level as
+	 * the client's domain.
+	 */
+	for (; server_layer > client_layer; server_layer--)
+		server_walker = server_walker->parent;
+
+	for (; client_layer >= 0; client_layer--) {
+		if (landlock_get_scope_mask(client, client_layer) & scope) {
+			/*
+			 * Client and server are at the same level in the
+			 * hierarchy. If the client is scoped, the request is
+			 * only allowed if this domain is also a server's
+			 * ancestor.
+			 */
+			return server_walker != client_walker;
+		}
+		client_walker = client_walker->parent;
+		server_walker = server_walker->parent;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool sock_is_scoped(struct sock *const other,
+			   const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *dom_other;
+
+	/* The credentials will not change. */
+	lockdep_assert_held(&unix_sk(other)->lock);
+	dom_other = landlock_cred(other->sk_socket->file->f_cred)->domain;
+	return domain_is_scoped(domain, dom_other,
+				LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET);
+}
+
+static bool is_abstract_socket(struct sock *const sock)
+{
+	struct unix_address *addr = unix_sk(sock)->addr;
+
+	if (!addr)
+		return false;
+
+	if (addr->len >= offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1 &&
+	    addr->name->sun_path[0] == '\0')
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static const struct access_masks unix_scope = {
+	.scope = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
+};
+
+static int hook_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *const sock,
+				    struct sock *const other,
+				    struct sock *const newsk)
+{
+	size_t handle_layer;
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+		landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), unix_scope,
+						&handle_layer);
+
+	/* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!is_abstract_socket(other))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!sock_is_scoped(other, subject->domain))
+		return 0;
+
+	landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET,
+			.u.net = &(struct lsm_network_audit) {
+				.sk = other,
+			},
+		},
+		.layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
+	});
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock,
+			      struct socket *const other)
+{
+	size_t handle_layer;
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+		landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), unix_scope,
+						&handle_layer);
+
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks if this datagram socket was already allowed to be connected
+	 * to other.
+	 */
+	if (unix_peer(sock->sk) == other->sk)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!is_abstract_socket(other->sk))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!sock_is_scoped(other->sk, subject->domain))
+		return 0;
+
+	landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET,
+			.u.net = &(struct lsm_network_audit) {
+				.sk = other->sk,
+			},
+		},
+		.layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
+	});
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static const struct access_masks signal_scope = {
+	.scope = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+};
+
+static int hook_task_kill(struct task_struct *const p,
+			  struct kernel_siginfo *const info, const int sig,
+			  const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	bool is_scoped;
+	size_t handle_layer;
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *subject;
+
+	if (!cred) {
+		/*
+		 * Always allow sending signals between threads of the same process.
+		 * This is required for process credential changes by the Native POSIX
+		 * Threads Library and implemented by the set*id(2) wrappers and
+		 * libcap(3) with tgkill(2).  See nptl(7) and libpsx(3).
+		 *
+		 * This exception is similar to the __ptrace_may_access() one.
+		 */
+		if (same_thread_group(p, current))
+			return 0;
+
+		/* Not dealing with USB IO. */
+		cred = current_cred();
+	}
+
+	subject = landlock_get_applicable_subject(cred, signal_scope,
+						  &handle_layer);
+
+	/* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	scoped_guard(rcu)
+	{
+		is_scoped = domain_is_scoped(subject->domain,
+					     landlock_get_task_domain(p),
+					     signal_scope.scope);
+	}
+
+	if (!is_scoped)
+		return 0;
+
+	landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK,
+			.u.tsk = p,
+		},
+		.layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
+	});
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int hook_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				    struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *subject;
+	bool is_scoped = false;
+
+	/* Lock already held by send_sigio() and send_sigurg(). */
+	lockdep_assert_held(&fown->lock);
+	subject = &landlock_file(fown->file)->fown_subject;
+
+	/*
+	 * Quick return for unowned socket.
+	 *
+	 * subject->domain has already been filtered when saved by
+	 * hook_file_set_fowner(), so there is no need to call
+	 * landlock_get_applicable_subject() here.
+	 */
+	if (!subject->domain)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Always allow delivery to the file owner's own process, including a
+	 * thread-group leader reached through a process-group owner.  This
+	 * mirrors hook_task_kill()'s same-process exemption and preserves the
+	 * guarantee of commit 18eb75f3af40 ("landlock: Always allow signals
+	 * between threads of the same process"), which the registration-time
+	 * check cannot honor for a process-group target.
+	 */
+	if (task_tgid(tsk) == landlock_file(fown->file)->fown_tg)
+		return 0;
+
+	scoped_guard(rcu)
+	{
+		is_scoped = domain_is_scoped(subject->domain,
+					     landlock_get_task_domain(tsk),
+					     signal_scope.scope);
+	}
+
+	if (!is_scoped)
+		return 0;
+
+	landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK,
+			.u.tsk = tsk,
+		},
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		.layer_plus_one = landlock_file(fown->file)->fown_layer + 1,
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+	});
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, hook_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, hook_unix_stream_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, hook_unix_may_send),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, hook_task_kill),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, hook_file_send_sigiotask),
+};
+
+__init void landlock_add_task_hooks(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
+			   &landlock_lsmid);
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/task.h b/security/landlock/task.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7c0036021
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/task.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Ptrace hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2019 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_TASK_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_TASK_H
+
+__init void landlock_add_task_hooks(void);
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_TASK_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/tsync.c b/security/landlock/tsync.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c5730bbd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/tsync.c
@@ -0,0 +1,619 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock - Cross-thread ruleset enforcement
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2025 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/completion.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/task_work.h>
+
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "tsync.h"
+
+/*
+ * Shared state between multiple threads which are enforcing Landlock rulesets
+ * in lockstep with each other.
+ */
+struct tsync_shared_context {
+	/* The old and tentative new creds of the calling thread. */
+	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	const struct cred *new_cred;
+
+	/* True if sibling tasks need to set the no_new_privs flag. */
+	bool set_no_new_privs;
+
+	/* An error encountered in preparation step, or 0. */
+	atomic_t preparation_error;
+
+	/*
+	 * Barrier after preparation step in restrict_one_thread.
+	 * The calling thread waits for completion.
+	 *
+	 * Re-initialized on every round of looking for newly spawned threads.
+	 */
+	atomic_t num_preparing;
+	struct completion all_prepared;
+
+	/* Sibling threads wait for completion. */
+	struct completion ready_to_commit;
+
+	/*
+	 * Barrier after commit step (used by syscall impl to wait for
+	 * completion).
+	 */
+	atomic_t num_unfinished;
+	struct completion all_finished;
+};
+
+struct tsync_work {
+	struct callback_head work;
+	struct task_struct *task;
+	struct tsync_shared_context *shared_ctx;
+};
+
+/*
+ * restrict_one_thread - update a thread's Landlock domain in lockstep with the
+ * other threads in the same process
+ *
+ * When this is run, the same function gets run in all other threads in the same
+ * process (except for the calling thread which called landlock_restrict_self).
+ * The concurrently running invocations of restrict_one_thread coordinate
+ * through the shared ctx object to do their work in lockstep to implement
+ * all-or-nothing semantics for enforcing the new Landlock domain.
+ *
+ * Afterwards, depending on the presence of an error, all threads either commit
+ * or abort the prepared credentials.  The commit operation can not fail any
+ * more.
+ */
+static void restrict_one_thread(struct tsync_shared_context *ctx)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct cred *cred = NULL;
+
+	if (current_cred() == ctx->old_cred) {
+		/*
+		 * Switch out old_cred with new_cred, if possible.
+		 *
+		 * In the common case, where all threads initially point to the
+		 * same struct cred, this optimization avoids creating separate
+		 * redundant credentials objects for each, which would all have
+		 * the same contents.
+		 *
+		 * Note: We are intentionally dropping the const qualifier
+		 * here, because it is required by commit_creds() and
+		 * abort_creds().
+		 */
+		cred = (struct cred *)get_cred(ctx->new_cred);
+	} else {
+		/* Else, prepare new creds and populate them. */
+		cred = prepare_creds();
+
+		if (!cred) {
+			atomic_set(&ctx->preparation_error, -ENOMEM);
+
+			/*
+			 * Even on error, we need to adhere to the protocol and
+			 * coordinate with concurrently running invocations.
+			 */
+			if (atomic_dec_return(&ctx->num_preparing) == 0)
+				complete_all(&ctx->all_prepared);
+
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		landlock_cred_copy(landlock_cred(cred),
+				   landlock_cred(ctx->new_cred));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Barrier: Wait until all threads are done preparing.
+	 * After this point, we can have no more failures.
+	 */
+	if (atomic_dec_return(&ctx->num_preparing) == 0)
+		complete_all(&ctx->all_prepared);
+
+	/*
+	 * Wait for signal from calling thread that it's safe to read the
+	 * preparation error now and we are ready to commit (or abort).
+	 */
+	wait_for_completion(&ctx->ready_to_commit);
+
+	/* Abort the commit if any of the other threads had an error. */
+	err = atomic_read(&ctx->preparation_error);
+	if (err) {
+		abort_creds(cred);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure that all sibling tasks fulfill the no_new_privs
+	 * prerequisite.  (This is in line with Seccomp's
+	 * SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC logic in kernel/seccomp.c)
+	 */
+	if (ctx->set_no_new_privs)
+		task_set_no_new_privs(current);
+
+	commit_creds(cred);
+
+out:
+	/* Notify the calling thread once all threads are done */
+	if (atomic_dec_return(&ctx->num_unfinished) == 0)
+		complete_all(&ctx->all_finished);
+}
+
+/*
+ * restrict_one_thread_callback - task_work callback for restricting a thread
+ *
+ * Calls restrict_one_thread with the struct landlock_shared_tsync_context.
+ */
+static void restrict_one_thread_callback(struct callback_head *work)
+{
+	struct tsync_work *ctx = container_of(work, struct tsync_work, work);
+
+	restrict_one_thread(ctx->shared_ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * struct tsync_works - a growable array of per-task contexts
+ *
+ * The zero-initialized struct represents the empty array.
+ */
+struct tsync_works {
+	struct tsync_work **works;
+	size_t size;
+	size_t capacity;
+};
+
+/*
+ * tsync_works_provide - provides a preallocated tsync_work for the given task
+ *
+ * This also stores a task pointer in the context and increments the reference
+ * count of the task.
+ *
+ * This function may fail in the case where we did not preallocate sufficient
+ * capacity.  This can legitimately happen if new threads get started after we
+ * grew the capacity.
+ *
+ * Return: A pointer to the preallocated context struct with task filled in, or
+ * NULL if preallocated context structs ran out.
+ */
+static struct tsync_work *tsync_works_provide(struct tsync_works *s,
+					      struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct tsync_work *ctx;
+
+	if (s->size >= s->capacity)
+		return NULL;
+
+	ctx = s->works[s->size];
+	s->size++;
+
+	ctx->task = get_task_struct(task);
+	return ctx;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tsync_works_trim - Put the last tsync_work element
+ *
+ * @s: TSYNC works to trim.
+ *
+ * Put the last task and decrement the size of @s.
+ *
+ * This helper does not cancel a running task, but just reset the last element
+ * to zero.
+ */
+static void tsync_works_trim(struct tsync_works *s)
+{
+	struct tsync_work *ctx;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(s->size <= 0))
+		return;
+
+	ctx = s->works[s->size - 1];
+
+	/*
+	 * For consistency, remove the task from ctx so that it does not look
+	 * like we handed it a task_work.
+	 */
+	put_task_struct(ctx->task);
+	*ctx = (typeof(*ctx)){};
+
+	/*
+	 * Cancel the tsync_works_provide() change to recycle the reserved
+	 * memory for the next thread, if any.  This also ensures that
+	 * cancel_tsync_works() and tsync_works_release() do not see any NULL
+	 * task pointers.
+	 */
+	s->size--;
+}
+
+/*
+ * tsync_works_grow_by - preallocates space for n more contexts in s
+ *
+ * On a successful return, the subsequent n calls to tsync_works_provide() are
+ * guaranteed to succeed.  (size + n <= capacity)
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if sufficient space for n more elements could be provided, -ENOMEM
+ * on allocation errors, -EOVERFLOW in case of integer overflow.
+ */
+static int tsync_works_grow_by(struct tsync_works *s, size_t n, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	size_t new_capacity;
+	struct tsync_work **works;
+	struct tsync_work *work;
+
+	if (check_add_overflow(s->size, n, &new_capacity))
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+	/* No need to reallocate if s already has sufficient capacity. */
+	if (new_capacity <= s->capacity)
+		return 0;
+
+	works = krealloc_array(s->works, new_capacity, sizeof(s->works[0]),
+			       flags);
+	if (!works)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	s->works = works;
+
+	for (i = s->capacity; i < new_capacity; i++) {
+		work = kzalloc_obj(*work, flags);
+		if (!work) {
+			/*
+			 * Leave the object in a consistent state,
+			 * but return an error.
+			 */
+			s->capacity = i;
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		s->works[i] = work;
+	}
+	s->capacity = new_capacity;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * tsync_works_contains - checks for presence of task in s
+ */
+static bool tsync_works_contains_task(const struct tsync_works *s,
+				      const struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < s->size; i++)
+		if (s->works[i]->task == task)
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * tsync_works_release - frees memory held by s and drops all task references
+ *
+ * This does not free s itself, only the data structures held by it.
+ */
+static void tsync_works_release(struct tsync_works *s)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < s->size; i++) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!s->works[i]->task))
+			continue;
+
+		put_task_struct(s->works[i]->task);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < s->capacity; i++)
+		kfree(s->works[i]);
+
+	kfree(s->works);
+	s->works = NULL;
+	s->size = 0;
+	s->capacity = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * count_additional_threads - counts the sibling threads that are not in works
+ */
+static size_t count_additional_threads(const struct tsync_works *works)
+{
+	const struct task_struct *caller, *thread;
+	size_t n = 0;
+
+	caller = current;
+
+	guard(rcu)();
+
+	for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
+		/* Skip current, since it is initiating the sync. */
+		if (thread == caller)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Skip exited threads. */
+		if (thread->flags & PF_EXITING)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Skip threads that we have already seen. */
+		if (tsync_works_contains_task(works, thread))
+			continue;
+
+		n++;
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * schedule_task_work - adds task_work for all eligible sibling threads
+ *                      which have not been scheduled yet
+ *
+ * For each added task_work, atomically increments shared_ctx->num_preparing and
+ * shared_ctx->num_unfinished.
+ *
+ * Return: True if at least one eligible sibling thread was found, false
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+static bool schedule_task_work(struct tsync_works *works,
+			       struct tsync_shared_context *shared_ctx)
+{
+	int err;
+	const struct task_struct *caller;
+	struct task_struct *thread;
+	struct tsync_work *ctx;
+	bool found_more_threads = false;
+
+	caller = current;
+
+	guard(rcu)();
+
+	for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
+		/* Skip current, since it is initiating the sync. */
+		if (thread == caller)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Skip exited threads. */
+		if (thread->flags & PF_EXITING)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Skip threads that we already looked at. */
+		if (tsync_works_contains_task(works, thread))
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * We found a sibling thread that is not doing its task_work
+		 * yet, and which might spawn new threads before our task work
+		 * runs, so we need at least one more round in the outer loop.
+		 */
+		found_more_threads = true;
+
+		ctx = tsync_works_provide(works, thread);
+		if (!ctx) {
+			/*
+			 * We ran out of preallocated contexts -- we need to
+			 * try again with this thread at a later time!
+			 * found_more_threads is already true at this point.
+			 */
+			break;
+		}
+
+		ctx->shared_ctx = shared_ctx;
+
+		atomic_inc(&shared_ctx->num_preparing);
+		atomic_inc(&shared_ctx->num_unfinished);
+
+		init_task_work(&ctx->work, restrict_one_thread_callback);
+		err = task_work_add(thread, &ctx->work, TWA_SIGNAL);
+		if (unlikely(err)) {
+			/*
+			 * task_work_add() only fails if the task is about to
+			 * exit.  We checked that earlier, but it can happen as
+			 * a race.  Resume without setting an error, as the
+			 * task is probably gone in the next loop iteration.
+			 */
+			tsync_works_trim(works);
+
+			atomic_dec(&shared_ctx->num_preparing);
+			atomic_dec(&shared_ctx->num_unfinished);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return found_more_threads;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cancel_tsync_works - cancel all task works where it is possible
+ *
+ * Task works can be canceled as long as they are still queued and have not
+ * started running.  If they get canceled, we decrement
+ * shared_ctx->num_preparing and shared_ctx->num_unfished and mark the two
+ * completions if needed, as if the task was never scheduled.
+ */
+static void cancel_tsync_works(const struct tsync_works *works,
+			       struct tsync_shared_context *shared_ctx)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < works->size; i++) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!works->works[i]->task))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!task_work_cancel(works->works[i]->task,
+				      &works->works[i]->work))
+			continue;
+
+		/* After dequeueing, act as if the task work had executed. */
+
+		if (atomic_dec_return(&shared_ctx->num_preparing) == 0)
+			complete_all(&shared_ctx->all_prepared);
+
+		if (atomic_dec_return(&shared_ctx->num_unfinished) == 0)
+			complete_all(&shared_ctx->all_finished);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * restrict_sibling_threads - enables a Landlock policy for all sibling threads
+ */
+int landlock_restrict_sibling_threads(const struct cred *old_cred,
+				      const struct cred *new_cred)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct tsync_shared_context shared_ctx;
+	struct tsync_works works = {};
+	size_t newly_discovered_threads;
+	bool found_more_threads;
+
+	atomic_set(&shared_ctx.preparation_error, 0);
+	init_completion(&shared_ctx.all_prepared);
+	init_completion(&shared_ctx.ready_to_commit);
+	atomic_set(&shared_ctx.num_unfinished, 1);
+	init_completion(&shared_ctx.all_finished);
+	shared_ctx.old_cred = old_cred;
+	shared_ctx.new_cred = new_cred;
+	shared_ctx.set_no_new_privs = task_no_new_privs(current);
+
+	/*
+	 * Serialize concurrent TSYNC operations to prevent deadlocks when
+	 * multiple threads call landlock_restrict_self() simultaneously.
+	 * If the lock is already held, we gracefully yield by restarting the
+	 * syscall. This allows the current thread to process pending
+	 * task_works before retrying.
+	 */
+	if (!down_write_trylock(&current->signal->exec_update_lock))
+		return restart_syscall();
+
+	/*
+	 * We schedule a pseudo-signal task_work for each of the calling task's
+	 * sibling threads.  In the task work, each thread:
+	 *
+	 * 1) runs prepare_creds() and writes back the error to
+	 *    shared_ctx.preparation_error, if needed.
+	 *
+	 * 2) signals that it's done with prepare_creds() to the calling task.
+	 *    (completion "all_prepared").
+	 *
+	 * 3) waits for the completion "ready_to_commit".  This is sent by the
+	 *    calling task after ensuring that all sibling threads have done
+	 *    with the "preparation" stage.
+	 *
+	 *    After this barrier is reached, it's safe to read
+	 *    shared_ctx.preparation_error.
+	 *
+	 * 4) reads shared_ctx.preparation_error and then either does
+	 *    commit_creds() or abort_creds().
+	 *
+	 * 5) signals that it's done altogether (barrier synchronization
+	 *    "all_finished")
+	 *
+	 * Unlike seccomp, which modifies sibling tasks directly, we do not
+	 * need to acquire the cred_guard_mutex and sighand->siglock:
+	 *
+	 * - As in our case, all threads are themselves exchanging their own
+	 *   struct cred through the credentials API, no locks are needed for
+	 *   that.
+	 * - Our for_each_thread() loops are protected by RCU.
+	 * - We do not acquire a lock to keep the list of sibling threads
+	 *   stable between our for_each_thread loops.  If the list of
+	 *   available sibling threads changes between these for_each_thread
+	 *   loops, we make up for that by continuing to look for threads until
+	 *   they are all discovered and have entered their task_work, where
+	 *   they are unable to spawn new threads.
+	 */
+	do {
+		/* In RCU read-lock, count the threads we need. */
+		newly_discovered_threads = count_additional_threads(&works);
+
+		if (newly_discovered_threads == 0)
+			break; /* done */
+
+		err = tsync_works_grow_by(&works, newly_discovered_threads,
+					  GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (err) {
+			atomic_set(&shared_ctx.preparation_error, err);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * The "all_prepared" barrier is used locally to the loop body,
+		 * this use of for_each_thread().  We can reset it on each loop
+		 * iteration because all previous loop iterations are done with
+		 * it already.
+		 *
+		 * num_preparing is initialized to 1 so that the counter can
+		 * not go to 0 and mark the completion as done before all task
+		 * works are registered.  We decrement it at the end of the
+		 * loop body.
+		 */
+		atomic_set(&shared_ctx.num_preparing, 1);
+		reinit_completion(&shared_ctx.all_prepared);
+
+		/*
+		 * In RCU read-lock, schedule task work on newly discovered
+		 * sibling tasks.
+		 */
+		found_more_threads = schedule_task_work(&works, &shared_ctx);
+
+		/*
+		 * Decrement num_preparing for current, to undo that we
+		 * initialized it to 1 a few lines above.
+		 */
+		if (atomic_dec_return(&shared_ctx.num_preparing) > 0) {
+			if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
+				    &shared_ctx.all_prepared)) {
+				/*
+				 * In case of interruption, we need to retry
+				 * the system call.
+				 */
+				atomic_set(&shared_ctx.preparation_error,
+					   -ERESTARTNOINTR);
+
+				/*
+				 * Opportunistic improvement: try to cancel task
+				 * works for tasks that did not start running
+				 * yet. We do not have a guarantee that it
+				 * cancels any of the enqueued task works
+				 * because task_work_run() might already have
+				 * dequeued them.
+				 */
+				cancel_tsync_works(&works, &shared_ctx);
+
+				/*
+				 * Break the loop with error. The cleanup code
+				 * after the loop unblocks the remaining
+				 * task_works.
+				 */
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	} while (found_more_threads &&
+		 !atomic_read(&shared_ctx.preparation_error));
+
+	/*
+	 * We now have either (a) all sibling threads blocking and in "prepared"
+	 * state in the task work, or (b) the preparation error is set. Ask all
+	 * threads to commit (or abort).
+	 */
+	complete_all(&shared_ctx.ready_to_commit);
+
+	/*
+	 * Decrement num_unfinished for current, to undo that we initialized it
+	 * to 1 at the beginning.
+	 */
+	if (atomic_dec_return(&shared_ctx.num_unfinished) > 0)
+		wait_for_completion(&shared_ctx.all_finished);
+
+	tsync_works_release(&works);
+	up_write(&current->signal->exec_update_lock);
+	return atomic_read(&shared_ctx.preparation_error);
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/tsync.h b/security/landlock/tsync.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ef86bb61c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/tsync.h
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock - Cross-thread ruleset enforcement
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2025 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_TSYNC_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_TSYNC_H
+
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+
+int landlock_restrict_sibling_threads(const struct cred *old_cred,
+				      const struct cred *new_cred);
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_TSYNC_H */
diff --git a/security/loadpin/Kconfig b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aef63d3e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config SECURITY_LOADPIN
+	bool "Pin load of kernel files (modules, fw, etc) to one filesystem"
+	depends on SECURITY && BLOCK
+	help
+	  Any files read through the kernel file reading interface
+	  (kernel modules, firmware, kexec images, security policy)
+	  can be pinned to the first filesystem used for loading. When
+	  enabled, any files that come from other filesystems will be
+	  rejected. This is best used on systems without an initrd that
+	  have a root filesystem backed by a read-only device such as
+	  dm-verity or a CDROM.
+
+config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE
+	bool "Enforce LoadPin at boot"
+	depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN
+	# Module compression breaks LoadPin unless modules are decompressed in
+	# the kernel.
+	depends on !MODULE_COMPRESS || MODULE_DECOMPRESS
+	help
+	  If selected, LoadPin will enforce pinning at boot. If not
+	  selected, it can be enabled at boot with the kernel parameter
+	  "loadpin.enforce=1".
+
+config SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY
+	bool "Allow reading files from certain other filesystems that use dm-verity"
+	depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN && DM_VERITY=y && SECURITYFS
+	help
+	  If selected LoadPin can allow reading files from filesystems
+	  that use dm-verity. LoadPin maintains a list of verity root
+	  digests it considers trusted. A verity backed filesystem is
+	  considered trusted if its root digest is found in the list
+	  of trusted digests.
+
+	  The list of trusted verity can be populated through an ioctl
+	  on the LoadPin securityfs entry 'dm-verity'. The ioctl
+	  expects a file descriptor of a file with verity digests as
+	  parameter. The file must be located on the pinned root and
+	  start with the line:
+
+	  # LOADPIN_TRUSTED_VERITY_ROOT_DIGESTS
+
+	  This is followed by the verity digests, with one digest per
+	  line.
diff --git a/security/loadpin/Makefile b/security/loadpin/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0ead1c310
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/loadpin/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin.o
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f71861f98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Module and Firmware Pinning Security Module
+ *
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LoadPin: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/hex.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/blkdev.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>	/* current */
+#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
+#include <linux/dm-verity-loadpin.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/loadpin.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+#define VERITY_DIGEST_FILE_HEADER "# LOADPIN_TRUSTED_VERITY_ROOT_DIGESTS"
+
+static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
+{
+	char *cmdline, *pathname;
+
+	pathname = kstrdup_quotable_file(file, GFP_KERNEL);
+	cmdline = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(current, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	pr_notice("%s %s obj=%s%s%s pid=%d cmdline=%s%s%s\n",
+		  origin, operation,
+		  (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "",
+		  pathname,
+		  (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "",
+		  task_pid_nr(current),
+		  cmdline ? "\"" : "", cmdline, cmdline ? "\"" : "");
+
+	kfree(cmdline);
+	kfree(pathname);
+}
+
+static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
+static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID];
+static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID] __ro_after_init;
+static struct super_block *pinned_root;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY
+static bool deny_reading_verity_digests;
+#endif
+
+// initialized to false
+static bool loadpin_root_writable;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+
+static int proc_handler_loadpin(const struct ctl_table *table, int dir,
+				void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	if (!loadpin_root_writable && SYSCTL_USER_TO_KERN(dir))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return proc_dointvec_minmax(table, dir, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
+static const struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname       = "enforce",
+		.data           = &enforce,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_handler_loadpin,
+		.extra1         = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+		.extra2         = SYSCTL_ONE,
+	},
+};
+#endif
+
+static void report_writable(struct super_block *mnt_sb, bool writable)
+{
+	if (mnt_sb->s_bdev) {
+		pr_info("%pg (%u:%u): %s\n", mnt_sb->s_bdev,
+			MAJOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
+			MINOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
+			writable ? "writable" : "read-only");
+	} else
+		pr_info("mnt_sb lacks block device, treating as: writable\n");
+
+	if (!writable)
+		pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * This must be called after early kernel init, since then the rootdev
+ * is available.
+ */
+static bool sb_is_writable(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+	bool writable = true;
+
+	if (mnt_sb->s_bdev)
+		writable = !bdev_read_only(mnt_sb->s_bdev);
+
+	return writable;
+}
+
+static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When unmounting the filesystem we were using for load
+	 * pinning, we acknowledge the superblock release, but make sure
+	 * no other modules or firmware can be loaded when we are in
+	 * enforcing mode. Otherwise, allow the root to be reestablished.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) && mnt_sb == pinned_root) {
+		if (enforce) {
+			pinned_root = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
+			pr_info("umount pinned fs: refusing further loads\n");
+		} else {
+			pinned_root = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	struct super_block *load_root;
+	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
+	bool first_root_pin = false;
+
+	/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
+	if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
+	    ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
+		report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
+	if (!file) {
+		if (!enforce) {
+			report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-denied");
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	load_root = file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb;
+
+	/* First loaded module/firmware defines the root for all others. */
+	spin_lock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+	/*
+	 * pinned_root is only NULL at startup or when the pinned root has
+	 * been unmounted while we are not in enforcing mode. Otherwise, it
+	 * is either a valid reference, or an ERR_PTR.
+	 */
+	if (!pinned_root) {
+		pinned_root = load_root;
+		first_root_pin = true;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+
+	if (first_root_pin) {
+		loadpin_root_writable = sb_is_writable(pinned_root);
+		report_writable(pinned_root, loadpin_root_writable);
+		report_load(origin, file, "pinned");
+	}
+
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) ||
+	    ((load_root != pinned_root) && !dm_verity_loadpin_is_bdev_trusted(load_root->s_bdev))) {
+		if (unlikely(!enforce)) {
+			report_load(origin, file, "pinning-ignored");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		report_load(origin, file, "denied");
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+			     bool contents)
+{
+	/*
+	 * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its
+	 * contents, so we can ignore the "are full contents available"
+	 * argument here.
+	 */
+	return loadpin_check(file, id);
+}
+
+static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+{
+	/*
+	 * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its
+	 * contents, so a NULL file is passed, and we can ignore the
+	 * state of "contents".
+	 */
+	return loadpin_check(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
+}
+
+static const struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid = {
+	.name = "loadpin",
+	.id = LSM_ID_LOADPIN,
+};
+
+static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
+};
+
+static void __init parse_exclude(void)
+{
+	int i, j;
+	char *cur;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure all the arrays stay within expected sizes. This
+	 * is slightly weird because kernel_read_file_str[] includes
+	 * READING_MAX_ID, which isn't actually meaningful here.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files) !=
+		     ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str) <
+		     ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) {
+		cur = exclude_read_files[i];
+		if (!cur)
+			break;
+		if (*cur == '\0')
+			continue;
+
+		for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id); j++) {
+			if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) {
+				pr_info("excluding: %s\n",
+					kernel_read_file_str[j]);
+				ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1;
+				/*
+				 * Can not break, because one read_file_str
+				 * may map to more than on read_file_id.
+				 */
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static int __init loadpin_init(void)
+{
+	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
+		enforce ? "" : "not ");
+	parse_exclude();
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+	if (!register_sysctl("kernel/loadpin", loadpin_sysctl_table))
+		pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
+#endif
+	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
+			   &loadpin_lsmid);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY
+
+enum loadpin_securityfs_interface_index {
+	LOADPIN_DM_VERITY,
+};
+
+static int read_trusted_verity_root_digests(unsigned int fd)
+{
+	void *data;
+	int rc;
+	char *p, *d;
+
+	if (deny_reading_verity_digests)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* The list of trusted root digests can only be set up once */
+	if (!list_empty(&dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digests))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	CLASS(fd, f)(fd);
+	if (fd_empty(f))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = kzalloc(SZ_4K, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	rc = kernel_read_file(fd_file(f), 0, (void **)&data, SZ_4K - 1, NULL, READING_POLICY);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	p = data;
+	p[rc] = '\0';
+	p = strim(p);
+
+	p = strim(data);
+	while ((d = strsep(&p, "\n")) != NULL) {
+		int len;
+		struct dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digest *trd;
+
+		if (d == data) {
+			/* first line, validate header */
+			if (strcmp(d, VERITY_DIGEST_FILE_HEADER)) {
+				rc = -EPROTO;
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		len = strlen(d);
+
+		if (len % 2) {
+			rc = -EPROTO;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		len /= 2;
+
+		trd = kzalloc_flex(*trd, data, len);
+		if (!trd) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		trd->len = len;
+
+		if (hex2bin(trd->data, d, len)) {
+			kfree(trd);
+			rc = -EPROTO;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		list_add_tail(&trd->node, &dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digests);
+	}
+
+	if (list_empty(&dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digests)) {
+		rc = -EPROTO;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	kfree(data);
+
+	return 0;
+
+err:
+	kfree(data);
+
+	/* any failure in loading/parsing invalidates the entire list */
+	{
+		struct dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digest *trd, *tmp;
+
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(trd, tmp, &dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digests, node) {
+			list_del(&trd->node);
+			kfree(trd);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* disallow further attempts after reading a corrupt/invalid file */
+	deny_reading_verity_digests = true;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/******************************** securityfs ********************************/
+
+static long dm_verity_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	void __user *uarg = (void __user *)arg;
+	unsigned int fd;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case LOADPIN_IOC_SET_TRUSTED_VERITY_DIGESTS:
+		if (copy_from_user(&fd, uarg, sizeof(fd)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		return read_trusted_verity_root_digests(fd);
+
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations loadpin_dm_verity_ops = {
+	.unlocked_ioctl = dm_verity_ioctl,
+	.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
+};
+
+/**
+ * init_loadpin_securityfs - create the securityfs directory for LoadPin
+ *
+ * We can not put this method normally under the loadpin_init() code path since
+ * the security subsystem gets initialized before the vfs caches.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the securityfs directory creation was successful.
+ */
+static int __init init_loadpin_securityfs(void)
+{
+	struct dentry *loadpin_dir, *dentry;
+
+	loadpin_dir = securityfs_create_dir("loadpin", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(loadpin_dir)) {
+		pr_err("LoadPin: could not create securityfs dir: %ld\n",
+		       PTR_ERR(loadpin_dir));
+		return PTR_ERR(loadpin_dir);
+	}
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_file("dm-verity", 0600, loadpin_dir,
+					(void *)LOADPIN_DM_VERITY, &loadpin_dm_verity_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		pr_err("LoadPin: could not create securityfs entry 'dm-verity': %ld\n",
+		       PTR_ERR(dentry));
+		return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY */
+
+DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
+	.id = &loadpin_lsmid,
+	.init = loadpin_init,
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY
+	.initcall_fs = init_loadpin_securityfs,
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY */
+};
+
+/* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
+module_param(enforce, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
+module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types");
diff --git a/security/lockdown/Kconfig b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e84ddf484
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+config SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
+	bool "Basic module for enforcing kernel lockdown"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	select MODULE_SIG if MODULES
+	help
+	  Build support for an LSM that enforces a coarse kernel lockdown
+	  behaviour.
+
+config SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
+	bool "Enable lockdown LSM early in init"
+	depends on SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
+	help
+	  Enable the lockdown LSM early in boot. This is necessary in order
+	  to ensure that lockdown enforcement can be carried out on kernel
+	  boot parameters that are otherwise parsed before the security
+	  subsystem is fully initialised. If enabled, lockdown will
+	  unconditionally be called before any other LSMs.
+
+choice
+	prompt "Kernel default lockdown mode"
+	default LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_NONE
+	depends on SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
+	help
+	  The kernel can be configured to default to differing levels of
+	  lockdown.
+
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_NONE
+	bool "None"
+	help
+	  No lockdown functionality is enabled by default. Lockdown may be
+	  enabled via the kernel commandline or /sys/kernel/security/lockdown.
+
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY
+	bool "Integrity"
+	help
+	 The kernel runs in integrity mode by default. Features that allow
+	 the kernel to be modified at runtime are disabled.
+
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY
+	bool "Confidentiality"
+	help
+	 The kernel runs in confidentiality mode by default. Features that
+	 allow the kernel to be modified at runtime or that permit userland
+	 code to read confidential material held inside the kernel are
+	 disabled.
+
+endchoice
diff --git a/security/lockdown/Makefile b/security/lockdown/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e3634b901
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lockdown/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown.o
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8d46886d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Lock down the kernel
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down;
+
+static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE,
+						 LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
+						 LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX};
+
+/*
+ * Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
+ */
+static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
+{
+	if (kernel_locked_down >= level)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	kernel_locked_down = level;
+	pr_notice("Kernel is locked down from %s; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
+		  where);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init lockdown_param(char *level)
+{
+	if (!level)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(level, "integrity") == 0)
+		lock_kernel_down("command line", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
+	else if (strcmp(level, "confidentiality") == 0)
+		lock_kernel_down("command line", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+early_param("lockdown", lockdown_param);
+
+/**
+ * lockdown_is_locked_down - Find out if the kernel is locked down
+ * @what: Tag to use in notice generated if lockdown is in effect
+ */
+static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
+{
+	if (WARN(what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
+		 "Invalid lockdown reason"))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (kernel_locked_down >= what) {
+		if (lockdown_reasons[what])
+			pr_notice_ratelimited("Lockdown: %s: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
+				  current->comm, lockdown_reasons[what]);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid = {
+	.name = "lockdown",
+	.id = LSM_ID_LOCKDOWN,
+};
+
+static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
+{
+#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
+	lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY)
+	lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
+#endif
+	security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
+			   &lockdown_lsmid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t lockdown_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+			     loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80] = "";
+	int i, offset = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_levels); i++) {
+		enum lockdown_reason level = lockdown_levels[i];
+
+		if (lockdown_reasons[level]) {
+			const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level];
+
+			if (kernel_locked_down == level)
+				offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "[%s] ", label);
+			else
+				offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "%s ", label);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Convert the last space to a newline if needed. */
+	if (offset > 0)
+		temp[offset-1] = '\n';
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+}
+
+static ssize_t lockdown_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t n, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *state;
+	int i, len, err = -EINVAL;
+
+	state = memdup_user_nul(buf, n);
+	if (IS_ERR(state))
+		return PTR_ERR(state);
+
+	len = strlen(state);
+	if (len && state[len-1] == '\n') {
+		state[len-1] = '\0';
+		len--;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_levels); i++) {
+		enum lockdown_reason level = lockdown_levels[i];
+		const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level];
+
+		if (label && !strcmp(state, label))
+			err = lock_kernel_down("securityfs", level);
+	}
+
+	kfree(state);
+	return err ? err : n;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations lockdown_ops = {
+	.read  = lockdown_read,
+	.write = lockdown_write,
+};
+
+static int __init lockdown_secfs_init(void)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_file("lockdown", 0644, NULL, NULL,
+					&lockdown_ops);
+	return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(dentry);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
+DEFINE_EARLY_LSM(lockdown) = {
+#else
+DEFINE_LSM(lockdown) = {
+#endif
+	.id = &lockdown_lsmid,
+	.init = lockdown_lsm_init,
+	.initcall_core = lockdown_secfs_init,
+};
diff --git a/security/lsm.h b/security/lsm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..32f808ad4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lsm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * LSM functions
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LSM_H_
+#define _LSM_H_
+
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_count.h>
+
+/* LSM debugging */
+extern bool lsm_debug;
+#define lsm_pr(...)		pr_info(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define lsm_pr_cont(...)	pr_cont(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define lsm_pr_dbg(...)							\
+	do {								\
+		if (lsm_debug)						\
+			pr_info(__VA_ARGS__);				\
+	} while (0)
+
+/* List of configured LSMs */
+extern unsigned int lsm_active_cnt;
+extern const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[];
+
+/* LSM blob configuration */
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes;
+
+/* LSM blob caches */
+extern struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
+extern struct kmem_cache *lsm_backing_file_cache;
+extern struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
+
+/* LSM blob allocators */
+int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
+int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task);
+
+/* LSM framework initializers */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
+int securityfs_init(void);
+#else
+static inline int securityfs_init(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITYFS */
+
+#endif /* _LSM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..737f5a263
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * common LSM auditing functions
+ *
+ * Based on code written for SELinux by :
+ *			Stephen Smalley
+ * 			James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Author : Etienne Basset, <etienne.basset@ensta.org>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/sctp.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+
+/**
+ * ipv4_skb_to_auditdata : fill auditdata from skb
+ * @skb : the skb
+ * @ad : the audit data to fill
+ * @proto : the layer 4 protocol
+ *
+ * return  0 on success
+ */
+int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
+		struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	struct iphdr *ih;
+
+	ih = ip_hdr(skb);
+	ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
+	ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
+
+	if (proto)
+		*proto = ih->protocol;
+	/* non initial fragment */
+	if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (ih->protocol) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+		struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+	case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+		struct udphdr *uh = udp_hdr(skb);
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr *sh = sctp_hdr(skb);
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/**
+ * ipv6_skb_to_auditdata : fill auditdata from skb
+ * @skb : the skb
+ * @ad : the audit data to fill
+ * @proto : the layer 4 protocol
+ *
+ * return  0 on success
+ */
+int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
+		struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+	int offset, ret = 0;
+	struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
+	u8 nexthdr;
+	__be16 frag_off;
+
+	ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+	ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
+	ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
+	/* IPv6 can have several extension header before the Transport header
+	 * skip them */
+	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+	offset += sizeof(*ip6);
+	nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+	offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (proto)
+		*proto = nexthdr;
+	switch (nexthdr) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+		struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+	case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+		struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+static inline void print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+				   const struct in6_addr *addr, __be16 port,
+				   const char *name1, const char *name2)
+{
+	if (!ipv6_addr_any(addr))
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI6c", name1, addr);
+	if (port)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+}
+
+static inline void print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
+				   __be16 port, const char *name1, const char *name2)
+{
+	if (addr)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI4", name1, &addr);
+	if (port)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_log_lsm_data - helper to log common LSM audit data
+ * @ab : the audit buffer
+ * @a : common audit data
+ */
+void audit_log_lsm_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+			const struct common_audit_data *a)
+{
+	/*
+	 * To keep stack sizes in check force programmers to notice if they
+	 * start making this union too large!  See struct lsm_network_audit
+	 * as an example of how to deal with large data.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(a->u) > sizeof(void *)*2);
+
+	switch (a->type) {
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE:
+		return;
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ipc_key=%d ", a->u.ipc_id);
+		break;
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d ", a->u.cap);
+		break;
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH: {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &a->u.path);
+
+		inode = d_backing_inode(a->u.path.dentry);
+		if (inode) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino);
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE: {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &a->u.file->f_path);
+
+		inode = file_inode(a->u.file);
+		if (inode) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino);
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP: {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &a->u.op->path);
+
+		inode = a->u.op->path.dentry->d_inode;
+		if (inode) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino);
+		}
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ioctlcmd=0x%hx", a->u.op->cmd);
+		break;
+	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY: {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+		spin_lock(&a->u.dentry->d_lock);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, a->u.dentry->d_name.name);
+		spin_unlock(&a->u.dentry->d_lock);
+
+		inode = d_backing_inode(a->u.dentry);
+		if (inode) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino);
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE: {
+		struct dentry *dentry;
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		inode = a->u.inode;
+		dentry = d_find_alias_rcu(inode);
+		if (dentry) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+			spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
+			spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
+		}
+		audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		break;
+	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK: {
+		struct task_struct *tsk = a->u.tsk;
+		if (tsk) {
+			pid_t pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
+			if (pid) {
+				char tskcomm[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+				audit_log_format(ab, " opid=%d ocomm=", pid);
+				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+				    get_task_comm(tskcomm, tsk));
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET:
+		if (a->u.net->sk) {
+			const struct sock *sk = a->u.net->sk;
+			const struct unix_sock *u;
+			struct unix_address *addr;
+			int len = 0;
+			char *p = NULL;
+
+			switch (sk->sk_family) {
+			case AF_INET: {
+				const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+
+				print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->inet_rcv_saddr,
+						inet->inet_sport,
+						"laddr", "lport");
+				print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->inet_daddr,
+						inet->inet_dport,
+						"faddr", "fport");
+				break;
+			}
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+			case AF_INET6: {
+				const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+
+				print_ipv6_addr(ab, &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr,
+						inet->inet_sport,
+						"laddr", "lport");
+				print_ipv6_addr(ab, &sk->sk_v6_daddr,
+						inet->inet_dport,
+						"faddr", "fport");
+				break;
+			}
+#endif
+			case AF_UNIX:
+				u = unix_sk(sk);
+				addr = smp_load_acquire(&u->addr);
+				if (!addr)
+					break;
+				if (u->path.dentry) {
+					audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &u->path);
+					break;
+				}
+				len = addr->len-sizeof(short);
+				p = &addr->name->sun_path[0];
+				audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
+				if (*p)
+					audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
+				else
+					audit_log_n_hex(ab, p, len);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		switch (a->u.net->family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net->v4info.saddr,
+					a->u.net->sport,
+					"saddr", "src");
+			print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net->v4info.daddr,
+					a->u.net->dport,
+					"daddr", "dest");
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net->v6info.saddr,
+					a->u.net->sport,
+					"saddr", "src");
+			print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net->v6info.daddr,
+					a->u.net->dport,
+					"daddr", "dest");
+			break;
+		}
+		if (a->u.net->netif > 0) {
+			struct net_device *dev;
+
+			/* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */
+			dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, a->u.net->netif);
+			if (dev) {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s", dev->name);
+				dev_put(dev);
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " key_serial=%u", a->u.key_struct.key);
+		if (a->u.key_struct.key_desc) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " key_desc=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, a->u.key_struct.key_desc);
+		}
+		break;
+#endif
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " kmod=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, a->u.kmod_name);
+		break;
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY: {
+		struct in6_addr sbn_pfx;
+
+		memset(&sbn_pfx.s6_addr, 0,
+		       sizeof(sbn_pfx.s6_addr));
+		memcpy(&sbn_pfx.s6_addr, &a->u.ibpkey->subnet_prefix,
+		       sizeof(a->u.ibpkey->subnet_prefix));
+		audit_log_format(ab, " pkey=0x%x subnet_prefix=%pI6c",
+				 a->u.ibpkey->pkey, &sbn_pfx);
+		break;
+	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " device=%s port_num=%u",
+				 a->u.ibendport->dev_name,
+				 a->u.ibendport->port);
+		break;
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " lockdown_reason=\"%s\"",
+				 lockdown_reasons[a->u.reason]);
+		break;
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " anonclass=%s", a->u.anonclass);
+		break;
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NLMSGTYPE:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " nl-msgtype=%hu", a->u.nlmsg_type);
+		break;
+	} /* switch (a->type) */
+}
+
+/**
+ * dump_common_audit_data - helper to dump common audit data
+ * @ab : the audit buffer
+ * @a : common audit data
+ */
+static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+				   const struct common_audit_data *a)
+{
+	char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
+	audit_log_lsm_data(ab, a);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_lsm_audit - generic LSM auditing function
+ * @a:  auxiliary audit data
+ * @pre_audit: lsm-specific pre-audit callback
+ * @post_audit: lsm-specific post-audit callback
+ *
+ * setup the audit buffer for common security information
+ * uses callback to print LSM specific information
+ */
+void common_lsm_audit(struct common_audit_data *a,
+	void (*pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *),
+	void (*post_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *))
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+	if (a == NULL)
+		return;
+	/* we use GFP_ATOMIC so we won't sleep */
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN,
+			     AUDIT_AVC);
+
+	if (ab == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (pre_audit)
+		pre_audit(ab, a);
+
+	dump_common_audit_data(ab, a);
+
+	if (post_audit)
+		post_audit(ab, a);
+
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
diff --git a/security/lsm_init.c b/security/lsm_init.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7c0fd17f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lsm_init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,568 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * LSM initialization functions
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+#include "lsm.h"
+
+/* LSM enabled constants. */
+static __initdata int lsm_enabled_true = 1;
+static __initdata int lsm_enabled_false = 0;
+
+/* Pointers to LSM sections defined in include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h */
+extern struct lsm_info __start_lsm_info[], __end_lsm_info[];
+extern struct lsm_info __start_early_lsm_info[], __end_early_lsm_info[];
+
+/* Number of "early" LSMs */
+static __initdata unsigned int lsm_count_early;
+
+/* Build and boot-time LSM ordering. */
+static __initconst const char *const lsm_order_builtin = CONFIG_LSM;
+static __initdata const char *lsm_order_cmdline;
+static __initdata const char *lsm_order_legacy;
+
+/* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */
+static __initdata struct lsm_info *lsm_order[MAX_LSM_COUNT + 1];
+static __initdata struct lsm_info *lsm_exclusive;
+
+#define lsm_order_for_each(iter)					\
+	for ((iter) = lsm_order; *(iter); (iter)++)
+#define lsm_for_each_raw(iter)						\
+	for ((iter) = __start_lsm_info;					\
+	     (iter) < __end_lsm_info; (iter)++)
+#define lsm_early_for_each_raw(iter)					\
+	for ((iter) = __start_early_lsm_info;				\
+	     (iter) < __end_early_lsm_info; (iter)++)
+
+#define lsm_initcall(level)						\
+	({								\
+		int _r, _rc = 0;					\
+		struct lsm_info **_lp, *_l;				\
+		lsm_order_for_each(_lp) {				\
+			_l = *_lp;					\
+			if (!_l->initcall_##level)			\
+				continue;				\
+			lsm_pr_dbg("running %s %s initcall",		\
+				   _l->id->name, #level);		\
+			_r = _l->initcall_##level();			\
+			if (_r) {					\
+				pr_warn("failed LSM %s %s initcall with errno %d\n", \
+					_l->id->name, #level, _r);	\
+				if (!_rc)				\
+					_rc = _r;			\
+			}						\
+		}							\
+		_rc;							\
+	})
+
+/**
+ * lsm_choose_security - Legacy "major" LSM selection
+ * @str: kernel command line parameter
+ */
+static int __init lsm_choose_security(char *str)
+{
+	lsm_order_legacy = str;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("security=", lsm_choose_security);
+
+/**
+ * lsm_choose_lsm - Modern LSM selection
+ * @str: kernel command line parameter
+ */
+static int __init lsm_choose_lsm(char *str)
+{
+	lsm_order_cmdline = str;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("lsm=", lsm_choose_lsm);
+
+/**
+ * lsm_debug_enable - Enable LSM framework debugging
+ * @str: kernel command line parameter
+ *
+ * Currently we only provide debug info during LSM initialization, but we may
+ * want to expand this in the future.
+ */
+static int __init lsm_debug_enable(char *str)
+{
+	lsm_debug = true;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("lsm.debug", lsm_debug_enable);
+
+/**
+ * lsm_enabled_set - Mark a LSM as enabled
+ * @lsm: LSM definition
+ * @enabled: enabled flag
+ */
+static void __init lsm_enabled_set(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use
+	 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state.
+	 */
+	if (!lsm->enabled ||
+	    lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true ||
+	    lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) {
+		lsm->enabled = enabled ? &lsm_enabled_true : &lsm_enabled_false;
+	} else {
+		*lsm->enabled = enabled;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_is_enabled - Determine if a LSM is enabled
+ * @lsm: LSM definition
+ */
+static inline bool lsm_is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+	return (lsm->enabled ? *lsm->enabled : false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_order_exists - Determine if a LSM exists in the ordered list
+ * @lsm: LSM definition
+ */
+static bool __init lsm_order_exists(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+	struct lsm_info **check;
+
+	lsm_order_for_each(check) {
+		if (*check == lsm)
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_order_append - Append a LSM to the ordered list
+ * @lsm: LSM definition
+ * @src: source of the addition
+ *
+ * Append @lsm to the enabled LSM array after ensuring that it hasn't been
+ * explicitly disabled, is a duplicate entry, or would run afoul of the
+ * LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE logic.
+ */
+static void __init lsm_order_append(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *src)
+{
+	/* Ignore duplicate selections. */
+	if (lsm_order_exists(lsm))
+		return;
+
+	/* Skip explicitly disabled LSMs. */
+	if (lsm->enabled && !lsm_is_enabled(lsm)) {
+		lsm_pr_dbg("skip previously disabled LSM %s:%s\n",
+			   src, lsm->id->name);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (lsm_active_cnt == MAX_LSM_COUNT) {
+		pr_warn("exceeded maximum LSM count on %s:%s\n",
+			src, lsm->id->name);
+		lsm_enabled_set(lsm, false);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) {
+		if (lsm_exclusive) {
+			lsm_pr_dbg("skip exclusive LSM conflict %s:%s\n",
+				   src, lsm->id->name);
+			lsm_enabled_set(lsm, false);
+			return;
+		} else {
+			lsm_pr_dbg("select exclusive LSM %s:%s\n",
+				   src, lsm->id->name);
+			lsm_exclusive = lsm;
+		}
+	}
+
+	lsm_enabled_set(lsm, true);
+	lsm_order[lsm_active_cnt] = lsm;
+	lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt++] = lsm->id;
+
+	lsm_pr_dbg("enabling LSM %s:%s\n", src, lsm->id->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_order_parse - Parse the comma delimited LSM list
+ * @list: LSM list
+ * @src: source of the list
+ */
+static void __init lsm_order_parse(const char *list, const char *src)
+{
+	struct lsm_info *lsm;
+	char *sep, *name, *next;
+
+	/* Handle any Legacy LSM exclusions if one was specified. */
+	if (lsm_order_legacy) {
+		/*
+		 * To match the original "security=" behavior, this explicitly
+		 * does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major if the selected
+		 * one was separately disabled: disable all non-matching
+		 * Legacy Major LSMs.
+		 */
+		lsm_for_each_raw(lsm) {
+			if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) &&
+			     strcmp(lsm->id->name, lsm_order_legacy)) {
+				lsm_enabled_set(lsm, false);
+				lsm_pr_dbg("skip legacy LSM conflict %s:%s\n",
+					   src, lsm->id->name);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* LSM_ORDER_FIRST */
+	lsm_for_each_raw(lsm) {
+		if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST)
+			lsm_order_append(lsm, "first");
+	}
+
+	/* Normal or "mutable" LSMs */
+	sep = kstrdup(list, GFP_KERNEL);
+	next = sep;
+	/* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */
+	while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) {
+		lsm_for_each_raw(lsm) {
+			if (!strcmp(lsm->id->name, name) &&
+			    lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE)
+				lsm_order_append(lsm, src);
+		}
+	}
+	kfree(sep);
+
+	/* Legacy LSM if specified. */
+	if (lsm_order_legacy) {
+		lsm_for_each_raw(lsm) {
+			if (!strcmp(lsm->id->name, lsm_order_legacy))
+				lsm_order_append(lsm, src);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* LSM_ORDER_LAST */
+	lsm_for_each_raw(lsm) {
+		if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST)
+			lsm_order_append(lsm, "last");
+	}
+
+	/* Disable all LSMs not previously enabled. */
+	lsm_for_each_raw(lsm) {
+		if (lsm_order_exists(lsm))
+			continue;
+		lsm_enabled_set(lsm, false);
+		lsm_pr_dbg("skip disabled LSM %s:%s\n", src, lsm->id->name);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_blob_size_update - Update the LSM blob size and offset information
+ * @sz_req: the requested additional blob size
+ * @sz_cur: the existing blob size
+ */
+static void __init lsm_blob_size_update(unsigned int *sz_req,
+					unsigned int *sz_cur)
+{
+	unsigned int offset;
+
+	if (*sz_req == 0)
+		return;
+
+	offset = ALIGN(*sz_cur, sizeof(void *));
+	*sz_cur = offset + *sz_req;
+	*sz_req = offset;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_prepare - Prepare the LSM framework for a new LSM
+ * @lsm: LSM definition
+ */
+static void __init lsm_prepare(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+	struct lsm_blob_sizes *blobs = lsm->blobs;
+
+	if (!blobs)
+		return;
+
+	/* Register the LSM blob sizes. */
+	blobs = lsm->blobs;
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_backing_file,
+			     &blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_ib, &blob_sizes.lbs_ib);
+	/* inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to LSM blobs. */
+	if (blobs->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
+		blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_perf_event,
+			     &blob_sizes.lbs_perf_event);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_superblock,
+			     &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_tun_dev, &blob_sizes.lbs_tun_dev);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_xattr_count,
+			     &blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bdev, &blob_sizes.lbs_bdev);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_map, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_prog, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog);
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_token, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_init_single - Initialize a given LSM
+ * @lsm: LSM definition
+ */
+static void __init lsm_init_single(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!lsm_is_enabled(lsm))
+		return;
+
+	lsm_pr_dbg("initializing %s\n", lsm->id->name);
+	ret = lsm->init();
+	WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->id->name, ret);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_static_call_init - Initialize a LSM's static calls
+ * @hl: LSM hook list
+ */
+static int __init lsm_static_call_init(struct security_hook_list *hl)
+{
+	struct lsm_static_call *scall = hl->scalls;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_COUNT; i++) {
+		/* Update the first static call that is not used yet */
+		if (!scall->hl) {
+			__static_call_update(scall->key, scall->trampoline,
+					     hl->hook.lsm_func_addr);
+			scall->hl = hl;
+			static_branch_enable(scall->active);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		scall++;
+	}
+
+	return -ENOSPC;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_add_hooks - Add a LSM's hooks to the LSM framework's hook lists
+ * @hooks: LSM hooks to add
+ * @count: number of hooks to add
+ * @lsmid: identification information for the LSM
+ *
+ * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the LSM framework.
+ */
+void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
+			       const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
+		if (lsm_static_call_init(&hooks[i]))
+			panic("exhausted LSM callback slots with LSM %s\n",
+			      lsmid->name);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * early_security_init - Initialize the early LSMs
+ */
+int __init early_security_init(void)
+{
+	struct lsm_info *lsm;
+
+	/* NOTE: lsm_pr_dbg() doesn't work here as lsm_debug is not yet set */
+
+	lsm_early_for_each_raw(lsm) {
+		lsm_enabled_set(lsm, true);
+		lsm_order_append(lsm, "early");
+		lsm_prepare(lsm);
+		lsm_init_single(lsm);
+		lsm_count_early++;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_init - Initializes the LSM framework
+ *
+ * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence.
+ */
+int __init security_init(void)
+{
+	unsigned int cnt;
+	struct lsm_info **lsm;
+
+	if (lsm_debug) {
+		struct lsm_info *i;
+
+		cnt = 0;
+		lsm_pr("available LSMs: ");
+		lsm_early_for_each_raw(i)
+			lsm_pr_cont("%s%s(E)", (cnt++ ? "," : ""), i->id->name);
+		lsm_for_each_raw(i)
+			lsm_pr_cont("%s%s", (cnt++ ? "," : ""), i->id->name);
+		lsm_pr_cont("\n");
+
+		lsm_pr("built-in LSM config: %s\n", lsm_order_builtin);
+
+		lsm_pr("legacy LSM parameter: %s\n", lsm_order_legacy);
+		lsm_pr("boot LSM parameter: %s\n", lsm_order_cmdline);
+
+		/* see the note about lsm_pr_dbg() in early_security_init() */
+		lsm_early_for_each_raw(i)
+			lsm_pr("enabled LSM early:%s\n", i->id->name);
+	}
+
+	if (lsm_order_cmdline) {
+		if (lsm_order_legacy)
+			lsm_order_legacy = NULL;
+		lsm_order_parse(lsm_order_cmdline, "cmdline");
+	} else
+		lsm_order_parse(lsm_order_builtin, "builtin");
+
+	lsm_order_for_each(lsm)
+		lsm_prepare(*lsm);
+
+	if (lsm_debug) {
+		lsm_pr("blob(cred) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+		lsm_pr("blob(file) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+		lsm_pr("blob(backing_file) size %d\n",
+		       blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file);
+		lsm_pr("blob(ib) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ib);
+		lsm_pr("blob(inode) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+		lsm_pr("blob(ipc) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+		lsm_pr("blob(key) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_key);
+		lsm_pr("blob(msg_msg)_size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+		lsm_pr("blob(sock) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
+		lsm_pr("blob(superblock) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
+		lsm_pr("blob(perf_event) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_perf_event);
+		lsm_pr("blob(task) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+		lsm_pr("blob(tun_dev) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_tun_dev);
+		lsm_pr("blob(xattr) count %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count);
+		lsm_pr("blob(bdev) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bdev);
+		lsm_pr("blob(bpf_map) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map);
+		lsm_pr("blob(bpf_prog) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog);
+		lsm_pr("blob(bpf_token) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token);
+	}
+
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_file)
+		lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
+						   blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
+						   SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file)
+		lsm_backing_file_cache = kmem_cache_create(
+						   "lsm_backing_file_cache",
+						   blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file,
+						   0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
+		lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
+						    blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
+						    SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+
+	if (lsm_cred_alloc((struct cred *)unrcu_pointer(current->cred),
+			   GFP_KERNEL))
+		panic("early LSM cred alloc failed\n");
+	if (lsm_task_alloc(current))
+		panic("early LSM task alloc failed\n");
+
+	cnt = 0;
+	lsm_order_for_each(lsm) {
+		/* skip the "early" LSMs as they have already been setup */
+		if (cnt++ < lsm_count_early)
+			continue;
+		lsm_init_single(*lsm);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_initcall_pure - Run the LSM pure initcalls
+ */
+static int __init security_initcall_pure(void)
+{
+	return lsm_initcall(pure);
+}
+pure_initcall(security_initcall_pure);
+
+/**
+ * security_initcall_early - Run the LSM early initcalls
+ */
+static int __init security_initcall_early(void)
+{
+	return lsm_initcall(early);
+}
+early_initcall(security_initcall_early);
+
+/**
+ * security_initcall_core - Run the LSM core initcalls
+ */
+static int __init security_initcall_core(void)
+{
+	int rc_sfs, rc_lsm;
+
+	rc_sfs = securityfs_init();
+	rc_lsm = lsm_initcall(core);
+
+	return (rc_sfs ? rc_sfs : rc_lsm);
+}
+core_initcall(security_initcall_core);
+
+/**
+ * security_initcall_subsys - Run the LSM subsys initcalls
+ */
+static int __init security_initcall_subsys(void)
+{
+	return lsm_initcall(subsys);
+}
+subsys_initcall(security_initcall_subsys);
+
+/**
+ * security_initcall_fs - Run the LSM fs initcalls
+ */
+static int __init security_initcall_fs(void)
+{
+	return lsm_initcall(fs);
+}
+fs_initcall(security_initcall_fs);
+
+/**
+ * security_initcall_device - Run the LSM device initcalls
+ */
+static int __init security_initcall_device(void)
+{
+	return lsm_initcall(device);
+}
+device_initcall(security_initcall_device);
+
+/**
+ * security_initcall_late - Run the LSM late initcalls
+ */
+static int __init security_initcall_late(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = lsm_initcall(late);
+	lsm_pr_dbg("all enabled LSMs fully activated\n");
+	call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_STARTED_ALL, NULL);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+late_initcall(security_initcall_late);
diff --git a/security/lsm_notifier.c b/security/lsm_notifier.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c92fad5d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lsm_notifier.c
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * LSM notifier functions
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+
+static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain);
+
+int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
+{
+	return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
+					    event, data);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier);
+
+int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+	return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
+						nb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier);
+
+int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+	return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
+						  nb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier);
diff --git a/security/lsm_syscalls.c b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..08a017669
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * System calls implementing the Linux Security Module API.
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2022 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2022 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+#include "lsm.h"
+
+/**
+ * lsm_name_to_attr - map an LSM attribute name to its ID
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ *
+ * Returns the LSM attribute value associated with @name, or 0 if
+ * there is no mapping.
+ */
+u64 lsm_name_to_attr(const char *name)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+		return LSM_ATTR_CURRENT;
+	if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+		return LSM_ATTR_EXEC;
+	if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+		return LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE;
+	if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+		return LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE;
+	if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
+		return LSM_ATTR_PREV;
+	if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+		return LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE;
+	return LSM_ATTR_UNDEF;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sys_lsm_set_self_attr - Set current task's security module attribute
+ * @attr: which attribute to set
+ * @ctx: the LSM contexts
+ * @size: size of @ctx
+ * @flags: reserved for future use
+ *
+ * Sets the calling task's LSM context. On success this function
+ * returns 0. If the attribute specified cannot be set a negative
+ * value indicating the reason for the error is returned.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE4(lsm_set_self_attr, unsigned int, attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *,
+		ctx, u32, size, u32, flags)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+	rc = security_setselfattr(attr, ctx, size, flags);
+	mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sys_lsm_get_self_attr - Return current task's security module attributes
+ * @attr: which attribute to return
+ * @ctx: the user-space destination for the information, or NULL
+ * @size: pointer to the size of space available to receive the data
+ * @flags: special handling options. LSM_FLAG_SINGLE indicates that only
+ * attributes associated with the LSM identified in the passed @ctx be
+ * reported.
+ *
+ * Returns the calling task's LSM contexts. On success this
+ * function returns the number of @ctx array elements. This value
+ * may be zero if there are no LSM contexts assigned. If @size is
+ * insufficient to contain the return data -E2BIG is returned and
+ * @size is set to the minimum required size. In all other cases
+ * a negative value indicating the error is returned.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE4(lsm_get_self_attr, unsigned int, attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *,
+		ctx, u32 __user *, size, u32, flags)
+{
+	return security_getselfattr(attr, ctx, size, flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sys_lsm_list_modules - Return a list of the active security modules
+ * @ids: the LSM module ids
+ * @size: pointer to size of @ids, updated on return
+ * @flags: reserved for future use, must be zero
+ *
+ * Returns a list of the active LSM ids. On success this function
+ * returns the number of @ids array elements. This value may be zero
+ * if there are no LSMs active. If @size is insufficient to contain
+ * the return data -E2BIG is returned and @size is set to the minimum
+ * required size. In all other cases a negative value indicating the
+ * error is returned.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lsm_list_modules, u64 __user *, ids, u32 __user *, size,
+		u32, flags)
+{
+	u32 total_size = lsm_active_cnt * sizeof(*ids);
+	u32 usize;
+	int i;
+
+	if (flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (get_user(usize, size))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (put_user(total_size, size) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (usize < total_size)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < lsm_active_cnt; i++)
+		if (put_user(lsm_idlist[i]->id, ids++))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+	return lsm_active_cnt;
+}
diff --git a/security/min_addr.c b/security/min_addr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..56e4f9d25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/min_addr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/minmax.h>
+
+/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access by both DAC and the LSM*/
+unsigned long mmap_min_addr;
+/* amount of vm to protect from userspace using CAP_SYS_RAWIO (DAC) */
+unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR;
+/* amount of vm to protect from userspace using the LSM = CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR */
+
+/*
+ * Update mmap_min_addr = max(dac_mmap_min_addr, CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR)
+ */
+static void update_mmap_min_addr(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
+	mmap_min_addr = umax(dac_mmap_min_addr, CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR);
+#else
+	mmap_min_addr = dac_mmap_min_addr;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * sysctl handler which just sets dac_mmap_min_addr = the new value and then
+ * calls update_mmap_min_addr() so non MAP_FIXED hints get rounded properly
+ */
+int mmap_min_addr_handler(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+			  void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	ret = proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+
+	update_mmap_min_addr();
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct ctl_table min_addr_sysctl_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname	= "mmap_min_addr",
+		.data		= &dac_mmap_min_addr,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(unsigned long),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= mmap_min_addr_handler,
+	},
+};
+
+static int __init mmap_min_addr_init(void)
+{
+	register_sysctl_init("vm", min_addr_sysctl_table);
+	update_mmap_min_addr();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+pure_initcall(mmap_min_addr_init);
diff --git a/security/safesetid/Kconfig b/security/safesetid/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..18b5fb904
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/safesetid/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config SECURITY_SAFESETID
+        bool "Gate setid transitions to limit CAP_SET{U/G}ID capabilities"
+        depends on SECURITY
+        select SECURITYFS
+        default n
+        help
+          SafeSetID is an LSM module that gates the setid family of syscalls to
+          restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those
+          approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit
+          the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated
+          with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace
+          UID mappings.
+
+          If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/safesetid/Makefile b/security/safesetid/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b0660321
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/safesetid/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for the safesetid LSM.
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) := safesetid.o
+safesetid-y := lsm.o securityfs.o
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d5fb94905
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+#include "lsm.h"
+
+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+int safesetid_initialized __initdata;
+
+struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
+struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setgid_rules;
+
+
+/* Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under @policy. */
+enum sid_policy_type _setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset *policy,
+		kid_t src, kid_t dst)
+{
+	struct setid_rule *rule;
+	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
+
+	if (policy->type == UID) {
+		hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kuid_val(src.uid)) {
+			if (!uid_eq(rule->src_id.uid, src.uid))
+				continue;
+			if (uid_eq(rule->dst_id.uid, dst.uid))
+				return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
+			result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+		}
+	} else if (policy->type == GID) {
+		hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kgid_val(src.gid)) {
+			if (!gid_eq(rule->src_id.gid, src.gid))
+				continue;
+			if (gid_eq(rule->dst_id.gid, dst.gid)){
+				return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
+			}
+			result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Should not reach here, report the ID as contrainsted */
+		result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under the active
+ * policy.
+ */
+static enum sid_policy_type setid_policy_lookup(kid_t src, kid_t dst, enum setid_type new_type)
+{
+	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
+	struct setid_ruleset *pol;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (new_type == UID)
+		pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setuid_rules);
+	else if (new_type == GID)
+		pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setgid_rules);
+	else { /* Should not reach here */
+		result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return result;
+	}
+
+	if (pol) {
+		pol->type = new_type;
+		result = _setid_policy_lookup(pol, src, dst);
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return result;
+}
+
+static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
+				      struct user_namespace *ns,
+				      int cap,
+				      unsigned int opts)
+{
+	/* We're only interested in CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID. */
+	if (cap != CAP_SETUID && cap != CAP_SETGID)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If CAP_SET{U/G}ID is currently used for a setid or setgroups syscall, we
+	 * want to let it go through here; the real security check happens later, in
+	 * the task_fix_set{u/g}id or task_fix_setgroups hooks.
+	 */
+	if ((opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (cap) {
+	case CAP_SETUID:
+		/*
+		* If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETUID for
+		* other purposes.
+		*/
+		if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = cred->uid}, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+			return 0;
+		/*
+		 * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
+		 * set*uid() (e.g. setting up userns uid mappings).
+		 */
+		pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
+			__kuid_val(cred->uid));
+		return -EPERM;
+	case CAP_SETGID:
+		/*
+		* If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETGID for
+		* other purposes.
+		*/
+		if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = cred->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+			return 0;
+		/*
+		 * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
+		 * set*gid() (e.g. setting up userns gid mappings).
+		 */
+		pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETGID, which is not available to GID %u for operations besides approved set*gid transitions\n",
+			__kgid_val(cred->gid));
+		return -EPERM;
+	default:
+		/* Error, the only capabilities were checking for is CAP_SETUID/GID */
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to
+ * credentials that contain @new_id.
+ */
+static bool id_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kid_t new_id, enum setid_type new_type)
+{
+	bool permitted;
+
+	/* If our old creds already had this ID in it, it's fine. */
+	if (new_type == UID) {
+		if (uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->euid) ||
+			uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->suid))
+			return true;
+	} else if (new_type == GID){
+		if (gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->gid) || gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->egid) ||
+			gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->sgid))
+			return true;
+	} else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
+	 * RUID.
+	 */
+	permitted =
+	    setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = old->uid}, new_id, new_type) != SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+
+	if (!permitted) {
+		if (new_type == UID) {
+			pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
+				__kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
+				__kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_id.uid));
+		} else if (new_type == GID) {
+			pr_warn("GID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
+				__kgid_val(old->gid), __kgid_val(old->egid),
+				__kgid_val(old->sgid), __kgid_val(new_id.gid));
+		} else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
+			return false;
+	}
+	return permitted;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether there is either an exception for user under old cred struct to
+ * set*uid to user under new cred struct, or the UID transition is allowed (by
+ * Linux set*uid rules) even without CAP_SETUID.
+ */
+static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
+				     const struct cred *old,
+				     int flags)
+{
+
+	/* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
+	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = old->uid}, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->uid}, UID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->euid}, UID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->suid}, UID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->fsuid}, UID))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
+	 * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
+	 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
+	 */
+	force_sig(SIGKILL);
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
+				     const struct cred *old,
+				     int flags)
+{
+
+	/* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
+	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = old->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->gid}, GID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->egid}, GID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->sgid}, GID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->fsgid}, GID))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
+	 * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
+	 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
+	 */
+	force_sig(SIGKILL);
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int safesetid_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	/* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
+	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = old->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+		return 0;
+
+	get_group_info(new->group_info);
+	for (i = 0; i < new->group_info->ngroups; i++) {
+		if (!id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->group_info->gid[i]}, GID)) {
+			put_group_info(new->group_info);
+			/*
+			 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
+			 * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
+			 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
+			 */
+			force_sig(SIGKILL);
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+	}
+
+	put_group_info(new->group_info);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid = {
+	.name = "safesetid",
+	.id = LSM_ID_SAFESETID,
+};
+
+static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgroups, safesetid_task_fix_setgroups),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
+};
+
+static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
+			   ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
+			   &safesetid_lsmid);
+
+	/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
+	safesetid_initialized = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(safesetid_security_init) = {
+	.id = &safesetid_lsmid,
+	.init = safesetid_security_init,
+	.initcall_fs = safesetid_init_securityfs,
+};
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.h b/security/safesetid/lsm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bf5172e2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef _SAFESETID_H
+#define _SAFESETID_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/uidgid.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+
+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+extern int safesetid_initialized __initdata;
+
+enum sid_policy_type {
+	SIDPOL_DEFAULT, /* source ID is unaffected by policy */
+	SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED, /* source ID is affected by policy */
+	SIDPOL_ALLOWED /* target ID explicitly allowed */
+};
+
+typedef union {
+	kuid_t uid;
+	kgid_t gid;
+} kid_t;
+
+enum setid_type {
+	UID,
+	GID
+};
+
+/*
+ * Hash table entry to store safesetid policy signifying that 'src_id'
+ * can set*id to 'dst_id'.
+ */
+struct setid_rule {
+	struct hlist_node next;
+	kid_t src_id;
+	kid_t dst_id;
+
+	/* Flag to signal if rule is for UID's or GID's */
+	enum setid_type type;
+};
+
+#define SETID_HASH_BITS 8 /* 256 buckets in hash table */
+
+/* Extension of INVALID_UID/INVALID_GID for kid_t type */
+#define INVALID_ID (kid_t){.uid = INVALID_UID}
+
+struct setid_ruleset {
+	DECLARE_HASHTABLE(rules, SETID_HASH_BITS);
+	char *policy_str;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+
+	//Flag to signal if ruleset is for UID's or GID's
+	enum setid_type type;
+};
+
+enum sid_policy_type _setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset *policy,
+		kid_t src, kid_t dst);
+
+extern struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
+extern struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setgid_rules;
+
+int safesetid_init_securityfs(void);
+
+#endif /* _SAFESETID_H */
diff --git a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a71e54806
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+
+#include "lsm.h"
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(uid_policy_update_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(gid_policy_update_lock);
+
+/*
+ * In the case the input buffer contains one or more invalid IDs, the kid_t
+ * variables pointed to by @parent and @child will get updated but this
+ * function will return an error.
+ * Contents of @buf may be modified.
+ */
+static int parse_policy_line(struct file *file, char *buf,
+	struct setid_rule *rule)
+{
+	char *child_str;
+	int ret;
+	u32 parsed_parent, parsed_child;
+
+	/* Format of |buf| string should be <UID>:<UID> or <GID>:<GID> */
+	child_str = strchr(buf, ':');
+	if (child_str == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*child_str = '\0';
+	child_str++;
+
+	ret = kstrtou32(buf, 0, &parsed_parent);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = kstrtou32(child_str, 0, &parsed_child);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (rule->type == UID){
+		rule->src_id.uid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent);
+		rule->dst_id.uid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child);
+		if (!uid_valid(rule->src_id.uid) || !uid_valid(rule->dst_id.uid))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (rule->type == GID){
+		rule->src_id.gid = make_kgid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent);
+		rule->dst_id.gid = make_kgid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child);
+		if (!gid_valid(rule->src_id.gid) || !gid_valid(rule->dst_id.gid))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		/* Error, rule->type is an invalid type */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __release_ruleset(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+	struct setid_ruleset *pol =
+		container_of(rcu, struct setid_ruleset, rcu);
+	int bucket;
+	struct setid_rule *rule;
+	struct hlist_node *tmp;
+
+	hash_for_each_safe(pol->rules, bucket, tmp, rule, next)
+		kfree(rule);
+	kfree(pol->policy_str);
+	kfree(pol);
+}
+
+static void release_ruleset(struct setid_ruleset *pol){
+	call_rcu(&pol->rcu, __release_ruleset);
+}
+
+static void insert_rule(struct setid_ruleset *pol, struct setid_rule *rule)
+{
+	if (pol->type == UID)
+		hash_add(pol->rules, &rule->next, __kuid_val(rule->src_id.uid));
+	else if (pol->type == GID)
+		hash_add(pol->rules, &rule->next, __kgid_val(rule->src_id.gid));
+	else /* Error, pol->type is neither UID or GID */
+		return;
+}
+
+static int verify_ruleset(struct setid_ruleset *pol)
+{
+	int bucket;
+	struct setid_rule *rule, *nrule;
+	int res = 0;
+
+	hash_for_each(pol->rules, bucket, rule, next) {
+		if (_setid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->dst_id, INVALID_ID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT) {
+			if (pol->type == UID) {
+				pr_warn("insecure policy detected: uid %d is constrained but transitively unconstrained through uid %d\n",
+					__kuid_val(rule->src_id.uid),
+					__kuid_val(rule->dst_id.uid));
+			} else if (pol->type == GID) {
+				pr_warn("insecure policy detected: gid %d is constrained but transitively unconstrained through gid %d\n",
+					__kgid_val(rule->src_id.gid),
+					__kgid_val(rule->dst_id.gid));
+			} else { /* pol->type is an invalid type */
+				res = -EINVAL;
+				return res;
+			}
+			res = -EINVAL;
+
+			/* fix it up */
+			nrule = kmalloc_obj(struct setid_rule);
+			if (!nrule)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			if (pol->type == UID){
+				nrule->src_id.uid = rule->dst_id.uid;
+				nrule->dst_id.uid = rule->dst_id.uid;
+				nrule->type = UID;
+			} else { /* pol->type must be GID if we've made it to here */
+				nrule->src_id.gid = rule->dst_id.gid;
+				nrule->dst_id.gid = rule->dst_id.gid;
+				nrule->type = GID;
+			}
+			insert_rule(pol, nrule);
+		}
+	}
+	return res;
+}
+
+static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file,
+				    const char __user *ubuf, size_t len, enum setid_type policy_type)
+{
+	struct setid_ruleset *pol;
+	char *buf, *p, *end;
+	int err;
+
+	if (len >= KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	pol = kmalloc_obj(struct setid_ruleset);
+	if (!pol)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	pol->policy_str = NULL;
+	pol->type = policy_type;
+	hash_init(pol->rules);
+
+	p = buf = memdup_user_nul(ubuf, len);
+	if (IS_ERR(buf)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(buf);
+		goto out_free_pol;
+	}
+	pol->policy_str = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (pol->policy_str == NULL) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free_buf;
+	}
+
+	/* policy lines, including the last one, end with \n */
+	while (*p != '\0') {
+		struct setid_rule *rule;
+
+		end = strchr(p, '\n');
+		if (end == NULL) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out_free_buf;
+		}
+		*end = '\0';
+
+		rule = kmalloc_obj(struct setid_rule);
+		if (!rule) {
+			err = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out_free_buf;
+		}
+
+		rule->type = policy_type;
+		err = parse_policy_line(file, p, rule);
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_rule;
+
+		if (_setid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->src_id, rule->dst_id) == SIDPOL_ALLOWED) {
+			pr_warn("bad policy: duplicate entry\n");
+			err = -EEXIST;
+			goto out_free_rule;
+		}
+
+		insert_rule(pol, rule);
+		p = end + 1;
+		continue;
+
+out_free_rule:
+		kfree(rule);
+		goto out_free_buf;
+	}
+
+	err = verify_ruleset(pol);
+	/* bogus policy falls through after fixing it up */
+	if (err && err != -EINVAL)
+		goto out_free_buf;
+
+	/*
+	 * Everything looks good, apply the policy and release the old one.
+	 * What we really want here is an xchg() wrapper for RCU, but since that
+	 * doesn't currently exist, just use a spinlock for now.
+	 */
+	if (policy_type == UID) {
+		mutex_lock(&uid_policy_update_lock);
+		pol = rcu_replace_pointer(safesetid_setuid_rules, pol,
+					  lockdep_is_held(&uid_policy_update_lock));
+		mutex_unlock(&uid_policy_update_lock);
+	} else if (policy_type == GID) {
+		mutex_lock(&gid_policy_update_lock);
+		pol = rcu_replace_pointer(safesetid_setgid_rules, pol,
+					  lockdep_is_held(&gid_policy_update_lock));
+		mutex_unlock(&gid_policy_update_lock);
+	} else {
+		/* Error, policy type is neither UID or GID */
+		pr_warn("error: bad policy type");
+	}
+	err = len;
+
+out_free_buf:
+	kfree(buf);
+out_free_pol:
+	if (pol)
+		release_ruleset(pol);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_uid_file_write(struct file *file,
+				    const char __user *buf,
+				    size_t len,
+				    loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	if (!file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return handle_policy_update(file, buf, len, UID);
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_gid_file_write(struct file *file,
+				    const char __user *buf,
+				    size_t len,
+				    loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	if (!file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return handle_policy_update(file, buf, len, GID);
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				   size_t len, loff_t *ppos, struct mutex *policy_update_lock, struct __rcu setid_ruleset* ruleset)
+{
+	ssize_t res = 0;
+	struct setid_ruleset *pol;
+	const char *kbuf;
+
+	mutex_lock(policy_update_lock);
+	pol = rcu_dereference_protected(ruleset, lockdep_is_held(policy_update_lock));
+	if (pol) {
+		kbuf = pol->policy_str;
+		res = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, ppos,
+					      kbuf, strlen(kbuf));
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(policy_update_lock);
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_uid_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				   size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return safesetid_file_read(file, buf, len, ppos,
+				   &uid_policy_update_lock, safesetid_setuid_rules);
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_gid_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				   size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return safesetid_file_read(file, buf, len, ppos,
+				   &gid_policy_update_lock, safesetid_setgid_rules);
+}
+
+
+
+static const struct file_operations safesetid_uid_file_fops = {
+	.read = safesetid_uid_file_read,
+	.write = safesetid_uid_file_write,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations safesetid_gid_file_fops = {
+	.read = safesetid_gid_file_read,
+	.write = safesetid_gid_file_write,
+};
+
+int __init safesetid_init_securityfs(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct dentry *policy_dir;
+	struct dentry *uid_policy_file;
+	struct dentry *gid_policy_file;
+
+	if (!safesetid_initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	policy_dir = securityfs_create_dir("safesetid", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(policy_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(policy_dir);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	uid_policy_file = securityfs_create_file("uid_allowlist_policy", 0600,
+			policy_dir, NULL, &safesetid_uid_file_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(uid_policy_file)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(uid_policy_file);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	gid_policy_file = securityfs_create_file("gid_allowlist_policy", 0600,
+			policy_dir, NULL, &safesetid_gid_file_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(gid_policy_file)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(gid_policy_file);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+
+	return 0;
+
+error:
+	securityfs_remove(policy_dir);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..71aea8fdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5718 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Security plug functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 Microsoft Corporation <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+#include "lsm.h"
+
+/*
+ * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
+ * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows
+ * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing
+ * purposes.
+ */
+const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = {
+	[LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
+	[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
+	[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
+	[LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
+	[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
+	[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
+	[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
+	[LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
+	[LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
+	[LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
+	[LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents",
+	[LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
+	[LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
+	[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
+	[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
+	[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
+	[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
+	[LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
+	[LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
+	[LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection",
+	[LOCKDOWN_XEN_USER_ACTIONS] = "Xen guest user action",
+	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
+	[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
+	[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
+	[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
+	[LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM",
+	[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
+	[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
+	[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
+	[LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret",
+	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
+};
+
+bool lsm_debug __ro_after_init;
+
+unsigned int lsm_active_cnt __ro_after_init;
+const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[MAX_LSM_COUNT];
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes;
+
+struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
+struct kmem_cache *lsm_backing_file_cache;
+struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
+
+#define SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(HOOK, IDX) security_hook_active_##HOOK##_##IDX
+
+/*
+ * Identifier for the LSM static calls.
+ * HOOK is an LSM hook as defined in linux/lsm_hookdefs.h
+ * IDX is the index of the static call. 0 <= NUM < MAX_LSM_COUNT
+ */
+#define LSM_STATIC_CALL(HOOK, IDX) lsm_static_call_##HOOK##_##IDX
+
+/*
+ * Call the macro M for each LSM hook MAX_LSM_COUNT times.
+ */
+#define LSM_LOOP_UNROLL(M, ...) 		\
+do {						\
+	UNROLL(MAX_LSM_COUNT, M, __VA_ARGS__)	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(M, ...) UNROLL(MAX_LSM_COUNT, M, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL
+#define LSM_HOOK_TRAMP(NAME, NUM) \
+	&STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(LSM_STATIC_CALL(NAME, NUM))
+#else
+#define LSM_HOOK_TRAMP(NAME, NUM) NULL
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define static calls and static keys for each LSM hook.
+ */
+#define DEFINE_LSM_STATIC_CALL(NUM, NAME, RET, ...)			\
+	DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(LSM_STATIC_CALL(NAME, NUM),		\
+				*((RET(*)(__VA_ARGS__))NULL));		\
+	static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(NAME, NUM));
+
+#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...)				\
+	LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(DEFINE_LSM_STATIC_CALL, NAME, RET, __VA_ARGS__)
+#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
+#undef LSM_HOOK
+#undef DEFINE_LSM_STATIC_CALL
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a table of static calls for each LSM hook.
+ * DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL invocation above generates a key (STATIC_CALL_KEY)
+ * and a trampoline (STATIC_CALL_TRAMP) which are used to call
+ * __static_call_update when updating the static call.
+ *
+ * The static calls table is used by early LSMs, some architectures can fault on
+ * unaligned accesses and the fault handling code may not be ready by then.
+ * Thus, the static calls table should be aligned to avoid any unhandled faults
+ * in early init.
+ */
+struct lsm_static_calls_table
+	static_calls_table __ro_after_init __aligned(sizeof(u64)) = {
+#define INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL(NUM, NAME)					\
+	(struct lsm_static_call) {					\
+		.key = &STATIC_CALL_KEY(LSM_STATIC_CALL(NAME, NUM)),	\
+		.trampoline = LSM_HOOK_TRAMP(NAME, NUM),		\
+		.active = &SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(NAME, NUM),		\
+	},
+#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...)				\
+	.NAME = {							\
+		LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL, NAME)		\
+	},
+#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
+#undef LSM_HOOK
+#undef INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL
+	};
+
+/**
+ * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob
+ * @file: the file that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the file blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
+{
+	if (!lsm_file_cache) {
+		file->f_security = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (file->f_security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_backing_file_alloc - allocate a composite backing file blob
+ * @backing_file: the backing file
+ *
+ * Allocate the backing file blob for all the modules.
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file)
+{
+	void *blob;
+
+	if (!lsm_backing_file_cache) {
+		backing_file_set_security(backing_file, NULL);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	blob = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_backing_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+	backing_file_set_security(backing_file, blob);
+	if (!blob)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_blob_alloc - allocate a composite blob
+ * @dest: the destination for the blob
+ * @size: the size of the blob
+ * @gfp: allocation type
+ *
+ * Allocate a blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_blob_alloc(void **dest, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	if (size == 0) {
+		*dest = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	*dest = kzalloc(size, gfp);
+	if (*dest == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob
+ * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
+ * @gfp: allocation type
+ *
+ * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return lsm_blob_alloc(&cred->security, blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
+ * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
+ * @gfp: allocation flags
+ *
+ * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
+		inode->i_security = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, gfp);
+	if (inode->i_security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob
+ * @task: the task that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the task blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return lsm_blob_alloc(&task->security, blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob
+ * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
+{
+	return lsm_blob_alloc(&kip->security, blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+/**
+ * lsm_key_alloc - allocate a composite key blob
+ * @key: the key that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the key blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_key_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+	return lsm_blob_alloc(&key->security, blob_sizes.lbs_key, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+/**
+ * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
+ * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
+{
+	return lsm_blob_alloc(&mp->security, blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg,
+			      GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_bdev_alloc - allocate a composite block_device blob
+ * @bdev: the block_device that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the block_device blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev)
+{
+	return lsm_blob_alloc(&bdev->bd_security, blob_sizes.lbs_bdev,
+			      GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+/**
+ * lsm_bpf_map_alloc - allocate a composite bpf_map blob
+ * @map: the bpf_map that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the bpf_map blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+	return lsm_blob_alloc(&map->security, blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_bpf_prog_alloc - allocate a composite bpf_prog blob
+ * @prog: the bpf_prog that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the bpf_prog blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	return lsm_blob_alloc(&prog->aux->security, blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_bpf_token_alloc - allocate a composite bpf_token blob
+ * @token: the bpf_token that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the bpf_token blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_bpf_token_alloc(struct bpf_token *token)
+{
+	return lsm_blob_alloc(&token->security, blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
+
+/**
+ * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	return lsm_blob_alloc(&sb->s_security, blob_sizes.lbs_superblock,
+			      GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_fill_user_ctx - Fill a user space lsm_ctx structure
+ * @uctx: a userspace LSM context to be filled
+ * @uctx_len: available uctx size (input), used uctx size (output)
+ * @val: the new LSM context value
+ * @val_len: the size of the new LSM context value
+ * @id: LSM id
+ * @flags: LSM defined flags
+ *
+ * Fill all of the fields in a userspace lsm_ctx structure.  If @uctx is NULL
+ * simply calculate the required size to output via @utc_len and return
+ * success.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -E2BIG if userspace buffer is not large enough,
+ * -EFAULT on a copyout error, -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, u32 *uctx_len,
+		      void *val, size_t val_len,
+		      u64 id, u64 flags)
+{
+	struct lsm_ctx *nctx = NULL;
+	size_t nctx_len;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	nctx_len = ALIGN(struct_size(nctx, ctx, val_len), sizeof(void *));
+	if (nctx_len > *uctx_len) {
+		rc = -E2BIG;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* no buffer - return success/0 and set @uctx_len to the req size */
+	if (!uctx)
+		goto out;
+
+	nctx = kzalloc(nctx_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (nctx == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	nctx->id = id;
+	nctx->flags = flags;
+	nctx->len = nctx_len;
+	nctx->ctx_len = val_len;
+	memcpy(nctx->ctx, val, val_len);
+
+	if (copy_to_user(uctx, nctx, nctx_len))
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+	kfree(nctx);
+	*uctx_len = nctx_len;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
+ * can be accessed with:
+ *
+ *	LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>)
+ *
+ * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each
+ * LSM hook.
+ */
+#define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default)
+#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME)
+#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \
+	static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT);
+#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
+	DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME)
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
+#undef LSM_HOOK
+
+/*
+ * Hook list operation macros.
+ *
+ * call_void_hook:
+ *	This is a hook that does not return a value.
+ *
+ * call_int_hook:
+ *	This is a hook that returns a value.
+ */
+#define __CALL_STATIC_VOID(NUM, HOOK, ...)				     \
+do {									     \
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(HOOK, NUM))) {    \
+		static_call(LSM_STATIC_CALL(HOOK, NUM))(__VA_ARGS__);	     \
+	}								     \
+} while (0);
+
+#define call_void_hook(HOOK, ...)                                 \
+	do {                                                      \
+		LSM_LOOP_UNROLL(__CALL_STATIC_VOID, HOOK, __VA_ARGS__); \
+	} while (0)
+
+
+#define __CALL_STATIC_INT(NUM, R, HOOK, LABEL, ...)			     \
+do {									     \
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(HOOK, NUM))) {  \
+		R = static_call(LSM_STATIC_CALL(HOOK, NUM))(__VA_ARGS__);    \
+		if (R != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(HOOK))				     \
+			goto LABEL;					     \
+	}								     \
+} while (0);
+
+#define call_int_hook(HOOK, ...)					\
+({									\
+	__label__ OUT;							\
+	int RC = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(HOOK);					\
+									\
+	LSM_LOOP_UNROLL(__CALL_STATIC_INT, RC, HOOK, OUT, __VA_ARGS__);	\
+OUT:									\
+	RC;								\
+})
+
+#define lsm_for_each_hook(scall, NAME)					\
+	for (scall = static_calls_table.NAME;				\
+	     scall - static_calls_table.NAME < MAX_LSM_COUNT; scall++)  \
+		if (static_key_enabled(&scall->active->key))
+
+/* Security operations */
+
+/**
+ * security_binder_set_context_mgr() - Check if becoming binder ctx mgr is ok
+ * @mgr: task credentials of current binder process
+ *
+ * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, mgr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_binder_transaction() - Check if a binder transaction is allowed
+ * @from: sending process
+ * @to: receiving process
+ *
+ * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call to @to.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
+				const struct cred *to)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, from, to);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_binder_transfer_binder() - Check if a binder transfer is allowed
+ * @from: sending process
+ * @to: receiving process
+ *
+ * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
+				    const struct cred *to)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, from, to);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_binder_transfer_file() - Check if a binder file xfer is allowed
+ * @from: sending process
+ * @to: receiving process
+ * @file: file being transferred
+ *
+ * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
+				  const struct cred *to, const struct file *file)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, from, to, file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ptrace_access_check() - Check if tracing is allowed
+ * @child: target process
+ * @mode: PTRACE_MODE flags
+ *
+ * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the @child
+ * process.  Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
+ * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of tracing check
+ * during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of binprm_security_ops if the
+ * process is being traced and its security attributes would be changed by the
+ * execve.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, child, mode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ptrace_traceme() - Check if tracing is allowed
+ * @parent: tracing process
+ *
+ * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
+ * current process before allowing the current process to present itself to the
+ * @parent process for tracing.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, parent);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process
+ * @target: target process
+ * @effective: effective capability set
+ * @inheritable: inheritable capability set
+ * @permitted: permitted capability set
+ *
+ * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the
+ * @target process.  The hook may also perform permission checking to determine
+ * if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets of the @target
+ * process.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained.
+ */
+int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target,
+		    kernel_cap_t *effective,
+		    kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+		    kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(capget, target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_capset() - Set the capability sets for a process
+ * @new: new credentials for the target process
+ * @old: current credentials of the target process
+ * @effective: effective capability set
+ * @inheritable: inheritable capability set
+ * @permitted: permitted capability set
+ *
+ * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the
+ * current process.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+		    const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+		    const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+		    const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(capset, new, old, effective, inheritable,
+			     permitted);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_capable() - Check if a process has the necessary capability
+ * @cred: credentials to examine
+ * @ns: user namespace
+ * @cap: capability requested
+ * @opts: capability check options
+ *
+ * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
+ * credentials.  @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
+ * @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h>.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if the capability is granted.
+ */
+int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
+		     struct user_namespace *ns,
+		     int cap,
+		     unsigned int opts)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(capable, cred, ns, cap, opts);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_quotactl() - Check if a quotactl() syscall is allowed for this fs
+ * @cmds: commands
+ * @type: type
+ * @id: id
+ * @sb: filesystem
+ *
+ * Check whether the quotactl syscall is allowed for this @sb.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(quotactl, cmds, type, id, sb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_quota_on() - Check if QUOTAON is allowed for a dentry
+ * @dentry: dentry
+ *
+ * Check whether QUOTAON is allowed for @dentry.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(quota_on, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_syslog() - Check if accessing the kernel message ring is allowed
+ * @type: SYSLOG_ACTION_* type
+ *
+ * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing
+ * logging to the console.  See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of
+ * the @type values.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_syslog(int type)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(syslog, type);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_settime64() - Check if changing the system time is allowed
+ * @ts: new time
+ * @tz: timezone
+ *
+ * Check permission to change the system time, struct timespec64 is defined in
+ * <include/linux/time64.h> and timezone is defined in <include/linux/time.h>.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(settime, ts, tz);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_vm_enough_memory_mm() - Check if allocating a new mem map is allowed
+ * @mm: mm struct
+ * @pages: number of pages
+ *
+ * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping.  If all LSMs return
+ * a positive value, __vm_enough_memory() will be called with cap_sys_admin
+ * set. If at least one LSM returns 0 or negative, __vm_enough_memory() will be
+ * called with cap_sys_admin cleared.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted by the LSM infrastructure to the
+ *         caller.
+ */
+int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
+{
+	struct lsm_static_call *scall;
+	int cap_sys_admin = 1;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * The module will respond with 0 if it thinks the __vm_enough_memory()
+	 * call should be made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules
+	 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module thinks it should
+	 * not be set it won't.
+	 */
+	lsm_for_each_hook(scall, vm_enough_memory) {
+		rc = scall->hl->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			cap_sys_admin = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec()
+ * @bprm: binary program information
+ *
+ * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security
+ * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of
+ * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new
+ * program.  This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for
+ * transitions between security domains).  The hook must set @bprm->secureexec
+ * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode.  @bprm
+ * contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ *
+ * If execveat(2) is called with the AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag, bprm->is_check is
+ * set.  The result must be the same as without this flag even if the execution
+ * will never really happen and @bprm will always be dropped.
+ *
+ * This hook must not change current->cred, only @bprm->cred.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, bprm);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file
+ * @bprm: binary program information
+ * @file: associated file
+ *
+ * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon
+ * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after
+ * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter.  This
+ * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the
+ * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely
+ * different file.  This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for
+ * transitions between security domains).  The hook must set @bprm->secureexec
+ * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode.  The
+ * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be
+ * cleared from current->personality.  @bprm contains the linux_binprm
+ * structure.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, bprm, file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search
+ * @bprm: binary program information
+ *
+ * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin.
+ * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in
+ * the preceding creds_for_exec call.  The argv list and envp list are reliably
+ * available in @bprm.  This hook may be called multiple times during a single
+ * execve.  @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, bprm);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec()
+ * @bprm: binary program information
+ *
+ * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being
+ * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to
+ * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the
+ * bprm_creds_for_exec hook.  @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure.  This
+ * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing
+ * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the
+ * attributes are changed.  This is called immediately before commit_creds().
+ */
+void security_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec()
+ * @bprm: binary program information
+ *
+ * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process
+ * being transformed by an execve operation.  The new credentials have, by this
+ * point, been set to @current->cred.  @bprm points to the linux_binprm
+ * structure.  This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the
+ * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state.  This is called
+ * immediately after commit_creds().
+ */
+void security_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_context_submount() - Initialise fc->security
+ * @fc: new filesystem context
+ * @reference: dentry reference for submount/remount
+ *
+ * Fill out the ->security field for a new fs_context.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success or negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int security_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *reference)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(fs_context_submount, fc, reference);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob
+ * @fc: destination filesystem context
+ * @src_fc: source filesystem context
+ *
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security.  This pointer is
+ * initialised to NULL by the caller.  @fc indicates the new filesystem context.
+ * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, fc, src_fc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context
+ * @fc: filesystem context
+ * @param: filesystem parameter
+ *
+ * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock.  The LSM can
+ * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere.
+ *
+ * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is
+ *         returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative
+ *         error code is returned.
+ */
+int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+				    struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+	struct lsm_static_call *scall;
+	int trc;
+	int rc = -ENOPARAM;
+
+	lsm_for_each_hook(scall, fs_context_parse_param) {
+		trc = scall->hl->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param);
+		if (trc == 0)
+			rc = 0;
+		else if (trc != -ENOPARAM)
+			return trc;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_alloc() - Allocate a super_block LSM blob
+ * @sb: filesystem superblock
+ *
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field.  The
+ * s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is allocated.
+ * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful.
+ */
+int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, sb);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_sb_free(sb);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects
+ * @sb: filesystem superblock
+ *
+ * Release objects tied to a superblock (e.g. inodes).  @sb contains the
+ * super_block structure being released.
+ */
+void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_free() - Free a super_block LSM blob
+ * @sb: filesystem superblock
+ *
+ * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field.  @sb contains the super_block
+ * structure to be modified.
+ */
+void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
+	kfree(sb->s_security);
+	sb->s_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_free_mnt_opts() - Free memory associated with mount options
+ * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options
+ *
+ * Free memory associated with @mnt_ops.
+ */
+void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
+{
+	if (!*mnt_opts)
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts);
+	*mnt_opts = NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts);
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() - Consume LSM mount options
+ * @options: mount options
+ * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options
+ *
+ * Eat (scan @options) and save them in @mnt_opts.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, options, mnt_opts);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts);
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_mnt_opts_compat() - Check if new mount options are allowed
+ * @sb: filesystem superblock
+ * @mnt_opts: new mount options
+ *
+ * Determine if the new mount options in @mnt_opts are allowed given the
+ * existing mounted filesystem at @sb.  @sb superblock being compared.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if options are compatible.
+ */
+int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb,
+				void *mnt_opts)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, sb, mnt_opts);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat);
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_remount() - Verify no incompatible mount changes during remount
+ * @sb: filesystem superblock
+ * @mnt_opts: (re)mount options
+ *
+ * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes are
+ * being made to those options.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb,
+			void *mnt_opts)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sb_remount, sb, mnt_opts);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount);
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_kern_mount() - Check if a kernel mount is allowed
+ * @sb: filesystem superblock
+ *
+ * Mount this @sb if allowed by permissions.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, sb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_show_options() - Output the mount options for a superblock
+ * @m: output file
+ * @sb: filesystem superblock
+ *
+ * Show (print on @m) mount options for this @sb.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, m, sb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_statfs() - Check if accessing fs stats is allowed
+ * @dentry: superblock handle
+ *
+ * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt
+ * mountpoint.  @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_mount() - Check permission for mounting a filesystem
+ * @dev_name: filesystem backing device
+ * @path: mount point
+ * @type: filesystem type
+ * @flags: mount flags
+ * @data: filesystem specific data
+ *
+ * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on the
+ * mount point named by @nd.  For an ordinary mount, @dev_name identifies a
+ * device if the file system type requires a device.  For a remount
+ * (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant.  For a loopback/bind mount
+ * (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the	pathname of the object being
+ * mounted.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+		      const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sb_mount, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_umount() - Check permission for unmounting a filesystem
+ * @mnt: mounted filesystem
+ * @flags: unmount flags
+ *
+ * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sb_umount, mnt, flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_pivotroot() - Check permissions for pivoting the rootfs
+ * @old_path: new location for current rootfs
+ * @new_path: location of the new rootfs
+ *
+ * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
+			  const struct path *new_path)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, old_path, new_path);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() - Set the mount options for a filesystem
+ * @sb: filesystem superblock
+ * @mnt_opts: binary mount options
+ * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in)
+ * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out)
+ *
+ * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
+			     void *mnt_opts,
+			     unsigned long kern_flags,
+			     unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+	struct lsm_static_call *scall;
+	int rc = mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : LSM_RET_DEFAULT(sb_set_mnt_opts);
+
+	lsm_for_each_hook(scall, sb_set_mnt_opts) {
+		rc = scall->hl->hook.sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, mnt_opts, kern_flags,
+					      set_kern_flags);
+		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(sb_set_mnt_opts))
+			break;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
+
+/**
+ * security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - Duplicate superblock mount options
+ * @oldsb: source superblock
+ * @newsb: destination superblock
+ * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in)
+ * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out)
+ *
+ * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+			       struct super_block *newsb,
+			       unsigned long kern_flags,
+			       unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, oldsb, newsb,
+			     kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
+
+/**
+ * security_move_mount() - Check permissions for moving a mount
+ * @from_path: source mount point
+ * @to_path: destination mount point
+ *
+ * Check permission before a mount is moved.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
+			const struct path *to_path)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(move_mount, from_path, to_path);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_path_notify() - Check if setting a watch is allowed
+ * @path: file path
+ * @mask: event mask
+ * @obj_type: file path type
+ *
+ * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, on
+ * an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
+			 unsigned int obj_type)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(path_notify, path, mask, obj_type);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_alloc() - Allocate an inode LSM blob
+ * @inode: the inode
+ * @gfp: allocation flags
+ *
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security.  The
+ * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is
+ * allocated.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ */
+int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode, gfp);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, inode);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_inode_free(inode);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	/* The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob */
+	call_void_hook(inode_free_security_rcu, head);
+	kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_free() - Free an inode's LSM blob
+ * @inode: the inode
+ *
+ * Release any LSM resources associated with @inode, although due to the
+ * inode's RCU protections it is possible that the resources will not be
+ * fully released until after the current RCU grace period has elapsed.
+ *
+ * It is important for LSMs to note that despite being present in a call to
+ * security_inode_free(), @inode may still be referenced in a VFS path walk
+ * and calls to security_inode_permission() may be made during, or after,
+ * a call to security_inode_free().  For this reason the inode->i_security
+ * field is released via a call_rcu() callback and any LSMs which need to
+ * retain inode state for use in security_inode_permission() should only
+ * release that state in the inode_free_security_rcu() LSM hook callback.
+ */
+void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
+	if (!inode->i_security)
+		return;
+	call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, inode_free_by_rcu);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_dentry_init_security() - Perform dentry initialization
+ * @dentry: the dentry to initialize
+ * @mode: mode used to determine resource type
+ * @name: name of the last path component
+ * @xattr_name: name of the security/LSM xattr
+ * @lsmctx: pointer to the resulting LSM context
+ *
+ * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available since NFSv4
+ * has no label backed by an EA anyway.  It is important to note that
+ * @xattr_name does not need to be free'd by the caller, it is a static string.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+				  const struct qstr *name,
+				  const char **xattr_name,
+				  struct lsm_context *lsmctx)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, dentry, mode, name,
+			     xattr_name, lsmctx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
+
+/**
+ * security_dentry_create_files_as() - Perform dentry initialization
+ * @dentry: the dentry to initialize
+ * @mode: mode used to determine resource type
+ * @name: name of the last path component
+ * @old: creds to use for LSM context calculations
+ * @new: creds to modify
+ *
+ * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available and set
+ * that context in passed in creds so that new files are created using that
+ * context. Context is calculated using the passed in creds and not the creds
+ * of the caller.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+				    const struct qstr *name,
+				    const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, dentry, mode,
+			     name, old, new);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context
+ * @inode: the inode
+ * @dir: parent directory
+ * @qstr: last component of the pathname
+ * @initxattrs: callback function to write xattrs
+ * @fs_data: filesystem specific data
+ *
+ * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly
+ * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode.  This
+ * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and
+ * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/...
+ * hooks called by the VFS.
+ *
+ * The hook function is expected to populate the xattrs array, by calling
+ * lsm_get_xattr_slot() to retrieve the slots reserved by the security module
+ * with the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure.  For each
+ * slot, the hook function should set ->name to the attribute name suffix
+ * (e.g. selinux), to allocate ->value (will be freed by the caller) and set it
+ * to the attribute value, to set ->value_len to the length of the value.  If
+ * the security module does not use security attributes or does not wish to put
+ * a security attribute on this particular inode, then it should return
+ * -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if the LSM successfully initialized all of the inode
+ *         security attributes that are required, negative values otherwise.
+ */
+int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				 const struct qstr *qstr,
+				 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
+{
+	struct lsm_static_call *scall;
+	struct xattr *new_xattrs = NULL;
+	int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP, xattr_count = 0;
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (initxattrs) {
+		/* Allocate +1 as terminator. */
+		new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 1,
+				     sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!new_xattrs)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	lsm_for_each_hook(scall, inode_init_security) {
+		ret = scall->hl->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs,
+						  &xattr_count);
+		if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+			goto out;
+		/*
+		 * As documented in lsm_hooks.h, -EOPNOTSUPP in this context
+		 * means that the LSM is not willing to provide an xattr, not
+		 * that it wants to signal an error. Thus, continue to invoke
+		 * the remaining LSMs.
+		 */
+	}
+
+	/* If initxattrs() is NULL, xattr_count is zero, skip the call. */
+	if (!xattr_count)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
+out:
+	for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--)
+		kfree(new_xattrs[xattr_count - 1].value);
+	kfree(new_xattrs);
+	return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_init_security_anon() - Initialize an anonymous inode
+ * @inode: the inode
+ * @name: the anonymous inode class
+ * @context_inode: an optional related inode
+ *
+ * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode and return
+ * whether the inode creation is permitted by the security module or not.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if the security module denies the
+ * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors.
+ */
+int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
+				      const struct qstr *name,
+				      const struct inode *context_inode)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, inode, name,
+			     context_inode);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+/**
+ * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed
+ * @dir: parent directory
+ * @dentry: new file
+ * @mode: new file mode
+ * @dev: device number
+ *
+ * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called even
+ * if mknod operation is being done for a regular file.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(path_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
+
+/**
+ * security_path_post_mknod() - Update inode security after reg file creation
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: new file
+ *
+ * Update inode security field after a regular file has been created.
+ */
+void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(path_post_mknod, idmap, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed
+ * @dir: parent directory
+ * @dentry: new directory
+ * @mode: new directory mode
+ *
+ * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			umode_t mode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
+
+/**
+ * security_path_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed
+ * @dir: parent directory
+ * @dentry: directory to remove
+ *
+ * Check the permission to remove a directory.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, dir, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_path_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed
+ * @dir: parent directory
+ * @dentry: file
+ *
+ * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(path_unlink, dir, dentry);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
+
+/**
+ * security_path_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed
+ * @dir: parent directory
+ * @dentry: symbolic link
+ * @old_name: file pathname
+ *
+ * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			  const char *old_name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(path_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_path_link - Check if creating a hard link is allowed
+ * @old_dentry: existing file
+ * @new_dir: new parent directory
+ * @new_dentry: new link
+ *
+ * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
+		       struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(path_link, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_path_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed
+ * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file
+ * @old_dentry: the old file
+ * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file
+ * @new_dentry: the new file
+ * @flags: flags
+ *
+ * Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+			 unsigned int flags)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
+		     (d_is_positive(new_dentry) &&
+		      IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
+		return 0;
+
+	return call_int_hook(path_rename, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
+			     new_dentry, flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
+
+/**
+ * security_path_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed
+ * @path: file
+ *
+ * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path.  Note that
+ * truncation permissions may also be checked based on already opened files,
+ * using the security_file_truncate() hook.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(path_truncate, path);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_path_chmod() - Check if changing the file's mode is allowed
+ * @path: file
+ * @mode: new mode
+ *
+ * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new mode is
+ * specified in @mode which is a bitmask of constants from
+ * <include/uapi/linux/stat.h>.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(path_chmod, path, mode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_path_chown() - Check if changing the file's owner/group is allowed
+ * @path: file
+ * @uid: file owner
+ * @gid: file group
+ *
+ * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(path_chown, path, uid, gid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_path_chroot() - Check if changing the root directory is allowed
+ * @path: directory
+ *
+ * Check for permission to change root directory.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(path_chroot, path);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed
+ * @dir: the parent directory
+ * @dentry: the file being created
+ * @mode: requested file mode
+ *
+ * Check permission to create a regular file.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			  umode_t mode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_create, dir, dentry, mode);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() - Update inode security of new tmpfile
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @inode: inode of the new tmpfile
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after a tmpfile has been created.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+					struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_create_tmpfile, idmap, inode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed
+ * @old_dentry: existing file
+ * @dir: new parent directory
+ * @new_dentry: new link
+ *
+ * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
+			struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_link, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed
+ * @dir: parent directory
+ * @dentry: file
+ *
+ * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, dir, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed
+ * @dir: parent directory
+ * @dentry: symbolic link
+ * @old_name: existing filename
+ *
+ * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			   const char *old_name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed
+ * @dir: parent directory
+ * @dentry: new directory
+ * @mode: new directory mode
+ *
+ * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
+ * associated with inode structure @dir.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed
+ * @dir: parent directory
+ * @dentry: directory to be removed
+ *
+ * Check the permission to remove a directory.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, dir, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed
+ * @dir: parent directory
+ * @dentry: new file
+ * @mode: new file mode
+ * @dev: device number
+ *
+ * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo file
+ * created via the mknod system call).  Note that if mknod operation is being
+ * done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called and not this
+ * hook.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			 umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed
+ * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file
+ * @old_dentry: the old file
+ * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file
+ * @new_dentry: the new file
+ * @flags: flags
+ *
+ * Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			  struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+			  unsigned int flags)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
+		     (d_is_positive(new_dentry) &&
+		      IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
+		int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, new_dir, new_dentry,
+					old_dir, old_dentry);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	return call_int_hook(inode_rename, old_dir, old_dentry,
+			     new_dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_readlink() - Check if reading a symbolic link is allowed
+ * @dentry: link
+ *
+ * Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_follow_link() - Check if following a symbolic link is allowed
+ * @dentry: link dentry
+ * @inode: link inode
+ * @rcu: true if in RCU-walk mode
+ *
+ * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname.  If
+ * @rcu is true, @inode is not stable.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+			       bool rcu)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, dentry, inode, rcu);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_permission() - Check if accessing an inode is allowed
+ * @inode: inode
+ * @mask: access mask
+ *
+ * Check permission before accessing an inode.  This hook is called by the
+ * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to
+ * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks.  Notice
+ * that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many other
+ * operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is called when
+ * the actual read/write operations are performed.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_permission, inode, mask);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @attr: new attributes
+ *
+ * Check permission before setting file attributes.  Note that the kernel call
+ * to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever file
+ * attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod operations,
+ * transferring disk quotas, etc).
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, idmap, dentry, attr);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_setattr() - Update the inode after a setattr operation
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @ia_valid: file attributes set
+ *
+ * Update inode security field after successful setting file attributes.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 int ia_valid)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_setattr, idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed
+ * @path: file
+ *
+ * Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, path);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_setxattr() - Check if setting file xattrs is allowed
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @name: xattr name
+ * @value: xattr value
+ * @size: size of xattr value
+ * @flags: flags
+ *
+ * This hook performs the desired permission checks before setting the extended
+ * attributes (xattrs) on @dentry.  It is important to note that we have some
+ * additional logic before the main LSM implementation calls to detect if we
+ * need to perform an additional capability check at the LSM layer.
+ *
+ * Normally we enforce a capability check prior to executing the various LSM
+ * hook implementations, but if a LSM wants to avoid this capability check,
+ * it can register a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook and return a value of 1 for
+ * xattrs that it wants to avoid the capability check, leaving the LSM fully
+ * responsible for enforcing the access control for the specific xattr.  If all
+ * of the enabled LSMs refrain from registering a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook,
+ * or return a 0 (the default return value), the capability check is still
+ * performed.  If no 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hooks are registered the capability
+ * check is performed.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			    struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+			    const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* enforce the capability checks at the lsm layer, if needed */
+	if (!call_int_hook(inode_xattr_skipcap, name)) {
+		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, idmap, dentry, name, value, size,
+			     flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ * @kacl: acl struct
+ *
+ * Check permission before setting posix acls, the posix acls in @kacl are
+ * identified by @acl_name.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+			   struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ * @kacl: acl struct
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry.
+ * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+				 struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ *
+ * Check permission before getting osix acls, the posix acls are identified by
+ * @acl_name.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ *
+ * Check permission before removing posix acls, the posix acls are identified
+ * by @acl_name.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			      struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_remove_acl() - Update inode security after rm posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after successfully removing posix acls on
+ * @dentry in @idmap. The posix acls are identified by @acl_name.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @name: xattr name
+ * @value: xattr value
+ * @size: xattr value size
+ * @flags: flags
+ *
+ * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				  const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_getxattr() - Check if xattr access is allowed
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @name: xattr name
+ *
+ * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes identified by
+ * @name for @dentry.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, dentry, name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_listxattr() - Check if listing xattrs is allowed
+ * @dentry: file
+ *
+ * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute names for
+ * @dentry.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_removexattr() - Check if removing an xattr is allowed
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @name: xattr name
+ *
+ * This hook performs the desired permission checks before setting the extended
+ * attributes (xattrs) on @dentry.  It is important to note that we have some
+ * additional logic before the main LSM implementation calls to detect if we
+ * need to perform an additional capability check at the LSM layer.
+ *
+ * Normally we enforce a capability check prior to executing the various LSM
+ * hook implementations, but if a LSM wants to avoid this capability check,
+ * it can register a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook and return a value of 1 for
+ * xattrs that it wants to avoid the capability check, leaving the LSM fully
+ * responsible for enforcing the access control for the specific xattr.  If all
+ * of the enabled LSMs refrain from registering a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook,
+ * or return a 0 (the default return value), the capability check is still
+ * performed.  If no 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hooks are registered the capability
+ * check is performed.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			       struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* enforce the capability checks at the lsm layer, if needed */
+	if (!call_int_hook(inode_xattr_skipcap, name)) {
+		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, idmap, dentry, name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_removexattr() - Update the inode after a removexattr op
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @name: xattr name
+ *
+ * Update the inode after a successful removexattr operation.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_file_setattr() - check if setting fsxattr is allowed
+ * @dentry: file to set filesystem extended attributes on
+ * @fa: extended attributes to set on the inode
+ *
+ * Called when file_setattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR ioctl() is called on
+ * inode
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(inode_file_setattr, dentry, fa);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_file_getattr() - check if retrieving fsxattr is allowed
+ * @dentry: file to retrieve filesystem extended attributes from
+ * @fa: extended attributes to get
+ *
+ * Called when file_getattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR ioctl() is called on
+ * inode
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(inode_file_getattr, dentry, fa);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required
+ * @dentry: associated dentry
+ *
+ * Called when an inode has been changed to determine if
+ * security_inode_killpriv() should be called.
+ *
+ * Return: Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation, return 0 if
+ *         security_inode_killpriv() does not need to be called, return >0 if
+ *         security_inode_killpriv() does need to be called.
+ */
+int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_killpriv() - The setuid bit is removed, update LSM state
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: associated dentry
+ *
+ * The @dentry's setuid bit is being removed.  Remove similar security labels.
+ * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 on success.  If error is returned, then the operation
+ *         causing setuid bit removal is failed.
+ */
+int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			    struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, idmap, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_getsecurity() - Get the xattr security label of an inode
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @inode: inode
+ * @name: xattr name
+ * @buffer: security label buffer
+ * @alloc: allocation flag
+ *
+ * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the security
+ * label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer.  Note that @name is the
+ * remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix has been removed.
+ * @alloc is used to specify if the call should return a value via the buffer
+ * or just the value length.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns size of buffer on success.
+ */
+int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			       struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+			       void **buffer, bool alloc)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
+
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getsecurity, idmap, inode, name, buffer,
+			     alloc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_setsecurity() - Set the xattr security label of an inode
+ * @inode: inode
+ * @name: xattr name
+ * @value: security label
+ * @size: length of security label
+ * @flags: flags
+ *
+ * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the extended
+ * attribute value @value.  @size indicates the size of the @value in bytes.
+ * @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. Note that @name is the
+ * remainder of the attribute name after the security. prefix has been removed.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+			       const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
+
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setsecurity, inode, name, value, size,
+			     flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_listsecurity() - List the xattr security label names
+ * @inode: inode
+ * @buffer: pointer to buffer
+ * @remaining_size: pointer to remaining size of buffer
+ *
+ * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels associated with
+ * @inode into *(@buffer).  The remaining size of @buffer is specified by
+ * *(@remaining_size).  *(@buffer) may be NULL to request the size of the
+ * buffer required. Updates *(@buffer) and *(@remaining_size).
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, or -errno on failure.
+ */
+int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode,
+				char **buffer, ssize_t *remaining_size)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, inode, buffer, remaining_size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_getlsmprop() - Get an inode's LSM data
+ * @inode: inode
+ * @prop: lsm specific information to return
+ *
+ * Get the lsm specific information associated with the node.
+ */
+void security_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	call_void_hook(inode_getlsmprop, inode, prop);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_copy_up() - Create new creds for an overlayfs copy-up op
+ * @src: union dentry of copy-up file
+ * @new: newly created creds
+ *
+ * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of overlay
+ * filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds and modify as
+ * need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to new creds temporarily to
+ * create new file and release newly allocated creds.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error.
+ */
+int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, src, new);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_copy_up_xattr() - Filter xattrs in an overlayfs copy-up op
+ * @src: union dentry of copy-up file
+ * @name: xattr name
+ *
+ * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied up from a
+ * lower layer to the union/overlay layer.   The caller is responsible for
+ * reading and writing the xattrs, this hook is merely a filter.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, -ECANCELED to discard the xattr,
+ *         -EOPNOTSUPP if the security module does not know about attribute,
+ *         or a negative error code to abort the copy up.
+ */
+int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, src, name);
+	if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr))
+		return rc;
+
+	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_setintegrity() - Set the inode's integrity data
+ * @inode: inode
+ * @type: type of integrity, e.g. hash digest, signature, etc
+ * @value: the integrity value
+ * @size: size of the integrity value
+ *
+ * Register a verified integrity measurement of a inode with LSMs.
+ * LSMs should free the previously saved data if @value is NULL.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+int security_inode_setintegrity(const struct inode *inode,
+				enum lsm_integrity_type type, const void *value,
+				size_t size)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setintegrity, inode, type, value, size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setintegrity);
+
+/**
+ * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node
+ * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node
+ * @kn: the kernfs node to initialize
+ *
+ * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based on its
+ * own and its parent's attributes.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+				  struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, kn_dir, kn);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_permission() - Check file permissions
+ * @file: file
+ * @mask: requested permissions
+ *
+ * Check file permissions before accessing an open file.  This hook is called
+ * by various operations that read or write files.  A security module can use
+ * this hook to perform additional checking on these operations, e.g. to
+ * revalidate permissions on use to support privilege bracketing or policy
+ * changes.  Notice that this hook is used when the actual read/write
+ * operations are performed, whereas the inode_security_ops hook is called when
+ * a file is opened (as well as many other operations).  Although this hook can
+ * be used to revalidate permissions for various system call operations that
+ * read or write files, it does not address the revalidation of permissions for
+ * memory-mapped files.  Security modules must handle this separately if they
+ * need such revalidation.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_permission, file, mask);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_alloc() - Allocate and init a file's LSM blob
+ * @file: the file
+ *
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field.  The
+ * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
+{
+	int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, file);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_file_free(file);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_release() - Perform actions before releasing the file ref
+ * @file: the file
+ *
+ * Perform actions before releasing the last reference to a file.
+ */
+void security_file_release(struct file *file)
+{
+	call_void_hook(file_release, file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob
+ * @file: the file
+ *
+ * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security.
+ */
+void security_file_free(struct file *file)
+{
+	void *blob;
+
+	call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
+
+	blob = file->f_security;
+	if (blob) {
+		file->f_security = NULL;
+		kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_backing_file_alloc() - Allocate and setup a backing file blob
+ * @backing_file: the backing file
+ * @user_file: the associated user visible file
+ *
+ * Allocate a backing file LSM blob and perform any necessary initialization of
+ * the LSM blob.  There will be some operations where the LSM will not have
+ * access to @user_file after this point, so any important state associated
+ * with @user_file that is important to the LSM should be captured in the
+ * backing file's LSM blob.
+ *
+ * LSM's should avoid taking a reference to @user_file in this hook as it will
+ * result in problems later when the system attempts to drop/put the file
+ * references due to a circular dependency.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful, negative values otherwise.
+ */
+int security_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file,
+				const struct file *user_file)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = lsm_backing_file_alloc(backing_file);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(backing_file_alloc, backing_file, user_file);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_backing_file_free(backing_file);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_backing_file_free() - Free a backing file blob
+ * @backing_file: the backing file
+ *
+ * Free any LSM state associate with a backing file's LSM blob, including the
+ * blob itself.
+ */
+void security_backing_file_free(struct file *backing_file)
+{
+	void *blob = backing_file_security(backing_file);
+
+	call_void_hook(backing_file_free, backing_file);
+
+	if (blob) {
+		backing_file_set_security(backing_file, NULL);
+		kmem_cache_free(lsm_backing_file_cache, blob);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed
+ * @file: associated file
+ * @cmd: ioctl cmd
+ * @arg: ioctl arguments
+ *
+ * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file.  Note that @arg sometimes
+ * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer
+ * value.  When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used
+ * by the security module.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, file, cmd, arg);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);
+
+/**
+ * security_file_ioctl_compat() - Check if an ioctl is allowed in compat mode
+ * @file: associated file
+ * @cmd: ioctl cmd
+ * @arg: ioctl arguments
+ *
+ * Compat version of security_file_ioctl() that correctly handles 32-bit
+ * processes running on 64-bit kernels.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			       unsigned long arg)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_ioctl_compat, file, cmd, arg);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl_compat);
+
+static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
+	 * it to imply PROT_EXEC?  If not, nothing to talk about...
+	 */
+	if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
+		return prot;
+	if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
+		return prot;
+	/*
+	 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
+	 */
+	if (!file)
+		return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+	/*
+	 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
+	 * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
+	 */
+	if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
+		if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) {
+			unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file);
+			if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC))
+				return prot;
+		}
+#endif
+		return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+	}
+	/* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
+	return prot;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_mmap_file() - Check if mmap'ing a file is allowed
+ * @file: file
+ * @prot: protection applied by the kernel
+ * @flags: flags
+ *
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g. if
+ * mapping anonymous memory.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+		       unsigned long flags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(mmap_file, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot),
+			     flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_mmap_backing_file - Check if mmap'ing a backing file is allowed
+ * @vma: the vm_area_struct for the mmap'd region
+ * @backing_file: the backing file being mmap'd
+ * @user_file: the user file being mmap'd
+ *
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation on a stacked filesystem.  This hook
+ * is called after the security_mmap_file() and is responsible for authorizing
+ * the mmap on @backing_file.  It is important to note that the mmap operation
+ * on @user_file has already been authorized and the @vma->vm_file has been
+ * set to @backing_file.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+			       struct file *backing_file,
+			       struct file *user_file)
+{
+	/* recommended by the stackable filesystem devs */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(backing_file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return call_int_hook(mmap_backing_file, vma, backing_file, user_file);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_mmap_backing_file);
+
+/**
+ * security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed
+ * @addr: address
+ *
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_mprotect() - Check if changing memory protections is allowed
+ * @vma: memory region
+ * @reqprot: application requested protection
+ * @prot: protection applied by the kernel
+ *
+ * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+			   unsigned long prot)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, vma, reqprot, prot);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_lock() - Check if a file lock is allowed
+ * @file: file
+ * @cmd: lock operation (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK)
+ *
+ * Check permission before performing file locking operations.  Note the hook
+ * mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_lock, file, cmd);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_fcntl() - Check if fcntl() op is allowed
+ * @file: file
+ * @cmd: fcntl command
+ * @arg: command argument
+ *
+ * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd from
+ * being performed on the file @file.  Note that @arg sometimes represents a
+ * user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer value.  When
+ * @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used by the
+ * security module.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, file, cmd, arg);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_set_fowner() - Set the file owner info in the LSM blob
+ * @file: the file
+ *
+ * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in
+ * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook.
+ *
+ * This hook is called with file->f_owner.lock held.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+	call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_send_sigiotask() - Check if sending SIGIO/SIGURG is allowed
+ * @tsk: target task
+ * @fown: signal sender
+ * @sig: signal to be sent, SIGIO is sent if 0
+ *
+ * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the
+ * process @tsk.  Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt.  Note
+ * that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a struct file,
+ * so the file structure (and associated security information) can always be
+ * obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner).
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, tsk, fown, sig);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_receive() - Check if receiving a file via IPC is allowed
+ * @file: file being received
+ *
+ * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to
+ * receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_receive, file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM
+ * @file:
+ *
+ * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission,
+ * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission.
+ *
+ * We can check if a file is opened for execution (e.g. execve(2) call), either
+ * directly or indirectly (e.g. ELF's ld.so) by checking file->f_flags &
+ * __FMODE_EXEC .
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_open(struct file *file)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_open, file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_file_post_open() - Evaluate a file after it has been opened
+ * @file: the file
+ * @mask: access mask
+ *
+ * Evaluate an opened file and the access mask requested with open(). The hook
+ * is useful for LSMs that require the file content to be available in order to
+ * make decisions.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_post_open, file, mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_post_open);
+
+/**
+ * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed
+ * @file: file
+ *
+ * Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate.  Note that
+ * truncation permission may also be checked based on the path, using the
+ * @path_truncate hook.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_truncate, file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_alloc() - Allocate a task's LSM blob
+ * @task: the task
+ * @clone_flags: flags indicating what is being shared
+ *
+ * Handle allocation of task-related resources.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+	int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, task, clone_flags);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_task_free(task);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_free() - Free a task's LSM blob and related resources
+ * @task: task
+ *
+ * Handle release of task-related resources.  Note that this can be called from
+ * interrupt context.
+ */
+void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	call_void_hook(task_free, task);
+
+	kfree(task->security);
+	task->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer
+ * @cred: credentials
+ * @gfp: gfp flags
+ *
+ * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that
+ * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, cred, gfp);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_cred_free(cred);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources
+ * @cred: credentials
+ *
+ * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials.
+ */
+void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+	/*
+	 * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that
+	 * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL))
+		return;
+
+	call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
+
+	kfree(cred->security);
+	cred->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_prepare_creds() - Prepare a new set of credentials
+ * @new: new credentials
+ * @old: original credentials
+ * @gfp: gfp flags
+ *
+ * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, new, old, gfp);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_cred_free(new);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds
+ * @new: target credentials
+ * @old: original credentials
+ *
+ * Transfer data from original creds to new creds.
+ */
+void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials
+ * @c: credentials
+ * @secid: secid value
+ *
+ * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c.  In case of
+ * failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ */
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = 0;
+	call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
+
+/**
+ * security_cred_getlsmprop() - Get the LSM data from a set of credentials
+ * @c: credentials
+ * @prop: destination for the LSM data
+ *
+ * Retrieve the security data of the cred structure @c.  In case of
+ * failure, @prop will be cleared.
+ */
+void security_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
+	call_void_hook(cred_getlsmprop, c, prop);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getlsmprop);
+
+/**
+ * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid
+ * @new: credentials
+ * @secid: secid
+ *
+ * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
+ * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if successful.
+ */
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, new, secid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_kernel_create_files_as() - Set file creation context using an inode
+ * @new: target credentials
+ * @inode: reference inode
+ *
+ * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as the
+ * objective context of the specified inode.  The current task must be the one
+ * that nominated @inode.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if successful.
+ */
+int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, new, inode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_kernel_module_request() - Check if loading a module is allowed
+ * @kmod_name: module name
+ *
+ * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
+ * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if successful.
+ */
+int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, kmod_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_kernel_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace
+ * @file: file
+ * @id: file identifier
+ * @contents: trust if security_kernel_post_read_file() will be called
+ *
+ * Read a file specified by userspace.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+			      bool contents)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, file, id, contents);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
+
+/**
+ * security_kernel_post_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace
+ * @file: file
+ * @buf: file contents
+ * @size: size of file contents
+ * @id: file identifier
+ *
+ * Read a file specified by userspace.  This must be paired with a prior call
+ * to security_kernel_read_file() call that indicated this hook would also be
+ * called, see security_kernel_read_file() for more information.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+				   enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, file, buf, size, id);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
+
+/**
+ * security_kernel_load_data() - Load data provided by userspace
+ * @id: data identifier
+ * @contents: true if security_kernel_post_load_data() will be called
+ *
+ * Load data provided by userspace.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, id, contents);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
+
+/**
+ * security_kernel_post_load_data() - Load userspace data from a non-file source
+ * @buf: data
+ * @size: size of data
+ * @id: data identifier
+ * @description: text description of data, specific to the id value
+ *
+ * Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer).  This
+ * must be paired with a prior security_kernel_load_data() call that indicated
+ * this hook would also be called, see security_kernel_load_data() for more
+ * information.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+				   enum kernel_load_data_id id,
+				   char *description)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, buf, size, id, description);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
+
+/**
+ * security_task_fix_setuid() - Update LSM with new user id attributes
+ * @new: updated credentials
+ * @old: credentials being replaced
+ * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag values
+ *
+ * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user identity
+ * attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter indicates which of
+ * the set*uid system calls invoked this hook.  If @new is the set of
+ * credentials that will be installed.  Modifications should be made to this
+ * rather than to @current->cred.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+			     int flags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, new, old, flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_fix_setgid() - Update LSM with new group id attributes
+ * @new: updated credentials
+ * @old: credentials being replaced
+ * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag value
+ *
+ * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the group identity
+ * attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter indicates which of
+ * the set*gid system calls invoked this hook.  @new is the set of credentials
+ * that will be installed.  Modifications should be made to this rather than to
+ * @current->cred.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+			     int flags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, new, old, flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_fix_setgroups() - Update LSM with new supplementary groups
+ * @new: updated credentials
+ * @old: credentials being replaced
+ *
+ * Update the module's state after setting the supplementary group identity
+ * attributes of the current process.  @new is the set of credentials that will
+ * be installed.  Modifications should be made to this rather than to
+ * @current->cred.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, new, old);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_setpgid() - Check if setting the pgid is allowed
+ * @p: task being modified
+ * @pgid: new pgid
+ *
+ * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the process
+ * @p to @pgid.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, p, pgid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_getpgid() - Check if getting the pgid is allowed
+ * @p: task
+ *
+ * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the process
+ * @p.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_getsid() - Check if getting the session id is allowed
+ * @p: task
+ *
+ * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process @p.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_current_getlsmprop_subj() - Current task's subjective LSM data
+ * @prop: lsm specific information
+ *
+ * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return
+ * it in @prop.
+ */
+void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
+	call_void_hook(current_getlsmprop_subj, prop);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getlsmprop_subj);
+
+/**
+ * security_task_getlsmprop_obj() - Get a task's objective LSM data
+ * @p: target task
+ * @prop: lsm specific information
+ *
+ * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and
+ * return it in @prop.
+ */
+void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
+	call_void_hook(task_getlsmprop_obj, p, prop);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getlsmprop_obj);
+
+/**
+ * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed
+ * @p: target task
+ * @nice: nice value
+ *
+ * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_setnice, p, nice);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_setioprio() - Check if setting a task's ioprio is allowed
+ * @p: target task
+ * @ioprio: ioprio value
+ *
+ * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, p, ioprio);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_getioprio() - Check if getting a task's ioprio is allowed
+ * @p: task
+ *
+ * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_prlimit() - Check if get/setting resources limits is allowed
+ * @cred: current task credentials
+ * @tcred: target task credentials
+ * @flags: LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating a get/set/both
+ *
+ * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of
+ * another task.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
+			  unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, cred, tcred, flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_setrlimit() - Check if setting a new rlimit value is allowed
+ * @p: target task's group leader
+ * @resource: resource whose limit is being set
+ * @new_rlim: new resource limit
+ *
+ * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p for
+ * @resource to @new_rlim.  The old resource limit values can be examined by
+ * dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource).
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
+			    struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, p, resource, new_rlim);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_setscheduler() - Check if setting sched policy/param is allowed
+ * @p: target task
+ *
+ * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of
+ * process @p.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_getscheduler() - Check if getting scheduling info is allowed
+ * @p: target task
+ *
+ * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process @p.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_movememory() - Check if moving memory is allowed
+ * @p: task
+ *
+ * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_movememory, p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_kill() - Check if sending a signal is allowed
+ * @p: target process
+ * @info: signal information
+ * @sig: signal value
+ * @cred: credentials of the signal sender, NULL if @current
+ *
+ * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p.  @info can be NULL, the
+ * constant 1, or a pointer to a kernel_siginfo structure.  If @info is 1 or
+ * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming from
+ * the kernel and should typically be permitted.  SIGIO signals are handled
+ * separately by the send_sigiotask hook in file_security_ops.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
+		       int sig, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(task_kill, p, info, sig, cred);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_prctl() - Check if a prctl op is allowed
+ * @option: operation
+ * @arg2: argument
+ * @arg3: argument
+ * @arg4: argument
+ * @arg5: argument
+ *
+ * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
+ * current process.
+ *
+ * Return: Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value
+ *         to cause prctl() to return immediately with that value.
+ */
+int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+			unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
+{
+	int thisrc;
+	int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl);
+	struct lsm_static_call *scall;
+
+	lsm_for_each_hook(scall, task_prctl) {
+		thisrc = scall->hl->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+		if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) {
+			rc = thisrc;
+			if (thisrc != 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_task_to_inode() - Set the security attributes of a task's inode
+ * @p: task
+ * @inode: inode
+ *
+ * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's
+ * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes.
+ */
+void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_create_user_ns() - Check if creating a new userns is allowed
+ * @cred: prepared creds
+ *
+ * Check permission prior to creating a new user namespace.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if successful, otherwise < 0 error code.
+ */
+int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(userns_create, cred);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ipc_permission() - Check if sysv ipc access is allowed
+ * @ipcp: ipc permission structure
+ * @flag: requested permissions
+ *
+ * Check permissions for access to IPC.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, ipcp, flag);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ipc_getlsmprop() - Get the sysv ipc object LSM data
+ * @ipcp: ipc permission structure
+ * @prop: pointer to lsm information
+ *
+ * Get the lsm information associated with the ipc object.
+ */
+
+void security_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
+	call_void_hook(ipc_getlsmprop, ipcp, prop);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_msg_msg_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc message LSM blob
+ * @msg: message structure
+ *
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field.  The
+ * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, msg);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_msg_msg_free(msg);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_msg_msg_free() - Free a sysv ipc message LSM blob
+ * @msg: message structure
+ *
+ * Deallocate the security structure for this message.
+ */
+void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
+	kfree(msg->security);
+	msg->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_msg_queue_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob
+ * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure
+ *
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to @msg. The security field is
+ * initialized to NULL when the structure is first created.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
+{
+	int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, msq);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_msg_queue_free(msq);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_msg_queue_free() - Free a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob
+ * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure
+ *
+ * Deallocate security field @perm->security for the message queue.
+ */
+void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
+{
+	call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
+	kfree(msq->security);
+	msq->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_msg_queue_associate() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed
+ * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure
+ * @msqflg: operation flags
+ *
+ * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the msgget system
+ * call. This hook is only called when returning the message queue identifier
+ * for an existing message queue, not when a new message queue is created.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, msq, msqflg);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_msg_queue_msgctl() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed
+ * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure
+ * @cmd: operation
+ *
+ * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd is to be
+ * performed on the message queue with permissions.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, msq, cmd);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_msg_queue_msgsnd() - Check if sending a sysv ipc message is allowed
+ * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure
+ * @msg: message
+ * @msqflg: operation flags
+ *
+ * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message queue
+ * with permissions specified in @msq.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq,
+			      struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, msq, msg, msqflg);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_msg_queue_msgrcv() - Check if receiving a sysv ipc msg is allowed
+ * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure
+ * @msg: message
+ * @target: target task
+ * @type: type of message requested
+ * @mode: operation flags
+ *
+ * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message	queue.
+ * The @target task structure contains a pointer to the process that will be
+ * receiving the message (not equal to the current process when inline receives
+ * are being performed).
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+			      struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_shm_alloc() - Allocate a sysv shm LSM blob
+ * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure
+ *
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @shp security field.  The
+ * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
+{
+	int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, shp);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_shm_free(shp);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_shm_free() - Free a sysv shm LSM blob
+ * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure
+ *
+ * Deallocate the security structure @perm->security for the memory segment.
+ */
+void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
+{
+	call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
+	kfree(shp->security);
+	shp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_shm_associate() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed
+ * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure
+ * @shmflg: operation flags
+ *
+ * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the shmget
+ * system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared memory
+ * region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared memory
+ * region is created.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(shm_associate, shp, shmflg);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_shm_shmctl() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed
+ * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure
+ * @cmd: operation
+ *
+ * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by @cmd is
+ * to be performed on the shared memory region with permissions in @shp.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, shp, cmd);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_shm_shmat() - Check if a sysv shm attach operation is allowed
+ * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure
+ * @shmaddr: address of memory region to attach
+ * @shmflg: operation flags
+ *
+ * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the
+ * shared memory segment with permissions @shp to the data segment of the
+ * calling process. The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
+		       char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sem_alloc() - Allocate a sysv semaphore LSM blob
+ * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure
+ *
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @sma security field. The
+ * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
+{
+	int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, sma);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_sem_free(sma);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sem_free() - Free a sysv semaphore LSM blob
+ * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure
+ *
+ * Deallocate security structure @sma->security for the semaphore.
+ */
+void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
+{
+	call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
+	kfree(sma->security);
+	sma->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sem_associate() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed
+ * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure
+ * @semflg: operation flags
+ *
+ * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget system
+ * call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore identifier for
+ * an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be created.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sem_associate, sma, semflg);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sem_semctl() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed
+ * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure
+ * @cmd: operation
+ *
+ * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be
+ * performed on the semaphore.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, sma, cmd);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sem_semop() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed
+ * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure
+ * @sops: operations to perform
+ * @nsops: number of operations
+ * @alter: flag indicating changes will be made
+ *
+ * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the semaphore
+ * set. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set may be modified.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
+		       unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sem_semop, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_d_instantiate() - Populate an inode's LSM state based on a dentry
+ * @dentry: dentry
+ * @inode: inode
+ *
+ * Fill in @inode security information for a @dentry if allowed.
+ */
+void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
+
+/*
+ * Please keep this in sync with it's counterpart in security/lsm_syscalls.c
+ */
+
+/**
+ * security_getselfattr - Read an LSM attribute of the current process.
+ * @attr: which attribute to return
+ * @uctx: the user-space destination for the information, or NULL
+ * @size: pointer to the size of space available to receive the data
+ * @flags: special handling options. LSM_FLAG_SINGLE indicates that only
+ * attributes associated with the LSM identified in the passed @ctx be
+ * reported.
+ *
+ * A NULL value for @uctx can be used to get both the number of attributes
+ * and the size of the data.
+ *
+ * Returns the number of attributes found on success, negative value
+ * on error. @size is reset to the total size of the data.
+ * If @size is insufficient to contain the data -E2BIG is returned.
+ */
+int security_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx,
+			 u32 __user *size, u32 flags)
+{
+	struct lsm_static_call *scall;
+	struct lsm_ctx lctx = { .id = LSM_ID_UNDEF, };
+	u8 __user *base = (u8 __user *)uctx;
+	u32 entrysize;
+	u32 total = 0;
+	u32 left;
+	bool toobig = false;
+	bool single = false;
+	int count = 0;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (attr == LSM_ATTR_UNDEF)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (size == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (get_user(left, size))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (flags) {
+		/*
+		 * Only flag supported is LSM_FLAG_SINGLE
+		 */
+		if (flags != LSM_FLAG_SINGLE || !uctx)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (copy_from_user(&lctx, uctx, sizeof(lctx)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		/*
+		 * If the LSM ID isn't specified it is an error.
+		 */
+		if (lctx.id == LSM_ID_UNDEF)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		single = true;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * In the usual case gather all the data from the LSMs.
+	 * In the single case only get the data from the LSM specified.
+	 */
+	lsm_for_each_hook(scall, getselfattr) {
+		if (single && lctx.id != scall->hl->lsmid->id)
+			continue;
+		entrysize = left;
+		if (base)
+			uctx = (struct lsm_ctx __user *)(base + total);
+		rc = scall->hl->hook.getselfattr(attr, uctx, &entrysize, flags);
+		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+			continue;
+		if (rc == -E2BIG) {
+			rc = 0;
+			left = 0;
+			toobig = true;
+		} else if (rc < 0)
+			return rc;
+		else
+			left -= entrysize;
+
+		total += entrysize;
+		count += rc;
+		if (single)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (put_user(total, size))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	if (toobig)
+		return -E2BIG;
+	if (count == 0)
+		return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getselfattr);
+	return count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Please keep this in sync with it's counterpart in security/lsm_syscalls.c
+ */
+
+/**
+ * security_setselfattr - Set an LSM attribute on the current process.
+ * @attr: which attribute to set
+ * @uctx: the user-space source for the information
+ * @size: the size of the data
+ * @flags: reserved for future use, must be 0
+ *
+ * Set an LSM attribute for the current process. The LSM, attribute
+ * and new value are included in @uctx.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if the input is inconsistent, -EFAULT
+ * if the user buffer is inaccessible, E2BIG if size is too big, or an
+ * LSM specific failure.
+ */
+int security_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx,
+			 u32 size, u32 flags)
+{
+	struct lsm_static_call *scall;
+	struct lsm_ctx *lctx;
+	int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setselfattr);
+	u64 required_len;
+
+	if (flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (size < sizeof(*lctx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	lctx = memdup_user(uctx, size);
+	if (IS_ERR(lctx))
+		return PTR_ERR(lctx);
+
+	if (size < lctx->len ||
+	    check_add_overflow(sizeof(*lctx), lctx->ctx_len, &required_len) ||
+	    lctx->len < required_len) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto free_out;
+	}
+
+	lsm_for_each_hook(scall, setselfattr)
+		if ((scall->hl->lsmid->id) == lctx->id) {
+			rc = scall->hl->hook.setselfattr(attr, lctx, size, flags);
+			break;
+		}
+
+free_out:
+	kfree(lctx);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task
+ * @p: the task
+ * @lsmid: LSM identification
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ *
+ * Read attribute @name for task @p and store it into @value if allowed.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, int lsmid, const char *name,
+			 char **value)
+{
+	struct lsm_static_call *scall;
+
+	lsm_for_each_hook(scall, getprocattr) {
+		if (lsmid != 0 && lsmid != scall->hl->lsmid->id)
+			continue;
+		return scall->hl->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
+	}
+	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task
+ * @lsmid: LSM identification
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: attribute value size
+ *
+ * Write (set) the current task's attribute @name to @value, size @size if
+ * allowed.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int security_setprocattr(int lsmid, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	struct lsm_static_call *scall;
+
+	lsm_for_each_hook(scall, setprocattr) {
+		if (lsmid != 0 && lsmid != scall->hl->lsmid->id)
+			continue;
+		return scall->hl->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
+	}
+	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ismaclabel() - Check if the named attribute is a MAC label
+ * @name: full extended attribute name
+ *
+ * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 1 if name is a MAC attribute otherwise returns 0.
+ */
+int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, name);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
+
+/**
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() - Convert a secid to a secctx
+ * @secid: secid
+ * @cp: the LSM context
+ *
+ * Convert secid to security context.  If @cp is NULL the length of the
+ * result will be returned, but no data will be returned.  This
+ * does mean that the length could change between calls to check the length and
+ * the next call which actually allocates and returns the data.
+ *
+ * Return: Return length of data on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, secid, cp);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
+
+/**
+ * security_lsmprop_to_secctx() - Convert a lsm_prop to a secctx
+ * @prop: lsm specific information
+ * @cp: the LSM context
+ * @lsmid: which security module to report
+ *
+ * Convert a @prop entry to security context.  If @cp is NULL the
+ * length of the result will be returned. This does mean that the
+ * length could change between calls to check the length and the
+ * next call which actually allocates and returns the @cp.
+ *
+ * @lsmid identifies which LSM should supply the context.
+ * A value of LSM_ID_UNDEF indicates that the first LSM suppling
+ * the hook should be used. This is used in cases where the
+ * ID of the supplying LSM is unambiguous.
+ *
+ * Return: Return length of data on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, struct lsm_context *cp,
+			       int lsmid)
+{
+	struct lsm_static_call *scall;
+
+	lsm_for_each_hook(scall, lsmprop_to_secctx) {
+		if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF && lsmid != scall->hl->lsmid->id)
+			continue;
+		return scall->hl->hook.lsmprop_to_secctx(prop, cp);
+	}
+	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(lsmprop_to_secctx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_lsmprop_to_secctx);
+
+/**
+ * security_secctx_to_secid() - Convert a secctx to a secid
+ * @secdata: secctx
+ * @seclen: length of secctx
+ * @secid: secid
+ *
+ * Convert security context to secid.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = 0;
+	return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, secdata, seclen, secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
+
+/**
+ * security_release_secctx() - Free a secctx buffer
+ * @cp: the security context
+ *
+ * Release the security context.
+ */
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	call_void_hook(release_secctx, cp);
+	memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_invalidate_secctx() - Invalidate an inode's security label
+ * @inode: inode
+ *
+ * Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context of
+ * an inode.
+ */
+void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_notifysecctx() - Notify the LSM of an inode's security label
+ * @inode: inode
+ * @ctx: secctx
+ * @ctxlen: length of secctx
+ *
+ * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should
+ * be.  Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module
+ * for this inode.  Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize
+ * the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server
+ * for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client.
+ * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_setsecctx() - Change the security label of an inode
+ * @dentry: inode
+ * @ctx: secctx
+ * @ctxlen: length of secctx
+ *
+ * Change the security context of an inode.  Updates the incore security
+ * context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed
+ * (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the
+ * context.  Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security
+ * context in its incore inode and on the backing filesystem to a value
+ * provided by the client on a SETATTR operation.  Must be called with
+ * inode->i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_getsecctx() - Get the security label of an inode
+ * @inode: inode
+ * @cp: security context
+ *
+ * On success, returns 0 and fills out @cp with the security context
+ * for the given @inode.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, inode, cp);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
+/**
+ * security_post_notification() - Check if a watch notification can be posted
+ * @w_cred: credentials of the task that set the watch
+ * @cred: credentials of the task which triggered the watch
+ * @n: the notification
+ *
+ * Check to see if a watch notification can be posted to a particular queue.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
+			       const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct watch_notification *n)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(post_notification, w_cred, cred, n);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+/**
+ * security_watch_key() - Check if a task is allowed to watch for key events
+ * @key: the key to watch
+ *
+ * Check to see if a process is allowed to watch for event notifications from
+ * a key or keyring.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(watch_key, key);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+/**
+ * security_netlink_send() - Save info and check if netlink sending is allowed
+ * @sk: sending socket
+ * @skb: netlink message
+ *
+ * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission checking
+ * can be performed when the message is processed.  The security information
+ * can be saved using the eff_cap field of the netlink_skb_parms structure.
+ * Also may be used to provide fine grained control over message transmission.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if the information was successfully saved and message is
+ *         allowed to be transmitted.
+ */
+int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(netlink_send, sk, skb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_unix_stream_connect() - Check if a AF_UNIX stream is allowed
+ * @sock: originating sock
+ * @other: peer sock
+ * @newsk: new sock
+ *
+ * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection
+ * between @sock and @other.
+ *
+ * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because
+ * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix
+ * domain sockets.  Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name
+ * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod
+ * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to
+ * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated.  Sufficient
+ * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible
+ * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target
+ * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
+				 struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, sock, other, newsk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
+
+/**
+ * security_unix_may_send() - Check if AF_UNIX socket can send datagrams
+ * @sock: originating sock
+ * @other: peer sock
+ *
+ * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to
+ * @other.
+ *
+ * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because
+ * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix
+ * domain sockets.  Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name
+ * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod
+ * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to
+ * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated.  Sufficient
+ * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible
+ * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target
+ * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,  struct socket *other)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, sock, other);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_create() - Check if creating a new socket is allowed
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @type: communications type
+ * @protocol: requested protocol
+ * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested
+ *
+ * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_create, family, type, protocol, kern);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_post_create() - Initialize a newly created socket
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @type: communications type
+ * @protocol: requested protocol
+ * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested
+ *
+ * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security
+ * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the socket
+ * structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored in the
+ * associated inode.  Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will allocate
+ * and attach security information to SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security.  This hook
+ * may be used to update the SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security field with additional
+ * information that wasn't available when the inode was allocated.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, sock, family, type,
+			     protocol, kern);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_socketpair() - Check if creating a socketpair is allowed
+ * @socka: first socket
+ * @sockb: second socket
+ *
+ * Check permissions before creating a fresh pair of sockets.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted and the connection was
+ *         established.
+ */
+int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, socka, sockb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair);
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_bind() - Check if a socket bind operation is allowed
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @address: requested bind address
+ * @addrlen: length of address
+ *
+ * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is performed
+ * and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the @address
+ * parameter.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+			 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_bind, sock, address, addrlen);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_connect() - Check if a socket connect operation is allowed
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @address: address of remote connection point
+ * @addrlen: length of address
+ *
+ * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation attempts to
+ * connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+			    struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_connect, sock, address, addrlen);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_listen() - Check if a socket is allowed to listen
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @backlog: connection queue size
+ *
+ * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_listen, sock, backlog);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_accept() - Check if a socket is allowed to accept connections
+ * @sock: listening socket
+ * @newsock: newly creation connection socket
+ *
+ * Check permission before accepting a new connection.  Note that the new
+ * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, but
+ * the accept operation has not actually been performed.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_accept, sock, newsock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check if sending a message is allowed
+ * @sock: sending socket
+ * @msg: message to send
+ * @size: size of message
+ *
+ * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_recvmsg() - Check if receiving a message is allowed
+ * @sock: receiving socket
+ * @msg: message to receive
+ * @size: size of message
+ * @flags: operational flags
+ *
+ * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+			    int size, int flags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, sock, msg, size, flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_getsockname() - Check if reading the socket addr is allowed
+ * @sock: socket
+ *
+ * Check permission before reading the local address (name) of the socket
+ * object.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_getpeername() - Check if reading the peer's addr is allowed
+ * @sock: socket
+ *
+ * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_getsockopt() - Check if reading a socket option is allowed
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @level: option's protocol level
+ * @optname: option name
+ *
+ * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket
+ * @sock.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, sock, level, optname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_setsockopt() - Check if setting a socket option is allowed
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @level: option's protocol level
+ * @optname: option name
+ *
+ * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket @sock.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, sock, level, optname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_shutdown() - Checks if shutting down the socket is allowed
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @how: flag indicating how sends and receives are handled
+ *
+ * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket @sock is
+ * shut down.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, sock, how);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sock_rcv_skb() - Check if an incoming network packet is allowed
+ * @sk: destination sock
+ * @skb: incoming packet
+ *
+ * Check permissions on incoming network packets.  This hook is distinct from
+ * Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the incoming
+ * sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk.  Must not
+ * sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, sk, skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_getpeersec_stream() - Get the remote peer label
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @optval: destination buffer
+ * @optlen: size of peer label copied into the buffer
+ * @len: maximum size of the destination buffer
+ *
+ * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state
+ * for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC.
+ * For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the socket is associated with an
+ * ipsec SA.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return
+ *         values.
+ */
+int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval,
+				      sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, sock, optval, optlen,
+			     len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() - Get the remote peer label
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @skb: datagram packet
+ * @secid: remote peer label secid
+ *
+ * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state
+ * for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via getsockopt
+ * SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated the IP_PASSSEC
+ * option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the security state returned by
+ * this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY ancillary message type.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, sock, skb, secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
+
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @gfp: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return lsm_blob_alloc(&sock->sk_security, blob_sizes.lbs_sock, gfp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sk_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a sock's LSM blob
+ * @sk: sock
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @priority: gfp flags
+ *
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, which
+ * is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
+{
+	int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, sk, family, priority);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_sk_free(sk);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sk_free() - Free the sock's LSM blob
+ * @sk: sock
+ *
+ * Deallocate security structure.
+ */
+void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+	kfree(sk->sk_security);
+	sk->sk_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sk_clone() - Clone a sock's LSM state
+ * @sk: original sock
+ * @newsk: target sock
+ *
+ * Clone/copy security structure.
+ */
+void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone);
+
+/**
+ * security_sk_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on socket
+ * @sk: original socket
+ * @flic: target flow
+ *
+ * Set the target flow's secid to socket's secid.
+ */
+void security_sk_classify_flow(const struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic)
+{
+	call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
+
+/**
+ * security_req_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on request_sock
+ * @req: request_sock
+ * @flic: target flow
+ *
+ * Sets @flic's secid to @req's secid.
+ */
+void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
+				struct flowi_common *flic)
+{
+	call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
+
+/**
+ * security_sock_graft() - Reconcile LSM state when grafting a sock on a socket
+ * @sk: sock being grafted
+ * @parent: target parent socket
+ *
+ * Sets @parent's inode secid to @sk's secid and update @sk with any necessary
+ * LSM state from @parent.
+ */
+void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+	call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft);
+
+/**
+ * security_inet_conn_request() - Set request_sock state using incoming connect
+ * @sk: parent listening sock
+ * @skb: incoming connection
+ * @req: new request_sock
+ *
+ * Initialize the @req LSM state based on @sk and the incoming connect in @skb.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk,
+			       struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, sk, skb, req);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request);
+
+/**
+ * security_inet_csk_clone() - Set new sock LSM state based on request_sock
+ * @newsk: new sock
+ * @req: connection request_sock
+ *
+ * Set that LSM state of @sock using the LSM state from @req.
+ */
+void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
+			     const struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inet_conn_established() - Update sock's LSM state with connection
+ * @sk: sock
+ * @skb: connection packet
+ *
+ * Update @sock's LSM state to represent a new connection from @skb.
+ */
+void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
+				    struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
+
+/**
+ * security_secmark_relabel_packet() - Check if setting a secmark is allowed
+ * @secid: new secmark value
+ *
+ * Check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to @secid.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
+
+/**
+ * security_secmark_refcount_inc() - Increment the secmark labeling rule count
+ *
+ * Tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded.
+ */
+void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+	call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
+
+/**
+ * security_secmark_refcount_dec() - Decrement the secmark labeling rule count
+ *
+ * Tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded.
+ */
+void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+	call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
+
+/**
+ * security_tun_dev_alloc_security() - Allocate a LSM blob for a TUN device
+ * @security: pointer to the LSM blob
+ *
+ * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN	device,
+ * returning the pointer in @security.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = lsm_blob_alloc(security, blob_sizes.lbs_tun_dev, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, *security);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(*security);
+		*security = NULL;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security);
+
+/**
+ * security_tun_dev_free_security() - Free a TUN device LSM blob
+ * @security: LSM blob
+ *
+ * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN device.
+ */
+void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
+{
+	kfree(security);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security);
+
+/**
+ * security_tun_dev_create() - Check if creating a TUN device is allowed
+ *
+ * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
+
+/**
+ * security_tun_dev_attach_queue() - Check if attaching a TUN queue is allowed
+ * @security: TUN device LSM blob
+ *
+ * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, security);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
+
+/**
+ * security_tun_dev_attach() - Update TUN device LSM state on attach
+ * @sk: associated sock
+ * @security: TUN device LSM blob
+ *
+ * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated
+ * with the TUN device's sock structure.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, sk, security);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
+
+/**
+ * security_tun_dev_open() - Update TUN device LSM state on open
+ * @security: TUN device LSM blob
+ *
+ * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated
+ * with the TUN device's security structure.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, security);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
+
+/**
+ * security_sctp_assoc_request() - Update the LSM on a SCTP association req
+ * @asoc: SCTP association
+ * @skb: packet requesting the association
+ *
+ * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to the LSM.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+				struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, asoc, skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request);
+
+/**
+ * security_sctp_bind_connect() - Validate a list of addrs for a SCTP option
+ * @sk: socket
+ * @optname: SCTP option to validate
+ * @address: list of IP addresses to validate
+ * @addrlen: length of the address list
+ *
+ * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock	@sk.
+ * Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either a connect or
+ * bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each IPv4 and IPv6 address using
+ * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6).
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+			       struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, sk, optname, address, addrlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect);
+
+/**
+ * security_sctp_sk_clone() - Clone a SCTP sock's LSM state
+ * @asoc: SCTP association
+ * @sk: original sock
+ * @newsk: target sock
+ *
+ * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP style
+ * socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls
+ * sctp_peeloff(3).
+ */
+void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
+			    struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone);
+
+/**
+ * security_sctp_assoc_established() - Update LSM state when assoc established
+ * @asoc: SCTP association
+ * @skb: packet establishing the association
+ *
+ * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association COOKIE_ACK packet to the
+ * security module.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+				    struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, asoc, skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established);
+
+/**
+ * security_mptcp_add_subflow() - Inherit the LSM label from the MPTCP socket
+ * @sk: the owning MPTCP socket
+ * @ssk: the new subflow
+ *
+ * Update the labeling for the given MPTCP subflow, to match the one of the
+ * owning MPTCP socket. This hook has to be called after the socket creation and
+ * initialization via the security_socket_create() and
+ * security_socket_post_create() LSM hooks.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(mptcp_add_subflow, sk, ssk);
+}
+
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
+/**
+ * security_unix_find() - Check if a named AF_UNIX socket can connect
+ * @path: path of the socket being connected to
+ * @other: peer sock
+ * @flags: flags associated with the socket
+ *
+ * This hook is called to check permissions before connecting to a named
+ * AF_UNIX socket. The caller does not hold any locks on @other.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(unix_find, path, other, flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_find);
+
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+/**
+ * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed
+ * @sec: LSM blob
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix of the port
+ * @pkey: IB pkey
+ *
+ * Check permission to access a pkey when modifying a QP.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access);
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() - Check if SMPs traffic is allowed
+ * @sec: LSM blob
+ * @dev_name: IB device name
+ * @port_num: port number
+ *
+ * Check permissions to send and receive SMPs on a end port.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec,
+				      const char *dev_name, u8 port_num)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, sec, dev_name, port_num);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet);
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_alloc_security() - Allocate an Infiniband LSM blob
+ * @sec: LSM blob
+ *
+ * Allocate a security structure for Infiniband objects.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure.
+ */
+int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = lsm_blob_alloc(sec, blob_sizes.lbs_ib, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, *sec);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(*sec);
+		*sec = NULL;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security);
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_free_security() - Free an Infiniband LSM blob
+ * @sec: LSM blob
+ *
+ * Deallocate an Infiniband security structure.
+ */
+void security_ib_free_security(void *sec)
+{
+	kfree(sec);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security);
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+/**
+ * security_xfrm_policy_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm policy LSM blob
+ * @ctxp: xfrm security context being added to the SPD
+ * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace
+ * @gfp: gfp flags
+ *
+ * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security field
+ * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated.
+ *
+ * Return:  Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ */
+int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+			       struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
+			       gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
+
+/**
+ * security_xfrm_policy_clone() - Clone xfrm policy LSM state
+ * @old_ctx: xfrm security context
+ * @new_ctxp: target xfrm security context
+ *
+ * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the information from
+ * the old_ctx structure.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ */
+int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+			       struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_xfrm_policy_free() - Free a xfrm security context
+ * @ctx: xfrm security context
+ *
+ * Free LSM resources associated with @ctx.
+ */
+void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
+
+/**
+ * security_xfrm_policy_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm policy is allowed
+ * @ctx: xfrm security context
+ *
+ * Authorize deletion of a SPD entry.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, ctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_xfrm_state_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob
+ * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD
+ * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace
+ *
+ * Allocate a security structure to the @x->security field; the security field
+ * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to
+ * correspond to @sec_ctx.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ */
+int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, x, sec_ctx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
+
+/**
+ * security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob
+ * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD
+ * @polsec: associated policy's security context
+ * @secid: secid from the flow
+ *
+ * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security field
+ * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated.  Set the context to
+ * correspond to secid.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful.
+ */
+int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				      struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, x, polsec, secid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_xfrm_state_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm state is allowed
+ * @x: xfrm state
+ *
+ * Authorize deletion of x->security.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, x);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete);
+
+/**
+ * security_xfrm_state_free() - Free a xfrm state
+ * @x: xfrm state
+ *
+ * Deallocate x->security.
+ */
+void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_xfrm_policy_lookup() - Check if using a xfrm policy is allowed
+ * @ctx: target xfrm security context
+ * @fl_secid: flow secid used to authorize access
+ *
+ * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing XFRMs on a
+ * packet.  The hook is called when selecting either a per-socket policy or a
+ * generic xfrm policy.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno on
+ *         other errors.
+ */
+int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, ctx, fl_secid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() - Check for a xfrm match
+ * @x: xfrm state to match
+ * @xp: xfrm policy to check for a match
+ * @flic: flow to check for a match.
+ *
+ * Check @xp and @flic for a match with @x.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 1 if there is a match.
+ */
+int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				       struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+				       const struct flowi_common *flic)
+{
+	struct lsm_static_call *scall;
+	int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
+
+	/*
+	 * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment
+	 * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately,
+	 * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux
+	 * supplies this call.
+	 *
+	 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than
+	 * using the macro
+	 */
+	lsm_for_each_hook(scall, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match) {
+		rc = scall->hl->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic);
+		break;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_xfrm_decode_session() - Determine the xfrm secid for a packet
+ * @skb: xfrm packet
+ * @secid: secid
+ *
+ * Decode the packet in @skb and return the security label in @secid.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if all xfrms used have the same secid.
+ */
+int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, skb, secid, 1);
+}
+
+void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic)
+{
+	int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, skb, &flic->flowic_secid,
+			       0);
+
+	BUG_ON(rc);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+/**
+ * security_key_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a kernel key LSM blob
+ * @key: key
+ * @cred: credentials
+ * @flags: allocation flags
+ *
+ * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does not
+ * have a serial number assigned at this point.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
+ */
+int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
+		       unsigned long flags)
+{
+	int rc = lsm_key_alloc(key);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(key_alloc, key, cred, flags);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_key_free(key);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_key_free() - Free a kernel key LSM blob
+ * @key: key
+ *
+ * Notification of destruction; free security data.
+ */
+void security_key_free(struct key *key)
+{
+	kfree(key->security);
+	key->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_key_permission() - Check if a kernel key operation is allowed
+ * @key_ref: key reference
+ * @cred: credentials of actor requesting access
+ * @need_perm: requested permissions
+ *
+ * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a key.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
+ */
+int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
+			    enum key_need_perm need_perm)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(key_permission, key_ref, cred, need_perm);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_key_getsecurity() - Get the key's security label
+ * @key: key
+ * @buffer: security label buffer
+ *
+ * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key for
+ * the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY.  This function allocates the
+ * storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller should free it.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns the length of @buffer (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
+ *         an error occurs.  May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if
+ *         there is no security label assigned to the key.
+ */
+int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer)
+{
+	*buffer = NULL;
+	return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, key, buffer);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_key_post_create_or_update() - Notification of key create or update
+ * @keyring: keyring to which the key is linked to
+ * @key: created or updated key
+ * @payload: data used to instantiate or update the key
+ * @payload_len: length of payload
+ * @flags: key flags
+ * @create: flag indicating whether the key was created or updated
+ *
+ * Notify the caller of a key creation or update.
+ */
+void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+					const void *payload, size_t payload_len,
+					unsigned long flags, bool create)
+{
+	call_void_hook(key_post_create_or_update, keyring, key, payload,
+		       payload_len, flags, create);
+}
+#endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+/**
+ * security_audit_rule_init() - Allocate and init an LSM audit rule struct
+ * @field: audit action
+ * @op: rule operator
+ * @rulestr: rule context
+ * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct
+ * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc
+ *
+ * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of
+ *         an invalid rule.
+ */
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+			     gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_audit_rule_known() - Check if an audit rule contains LSM fields
+ * @krule: audit rule
+ *
+ * Specifies whether given @krule contains any fields related to the current
+ * LSM.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, krule);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_audit_rule_free() - Free an LSM audit rule struct
+ * @lsmrule: audit rule struct
+ *
+ * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by
+ * audit_rule_init().
+ */
+void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_audit_rule_match() - Check if a label matches an audit rule
+ * @prop: security label
+ * @field: LSM audit field
+ * @op: matching operator
+ * @lsmrule: audit rule
+ *
+ * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved by
+ * security_audit_rule_known().
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on
+ *         failure.
+ */
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
+			      void *lsmrule)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, prop, field, op, lsmrule);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+/**
+ * security_bpf() - Check if the bpf syscall operation is allowed
+ * @cmd: command
+ * @attr: bpf attribute
+ * @size: size
+ * @kernel: whether or not call originated from kernel
+ *
+ * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied into
+ * the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own rules to
+ * check the specific cmd they need.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool kernel)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bpf, cmd, attr, size, kernel);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_map() - Check if access to a bpf map is allowed
+ * @map: bpf map
+ * @fmode: mode
+ *
+ * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF
+ * maps.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_map, map, fmode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_prog() - Check if access to a bpf program is allowed
+ * @prog: bpf program
+ *
+ * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF
+ * programs.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, prog);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_map_create() - Check if BPF map creation is allowed
+ * @map: BPF map object
+ * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF map
+ * @token: BPF token used to grant user access
+ * @kernel: whether or not call originated from kernel
+ *
+ * Do a check when the kernel creates a new BPF map. This is also the
+ * point where LSM blob is allocated for LSMs that need them.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
+			    struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = lsm_bpf_map_alloc(map);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, token, kernel);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_bpf_map_free(map);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_prog_load() - Check if loading of BPF program is allowed
+ * @prog: BPF program object
+ * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF program
+ * @token: BPF token used to grant user access to BPF subsystem
+ * @kernel: whether or not call originated from kernel
+ *
+ * Perform an access control check when the kernel loads a BPF program and
+ * allocates associated BPF program object. This hook is also responsible for
+ * allocating any required LSM state for the BPF program.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
+			   struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = lsm_bpf_prog_alloc(prog);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, token, kernel);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_bpf_prog_free(prog);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_token_create() - Check if creating of BPF token is allowed
+ * @token: BPF token object
+ * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF token
+ * @path: path pointing to BPF FS mount point from which BPF token is created
+ *
+ * Do a check when the kernel instantiates a new BPF token object from BPF FS
+ * instance. This is also the point where LSM blob can be allocated for LSMs.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
+			      const struct path *path)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = lsm_bpf_token_alloc(token);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(bpf_token_create, token, attr, path);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_bpf_token_free(token);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_token_cmd() - Check if BPF token is allowed to delegate
+ * requested BPF syscall command
+ * @token: BPF token object
+ * @cmd: BPF syscall command requested to be delegated by BPF token
+ *
+ * Do a check when the kernel decides whether provided BPF token should allow
+ * delegation of requested BPF syscall command.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_cmd, token, cmd);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_token_capable() - Check if BPF token is allowed to delegate
+ * requested BPF-related capability
+ * @token: BPF token object
+ * @cap: capabilities requested to be delegated by BPF token
+ *
+ * Do a check when the kernel decides whether provided BPF token should allow
+ * delegation of requested BPF-related capabilities.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_capable, token, cap);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_map_free() - Free a bpf map's LSM blob
+ * @map: bpf map
+ *
+ * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map.
+ */
+void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+	call_void_hook(bpf_map_free, map);
+	kfree(map->security);
+	map->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a BPF program's LSM blob
+ * @prog: BPF program struct
+ *
+ * Clean up the security information stored inside BPF program.
+ */
+void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free, prog);
+	kfree(prog->aux->security);
+	prog->aux->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_token_free() - Free a BPF token's LSM blob
+ * @token: BPF token struct
+ *
+ * Clean up the security information stored inside BPF token.
+ */
+void security_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
+{
+	call_void_hook(bpf_token_free, token);
+	kfree(token->security);
+	token->security = NULL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
+
+/**
+ * security_locked_down() - Check if a kernel feature is allowed
+ * @what: requested kernel feature
+ *
+ * Determine whether a kernel feature that potentially enables arbitrary code
+ * execution in kernel space should be permitted.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(locked_down, what);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
+
+/**
+ * security_bdev_alloc() - Allocate a block device LSM blob
+ * @bdev: block device
+ *
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to @bdev->bd_security.  The
+ * security field is initialized to NULL when the bdev structure is
+ * allocated.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ */
+int security_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rc = lsm_bdev_alloc(bdev);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(bdev_alloc_security, bdev);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_bdev_free(bdev);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_alloc);
+
+/**
+ * security_bdev_free() - Free a block device's LSM blob
+ * @bdev: block device
+ *
+ * Deallocate the bdev security structure and set @bdev->bd_security to NULL.
+ */
+void security_bdev_free(struct block_device *bdev)
+{
+	if (!bdev->bd_security)
+		return;
+
+	call_void_hook(bdev_free_security, bdev);
+
+	kfree(bdev->bd_security);
+	bdev->bd_security = NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_free);
+
+/**
+ * security_bdev_setintegrity() - Set the device's integrity data
+ * @bdev: block device
+ * @type: type of integrity, e.g. hash digest, signature, etc
+ * @value: the integrity value
+ * @size: size of the integrity value
+ *
+ * Register a verified integrity measurement of a bdev with LSMs.
+ * LSMs should free the previously saved data if @value is NULL.
+ * Please note that the new hook should be invoked every time the security
+ * information is updated to keep these data current. For example, in dm-verity,
+ * if the mapping table is reloaded and configured to use a different dm-verity
+ * target with a new roothash and signing information, the previously stored
+ * data in the LSM blob will become obsolete. It is crucial to re-invoke the
+ * hook to refresh these data and ensure they are up to date. This necessity
+ * arises from the design of device-mapper, where a device-mapper device is
+ * first created, and then targets are subsequently loaded into it. These
+ * targets can be modified multiple times during the device's lifetime.
+ * Therefore, while the LSM blob is allocated during the creation of the block
+ * device, its actual contents are not initialized at this stage and can change
+ * substantially over time. This includes alterations from data that the LSMs
+ * 'trusts' to those they do not, making it essential to handle these changes
+ * correctly. Failure to address this dynamic aspect could potentially allow
+ * for bypassing LSM checks.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+int security_bdev_setintegrity(struct block_device *bdev,
+			       enum lsm_integrity_type type, const void *value,
+			       size_t size)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bdev_setintegrity, bdev, type, value, size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_setintegrity);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+/**
+ * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed
+ * @type: type of event
+ *
+ * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_perf_event_open(int type)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, type);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_perf_event_alloc() - Allocate a perf event LSM blob
+ * @event: perf event
+ *
+ * Allocate and save perf_event security info.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = lsm_blob_alloc(&event->security, blob_sizes.lbs_perf_event,
+			    GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, event);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(event->security);
+		event->security = NULL;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_perf_event_free() - Free a perf event LSM blob
+ * @event: perf event
+ *
+ * Release (free) perf_event security info.
+ */
+void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	kfree(event->security);
+	event->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_perf_event_read() - Check if reading a perf event label is allowed
+ * @event: perf event
+ *
+ * Read perf_event security info if allowed.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, event);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_perf_event_write() - Check if writing a perf event label is allowed
+ * @event: perf event
+ *
+ * Write perf_event security info if allowed.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, event);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+/**
+ * security_uring_override_creds() - Check if overriding creds is allowed
+ * @new: new credentials
+ *
+ * Check if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to
+ * override it's credentials with @new.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, new);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_uring_sqpoll() - Check if IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL is allowed
+ *
+ * Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling thread
+ * (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL).
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_uring_cmd() - Check if a io_uring passthrough command is allowed
+ * @ioucmd: command
+ *
+ * Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_uring_allowed() - Check if io_uring_setup() is allowed
+ *
+ * Check whether the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(uring_allowed);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
+/**
+ * security_initramfs_populated() - Notify LSMs that initramfs has been loaded
+ *
+ * Tells the LSMs the initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
+ */
+void security_initramfs_populated(void)
+{
+	call_void_hook(initramfs_populated);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/.gitignore b/security/selinux/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..01c0df8ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+av_permissions.h
+flask.h
+/genheaders
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5588c4d57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config SECURITY_SELINUX
+	bool "SELinux Support"
+	depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
+	select NETWORK_SECMARK
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
+	  You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+	bool "SELinux boot parameter"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option adds a kernel parameter 'selinux', which allows SELinux
+	  to be disabled at boot.  If this option is selected, SELinux
+	  functionality can be disabled with selinux=0 on the kernel
+	  command line.  The purpose of this option is to allow a single
+	  kernel image to be distributed with SELinux built in, but not
+	  necessarily enabled.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+	bool "SELinux Development Support"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default y
+	help
+	  This enables the development support option of SELinux,
+	  which is useful for experimenting with SELinux and developing
+	  policies.  If unsure, say Y.  With this option enabled, the
+	  kernel will start in permissive mode (log everything, deny nothing)
+	  unless you specify enforcing=1 on the kernel command line.  You
+	  can interactively toggle the kernel between enforcing mode and
+	  permissive mode (if permitted by the policy) via
+	  /sys/fs/selinux/enforce.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+	bool "SELinux AVC Statistics"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option collects access vector cache statistics to
+	  /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats, which may be monitored via
+	  tools such as avcstat.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
+	int "SELinux sidtab hashtable size"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	range 8 13
+	default 9
+	help
+	  This option sets the number of buckets used in the sidtab hashtable
+	  to 2^SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS buckets. The number of hash
+	  collisions may be viewed at /sys/fs/selinux/ss/sidtab_hash_stats. If
+	  chain lengths are high (e.g. > 20) then selecting a higher value here
+	  will ensure that lookups times are short and stable.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE
+	int "SELinux SID to context string translation cache size"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default 256
+	help
+	  This option defines the size of the internal SID -> context string
+	  cache, which improves the performance of context to string
+	  conversion.  Setting this option to 0 disables the cache completely.
+
+	  If unsure, keep the default value.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_HASH_BITS
+	int "SELinux avc hashtable size"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	range 9 14
+	default 9
+	help
+	  This option sets the number of buckets used in the AVC hash table
+	  to 2^SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_HASH_BITS. A higher value helps maintain
+	  shorter chain lengths especially when expanding AVC nodes via
+	  /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_threshold.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+	bool "SELinux kernel debugging support"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default n
+	help
+	  This enables debugging code designed to help SELinux kernel
+	  developers, unless you know what this does in the kernel code you
+	  should leave this disabled.
+
+	  To fine control the messages to be printed enable
+	  CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG and see
+	  Documentation/admin-guide/dynamic-debug-howto.rst for additional
+	  information.
+
+	  Example usage:
+
+		echo -n 'file "security/selinux/*" +p' > \
+			/proc/dynamic_debug/control
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..72d3baf79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for building the SELinux module as part of the kernel tree.
+#
+
+# NOTE: There are a number of improvements that can be made to this Makefile
+# once the kernel requires make v4.3 or greater; the most important feature
+# lacking in older versions of make is support for grouped targets.  These
+# improvements are noted inline in the Makefile below ...
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o
+
+ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
+
+ccflags-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG) += -DDEBUG
+
+selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o \
+	     netnode.o netport.o status.o initcalls.o \
+	     ss/ebitmap.o ss/hashtab.o ss/symtab.o ss/sidtab.o ss/avtab.o \
+	     ss/policydb.o ss/services.o ss/conditional.o ss/mls.o ss/context.o
+
+selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
+selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
+selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o
+selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
+
+genhdrs := flask.h av_permissions.h
+
+# see the note above, replace the dependency rule with the one below:
+#  $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(genhdrs))
+$(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
+
+quiet_cmd_genhdrs = GEN     $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(genhdrs))
+      cmd_genhdrs = $< $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(genhdrs))
+
+targets += $(genhdrs)
+
+# see the note above, replace the 'flask.h' rule with the line below:
+#  $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(genhdrs)) &: $(obj)/genheaders FORCE
+$(obj)/flask.h: $(obj)/genheaders FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,genhdrs)
+
+hostprogs := genheaders
+HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..813e82bcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1208 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC).
+ *
+ * Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ *	     James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Update:   KaiGai, Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *	Replaced the avc_lock spinlock by RCU.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "classmap.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/avc.h>
+
+#define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS		(1 << CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_HASH_BITS)
+#define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD	AVC_CACHE_SLOTS
+#define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM	16
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field)	this_cpu_inc(avc_cache_stats.field)
+#else
+#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field)	do {} while (0)
+#endif
+
+struct avc_entry {
+	u32			ssid;
+	u32			tsid;
+	u16			tclass;
+	struct av_decision	avd;
+	struct avc_xperms_node	*xp_node;
+};
+
+struct avc_node {
+	struct avc_entry	ae;
+	struct hlist_node	list; /* anchored in avc_cache->slots[i] */
+	struct rcu_head		rhead;
+};
+
+struct avc_xperms_decision_node {
+	struct extended_perms_decision xpd;
+	struct list_head xpd_list; /* list of extended_perms_decision */
+};
+
+struct avc_xperms_node {
+	struct extended_perms xp;
+	struct list_head xpd_head; /* list head of extended_perms_decision */
+};
+
+struct avc_cache {
+	struct hlist_head	slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
+	spinlock_t		slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
+	atomic_t		lru_hint;	/* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
+	atomic_t		active_nodes;
+	u32			latest_notif;	/* latest revocation notification */
+};
+
+struct avc_callback_node {
+	int (*callback) (u32 event);
+	u32 events;
+	struct avc_callback_node *next;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
+#endif
+
+struct selinux_avc {
+	unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
+	struct avc_cache avc_cache;
+};
+
+static struct selinux_avc selinux_avc;
+
+void selinux_avc_init(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	selinux_avc.avc_cache_threshold = AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD;
+	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[i]);
+		spin_lock_init(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
+	}
+	atomic_set(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
+	atomic_set(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
+}
+
+unsigned int avc_get_cache_threshold(void)
+{
+	return selinux_avc.avc_cache_threshold;
+}
+
+void avc_set_cache_threshold(unsigned int cache_threshold)
+{
+	selinux_avc.avc_cache_threshold = cache_threshold;
+}
+
+static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks __ro_after_init;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep __ro_after_init;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep __ro_after_init;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep __ro_after_init;
+
+static inline u32 avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+	return av_hash(ssid, tsid, (u32)tclass, (u32)(AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_init - Initialize the AVC.
+ *
+ * Initialize the access vector cache.
+ */
+void __init avc_init(void)
+{
+	avc_node_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(avc_node, SLAB_PANIC);
+	avc_xperms_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(avc_xperms_node, SLAB_PANIC);
+	avc_xperms_decision_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(avc_xperms_decision_node, SLAB_PANIC);
+	avc_xperms_data_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(extended_perms_data, SLAB_PANIC);
+}
+
+int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
+{
+	int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
+	struct avc_node *node;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+		head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[i];
+		if (!hlist_empty(head)) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list)
+				chain_len++;
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
+			 "longest chain: %d\n",
+			 atomic_read(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes),
+			 slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * using a linked list for extended_perms_decision lookup because the list is
+ * always small. i.e. less than 5, typically 1
+ */
+static struct extended_perms_decision *
+avc_xperms_decision_lookup(u8 driver, u8 base_perm,
+			   struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(xpd_node, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+		if (xpd_node->xpd.driver == driver &&
+		    xpd_node->xpd.base_perm == base_perm)
+			return &xpd_node->xpd;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int
+avc_xperms_has_perm(struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+					u8 perm, u8 which)
+{
+	unsigned int rc = 0;
+
+	if ((which == XPERMS_ALLOWED) &&
+			(xpd->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED))
+		rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
+	else if ((which == XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) &&
+			(xpd->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
+		rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->auditallow->p, perm);
+	else if ((which == XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) &&
+			(xpd->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
+		rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->dontaudit->p, perm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_allow_perm(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node,
+				  u8 driver, u8 base_perm, u8 perm)
+{
+	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+	security_xperm_set(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver);
+	xp_node->xp.base_perms |= base_perm;
+	xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, base_perm, xp_node);
+	if (xpd && xpd->allowed)
+		security_xperm_set(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_decision_free(struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node)
+{
+	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+
+	xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
+	if (xpd->allowed)
+		kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->allowed);
+	if (xpd->auditallow)
+		kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->auditallow);
+	if (xpd->dontaudit)
+		kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->dontaudit);
+	kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, xpd_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_free(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node, *tmp;
+
+	if (!xp_node)
+		return;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(xpd_node, tmp, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+		list_del(&xpd_node->xpd_list);
+		avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
+	}
+	kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_cachep, xp_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_copy_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
+					struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+	dest->base_perm = src->base_perm;
+	dest->driver = src->driver;
+	dest->used = src->used;
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+		memcpy(dest->allowed->p, src->allowed->p,
+				sizeof(src->allowed->p));
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
+		memcpy(dest->auditallow->p, src->auditallow->p,
+				sizeof(src->auditallow->p));
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+		memcpy(dest->dontaudit->p, src->dontaudit->p,
+				sizeof(src->dontaudit->p));
+}
+
+/*
+ * similar to avc_copy_xperms_decision, but only copy decision
+ * information relevant to this perm
+ */
+static inline void avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(u8 perm,
+			struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
+			struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+	/*
+	 * compute index of the u32 of the 256 bits (8 u32s) that contain this
+	 * command permission
+	 */
+	u8 i = perm >> 5;
+
+	dest->base_perm = src->base_perm;
+	dest->used = src->used;
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+		dest->allowed->p[i] = src->allowed->p[i];
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
+		dest->auditallow->p[i] = src->auditallow->p[i];
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+		dest->dontaudit->p[i] = src->dontaudit->p[i];
+}
+
+static struct avc_xperms_decision_node
+		*avc_xperms_decision_alloc(u8 which)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
+	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+
+	xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
+	if (!xpd_node)
+		return NULL;
+
+	xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
+	if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+		xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+						 GFP_NOWAIT);
+		if (!xpd->allowed)
+			goto error;
+	}
+	if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+		xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+						    GFP_NOWAIT);
+		if (!xpd->auditallow)
+			goto error;
+	}
+	if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+		xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+						   GFP_NOWAIT);
+		if (!xpd->dontaudit)
+			goto error;
+	}
+	return xpd_node;
+error:
+	avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int avc_add_xperms_decision(struct avc_node *node,
+			struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
+
+	dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src->used);
+	if (!dest_xpd)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, src);
+	list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &node->ae.xp_node->xpd_head);
+	node->ae.xp_node->xp.len++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+
+	xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
+	if (!xp_node)
+		return xp_node;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
+	return xp_node;
+}
+
+static int avc_xperms_populate(struct avc_node *node,
+				struct avc_xperms_node *src)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_node *dest;
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *src_xpd;
+
+	if (src->xp.len == 0)
+		return 0;
+	dest = avc_xperms_alloc();
+	if (!dest)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memcpy(dest->xp.drivers.p, src->xp.drivers.p, sizeof(dest->xp.drivers.p));
+	dest->xp.len = src->xp.len;
+	dest->xp.base_perms = src->xp.base_perms;
+
+	/* for each source xpd allocate a destination xpd and copy */
+	list_for_each_entry(src_xpd, &src->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+		dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src_xpd->xpd.used);
+		if (!dest_xpd)
+			goto error;
+		avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, &src_xpd->xpd);
+		list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &dest->xpd_head);
+	}
+	node->ae.xp_node = dest;
+	return 0;
+error:
+	avc_xperms_free(dest);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+
+}
+
+static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested,
+					struct av_decision *avd,
+					struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+					u8 perm,
+					int result,
+					u32 *deniedp)
+{
+	u32 denied, audited;
+
+	denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
+	if (unlikely(denied)) {
+		audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
+		if (audited && xpd) {
+			if (avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
+				audited = 0;
+		}
+	} else if (result) {
+		audited = denied = requested;
+	} else {
+		audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
+		if (audited && xpd) {
+			if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
+				audited = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*deniedp = denied;
+	return audited;
+}
+
+static inline int avc_xperms_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				   u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
+				   struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+				   u8 perm, int result,
+				   struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	u32 audited, denied;
+
+	audited = avc_xperms_audit_required(
+			requested, avd, xpd, perm, result, &denied);
+	if (likely(!audited))
+		return 0;
+	return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+			audited, denied, result, ad);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
+	avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
+	kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
+{
+	hlist_del_rcu(&node->list);
+	call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
+	atomic_dec(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
+{
+	avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
+	kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
+	atomic_dec(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_replace(struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
+{
+	hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
+	call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
+	atomic_dec(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes);
+}
+
+static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+	int hvalue, try, ecx;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+	spinlock_t *lock;
+
+	for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
+		hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.lru_hint) &
+			(AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+		head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+		lock = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+
+		if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags))
+			continue;
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list) {
+			avc_node_delete(node);
+			avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
+			ecx++;
+			if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
+				rcu_read_unlock();
+				spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
+	}
+out:
+	return ecx;
+}
+
+static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+
+	node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
+	if (!node)
+		goto out;
+
+	INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
+
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes) >
+	    selinux_avc.avc_cache_threshold)
+		avc_reclaim_node();
+
+out:
+	return node;
+}
+
+static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	node->ae.ssid = ssid;
+	node->ae.tsid = tsid;
+	node->ae.tclass = tclass;
+	memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
+}
+
+static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
+	u32 hvalue;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+
+	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list) {
+		if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
+		    tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
+		    tsid == node->ae.tsid) {
+			ret = node;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ *
+ * Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the
+ * (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
+ * based on @tclass.  If a valid AVC entry exists,
+ * then this function returns the avc_node.
+ * Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
+ */
+static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
+	node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+
+	if (node)
+		return node;
+
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int avc_latest_notif_update(u32 seqno, int is_insert)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(notif_lock);
+	unsigned long flag;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&notif_lock, flag);
+	if (is_insert) {
+		if (seqno < selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif) {
+			pr_warn("SELinux: avc:  seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
+			       seqno, selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif);
+			ret = -EAGAIN;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (seqno > selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif)
+			selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&notif_lock, flag);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_insert - Insert an AVC entry.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @avd: resulting av decision
+ * @xp_node: resulting extended permissions
+ *
+ * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
+ * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
+ * The access vectors and the sequence number are
+ * normally provided by the security server in
+ * response to a security_compute_av() call.  If the
+ * sequence number @avd->seqno is not less than the latest
+ * revocation notification, then the function copies
+ * the access vectors into a cache entry.
+ */
+static void avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+		       struct av_decision *avd, struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+	struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
+	u32 hvalue;
+	unsigned long flag;
+	spinlock_t *lock;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+
+	if (avc_latest_notif_update(avd->seqno, 1))
+		return;
+
+	node = avc_alloc_node();
+	if (!node)
+		return;
+
+	avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+	if (avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node)) {
+		avc_node_kill(node);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+	lock = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+	spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+	hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
+		if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
+			pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
+			pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
+			avc_node_replace(node, pos);
+			goto found;
+		}
+	}
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
+found:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_audit_pre_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+	struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data;
+	u32 av = sad->audited, perm;
+	const char *const *perms;
+	u32 i;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ", sad->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+
+	if (av == 0) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " null");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	perms = secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].perms;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " {");
+	i = 0;
+	perm = 1;
+	while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) {
+		if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]);
+			av &= ~perm;
+		}
+		i++;
+		perm <<= 1;
+	}
+
+	if (av)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av);
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " } for ");
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_audit_post_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+	struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data;
+	char *scontext = NULL;
+	char *tcontext = NULL;
+	const char *tclass = NULL;
+	u32 scontext_len;
+	u32 tcontext_len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->ssid, &scontext,
+				     &scontext_len);
+	if (rc)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%d", sad->ssid);
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " scontext=%s", scontext);
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->tsid, &tcontext,
+				     &tcontext_len);
+	if (rc)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", sad->tsid);
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", tcontext);
+
+	tclass = secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].name;
+	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", tclass);
+
+	if (sad->denied)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u", sad->result ? 0 : 1);
+
+	trace_selinux_audited(sad, scontext, tcontext, tclass);
+	kfree(tcontext);
+	kfree(scontext);
+
+	/* in case of invalid context report also the actual context string */
+	rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->ssid, &scontext,
+					   &scontext_len);
+	if (!rc && scontext) {
+		if (scontext_len && scontext[scontext_len - 1] == '\0')
+			scontext_len--;
+		audit_log_format(ab, " srawcon=");
+		audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, scontext, scontext_len);
+		kfree(scontext);
+	}
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->tsid, &scontext,
+					   &scontext_len);
+	if (!rc && scontext) {
+		if (scontext_len && scontext[scontext_len - 1] == '\0')
+			scontext_len--;
+		audit_log_format(ab, " trawcon=");
+		audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, scontext, scontext_len);
+		kfree(scontext);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint.
+ * Note that it is non-blocking and can be called from under
+ * rcu_read_lock().
+ */
+noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
+			    struct common_audit_data *a)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!a) {
+		a = &stack_data;
+		a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+	}
+
+	sad.tclass = tclass;
+	sad.requested = requested;
+	sad.ssid = ssid;
+	sad.tsid = tsid;
+	sad.audited = audited;
+	sad.denied = denied;
+	sad.result = result;
+
+	a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+
+	common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events.
+ * @callback: callback function
+ * @events: security events
+ *
+ * Register a callback function for events in the set @events.
+ * Returns %0 on success or -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory
+ * exists to add the callback.
+ */
+int __init avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events)
+{
+	struct avc_callback_node *c;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	c = kmalloc_obj(*c);
+	if (!c) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	c->callback = callback;
+	c->events = events;
+	c->next = avc_callbacks;
+	avc_callbacks = c;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_update_node - Update an AVC entry
+ * @event : Updating event
+ * @perms : Permission mask bits
+ * @driver: xperm driver information
+ * @base_perm: the base permission associated with the extended permission
+ * @xperm: xperm permissions
+ * @ssid: AVC entry source sid
+ * @tsid: AVC entry target sid
+ * @tclass : AVC entry target object class
+ * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
+ * @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
+ * @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0.
+ *
+ * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
+ * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
+ * otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
+ * will release later by RCU.
+ */
+static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 base_perm,
+			   u8 xperm, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
+			   struct extended_perms_decision *xpd, u32 flags)
+{
+	u32 hvalue;
+	int rc = 0;
+	unsigned long flag;
+	struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+	spinlock_t *lock;
+
+	node = avc_alloc_node();
+	if (!node) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Lock the target slot */
+	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+
+	head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+	lock = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
+		if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid &&
+		    tsid == pos->ae.tsid &&
+		    tclass == pos->ae.tclass &&
+		    seqno == pos->ae.avd.seqno){
+			orig = pos;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!orig) {
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		avc_node_kill(node);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy and replace original node.
+	 */
+
+	avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
+
+	if (orig->ae.xp_node) {
+		rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, orig->ae.xp_node);
+		if (rc) {
+			avc_node_kill(node);
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+	}
+
+	switch (event) {
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
+		node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
+		if (node->ae.xp_node && (flags & AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS))
+			avc_xperms_allow_perm(node->ae.xp_node, driver, base_perm, xperm);
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
+		node->ae.avd.allowed &= ~perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE:
+		node->ae.avd.auditallow |= perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE:
+		node->ae.avd.auditallow &= ~perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE:
+		node->ae.avd.auditdeny |= perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
+		node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS:
+		rc = avc_add_xperms_decision(node, xpd);
+		if (rc) {
+			avc_node_kill(node);
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	avc_node_replace(node, orig);
+out_unlock:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_flush - Flush the cache
+ */
+static void avc_flush(void)
+{
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+	struct avc_node *node;
+	spinlock_t *lock;
+	unsigned long flag;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+		head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[i];
+		lock = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
+
+		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+		/*
+		 * With preemptible RCU, the outer spinlock does not
+		 * prevent RCU grace periods from ending.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list)
+			avc_node_delete(node);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
+ * @seqno: policy sequence number
+ */
+int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
+{
+	struct avc_callback_node *c;
+	int rc = 0, tmprc;
+
+	avc_flush();
+
+	for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
+		if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+			tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
+			/* save the first error encountered for the return
+			   value and continue processing the callbacks */
+			if (!rc)
+				rc = tmprc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	avc_latest_notif_update(seqno, 0);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_compute_av - Add an entry to the AVC based on the security policy
+ * @ssid: subject
+ * @tsid: object/target
+ * @tclass: object class
+ * @avd: access vector decision
+ * @xp_node: AVC extended permissions node
+ *
+ * Slow-path helper function for avc_has_perm_noaudit, when the avc_node lookup
+ * fails.  Don't inline this, since it's the slow-path and just results in a
+ * bigger stack frame.
+ */
+static noinline void avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				    struct av_decision *avd,
+				    struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
+	security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
+	avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
+}
+
+static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			       u8 driver, u8 base_perm, u8 xperm,
+			       unsigned int flags, struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	if (enforcing_enabled() &&
+	    !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver, base_perm,
+			xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The avc extended permissions logic adds an additional 256 bits of
+ * permissions to an avc node when extended permissions for that node are
+ * specified in the avtab. If the additional 256 permissions is not adequate,
+ * as-is the case with ioctls, then multiple may be chained together and the
+ * driver field is used to specify which set contains the permission.
+ */
+int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			   u8 driver, u8 base_perm, u8 xperm,
+			   struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	u32 denied;
+	struct extended_perms_decision local_xpd;
+	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd = NULL;
+	struct extended_perms_data allowed;
+	struct extended_perms_data auditallow;
+	struct extended_perms_data dontaudit;
+	struct avc_xperms_node local_xp_node;
+	struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+	int rc = 0, rc2;
+
+	xp_node = &local_xp_node;
+	if (WARN_ON(!requested))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	if (unlikely(!node)) {
+		avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
+	} else {
+		memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
+		xp_node = node->ae.xp_node;
+	}
+	/* if extended permissions are not defined, only consider av_decision */
+	if (!xp_node || !xp_node->xp.len)
+		goto decision;
+
+	local_xpd.allowed = &allowed;
+	local_xpd.auditallow = &auditallow;
+	local_xpd.dontaudit = &dontaudit;
+
+	xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, base_perm, xp_node);
+	if (unlikely(!xpd)) {
+		/*
+		 * Compute the extended_perms_decision only if the driver
+		 * is flagged and the base permission is known.
+		 */
+		if (!security_xperm_test(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver) ||
+		    !(xp_node->xp.base_perms & base_perm)) {
+			avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+			goto decision;
+		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		security_compute_xperms_decision(ssid, tsid, tclass, driver,
+						 base_perm, &local_xpd);
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested, driver,
+				base_perm, xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno,
+				&local_xpd, 0);
+	} else {
+		avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(xperm, &local_xpd, xpd);
+	}
+	xpd = &local_xpd;
+
+	if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, xperm, XPERMS_ALLOWED))
+		avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+
+decision:
+	denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
+	if (unlikely(denied))
+		rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, driver,
+				base_perm, xperm, AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+			&avd, xpd, xperm, rc, ad);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_perm_nonode - Add an entry to the AVC
+ * @ssid: subject
+ * @tsid: object/target
+ * @tclass: object class
+ * @requested: requested permissions
+ * @flags: AVC flags
+ * @avd: access vector decision
+ *
+ * This is the "we have no node" part of avc_has_perm_noaudit(), which is
+ * unlikely and needs extra stack space for the new node that we generate, so
+ * don't inline it.
+ */
+static noinline int avc_perm_nonode(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				    u32 requested, unsigned int flags,
+				    struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	u32 denied;
+	struct avc_xperms_node xp_node;
+
+	avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
+	denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
+	if (unlikely(denied))
+		return avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0, 0,
+				  flags, avd);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ * @flags:  AVC_STRICT or 0
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ *
+ * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
+ * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
+ * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
+ * a new decision and add it to the cache.  Return a copy of the decisions
+ * in @avd.  Return %0 if all @requested permissions are granted,
+ * -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or another -errno upon
+ * other errors.  This function is typically called by avc_has_perm(),
+ * but may also be called directly to separate permission checking from
+ * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but
+ * should be released for the auditing.
+ */
+inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+				u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+				unsigned int flags,
+				struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	u32 denied;
+	struct avc_node *node;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!requested))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	if (unlikely(!node)) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return avc_perm_nonode(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+				       flags, avd);
+	}
+	denied = requested & ~node->ae.avd.allowed;
+	memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (unlikely(denied))
+		return avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0, 0,
+				  flags, avd);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
+ * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
+ * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
+ * a new decision and add it to the cache.  Audit the granting or denial of
+ * permissions in accordance with the policy.  Return %0 if all @requested
+ * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
+ * another -errno upon other errors.
+ */
+int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+		 u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
+{
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int rc, rc2;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,
+				  &avd);
+
+	rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
+			auditdata);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
+{
+	return selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/genheaders.c b/security/selinux/genheaders.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3834d7eb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/genheaders.c
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+struct security_class_mapping {
+	const char *name;
+	const char *perms[sizeof(unsigned) * 8 + 1];
+};
+
+#include "classmap.h"
+#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+
+const char *progname;
+
+static void usage(void)
+{
+	printf("usage: %s flask.h av_permissions.h\n", progname);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+static char *stoupperx(const char *s)
+{
+	char *s2 = strdup(s);
+	char *p;
+
+	if (!s2) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s:  out of memory\n", progname);
+		exit(3);
+	}
+
+	for (p = s2; *p; p++)
+		*p = toupper(*p);
+	return s2;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	int i, j;
+	int isids_len;
+	FILE *fout;
+
+	progname = argv[0];
+
+	if (argc < 3)
+		usage();
+
+	fout = fopen(argv[1], "w");
+	if (!fout) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not open %s for writing:  %s\n",
+			argv[1], strerror(errno));
+		exit(2);
+	}
+
+	fprintf(fout, "/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "#ifndef _SELINUX_FLASK_H_\n#define _SELINUX_FLASK_H_\n\n");
+
+	for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
+		char *name = stoupperx(secclass_map[i].name);
+
+		fprintf(fout, "#define SECCLASS_%-39s %2d\n", name, i+1);
+		free(name);
+	}
+
+	fprintf(fout, "\n");
+
+	isids_len = sizeof(initial_sid_to_string) / sizeof(char *);
+	for (i = 1; i < isids_len; i++) {
+		const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
+		if (s) {
+			char *sidname = stoupperx(s);
+
+			fprintf(fout, "#define SECINITSID_%-39s %2d\n", sidname, i);
+			free(sidname);
+		}
+	}
+	fprintf(fout, "\n#define SECINITSID_NUM %d\n", i-1);
+	fprintf(fout, "\nstatic inline bool security_is_socket_class(u16 kern_tclass)\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "{\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\tbool sock = false;\n\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\tswitch (kern_tclass) {\n");
+	for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
+		static char s[] = "SOCKET";
+		int len, l;
+		char *name = stoupperx(secclass_map[i].name);
+
+		len = strlen(name);
+		l = sizeof(s) - 1;
+		if (len >= l && memcmp(name + len - l, s, l) == 0)
+			fprintf(fout, "\tcase SECCLASS_%s:\n", name);
+		free(name);
+	}
+	fprintf(fout, "\t\tsock = true;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\t\tbreak;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\tdefault:\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\t\tbreak;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\t}\n\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\treturn sock;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "}\n");
+
+	fprintf(fout, "\n#endif\n");
+
+	if (fclose(fout) != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not successfully close %s:  %s\n",
+			argv[1], strerror(errno));
+		exit(4);
+	}
+
+	fout = fopen(argv[2], "w");
+	if (!fout) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not open %s for writing:  %s\n",
+			argv[2], strerror(errno));
+		exit(5);
+	}
+
+	fprintf(fout, "/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "#ifndef _SELINUX_AV_PERMISSIONS_H_\n#define _SELINUX_AV_PERMISSIONS_H_\n\n");
+
+	for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
+		const struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i];
+		int len;
+		char *name = stoupperx(map->name);
+
+		len = strlen(name);
+		for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++) {
+			char *permname;
+
+			if (j >= 32) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Too many permissions to fit into an access vector at (%s, %s).\n",
+					map->name, map->perms[j]);
+				exit(5);
+			}
+			permname = stoupperx(map->perms[j]);
+			fprintf(fout, "#define %s__%-*s 0x%08xU\n", name,
+				39-len, permname, 1U<<j);
+			free(permname);
+		}
+		free(name);
+	}
+
+	fprintf(fout, "\n#endif\n");
+
+	if (fclose(fout) != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not successfully close %s:  %s\n",
+			argv[2], strerror(errno));
+		exit(6);
+	}
+
+	exit(0);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..70a3388c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,7993 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ *  Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
+ *
+ *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ *	      Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
+ *	      Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
+ *	      James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *					   Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ *			    <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
+ *		       Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <net/icmp.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>		/* for local_port_range[] */
+#include <net/tcp.h>		/* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>	/* for network interface checks */
+#include <net/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/sctp.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
+#include <linux/quota.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>		/* for Unix socket types */
+#include <net/af_unix.h>	/* for Unix socket types */
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
+#include <linux/syslog.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/kernfs.h>
+#include <linux/stringhash.h>	/* for hashlen_string() */
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/fanotify.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring/cmd.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+#include <linux/memfd.h>
+
+#include "initcalls.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netif.h"
+#include "netnode.h"
+#include "netport.h"
+#include "ibpkey.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+
+#define SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 1
+
+struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+
+/* SECMARK reference count */
+static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
+
+static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long enforcing;
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
+		selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
+#else
+#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
+#endif
+
+int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long enabled;
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
+		selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
+#endif
+
+static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long checkreqprot;
+
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
+		if (checkreqprot)
+			pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter.  This is no longer supported.\n");
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
+ * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
+ * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
+ * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.  If the always_check_network
+ * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
+{
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+		atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled.  Returns true
+ * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled.  If the
+ * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
+ * is always considered enabled.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
+{
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+		netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
+}
+
+static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+		sel_netif_flush();
+		sel_netnode_flush();
+		sel_netport_flush();
+		synchronize_net();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+		sel_ib_pkey_flush();
+		call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * initialise the security for the init task
+ */
+static void cred_init_security(void)
+{
+	struct cred_security_struct *crsec;
+
+	/* NOTE: the lsm framework zeros out the buffer on allocation */
+
+	crsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred));
+	crsec->osid = crsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the security ID of a set of credentials
+ */
+static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec;
+
+	crsec = selinux_cred(cred);
+	return crsec->sid;
+}
+
+static void __ad_net_init(struct common_audit_data *ad,
+			  struct lsm_network_audit *net,
+			  int ifindex, struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+	ad->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad->u.net = net;
+	net->netif = ifindex;
+	net->sk = sk;
+	net->family = family;
+}
+
+static void ad_net_init_from_sk(struct common_audit_data *ad,
+				struct lsm_network_audit *net,
+				struct sock *sk)
+{
+	__ad_net_init(ad, net, 0, sk, 0);
+}
+
+static void ad_net_init_from_iif(struct common_audit_data *ad,
+				 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
+				 int ifindex, u16 family)
+{
+	__ad_net_init(ad, net, ifindex, NULL, family);
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the objective security ID of a task
+ */
+static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	u32 sid;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return sid;
+}
+
+static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
+
+/*
+ * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid.  The
+ * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
+ * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
+ * invalid.  The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
+ */
+static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
+				       struct dentry *dentry,
+				       bool may_sleep)
+{
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	if (may_sleep)
+		might_sleep();
+	else
+		return -ECHILD;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check to ensure that an inode's SELinux state is valid and try
+	 * reloading the inode security label if necessary.  This will fail if
+	 * @dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be found; in that
+	 * case, continue using the old label.
+	 */
+	inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return selinux_inode(inode);
+}
+
+static inline struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode,
+							       bool rcu)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+	/* check below is racy, but revalidate will recheck with lock held */
+	if (data_race(likely(isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)))
+		return isec;
+	rc = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
+	if (rc)
+		return ERR_PTR(rc);
+	return isec;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the security label of an inode.
+ */
+static inline struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+	/* check below is racy, but revalidate will recheck with lock held */
+	if (data_race(likely(isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)))
+		return isec;
+	__inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
+	return isec;
+}
+
+static inline struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return selinux_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
+ */
+static inline struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+	/* check below is racy, but revalidate will recheck with lock held */
+	if (data_race(likely(isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)))
+		return isec;
+	__inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
+	return isec;
+}
+
+static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+
+	if (!isec)
+		return;
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
+	/*
+	 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
+	 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
+	 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
+	 *
+	 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
+	 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
+	 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
+	 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
+	 */
+	if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
+		spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		list_del_init(&isec->list);
+		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+	}
+}
+
+struct selinux_mnt_opts {
+	u32 fscontext_sid;
+	u32 context_sid;
+	u32 rootcontext_sid;
+	u32 defcontext_sid;
+};
+
+static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
+{
+	kfree(mnt_opts);
+}
+
+enum {
+	Opt_error = -1,
+	Opt_context = 0,
+	Opt_defcontext = 1,
+	Opt_fscontext = 2,
+	Opt_rootcontext = 3,
+	Opt_seclabel = 4,
+};
+
+#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
+static const struct {
+	const char *name;
+	int len;
+	int opt;
+	bool has_arg;
+} tokens[] = {
+	A(context, true),
+	A(fscontext, true),
+	A(defcontext, true),
+	A(rootcontext, true),
+	A(seclabel, false),
+};
+#undef A
+
+static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
+		size_t len = tokens[i].len;
+		if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
+			continue;
+		if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
+			if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
+				continue;
+			*arg = s + len + 1;
+		} else if (len != l)
+			continue;
+		return tokens[i].opt;
+	}
+	return Opt_error;
+}
+
+#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
+
+static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
+			struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
+			const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(cred);
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(crsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(crsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
+			struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
+			const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(cred);
+	int rc;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(crsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	/* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
+	return	!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
+		(selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
+		 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
+		  !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))) ||
+		(selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel() &&
+		 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs"));
+}
+
+static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+
+	/*
+	 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
+	 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
+
+	switch (sbsec->behavior) {
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
+		return 1;
+
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
+		return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
+
+	/* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+	struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
+	u32 sid;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
+	 * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
+	 * the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
+	 * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
+	 * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
+	 */
+	if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+		pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
+			sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+		goto fallback;
+	}
+
+	rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+	if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
+		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+			pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
+				sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+			goto fallback;
+		} else {
+			pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
+				sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+fallback:
+	/* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
+	rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, "/",
+				SECCLASS_DIR, &sid);
+	if (rc)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
+		sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+	sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+	sbsec->sid = sid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+	struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
+		rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
+
+	/*
+	 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT.  It's not sufficient to simply
+	 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
+	 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
+	 */
+	if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
+		sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
+	else
+		sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
+
+	/* Initialize the root inode. */
+	rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
+
+	/* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
+	   inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
+	   during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
+	   populates itself. */
+	spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+	while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec =
+				list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
+					   struct inode_security_struct, list);
+		struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
+		list_del_init(&isec->list);
+		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		inode = igrab(inode);
+		if (inode) {
+			if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
+				inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
+			iput(inode);
+		}
+		spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
+		      u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+{
+	char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
+	/* check if the old mount command had the same options */
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
+		if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
+		    (old_sid != new_sid))
+			return 1;
+
+	/* check if we were passed the same options twice,
+	 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
+	 */
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		if (mnt_flags & flag)
+			return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
+ * labeling information.
+ */
+static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
+				void *mnt_opts,
+				unsigned long kern_flags,
+				unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+	struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
+	struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+	u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
+	u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+	 * place the results is not allowed
+	 */
+	if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		if (!opts) {
+			/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
+			   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
+			   server is ready to handle calls. */
+			if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
+				sbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
+				*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+			}
+			goto out;
+		}
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
+			"before the security server is initialized\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
+	 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
+	 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
+	 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
+	 *
+	 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
+	 * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using
+	 * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
+	 * will be used for both mounts)
+	 */
+	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+	    && !opts)
+		goto out;
+
+	root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
+
+	/*
+	 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
+	 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
+	 * than once with different security options.
+	 */
+	if (opts) {
+		if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
+			fscontext_sid = opts->fscontext_sid;
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
+					fscontext_sid))
+				goto out_double_mount;
+			sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
+		}
+		if (opts->context_sid) {
+			context_sid = opts->context_sid;
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+					context_sid))
+				goto out_double_mount;
+			sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
+		}
+		if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
+			rootcontext_sid = opts->rootcontext_sid;
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
+					rootcontext_sid))
+				goto out_double_mount;
+			sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+		}
+		if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
+			defcontext_sid = opts->defcontext_sid;
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
+					defcontext_sid))
+				goto out_double_mount;
+			sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+		/* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
+		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
+			goto out_double_mount;
+		rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	sbsec->creator_sid = current_sid();
+
+	if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
+
+	if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs") ||
+	    (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel() &&
+	     !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs")))
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
+
+	if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
+
+	if (!sbsec->behavior) {
+		/*
+		 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
+		 * filesystem type.
+		 */
+		rc = security_fs_use(sb);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
+					__func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
+	 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
+	 * line and security labels must be ignored.
+	 */
+	if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
+	    strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
+	    strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
+	    strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
+	    strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
+		if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
+		    defcontext_sid) {
+			rc = -EACCES;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
+			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+			rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(),
+						     current_sid(),
+						     SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
+						     &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		goto out_set_opts;
+	}
+
+	/* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
+	if (fscontext_sid) {
+		rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
+	 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
+	 * the superblock context if not already set.
+	 */
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBNATIVE) {
+		/*
+		 * This means we are initializing a superblock that has been
+		 * mounted before the SELinux was initialized and the
+		 * filesystem requested native labeling. We had already
+		 * returned SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in *set_kern_flags
+		 * in the original mount attempt, so now we just need to set
+		 * the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior.
+		 */
+		sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+	} else if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
+		sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+		*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+	}
+
+	if (context_sid) {
+		if (!fscontext_sid) {
+			rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
+							  cred);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			sbsec->sid = context_sid;
+		} else {
+			rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
+							     cred);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		if (!rootcontext_sid)
+			rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
+
+		sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
+		sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+	}
+
+	if (rootcontext_sid) {
+		rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
+						     cred);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
+		root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+	}
+
+	if (defcontext_sid) {
+		if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
+			sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
+			       "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
+			rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
+							     sbsec, cred);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
+		sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
+	}
+
+out_set_opts:
+	rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
+	return rc;
+out_double_mount:
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
+	       "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
+	       sb->s_type->name);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+				    const struct super_block *newsb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+	struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
+	char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+	char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
+	if (oldflags != newflags)
+		goto mismatch;
+	if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
+		goto mismatch;
+	if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
+		goto mismatch;
+	if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
+		goto mismatch;
+	if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
+		struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
+		if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
+			goto mismatch;
+	}
+	if (old->creator_sid != new->creator_sid)
+		goto mismatch;
+	return 0;
+mismatch:
+	pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, "
+			    "different security settings for (dev %s, "
+			    "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
+	return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+					struct super_block *newsb,
+					unsigned long kern_flags,
+					unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
+						selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+	struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
+
+	int set_fscontext =	(oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
+	int set_context =	(oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
+	int set_rootcontext =	(oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
+
+	/*
+	 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+	 * place the results is not allowed.
+	 */
+	if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
+	 * mount options.  thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
+			newsbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
+			*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
+	BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
+
+	/* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
+	if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+		mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
+		if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
+			*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+		return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
+	}
+
+	newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
+
+	newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
+	newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
+	newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
+	newsbsec->creator_sid = oldsbsec->creator_sid;
+
+	if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
+		!(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
+		rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
+		newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+		*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+	}
+
+	if (set_context) {
+		u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+
+		if (!set_fscontext)
+			newsbsec->sid = sid;
+		if (!set_rootcontext) {
+			struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
+			newisec->sid = sid;
+		}
+		newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
+	}
+	if (set_rootcontext) {
+		const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
+		struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
+
+		newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
+	}
+
+	sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: the caller is responsible for freeing the memory even if on error.
+ */
+static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
+{
+	struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
+	u32 *dst_sid;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (token == Opt_seclabel)
+		/* eaten and completely ignored */
+		return 0;
+	if (!s)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!opts) {
+		opts = kzalloc_obj(*opts);
+		if (!opts)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		*mnt_opts = opts;
+	}
+
+	switch (token) {
+	case Opt_context:
+		if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
+			goto err;
+		dst_sid = &opts->context_sid;
+		break;
+	case Opt_fscontext:
+		if (opts->fscontext_sid)
+			goto err;
+		dst_sid = &opts->fscontext_sid;
+		break;
+	case Opt_rootcontext:
+		if (opts->rootcontext_sid)
+			goto err;
+		dst_sid = &opts->rootcontext_sid;
+		break;
+	case Opt_defcontext:
+		if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
+			goto err;
+		dst_sid = &opts->defcontext_sid;
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n",
+			s, rc);
+	return rc;
+
+err:
+	pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
+{
+	char *context = NULL;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
+	if (!rc) {
+		bool has_comma = strchr(context, ',');
+
+		seq_putc(m, '=');
+		if (has_comma)
+			seq_putc(m, '\"');
+		seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
+		if (has_comma)
+			seq_putc(m, '\"');
+	}
+	kfree(context);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
+		seq_putc(m, ',');
+		seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
+		rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
+		seq_putc(m, ',');
+		seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
+		rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
+		seq_putc(m, ',');
+		seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
+		rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
+		struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
+		seq_putc(m, ',');
+		seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
+		rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
+		seq_putc(m, ',');
+		seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
+{
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFSOCK:
+		return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
+	case S_IFLNK:
+		return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
+	case S_IFREG:
+		return SECCLASS_FILE;
+	case S_IFBLK:
+		return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
+	case S_IFDIR:
+		return SECCLASS_DIR;
+	case S_IFCHR:
+		return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
+	case S_IFIFO:
+		return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
+
+	}
+
+	return SECCLASS_FILE;
+}
+
+static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
+{
+	return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
+		protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
+}
+
+static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
+{
+	return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
+}
+
+static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
+{
+	bool extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
+
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_UNIX:
+		switch (type) {
+		case SOCK_STREAM:
+		case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
+			return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
+		case SOCK_DGRAM:
+		case SOCK_RAW:
+			return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
+		}
+		break;
+	case PF_INET:
+	case PF_INET6:
+		switch (type) {
+		case SOCK_STREAM:
+		case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
+			if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
+				return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
+			else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
+				return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
+			else
+				return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+		case SOCK_DGRAM:
+			if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
+				return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
+			else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
+						  protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
+				return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
+			else
+				return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+		default:
+			return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+		}
+		break;
+	case PF_NETLINK:
+		switch (protocol) {
+		case NETLINK_ROUTE:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_NFLOG:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_XFRM:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_SELINUX:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_ISCSI:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_AUDIT:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_GENERIC:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_RDMA:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
+		default:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+		}
+	case PF_PACKET:
+		return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
+	case PF_KEY:
+		return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
+	case PF_APPLETALK:
+		return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
+	}
+
+	if (extsockclass) {
+		switch (family) {
+		case PF_AX25:
+			return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
+		case PF_IPX:
+			return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
+		case PF_NETROM:
+			return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
+		case PF_ATMPVC:
+			return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_X25:
+			return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
+		case PF_ROSE:
+			return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
+		case PF_DECnet:
+			return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
+		case PF_ATMSVC:
+			return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_RDS:
+			return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
+		case PF_IRDA:
+			return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
+		case PF_PPPOX:
+			return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
+		case PF_LLC:
+			return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_CAN:
+			return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
+		case PF_TIPC:
+			return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_BLUETOOTH:
+			return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
+		case PF_IUCV:
+			return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
+		case PF_RXRPC:
+			return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_ISDN:
+			return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
+		case PF_PHONET:
+			return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
+		case PF_IEEE802154:
+			return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
+		case PF_CAIF:
+			return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
+		case PF_ALG:
+			return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
+		case PF_NFC:
+			return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_VSOCK:
+			return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
+		case PF_KCM:
+			return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
+		case PF_QIPCRTR:
+			return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
+		case PF_SMC:
+			return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_XDP:
+			return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
+		case PF_MCTP:
+			return SECCLASS_MCTP_SOCKET;
+#if PF_MAX > 46
+#error New address family defined, please update this function.
+#endif
+		}
+	}
+
+	return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
+}
+
+static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
+				 u16 tclass,
+				 u16 flags,
+				 u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
+	char *buffer, *path;
+
+	buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(path))
+		rc = PTR_ERR(path);
+	else {
+		if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
+			/* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
+			 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
+			 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
+			while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
+				path[1] = '/';
+				path++;
+			}
+		}
+		rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name,
+					path, tclass, sid);
+		if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+			/* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
+			*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+			rc = 0;
+		}
+	}
+	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+				  u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
+{
+#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
+	char *context;
+	unsigned int len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
+	context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!context)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	context[len] = '\0';
+	rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
+	if (rc == -ERANGE) {
+		kfree(context);
+
+		/* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
+		rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			return rc;
+
+		len = rc;
+		context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!context)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		context[len] = '\0';
+		rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+				    context, len);
+	}
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		kfree(context);
+		if (rc != -ENODATA) {
+			pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%llu\n",
+				__func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+			return rc;
+		}
+		*sid = def_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, sid,
+					     def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc) {
+		char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+		u64 ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+		if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+			pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%llu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
+					      ino, dev, context);
+		} else {
+			pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%llu\n",
+				__func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+		}
+	}
+	kfree(context);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
+static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+	u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
+	u16 sclass;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/* check below is racy, but we will recheck with lock held */
+	if (data_race(isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED))
+		return 0;
+
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
+		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
+		/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
+		   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
+		   server is ready to handle calls. */
+		spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		if (list_empty(&isec->list))
+			list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
+		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	sclass = isec->sclass;
+	task_sid = isec->task_sid;
+	sid = isec->sid;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+
+	switch (sbsec->behavior) {
+	/*
+	 * In case of SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE we need to re-fetch the labels
+	 * via xattr when called from delayed_superblock_init().
+	 */
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
+		if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+			sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+			break;
+		}
+		/* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
+		   Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
+		if (opt_dentry) {
+			/* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
+			dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
+			 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
+			 * that first.  We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
+			 * two, depending upon that...
+			 */
+			dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+			if (!dentry)
+				dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
+		}
+		if (!dentry) {
+			/*
+			 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+			 * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+			 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+			 * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as these
+			 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
+			 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
+			 * be used again by userspace.
+			 */
+			goto out_invalid;
+		}
+
+		rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
+					    &sid);
+		dput(dentry);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
+		sid = task_sid;
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
+		/* Default to the fs SID. */
+		sid = sbsec->sid;
+
+		/* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
+		rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid,
+					     sclass, NULL, &sid);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
+		sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
+		sid = sbsec->sid;
+
+		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
+		     (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
+		      selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
+			/* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
+			 * procfs inodes */
+			if (opt_dentry) {
+				/* Called from d_instantiate or
+				 * d_splice_alias. */
+				dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+			} else {
+				/* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
+				 * find a dentry.  Some filesystems really want
+				 * a connected one, so try that first.
+				 */
+				dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+				if (!dentry)
+					dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
+			}
+			/*
+			 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+			 * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+			 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+			 * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as
+			 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
+			 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
+			 * could be used again by userspace.
+			 */
+			if (!dentry)
+				goto out_invalid;
+			rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
+						   sbsec->flags, &sid);
+			if (rc) {
+				dput(dentry);
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
+			    (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+				rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
+							    sid, &sid);
+				if (rc) {
+					dput(dentry);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+			dput(dentry);
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+out:
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
+		if (rc) {
+			isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+		isec->sid = sid;
+	}
+
+out_unlock:
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+	return rc;
+
+out_invalid:
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
+		isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+		isec->sid = sid;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
+{
+	u32 perm = 0;
+
+	switch (sig) {
+	case SIGCHLD:
+		/* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
+		break;
+	case SIGKILL:
+		/* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
+		break;
+	case SIGSTOP:
+		/* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* All other signals. */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return perm;
+}
+
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
+#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
+#endif
+
+/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
+static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
+			       int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	u16 sclass;
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
+	int rc;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
+	ad.u.cap = cap;
+
+	switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
+	case 0:
+		sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_err("SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
+	if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
+		int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
+		if (rc2)
+			return rc2;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
+   The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
+   data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
+static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			  struct inode *inode,
+			  u32 perms,
+			  struct common_audit_data *adp)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+}
+
+/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
+   the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
+   pathname if needed. */
+static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				  struct dentry *dentry,
+				  u32 av)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+	/* check below is racy, but revalidate will recheck with lock held */
+	if (data_race(unlikely(isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED)))
+		__inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
+   the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
+   pathname if needed. */
+static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				const struct path *path,
+				u32 av)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = *path;
+	/* check below is racy, but revalidate will recheck with lock held */
+	if (data_race(unlikely(isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED)))
+		__inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
+static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				     struct file *file,
+				     u32 av)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = file;
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid);
+#endif
+
+static int __file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, const struct file *file,
+			   u32 av, bool bf_user_file)
+
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
+	u32 tsid_fd;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (bf_user_file) {
+		struct backing_file_security_struct *bfsec;
+		const struct path *path;
+
+		if (WARN_ON(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)))
+			return -EIO;
+
+		bfsec = selinux_backing_file(file);
+		path = backing_file_user_path(file);
+		tsid_fd = bfsec->uf_sid;
+		inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
+
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+		ad.u.path = *path;
+	} else {
+		struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+
+		tsid_fd = fsec->sid;
+		inode = file_inode(file);
+
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+		ad.u.file = file;
+	}
+
+	if (ssid != tsid_fd) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, tsid_fd, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+	/* regardless of backing vs user file, use the underlying file here */
+	rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, ssid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+#endif
+
+	/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
+	if (av)
+		return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
+   access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
+   descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
+   check a particular permission to the file.
+   Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
+   has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
+   access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
+   where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
+static inline int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				const struct file *file, u32 av)
+{
+	return __file_has_perm(cred, file, av, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
+ */
+static int
+selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct cred_security_struct *crsec,
+				 struct inode *dir,
+				 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
+				 u32 *_new_isid)
+{
+	const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
+						selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
+
+	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
+	    (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
+		*_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+	} else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
+		   crsec->create_sid) {
+		*_new_isid = crsec->create_sid;
+	} else {
+		const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
+		return security_transition_sid(crsec->sid,
+					       dsec->sid, tclass,
+					       name, _new_isid);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
+static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
+		      struct dentry *dentry,
+		      u16 tclass)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	u32 sid, newsid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	dsec = inode_security(dir);
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
+
+	sid = crsec->sid;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+			  DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
+			  &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(crsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
+					   &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+#define MAY_LINK	0
+#define MAY_UNLINK	1
+#define MAY_RMDIR	2
+
+/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
+static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
+		    struct dentry *dentry,
+		    int kind)
+
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	u32 av;
+	int rc;
+
+	dsec = inode_security(dir);
+	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+
+	av = DIR__SEARCH;
+	av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	switch (kind) {
+	case MAY_LINK:
+		av = FILE__LINK;
+		break;
+	case MAY_UNLINK:
+		av = FILE__UNLINK;
+		break;
+	case MAY_RMDIR:
+		av = DIR__RMDIR;
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized kind %d\n",
+			__func__, kind);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
+			     struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			     struct inode *new_dir,
+			     struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	u32 av;
+	int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
+	int rc;
+
+	old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
+	old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
+	old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
+	new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+
+	ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+			  DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
+			  old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
+				  old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
+	av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
+	if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
+		av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
+		new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
+		new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
+				  new_isec->sclass,
+				  (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
+static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       const struct super_block *sb,
+			       u32 perms,
+			       struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
+		if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+			av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
+		if (mask & MAY_READ)
+			av |= FILE__READ;
+
+		if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
+			av |= FILE__APPEND;
+		else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+
+	} else {
+		if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+			av |= DIR__SEARCH;
+		if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+			av |= DIR__WRITE;
+		if (mask & MAY_READ)
+			av |= DIR__READ;
+	}
+
+	return av;
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_to_av(const struct file *file)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+		av |= FILE__READ;
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+		if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
+			av |= FILE__APPEND;
+		else
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+	}
+	if (!av) {
+		/*
+		 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
+		 */
+		av = FILE__IOCTL;
+	}
+
+	return av;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
+ * open permission.
+ */
+static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
+{
+	u32 av = file_to_av(file);
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
+	    inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+		av |= FILE__OPEN;
+
+	return av;
+}
+
+/* Hook functions begin here. */
+
+static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
+			    BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
+				      const struct cred *to)
+{
+	u32 mysid = current_sid();
+	u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
+	u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
+	int rc;
+
+	if (mysid != fromsid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+				  BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid,
+			    SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
+					  const struct cred *to)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
+			    SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
+					const struct cred *to,
+					const struct file *file)
+{
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+
+	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_FD,
+				  FD__USE,
+				  &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+	rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+#endif
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+
+	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+				       unsigned int mode)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
+
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
+		return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ,
+				NULL);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
+			NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
+			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+			  kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target),
+			SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+			  const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+			  const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+			  const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
+ * which was removed).
+ *
+ * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
+ * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
+ * need to control this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use of
+ * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
+ */
+
+static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+			   int cap, unsigned int opts)
+{
+	return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
+}
+
+static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!sb)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (cmds) {
+	case Q_SYNC:
+	case Q_QUOTAON:
+	case Q_QUOTAOFF:
+	case Q_SETINFO:
+	case Q_SETQUOTA:
+	case Q_XQUOTAOFF:
+	case Q_XQUOTAON:
+	case Q_XSETQLIM:
+		rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
+		break;
+	case Q_GETFMT:
+	case Q_GETINFO:
+	case Q_GETQUOTA:
+	case Q_XGETQUOTA:
+	case Q_XGETQSTAT:
+	case Q_XGETQSTATV:
+	case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
+		rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
+		break;
+	default:
+		rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
+		break;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_syslog(int type)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:	/* Read last kernel messages */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER:	/* Return size of the log buffer */
+		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF:	/* Disable logging to console */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON:	/* Enable logging to console */
+	/* Set level of messages printed to console */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
+		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
+				    NULL);
+	}
+	/* All other syslog types */
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+			    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check permission for allocating a new virtual mapping. Returns
+ * 0 if permission is granted, negative error code if not.
+ *
+ * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
+ * processes that allocate mappings.
+ */
+static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
+{
+	return cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+				   CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
+}
+
+/* binprm security operations */
+
+static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = 0;
+	struct task_struct *tracer;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
+	if (tracer)
+		sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sid;
+}
+
+static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			    const struct cred_security_struct *old_crsec,
+			    const struct cred_security_struct *new_crsec)
+{
+	int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
+	int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
+	int rc;
+	u32 av;
+
+	if (!nnp && !nosuid)
+		return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
+
+	if (new_crsec->sid == old_crsec->sid)
+		return 0; /* No change in credentials */
+
+	/*
+	 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
+	 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
+	 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
+	 * the old and new contexts.
+	 */
+	if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
+		av = 0;
+		if (nnp)
+			av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
+		if (nosuid)
+			av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
+		rc = avc_has_perm(old_crsec->sid, new_crsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
+		if (!rc)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
+	 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
+	 * of the permissions of the current SID.
+	 */
+	rc = security_bounded_transition(old_crsec->sid,
+					 new_crsec->sid);
+	if (!rc)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
+	 * NNP:  Operation not permitted for caller.
+	 * nosuid:  Permission denied to file.
+	 */
+	if (nnp)
+		return -EPERM;
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *old_crsec;
+	struct cred_security_struct *new_crsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
+	int rc;
+
+	/* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
+	 * the script interpreter */
+
+	old_crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+	new_crsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
+
+	if (WARN_ON(isec->sclass != SECCLASS_FILE &&
+		    isec->sclass != SECCLASS_MEMFD_FILE))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	/* Default to the current task SID. */
+	new_crsec->sid = old_crsec->sid;
+	new_crsec->osid = old_crsec->sid;
+
+	/* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
+	new_crsec->create_sid = 0;
+	new_crsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
+	new_crsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Before policy is loaded, label any task outside kernel space
+	 * as SECINITSID_INIT, so that any userspace tasks surviving from
+	 * early boot end up with a label different from SECINITSID_KERNEL
+	 * (if the policy chooses to set SECINITSID_INIT != SECINITSID_KERNEL).
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		new_crsec->sid = SECINITSID_INIT;
+		/* also clear the exec_sid just in case */
+		new_crsec->exec_sid = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (old_crsec->exec_sid) {
+		new_crsec->sid = old_crsec->exec_sid;
+		/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
+		new_crsec->exec_sid = 0;
+
+		/* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
+		rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_crsec, new_crsec);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	} else {
+		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
+		rc = security_transition_sid(old_crsec->sid,
+					     isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
+					     &new_crsec->sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		/*
+		 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
+		 * transition.
+		 */
+		rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_crsec, new_crsec);
+		if (rc)
+			new_crsec->sid = old_crsec->sid;
+	}
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = bprm->file;
+
+	if (new_crsec->sid == old_crsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(old_crsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+				  FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	} else {
+		/* Check permissions for the transition. */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(old_crsec->sid, new_crsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		rc = avc_has_perm(new_crsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+				  FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		/* Check for shared state */
+		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
+			rc = avc_has_perm(old_crsec->sid, new_crsec->sid,
+					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
+					  NULL);
+			if (rc)
+				return -EPERM;
+		}
+
+		/* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
+		 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
+		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
+			u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
+			if (ptsid != 0) {
+				rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_crsec->sid,
+						  SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+						  PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+				if (rc)
+					return -EPERM;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
+		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+		/* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
+		   the noatsecure permission is granted between
+		   the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(old_crsec->sid, new_crsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
+				  NULL);
+		bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
+{
+	return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
+static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
+					    struct files_struct *files)
+{
+	struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
+	struct tty_struct *tty;
+	int drop_tty = 0;
+	unsigned n;
+
+	tty = get_current_tty();
+	if (tty) {
+		spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
+		if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
+			struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
+
+			/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
+			   Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
+			   rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
+			   open file may belong to another process and we are
+			   only interested in the inode-based check here. */
+			file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
+						struct tty_file_private, list);
+			file = file_priv->file;
+			if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
+				drop_tty = 1;
+		}
+		spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
+		tty_kref_put(tty);
+	}
+	/* Reset controlling tty. */
+	if (drop_tty)
+		no_tty();
+
+	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
+	n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
+	if (!n) /* none found? */
+		return;
+
+	devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
+	if (IS_ERR(devnull))
+		devnull = NULL;
+	/* replace all the matching ones with this */
+	do {
+		replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
+	} while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
+	if (devnull)
+		fput(devnull);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
+ */
+static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct cred_security_struct *new_crsec;
+	struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
+	int rc, i;
+
+	new_crsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
+	if (new_crsec->sid == new_crsec->osid)
+		return;
+
+	/* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
+	flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
+
+	/* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
+	current->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+	/* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
+	 * SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
+	 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
+	 *
+	 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
+	 * controlled by the setrlimit check.  The inclusion of the init task's
+	 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
+	 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
+	 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
+	 */
+	rc = avc_has_perm(new_crsec->osid, new_crsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			  PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
+	if (rc) {
+		/* protect against do_prlimit() */
+		task_lock(current);
+		for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
+			rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
+			initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
+			rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
+		}
+		task_unlock(current);
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
+			update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
+ * due to exec
+ */
+static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+	u32 osid, sid;
+	int rc;
+
+	osid = crsec->osid;
+	sid = crsec->sid;
+
+	if (sid == osid)
+		return;
+
+	/* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
+	 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
+	 * flush and unblock signals.
+	 *
+	 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
+	 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
+	 */
+	rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
+	if (rc) {
+		clear_itimer();
+
+		spin_lock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
+		if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
+			flush_sigqueue(&current->pending);
+			flush_sigqueue(&current->signal->shared_pending);
+			flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
+			sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
+			recalc_sigpending();
+		}
+		spin_unlock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
+	}
+
+	/* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
+	 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
+	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+	__wake_up_parent(current, unrcu_pointer(current->real_parent));
+	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+}
+
+/* superblock security operations */
+
+static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+
+	mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
+	spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+	sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
+	sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sbsec->creator_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
+{
+	bool open_quote = false;
+	int len;
+	char c;
+
+	for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
+		if (c == '"')
+			open_quote = !open_quote;
+		if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
+			break;
+	}
+	return len;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
+{
+	char *from = options;
+	char *to = options;
+	bool first = true;
+	int rc;
+
+	while (1) {
+		int len = opt_len(from);
+		int token;
+		char *arg = NULL;
+
+		token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
+
+		if (token != Opt_error) {
+			char *p, *q;
+
+			/* strip quotes */
+			if (arg) {
+				for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
+					char c = *p;
+					if (c != '"')
+						*q++ = c;
+				}
+				arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
+				if (!arg) {
+					rc = -ENOMEM;
+					goto free_opt;
+				}
+			}
+			rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
+			kfree(arg);
+			arg = NULL;
+			if (unlikely(rc)) {
+				goto free_opt;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (!first) {	// copy with preceding comma
+				from--;
+				len++;
+			}
+			if (to != from)
+				memmove(to, from, len);
+			to += len;
+			first = false;
+		}
+		if (!from[len])
+			break;
+		from += len + 1;
+	}
+	*to = '\0';
+	return 0;
+
+free_opt:
+	if (*mnt_opts) {
+		selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
+		*mnt_opts = NULL;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
+{
+	struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+
+	/*
+	 * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
+	 * options specified, otherwise accept.
+	 */
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		return opts ? 1 : 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
+	 * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
+	 */
+	if (!opts)
+		return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
+
+	if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
+		if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
+			       opts->fscontext_sid))
+			return 1;
+	}
+	if (opts->context_sid) {
+		if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+			       opts->context_sid))
+			return 1;
+	}
+	if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+
+		root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
+		if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
+			       opts->rootcontext_sid))
+			return 1;
+	}
+	if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
+		if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
+			       opts->defcontext_sid))
+			return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
+{
+	struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!opts)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
+		if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
+			       opts->fscontext_sid))
+			goto out_bad_option;
+	}
+	if (opts->context_sid) {
+		if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+			       opts->context_sid))
+			goto out_bad_option;
+	}
+	if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+		root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
+		if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
+			       opts->rootcontext_sid))
+			goto out_bad_option;
+	}
+	if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
+		if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
+			       opts->defcontext_sid))
+			goto out_bad_option;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+out_bad_option:
+	pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
+	       "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
+	       sb->s_type->name);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
+	return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
+	return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
+			 const struct path *path,
+			 const char *type,
+			 unsigned long flags,
+			 void *data)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+		return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
+					   FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
+	else
+		return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
+			      const struct path *to_path)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
+				   FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc,
+				   struct super_block *reference)
+{
+	const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(reference);
+	struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that fc->security remains NULL when no options are set
+	 * as expected by selinux_set_mnt_opts().
+	 */
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & (FSCONTEXT_MNT|CONTEXT_MNT|DEFCONTEXT_MNT)))
+		return 0;
+
+	opts = kzalloc_obj(*opts);
+	if (!opts)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT)
+		opts->fscontext_sid = sbsec->sid;
+	if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT)
+		opts->context_sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+	if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT)
+		opts->defcontext_sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+	fc->security = opts;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
+				  struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+	const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
+
+	if (!src)
+		return 0;
+
+	fc->security = kmemdup(src, sizeof(*src), GFP_KERNEL);
+	return fc->security ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
+	fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR,	Opt_context),
+	fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR,	Opt_defcontext),
+	fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR,	Opt_fscontext),
+	fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR,	Opt_rootcontext),
+	fsparam_flag  (SECLABEL_STR,	Opt_seclabel),
+	{}
+};
+
+static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+					  struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+	struct fs_parse_result result;
+	int opt;
+
+	opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+	if (opt < 0)
+		return opt;
+
+	return selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
+}
+
+/* inode security operations */
+
+static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
+	isec->inode = inode;
+	isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
+	isec->task_sid = sid;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	inode_free_security(inode);
+}
+
+static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+					const struct qstr *name,
+					const char **xattr_name,
+					struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
+					   d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+					   inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
+					   &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (xattr_name)
+		*xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
+
+	cp->id = LSM_ID_SELINUX;
+	return security_sid_to_context(newsid, &cp->context, &cp->len);
+}
+
+static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+					  const struct qstr *name,
+					  const struct cred *old,
+					  struct cred *new)
+{
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+	struct cred_security_struct *crsec;
+
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
+					   d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+					   inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
+					   &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	crsec = selinux_cred(new);
+	crsec->create_sid = newsid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				       const struct qstr *qstr,
+				       struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	struct xattr *xattr;
+	u32 newsid, clen;
+	u16 newsclass;
+	int rc;
+	char *context;
+
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
+
+	newsid = crsec->create_sid;
+	newsclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(crsec, dir, qstr, newsclass, &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+		isec->sclass = newsclass;
+		isec->sid = newsid;
+		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+	}
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized() ||
+	    !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
+	if (xattr) {
+		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
+						   &context, &clen);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		xattr->value = context;
+		xattr->value_len = clen;
+		xattr->name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
+					    const struct qstr *name,
+					    const struct inode *context_inode)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	int rc;
+	bool is_memfd = false;
+
+	if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized()))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (name != NULL && name->name != NULL &&
+	    !strcmp(name->name, MEMFD_ANON_NAME)) {
+		if (!selinux_policycap_memfd_class())
+			return 0;
+		is_memfd = true;
+	}
+
+	isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+	/*
+	 * We only get here once per ephemeral inode.  The inode has
+	 * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
+	 * untouched.
+	 */
+
+	if (context_inode) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
+			selinux_inode(context_inode);
+		if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  context_inode is not initialized\n");
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+
+		isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
+		isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
+	} else {
+		if (is_memfd)
+			isec->sclass = SECCLASS_MEMFD_FILE;
+		else
+			isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
+		rc = security_transition_sid(
+			sid, sid,
+			isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+	/*
+	 * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
+	 * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
+	 */
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE;
+	ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?";
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid,
+			    isec->sid,
+			    isec->sclass,
+			    FILE__CREATE,
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+				struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+				     bool rcu)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+	isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
+	if (IS_ERR(isec))
+		return PTR_ERR(isec);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
+}
+
+static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
+					   u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+					   int result)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
+	ad.u.inode = inode;
+
+	return slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
+			    audited, denied, result, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * task_avdcache_reset - Reset the task's AVD cache
+ * @tsec: the task's security state
+ *
+ * Clear the task's AVD cache in @tsec and reset it to the current policy's
+ * and task's info.
+ */
+static inline void task_avdcache_reset(struct task_security_struct *tsec)
+{
+	memset(&tsec->avdcache.dir, 0, sizeof(tsec->avdcache.dir));
+	tsec->avdcache.sid = current_sid();
+	tsec->avdcache.seqno = avc_policy_seqno();
+	tsec->avdcache.dir_spot = TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE - 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * task_avdcache_search - Search the task's AVD cache
+ * @tsec: the task's security state
+ * @isec: the inode to search for in the cache
+ * @avdc: matching avd cache entry returned to the caller
+ *
+ * Search @tsec for a AVD cache entry that matches @isec and return it to the
+ * caller via @avdc.  Returns 0 if a match is found, negative values otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int task_avdcache_search(struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+				       struct inode_security_struct *isec,
+				       struct avdc_entry **avdc)
+{
+	int orig, iter;
+
+	/* focused on path walk optimization, only cache directories */
+	if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_DIR)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (unlikely(current_sid() != tsec->avdcache.sid ||
+		     tsec->avdcache.seqno != avc_policy_seqno())) {
+		task_avdcache_reset(tsec);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	orig = iter = tsec->avdcache.dir_spot;
+	do {
+		if (tsec->avdcache.dir[iter].isid == isec->sid) {
+			/* cache hit */
+			tsec->avdcache.dir_spot = iter;
+			*avdc = &tsec->avdcache.dir[iter];
+			return 0;
+		}
+		iter = (iter - 1) & (TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE - 1);
+	} while (iter != orig);
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * task_avdcache_update - Update the task's AVD cache
+ * @tsec: the task's security state
+ * @isec: the inode associated with the cache entry
+ * @avd: the AVD to cache
+ *
+ * Update the AVD cache in @tsec with the @avd info associated
+ * with @isec.
+ */
+static inline void task_avdcache_update(struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+					struct inode_security_struct *isec,
+					struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	int spot;
+
+	/* focused on path walk optimization, only cache directories */
+	if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_DIR)
+		return;
+
+	/* update cache */
+	spot = (tsec->avdcache.dir_spot + 1) & (TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE - 1);
+	tsec->avdcache.dir_spot = spot;
+	tsec->avdcache.dir[spot].isid = isec->sid;
+	tsec->avdcache.dir[spot].avd = *avd;
+	tsec->avdcache.permissive_neveraudit =
+		(avd->flags == (AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE|AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT));
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_inode_permission - Check if the current task can access an inode
+ * @inode: the inode that is being accessed
+ * @requested: the accesses being requested
+ *
+ * Check if the current task is allowed to access @inode according to
+ * @requested.  Returns 0 if allowed, negative values otherwise.
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int requested)
+{
+	int mask;
+	u32 perms;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct avdc_entry *avdc;
+	struct av_decision avd, *avdp = &avd;
+	int rc, rc2;
+	u32 audited, denied;
+
+	mask = requested & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
+
+	/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
+	if (!mask)
+		return 0;
+
+	tsec = selinux_task(current);
+	if (task_avdcache_permnoaudit(tsec, sid))
+		return 0;
+
+	isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, requested & MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
+	if (IS_ERR(isec))
+		return PTR_ERR(isec);
+	perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
+
+	rc = task_avdcache_search(tsec, isec, &avdc);
+	if (likely(!rc)) {
+		/* Cache hit. */
+		avdp = &avdc->avd;
+		denied = perms & ~avdp->allowed;
+		if (unlikely(denied) && enforcing_enabled() &&
+			!(avdp->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
+			rc = -EACCES;
+	} else {
+		/* Cache miss. */
+		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+					  perms, 0, avdp);
+		task_avdcache_update(tsec, isec, avdp);
+	}
+
+	audited = avc_audit_required(perms, avdp, rc,
+				     (requested & MAY_ACCESS) ?
+				     FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, &denied);
+	if (likely(!audited))
+		return rc;
+
+	rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
+	u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
+
+	/* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
+	if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
+		ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
+			      ATTR_FORCE);
+		if (!ia_valid)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
+			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
+		return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
+	    inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
+	    (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
+	    !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
+		av |= FILE__OPEN;
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = selinux_task(current);
+
+	if (task_avdcache_permnoaudit(tsec, current_sid()))
+		return 0;
+
+	return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
+
+	if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
+		return false;
+	if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap - Skip the xattr capability checks?
+ * @name: name of the xattr
+ *
+ * Returns 1 to indicate that SELinux "owns" the access control rights to xattrs
+ * named @name; the LSM layer should avoid enforcing any traditional
+ * capability based access controls on this xattr.  Returns 0 to indicate that
+ * SELinux does not "own" the access control rights to xattrs named @name and is
+ * deferring to the LSM layer for further access controls, including capability
+ * based controls.
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap(const char *name)
+{
+	/* require capability check if not a selinux xattr */
+	return !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				  struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				  const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/* if not a selinux xattr, only check the ordinary setattr perm */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
+		return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return (inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
+
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+
+	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+			  FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+		if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
+			struct audit_buffer *ab;
+			size_t audit_size;
+
+			/* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
+			 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
+			if (value) {
+				const char *str = value;
+
+				if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
+					audit_size = size - 1;
+				else
+					audit_size = size;
+			} else {
+				audit_size = 0;
+			}
+			ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+					     GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+			if (!ab)
+				return rc;
+			audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
+			audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
+			audit_log_end(ab);
+
+			return rc;
+		}
+		rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value,
+						   size, &newsid);
+	}
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
+			  FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid,
+					  sid, isec->sclass);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(newsid,
+			    sbsec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+				 struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+					const void *value, size_t size,
+					int flags)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+		/* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		/* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
+		 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
+		 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
+		 * we've since initialized.
+		 */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
+					   &newsid);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
+		       "for (%s, %llu), rc=%d\n",
+		       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+	isec->sid = newsid;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				     struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	/* if not a selinux xattr, only check the ordinary setattr perm */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
+		return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	/* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
+	   You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				      struct file_kattr *fa)
+{
+	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				      struct file_kattr *fa)
+{
+	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
+						unsigned int obj_type)
+{
+	int ret;
+	u32 perm;
+
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = *path;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
+	 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
+	 */
+	switch (obj_type) {
+	case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
+		perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
+		break;
+	case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
+		perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
+		ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
+						FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+		break;
+	case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
+		perm = FILE__WATCH;
+		break;
+	case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_MNTNS:
+		perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNTNS;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
+	if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
+		perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
+
+	/* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
+	if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_PRE_ACCESS |
+		    FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
+		perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
+
+	return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
+ *
+ * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				     struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				     void **buffer, bool alloc)
+{
+	u32 size;
+	int error;
+	char *context = NULL;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
+	 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_initialized() ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
+	 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
+	 * use the in-core value under current policy.
+	 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
+	 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
+	 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
+	 * in-core context value, not a denial.
+	 */
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
+	if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
+		error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
+						      &size);
+	else
+		error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid,
+						&context, &size);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+	error = size;
+	if (alloc) {
+		*buffer = context;
+		goto out_nofree;
+	}
+	kfree(context);
+out_nofree:
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				     const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!value || !size)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+	isec->sid = newsid;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char **buffer,
+				ssize_t *remaining_size)
+{
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+	return xattr_list_one(buffer, remaining_size, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
+
+	prop->selinux.secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+{
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+	struct cred_security_struct *crsec;
+	struct cred *new_creds = *new;
+
+	if (new_creds == NULL) {
+		new_creds = prepare_creds();
+		if (!new_creds)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	crsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
+	/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
+	selinux_inode_getlsmprop(d_inode(src), &prop);
+	crsec->create_sid = prop.selinux.secid;
+	*new = new_creds;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	/* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
+	 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
+	 * xattrs up.  Instead, filter out SELinux-related xattrs following
+	 * policy load.
+	 */
+	if (selinux_initialized() && !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
+		return -ECANCELED; /* Discard */
+	/*
+	 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
+	 * by selinux.
+	 */
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+/* kernfs node operations */
+
+static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+					struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+	u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
+	int rc;
+	char *context;
+
+	rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+	if (rc == -ENODATA)
+		return 0;
+	else if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	clen = (u32)rc;
+	context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!context)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		kfree(context);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(context, clen, &parent_sid,
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
+	kfree(context);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (crsec->create_sid) {
+		newsid = crsec->create_sid;
+	} else {
+		u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
+		const char *kn_name;
+		struct qstr q;
+
+		/* kn is fresh, can't be renamed, name goes not away */
+		kn_name = rcu_dereference_check(kn->name, true);
+		q.name = kn_name;
+		q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn_name);
+
+		rc = security_transition_sid(crsec->sid,
+					     parent_sid, secclass, &q,
+					     &newsid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
+					   &context, &clen);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
+			      XATTR_CREATE);
+	kfree(context);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* file security operations */
+
+static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	/* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
+	if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
+		mask |= MAY_APPEND;
+
+	return file_has_perm(cred, file,
+			     file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	if (!mask)
+		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
+		return 0;
+
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
+	if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
+	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+		/* No change since file_open check. */
+		return 0;
+
+	return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	fsec->sid = sid;
+	fsec->fown_sid = sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file,
+				      const struct file *user_file)
+{
+	struct backing_file_security_struct *bfsec;
+
+	bfsec = selinux_backing_file(backing_file);
+	bfsec->uf_sid = selinux_file(user_file)->sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
+ * operation to an inode.
+ */
+static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+		u32 requested, u16 cmd)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
+	u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
+	int rc;
+	u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
+	u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
+	ad.u.op = &ioctl;
+	ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
+	ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
+
+	if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
+				SECCLASS_FD,
+				FD__USE,
+				&ad);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
+	rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, requested,
+				    driver, AVC_EXT_IOCTL, xperm, &ad);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			      unsigned long arg)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int error = 0;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case FIONREAD:
+	case FIBMAP:
+	case FIGETBSZ:
+	case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
+	case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
+		break;
+
+	case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
+	case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
+		break;
+
+	/* sys_ioctl() checks */
+	case FIONBIO:
+	case FIOASYNC:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
+		break;
+
+	case KDSKBENT:
+	case KDSKBSENT:
+		error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+					    CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
+		break;
+
+	case FIOCLEX:
+	case FIONCLEX:
+		if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
+			error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
+		break;
+
+	/* default case assumes that the command will go
+	 * to the file's ioctl() function.
+	 */
+	default:
+		error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			      unsigned long arg)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If we are in a 64-bit kernel running 32-bit userspace, we need to
+	 * make sure we don't compare 32-bit flags to 64-bit flags.
+	 */
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
+		cmd = FS_IOC_GETFLAGS;
+		break;
+	case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
+		cmd = FS_IOC_SETFLAGS;
+		break;
+	case FS_IOC32_GETVERSION:
+		cmd = FS_IOC_GETVERSION;
+		break;
+	case FS_IOC32_SETVERSION:
+		cmd = FS_IOC_SETVERSION;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return selinux_file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
+}
+
+static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
+
+static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred,
+				 const struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+				 bool shared, bool bf_user_file)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	bool prot_exec = prot & PROT_EXEC;
+	bool prot_write = prot & PROT_WRITE;
+
+	if (file) {
+		if (bf_user_file)
+			inode = d_inode(backing_file_user_path(file)->dentry);
+		else
+			inode = file_inode(file);
+	}
+
+	if (default_noexec && prot_exec &&
+	    (!file || IS_PRIVATE(inode) || (!shared && prot_write))) {
+		int rc;
+		u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+
+		/*
+		 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a private
+		 * file mapping that will also be writable.
+		 */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM,
+				  NULL);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (file) {
+		/* "read" always possible, "write" only if shared */
+		u32 av = FILE__READ;
+		if (shared && prot_write)
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+		if (prot_exec)
+			av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
+
+		return __file_has_perm(cred, file, av, bf_user_file);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred,
+				      const struct file *file,
+				      unsigned long prot, bool shared)
+{
+	return __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, false);
+}
+
+static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
+		u32 sid = current_sid();
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_mmap_file_common(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+				    unsigned long prot, bool shared)
+{
+	if (file) {
+		int rc;
+		struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+		ad.u.file = file;
+		rc = inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), FILE__MAP, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared);
+}
+
+static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file,
+			     unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
+			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	return selinux_mmap_file_common(current_cred(), file, prot,
+					(flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_mmap_backing_file - Check mmap permissions on a backing file
+ * @vma: memory region
+ * @backing_file: stacked filesystem backing file
+ * @user_file: user visible file
+ *
+ * This is called after selinux_mmap_file() on stacked filesystems, and it
+ * is this function's responsibility to verify access to @backing_file and
+ * setup the SELinux state for possible later use in the mprotect() code path.
+ *
+ * By the time this function is called, mmap() access to @user_file has already
+ * been authorized and @vma->vm_file has been set to point to @backing_file.
+ *
+ * Return zero on success, negative values otherwise.
+ */
+static int selinux_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				     struct file *backing_file,
+				     struct file *user_file __always_unused)
+{
+	unsigned long prot = 0;
+
+	/* translate vma->vm_flags perms into PROT perms */
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)
+		prot |= PROT_READ;
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+		prot |= PROT_WRITE;
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
+		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
+
+	return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file->f_cred, backing_file,
+					prot, vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				 unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
+				 unsigned long prot)
+{
+	int rc;
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	const struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
+	bool backing_file;
+	bool shared = vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
+
+	/* check if we need to trigger the "backing files are awful" mode */
+	backing_file = file && (file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING);
+
+	if (default_noexec &&
+	    (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+		/*
+		 * We don't use the vma_is_initial_heap() helper as it has
+		 * a history of problems and is currently broken on systems
+		 * where there is no heap, e.g. brk == start_brk.  Before
+		 * replacing the conditional below with vma_is_initial_heap(),
+		 * or something similar, please ensure that the logic is the
+		 * same as what we have below or you have tested every possible
+		 * corner case you can think to test.
+		 */
+		if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
+		    vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
+			rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					  PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		} else if (!file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) ||
+			    vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
+			rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					  PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		} else if (file && vma->anon_vma) {
+			/*
+			 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
+			 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
+			 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
+			 * modified content.  This typically should only
+			 * occur for text relocations.
+			 */
+			rc = __file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__EXECMOD,
+					     backing_file);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			if (backing_file) {
+				rc = file_has_perm(file->f_cred, file,
+						   FILE__EXECMOD);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, backing_file);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (backing_file) {
+		rc = file_map_prot_check(file->f_cred, file, prot, shared);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			      unsigned long arg)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int err = 0;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case F_SETFL:
+		if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
+			err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
+			break;
+		}
+		fallthrough;
+	case F_SETOWN:
+	case F_SETSIG:
+	case F_GETFL:
+	case F_GETOWN:
+	case F_GETSIG:
+	case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
+		/* Just check FD__USE permission */
+		err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
+		break;
+	case F_GETLK:
+	case F_SETLK:
+	case F_SETLKW:
+	case F_OFD_GETLK:
+	case F_OFD_SETLK:
+	case F_OFD_SETLKW:
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+	case F_GETLK64:
+	case F_SETLK64:
+	case F_SETLKW64:
+#endif
+		err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+	fsec = selinux_file(file);
+	fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				       struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
+	u32 perm;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+	/* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
+	file = fown->file;
+
+	fsec = selinux_file(file);
+
+	if (!signum)
+		perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
+	else
+		perm = signal_to_av(signum);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
+			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	fsec = selinux_file(file);
+	isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
+	/*
+	 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
+	 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
+	 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
+	 * Task label is already saved in the file security
+	 * struct as its SID.
+	 */
+	fsec->isid = isec->sid;
+	fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
+	/*
+	 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
+	 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
+	 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
+	 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
+	 * new inode label or new policy.
+	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
+	 */
+	return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
+}
+
+/* task security operations */
+
+static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
+			      u64 clone_flags)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_task(current);
+	struct task_security_struct *new_tsec = selinux_task(task);
+
+	*new_tsec = *old_tsec;
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+				gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *old_crsec = selinux_cred(old);
+	struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(new);
+
+	*crsec = *old_crsec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *old_crsec = selinux_cred(old);
+	struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(new);
+
+	*crsec = *old_crsec;
+}
+
+static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = cred_sid(c);
+}
+
+static void selinux_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	prop->selinux.secid = cred_sid(c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the security data for a kernel service
+ * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
+ */
+static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+	struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(new);
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
+			   SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
+			   KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
+			   NULL);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		crsec->sid = secid;
+		crsec->create_sid = 0;
+		crsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
+		crsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
+ * objective context of the specified inode
+ */
+static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+	struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(new);
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+			   SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
+			   KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
+			   NULL);
+
+	if (ret == 0)
+		crsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
+	ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+			    SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_load_from_file(struct file *file, u32 requested)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	if (file == NULL)
+		return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, requested, NULL);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = file;
+
+	fsec = selinux_file(file);
+	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, requested, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
+				    enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+				    bool contents)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(READING_MAX_ID > 8,
+			 "New kernel_read_file_id introduced; update SELinux!");
+
+	switch (id) {
+	case READING_FIRMWARE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file, SYSTEM__FIRMWARE_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case READING_MODULE:
+	case READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file,
+						   SYSTEM__KEXEC_IMAGE_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file,
+						SYSTEM__KEXEC_INITRAMFS_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case READING_POLICY:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file, SYSTEM__POLICY_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case READING_X509_CERTIFICATE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file,
+						SYSTEM__X509_CERTIFICATE_LOAD);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(LOADING_MAX_ID > 8,
+			 "New kernel_load_data_id introduced; update SELinux!");
+
+	switch (id) {
+	case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL, SYSTEM__FIRMWARE_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case LOADING_MODULE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL,
+						   SYSTEM__KEXEC_IMAGE_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case LOADING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL,
+						SYSTEM__KEXEC_INITRAMFS_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case LOADING_POLICY:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL,
+						   SYSTEM__POLICY_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case LOADING_X509_CERTIFICATE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL,
+						SYSTEM__X509_CERTIFICATE_LOAD);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	prop->selinux.secid = current_sid();
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+					struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	prop->selinux.secid = task_sid_obj(p);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
+				unsigned int flags)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (!flags)
+		return 0;
+	if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
+		av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
+	if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
+		av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
+	return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
+			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
+		struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+	struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
+
+	/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
+	   lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
+	   later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
+	   upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
+	if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
+		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
+				    SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
+				int sig, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	u32 secid;
+	u32 perm;
+
+	if (!sig)
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
+	else
+		perm = signal_to_av(sig);
+	if (!cred)
+		secid = current_sid();
+	else
+		secid = cred_sid(cred);
+	return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
+				  struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+	u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
+
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+	isec->sid = sid;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+}
+
+static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE,
+			USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+	int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
+
+	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+	ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
+	if (ih == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
+	if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
+		goto out;
+
+	ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
+	ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
+	ret = 0;
+
+	if (proto)
+		*proto = ih->protocol;
+
+	switch (ih->protocol) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+		struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+		struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+	u8 nexthdr;
+	int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
+	struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
+	__be16 frag_off;
+
+	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+	ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
+	if (ip6 == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
+	ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
+	ret = 0;
+
+	nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+	offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
+	offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (proto)
+		*proto = nexthdr;
+
+	switch (nexthdr) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+		struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+		struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
+	/* includes fragments */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+
+static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
+			     char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
+{
+	char *addrp;
+	int ret;
+
+	switch (ad->u.net->family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
+		if (ret)
+			goto parse_error;
+		addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
+				       &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
+		goto okay;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	case PF_INET6:
+		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
+		if (ret)
+			goto parse_error;
+		addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
+				       &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
+		goto okay;
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+	default:
+		addrp = NULL;
+		goto okay;
+	}
+
+parse_error:
+	pr_warn(
+	       "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
+	       " unable to parse packet\n");
+	return ret;
+
+okay:
+	if (_addrp)
+		*_addrp = addrp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
+ * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
+ * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
+ * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
+ * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
+ * peer labels.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int err;
+	u32 xfrm_sid;
+	u32 nlbl_sid;
+	u32 nlbl_type;
+
+	err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return -EACCES;
+	err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid,
+					   nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
+	if (unlikely(err)) {
+		pr_warn(
+		       "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
+		       " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
+ * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
+ * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
+ * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
+ *
+ * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
+ * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
+ * @conn_sid.  If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
+ * of @sk_sid.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
+		err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid,
+					    conn_sid);
+	else
+		*conn_sid = sk_sid;
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* socket security operations */
+
+static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct cred_security_struct *crsec,
+				 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
+{
+	if (crsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
+		*socksid = crsec->sockcreate_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return security_transition_sid(crsec->sid, crsec->sid,
+				       secclass, NULL, socksid);
+}
+
+static bool sock_skip_has_perm(u32 sid)
+{
+	if (sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Before POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT, sockets that
+	 * inherited the kernel context from early boot used to be skipped
+	 * here, so preserve that behavior unless the capability is set.
+	 *
+	 * By setting the capability the policy signals that it is ready
+	 * for this quirk to be fixed. Note that sockets created by a kernel
+	 * thread or a usermode helper executed without a transition will
+	 * still be skipped in this check regardless of the policycap
+	 * setting.
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context() &&
+	    sid == SECINITSID_INIT)
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+
+static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+	if (sock_skip_has_perm(sksec->sid))
+		return 0;
+
+	ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
+				 int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+	u32 newsid;
+	u16 secclass;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (kern)
+		return 0;
+
+	secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+	rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(crsec, secclass, &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(crsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				      int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+	u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+	u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (!kern) {
+		err = socket_sockcreate_sid(crsec, sclass, &sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	isec->sclass = sclass;
+	isec->sid = sid;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+
+	if (sock->sk) {
+		sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+		sksec->sclass = sclass;
+		sksec->sid = sid;
+		/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
+		if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+			sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
+
+		err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
+				     struct socket *sockb)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
+
+	sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
+	sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
+   Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
+   permission check between the socket and the port number. */
+
+static int __selinux_socket_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	u16 family;
+	int err;
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
+	family = sk->sk_family;
+	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
+		char *addrp;
+		struct common_audit_data ad;
+		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+		u16 family_sa;
+		unsigned short snum;
+		u32 sid, node_perm;
+
+		/*
+		 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+		 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
+		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+		 */
+		if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		family_sa = address->sa_family;
+		switch (family_sa) {
+		case AF_UNSPEC:
+		case AF_INET:
+			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+			if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
+				if (family == PF_INET6) {
+					/* Length check from inet6_bind_sk() */
+					if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+						return -EINVAL;
+					/* Family check from __inet6_bind() */
+					goto err_af;
+				}
+				/* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
+				 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
+				 */
+				if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
+					goto err_af;
+				family_sa = AF_INET;
+			}
+			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+			addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+			addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto err_af;
+		}
+
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+		ad.u.net = &net;
+		ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
+		ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
+
+		if (snum) {
+			int low, high;
+
+			inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
+
+			if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
+			    snum < low || snum > high) {
+				err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
+						      snum, &sid);
+				if (err)
+					goto out;
+				err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+						   sksec->sclass,
+						   SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
+				if (err)
+					goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		switch (sksec->sclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
+		case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
+		case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (family_sa == AF_INET)
+			ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+		else
+			ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+
+		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+				   sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+out:
+	return err;
+err_af:
+	/* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
+	if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	return __selinux_socket_bind(sock->sk, address, addrlen);
+}
+
+/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
+ * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
+ */
+static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
+					 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	int err;
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
+	 * way to disconnect the socket
+	 */
+	if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a TCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
+	 * for the port.
+	 */
+	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
+		struct common_audit_data ad;
+		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+		unsigned short snum;
+		u32 sid, perm;
+
+		/* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+		 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
+		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+		 */
+		switch (address->sa_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
+			 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
+			 */
+			if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			else
+				return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+		}
+
+		err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		switch (sksec->sclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+			perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+			perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+		ad.u.net = &net;
+		ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
+		ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
+		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
+static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+				  struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sk, address, addrlen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
+	u16 sclass;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	sclass = isec->sclass;
+	sid = isec->sid;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+
+	newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
+	newisec->sclass = sclass;
+	newisec->sid = sid;
+	newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				  int size)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct sockaddr *const addr = msg->msg_name;
+	const int addrlen = msg->msg_namelen;
+
+	rc = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (addr && (msg->msg_flags & MSG_FASTOPEN) &&
+	    (sk_is_tcp(sock->sk) ||
+	     (sk_is_inet(sock->sk) && sock->sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM &&
+	      sock->sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP))) {
+		rc = selinux_socket_connect(sock, addr, addrlen);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				  int size, int flags)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				     int optname)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
+					      struct sock *other,
+					      struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+	int err;
+
+	ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other);
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
+			   sksec_other->sclass,
+			   UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* server child socket */
+	sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
+	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid,
+				    sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* connecting socket */
+	sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
+					struct socket *other)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+	ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other->sk);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
+				    char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
+				    struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	int err;
+	u32 if_sid;
+	u32 node_sid;
+
+	err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
+			   SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				       u16 family)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+	char *addrp;
+
+	ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
+		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int err, peerlbl_active, secmark_active;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+	char *addrp;
+
+	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+
+	/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
+	 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
+	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
+	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
+		return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
+
+	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+		return 0;
+
+	ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		u32 peer_sid;
+
+		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
+					       addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
+		if (err) {
+			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
+			return err;
+		}
+		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
+				   PEER__RECV, &ad);
+		if (err) {
+			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
+			return err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (secmark_active) {
+		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+					    sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
+					    unsigned int len)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	char *scontext = NULL;
+	u32 scontext_len;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+		peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
+	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+	err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext,
+				      &scontext_len);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	if (scontext_len > len) {
+		err = -ERANGE;
+		goto out_len;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
+		err = -EFAULT;
+out_len:
+	if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &scontext_len, sizeof(scontext_len)))
+		err = -EFAULT;
+	kfree(scontext);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+{
+	u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
+	u16 family;
+
+	if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+	else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
+		family = PF_INET6;
+	else if (sock)
+		family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+	else {
+		*secid = SECSID_NULL;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+		isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
+		peer_secid = isec->sid;
+	} else if (skb)
+		selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
+
+	*secid = peer_secid;
+	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
+		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+
+	sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
+
+	newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
+	newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_getsecid(const struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
+{
+	if (!sk)
+		*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
+	else {
+		const struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+
+		*secid = sksec->sid;
+	}
+}
+
+static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec =
+		inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+
+	if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
+	    sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		isec->sid = sksec->sid;
+	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determines peer_secid for the asoc and updates socket's peer label
+ * if it's the first association on the socket.
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+					  struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+	int err;
+
+	/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+
+	if (selinux_peerlbl_enabled()) {
+		asoc->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+		/* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
+		 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
+		 */
+		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &asoc->peer_secid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		if (asoc->peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
+			asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	} else {
+		asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	}
+
+	if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
+		sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
+
+		/* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
+		 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
+		 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
+		 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
+		 */
+		sksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
+	} else if (sksec->peer_sid != asoc->peer_secid) {
+		/* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
+		 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
+		 */
+		ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, asoc->base.sk);
+		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
+				   sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
+				   &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk. This
+ * happens on an incoming connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or
+ * sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already present).
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+				      struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
+	u32 conn_sid;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+		return 0;
+
+	err = selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
+	 * the information in asoc. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
+	 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
+	 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
+	 * plug this into the new socket.
+	 */
+	err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, asoc->peer_secid, &conn_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	asoc->secid = conn_sid;
+
+	/* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
+	return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(asoc, skb);
+}
+
+/* Called when SCTP receives a COOKIE ACK chunk as the final
+ * response to an association request (initited by us).
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+					  struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Inherit secid from the parent socket - this will be picked up
+	 * by selinux_sctp_sk_clone() if the association gets peeled off
+	 * into a new socket.
+	 */
+	asoc->secid = sksec->sid;
+
+	return selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
+}
+
+/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
+ * based on their @optname.
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+				     struct sockaddr *address,
+				     int addrlen)
+{
+	int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
+	void *addr_buf;
+	struct sockaddr *addr;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
+	addr_buf = address;
+
+	while (walk_size < addrlen) {
+		if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		addr = addr_buf;
+		switch (addr->sa_family) {
+		case AF_UNSPEC:
+		case AF_INET:
+			len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		switch (optname) {
+		/* Bind checks */
+		case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+		case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+		case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
+			err = __selinux_socket_bind(sk, addr, len);
+			break;
+		/* Connect checks */
+		case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
+		case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
+		case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
+		case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
+			err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr, len);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+
+			/* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
+			 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
+			 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
+			 * is called here. The situations handled are:
+			 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
+			 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
+			 * primary address is selected.
+			 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
+			 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
+			 * selinux_socket_connect().
+			 */
+			err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		addr_buf += len;
+		walk_size += len;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
+static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
+				  struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
+
+	/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
+	 * the non-sctp clone version.
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+		return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
+
+	newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
+	newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+	selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
+}
+
+static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = selinux_sock(ssk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+
+	ssksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+	ssksec->sid = sksec->sid;
+
+	/* replace the existing subflow label deleting the existing one
+	 * and re-recreating a new label using the updated context
+	 */
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssksec);
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(ssk, ssk->sk_family);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				     struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	int err;
+	u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
+	u32 connsid;
+	u32 peersid;
+
+	err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	req->secid = connsid;
+	req->peer_secid = peersid;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
+				   const struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
+
+	newsksec->sid = req->secid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
+	/* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
+	   new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
+	   So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
+	   time it will have been created and available. */
+
+	/* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
+	 * thread with access to newsksec */
+	selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+
+	/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+
+	selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
+}
+
+static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+	atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
+static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
+				      struct flowi_common *flic)
+{
+	flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void *security)
+{
+	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security);
+
+	tunsec->sid = current_sid();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	/* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
+	 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
+	 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
+	 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
+	 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
+	 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
+{
+	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			    TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
+{
+	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+
+	/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
+	 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
+	 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
+	 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
+	 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
+	 * protocols were being used */
+
+	sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
+	sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
+{
+	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security);
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int err;
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	tunsec->sid = sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				       const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	int ifindex;
+	u16 family;
+	char *addrp;
+	u32 peer_sid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+	int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	family = state->pf;
+	if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
+	ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
+	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		int err;
+
+		err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
+					       addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
+		if (err) {
+			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
+			return NF_DROP;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (secmark_active)
+		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP;
+
+	if (netlbl_enabled())
+		/* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
+		 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
+		 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
+		 * protection */
+		if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
+			return NF_DROP;
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				      const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	struct sock *sk;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	if (!netlbl_enabled())
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	/* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
+	 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
+	 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
+	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+	if (sk) {
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+		if (sk_listener(sk))
+			/* if the socket is the listening state then this
+			 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
+			 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
+			 * not the parent socket.  unfortunately, we can't
+			 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
+			 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
+			 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
+			 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
+			 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
+			 * layer).  it is far from ideal, but until we get a
+			 * security label in the packet itself this is the
+			 * best we can do. */
+			return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+		/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
+		sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+		sid = sksec->sid;
+	} else
+		sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+	if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	struct sock *sk;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+	u8 proto = 0;
+
+	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+	if (sk == NULL)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+	sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+
+	ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, state->out->ifindex, state->pf);
+	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
+		if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
+				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+	if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
+		return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
+					 struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	u16 family;
+	u32 secmark_perm;
+	u32 peer_sid;
+	int ifindex;
+	struct sock *sk;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+	char *addrp;
+	int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
+
+	/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
+	 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
+	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
+	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
+		return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
+
+	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
+	/* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
+	 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
+	 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
+	 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
+	 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
+	 *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
+	 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
+	 *       TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
+	 *       is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
+	 *       unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
+	 *       connection. */
+	if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
+	    !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+#endif
+
+	family = state->pf;
+	if (sk == NULL) {
+		/* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
+		 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
+		 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
+		 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
+		if (skb->skb_iif) {
+			secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
+			if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
+				return NF_DROP;
+		} else {
+			secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+			peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+		}
+	} else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
+		/* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
+		 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet.  In
+		 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
+		 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
+		 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
+		 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
+		 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
+		 * selinux_inet_conn_request().  See also selinux_ip_output()
+		 * for similar problems. */
+		u32 skb_sid;
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+		sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+		if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
+		 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
+		 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
+		 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
+		 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
+		 * pass the packet. */
+		if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			switch (family) {
+			case PF_INET:
+				if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+					return NF_ACCEPT;
+				break;
+			case PF_INET6:
+				if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+					return NF_ACCEPT;
+				break;
+			default:
+				return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+			}
+		}
+		if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+	} else {
+		/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
+		 * associated socket. */
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+		peer_sid = sksec->sid;
+		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+	}
+
+	ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
+	ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
+	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	if (secmark_active)
+		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+				 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		u32 if_sid;
+		u32 node_sid;
+
+		if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
+				 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+		if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
+				 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+	}
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+#endif	/* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+static int nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms(struct sock *sk, u32 perms, u16 nlmsg_type)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u8 driver;
+	u8 xperm;
+
+	if (sock_skip_has_perm(sksec->sid))
+		return 0;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NLMSGTYPE;
+	ad.u.nlmsg_type = nlmsg_type;
+
+	driver = nlmsg_type >> 8;
+	xperm = nlmsg_type & 0xff;
+
+	return avc_has_extended_perms(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass,
+				      perms, driver, AVC_EXT_NLMSG, xperm, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	unsigned int msg_len;
+	unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
+	unsigned char *data = skb->data;
+	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
+	u32 perm;
+
+	while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
+		nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
+
+		/* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
+		 *       users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
+		 *       length fields; our solution is to follow what
+		 *       netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
+		 *       messages with length fields that are clearly junk
+		 */
+		if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
+			return 0;
+
+		rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+		if (rc == 0) {
+			if (selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm()) {
+				rc = nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms(
+					sk, perm, nlh->nlmsg_type);
+			} else {
+				rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
+			}
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		} else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+			/* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
+			pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
+				" message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
+				" pid=%d comm=%s\n",
+				sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
+				secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
+				task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
+			if (enforcing_enabled() &&
+			    !security_get_allow_unknown())
+				return rc;
+			rc = 0;
+		} else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+			/* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
+			rc = 0;
+		} else {
+			return rc;
+		}
+
+		/* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
+		msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
+		if (msg_len >= data_len)
+			return 0;
+		data_len -= msg_len;
+		data += msg_len;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
+{
+	isec->sclass = sclass;
+	isec->sid = current_sid();
+}
+
+static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
+			u32 perms)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+
+	msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
+	msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* message queue security operations */
+static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+	ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+			    MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+			    MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
+{
+	u32 perms;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case MSG_INFO:
+		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT_ANY:
+		perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+		perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+	msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
+
+	/*
+	 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
+	 */
+	if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
+		/*
+		 * Compute new sid based on current process and
+		 * message queue this message will be stored in
+		 */
+		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid,
+					     SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
+
+	/* Can this process write to the queue? */
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+			  MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
+	if (!rc)
+		/* Can this process send the message */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
+				  MSG__SEND, &ad);
+	if (!rc)
+		/* Can the message be put in the queue? */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+				  MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+				    struct task_struct *target,
+				    long type, int mode)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
+	int rc;
+
+	isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+	msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+			  SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Shared Memory security operations */
+static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
+	ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+			    SHM__CREATE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+			    SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
+static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
+{
+	u32 perms;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SHM_INFO:
+		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT_ANY:
+		perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+		perms = SHM__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case SHM_LOCK:
+	case SHM_UNLOCK:
+		perms = SHM__LOCK;
+		break;
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		perms = SHM__DESTROY;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
+}
+
+static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
+			     char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
+{
+	u32 perms;
+
+	if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
+		perms = SHM__READ;
+	else
+		perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
+}
+
+/* Semaphore security operations */
+static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
+	ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+			    SEM__CREATE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+			    SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
+static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
+{
+	int err;
+	u32 perms;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SEM_INFO:
+		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
+	case GETPID:
+	case GETNCNT:
+	case GETZCNT:
+		perms = SEM__GETATTR;
+		break;
+	case GETVAL:
+	case GETALL:
+		perms = SEM__READ;
+		break;
+	case SETVAL:
+	case SETALL:
+		perms = SEM__WRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		perms = SEM__DESTROY;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+		perms = SEM__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT_ANY:
+		perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
+			     struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+	u32 perms;
+
+	if (alter)
+		perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
+	else
+		perms = SEM__READ;
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	av = 0;
+	if (flag & S_IRUGO)
+		av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
+	if (flag & S_IWUGO)
+		av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
+
+	if (av == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
+}
+
+static void selinux_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+				   struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
+	prop->selinux.secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
+static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (inode)
+		inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_lsm_getattr(unsigned int attr, struct task_struct *p,
+			       char **value)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec;
+	int error;
+	u32 sid;
+	u32 len;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	crsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
+	if (p != current) {
+		error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), crsec->sid,
+				     SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
+		if (error)
+			goto err_unlock;
+	}
+	switch (attr) {
+	case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
+		sid = crsec->sid;
+		break;
+	case LSM_ATTR_PREV:
+		sid = crsec->osid;
+		break;
+	case LSM_ATTR_EXEC:
+		sid = crsec->exec_sid;
+		break;
+	case LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE:
+		sid = crsec->create_sid;
+		break;
+	case LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
+		sid = crsec->keycreate_sid;
+		break;
+	case LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
+		sid = crsec->sockcreate_sid;
+		break;
+	default:
+		error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		goto err_unlock;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+		*value = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+	return len;
+
+err_unlock:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_lsm_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	struct cred_security_struct *crsec;
+	struct cred *new;
+	u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
+	int error;
+	char *str = value;
+
+	/*
+	 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
+	 */
+	switch (attr) {
+	case LSM_ATTR_EXEC:
+		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
+		break;
+	case LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE:
+		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
+		break;
+	case LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
+		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
+		break;
+	case LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
+		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
+		break;
+	case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
+		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	/* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
+	if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
+		if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
+			str[size-1] = 0;
+			size--;
+		}
+		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size,
+						&sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (error == -EINVAL && attr == LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE) {
+			if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
+				struct audit_buffer *ab;
+				size_t audit_size;
+
+				/* We strip a nul only if it is at the end,
+				 * otherwise the context contains a nul and
+				 * we should audit that */
+				if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
+					audit_size = size - 1;
+				else
+					audit_size = size;
+				ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+						     GFP_ATOMIC,
+						     AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+				if (!ab)
+					return error;
+				audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
+				audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value,
+							    audit_size);
+				audit_log_end(ab);
+
+				return error;
+			}
+			error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
+							&sid);
+		}
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+	}
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Permission checking based on the specified context is
+	   performed during the actual operation (execve,
+	   open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
+	   operation.  See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
+	   checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
+	   operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
+	crsec = selinux_cred(new);
+	if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) {
+		crsec->exec_sid = sid;
+	} else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE) {
+		crsec->create_sid = sid;
+	} else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE) {
+		if (sid) {
+			error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid,
+					     SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
+			if (error)
+				goto abort_change;
+		}
+		crsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
+	} else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE) {
+		crsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
+	} else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) {
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		if (sid == 0)
+			goto abort_change;
+
+		if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
+			error = security_bounded_transition(crsec->sid, sid);
+			if (error)
+				goto abort_change;
+		}
+
+		/* Check permissions for the transition. */
+		error = avc_has_perm(crsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
+		if (error)
+			goto abort_change;
+
+		/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
+		   Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
+		ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
+		if (ptsid != 0) {
+			error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					     PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+			if (error)
+				goto abort_change;
+		}
+
+		crsec->sid = sid;
+	} else {
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		goto abort_change;
+	}
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return size;
+
+abort_change:
+	abort_creds(new);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_getselfattr - Get SELinux current task attributes
+ * @attr: the requested attribute
+ * @ctx: buffer to receive the result
+ * @size: buffer size (input), buffer size used (output)
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Fill the passed user space @ctx with the details of the requested
+ * attribute.
+ *
+ * Returns the number of attributes on success, an error code otherwise.
+ * There will only ever be one attribute.
+ */
+static int selinux_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx,
+			       u32 *size, u32 flags)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *val = NULL;
+	int val_len;
+
+	val_len = selinux_lsm_getattr(attr, current, &val);
+	if (val_len < 0)
+		return val_len;
+	rc = lsm_fill_user_ctx(ctx, size, val, val_len, LSM_ID_SELINUX, 0);
+	kfree(val);
+	return (!rc ? 1 : rc);
+}
+
+static int selinux_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx,
+			       u32 size, u32 flags)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_lsm_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len);
+	if (rc > 0)
+		return 0;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
+			       const char *name, char **value)
+{
+	unsigned int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
+	int rc;
+
+	if (attr) {
+		rc = selinux_lsm_getattr(attr, p, value);
+		if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
+
+	if (attr)
+		return selinux_lsm_setattr(attr, value, size);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
+}
+
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	u32 seclen;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (cp) {
+		cp->id = LSM_ID_SELINUX;
+		ret = security_sid_to_context(secid, &cp->context, &cp->len);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		return cp->len;
+	}
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(secid, NULL, &seclen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	return seclen;
+}
+
+static int selinux_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop,
+				     struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	return selinux_secid_to_secctx(prop->selinux.secid, cp);
+}
+
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen,
+				       secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	if (cp->id == LSM_ID_SELINUX) {
+		kfree(cp->context);
+		cp->context = NULL;
+		cp->id = LSM_ID_UNDEF;
+	}
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ *	called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
+					   ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+	/* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
+	return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+				     ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	int len;
+	len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode,
+					XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
+					(void **)&cp->context, true);
+	if (len < 0)
+		return len;
+	cp->len = len;
+	cp->id = LSM_ID_SELINUX;
+	return 0;
+}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
+			     unsigned long flags)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec;
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k);
+
+	crsec = selinux_cred(cred);
+	if (crsec->keycreate_sid)
+		ksec->sid = crsec->keycreate_sid;
+	else
+		ksec->sid = crsec->sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
+				  const struct cred *cred,
+				  enum key_need_perm need_perm)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec;
+	u32 perm, sid;
+
+	switch (need_perm) {
+	case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
+		perm = KEY__VIEW;
+		break;
+	case KEY_NEED_READ:
+		perm = KEY__READ;
+		break;
+	case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
+		perm = KEY__WRITE;
+		break;
+	case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
+		perm = KEY__SEARCH;
+		break;
+	case KEY_NEED_LINK:
+		perm = KEY__LINK;
+		break;
+	case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
+		perm = KEY__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
+	case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
+	case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
+	case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	}
+
+	sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	ksec = selinux_key(key);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key);
+	char *context = NULL;
+	unsigned len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid,
+				     &context, &len);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = len;
+	*_buffer = context;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key);
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int err;
+	u32 sid = 0;
+	struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
+	struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
+
+	err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
+	ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
+	ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
+	ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
+	return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
+			    SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
+			    INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
+					    u8 port_num)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int err;
+	u32 sid = 0;
+	struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
+	struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
+
+	err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num,
+				      &sid);
+
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
+	ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
+	ibendport.port = port_num;
+	ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
+	return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
+			    SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
+			    INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void *ib_sec)
+{
+	struct ib_security_struct *sec = selinux_ib(ib_sec);
+
+	sec->sid = current_sid();
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
+		       unsigned int size, bool kernel)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int ret;
+
+	if (selinux_policycap_bpf_token_perms())
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
+		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+				   NULL);
+		break;
+	case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
+		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+				   NULL);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
+		av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
+	if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
+	return av;
+}
+
+/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
+ * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf
+ * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
+ * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
+ * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
+ * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
+ * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
+ */
+static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+	struct bpf_prog *prog;
+	struct bpf_map *map;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
+		map = file->private_data;
+		bpfsec = selinux_bpf_map_security(map);
+		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+				   bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	} else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
+		prog = file->private_data;
+		bpfsec = selinux_bpf_prog_security(prog);
+		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+				   BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+	bpfsec = selinux_bpf_map_security(map);
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+			    bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+	bpfsec = selinux_bpf_prog_security(prog);
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+			    BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
+}
+
+static u32 selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(u32 fd)
+{
+	struct path path;
+	struct super_block *sb;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+
+	CLASS(fd, f)(fd);
+
+	if (fd_empty(f))
+		return SECSID_NULL;
+
+	path = fd_file(f)->f_path;
+	sb = path.dentry->d_sb;
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+
+	return sbsec->creator_sid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
+				  struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+	u32 ssid;
+
+	bpfsec = selinux_bpf_map_security(map);
+	bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+
+	if (!token)
+		ssid = bpfsec->sid;
+	else
+		ssid = selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(attr->map_token_fd);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(ssid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
+				 struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+	u32 ssid;
+
+	bpfsec = selinux_bpf_prog_security(prog);
+	bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+
+	if (!token)
+		ssid = bpfsec->sid;
+	else
+		ssid = selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(attr->prog_token_fd);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(ssid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+#define bpf_token_cmd(T, C) \
+	((T)->allowed_cmds & (1ULL << (C)))
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token,
+				    union bpf_attr *attr,
+				    const struct path *path)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+	u32 sid = selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(attr->token_create.bpffs_fd);
+	int err;
+
+	bpfsec = selinux_bpf_token_security(token);
+	bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+	bpfsec->grantor_sid = sid;
+
+	bpfsec->perms = 0;
+	/**
+	 * 'token->allowed_cmds' is a bit mask of allowed commands
+	 * Convert the BPF command enum to a bitmask representing its position
+	 * in the allowed_cmds bitmap.
+	 */
+	if (bpf_token_cmd(token, BPF_MAP_CREATE)) {
+		err = avc_has_perm(bpfsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+				   BPF__MAP_CREATE_AS, NULL);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		bpfsec->perms |= BPF__MAP_CREATE;
+	}
+	if (bpf_token_cmd(token, BPF_PROG_LOAD)) {
+		err = avc_has_perm(bpfsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+				   BPF__PROG_LOAD_AS, NULL);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		bpfsec->perms |= BPF__PROG_LOAD;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token,
+				 enum bpf_cmd cmd)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+	bpfsec = token->security;
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
+		if (!(bpfsec->perms & BPF__MAP_CREATE))
+			return -EACCES;
+		break;
+	case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
+		if (!(bpfsec->perms & BPF__PROG_LOAD))
+			return -EACCES;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
+{
+	u16 sclass;
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
+	bool initns = (token->userns == &init_user_ns);
+	u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
+
+	switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
+	case 0:
+		sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_err("SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), bpfsec->grantor_sid, sclass, av,
+			    NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+static int selinux_perf_event_open(int type)
+{
+	u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
+
+	if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
+		requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
+	else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
+		requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
+	else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
+		requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
+	else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
+		requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
+			    requested, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
+
+	perfsec = selinux_perf_event(event->security);
+	perfsec->sid = current_sid();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
+ * @new: the target creds
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
+ * to service an io_uring operation.
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
+			    SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
+ * kernel polling thread.
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid,
+			    SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
+ * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
+ * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+	struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = file;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_allowed - check if io_uring_setup() can be called
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__ALLOWED,
+			    NULL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
+static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = {
+	.name = "selinux",
+	.id = LSM_ID_SELINUX,
+};
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct cred_security_struct),
+	.lbs_task = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
+	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
+	.lbs_backing_file = sizeof(struct backing_file_security_struct),
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+	.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
+	.lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct),
+	.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+	.lbs_perf_event = sizeof(struct perf_event_security_struct),
+#endif
+	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
+	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
+	.lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
+	.lbs_tun_dev = sizeof(struct tun_security_struct),
+	.lbs_ib = sizeof(struct ib_security_struct),
+	.lbs_bpf_map = sizeof(struct bpf_security_struct),
+	.lbs_bpf_prog = sizeof(struct bpf_security_struct),
+	.lbs_bpf_token = sizeof(struct bpf_security_struct),
+};
+
+/*
+ * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
+ * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
+ * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
+ *    structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
+ *    hooks),
+ * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
+ *    hooks ("allocating" hooks).
+ *
+ * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
+ */
+static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_file_getattr, selinux_inode_file_getattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_file_setattr, selinux_inode_file_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getlsmprop, selinux_inode_getlsmprop),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(backing_file_alloc, selinux_backing_file_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, selinux_file_ioctl_compat),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_backing_file, selinux_mmap_backing_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getlsmprop, selinux_cred_getlsmprop),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getlsmprop, selinux_ipc_getlsmprop),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, selinux_getselfattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, selinux_setselfattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
+			selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mptcp_add_subflow, selinux_mptcp_add_subflow),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
+		      selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+			selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_allowed, selinux_uring_allowed),
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
+	 */
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, selinux_fs_context_submount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
+	 */
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
+		      selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsmprop_to_secctx, selinux_lsmprop_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
+		      selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_create, selinux_bpf_map_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_load, selinux_bpf_prog_load),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_create, selinux_bpf_token_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_cmd, selinux_bpf_token_cmd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_capable, selinux_bpf_token_capable),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
+#endif
+};
+
+static __init int selinux_init(void)
+{
+	vma_flags_t data_default_flags = VMA_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+
+	pr_info("SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
+
+	memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
+	enforcing_set(selinux_enforcing_boot);
+	selinux_avc_init();
+	mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+	mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+	/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
+	cred_init_security();
+
+	/* Inform the audit system that secctx is used */
+	audit_cfg_lsm(&selinux_lsmid,
+		      AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_SUBJECT |
+		      AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_OBJECT);
+
+	default_noexec = !vma_flags_test(&data_default_flags, VMA_EXEC_BIT);
+	if (!default_noexec)
+		pr_notice("SELinux:  virtual memory is executable by default\n");
+
+	avc_init();
+
+	avtab_cache_init();
+
+	ebitmap_cache_init();
+
+	hashtab_cache_init();
+
+	security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
+			   &selinux_lsmid);
+
+	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
+		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
+
+	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
+		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
+
+	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_audit_rule_avc_callback,
+			     AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
+		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC audit callback\n");
+
+	if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
+		pr_debug("SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
+	else
+		pr_debug("SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
+
+	fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
+{
+	selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+void selinux_complete_init(void)
+{
+	pr_debug("SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
+
+	/* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
+	pr_debug("SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
+	iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
+}
+
+/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
+   all processes and objects when they are created. */
+DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
+	.id = &selinux_lsmid,
+	.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+	.enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
+	.blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
+	.init = selinux_init,
+	.initcall_device = selinux_initcall,
+};
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
+static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ip_postroute,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ip_forward,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_FORWARD,
+		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ip_output,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ip_postroute,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+		.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ip_forward,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_FORWARD,
+		.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ip_output,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+		.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+};
+
+static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
+{
+	return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
+				     ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
+{
+	nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
+				ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
+	.init = selinux_nf_register,
+	.exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
+};
+
+int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
+		return 0;
+
+	pr_debug("SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
+
+	err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
+	if (err)
+		panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ae09d59aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Pkey table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of Infiniband PKEYs to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ * This code is heavily based on the "netif" and "netport" concept originally
+ * developed by
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> and
+ * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *   (see security/selinux/netif.c and security/selinux/netport.c for more
+ *   information)
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Mellanox Technologies, 2016
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+#include "initcalls.h"
+#include "ibpkey.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#define SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE       256
+#define SEL_PKEY_HASH_BKT_LIMIT   16
+
+struct sel_ib_pkey_bkt {
+	int size;
+	struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct sel_ib_pkey {
+	struct pkey_security_struct psec;
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_ib_pkey_lock);
+static struct sel_ib_pkey_bkt sel_ib_pkey_hash[SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_hashfn - Hashing function for the pkey table
+ * @pkey: pkey number
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the pkey table, it returns the bucket
+ * number for the given pkey.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_ib_pkey_hashfn(u16 pkey)
+{
+	return (pkey & (SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_find - Search for a pkey record
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet_prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey_num
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the pkey table and return the matching record.  If an entry
+ * can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct sel_ib_pkey *sel_ib_pkey_find(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey;
+
+	idx = sel_ib_pkey_hashfn(pkey_num);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(pkey, &sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list, list) {
+		if (pkey->psec.pkey == pkey_num &&
+		    pkey->psec.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
+			return pkey;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_insert - Insert a new pkey into the table
+ * @pkey: the new pkey record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new pkey record to the hash table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_ib_pkey_insert(struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+
+	/* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
+	 * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds
+	 */
+	idx = sel_ib_pkey_hashfn(pkey->psec.pkey);
+	list_add_rcu(&pkey->list, &sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list);
+	if (sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].size == SEL_PKEY_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
+		struct sel_ib_pkey *tail;
+
+		tail = list_entry(
+			rcu_dereference_protected(
+				list_tail_rcu(&sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list),
+				lockdep_is_held(&sel_ib_pkey_lock)),
+			struct sel_ib_pkey, list);
+		list_del_rcu(&tail->list);
+		kfree_rcu(tail, rcu);
+	} else {
+		sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].size++;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a pkey using the policy
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @sid: pkey SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a pkey by querying the security
+ * policy.  The result is added to the pkey table to speedup future
+ * queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey;
+	struct sel_ib_pkey *new;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+	pkey = sel_ib_pkey_find(subnet_prefix, pkey_num);
+	if (pkey) {
+		*sid = pkey->psec.sid;
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = security_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_num,
+				   sid);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	new = kmalloc_obj(*new, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!new) {
+		/* If this memory allocation fails still return 0. The SID
+		 * is valid, it just won't be added to the cache.
+		 */
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	new->psec.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
+	new->psec.pkey = pkey_num;
+	new->psec.sid = *sid;
+	sel_ib_pkey_insert(new);
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_sid - Lookup the SID of a PKEY
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet_prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @sid: pkey SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a PKEY using the fastest method
+ * possible.  First the pkey table is queried, but if an entry can't be found
+ * then the policy is queried and the result is added to the table to speedup
+ * future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	pkey = sel_ib_pkey_find(subnet_prefix, pkey_num);
+	if (likely(pkey)) {
+		*sid = pkey->psec.sid;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(subnet_prefix, pkey_num, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_flush - Flush the entire pkey table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the pkey table
+ *
+ */
+void sel_ib_pkey_flush(void)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey, *pkey_tmp;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(pkey, pkey_tmp,
+					 &sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list, list) {
+			list_del_rcu(&pkey->list);
+			kfree_rcu(pkey, rcu);
+		}
+		sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].size = 0;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+}
+
+int __init sel_ib_pkey_init(void)
+{
+	int iter;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE; iter++) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_ib_pkey_hash[iter].list);
+		sel_ib_pkey_hash[iter].size = 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ima.c b/security/selinux/ima.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa34da9b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ima.c
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com)
+ *
+ * Measure critical data structures maintained by SELinux
+ * using IMA subsystem.
+ */
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include "security.h"
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/*
+ * selinux_ima_collect_state - Read selinux configuration settings
+ *
+ * On success returns the configuration settings string.
+ * On error, returns NULL.
+ */
+static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void)
+{
+	const char *on = "=1;", *off = "=0;";
+	char *buf;
+	int buf_len, len, i, rc;
+
+	buf_len = strlen("initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;") + 1;
+
+	len = strlen(on);
+	for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++)
+		buf_len += strlen(selinux_policycap_names[i]) + len;
+
+	buf = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf)
+		return NULL;
+
+	rc = strscpy(buf, "initialized", buf_len);
+	WARN_ON(rc < 0);
+
+	rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_initialized() ? on : off, buf_len);
+	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+
+	rc = strlcat(buf, "enforcing", buf_len);
+	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+
+	rc = strlcat(buf, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off, buf_len);
+	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+
+	rc = strlcat(buf, "checkreqprot", buf_len);
+	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+
+	rc = strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off, buf_len);
+	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++) {
+		rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_policycap_names[i], buf_len);
+		WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+
+		rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_state.policycap[i] ? on : off,
+			buf_len);
+		WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	}
+
+	return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_ima_measure_state_locked - Measure SELinux state and hash of policy
+ */
+void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(void)
+{
+	char *state_str = NULL;
+	void *policy = NULL;
+	size_t policy_len;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+	state_str = selinux_ima_collect_state();
+	if (!state_str) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed to read state.\n", __func__);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-state",
+				  state_str, strlen(state_str), false,
+				  NULL, 0);
+
+	kfree(state_str);
+
+	/*
+	 * Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed.
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return;
+
+	rc = security_read_state_kernel(&policy, &policy_len);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed to read policy %d.\n", __func__, rc);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-policy-hash",
+				  policy, policy_len, true,
+				  NULL, 0);
+
+	vfree(policy);
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_ima_measure_state - Measure SELinux state and hash of policy
+ */
+void selinux_ima_measure_state(void)
+{
+	lockdep_assert_not_held(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+	mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+	selinux_ima_measure_state_locked();
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..85a531ac7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+#define _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_avc_callback - update the audit LSM rules on AVC events.
+ * @event: the AVC event
+ *
+ * Update any audit LSM rules based on the AVC event specified in @event.
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative values otherwise.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_avc_callback(u32 event);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operator the rule uses
+ * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
+ * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not.  On success, the rule structure
+ * will be allocated internally.  The caller must free this structure with
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule,
+			    gfp_t gfp);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
+ *
+ * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
+ * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
+ */
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
+ * @prop: includes the context ID to check
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operator the rule uses
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
+ * -errno on failure.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
+			     void *rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
+ * @rule: rule to be checked
+ * Returns 1 if there are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..01b5167fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Access vector cache interface for object managers.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_H_
+#define _SELINUX_AVC_H_
+
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "av_permissions.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the AVC.
+ */
+struct avc_entry;
+
+struct task_struct;
+struct inode;
+struct sock;
+struct sk_buff;
+
+/*
+ * AVC statistics
+ */
+struct avc_cache_stats {
+	unsigned int lookups;
+	unsigned int misses;
+	unsigned int allocations;
+	unsigned int reclaims;
+	unsigned int frees;
+};
+
+/*
+ * We only need this data after we have decided to send an audit message.
+ */
+struct selinux_audit_data {
+	u32 ssid;
+	u32 tsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	u32 requested;
+	u32 audited;
+	u32 denied;
+	int result;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+/*
+ * AVC operations
+ */
+
+void __init avc_init(void);
+
+static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
+				     int result, u32 auditdeny, u32 *deniedp)
+{
+	u32 denied, audited;
+
+	if (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT)
+		return 0;
+
+	denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
+	if (unlikely(denied)) {
+		audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
+		/*
+		 * auditdeny is TRICKY!  Setting a bit in
+		 * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
+		 * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
+		 * permission.  Take notice that this is unrelated to the
+		 * actual permissions that were denied.  As an example lets
+		 * assume:
+		 *
+		 * denied == READ
+		 * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
+		 * auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
+		 *
+		 * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
+		 * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
+		 * ACCESS
+		 */
+		if (auditdeny && !(auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
+			audited = 0;
+	} else if (result)
+		audited = denied = requested;
+	else
+		audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
+	*deniedp = denied;
+	return audited;
+}
+
+int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, u32 audited,
+		   u32 denied, int result, struct common_audit_data *a);
+
+/**
+ * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
+ * @a:  auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
+ * with the policy.  This function is typically called by
+ * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
+ * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
+ * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
+ * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
+ * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
+ * before calling the auditing code.
+ */
+static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			    struct av_decision *avd, int result,
+			    struct common_audit_data *a)
+{
+	u32 audited, denied;
+	audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied);
+	if (likely(!audited))
+		return 0;
+	return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, audited, denied,
+			      result, a);
+}
+
+#define AVC_STRICT	   1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
+#define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2 /* update extended permissions */
+int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			 unsigned int flags, struct av_decision *avd);
+
+int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		 struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
+
+#define AVC_EXT_IOCTL	(1 << 0) /* Cache entry for an ioctl extended permission */
+#define AVC_EXT_NLMSG	(1 << 1) /* Cache entry for an nlmsg extended permission */
+int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			   u8 driver, u8 base_perm, u8 perm,
+			   struct common_audit_data *ad);
+
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
+
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT		1
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE		2
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE		4
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_RESET		8
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE	16
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE 32
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE	64
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE	128
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS		256
+
+int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
+
+/* Exported to selinuxfs */
+int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
+unsigned int avc_get_cache_threshold(void);
+void avc_set_cache_threshold(unsigned int cache_threshold);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..48ad64d54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Access vector cache interface for the security server.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
+#define _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno);
+
+/* Class/perm mapping support */
+struct security_class_mapping {
+	const char *name;
+	const char *perms[sizeof(u32) * 8 + 1];
+};
+
+extern const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[];
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..90cb61b16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#define COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS                                            \
+	"ioctl", "read", "write", "create", "getattr", "setattr", "lock", \
+		"relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append", "map"
+
+#define COMMON_FILE_PERMS                                                \
+	COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", "rename", "execute",   \
+		"quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", "open", "execmod", \
+		"watch", "watch_mount", "watch_sb", "watch_with_perm",   \
+		"watch_reads", "watch_mountns"
+
+#define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS                                              \
+	COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", "listen", "accept", \
+		"getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom", "sendto",  \
+		"name_bind"
+
+#define COMMON_IPC_PERMS                                            \
+	"create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", "write", \
+		"associate", "unix_read", "unix_write"
+
+#define COMMON_CAP_PERMS                                                     \
+	"chown", "dac_override", "dac_read_search", "fowner", "fsetid",      \
+		"kill", "setgid", "setuid", "setpcap", "linux_immutable",    \
+		"net_bind_service", "net_broadcast", "net_admin", "net_raw", \
+		"ipc_lock", "ipc_owner", "sys_module", "sys_rawio",          \
+		"sys_chroot", "sys_ptrace", "sys_pacct", "sys_admin",        \
+		"sys_boot", "sys_nice", "sys_resource", "sys_time",          \
+		"sys_tty_config", "mknod", "lease", "audit_write",           \
+		"audit_control", "setfcap"
+
+#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS                                                     \
+	"mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", \
+		"audit_read", "perfmon", "bpf", "checkpoint_restore"
+
+#ifdef __KERNEL__ /* avoid this check when building host programs */
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
+#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Note: The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket",
+ *	 and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".
+ */
+const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
+	{ "security",
+	  { "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member", "check_context",
+	    "load_policy", "compute_relabel", "compute_user", "setenforce",
+	    "setbool", "setsecparam", "setcheckreqprot", "read_policy",
+	    "validate_trans", NULL } },
+	{ "process",
+	  { "fork",	    "transition",    "sigchld",	    "sigkill",
+	    "sigstop",	    "signull",	     "signal",	    "ptrace",
+	    "getsched",	    "setsched",	     "getsession",  "getpgid",
+	    "setpgid",	    "getcap",	     "setcap",	    "share",
+	    "getattr",	    "setexec",	     "setfscreate", "noatsecure",
+	    "siginh",	    "setrlimit",     "rlimitinh",   "dyntransition",
+	    "setcurrent",   "execmem",	     "execstack",   "execheap",
+	    "setkeycreate", "setsockcreate", "getrlimit",   NULL } },
+	{ "process2", { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
+	{ "system",
+	  { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod", "syslog_console",
+	    "module_request", "module_load", "firmware_load",
+	    "kexec_image_load", "kexec_initramfs_load", "policy_load",
+	    "x509_certificate_load", NULL } },
+	{ "capability", { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "filesystem",
+	  { "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr", "relabelfrom",
+	    "relabelto", "associate", "quotamod", "quotaget", "watch", NULL } },
+	{ "file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } },
+	{ "dir",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name", "reparent", "search",
+	    "rmdir", NULL } },
+	{ "fd", { "use", NULL } },
+	{ "lnk_file", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "chr_file", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "blk_file", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "sock_file", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "fifo_file", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "tcp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
+	{ "udp_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "node_bind", NULL } },
+	{ "rawip_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "node_bind", NULL } },
+	{ "node", { "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } },
+	{ "netif", { "ingress", "egress", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "packet_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "key_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "unix_stream_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", NULL } },
+	{ "unix_dgram_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "sem", { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "msg", { "send", "receive", NULL } },
+	{ "msgq", { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, "enqueue", NULL } },
+	{ "shm", { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, "lock", NULL } },
+	{ "ipc", { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_route_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_tcpdiag_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_nflog_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_xfrm_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_selinux_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_iscsi_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_audit_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg_relay",
+	    "nlmsg_readpriv", "nlmsg_tty_audit", "nlmsg", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_fib_lookup_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_connector_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_netfilter_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_dnrt_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "association",
+	  { "sendto", "recvfrom", "setcontext", "polmatch", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_kobject_uevent_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_generic_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_scsitransport_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_rdma_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_crypto_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "appletalk_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "packet",
+	  { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } },
+	{ "key",
+	  { "view", "read", "write", "search", "link", "setattr", "create",
+	    NULL } },
+	{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
+	{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
+	{ "capability2", { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
+	{ "tun_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
+	{ "binder",
+	  { "impersonate", "call", "set_context_mgr", "transfer", NULL } },
+	{ "cap_userns", { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "cap2_userns", { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "sctp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "node_bind", "name_connect", "association",
+	    NULL } },
+	{ "icmp_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "node_bind", NULL } },
+	{ "ax25_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "ipx_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netrom_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "atmpvc_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "x25_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "rose_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "decnet_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "atmsvc_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "rds_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "irda_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "pppox_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "llc_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "can_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "tipc_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "bluetooth_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "iucv_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "rxrpc_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "isdn_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "phonet_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "ieee802154_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "caif_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "alg_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "nfc_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "vsock_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "kcm_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "qipcrtr_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "smc_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "infiniband_pkey", { "access", NULL } },
+	{ "infiniband_endport", { "manage_subnet", NULL } },
+	{ "bpf",
+	  { "map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run",
+	    "map_create_as", "prog_load_as", NULL } },
+	{ "xdp_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "mctp_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "perf_event",
+	  { "open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write", NULL } },
+	{ "anon_inode", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", "allowed", NULL } },
+	{ "user_namespace", { "create", NULL } },
+	{ "memfd_file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } },
+	/* last one */ { NULL, {} }
+};
+
+#ifdef __KERNEL__ /* avoid this check when building host programs */
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+
+#if PF_MAX > 46
+#error New address family defined, please update secclass_map.
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..060833e2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Interface to booleans in the security server. This is exported
+ * for the selinuxfs.
+ *
+ * Author: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
+#define _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_policy *policy, u32 *len, char ***names,
+		       int **values);
+
+int security_set_bools(u32 len, const int *values);
+
+int security_get_bool_value(u32 index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/hash.h b/security/selinux/include/hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..18956dbef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_HASH_H_
+#define _SELINUX_HASH_H_
+
+/*
+ * Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
+ * public domain.
+ */
+static inline u32 av_hash(u32 key1, u32 key2, u32 key3, u32 mask)
+{
+	static const u32 c1 = 0xcc9e2d51;
+	static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593;
+	static const u32 r1 = 15;
+	static const u32 r2 = 13;
+	static const u32 m = 5;
+	static const u32 n = 0xe6546b64;
+
+	u32 hash = 0;
+
+#define mix(input)                                         \
+	do {                                               \
+		u32 v = input;                             \
+		v *= c1;                                   \
+		v = (v << r1) | (v >> (32 - r1));          \
+		v *= c2;                                   \
+		hash ^= v;                                 \
+		hash = (hash << r2) | (hash >> (32 - r2)); \
+		hash = hash * m + n;                       \
+	} while (0)
+
+	mix(key1);
+	mix(key2);
+	mix(key3);
+
+#undef mix
+
+	hash ^= hash >> 16;
+	hash *= 0x85ebca6b;
+	hash ^= hash >> 13;
+	hash *= 0xc2b2ae35;
+	hash ^= hash >> 16;
+
+	return hash & mask;
+}
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_HASH_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h b/security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..875b05584
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * pkey table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of pkeys to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Mellanox Technologies, 2016
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_IB_PKEY_H
+#define _SELINUX_IB_PKEY_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+void sel_ib_pkey_flush(void);
+int sel_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey, u32 *sid);
+#else
+static inline void sel_ib_pkey_flush(void)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline int sel_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey, u32 *sid)
+{
+	*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/ima.h b/security/selinux/include/ima.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..38ab302f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/ima.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com)
+ *
+ * Measure critical data structures maintained by SELinux
+ * using IMA subsystem.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_IMA_H_
+#define _SELINUX_IMA_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+extern void selinux_ima_measure_state(void);
+extern void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(void);
+#else
+static inline void selinux_ima_measure_state(void)
+{
+}
+static inline void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_IMA_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initcalls.h b/security/selinux/include/initcalls.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6674cf489
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/initcalls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * SELinux initcalls
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_INITCALLS_H
+#define _SELINUX_INITCALLS_H
+
+int init_sel_fs(void);
+int sel_netport_init(void);
+int sel_netnode_init(void);
+int sel_netif_init(void);
+int sel_netlink_init(void);
+int sel_ib_pkey_init(void);
+int selinux_nf_ip_init(void);
+
+int selinux_initcall(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d7ba60b62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifdef __KERNEL__
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#else
+#include <stddef.h>
+#endif
+
+static const char *const initial_sid_to_string[] = {
+	NULL, /* zero placeholder, not used */
+	"kernel", /* kernel / SECINITSID_KERNEL */
+	"security", /* security / SECINITSID_SECURITY */
+	"unlabeled", /* unlabeled / SECINITSID_UNLABELED */
+	NULL, /* fs */
+	"file", /* file / SECINITSID_FILE */
+	NULL, /* file_labels */
+	"init", /* init / SECINITSID_INIT */
+	"any_socket", /* any_socket / SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET */
+	"port", /* port / SECINITSID_PORT */
+	"netif", /* netif / SECINITSID_NETIF */
+	"netmsg", /* netmsg / SECINITSID_NETMSG */
+	"node", /* node / SECINITSID_NODE */
+	NULL, /* igmp_packet */
+	NULL, /* icmp_socket */
+	NULL, /* tcp_socket */
+	NULL, /* sysctl_modprobe */
+	NULL, /* sysctl */
+	NULL, /* sysctl_fs */
+	NULL, /* sysctl_kernel */
+	NULL, /* sysctl_net */
+	NULL, /* sysctl_net_unix */
+	NULL, /* sysctl_vm */
+	NULL, /* sysctl_dev */
+	NULL, /* kmod */
+	NULL, /* policy */
+	NULL, /* scmp_packet */
+	"devnull", /* devnull / SECINITSID_DEVNULL */
+};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netif.h b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2838bdc17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Network interface table.
+ *
+ * Network interfaces (devices) do not have a security field, so we
+ * maintain a table associating each interface with a SID.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *                    Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
+#define _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
+
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+
+void sel_netif_flush(void);
+
+int sel_netif_sid(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_NETIF_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5731c0dcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * SELinux interface to the NetLabel subsystem
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETLABEL_H_
+#define _SELINUX_NETLABEL_H_
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/request_sock.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
+
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void);
+
+void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, int error,
+			int gateway);
+
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec);
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec);
+
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *type,
+				 u32 *sid);
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 sid);
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+				      struct sk_buff *skb);
+int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family);
+void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
+int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+				struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family,
+				struct common_audit_data *ad);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				     int optname);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+					 struct sockaddr *addr);
+
+#else
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family,
+				      int error, int gateway)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline void
+selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline void
+selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family,
+					       u32 *type, u32 *sid)
+{
+	*type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_NONE;
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family,
+					       u32 sid)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int
+selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+				  struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req,
+						   u16 family)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk,
+						struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+					      struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family,
+					      struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
+						   int level, int optname)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk,
+						struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+						       struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netnode.h b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e4dc904c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Network node table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network nodes to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead since most of these queries happen on
+ * a per-packet basis.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETNODE_H
+#define _SELINUX_NETNODE_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+void sel_netnode_flush(void);
+
+int sel_netnode_sid(const void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netport.h b/security/selinux/include/netport.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9096a8289
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netport.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Network port table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network ports to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2008
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETPORT_H
+#define _SELINUX_NETPORT_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+void sel_netport_flush(void);
+
+int sel_netport_sid(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3c0a16ec9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ *  Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the SELinux security data structures for kernel objects.
+ *
+ *  Author(s):  Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ *		Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
+ *		Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
+ *		James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_
+#define _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_
+
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+
+struct avdc_entry {
+	u32 isid; /* inode SID */
+	struct av_decision avd; /* av decision */
+};
+
+struct cred_security_struct {
+	u32 osid; /* SID prior to last execve */
+	u32 sid; /* current SID */
+	u32 exec_sid; /* exec SID */
+	u32 create_sid; /* fscreate SID */
+	u32 keycreate_sid; /* keycreate SID */
+	u32 sockcreate_sid; /* fscreate SID */
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+struct task_security_struct {
+#define TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE (1 << 2)
+	struct {
+		u32 sid; /* current SID for cached entries */
+		u32 seqno; /* AVC sequence number */
+		unsigned int dir_spot; /* dir cache index to check first */
+		struct avdc_entry dir[TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE]; /* dir entries */
+		bool permissive_neveraudit; /* permissive and neveraudit */
+	} avdcache;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+static inline bool task_avdcache_permnoaudit(struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+					     u32 sid)
+{
+	return (tsec->avdcache.permissive_neveraudit &&
+		sid == tsec->avdcache.sid &&
+		tsec->avdcache.seqno == avc_policy_seqno());
+}
+
+enum label_initialized {
+	LABEL_INVALID, /* invalid or not initialized */
+	LABEL_INITIALIZED, /* initialized */
+	LABEL_PENDING
+};
+
+struct inode_security_struct {
+	struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode object */
+	struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
+	u32 task_sid; /* SID of creating task */
+	u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
+	u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */
+	unsigned char initialized; /* initialization flag */
+	spinlock_t lock;
+};
+
+struct file_security_struct {
+	u32 sid; /* SID of open file description */
+	u32 fown_sid; /* SID of file owner (for SIGIO) */
+	u32 isid; /* SID of inode at the time of file open */
+	u32 pseqno; /* Policy seqno at the time of file open */
+};
+
+struct backing_file_security_struct {
+	u32 uf_sid; /* associated user file fsec->sid */
+};
+
+struct superblock_security_struct {
+	u32 sid; /* SID of file system superblock */
+	u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */
+	u32 mntpoint_sid; /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */
+	u32 creator_sid; /* SID of privileged process */
+	unsigned short behavior; /* labeling behavior */
+	unsigned short flags; /* which mount options were specified */
+	struct mutex lock;
+	struct list_head isec_head;
+	spinlock_t isec_lock;
+};
+
+struct msg_security_struct {
+	u32 sid; /* SID of message */
+};
+
+struct ipc_security_struct {
+	u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */
+	u32 sid; /* SID of IPC resource */
+};
+
+struct netif_security_struct {
+	const struct net *ns; /* network namespace */
+	int ifindex; /* device index */
+	u32 sid; /* SID for this interface */
+};
+
+struct netnode_security_struct {
+	union {
+		__be32 ipv4; /* IPv4 node address */
+		struct in6_addr ipv6; /* IPv6 node address */
+	} addr;
+	u32 sid; /* SID for this node */
+	u16 family; /* address family */
+};
+
+struct netport_security_struct {
+	u32 sid; /* SID for this node */
+	u16 port; /* port number */
+	u8 protocol; /* transport protocol */
+};
+
+struct sk_security_struct {
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+	enum { /* NetLabel state */
+	       NLBL_UNSET = 0,
+	       NLBL_REQUIRE,
+	       NLBL_LABELED,
+	       NLBL_REQSKB,
+	       NLBL_CONNLABELED,
+	} nlbl_state;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlbl_secattr; /* NetLabel sec attributes */
+#endif
+	u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
+	u32 peer_sid; /* SID of peer */
+	u16 sclass; /* sock security class */
+	enum { /* SCTP association state */
+	       SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET = 0,
+	       SCTP_ASSOC_SET,
+	} sctp_assoc_state;
+};
+
+struct tun_security_struct {
+	u32 sid; /* SID for the tun device sockets */
+};
+
+struct key_security_struct {
+	u32 sid; /* SID of key */
+};
+
+struct ib_security_struct {
+	u32 sid; /* SID of the queue pair or MAD agent */
+};
+
+struct pkey_security_struct {
+	u64 subnet_prefix; /* Port subnet prefix */
+	u16 pkey; /* PKey number */
+	u32 sid; /* SID of pkey */
+};
+
+struct bpf_security_struct {
+	u32 sid; /* SID of bpf obj creator */
+	u32 perms; /* permissions for allowed bpf token commands */
+	u32 grantor_sid; /* SID of token grantor */
+};
+
+struct perf_event_security_struct {
+	u32 sid; /* SID of perf_event obj creator */
+};
+
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;
+static inline struct cred_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	return cred->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
+}
+
+static inline struct task_security_struct *
+selinux_task(const struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return task->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_task;
+}
+
+static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file)
+{
+	return file->f_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
+}
+
+static inline struct backing_file_security_struct *
+selinux_backing_file(const struct file *backing_file)
+{
+	void *blob = backing_file_security(backing_file);
+	return blob + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file;
+}
+
+static inline struct inode_security_struct *
+selinux_inode(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+		return NULL;
+	return inode->i_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+}
+
+static inline struct msg_security_struct *
+selinux_msg_msg(const struct msg_msg *msg_msg)
+{
+	return msg_msg->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg;
+}
+
+static inline struct ipc_security_struct *
+selinux_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
+{
+	return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the subjective security ID of the current task
+ */
+static inline u32 current_sid(void)
+{
+	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+
+	return crsec->sid;
+}
+
+static inline struct superblock_security_struct *
+selinux_superblock(const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+	return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static inline struct key_security_struct *selinux_key(const struct key *key)
+{
+	return key->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+	return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
+static inline struct tun_security_struct *selinux_tun_dev(void *security)
+{
+	return security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_tun_dev;
+}
+
+static inline struct ib_security_struct *selinux_ib(void *ib_sec)
+{
+	return ib_sec + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ib;
+}
+
+static inline struct perf_event_security_struct *
+selinux_perf_event(void *perf_event)
+{
+	return perf_event + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_perf_event;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static inline struct bpf_security_struct *
+selinux_bpf_map_security(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+	return map->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map;
+}
+
+static inline struct bpf_security_struct *
+selinux_bpf_prog_security(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	return prog->aux->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog;
+}
+
+static inline struct bpf_security_struct *
+selinux_bpf_token_security(struct bpf_token *token)
+{
+	return token->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
+#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dbf39358a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_H_
+#define _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_H_
+
+/* Policy capabilities */
+enum {
+	POLICYDB_CAP_NETPEER,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_OPENPERM,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_EXTSOCKCLASS,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_ALWAYSNETWORK,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_CGROUPSECLABEL,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_MEMFD_CLASS,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_BPF_TOKEN_PERMS,
+	__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX
+};
+#define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
+
+extern const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX];
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6e2b808e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_
+#define _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_
+
+#include "policycap.h"
+
+/* clang-format off */
+/* Policy capability names */
+const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {
+	"network_peer_controls",
+	"open_perms",
+	"extended_socket_class",
+	"always_check_network",
+	"cgroup_seclabel",
+	"nnp_nosuid_transition",
+	"genfs_seclabel_symlinks",
+	"ioctl_skip_cloexec",
+	"userspace_initial_context",
+	"netlink_xperm",
+	"netif_wildcard",
+	"genfs_seclabel_wildcard",
+	"functionfs_seclabel",
+	"memfd_class",
+	"bpf_token_perms",
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a74415e3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Security server interface.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
+#define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
+
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "policycap.h"
+
+#define SECSID_NULL   0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */
+#define SECSID_WILD   0xffffffff /* wildcard SID */
+#define SECCLASS_NULL 0x0000 /* no class */
+
+/* Identify specific policy version changes */
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE		     15
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL		     16
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6		     17
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS	     18
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS	     19
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS		     19
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB		     20
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS	     21
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP		     22
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE	     23
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY	     24
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS	     25
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS	     26
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS 27
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE	     28
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES    29
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL	     30
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND	     31
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB		     32
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS	     33 /* compressed filename transitions */
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_COND_XPERMS	     34 /* extended permissions in conditional policies */
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEVERAUDIT	     35 /* neveraudit types */
+
+/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_NEVERAUDIT
+
+/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
+#define SE_MNTMASK 0x0f
+/* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
+/* BE CAREFUL, these need to be the low order bits for selinux_get_mnt_opts */
+#define CONTEXT_MNT	0x01
+#define FSCONTEXT_MNT	0x02
+#define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT 0x04
+#define DEFCONTEXT_MNT	0x08
+#define SBLABEL_MNT	0x10
+/* Non-mount related flags */
+#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100
+#define SE_SBPROC	 0x0200
+#define SE_SBGENFS	 0x0400
+#define SE_SBGENFS_XATTR 0x0800
+#define SE_SBNATIVE	 0x1000
+
+#define CONTEXT_STR	"context"
+#define FSCONTEXT_STR	"fscontext"
+#define ROOTCONTEXT_STR "rootcontext"
+#define DEFCONTEXT_STR	"defcontext"
+#define SECLABEL_STR	"seclabel"
+
+struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
+
+extern int selinux_enabled_boot;
+
+/*
+ * type_datum properties
+ * available at the kernel policy version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
+ */
+#define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY   0x0001
+#define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE 0x0002
+
+/* limitation of boundary depth  */
+#define POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH 4
+
+struct selinux_policy;
+
+struct selinux_state {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+	bool enforcing;
+#endif
+	bool initialized;
+	bool policycap[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX];
+
+	struct page *status_page;
+	struct mutex status_lock;
+
+	struct selinux_policy __rcu *policy;
+	struct mutex policy_mutex;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+void selinux_avc_init(void);
+
+extern struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+
+static inline bool selinux_initialized(void)
+{
+	/* do a synchronized load to avoid race conditions */
+	return smp_load_acquire(&selinux_state.initialized);
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_mark_initialized(void)
+{
+	/* do a synchronized write to avoid race conditions */
+	smp_store_release(&selinux_state.initialized, true);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static inline bool enforcing_enabled(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.enforcing);
+}
+
+static inline void enforcing_set(bool value)
+{
+	WRITE_ONCE(selinux_state.enforcing, value);
+}
+#else
+static inline bool enforcing_enabled(void)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline void enforcing_set(bool value)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline bool checkreqprot_get(void)
+{
+	/* non-zero/true checkreqprot values are no longer supported */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_netpeer(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETPEER]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_openperm(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_OPENPERM]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_extsockclass(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_EXTSOCKCLASS]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_ALWAYSNETWORK]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_CGROUPSECLABEL]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_memfd_class(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_MEMFD_CLASS]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_bpf_token_perms(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_BPF_TOKEN_PERMS]);
+}
+
+struct selinux_policy_convert_data;
+
+struct selinux_load_state {
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct selinux_policy_convert_data *convert_data;
+};
+
+int security_mls_enabled(void);
+int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len,
+			 struct selinux_load_state *load_state);
+void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_load_state *load_state);
+void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_load_state *load_state);
+int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len);
+int security_read_state_kernel(void **data, size_t *len);
+int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
+
+/* Maximum supported number of permissions per class */
+#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
+struct av_decision {
+	u32 allowed;
+	u32 auditallow;
+	u32 auditdeny;
+	u32 seqno;
+	u32 flags;
+};
+
+#define XPERMS_ALLOWED	  1
+#define XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 2
+#define XPERMS_DONTAUDIT  4
+
+#define security_xperm_set(perms, x)  ((perms)[(x) >> 5] |= 1 << ((x)&0x1f))
+#define security_xperm_test(perms, x) (1 & ((perms)[(x) >> 5] >> ((x)&0x1f)))
+struct extended_perms_data {
+	u32 p[8];
+};
+
+struct extended_perms_decision {
+	u8 used;
+	u8 driver;
+	u8 base_perm;
+	struct extended_perms_data *allowed;
+	struct extended_perms_data *auditallow;
+	struct extended_perms_data *dontaudit;
+};
+
+struct extended_perms {
+	u16 len; /* length associated decision chain */
+	u8 base_perms; /* which base permissions are covered */
+	struct extended_perms_data drivers; /* flag drivers that are used */
+};
+
+/* definitions of av_decision.flags */
+#define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001
+#define AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT  0x0002
+
+void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			 struct av_decision *avd,
+			 struct extended_perms *xperms);
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u8 driver,
+				      u8 base_perm,
+				      struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
+
+void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			      struct av_decision *avd);
+
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+
+int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+
+int security_sid_to_context_inval(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+
+int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+			    u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
+
+int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
+
+int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+				    u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags);
+
+int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+				  u32 *sid);
+
+int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_netif_sid(const char *name, u32 *if_sid);
+
+int security_node_sid(u16 domain, const void *addr, u32 addrlen, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				 u16 tclass);
+
+int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				      u16 tclass);
+
+int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid);
+
+int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
+
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, u32 xfrm_sid,
+				 u32 *peer_sid);
+
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy, char ***classes,
+			 u32 *nclasses);
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy, const char *class,
+			     char ***perms, u32 *nperms);
+int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
+int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
+
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR	 1 /* use xattr */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS	 2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK	 3 /* use task SIDs, e.g. pipefs/sockfs */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS	 4 /* use the genfs support */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE	 5 /* no labeling support */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT 6 /* use mountpoint labeling */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE	 7 /* use native label support */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX	 7 /* Highest SECURITY_FS_USE_XXX */
+
+int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb);
+
+int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, const char *path, u16 sclass,
+		       u32 *sid);
+
+int selinux_policy_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, const char *fstype,
+			     const char *path, u16 sclass, u32 *sid);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+				   u32 *sid);
+
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+#else
+static inline int
+security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, u32 *sid)
+{
+	return -EIDRM;
+}
+
+static inline int
+security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid);
+
+/*
+ * status notifier using mmap interface
+ */
+extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void);
+
+#define SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION 1
+struct selinux_kernel_status {
+	u32 version; /* version number of the structure */
+	u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */
+	u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */
+	u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */
+	u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */
+	/*
+	 * The version > 0 supports above members.
+	 */
+} __packed;
+
+extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(bool enforcing);
+extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(u32 seqno);
+extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
+extern struct path selinux_null;
+extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
+extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
+extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
+
+extern void avtab_cache_init(void);
+extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
+extern void hashtab_cache_init(void);
+extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats(char *page);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..de485556a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks
+ *
+ * Author : Trent Jaeger, <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
+ * Updated : Venkat Yekkirala, <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
+#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
+
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/xfrm.h>
+
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, gfp_t gfp);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+			      struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp);
+void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+			     struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid);
+void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+				      const struct flowi_common *flic);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount;
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
+{
+	return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0);
+}
+
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+			      struct common_audit_data *ad);
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
+
+static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
+{
+	struct net *net;
+
+	down_read(&net_rwsem);
+	for_each_net(net)
+		rt_genid_bump_all(net);
+	up_read(&net_rwsem);
+}
+#else
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+					    struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+					      struct common_audit_data *ad,
+					      u8 proto)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid,
+					      int ckall)
+{
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/initcalls.c b/security/selinux/initcalls.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f6716a1d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/initcalls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * SELinux initcalls
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+
+#include "initcalls.h"
+
+/**
+ * selinux_initcall - Perform the SELinux initcalls
+ *
+ * Used as a device initcall in the SELinux LSM definition.
+ */
+int __init selinux_initcall(void)
+{
+	int rc = 0, rc_tmp = 0;
+
+	rc_tmp = init_sel_fs();
+	if (!rc && rc_tmp)
+		rc = rc_tmp;
+
+	rc_tmp = sel_netport_init();
+	if (!rc && rc_tmp)
+		rc = rc_tmp;
+
+	rc_tmp = sel_netnode_init();
+	if (!rc && rc_tmp)
+		rc = rc_tmp;
+
+	rc_tmp = sel_netif_init();
+	if (!rc && rc_tmp)
+		rc = rc_tmp;
+
+	rc_tmp = sel_netlink_init();
+	if (!rc && rc_tmp)
+		rc = rc_tmp;
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND)
+	rc_tmp = sel_ib_pkey_init();
+	if (!rc && rc_tmp)
+		rc = rc_tmp;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
+	rc_tmp = selinux_nf_ip_init();
+	if (!rc && rc_tmp)
+		rc = rc_tmp;
+#endif
+
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fa6d24a37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Network interface table.
+ *
+ * Network interfaces (devices) do not have a security field, so we
+ * maintain a table associating each interface with a SID.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *		      Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+
+#include "initcalls.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netif.h"
+
+#define SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE	64
+#define SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX	1024
+
+struct sel_netif {
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct netif_security_struct nsec;
+	struct rcu_head rcu_head;
+};
+
+static u32 sel_netif_total;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netif_lock);
+static struct list_head sel_netif_hash[SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_hashfn - Hashing function for the interface table
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the network interface table, it returns the
+ * bucket number for the given interface.
+ *
+ */
+static inline u32 sel_netif_hashfn(const struct net *ns, int ifindex)
+{
+	return (((uintptr_t)ns + ifindex) & (SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_find - Search for an interface record
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the network interface table and return the record matching @ifindex.
+ * If an entry can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(const struct net *ns,
+					       int ifindex)
+{
+	u32 idx = sel_netif_hashfn(ns, ifindex);
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list)
+		if (net_eq(netif->nsec.ns, ns) &&
+		    netif->nsec.ifindex == ifindex)
+			return netif;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_insert - Insert a new interface into the table
+ * @netif: the new interface record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new interface record to the network interface hash table.  Returns
+ * zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netif_insert(struct sel_netif *netif)
+{
+	u32 idx;
+
+	if (sel_netif_total >= SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+
+	idx = sel_netif_hashfn(netif->nsec.ns, netif->nsec.ifindex);
+	list_add_rcu(&netif->list, &sel_netif_hash[idx]);
+	sel_netif_total++;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_destroy - Remove an interface record from the table
+ * @netif: the existing interface record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove an existing interface record from the network interface table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netif_destroy(struct sel_netif *netif)
+{
+	list_del_rcu(&netif->list);
+	sel_netif_total--;
+	kfree_rcu(netif, rcu_head);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network interface using the policy
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ * @sid: interface SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network interface by querying the
+ * security policy.  The result is added to the network interface table to
+ * speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netif_sid_slow(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+	struct sel_netif *new;
+	struct net_device *dev;
+
+	/* NOTE: we always use init's network namespace since we don't
+	 * currently support containers */
+
+	dev = dev_get_by_index(ns, ifindex);
+	if (unlikely(dev == NULL)) {
+		pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), invalid network interface (%d)\n",
+			__func__, ifindex);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
+	if (netif != NULL) {
+		*sid = netif->nsec.sid;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, sid);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* If this memory allocation fails still return 0. The SID
+	 * is valid, it just won't be added to the cache.
+	 */
+	new = kmalloc_obj(*new, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (new) {
+		new->nsec.ns = ns;
+		new->nsec.ifindex = ifindex;
+		new->nsec.sid = *sid;
+		if (sel_netif_insert(new))
+			kfree(new);
+	}
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	dev_put(dev);
+	if (unlikely(ret))
+		pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network interface label (%d)\n",
+			__func__, ifindex);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_sid - Lookup the SID of a network interface
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ * @sid: interface SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network interface using the fastest
+ * method possible.  First the interface table is queried, but if an entry
+ * can't be found then the policy is queried and the result is added to the
+ * table to speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values
+ * on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_netif_sid(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
+	if (likely(netif != NULL)) {
+		*sid = netif->nsec.sid;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sel_netif_sid_slow(ns, ifindex, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_kill - Remove an entry from the network interface table
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function removes the entry matching @ifindex from the network interface
+ * table if it exists.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netif_kill(const struct net *ns, int ifindex)
+{
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
+	if (netif)
+		sel_netif_destroy(netif);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_flush - Flush the entire network interface table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the network interface table.
+ *
+ */
+void sel_netif_flush(void)
+{
+	int idx;
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; idx++)
+		list_for_each_entry(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list)
+			sel_netif_destroy(netif);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+}
+
+static int sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler(struct notifier_block *this,
+					     unsigned long event, void *ptr)
+{
+	struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr);
+
+	if (event == NETDEV_DOWN)
+		sel_netif_kill(dev_net(dev), dev->ifindex);
+
+	return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block sel_netif_netdev_notifier = {
+	.notifier_call = sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler,
+};
+
+int __init sel_netif_init(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; i++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netif_hash[i]);
+
+	register_netdevice_notifier(&sel_netif_netdev_notifier);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d51dfe892
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,619 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * SELinux NetLabel Support
+ *
+ * This file provides the necessary glue to tie NetLabel into the SELinux
+ * subsystem.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007, 2008
+ */
+
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached - Cache a SID lookup
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: the packet's address family
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Query the SELinux security server to lookup the correct SID for the given
+ * security attributes.  If the query is successful, cache the result to speed
+ * up future lookups.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					   u16 family,
+					   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+					   u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(secattr, sid);
+	if (rc == 0 &&
+	    (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) &&
+	    (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE))
+		netlbl_cache_add(skb, family, secattr);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr - Generate the NetLabel socket secattr
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Generate the NetLabel security attributes for a socket, making full use of
+ * the socket's attribute cache.  Returns a pointer to the security attributes
+ * on success, or an ERR_PTR on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
+
+	if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
+		return sksec->nlbl_secattr;
+
+	secattr = netlbl_secattr_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (secattr == NULL)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sksec->sid, secattr);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		netlbl_secattr_free(secattr);
+		return ERR_PTR(rc);
+	}
+	sksec->nlbl_secattr = secattr;
+
+	return secattr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr - Get the cached NetLabel secattr
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Query the socket's cached secattr and if the SID matches the cached value
+ * return the cache, otherwise return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
+							const struct sock *sk,
+							u32 sid)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
+
+	if (secattr == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
+	    (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+		return secattr;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate - Invalidate the NetLabel cache
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Invalidate the NetLabel security attribute mapping cache.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
+{
+	netlbl_cache_invalidate();
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_err - Handle a NetLabel packet error
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: the packet's address family
+ * @error: the error code
+ * @gateway: true if host is acting as a gateway, false otherwise
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * When a packet is dropped due to a call to avc_has_perm() pass the error
+ * code to the NetLabel subsystem so any protocol specific processing can be
+ * done.  This is safe to call even if you are unsure if NetLabel labeling is
+ * present on the packet, NetLabel is smart enough to only act when it should.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, int error, int gateway)
+{
+	netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, error, gateway);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free - Free the NetLabel fields
+ * @sksec: the sk_security_struct
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Free all of the memory in the NetLabel fields of a sk_security_struct.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
+{
+	if (!sksec->nlbl_secattr)
+		return;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_free(sksec->nlbl_secattr);
+	sksec->nlbl_secattr = NULL;
+	sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
+ * @sksec: the sk_security_struct
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset.
+ * The caller is responsible for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
+{
+	sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid - Get the sid of a packet using NetLabel
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Call the NetLabel mechanism to get the security attributes of the given
+ * packet and use those attributes to determine the correct context/SID to
+ * assign to the packet.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				 u16 family,
+				 u32 *type,
+				 u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+
+	if (!netlbl_enabled()) {
+		*type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_NONE;
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
+		rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, family,
+						     &secattr, sid);
+	else
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	*type = secattr.type;
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid - Set the NetLabel on a packet given a sid
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description
+ * Call the NetLabel mechanism to set the label of a packet using @sid.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				 u16 family,
+				 u32 sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr_storage;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = NULL;
+	struct sock *sk;
+
+	/* if this is a locally generated packet check to see if it is already
+	 * being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
+	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+	if (sk != NULL) {
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+
+		if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
+			return 0;
+		secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid);
+	}
+	if (secattr == NULL) {
+		secattr = &secattr_storage;
+		netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
+		rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sid, secattr);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			goto skbuff_setsid_return;
+	}
+
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_setattr(skb, family, secattr);
+
+skbuff_setsid_return:
+	if (secattr == &secattr_storage)
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(secattr);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request - Label an incoming sctp association.
+ * @asoc: incoming association.
+ * @skb: the packet.
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new incoming connection is represented by @asoc, ......
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
+	struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
+
+	if (asoc->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
+	    asoc->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(asoc->secid, &secattr);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto assoc_request_return;
+
+	/* Move skb hdr address info to a struct sockaddr and then call
+	 * netlbl_conn_setattr().
+	 */
+	if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
+		addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+		addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+		rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(asoc->base.sk, (void *)&addr4, &secattr);
+	} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && ip_hdr(skb)->version == 6) {
+		addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+		addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+		rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(asoc->base.sk, (void *)&addr6, &secattr);
+	} else {
+		rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+	}
+
+	if (rc == 0)
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+
+assoc_request_return:
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
+ * @req: incoming connection request socket
+ * @family: the request socket's address family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new incoming connection request is represented by @req, we need to label
+ * the new request_sock here and the stack will ensure the on-the-wire label
+ * will get preserved when a full sock is created once the connection handshake
+ * is complete.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+
+	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(req->secid, &secattr);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto inet_conn_request_return;
+	rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
+inet_conn_request_return:
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone - Initialize the newly created sock
+ * @sk: the new sock
+ * @family: the sock's address family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new connection has been established using @sk, we've already labeled the
+ * socket via the request_sock struct in selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request() but
+ * we need to set the NetLabel state here since we now have a sock structure.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+
+	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6)
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+	else
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone - Copy state to the newly created sock
+ * @sk: current sock
+ * @newsk: the new sock
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3).
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
+
+	newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
+ * @sk: the sock to label
+ * @family: protocol family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
+ * SID.  Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
+
+	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
+	if (IS_ERR(secattr))
+		return PTR_ERR(secattr);
+	/* On socket creation, replacement of IP options is safe even if
+	 * the caller does not hold the socket lock.
+	 */
+	rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, family, secattr, true);
+	switch (rc) {
+	case 0:
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+		break;
+	case -EDESTADDRREQ:
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
+		rc = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb - Do an inbound access check using NetLabel
+ * @sksec: the sock's sk_security_struct
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @ad: the audit data
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Fetch the NetLabel security attributes from @skb and perform an access check
+ * against the receiving socket.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * error.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+				struct sk_buff *skb,
+				u16 family,
+				struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	int rc;
+	u32 nlbl_sid;
+	u32 perm;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+
+	if (!netlbl_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
+		rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, family,
+						     &secattr, &nlbl_sid);
+	else
+		nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	switch (sksec->sclass) {
+	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
+		perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		break;
+	case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+		perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		break;
+	default:
+		perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+	}
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+		netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_option - Is this a NetLabel option
+ * @level: the socket level or protocol
+ * @optname: the socket option name
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Returns true if @level and @optname refer to a NetLabel option.
+ * Helper for selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt().
+ */
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_option(int level, int optname)
+{
+	return (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS) ||
+		(level == IPPROTO_IPV6 && optname == IPV6_HOPOPTS);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt - Do not allow users to remove a NetLabel
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @level: the socket level or protocol
+ * @optname: the socket option name
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Check the setsockopt() call and if the user is trying to replace the IP
+ * options on a socket and a NetLabel is in place for the socket deny the
+ * access; otherwise allow the access.  Returns zero when the access is
+ * allowed, -EACCES when denied, and other negative values on error.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
+				     int level,
+				     int optname)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+
+	if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
+	    (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED ||
+	     sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_CONNLABELED)) {
+		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+		lock_sock(sk);
+		/* call the netlabel function directly as we want to see the
+		 * on-the-wire label that is assigned via the socket's options
+		 * and not the cached netlabel/lsm attributes */
+		rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr);
+		release_sock(sk);
+		if (rc == 0)
+			rc = -EACCES;
+		else if (rc == -ENOMSG)
+			rc = 0;
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper - Help label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
+						struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
+
+	/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
+	 * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
+	 * the socket */
+	if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
+		netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
+		rc = 0;
+		return rc;
+	}
+	secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
+	if (IS_ERR(secattr))
+		return PTR_ERR(secattr);
+
+	rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked - Label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket that already has the socket locked
+ * with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+					 struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+
+	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
+	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
+		return 0;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	lock_sock(sk);
+	rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
+	release_sock(sk);
+
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eb40e4603
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Netlink event notifications for SELinux.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/selinux_netlink.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/netlink.h>
+
+#include "initcalls.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+static struct sock *selnl __ro_after_init;
+
+static int selnl_msglen(int msgtype)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	switch (msgtype) {
+	case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE:
+		ret = sizeof(struct selnl_msg_setenforce);
+		break;
+
+	case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD:
+		ret = sizeof(struct selnl_msg_policyload);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void selnl_add_payload(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int len, int msgtype, void *data)
+{
+	switch (msgtype) {
+	case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE: {
+		struct selnl_msg_setenforce *msg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
+
+		memset(msg, 0, len);
+		msg->val = *((int *)data);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD: {
+		struct selnl_msg_policyload *msg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
+
+		memset(msg, 0, len);
+		msg->seqno = *((u32 *)data);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+}
+
+static void selnl_notify(int msgtype, void *data)
+{
+	int len;
+	sk_buff_data_t tmp;
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+
+	len = selnl_msglen(msgtype);
+
+	skb = nlmsg_new(len, GFP_USER);
+	if (!skb)
+		goto oom;
+
+	tmp = skb->tail;
+	nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, 0, 0, msgtype, len, 0);
+	if (!nlh)
+		goto out_kfree_skb;
+	selnl_add_payload(nlh, len, msgtype, data);
+	nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - tmp;
+	NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = SELNLGRP_AVC;
+	netlink_broadcast(selnl, skb, 0, SELNLGRP_AVC, GFP_USER);
+out:
+	return;
+
+out_kfree_skb:
+	kfree_skb(skb);
+oom:
+	pr_err("SELinux:  OOM in %s\n", __func__);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val)
+{
+	selnl_notify(SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE, &val);
+}
+
+void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno)
+{
+	selnl_notify(SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD, &seqno);
+}
+
+int __init sel_netlink_init(void)
+{
+	struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
+		.groups	= SELNLGRP_MAX,
+		.flags	= NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV,
+	};
+
+	selnl = netlink_kernel_create(&init_net, NETLINK_SELINUX, &cfg);
+	if (selnl == NULL)
+		panic("SELinux:  Cannot create netlink socket.");
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..adb93003b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Network node table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network nodes to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead since most of these queries happen on
+ * a per-packet basis.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * This code is heavily based on the "netif" concept originally developed by
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *   (see security/selinux/netif.c for more information)
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#include "initcalls.h"
+#include "netnode.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#define SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE       256
+#define SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT   16
+
+struct sel_netnode_bkt {
+	unsigned int size;
+	struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct sel_netnode {
+	struct netnode_security_struct nsec;
+
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+/* NOTE: we are using a combined hash table for both IPv4 and IPv6, the reason
+ * for this is that I suspect most users will not make heavy use of both
+ * address families at the same time so one table will usually end up wasted,
+ * if this becomes a problem we can always add a hash table for each address
+ * family later */
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netnode_lock);
+static struct sel_netnode_bkt sel_netnode_hash[SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4 - IPv4 hashing function for the node table
+ * @addr: IPv4 address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the IPv4 hashing function for the node interface table, it returns
+ * the bucket number for the given IP address.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(__be32 addr)
+{
+	/* at some point we should determine if the mismatch in byte order
+	 * affects the hash function dramatically */
+	return (addr & (SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6 - IPv6 hashing function for the node table
+ * @addr: IPv6 address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the IPv6 hashing function for the node interface table, it returns
+ * the bucket number for the given IP address.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(const struct in6_addr *addr)
+{
+	/* just hash the least significant 32 bits to keep things fast (they
+	 * are the most likely to be different anyway), we can revisit this
+	 * later if needed */
+	return (addr->s6_addr32[3] & (SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_find - Search for a node record
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @family: address family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the network node table and return the record matching @addr.  If an
+ * entry can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct sel_netnode *sel_netnode_find(const void *addr, u16 family)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_netnode *node;
+
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(*(const __be32 *)addr);
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(addr);
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list, list)
+		if (node->nsec.family == family)
+			switch (family) {
+			case PF_INET:
+				if (node->nsec.addr.ipv4 == *(const __be32 *)addr)
+					return node;
+				break;
+			case PF_INET6:
+				if (ipv6_addr_equal(&node->nsec.addr.ipv6,
+						    addr))
+					return node;
+				break;
+			}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_insert - Insert a new node into the table
+ * @node: the new node record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new node record to the network address hash table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+
+	switch (node->nsec.family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(node->nsec.addr.ipv4);
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(&node->nsec.addr.ipv6);
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
+	 * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */
+	list_add_rcu(&node->list, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list);
+	if (sel_netnode_hash[idx].size == SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
+		struct sel_netnode *tail;
+		tail = list_entry(
+			rcu_dereference_protected(
+				list_tail_rcu(&sel_netnode_hash[idx].list),
+				lockdep_is_held(&sel_netnode_lock)),
+			struct sel_netnode, list);
+		list_del_rcu(&tail->list);
+		kfree_rcu(tail, rcu);
+	} else
+		sel_netnode_hash[idx].size++;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network address using the policy
+ * @addr: the IP address
+ * @family: the address family
+ * @sid: node SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network address by querying the
+ * security policy.  The result is added to the network address table to
+ * speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(const void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct sel_netnode *node;
+	struct sel_netnode *new;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+	node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family);
+	if (node != NULL) {
+		*sid = node->nsec.sid;
+		spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* If this memory allocation fails still return 0. The SID
+	 * is valid, it just won't be added to the cache.
+	 */
+	new = kmalloc_obj(*new, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET,
+					addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), sid);
+		if (new)
+			new->nsec.addr.ipv4 = *(const __be32 *)addr;
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+		ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET6,
+					addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr), sid);
+		if (new)
+			new->nsec.addr.ipv6 = *(const struct in6_addr *)addr;
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (ret == 0 && new) {
+		new->nsec.family = family;
+		new->nsec.sid = *sid;
+		sel_netnode_insert(new);
+	} else
+		kfree(new);
+
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+	if (unlikely(ret))
+		pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network node label\n",
+			__func__);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_sid - Lookup the SID of a network address
+ * @addr: the IP address
+ * @family: the address family
+ * @sid: node SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network address using the fastest
+ * method possible.  First the address table is queried, but if an entry
+ * can't be found then the policy is queried and the result is added to the
+ * table to speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values
+ * on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_netnode_sid(const void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct sel_netnode *node;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family);
+	if (likely(node != NULL)) {
+		*sid = node->nsec.sid;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sel_netnode_sid_slow(addr, family, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_flush - Flush the entire network address table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the network address table.
+ *
+ */
+void sel_netnode_flush(void)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_netnode *node, *node_tmp;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(node, node_tmp,
+					 &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list, list) {
+				list_del_rcu(&node->list);
+				kfree_rcu(node, rcu);
+		}
+		sel_netnode_hash[idx].size = 0;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+}
+
+int __init sel_netnode_init(void)
+{
+	int iter;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE; iter++) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netnode_hash[iter].list);
+		sel_netnode_hash[iter].size = 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..006a6ec71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Network port table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network ports to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * This code is heavily based on the "netif" concept originally developed by
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *   (see security/selinux/netif.c for more information)
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2008
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#include "initcalls.h"
+#include "netport.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#define SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE       256
+#define SEL_NETPORT_HASH_BKT_LIMIT   16
+
+struct sel_netport_bkt {
+	int size;
+	struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct sel_netport {
+	struct netport_security_struct psec;
+
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netport_lock);
+static struct sel_netport_bkt sel_netport_hash[SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_hashfn - Hashing function for the port table
+ * @pnum: port number
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the port table, it returns the bucket
+ * number for the given port.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_netport_hashfn(u16 pnum)
+{
+	return (pnum & (SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_find - Search for a port record
+ * @protocol: protocol
+ * @pnum: port
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the network port table and return the matching record.  If an entry
+ * can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct sel_netport *sel_netport_find(u8 protocol, u16 pnum)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_netport *port;
+
+	idx = sel_netport_hashfn(pnum);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(port, &sel_netport_hash[idx].list, list)
+		if (port->psec.port == pnum && port->psec.protocol == protocol)
+			return port;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_insert - Insert a new port into the table
+ * @port: the new port record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new port record to the network address hash table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netport_insert(struct sel_netport *port)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+
+	/* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
+	 * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */
+	idx = sel_netport_hashfn(port->psec.port);
+	list_add_rcu(&port->list, &sel_netport_hash[idx].list);
+	if (sel_netport_hash[idx].size == SEL_NETPORT_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
+		struct sel_netport *tail;
+		tail = list_entry(
+			rcu_dereference_protected(
+				list_tail_rcu(&sel_netport_hash[idx].list),
+				lockdep_is_held(&sel_netport_lock)),
+			struct sel_netport, list);
+		list_del_rcu(&tail->list);
+		kfree_rcu(tail, rcu);
+	} else
+		sel_netport_hash[idx].size++;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network address using the policy
+ * @protocol: protocol
+ * @pnum: port
+ * @sid: port SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network port by querying the security
+ * policy.  The result is added to the network port table to speedup future
+ * queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netport_sid_slow(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct sel_netport *port;
+	struct sel_netport *new;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+	port = sel_netport_find(protocol, pnum);
+	if (port != NULL) {
+		*sid = port->psec.sid;
+		spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = security_port_sid(protocol, pnum, sid);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* If this memory allocation fails still return 0. The SID
+	 * is valid, it just won't be added to the cache.
+	 */
+	new = kmalloc_obj(*new, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (new) {
+		new->psec.port = pnum;
+		new->psec.protocol = protocol;
+		new->psec.sid = *sid;
+		sel_netport_insert(new);
+	}
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+	if (unlikely(ret))
+		pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network port label\n",
+			__func__);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_sid - Lookup the SID of a network port
+ * @protocol: protocol
+ * @pnum: port
+ * @sid: port SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network port using the fastest method
+ * possible.  First the port table is queried, but if an entry can't be found
+ * then the policy is queried and the result is added to the table to speedup
+ * future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_netport_sid(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct sel_netport *port;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	port = sel_netport_find(protocol, pnum);
+	if (likely(port != NULL)) {
+		*sid = port->psec.sid;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sel_netport_sid_slow(protocol, pnum, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_flush - Flush the entire network port table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the network address table.
+ *
+ */
+void sel_netport_flush(void)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_netport *port, *port_tmp;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(port, port_tmp,
+					 &sel_netport_hash[idx].list, list) {
+			list_del_rcu(&port->list);
+			kfree_rcu(port, rcu);
+		}
+		sel_netport_hash[idx].size = 0;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+}
+
+int __init sel_netport_init(void)
+{
+	int iter;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE; iter++) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netport_hash[iter].list);
+		sel_netport_hash[iter].size = 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..655d2616c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Netlink message type permission tables, for user generated messages.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+#include <linux/if.h>
+#include <linux/inet_diag.h>
+#include <linux/xfrm.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/sock_diag.h>
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "av_permissions.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+struct nlmsg_perm {
+	u16 nlmsg_type;
+	u32 perm;
+};
+
+static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = {
+	{ RTM_NEWLINK, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELLINK, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETLINK, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_SETLINK, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_NEWADDR, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELADDR, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETADDR, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWROUTE, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELROUTE, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETROUTE, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWNEIGH, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELNEIGH, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETNEIGH, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWRULE, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELRULE, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETRULE, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWQDISC, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELQDISC, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETQDISC, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWTCLASS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELTCLASS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETTCLASS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWTFILTER, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELTFILTER, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETTFILTER, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWACTION, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELACTION, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETACTION, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWPREFIX, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETMULTICAST, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_GETANYCAST, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_GETNEIGHTBL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_SETNEIGHTBL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_NEWADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_GETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_SETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_NEWNETCONF, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELNETCONF, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETNETCONF, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWMDB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELMDB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETMDB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWNSID, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELNSID, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_GETNSID, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_GETSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_SETSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_NEWCACHEREPORT, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWCHAIN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELCHAIN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETCHAIN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWNEXTHOP, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELNEXTHOP, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETNEXTHOP, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWLINKPROP, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELLINKPROP, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_NEWVLAN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELVLAN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETVLAN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELNEXTHOPBUCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETNEXTHOPBUCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWTUNNEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELTUNNEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETTUNNEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+};
+
+static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = {
+	{ TCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ SOCK_DESTROY, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+};
+
+static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] = {
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_DELSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_UPDSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWAE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETAE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_REPORT, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWSADINFO, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETSADINFO, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_MAPPING, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_SETDEFAULT, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETDEFAULT, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+};
+
+static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = {
+	{ AUDIT_GET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ AUDIT_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ AUDIT_LIST, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
+	{ AUDIT_ADD, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ AUDIT_DEL, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ AUDIT_LIST_RULES, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
+	{ AUDIT_ADD_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ AUDIT_DEL_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ AUDIT_USER, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY },
+	{ AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ AUDIT_TRIM, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ AUDIT_TTY_GET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ AUDIT_TTY_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT },
+	{ AUDIT_GET_FEATURE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ AUDIT_SET_FEATURE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+};
+
+static int nlmsg_perm(u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm, const struct nlmsg_perm *tab,
+		      size_t tabsize)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err = -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tabsize / sizeof(struct nlmsg_perm); i++)
+		if (nlmsg_type == tab[i].nlmsg_type) {
+			*perm = tab[i].perm;
+			err = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
+{
+	/* While it is possible to add a similar permission to other netlink
+	 * classes, note that the extended permission value is matched against
+	 * the nlmsg_type field. Notably, SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET uses
+	 * dynamic values for this field, which means that it cannot be added
+	 * as-is.
+	 */
+
+	switch (sclass) {
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET:
+		/* RTM_MAX always points to RTM_SETxxxx, ie RTM_NEWxxx + 3.
+		 * If the BUILD_BUG_ON() below fails you must update the
+		 * structures at the top of this file with the new mappings
+		 * before updating the BUILD_BUG_ON() macro!
+		 */
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(RTM_MAX != (RTM_NEWTUNNEL + 3));
+
+		if (selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm()) {
+			*perm = NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		return nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_route_perms,
+				  sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms));
+		break;
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET:
+		if (selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm()) {
+			*perm = NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		return nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms,
+				  sizeof(nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms));
+		break;
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET:
+		/* If the BUILD_BUG_ON() below fails you must update the
+		 * structures at the top of this file with the new mappings
+		 * before updating the BUILD_BUG_ON() macro!
+		 */
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRM_MSG_MAX != XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE);
+
+		if (selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm()) {
+			*perm = NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		return nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_xfrm_perms,
+				  sizeof(nlmsg_xfrm_perms));
+		break;
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET:
+		if (selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm()) {
+			*perm = NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG;
+			return 0;
+		} else if ((nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG &&
+			    nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) ||
+			   (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 &&
+			    nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2)) {
+			*perm = NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		return nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_audit_perms,
+				  sizeof(nlmsg_audit_perms));
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* No messaging from userspace, or class unknown/unhandled */
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5aaaf6941
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2016 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* Updated: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ *	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ *  Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ *	Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/hex.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/major.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kobject.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+
+/* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API.
+   Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */
+
+#include "initcalls.h"
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "ima.h"
+
+enum sel_inos {
+	SEL_ROOT_INO = 2,
+	SEL_LOAD,	/* load policy */
+	SEL_ENFORCE,	/* get or set enforcing status */
+	SEL_CONTEXT,	/* validate context */
+	SEL_ACCESS,	/* compute access decision */
+	SEL_CREATE,	/* compute create labeling decision */
+	SEL_RELABEL,	/* compute relabeling decision */
+	SEL_USER,	/* compute reachable user contexts */
+	SEL_POLICYVERS,	/* return policy version for this kernel */
+	SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS, /* commit new boolean values */
+	SEL_MLS,	/* return if MLS policy is enabled */
+	SEL_DISABLE,	/* disable SELinux until next reboot */
+	SEL_MEMBER,	/* compute polyinstantiation membership decision */
+	SEL_CHECKREQPROT, /* check requested protection, not kernel-applied one */
+	SEL_COMPAT_NET,	/* whether to use old compat network packet controls */
+	SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown reject handling to userspace */
+	SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown deny handling to userspace */
+	SEL_STATUS,	/* export current status using mmap() */
+	SEL_POLICY,	/* allow userspace to read the in kernel policy */
+	SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS, /* compute validatetrans decision */
+	SEL_INO_NEXT,	/* The next inode number to use */
+};
+
+struct selinux_fs_info {
+	struct dentry *bool_dir;
+	unsigned int bool_num;
+	char **bool_pending_names;
+	int *bool_pending_values;
+	struct dentry *class_dir;
+	unsigned long last_class_ino;
+	unsigned long last_ino;
+	struct super_block *sb;
+};
+
+static int selinux_fs_info_create(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
+
+	fsi = kzalloc_obj(*fsi);
+	if (!fsi)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	fsi->last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
+	fsi->sb = sb;
+	sb->s_fs_info = fsi;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_fs_info_free(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (fsi) {
+		for (i = 0; i < fsi->bool_num; i++)
+			kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names[i]);
+		kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names);
+		kfree(fsi->bool_pending_values);
+	}
+	kfree(fsi);
+}
+
+#define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET		0x01000000
+#define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET		0x02000000
+#define SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET		0x04000000
+#define SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET	0x08000000
+#define SEL_INO_MASK			0x00ffffff
+
+#define BOOL_DIR_NAME "booleans"
+#define CLASS_DIR_NAME "class"
+
+#define TMPBUFLEN	12
+static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
+			   enforcing_enabled());
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	char *page = NULL;
+	ssize_t length;
+	int scan_value;
+	bool old_value, new_value;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &scan_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	new_value = !!scan_value;
+
+	old_value = enforcing_enabled();
+	if (new_value != old_value) {
+		length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+				      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE,
+				      NULL);
+		if (length)
+			goto out;
+		audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
+			" enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=selinux res=1",
+			new_value, old_value,
+			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+			audit_get_sessionid(current));
+		enforcing_set(new_value);
+		if (new_value)
+			avc_ss_reset(0);
+		selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value);
+		selinux_status_update_setenforce(new_value);
+		if (!new_value)
+			call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
+
+		selinux_ima_measure_state();
+	}
+	length = count;
+out:
+	kfree(page);
+	return length;
+}
+#else
+#define sel_write_enforce NULL
+#endif
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_enforce_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_enforce,
+	.write		= sel_write_enforce,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+	ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino;
+	int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ?
+		security_get_reject_unknown() :
+		!security_get_allow_unknown();
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", handle_unknown);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_handle_unknown,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_open_handle_status(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	struct page    *status = selinux_kernel_status_page();
+
+	if (!status)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	filp->private_data = status;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_handle_status(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct page    *status = filp->private_data;
+
+	BUG_ON(!status);
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos,
+				       page_address(status),
+				       sizeof(struct selinux_kernel_status));
+}
+
+static int sel_mmap_handle_status(struct file *filp,
+				  struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	struct page    *status = filp->private_data;
+	unsigned long	size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+
+	BUG_ON(!status);
+
+	/* only allows one page from the head */
+	if (vma->vm_pgoff > 0 || size != PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EIO;
+	/* disallow writable mapping */
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+		return -EPERM;
+	/* disallow mprotect() turns it into writable */
+	vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_MAYWRITE);
+
+	return remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start,
+			       page_to_pfn(status),
+			       size, vma->vm_page_prot);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_handle_status_ops = {
+	.open		= sel_open_handle_status,
+	.read		= sel_read_handle_status,
+	.mmap		= sel_mmap_handle_status,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	/*
+	 * Setting disable is no longer supported, see
+	 * https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/wiki/DEPRECATE-runtime-disable
+	 */
+	pr_err_once("SELinux: %s (%d) wrote to disable. This is no longer supported.\n",
+		    current->comm, current->pid);
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_disable_ops = {
+	.write		= sel_write_disable,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_policyvers,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/* declaration for sel_write_load */
+static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, struct dentry *bool_dir,
+			  unsigned int *bool_num, char ***bool_pending_names,
+			  int **bool_pending_values);
+static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
+			    struct dentry *class_dir,
+			    unsigned long *last_class_ino);
+
+/* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */
+static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
+			unsigned long *ino);
+
+/* declaration for sel_make_policy_nodes */
+static struct dentry *sel_make_swapover_dir(struct super_block *sb,
+						unsigned long *ino);
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
+			   security_mls_enabled());
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_mls_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_mls,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+struct policy_load_memory {
+	size_t len;
+	void *data;
+};
+
+static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	struct policy_load_memory *plm = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	plm = kzalloc_obj(*plm);
+	if (!plm)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+	rc = security_read_policy(&plm->data, &plm->len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+	if ((size_t)i_size_read(inode) != plm->len) {
+		inode_lock(inode);
+		i_size_write(inode, plm->len);
+		inode_unlock(inode);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+	filp->private_data = plm;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+	if (plm)
+		vfree(plm->data);
+	kfree(plm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
+
+	vfree(plm->data);
+	kfree(plm);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len);
+}
+
+static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+	struct policy_load_memory *plm = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data;
+	unsigned long offset;
+	struct page *page;
+
+	if (vmf->flags & (FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE | FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+	offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	if (offset >= roundup(plm->len, PAGE_SIZE))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+	page = vmalloc_to_page(plm->data + offset);
+	get_page(page);
+
+	vmf->page = page;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct vm_operations_struct sel_mmap_policy_ops = {
+	.fault = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
+	.page_mkwrite = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
+};
+
+static int sel_mmap_policy(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) {
+		/* do not allow mprotect to make mapping writable */
+		vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_MAYWRITE);
+
+		if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+			return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	vm_flags_set(vma, VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP);
+	vma->vm_ops = &sel_mmap_policy_ops;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = {
+	.open		= sel_open_policy,
+	.read		= sel_read_policy,
+	.mmap		= sel_mmap_policy,
+	.release	= sel_release_policy,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static void sel_remove_old_bool_data(unsigned int bool_num, char **bool_names,
+				     int *bool_values)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	/* bool_dir cleanup */
+	for (i = 0; i < bool_num; i++)
+		kfree(bool_names[i]);
+	kfree(bool_names);
+	kfree(bool_values);
+}
+
+static int sel_make_policy_nodes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi,
+				struct selinux_policy *newpolicy)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	struct dentry *tmp_parent, *tmp_bool_dir, *tmp_class_dir;
+	struct renamedata rd = {};
+	unsigned int bool_num = 0;
+	char **bool_names = NULL;
+	int *bool_values = NULL;
+	unsigned long tmp_ino = fsi->last_ino; /* Don't increment last_ino in this function */
+
+	tmp_parent = sel_make_swapover_dir(fsi->sb, &tmp_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(tmp_parent))
+		return PTR_ERR(tmp_parent);
+
+	tmp_ino = fsi->bool_dir->d_inode->i_ino - 1; /* sel_make_dir will increment and set */
+	tmp_bool_dir = sel_make_dir(tmp_parent, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &tmp_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(tmp_bool_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(tmp_bool_dir);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tmp_ino = fsi->class_dir->d_inode->i_ino - 1; /* sel_make_dir will increment and set */
+	tmp_class_dir = sel_make_dir(tmp_parent, CLASS_DIR_NAME, &tmp_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(tmp_class_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(tmp_class_dir);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_bools(newpolicy, tmp_bool_dir, &bool_num,
+			     &bool_names, &bool_values);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = sel_make_classes(newpolicy, tmp_class_dir,
+			       &fsi->last_class_ino);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	rd.old_parent = tmp_parent;
+	rd.new_parent = fsi->sb->s_root;
+
+	/* booleans */
+	ret = start_renaming_two_dentries(&rd, tmp_bool_dir, fsi->bool_dir);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	d_exchange(tmp_bool_dir, fsi->bool_dir);
+
+	swap(fsi->bool_num, bool_num);
+	swap(fsi->bool_pending_names, bool_names);
+	swap(fsi->bool_pending_values, bool_values);
+
+	fsi->bool_dir = tmp_bool_dir;
+	end_renaming(&rd);
+
+	/* classes */
+	ret = start_renaming_two_dentries(&rd, tmp_class_dir, fsi->class_dir);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	d_exchange(tmp_class_dir, fsi->class_dir);
+	fsi->class_dir = tmp_class_dir;
+
+	end_renaming(&rd);
+
+out:
+	sel_remove_old_bool_data(bool_num, bool_names, bool_values);
+	/* Since the other temporary dirs are children of tmp_parent
+	 * this will handle all the cleanup in the case of a failure before
+	 * the swapover
+	 */
+	simple_recursive_removal(tmp_parent, NULL);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
+	struct selinux_load_state load_state;
+	ssize_t length;
+	void *data = NULL;
+
+	/* no partial writes */
+	if (*ppos)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/* no empty policies */
+	if (!count)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY, NULL);
+	if (length)
+		return length;
+
+	data = vmalloc(count);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+		length = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+	length = security_load_policy(data, count, &load_state);
+	if (length) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n");
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi, load_state.policy);
+	if (length) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to initialize selinuxfs\n");
+		selinux_policy_cancel(&load_state);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	selinux_policy_commit(&load_state);
+	length = count;
+	audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
+		"auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1",
+		from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+		audit_get_sessionid(current));
+
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+out:
+	vfree(data);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_load_ops = {
+	.write		= sel_write_load,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	char *canon = NULL;
+	u32 sid, len;
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT, NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_sid_to_context(sid, &canon, &len);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ERANGE;
+	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  context size (%u) exceeds "
+			"payload max\n", __func__, len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(buf, canon, len);
+	length = len;
+out:
+	kfree(canon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u",
+			   checkreqprot_get());
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Setting checkreqprot is no longer supported, see
+	 * https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/wiki/DEPRECATE-checkreqprot
+	 */
+	pr_err_once("SELinux: %s (%d) wrote to checkreqprot. This is no longer supported.\n",
+		    current->comm, current->pid);
+	return count;
+}
+static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_checkreqprot,
+	.write		= sel_write_checkreqprot,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
+					const char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *oldcon = NULL, *newcon = NULL, *taskcon = NULL;
+	char *req = NULL;
+	u32 osid, nsid, tsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__VALIDATE_TRANS, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	req = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(req)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(req);
+		req = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	oldcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!oldcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	newcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!newcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	taskcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!taskcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(req, "%s %s %hu %s", oldcon, newcon, &tclass, taskcon) != 4)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(oldcon, &osid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(newcon, &nsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(taskcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = security_validate_transition_user(osid, nsid, tsid, tclass);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = count;
+out:
+	kfree(req);
+	kfree(oldcon);
+	kfree(newcon);
+	kfree(taskcon);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_transition_ops = {
+	.write		= sel_write_validatetrans,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Remaining nodes use transaction based IO methods like nfsd/nfsctl.c
+ */
+static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+
+static ssize_t (*const write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
+	[SEL_ACCESS] = sel_write_access,
+	[SEL_CREATE] = sel_write_create,
+	[SEL_RELABEL] = sel_write_relabel,
+	[SEL_USER] = sel_write_user,
+	[SEL_MEMBER] = sel_write_member,
+	[SEL_CONTEXT] = sel_write_context,
+};
+
+static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	ino_t ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+	char *data;
+	ssize_t rv;
+
+	if (ino >= ARRAY_SIZE(write_op) || !write_op[ino])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = simple_transaction_get(file, buf, size);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	rv = write_op[ino](file, data, size);
+	if (rv > 0) {
+		simple_transaction_set(file, rv);
+		rv = size;
+	}
+	return rv;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations transaction_ops = {
+	.write		= selinux_transaction_write,
+	.read		= simple_transaction_read,
+	.release	= simple_transaction_release,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * payload - write methods
+ * If the method has a response, the response should be put in buf,
+ * and the length returned.  Otherwise return 0 or -error.
+ */
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+	u32 ssid, tsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV, NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
+
+	length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
+			  "%x %x %x %x %u %x",
+			  avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
+			  avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
+			  avd.seqno, avd.flags);
+out:
+	kfree(tcon);
+	kfree(scon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+	char *namebuf = NULL, *objname = NULL;
+	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *newcon = NULL;
+	u32 len;
+	int nargs;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE,
+			      NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	namebuf = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!namebuf)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	nargs = sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu %s", scon, tcon, &tclass, namebuf);
+	if (nargs < 3 || nargs > 4)
+		goto out;
+	if (nargs == 4) {
+		/*
+		 * If and when the name of new object to be queried contains
+		 * either whitespace or multibyte characters, they shall be
+		 * encoded based on the percentage-encoding rule.
+		 * If not encoded, the sscanf logic picks up only left-half
+		 * of the supplied name; split by a whitespace unexpectedly.
+		 */
+		char   *r, *w;
+		int     c1, c2;
+
+		r = w = namebuf;
+		do {
+			c1 = *r++;
+			if (c1 == '+')
+				c1 = ' ';
+			else if (c1 == '%') {
+				c1 = hex_to_bin(*r++);
+				if (c1 < 0)
+					goto out;
+				c2 = hex_to_bin(*r++);
+				if (c2 < 0)
+					goto out;
+				c1 = (c1 << 4) | c2;
+			}
+			*w++ = c1;
+		} while (c1 != '\0');
+
+		objname = namebuf;
+	}
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+					      objname, &newsid);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ERANGE;
+	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  context size (%u) exceeds "
+			"payload max\n", __func__, len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+	length = len;
+out:
+	kfree(newcon);
+	kfree(namebuf);
+	kfree(tcon);
+	kfree(scon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *newcon = NULL;
+	u32 len;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL,
+			      NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_change_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ERANGE;
+	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT)
+		goto out;
+
+	memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+	length = len;
+out:
+	kfree(newcon);
+	kfree(tcon);
+	kfree(scon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	pr_err_once("SELinux: %s (%d) wrote to user. This is no longer supported.\n",
+		    current->comm, current->pid);
+	buf[0] = '0';
+	buf[1] = 0;
+	return 2;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *newcon = NULL;
+	u32 len;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER,
+			      NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_member_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ERANGE;
+	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  context size (%u) exceeds "
+			"payload max\n", __func__, len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+	length = len;
+out:
+	kfree(newcon);
+	kfree(tcon);
+	kfree(scon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, umode_t mode)
+{
+	struct inode *ret = new_inode(sb);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		ret->i_mode = mode;
+		simple_inode_init_ts(ret);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *sel_attach(struct dentry *parent, const char *name,
+				 struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry = d_alloc_name(parent, name);
+	if (unlikely(!dentry)) {
+		iput(inode);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+	d_make_persistent(dentry, inode);
+	dput(dentry);
+	return dentry;
+}
+
+static int sel_attach_file(struct dentry *parent, const char *name,
+			   struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry = sel_attach(parent, name, inode);
+	return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(dentry);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	char buffer[4];
+	ssize_t length;
+	ssize_t ret;
+	int cur_enforcing;
+	unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
+	const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+
+	mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name,
+					     fsi->bool_pending_names[index]))
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(index);
+	if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
+		ret = cur_enforcing;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	length = scnprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d %d", !!cur_enforcing,
+			  !!fsi->bool_pending_values[index]);
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, length);
+
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	char *page = NULL;
+	ssize_t length;
+	int new_value;
+	unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
+	const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
+			      NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name,
+					     fsi->bool_pending_names[index]))
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (new_value)
+		new_value = 1;
+
+	fsi->bool_pending_values[index] = new_value;
+	length = count;
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+	kfree(page);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_bool_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_bool,
+	.write		= sel_write_bool,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
+				      const char __user *buf,
+				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	char *page = NULL;
+	ssize_t length;
+	int new_value;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
+			      NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = 0;
+	if (new_value && fsi->bool_pending_values)
+		length = security_set_bools(fsi->bool_num,
+					    fsi->bool_pending_values);
+
+	if (!length)
+		length = count;
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+	kfree(page);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = {
+	.write		= sel_commit_bools_write,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, struct dentry *bool_dir,
+			  unsigned int *bool_num, char ***bool_pending_names,
+			  int **bool_pending_values)
+{
+	int ret;
+	char **names, *page;
+	u32 i, num;
+
+	page = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = security_get_bools(newpolicy, &num, &names, bool_pending_values);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	*bool_num = num;
+	*bool_pending_names = names;
+
+	for (i = 0; !ret && i < num; i++) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+		ssize_t len;
+		u32 sid;
+
+		len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
+		if (len >= PAGE_SIZE) {
+			ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(bool_dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+		if (!inode) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+		ret = selinux_policy_genfs_sid(newpolicy, "selinuxfs", page,
+					 SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: no sid found, defaulting to security isid for %s\n",
+					   page);
+			sid = SECINITSID_SECURITY;
+		}
+
+		isec->sid = sid;
+		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+		inode->i_fop = &sel_bool_ops;
+		inode->i_ino = i|SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET;
+
+		ret = sel_attach_file(bool_dir, names[i], inode);
+	}
+out:
+	kfree(page);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+					    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u",
+			   avc_get_cache_threshold());
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
+					     const char __user *buf,
+					     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t ret;
+	unsigned int new_value;
+
+	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			   SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM,
+			   NULL);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	avc_set_cache_threshold(new_value);
+
+	ret = count;
+out:
+	kfree(page);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_avc_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	page = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	length = avc_get_hash_stats(page);
+	if (length >= 0)
+		length = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
+	kfree(page);
+
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_sidtab_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	page = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	length = security_sidtab_hash_stats(page);
+	if (length >= 0)
+		length = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page,
+						length);
+	kfree(page);
+
+	return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_sidtab_hash_stats,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_avc_cache_threshold,
+	.write		= sel_write_avc_cache_threshold,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_avc_hash_stats_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_avc_hash_stats,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+static struct avc_cache_stats *sel_avc_get_stat_idx(loff_t *idx)
+{
+	loff_t cpu;
+
+	for (cpu = *idx; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) {
+		if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
+			continue;
+		*idx = cpu + 1;
+		return &per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, cpu);
+	}
+	(*idx)++;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *sel_avc_stats_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	loff_t n = *pos - 1;
+
+	if (*pos == 0)
+		return SEQ_START_TOKEN;
+
+	return sel_avc_get_stat_idx(&n);
+}
+
+static void *sel_avc_stats_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return sel_avc_get_stat_idx(pos);
+}
+
+static int sel_avc_stats_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct avc_cache_stats *st = v;
+
+	if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
+		seq_puts(seq,
+			 "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees\n");
+	} else {
+		unsigned int lookups = st->lookups;
+		unsigned int misses = st->misses;
+		unsigned int hits = lookups - misses;
+		seq_printf(seq, "%u %u %u %u %u %u\n", lookups,
+			   hits, misses, st->allocations,
+			   st->reclaims, st->frees);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void sel_avc_stats_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{ }
+
+static const struct seq_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops = {
+	.start		= sel_avc_stats_seq_start,
+	.next		= sel_avc_stats_seq_next,
+	.show		= sel_avc_stats_seq_show,
+	.stop		= sel_avc_stats_seq_stop,
+};
+
+static int sel_open_avc_cache_stats(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_ops = {
+	.open		= sel_open_avc_cache_stats,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+	.release	= seq_release,
+};
+#endif
+
+static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err = 0;
+	static const struct tree_descr files[] = {
+		{ "cache_threshold",
+		  &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
+		{ "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+		{ "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+#endif
+	};
+
+	for (i = 0; !err && i < ARRAY_SIZE(files); i++) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
+		if (!inode)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
+		inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
+
+		err = sel_attach_file(dir, files[i].name, inode);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_ss_files(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err = 0;
+	static const struct tree_descr files[] = {
+		{ "sidtab_hash_stats", &sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+	};
+
+	for (i = 0; !err && i < ARRAY_SIZE(files); i++) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
+		if (!inode)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
+		inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
+
+		err = sel_attach_file(dir, files[i].name, inode);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *con;
+	u32 sid, len;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, con, len);
+	kfree(con);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_initcon_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_initcon,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	for (i = 1; !err && i <= SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+		const char *s = security_get_initial_sid_context(i);
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		if (!s)
+			continue;
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+		if (!inode)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		inode->i_fop = &sel_initcon_ops;
+		inode->i_ino = i|SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET;
+		err = sel_attach_file(dir, s, inode);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class)
+{
+	return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1)) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static inline u16 sel_ino_to_class(unsigned long ino)
+{
+	return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) / (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sel_perm_to_ino(u16 class, u32 perm)
+{
+	return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1) + perm) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
+{
+	return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) % (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+	char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t len = scnprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_class,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+	char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t len = scnprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_perm,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int value;
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+	unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+
+	value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value);
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_policycap,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_make_perm_files(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
+			char *objclass, int classvalue,
+			struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	u32 i, nperms;
+	int rc;
+	char **perms;
+
+	rc = security_get_permissions(newpolicy, objclass, &perms, &nperms);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; !rc && i < nperms; i++) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+		if (!inode) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
+		/* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
+		inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i + 1);
+
+		rc = sel_attach_file(dir, perms[i], inode);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++)
+		kfree(perms[i]);
+	kfree(perms);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
+				char *classname, int index,
+				struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	int err;
+
+	inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+	if (!inode)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	inode->i_fop = &sel_class_ops;
+	inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index);
+
+	err = sel_attach_file(dir, "index", inode);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(dir, "perms", &fsi->last_class_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+		return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+
+	return sel_make_perm_files(newpolicy, classname, index, dentry);
+}
+
+static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
+			    struct dentry *class_dir,
+			    unsigned long *last_class_ino)
+{
+	u32 i, nclasses;
+	int rc;
+	char **classes;
+
+	rc = security_get_classes(newpolicy, &classes, &nclasses);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
+	*last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
+		struct dentry *class_name_dir;
+
+		class_name_dir = sel_make_dir(class_dir, classes[i],
+					      last_class_ino);
+		if (IS_ERR(class_name_dir)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(class_name_dir);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */
+		rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(newpolicy, classes[i], i + 1,
+				class_name_dir);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++)
+		kfree(classes[i]);
+	kfree(classes);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_policycap(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+	unsigned int iter;
+	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	for (iter = 0; !err && iter <= POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; iter++) {
+		const char *name;
+
+		if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
+			name = selinux_policycap_names[iter];
+		else
+			name = "unknown";
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFREG | 0444);
+		if (!inode)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		inode->i_fop = &sel_policycap_ops;
+		inode->i_ino = iter | SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET;
+		err = sel_attach_file(dir, name, inode);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
+			unsigned long *ino)
+{
+	struct inode *inode;
+
+	inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
+	if (!inode)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+	inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+	inode->i_ino = ++(*ino);
+	/* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
+	inc_nlink(inode);
+	/* bump link count on parent directory, too */
+	inc_nlink(d_inode(dir));
+
+	return sel_attach(dir, name, inode);
+}
+
+static int reject_all(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+	return -EPERM;	// no access for anyone, root or no root.
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations swapover_dir_inode_operations = {
+	.lookup		= simple_lookup,
+	.permission	= reject_all,
+};
+
+static struct dentry *sel_make_swapover_dir(struct super_block *sb,
+						unsigned long *ino)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct inode *inode;
+
+	inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFDIR);
+	if (!inode)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	dentry = simple_start_creating(sb->s_root, ".swapover");
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		iput(inode);
+		return dentry;
+	}
+
+	inode->i_op = &swapover_dir_inode_operations;
+	inode->i_ino = ++(*ino);
+	/* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
+	inc_nlink(inode);
+	d_make_persistent(dentry, inode);
+	inc_nlink(sb->s_root->d_inode);
+	simple_done_creating(dentry);
+	return dentry;	// borrowed
+}
+
+#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
+
+static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
+	int ret;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	static const struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
+		[SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops,
+					S_IWUGO},
+		/* last one */ {"", NULL, 0}
+	};
+
+	ret = selinux_fs_info_create(sb);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	fsi->bool_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(fsi->bool_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->bool_dir);
+		fsi->bool_dir = NULL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
+	if (!inode)
+		goto err;
+
+	inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
+	isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+	isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
+	isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+
+	init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
+	ret = sel_attach_file(sb->s_root, NULL_FILE_NAME, inode);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "ss", &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_ss_files(dentry);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "initial_contexts", &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_initcon_files(dentry);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	fsi->class_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, CLASS_DIR_NAME, &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(fsi->class_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->class_dir);
+		fsi->class_dir = NULL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities", &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_policycap(dentry);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy capabilities\n");
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	pr_err("SELinux: %s:  failed while creating inodes\n",
+		__func__);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sel_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	return get_tree_single(fc, sel_fill_super);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations sel_context_ops = {
+	.get_tree	= sel_get_tree,
+};
+
+static int sel_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	fc->ops = &sel_context_ops;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void sel_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+
+	kill_anon_super(sb);
+	selinux_fs_info_free(fsi);
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type sel_fs_type = {
+	.name		= "selinuxfs",
+	.init_fs_context = sel_init_fs_context,
+	.kill_sb	= sel_kill_sb,
+};
+
+struct path selinux_null __ro_after_init;
+
+int __init init_sel_fs(void)
+{
+	struct qstr null_name = QSTR(NULL_FILE_NAME);
+	int err;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
+		return 0;
+
+	err = sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = register_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
+	if (err) {
+		sysfs_remove_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	selinux_null.mnt = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
+	if (IS_ERR(selinux_null.mnt)) {
+		pr_err("selinuxfs:  could not mount!\n");
+		err = PTR_ERR(selinux_null.mnt);
+		selinux_null.mnt = NULL;
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	selinux_null.dentry = try_lookup_noperm(&null_name,
+						  selinux_null.mnt->mnt_root);
+	if (IS_ERR(selinux_null.dentry)) {
+		pr_err("selinuxfs:  could not lookup null!\n");
+		err = PTR_ERR(selinux_null.dentry);
+		selinux_null.dentry = NULL;
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to pre-allocate the status page, so the sequence number of the
+	 * initial policy load can be stored.
+	 */
+	(void) selinux_kernel_status_page();
+
+	return err;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0f94edd01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Implementation of the access vector table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and
+ *          Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *          Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *
+ * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ *          Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep __ro_after_init;
+
+static inline u32 avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
+{
+	return av_hash((u32)keyp->target_class, (u32)keyp->target_type,
+		       (u32)keyp->source_type, mask);
+}
+
+static struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h,
+					    struct avtab_node **dst,
+					    const struct avtab_key *key,
+					    const struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *newnode;
+	struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
+	newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (newnode == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	newnode->key = *key;
+
+	if (key->specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+		xperms = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (xperms == NULL) {
+			kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		*xperms = *(datum->u.xperms);
+		newnode->datum.u.xperms = xperms;
+	} else {
+		newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
+	}
+
+	newnode->next = *dst;
+	*dst = newnode;
+
+	h->nel++;
+	return newnode;
+}
+
+static int avtab_node_cmp(const struct avtab_key *key1,
+			  const struct avtab_key *key2)
+{
+	u16 specified = key1->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED | AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+	if (key1->source_type == key2->source_type &&
+	    key1->target_type == key2->target_type &&
+	    key1->target_class == key2->target_class &&
+	    (specified & key2->specified))
+		return 0;
+	if (key1->source_type < key2->source_type)
+		return -1;
+	if (key1->source_type == key2->source_type &&
+	    key1->target_type < key2->target_type)
+		return -1;
+	if (key1->source_type == key2->source_type &&
+	    key1->target_type == key2->target_type &&
+	    key1->target_class < key2->target_class)
+		return -1;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key,
+			const struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+	u32 hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+	int cmp;
+
+	if (!h || !h->nslot || h->nel == U32_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur;
+	     prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+		cmp = avtab_node_cmp(key, &cur->key);
+		/* extended perms may not be unique */
+		if (cmp == 0 && !(key->specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+			return -EEXIST;
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, prev ? &prev->next : &h->htable[hvalue],
+				    key, datum);
+	if (!newnode)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Unlike avtab_insert(), this function allow multiple insertions of the same
+ * key/specified mask into the table, as needed by the conditional avtab.
+ * It also returns a pointer to the node inserted.
+ */
+struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
+					  const struct avtab_key *key,
+					  const struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+	u32 hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur;
+	int cmp;
+
+	if (!h || !h->nslot || h->nel == U32_MAX)
+		return NULL;
+	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur;
+	     prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+		cmp = avtab_node_cmp(key, &cur->key);
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	return avtab_insert_node(h, prev ? &prev->next : &h->htable[hvalue],
+				 key, datum);
+}
+
+/* This search function returns a node pointer, and can be used in
+ * conjunction with avtab_search_next_node()
+ */
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
+				     const struct avtab_key *key)
+{
+	u32 hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+	int cmp;
+
+	if (!h || !h->nslot)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+	for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		cmp = avtab_node_cmp(key, &cur->key);
+		if (cmp == 0)
+			return cur;
+		if (cmp < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node,
+					  u16 specified)
+{
+	struct avtab_key tmp_key;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+	int cmp;
+
+	if (!node)
+		return NULL;
+	tmp_key = node->key;
+	tmp_key.specified = specified;
+	for (cur = node->next; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		cmp = avtab_node_cmp(&tmp_key, &cur->key);
+		if (cmp == 0)
+			return cur;
+		if (cmp < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	struct avtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		while (cur) {
+			temp = cur;
+			cur = cur->next;
+			if (temp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+				kmem_cache_free(avtab_xperms_cachep,
+						temp->datum.u.xperms);
+			kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
+		}
+	}
+	kvfree(h->htable);
+	h->htable = NULL;
+	h->nel = 0;
+	h->nslot = 0;
+	h->mask = 0;
+}
+
+void avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
+{
+	h->htable = NULL;
+	h->nel = 0;
+	h->nslot = 0;
+	h->mask = 0;
+}
+
+static int avtab_alloc_common(struct avtab *h, u32 nslot)
+{
+	if (!nslot)
+		return 0;
+
+	h->htable = kvcalloc(nslot, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!h->htable)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	h->nslot = nslot;
+	h->mask = nslot - 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
+{
+	int rc;
+	u32 nslot = 0;
+
+	if (nrules != 0) {
+		nslot = nrules > 3 ? rounddown_pow_of_two(nrules / 2) : 2;
+		if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
+			nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
+
+		rc = avtab_alloc_common(h, nslot);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n", nslot, nrules);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig)
+{
+	return avtab_alloc_common(new, orig->nslot);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
+{
+	u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	unsigned long long chain2_len_sum;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	chain2_len_sum = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		if (cur) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			while (cur) {
+				chain_len++;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+			chain2_len_sum +=
+				(unsigned long long)chain_len * chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+		 "longest chain length %d, sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
+		 tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
+		 chain2_len_sum);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
+
+/* clang-format off */
+static const uint16_t spec_order[] = {
+	AVTAB_ALLOWED,
+	AVTAB_AUDITDENY,
+	AVTAB_AUDITALLOW,
+	AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+	AVTAB_CHANGE,
+	AVTAB_MEMBER,
+	AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED,
+	AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW,
+	AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *pol,
+		    int (*insertf)(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
+				   const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
+		    void *p, bool conditional)
+{
+	__le16 buf16[4];
+	u16 enabled;
+	u32 items, items2, val, i;
+	struct avtab_key key;
+	struct avtab_datum datum;
+	struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
+	__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int vers = pol->policyvers;
+
+	memset(&key, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
+	memset(&datum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
+
+	if (vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		/* Read five or more items: source type, target type,
+		 * target class, AV type, and at least one datum.
+		 */
+		items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
+		if (items2 < 5 || items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid item count\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32) * items2);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		items = 0;
+
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+		key.source_type = (u16)val;
+		if (key.source_type != val) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+		key.target_type = (u16)val;
+		if (key.target_type != val) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+		key.target_class = (u16)val;
+		if (key.target_class != val) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
+		    !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
+		    !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+		enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0;
+
+		if (!(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if ((val & AVTAB_AV) && (val & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (val & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
+			if (val & spec_order[i]) {
+				if (items >= items2) {
+					pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has too many items (%d/%d)\n",
+					       items + 1, items2);
+					return -EINVAL;
+				}
+				key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
+				datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+
+				if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
+				    !policydb_simpletype_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
+					pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
+					return -EINVAL;
+				}
+
+				rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (items != items2) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n",
+			       items2, items);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16) * 4);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	items = 0;
+	key.source_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+	key.target_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+	key.target_class = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+	key.specified = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+
+	if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
+	    !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
+	    !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (hweight16(key.specified & ~AVTAB_ENABLED) != 1) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  avtab:  not exactly one specifier\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (key.specified & ~AVTAB_SPECIFIER_MASK) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  avtab:  invalid specifier\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) &&
+	    (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  avtab:  policy version %u does not "
+		       "support extended permissions rules and one "
+		       "was specified\n",
+		       vers);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_COND_XPERMS) &&
+		   (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) && conditional) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  avtab:  policy version %u does not "
+		       "support extended permissions rules in conditional "
+		       "policies and one was specified\n",
+		       vers);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+		memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms));
+		rc = next_entry(&xperms.specified, fp, sizeof(u8));
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		if (!avtab_is_valid_xperm_specified(xperms.specified))
+			pr_warn_once_policyload(pol,
+						"SELinux: avtab: unsupported xperm specifier %#x\n",
+						xperms.specified);
+		rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp,
+				sizeof(u32) * ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p); i++)
+			xperms.perms.p[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
+		datum.u.xperms = &xperms;
+	} else {
+		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
+	}
+	if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
+	    !policydb_simpletype_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
+}
+
+static int avtab_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
+			 const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p)
+{
+	return avtab_insert(a, k, d);
+}
+
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *pol)
+{
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	u32 nel, i;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated table\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (!nel) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: avtab: table is empty\n");
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* avtab_read_item() reads at least 96 bytes for any valid entry */
+	rc = size_check(3 * sizeof(u32), nel, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = avtab_alloc(a, nel);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = avtab_read_item(a, fp, pol, avtab_insertf, NULL, false);
+		if (rc) {
+			if (rc == -ENOMEM)
+				pr_err("SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n");
+			else if (rc == -EEXIST)
+				pr_err("SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
+
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+bad:
+	avtab_destroy(a);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le16 buf16[4];
+	__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p)];
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
+	buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
+	buf16[2] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_class);
+	buf16[3] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.specified);
+	rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+		rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->specified, sizeof(u8), 1,
+			       fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->driver, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p); i++)
+			buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]);
+		rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
+			       ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p), fp);
+	} else {
+		buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
+		rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	}
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(a->nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < a->nslot; i++) {
+		for (cur = a->htable[i]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+			rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+void __init avtab_cache_init(void)
+{
+	avtab_node_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(avtab_node, SLAB_PANIC);
+	avtab_xperms_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(avtab_extended_perms, SLAB_PANIC);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1de4cce28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * An access vector table (avtab) is a hash table
+ * of access vectors and transition types indexed
+ * by a type pair and a class.  An access vector
+ * table is used to represent the type enforcement
+ * tables.
+ *
+ *  Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and
+ *          Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *          Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *
+ * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ *          Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
+#define _SS_AVTAB_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+struct avtab_key {
+	u16 source_type; /* source type */
+	u16 target_type; /* target type */
+	u16 target_class; /* target object class */
+#define AVTAB_ALLOWED	 0x0001
+#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW 0x0002
+#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY	 0x0004
+#define AVTAB_AV	 (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 0x0010
+#define AVTAB_MEMBER	 0x0020
+#define AVTAB_CHANGE	 0x0040
+#define AVTAB_TYPE	 (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+/* extended permissions */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED	0x0100
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 0x0200
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT	0x0400
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS                                      \
+	(AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED | AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW | \
+	 AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED	  0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_SPECIFIER_MASK (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE | AVTAB_XPERMS | AVTAB_ENABLED)
+	u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
+};
+
+/*
+ * For operations that require more than the 32 permissions provided by the avc
+ * extended permissions may be used to provide 256 bits of permissions.
+ */
+struct avtab_extended_perms {
+/* These are not flags. All 256 values may be used */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION	0x01
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER	0x02
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_NLMSG		0x03
+	/* extension of the avtab_key specified */
+	u8 specified; /* ioctl, netfilter, ... */
+	/*
+	 * if 256 bits is not adequate as is often the case with ioctls, then
+	 * multiple extended perms may be used and the driver field
+	 * specifies which permissions are included.
+	 */
+	u8 driver;
+	/* 256 bits of permissions */
+	struct extended_perms_data perms;
+};
+
+static inline bool avtab_is_valid_xperm_specified(u8 specified)
+{
+	switch (specified) {
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION:
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER:
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_NLMSG:
+		return true;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+struct avtab_datum {
+	union {
+		u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
+		struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
+	} u;
+};
+
+struct avtab_node {
+	struct avtab_key key;
+	struct avtab_datum datum;
+	struct avtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct avtab {
+	struct avtab_node **htable;
+	u32 nel; /* number of elements */
+	u32 nslot; /* number of hash slots */
+	u32 mask; /* mask to compute hash func */
+};
+
+void avtab_init(struct avtab *h);
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules);
+int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig);
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
+
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS    16
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag);
+#else
+static inline void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+struct policydb;
+struct policy_file;
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *pol,
+		    int (*insert)(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
+				  const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
+		    void *p, bool conditional);
+
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *pol);
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur,
+		     struct policy_file *fp);
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
+					  const struct avtab_key *key,
+					  const struct avtab_datum *datum);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
+				     const struct avtab_key *key);
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node,
+					  u16 specified);
+
+#endif /* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2956dd7ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -0,0 +1,765 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *	    Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *          Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
+ * in reverse polish notation. It returns true (1), false (0),
+ * or undefined (-1). Undefined occurs when the expression
+ * exceeds the stack depth of COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH.
+ */
+static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+	int sp = -1;
+
+	if (expr->len == 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < expr->len; i++) {
+		struct cond_expr_node *node = &expr->nodes[i];
+
+		switch (node->expr_type) {
+		case COND_BOOL:
+			if (sp == (COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+				return -1;
+			sp++;
+			s[sp] = p->bool_val_to_struct[node->boolean - 1]->state;
+			break;
+		case COND_NOT:
+			if (sp < 0)
+				return -1;
+			s[sp] = !s[sp];
+			break;
+		case COND_OR:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case COND_AND:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case COND_XOR:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] ^= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case COND_EQ:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] = (s[sp] == s[sp + 1]);
+			break;
+		case COND_NEQ:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] = (s[sp] != s[sp + 1]);
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * evaluate_cond_node evaluates the conditional stored in
+ * a struct cond_node and if the result is different than the
+ * current state of the node it sets the rules in the true/false
+ * list appropriately. If the result of the expression is undefined
+ * all of the rules are disabled for safety.
+ */
+static void evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *avnode;
+	int new_state;
+	u32 i;
+
+	new_state = cond_evaluate_expr(p, &node->expr);
+	if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
+		node->cur_state = new_state;
+		if (new_state == -1)
+			pr_err("SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
+		/* turn the rules on or off */
+		for (i = 0; i < node->true_list.len; i++) {
+			avnode = node->true_list.nodes[i];
+			if (new_state <= 0)
+				avnode->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+			else
+				avnode->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < node->false_list.len; i++) {
+			avnode = node->false_list.nodes[i];
+			/* -1 or 1 */
+			if (new_state)
+				avnode->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+			else
+				avnode->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+void evaluate_cond_nodes(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++)
+		evaluate_cond_node(p, &p->cond_list[i]);
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL;
+	p->cond_list = NULL;
+	p->cond_list_len = 0;
+
+	avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+}
+
+static void cond_node_destroy(struct cond_node *node)
+{
+	kfree(node->expr.nodes);
+	/* the avtab_ptr_t nodes are destroyed by the avtab */
+	kfree(node->true_list.nodes);
+	kfree(node->false_list.nodes);
+}
+
+static void cond_list_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++)
+		cond_node_destroy(&p->cond_list[i]);
+	kfree(p->cond_list);
+	p->cond_list = NULL;
+	p->cond_list_len = 0;
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+	avtab_destroy(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+	cond_list_destroy(p);
+}
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+	p->bool_val_to_struct = kzalloc_objs(*p->bool_val_to_struct,
+					     p->p_bools.nprim);
+	if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_cond_avtab, "conditional_rules");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+
+	booldatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (!booldatum->value || booldatum->value > p->p_bools.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS][booldatum->value - 1] = key;
+	p->bool_val_to_struct[booldatum->value - 1] = booldatum;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 len, val;
+	int rc;
+
+	booldatum = kzalloc_obj(*booldatum);
+	if (!booldatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf));
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (!val_is_boolean(val))
+		goto err;
+	booldatum->state = (int)val;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, booldatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	pr_err("SELinux: conditional: failed to read boolean\n");
+	cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+struct cond_insertf_data {
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct avtab_node **dst;
+	struct cond_av_list *other;
+};
+
+static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
+			const struct avtab_datum *d, void *ptr)
+{
+	struct cond_insertf_data *data = ptr;
+	struct policydb *p = data->p;
+	struct cond_av_list *other = data->other;
+	struct avtab_node *node_ptr;
+	u32 i;
+	bool found;
+
+	/*
+	 * For type rules we have to make certain there aren't any
+	 * conflicting rules by searching the te_avtab and the
+	 * cond_te_avtab.
+	 */
+	if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
+		if (avtab_search_node(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If we are reading the false list other will be a pointer to
+		 * the true list. We can have duplicate entries if there is only
+		 * 1 other entry and it is in our true list.
+		 *
+		 * If we are reading the true list (other == NULL) there shouldn't
+		 * be any other entries.
+		 */
+		if (other) {
+			node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k);
+			if (node_ptr) {
+				if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr,
+							   k->specified)) {
+					pr_err("SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n");
+					return -EINVAL;
+				}
+				found = false;
+				for (i = 0; i < other->len; i++) {
+					if (other->nodes[i] == node_ptr) {
+						found = true;
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+				if (!found) {
+					pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n");
+					return -EINVAL;
+				}
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
+				pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
+	if (!node_ptr) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: could not insert rule.\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	*data->dst = node_ptr;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp,
+			     struct cond_av_list *list,
+			     struct cond_av_list *other)
+{
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	u32 i, len;
+	struct cond_insertf_data data;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (len == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* avtab_read_item() reads at least 96 bytes for any valid entry */
+	rc = size_check(3 * sizeof(u32), len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	list->nodes = kzalloc_objs(*list->nodes, len);
+	if (!list->nodes)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	data.p = p;
+	data.other = other;
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		data.dst = &list->nodes[i];
+		rc = avtab_read_item(&p->te_cond_avtab, fp, p, cond_insertf,
+				     &data, true);
+		if (rc) {
+			kfree(list->nodes);
+			list->nodes = NULL;
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	list->len = len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int expr_node_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr_node *expr)
+{
+	if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (expr->expr_type == COND_BOOL &&
+	    (expr->boolean == 0 || expr->boolean > p->p_bools.nprim)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	u32 i, len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	/* expr */
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	/* we will read 64 bytes per node */
+	rc = size_check(2 * sizeof(u32), len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	node->expr.nodes = kzalloc_objs(*node->expr.nodes, len);
+	if (!node->expr.nodes)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	node->expr.len = len;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		struct cond_expr_node *expr = &node->expr.nodes[i];
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		expr->boolean = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+		if (!expr_node_isvalid(p, expr))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, &node->true_list);
+}
+
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	u32 i, len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	/* cond_read_node() reads at least 128 bytes for any valid node */
+	rc = size_check(4 * sizeof(u32), len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	p->cond_list = kzalloc_objs(*p->cond_list, len);
+	if (!p->cond_list)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = avtab_alloc(&(p->te_cond_avtab), p->te_avtab.nel);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	p->cond_list_len = len;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		rc = cond_read_node(p, &p->cond_list[i], fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto err;
+	}
+	return 0;
+err:
+	cond_list_destroy(p);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int cond_write_bool(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->value);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->state);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cond_write_cond_av_list doesn't write out the av_list nodes.
+ * Instead it writes out the key/value pairs from the avtab. This
+ * is necessary because there is no way to uniquely identifying rules
+ * in the avtab so it is not possible to associate individual rules
+ * in the avtab with a conditional without saving them as part of
+ * the conditional. This means that the avtab with the conditional
+ * rules will not be saved but will be rebuilt on policy load.
+ */
+static int cond_write_av_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_av_list *list,
+			      struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	u32 i;
+	int rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(list->len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < list->len; i++) {
+		rc = avtab_write_item(p, list->nodes[i], fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_write_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node,
+			   struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	int rc;
+	u32 i;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->cur_state);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < node->expr.len; i++) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].expr_type);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].boolean);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = cond_write_av_list(p, &node->true_list, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = cond_write_av_list(p, &node->false_list, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->cond_list_len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++) {
+		rc = cond_write_node(p, &p->cond_list[i], fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+			 struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+
+	if (!ctab || !key || !xpermd)
+		return;
+
+	for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
+	     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+		if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
+			services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+	}
+}
+/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
+ * av table, and if so, add them to the result
+ */
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+		     struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+
+	if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
+		return;
+
+	for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
+	     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+		if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+			avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
+		if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY | AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY | AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+			/* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
+			 * permission we do NOT want to audit (dontaudit), we use
+			 * the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
+			 * are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
+			 */
+			avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+		if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+			avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+		if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
+		    (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+			services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
+	}
+}
+
+static int cond_dup_av_list(struct cond_av_list *new,
+			    const struct cond_av_list *orig,
+			    struct avtab *avtab)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+
+	new->nodes = kzalloc_objs(*new->nodes, orig->len);
+	if (!new->nodes)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < orig->len; i++) {
+		new->nodes[i] = avtab_insert_nonunique(
+			avtab, &orig->nodes[i]->key, &orig->nodes[i]->datum);
+		if (!new->nodes[i])
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		new->len++;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int duplicate_policydb_cond_list(struct policydb *newp,
+					const struct policydb *origp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	u32 i;
+
+	rc = avtab_alloc_dup(&newp->te_cond_avtab, &origp->te_cond_avtab);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	newp->cond_list_len = 0;
+	newp->cond_list = kzalloc_objs(*newp->cond_list, origp->cond_list_len);
+	if (!newp->cond_list)
+		goto error;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < origp->cond_list_len; i++) {
+		struct cond_node *newn = &newp->cond_list[i];
+		const struct cond_node *orign = &origp->cond_list[i];
+
+		newp->cond_list_len++;
+
+		newn->cur_state = orign->cur_state;
+		newn->expr.nodes =
+			kmemdup(orign->expr.nodes,
+				orign->expr.len * sizeof(*orign->expr.nodes),
+				GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!newn->expr.nodes)
+			goto error;
+
+		newn->expr.len = orign->expr.len;
+
+		rc = cond_dup_av_list(&newn->true_list, &orign->true_list,
+				      &newp->te_cond_avtab);
+		if (rc)
+			goto error;
+
+		rc = cond_dup_av_list(&newn->false_list, &orign->false_list,
+				      &newp->te_cond_avtab);
+		if (rc)
+			goto error;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+error:
+	avtab_destroy(&newp->te_cond_avtab);
+	cond_list_destroy(newp);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static int cond_bools_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *args)
+{
+	/* key was not copied so no need to free here */
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_bools_copy(struct hashtab_node *new,
+			   const struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args)
+{
+	struct cond_bool_datum *datum;
+
+	datum = kmemdup(orig->datum, sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum),
+			GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!datum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new->key = orig->key; /* No need to copy, never modified */
+	new->datum = datum;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_bools_index(void *key, void *datum, void *args)
+{
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum, **cond_bool_array;
+
+	booldatum = datum;
+	cond_bool_array = args;
+	cond_bool_array[booldatum->value - 1] = booldatum;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int duplicate_policydb_bools(struct policydb *newdb,
+				    const struct policydb *orig)
+{
+	struct cond_bool_datum **cond_bool_array;
+	int rc;
+
+	cond_bool_array = kzalloc_objs(*orig->bool_val_to_struct,
+				       orig->p_bools.nprim);
+	if (!cond_bool_array)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = hashtab_duplicate(&newdb->p_bools.table, &orig->p_bools.table,
+			       cond_bools_copy, cond_bools_destroy, NULL);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(cond_bool_array);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	hashtab_map(&newdb->p_bools.table, cond_bools_index, cond_bool_array);
+	newdb->bool_val_to_struct = cond_bool_array;
+
+	newdb->p_bools.nprim = orig->p_bools.nprim;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_destroy_dup(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	hashtab_map(&p->p_bools.table, cond_bools_destroy, NULL);
+	hashtab_destroy(&p->p_bools.table);
+	cond_policydb_destroy(p);
+}
+
+int cond_policydb_dup(struct policydb *new, const struct policydb *orig)
+{
+	cond_policydb_init(new);
+
+	if (duplicate_policydb_bools(new, orig))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (duplicate_policydb_cond_list(new, orig)) {
+		cond_policydb_destroy_dup(new);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..468e98ad3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *          Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CONDITIONAL_H_
+#define _CONDITIONAL_H_
+
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "../include/conditional.h"
+
+#define COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH 10
+
+/*
+ * A conditional expression is a list of operators and operands
+ * in reverse polish notation.
+ */
+struct cond_expr_node {
+#define COND_BOOL 1 /* plain bool */
+#define COND_NOT  2 /* !bool */
+#define COND_OR	  3 /* bool || bool */
+#define COND_AND  4 /* bool && bool */
+#define COND_XOR  5 /* bool ^ bool */
+#define COND_EQ	  6 /* bool == bool */
+#define COND_NEQ  7 /* bool != bool */
+#define COND_LAST COND_NEQ
+	u32 expr_type;
+	u32 boolean;
+};
+
+struct cond_expr {
+	struct cond_expr_node *nodes;
+	u32 len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Each cond_node contains a list of rules to be enabled/disabled
+ * depending on the current value of the conditional expression. This
+ * struct is for that list.
+ */
+struct cond_av_list {
+	struct avtab_node **nodes;
+	u32 len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * A cond node represents a conditional block in a policy. It
+ * contains a conditional expression, the current state of the expression,
+ * two lists of rules to enable/disable depending on the value of the
+ * expression (the true list corresponds to if and the false list corresponds
+ * to else)..
+ */
+struct cond_node {
+	int cur_state;
+	struct cond_expr expr;
+	struct cond_av_list true_list;
+	struct cond_av_list false_list;
+};
+
+void cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p);
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p);
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p);
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp);
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
+int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
+
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+		     struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+			 struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
+void evaluate_cond_nodes(struct policydb *p);
+void cond_policydb_destroy_dup(struct policydb *p);
+int cond_policydb_dup(struct policydb *new, const struct policydb *orig);
+
+#endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1d75a8a04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A constraint is a condition that must be satisfied in
+ * order for one or more permissions to be granted.
+ * Constraints are used to impose additional restrictions
+ * beyond the type-based rules in `te' or the role-based
+ * transition rules in `rbac'.  Constraints are typically
+ * used to prevent a process from transitioning to a new user
+ * identity or role unless it is in a privileged type.
+ * Constraints are likewise typically used to prevent a
+ * process from labeling an object with a different user
+ * identity.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+#define _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+
+#define CEXPR_MAXDEPTH 5
+
+struct constraint_expr {
+#define CEXPR_NOT   1 /* not expr */
+#define CEXPR_AND   2 /* expr and expr */
+#define CEXPR_OR    3 /* expr or expr */
+#define CEXPR_ATTR  4 /* attr op attr */
+#define CEXPR_NAMES 5 /* attr op names */
+	u32 expr_type; /* expression type */
+
+#define CEXPR_USER    1 /* user */
+#define CEXPR_ROLE    2 /* role */
+#define CEXPR_TYPE    4 /* type */
+#define CEXPR_TARGET  8 /* target if set, source otherwise */
+#define CEXPR_XTARGET 16 /* special 3rd target for validatetrans rule */
+#define CEXPR_L1L2    32 /* low level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H2    64 /* low level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1L2    128 /* high level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1H2    256 /* high level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H1    512 /* low level 1 vs. high level 1 */
+#define CEXPR_L2H2    1024 /* low level 2 vs. high level 2 */
+	u32 attr; /* attribute */
+
+#define CEXPR_EQ     1 /* == or eq */
+#define CEXPR_NEQ    2 /* != */
+#define CEXPR_DOM    3 /* dom */
+#define CEXPR_DOMBY  4 /* domby  */
+#define CEXPR_INCOMP 5 /* incomp */
+	u32 op; /* operator */
+
+	struct ebitmap names; /* names */
+	/* internally unused, only forwarded via policydb_write() */
+	struct type_set *type_names;
+
+	struct constraint_expr *next; /* next expression */
+};
+
+struct constraint_node {
+	u32 permissions; /* constrained permissions */
+	struct constraint_expr *expr; /* constraint on permissions */
+	struct constraint_node *next; /* next constraint */
+};
+
+#endif /* _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.c b/security/selinux/ss/context.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a528b7f76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.c
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Implementations of the security context functions.
+ *
+ * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+
+#include "context.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+
+u32 context_compute_hash(const struct context *c)
+{
+	u32 hash = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a context is invalid, it will always be represented by a
+	 * context struct with only the len & str set (and vice versa)
+	 * under a given policy. Since context structs from different
+	 * policies should never meet, it is safe to hash valid and
+	 * invalid contexts differently. The context_equal() function
+	 * already operates under the same assumption.
+	 */
+	if (c->len)
+		return full_name_hash(NULL, c->str, c->len);
+
+	hash = jhash_3words(c->user, c->role, c->type, hash);
+	hash = mls_range_hash(&c->range, hash);
+	return hash;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dd3b9b5b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A security context is a set of security attributes
+ * associated with each subject and object controlled
+ * by the security policy.  Security contexts are
+  * externally represented as variable-length strings
+ * that can be interpreted by a user or application
+ * with an understanding of the security policy.
+ * Internally, the security server uses a simple
+ * structure.  This structure is private to the
+ * security server and can be changed without affecting
+ * clients of the security server.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+#define _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "mls_types.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+/*
+ * A security context consists of an authenticated user
+ * identity, a role, a type and a MLS range.
+ */
+struct context {
+	u32 user;
+	u32 role;
+	u32 type;
+	u32 len; /* length of string in bytes */
+	struct mls_range range;
+	char *str; /* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
+};
+
+static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+	memset(&c->range, 0, sizeof(c->range));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cpy(struct context *dst,
+				  const struct context *src)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the low level of 'src'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_low(struct context *dst,
+				      const struct context *src)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the high level of 'src'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst,
+				       const struct context *src)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_glblub(struct context *dst,
+				     const struct context *c1,
+				     const struct context *c2)
+{
+	struct mls_range *dr = &dst->range;
+	const struct mls_range *r1 = &c1->range, *r2 = &c2->range;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (r1->level[1].sens < r2->level[0].sens ||
+	    r2->level[1].sens < r1->level[0].sens)
+		/* These ranges have no common sensitivities */
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Take the greatest of the low */
+	dr->level[0].sens = max(r1->level[0].sens, r2->level[0].sens);
+
+	/* Take the least of the high */
+	dr->level[1].sens = min(r1->level[1].sens, r2->level[1].sens);
+
+	rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[0].cat, &r1->level[0].cat,
+			 &r2->level[0].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[1].cat, &r1->level[1].cat,
+			 &r2->level[1].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline bool mls_context_equal(const struct context *c1,
+				     const struct context *c2)
+{
+	return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
+		ebitmap_equal(&c1->range.level[0].cat, &c2->range.level[0].cat) &&
+		(c1->range.level[1].sens == c2->range.level[1].sens) &&
+		ebitmap_equal(&c1->range.level[1].cat, &c2->range.level[1].cat));
+}
+
+static inline void mls_context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+	ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[0].cat);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[1].cat);
+	mls_context_init(c);
+}
+
+static inline void context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+	memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+}
+
+static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	dst->user = src->user;
+	dst->role = src->role;
+	dst->type = src->type;
+	if (src->str) {
+		dst->str = kstrdup(src->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!dst->str)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		dst->len = src->len;
+	} else {
+		dst->str = NULL;
+		dst->len = 0;
+	}
+	rc = mls_context_cpy(dst, src);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(dst->str);
+		dst->str = NULL;
+		dst->len = 0;
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+	c->user = c->role = c->type = 0;
+	kfree(c->str);
+	c->str = NULL;
+	c->len = 0;
+	mls_context_destroy(c);
+}
+
+static inline bool context_equal(const struct context *c1,
+				 const struct context *c2)
+{
+	if (c1->len && c2->len)
+		return (c1->len == c2->len && !strcmp(c1->str, c2->str));
+	if (c1->len || c2->len)
+		return 0;
+	return ((c1->user == c2->user) && (c1->role == c2->role) &&
+		(c1->type == c2->type) && mls_context_equal(c1, c2));
+}
+
+u32 context_compute_hash(const struct context *c);
+
+#endif /* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ea894361f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *          Added support to import/export the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *          (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ *
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *          Applied standard bit operations to improve bitmap scanning.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+#define BITS_PER_U64 ((u32)(sizeof(u64) * 8))
+
+static struct kmem_cache *ebitmap_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
+
+bool ebitmap_equal(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+	const struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+
+	if (e1->highbit != e2->highbit)
+		return false;
+
+	n1 = e1->node;
+	n2 = e2->node;
+	while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit == n2->startbit) &&
+	       !memcmp(n1->maps, n2->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8)) {
+		n1 = n1->next;
+		n2 = n2->next;
+	}
+
+	if (n1 || n2)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *src)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *new, *prev;
+	const struct ebitmap_node *n;
+
+	ebitmap_init(dst);
+	n = src->node;
+	prev = NULL;
+	while (n) {
+		new = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!new) {
+			ebitmap_destroy(dst);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		new->startbit = n->startbit;
+		memcpy(new->maps, n->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8);
+		new->next = NULL;
+		if (prev)
+			prev->next = new;
+		else
+			dst->node = new;
+		prev = new;
+		n = n->next;
+	}
+
+	dst->highbit = src->highbit;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *e1,
+		const struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n;
+	u32 bit;
+	int rc;
+
+	ebitmap_init(dst);
+
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e1, n, bit)
+	{
+		if (ebitmap_get_bit(e2, bit)) {
+			rc = ebitmap_set_bit(dst, bit, 1);
+			if (rc < 0)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * ebitmap_netlbl_export - Export an ebitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap
+ * @ebmap: the ebitmap to export
+ * @catmap: the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Export a SELinux extensibile bitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on error.
+ *
+ */
+int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = ebmap->node;
+	unsigned long e_map;
+	u32 offset;
+	unsigned int iter;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (e_iter == NULL) {
+		*catmap = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (*catmap != NULL)
+		netlbl_catmap_free(*catmap);
+	*catmap = NULL;
+
+	while (e_iter) {
+		offset = e_iter->startbit;
+		for (iter = 0; iter < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; iter++) {
+			e_map = e_iter->maps[iter];
+			if (e_map != 0) {
+				rc = netlbl_catmap_setlong(catmap, offset,
+							   e_map, GFP_ATOMIC);
+				if (rc != 0)
+					goto netlbl_export_failure;
+			}
+			offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+		}
+		e_iter = e_iter->next;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+netlbl_export_failure:
+	netlbl_catmap_free(*catmap);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ebitmap_netlbl_import - Import a NetLabel category bitmap into an ebitmap
+ * @ebmap: the ebitmap to import
+ * @catmap: the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Import a NetLabel category bitmap into a SELinux extensibile bitmap.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on error.
+ *
+ */
+int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = NULL;
+	struct ebitmap_node *e_prev = NULL;
+	u32 offset = 0, idx;
+	unsigned long bitmap;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		rc = netlbl_catmap_getlong(catmap, &offset, &bitmap);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto netlbl_import_failure;
+		if (offset == (u32)-1)
+			return 0;
+
+		/* don't waste ebitmap space if the netlabel bitmap is empty */
+		if (bitmap == 0) {
+			offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (e_iter == NULL ||
+		    offset >= e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
+			e_prev = e_iter;
+			e_iter = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep,
+						   GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (e_iter == NULL)
+				goto netlbl_import_failure;
+			e_iter->startbit = offset - (offset % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+			if (e_prev == NULL)
+				ebmap->node = e_iter;
+			else
+				e_prev->next = e_iter;
+			ebmap->highbit = e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+		}
+
+		/* offset will always be aligned to an unsigned long */
+		idx = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(e_iter, offset);
+		e_iter->maps[idx] = bitmap;
+
+		/* next */
+		offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	/* NOTE: we should never reach this return */
+	return 0;
+
+netlbl_import_failure:
+	ebitmap_destroy(ebmap);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+/*
+ * Check to see if all the bits set in e2 are also set in e1. Optionally,
+ * if last_e2bit is non-zero, the highest set bit in e2 cannot exceed
+ * last_e2bit.
+ */
+int ebitmap_contains(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2,
+		     u32 last_e2bit)
+{
+	const struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+	int i;
+
+	if (e1->highbit < e2->highbit)
+		return 0;
+
+	n1 = e1->node;
+	n2 = e2->node;
+
+	while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit <= n2->startbit)) {
+		if (n1->startbit < n2->startbit) {
+			n1 = n1->next;
+			continue;
+		}
+		for (i = EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS - 1; (i >= 0) && !n2->maps[i];)
+			i--; /* Skip trailing NULL map entries */
+		if (last_e2bit && (i >= 0)) {
+			u32 lastsetbit = n2->startbit + i * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE +
+					 __fls(n2->maps[i]);
+			if (lastsetbit > last_e2bit)
+				return 0;
+		}
+
+		while (i >= 0) {
+			if ((n1->maps[i] & n2->maps[i]) != n2->maps[i])
+				return 0;
+			i--;
+		}
+
+		n1 = n1->next;
+		n2 = n2->next;
+	}
+
+	if (n2)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+u32 ebitmap_get_highest_set_bit(const struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+	const struct ebitmap_node *n;
+	unsigned long unit;
+	u32 pos = 0;
+
+	n = e->node;
+	if (!n)
+		return 0;
+
+	while (n->next)
+		n = n->next;
+
+	for (unsigned int i = EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; i > 0; i--) {
+		unit = n->maps[i - 1];
+		if (unit == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		pos = (i - 1) * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+		while (unit >>= 1)
+			pos++;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return n->startbit + pos;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_get_bit(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 bit)
+{
+	const struct ebitmap_node *n;
+
+	if (e->highbit < bit)
+		return 0;
+
+	n = e->node;
+	while (n && (n->startbit <= bit)) {
+		if ((n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) > bit)
+			return ebitmap_node_get_bit(n, bit);
+		n = n->next;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, u32 bit, int value)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *prev, *new;
+
+	prev = NULL;
+	n = e->node;
+	while (n && n->startbit <= bit) {
+		if ((n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) > bit) {
+			if (value) {
+				ebitmap_node_set_bit(n, bit);
+			} else {
+				u32 s;
+
+				ebitmap_node_clr_bit(n, bit);
+
+				s = find_first_bit(n->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+				if (s < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+					return 0;
+
+				/* drop this node from the bitmap */
+				if (!n->next) {
+					/*
+					 * this was the highest map
+					 * within the bitmap
+					 */
+					if (prev)
+						e->highbit = prev->startbit +
+							     EBITMAP_SIZE;
+					else
+						e->highbit = 0;
+				}
+				if (prev)
+					prev->next = n->next;
+				else
+					e->node = n->next;
+				kmem_cache_free(ebitmap_node_cachep, n);
+			}
+			return 0;
+		}
+		prev = n;
+		n = n->next;
+	}
+
+	if (!value)
+		return 0;
+
+	new = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new->startbit = bit - (bit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+	ebitmap_node_set_bit(new, bit);
+
+	if (!n)
+		/* this node will be the highest map within the bitmap */
+		e->highbit = new->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+
+	if (prev) {
+		new->next = prev->next;
+		prev->next = new;
+	} else {
+		new->next = e->node;
+		e->node = new;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *temp;
+
+	if (!e)
+		return;
+
+	n = e->node;
+	while (n) {
+		temp = n;
+		n = n->next;
+		kmem_cache_free(ebitmap_node_cachep, temp);
+	}
+
+	e->highbit = 0;
+	e->node = NULL;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n = NULL;
+	u32 mapunit, count, startbit, index, i;
+	__le32 ebitmap_start;
+	u64 map;
+	__le64 mapbits;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	int rc;
+
+	ebitmap_init(e);
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	mapunit = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	e->highbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	if (mapunit != BITS_PER_U64) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
+		       "match my size %u (high bit was %u)\n",
+		       mapunit, BITS_PER_U64, e->highbit);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* round up e->highbit */
+	e->highbit += EBITMAP_SIZE - 1;
+	e->highbit -= (e->highbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+
+	if (!e->highbit) {
+		e->node = NULL;
+		goto ok;
+	}
+
+	if (e->highbit && !count)
+		goto bad;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(&ebitmap_start, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		startbit = le32_to_cpu(ebitmap_start);
+
+		if (startbit & (mapunit - 1)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%u) is "
+			       "not a multiple of the map unit size (%u)\n",
+			       startbit, mapunit);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		if (startbit > e->highbit - mapunit) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%u) is "
+			       "beyond the end of the bitmap (%u)\n",
+			       startbit, (e->highbit - mapunit));
+			goto bad;
+		}
+
+		if (!n || startbit >= n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
+			struct ebitmap_node *tmp;
+			tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep,
+						GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!tmp) {
+				pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto bad;
+			}
+			/* round down */
+			tmp->startbit = startbit - (startbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+			if (n)
+				n->next = tmp;
+			else
+				e->node = tmp;
+			n = tmp;
+		} else if (startbit <= n->startbit) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: start bit %u"
+			       " comes after start bit %u\n",
+			       startbit, n->startbit);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+
+		rc = next_entry(&mapbits, fp, sizeof(u64));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		map = le64_to_cpu(mapbits);
+		if (!map) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: empty map\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+
+		index = (startbit - n->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+		while (map) {
+			n->maps[index++] = map & (-1UL);
+			map = EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(map);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (n && n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE != e->highbit) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: high bit %u is not equal to the expected value %zu\n",
+		       e->highbit, n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+ok:
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	ebitmap_destroy(e);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_write(const struct ebitmap *e, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n;
+	u32 bit, count, last_bit, last_startbit;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u64 map;
+	int rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(BITS_PER_U64);
+
+	count = 0;
+	last_bit = 0;
+	last_startbit = U32_MAX;
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit)
+	{
+		if (last_startbit == U32_MAX ||
+		    rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
+			count++;
+			last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+		}
+		last_bit = roundup(bit + 1, BITS_PER_U64);
+	}
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(last_bit);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(count);
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	map = 0;
+	last_startbit = U32_MAX;
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit)
+	{
+		if (last_startbit == U32_MAX ||
+		    rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
+			__le64 buf64[1];
+
+			/* this is the very first bit */
+			if (!map) {
+				last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+				map = (u64)1 << (bit - last_startbit);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/* write the last node */
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(last_startbit);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			buf64[0] = cpu_to_le64(map);
+			rc = put_entry(buf64, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			/* set up for the next node */
+			map = 0;
+			last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+		}
+		map |= (u64)1 << (bit - last_startbit);
+	}
+	/* write the last node */
+	if (map) {
+		__le64 buf64[1];
+
+		/* write the last node */
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(last_startbit);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		buf64[0] = cpu_to_le64(map);
+		rc = put_entry(buf64, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+u32 ebitmap_hash(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 hash)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+	/* need to change hash even if ebitmap is empty */
+	hash = jhash_1word(e->highbit, hash);
+	for (node = e->node; node; node = node->next) {
+		hash = jhash_1word(node->startbit, hash);
+		hash = jhash(node->maps, sizeof(node->maps), hash);
+	}
+	return hash;
+}
+
+void __init ebitmap_cache_init(void)
+{
+	ebitmap_node_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(ebitmap_node, SLAB_PANIC);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ae05cc8e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * An extensible bitmap is a bitmap that supports an
+ * arbitrary number of bits.  Extensible bitmaps are
+ * used to represent sets of values, such as types,
+ * roles, categories, and classes.
+ *
+ * Each extensible bitmap is implemented as a linked
+ * list of bitmap nodes, where each bitmap node has
+ * an explicitly specified starting bit position within
+ * the total bitmap.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+#define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE 64
+#else
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE 32
+#endif
+
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS                                     \
+	((EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE - sizeof(void *) - sizeof(u32)) / \
+	 sizeof(unsigned long))
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG
+#define EBITMAP_SIZE	  (EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_BIT	  1UL
+#define EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(x) \
+	(((x) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2)
+
+struct ebitmap_node {
+	struct ebitmap_node *next;
+	unsigned long maps[EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS];
+	u32 startbit;
+};
+
+struct ebitmap {
+	struct ebitmap_node *node; /* first node in the bitmap */
+	u32 highbit; /* highest position in the total bitmap */
+};
+
+#define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
+
+static inline u32 ebitmap_start_positive(const struct ebitmap *e,
+					 struct ebitmap_node **n)
+{
+	u32 ofs;
+
+	for (*n = e->node; *n; *n = (*n)->next) {
+		ofs = find_first_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+		if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+			return (*n)->startbit + ofs;
+	}
+	return ebitmap_length(e);
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_init(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+	memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
+}
+
+static inline u32 ebitmap_next_positive(const struct ebitmap *e,
+					struct ebitmap_node **n, u32 bit)
+{
+	u32 ofs;
+
+	ofs = find_next_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE, bit - (*n)->startbit + 1);
+	if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+		return ofs + (*n)->startbit;
+
+	for (*n = (*n)->next; *n; *n = (*n)->next) {
+		ofs = find_first_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+		if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+			return ofs + (*n)->startbit;
+	}
+	return ebitmap_length(e);
+}
+
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(node, bit) \
+	(((bit) - (node)->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(node, bit) \
+	(((bit) - (node)->startbit) % EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+
+static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(const struct ebitmap_node *n, u32 bit)
+{
+	u32 index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+	u32 ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+	BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+	if ((n->maps[index] & (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs)))
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_node_set_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n, u32 bit)
+{
+	u32 index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+	u32 ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+	BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+	n->maps[index] |= (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n, u32 bit)
+{
+	u32 index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+	u32 ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+	BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+	n->maps[index] &= ~(EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
+}
+
+#define ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit)      \
+	for ((bit) = ebitmap_start_positive(e, &(n)); \
+	     (bit) < ebitmap_length(e);               \
+	     (bit) = ebitmap_next_positive(e, &(n), bit))
+
+bool ebitmap_equal(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *src);
+int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *e1,
+		const struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_contains(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2,
+		     u32 last_e2bit);
+u32 ebitmap_get_highest_set_bit(const struct ebitmap *e);
+int ebitmap_get_bit(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 bit);
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, u32 bit, int value);
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
+struct policy_file;
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, struct policy_file *fp);
+int ebitmap_write(const struct ebitmap *e, struct policy_file *fp);
+u32 ebitmap_hash(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 hash);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap);
+int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap);
+#else
+static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+					struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap)
+{
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+					struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap)
+{
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SS_EBITMAP_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9ffc8a371
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the hash table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "hashtab.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *hashtab_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * Here we simply round the number of elements up to the nearest power of two.
+ * I tried also other options like rounding down or rounding to the closest
+ * power of two (up or down based on which is closer), but I was unable to
+ * find any significant difference in lookup/insert performance that would
+ * justify switching to a different (less intuitive) formula. It could be that
+ * a different formula is actually more optimal, but any future changes here
+ * should be supported with performance/memory usage data.
+ *
+ * The total memory used by the htable arrays (only) with Fedora policy loaded
+ * is approximately 163 KB at the time of writing.
+ */
+static u32 hashtab_compute_size(u32 nel)
+{
+	return nel == 0 ? 0 : roundup_pow_of_two(nel);
+}
+
+int hashtab_init(struct hashtab *h, u32 nel_hint)
+{
+	u32 size = hashtab_compute_size(nel_hint);
+
+	/* should already be zeroed, but better be safe */
+	h->nel = 0;
+	h->size = 0;
+	h->htable = NULL;
+
+	if (size) {
+		h->htable = kzalloc_objs(*h->htable, size,
+					 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
+		if (!h->htable)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		h->size = size;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int __hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_node **dst, void *key,
+		     void *datum)
+{
+	struct hashtab_node *newnode;
+
+	newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(hashtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!newnode)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	newnode->key = key;
+	newnode->datum = datum;
+	newnode->next = *dst;
+	*dst = newnode;
+
+	h->nel++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		while (cur) {
+			temp = cur;
+			cur = cur->next;
+			kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, temp);
+		}
+		h->htable[i] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	kfree(h->htable);
+	h->htable = NULL;
+}
+
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h, int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+		void *args)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	int ret;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		while (cur) {
+			ret = apply(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
+			if (ret)
+				return ret;
+			cur = cur->next;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
+{
+	u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	u64 chain2_len_sum;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	chain2_len_sum = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		if (cur) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			while (cur) {
+				chain_len++;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+
+			chain2_len_sum += (u64)chain_len * chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	info->slots_used = slots_used;
+	info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
+	info->chain2_len_sum = chain2_len_sum;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
+
+int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, const struct hashtab *orig,
+		      int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new,
+				  const struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args),
+		      int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args), void *args)
+{
+	const struct hashtab_node *orig_cur;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur, *tmp, *tail;
+	u32 i;
+	int rc;
+
+	memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+
+	new->htable = kzalloc_objs(*new->htable, orig->size);
+	if (!new->htable)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new->size = orig->size;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < orig->size; i++) {
+		tail = NULL;
+		for (orig_cur = orig->htable[i]; orig_cur;
+		     orig_cur = orig_cur->next) {
+			tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(hashtab_node_cachep,
+						GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!tmp)
+				goto error;
+			rc = copy(tmp, orig_cur, args);
+			if (rc) {
+				kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, tmp);
+				goto error;
+			}
+			tmp->next = NULL;
+			if (!tail)
+				new->htable[i] = tmp;
+			else
+				tail->next = tmp;
+			tail = tmp;
+			new->nel++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+error:
+	for (i = 0; i < new->size; i++) {
+		for (cur = new->htable[i]; cur; cur = tmp) {
+			tmp = cur->next;
+			destroy(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
+			kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, cur);
+		}
+	}
+	kfree(new->htable);
+	memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+void __init hashtab_cache_init(void)
+{
+	hashtab_node_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(hashtab_node, SLAB_PANIC);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c641fb129
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A hash table (hashtab) maintains associations between
+ * key values and datum values.  The type of the key values
+ * and the type of the datum values is arbitrary.  The
+ * functions for hash computation and key comparison are
+ * provided by the creator of the table.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+#define _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#define HASHTAB_MAX_NODES U32_MAX
+
+struct hashtab_key_params {
+	u32 (*hash)(const void *key); /* hash func */
+	int (*cmp)(const void *key1, const void *key2); /* comparison func */
+};
+
+struct hashtab_node {
+	void *key;
+	void *datum;
+	struct hashtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct hashtab {
+	struct hashtab_node **htable; /* hash table */
+	u32 size; /* number of slots in hash table */
+	u32 nel; /* number of elements in hash table */
+};
+
+struct hashtab_info {
+	u32 slots_used;
+	u32 max_chain_len;
+	u64 chain2_len_sum;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initializes a new hash table with the specified characteristics.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENOMEM if insufficient space is available or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int hashtab_init(struct hashtab *h, u32 nel_hint);
+
+int __hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_node **dst, void *key,
+		     void *datum);
+
+/*
+ * Inserts the specified (key, datum) pair into the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENOMEM on memory allocation error,
+ * -EEXIST if there is already an entry with the same key,
+ * -EINVAL for general errors or
+  0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum,
+				 struct hashtab_key_params key_params)
+{
+	u32 hvalue;
+	struct hashtab_node *prev, *cur;
+
+	cond_resched();
+
+	if (!h->size || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hvalue = key_params.hash(key) & (h->size - 1);
+	prev = NULL;
+	cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur) {
+		int cmp = key_params.cmp(key, cur->key);
+
+		if (cmp == 0)
+			return -EEXIST;
+		if (cmp < 0)
+			break;
+		prev = cur;
+		cur = cur->next;
+	}
+
+	return __hashtab_insert(h, prev ? &prev->next : &h->htable[hvalue], key,
+				datum);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Searches for the entry with the specified key in the hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if no entry has the specified key or
+ * the datum of the entry otherwise.
+ */
+static inline void *hashtab_search(const struct hashtab *h, const void *key,
+				   struct hashtab_key_params key_params)
+{
+	u32 hvalue;
+	const struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!h->size)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = key_params.hash(key) & (h->size - 1);
+	cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur) {
+		int cmp = key_params.cmp(key, cur->key);
+
+		if (cmp == 0)
+			return cur->datum;
+		if (cmp < 0)
+			break;
+		cur = cur->next;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Destroys the specified hash table.
+ */
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h);
+
+/*
+ * Applies the specified apply function to (key,datum,args)
+ * for each entry in the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * The order in which the function is applied to the entries
+ * is dependent upon the internal structure of the hash table.
+ *
+ * If apply returns a non-zero status, then hashtab_map will cease
+ * iterating through the hash table and will propagate the error
+ * return to its caller.
+ */
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h, int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+		void *args);
+
+int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, const struct hashtab *orig,
+		      int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new,
+				  const struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args),
+		      int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args), void *args);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+/* Fill info with some hash table statistics */
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info);
+#else
+static inline void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
+{
+	return;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SS_HASHTAB_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3cd36e201
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,663 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *          Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *          Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *          Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
+ *          Copyright (C) Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
+ * security context string representation of `context'.
+ */
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context)
+{
+	int i, l, len, head, prev;
+	const char *nm;
+	struct ebitmap *e;
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		u32 index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
+		len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
+
+		/* categories */
+		head = -2;
+		prev = -2;
+		e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i)
+		{
+			if (i - prev > 1) {
+				/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
+				if (head != prev) {
+					nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+					len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+				}
+				nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
+				len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+				head = i;
+			}
+			prev = i;
+		}
+		if (prev != head) {
+			nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+			len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+		}
+		if (l == 0) {
+			if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+					 &context->range.level[1]))
+				break;
+			else
+				len++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
+ * Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
+ */
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			char **scontext)
+{
+	const char *nm;
+	char *scontextp;
+	int i, l, head, prev;
+	struct ebitmap *e;
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	scontextp = *scontext;
+
+	*scontextp = ':';
+	scontextp++;
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS,
+					   context->range.level[l].sens - 1));
+		scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
+
+		/* categories */
+		head = -2;
+		prev = -2;
+		e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i)
+		{
+			if (i - prev > 1) {
+				/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
+				if (prev != head) {
+					if (prev - head > 1)
+						*scontextp++ = '.';
+					else
+						*scontextp++ = ',';
+					nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+					strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+					scontextp += strlen(nm);
+				}
+				if (prev < 0)
+					*scontextp++ = ':';
+				else
+					*scontextp++ = ',';
+				nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
+				strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+				scontextp += strlen(nm);
+				head = i;
+			}
+			prev = i;
+		}
+
+		if (prev != head) {
+			if (prev - head > 1)
+				*scontextp++ = '.';
+			else
+				*scontextp++ = ',';
+			nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+			strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+			scontextp += strlen(nm);
+		}
+
+		if (l == 0) {
+			if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+					 &context->range.level[1]))
+				break;
+			else
+				*scontextp++ = '-';
+		}
+	}
+
+	*scontext = scontextp;
+}
+
+bool mls_level_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, const struct mls_level *l)
+{
+	const char *name;
+	const struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+	u32 bit;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+		return false;
+
+	name = sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, l->sens - 1);
+	if (!name)
+		return false;
+
+	levdatum = symtab_search(&p->p_levels, name);
+	if (!levdatum)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Validate that all bits set in l->cat are also be set in
+	 * levdatum->level->cat and no bit in l->cat is larger than
+	 * p->p_cats.nprim.
+	 */
+	rc = ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level.cat, &l->cat,
+			      p->p_cats.nprim);
+	if (!rc)
+		return false;
+
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&levdatum->level.cat, node, bit) {
+		if (!sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, bit))
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool mls_range_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, const struct mls_range *r)
+{
+	return (mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[0]) &&
+		mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[1]) &&
+		mls_level_dom(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true if the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid.  Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+bool mls_context_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, const struct context *c)
+{
+	const struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return true;
+
+	if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, &c->range))
+		return false;
+
+	if (c->role == OBJECT_R_VAL)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * User must be authorized for the MLS range.
+	 */
+	if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+		return false;
+	usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+	if (!usrdatum || !mls_range_contains(usrdatum->range, c->range))
+		return false; /* user may not be associated with range */
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `scontext'.
+ *
+ * This function modifies the string in place, inserting
+ * NULL characters to terminate the MLS fields.
+ *
+ * If a def_sid is provided and no MLS field is present,
+ * copy the MLS field of the associated default context.
+ * Used for upgraded to MLS systems where objects may lack
+ * MLS fields.
+ *
+ * Policy read-lock must be held for sidtab lookup.
+ *
+ */
+int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol, char oldc, char *scontext,
+		       struct context *context, struct sidtab *s, u32 def_sid)
+{
+	char *sensitivity, *cur_cat, *next_cat, *rngptr;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
+	u32 i;
+	int l, rc;
+	char *rangep[2];
+
+	if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
+		/*
+		 * With no MLS, only return -EINVAL if there is a MLS field
+		 * and it did not come from an xattr.
+		 */
+		if (oldc && def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * No MLS component to the security context, try and map to
+	 * default if provided.
+	 */
+	if (!oldc) {
+		struct context *defcon;
+
+		if (def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		defcon = sidtab_search(s, def_sid);
+		if (!defcon)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		return mls_context_cpy(context, defcon);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're dealing with a range, figure out where the two parts
+	 * of the range begin.
+	 */
+	rangep[0] = scontext;
+	rangep[1] = strchr(scontext, '-');
+	if (rangep[1]) {
+		rangep[1][0] = '\0';
+		rangep[1]++;
+	}
+
+	/* For each part of the range: */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		/* Split sensitivity and category set. */
+		sensitivity = rangep[l];
+		if (sensitivity == NULL)
+			break;
+		next_cat = strchr(sensitivity, ':');
+		if (next_cat)
+			*(next_cat++) = '\0';
+
+		/* Parse sensitivity. */
+		levdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_levels, sensitivity);
+		if (!levdatum)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level.sens;
+
+		/* Extract category set. */
+		while (next_cat != NULL) {
+			cur_cat = next_cat;
+			next_cat = strchr(next_cat, ',');
+			if (next_cat != NULL)
+				*(next_cat++) = '\0';
+
+			/* Separate into range if exists */
+			rngptr = strchr(cur_cat, '.');
+			if (rngptr != NULL) {
+				/* Remove '.' */
+				*rngptr++ = '\0';
+			}
+
+			catdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_cats, cur_cat);
+			if (!catdatum)
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+					     catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			/* If range, set all categories in range */
+			if (rngptr == NULL)
+				continue;
+
+			rngdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_cats, rngptr);
+			if (!rngdatum)
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value)
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
+				rc = ebitmap_set_bit(
+					&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* If we didn't see a '-', the range start is also the range end. */
+	if (rangep[1] == NULL) {
+		context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
+				 &context->range.level[0].cat);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `str'.  This function will allocate temporary memory with the
+ * given constraints of gfp_mask.
+ */
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+		    gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	char *tmpstr;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tmpstr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask);
+	if (!tmpstr) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+	} else {
+		rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', tmpstr, context, NULL,
+					SECSID_NULL);
+		kfree(tmpstr);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
+ */
+int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range)
+{
+	int l, rc = 0;
+
+	/* Copy the MLS range into the  context */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		context->range.level[l].sens = range->level[l].sens;
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+				 &range->level[l].cat);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p, struct context *fromcon,
+			 struct user_datum *user, struct context *usercon)
+{
+	if (p->mls_enabled) {
+		struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
+		struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
+		struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
+		struct mls_level *user_clr = &(user->range.level[1]);
+		struct mls_level *user_def = &(user->dfltlevel);
+		struct mls_level *usercon_sen = &(usercon->range.level[0]);
+		struct mls_level *usercon_clr = &(usercon->range.level[1]);
+
+		/* Honor the user's default level if we can */
+		if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr))
+			*usercon_sen = *user_def;
+		else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr))
+			*usercon_sen = *fromcon_sen;
+		else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def))
+			*usercon_sen = *user_low;
+		else
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* Lower the clearance of available contexts
+		   if the clearance of "fromcon" is lower than
+		   that of the user's default clearance (but
+		   only if the "fromcon" clearance dominates
+		   the user's computed sensitivity level) */
+		if (mls_level_dom(user_clr, fromcon_clr))
+			*usercon_clr = *fromcon_clr;
+		else if (mls_level_dom(fromcon_clr, user_clr))
+			*usercon_clr = *user_clr;
+		else
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `oldc' from the values specified in the
+ * policy `oldp' to the values specified in the policy `newp',
+ * storing the resulting context in `newc'.
+ */
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, struct policydb *newp,
+			struct context *oldc, struct context *newc)
+{
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+	u32 i;
+	int l;
+
+	if (!oldp->mls_enabled || !newp->mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		const char *name = sym_name(oldp, SYM_LEVELS,
+					    oldc->range.level[l].sens - 1);
+
+		levdatum = symtab_search(&newp->p_levels, name);
+
+		if (!levdatum)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		newc->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level.sens;
+
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&oldc->range.level[l].cat, node,
+					      i)
+		{
+			int rc;
+
+			catdatum = symtab_search(&newp->p_cats,
+						 sym_name(oldp, SYM_CATS, i));
+			if (!catdatum)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&newc->range.level[l].cat,
+					     catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p, struct context *scontext,
+		    struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, u32 specified,
+		    struct context *newcontext, bool sock)
+{
+	struct range_trans rtr;
+	struct mls_range *r;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	char default_range = 0;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (specified) {
+	case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+		/* Look for a range transition rule. */
+		rtr.source_type = scontext->type;
+		rtr.target_type = tcontext->type;
+		rtr.target_class = tclass;
+		r = policydb_rangetr_search(p, &rtr);
+		if (r)
+			return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
+
+		if (tclass && tclass <= p->p_classes.nprim) {
+			cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+			if (cladatum)
+				default_range = cladatum->default_range;
+		}
+
+		switch (default_range) {
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
+			return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
+			return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, scontext);
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
+			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
+			return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, tcontext);
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
+			return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext);
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
+			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext);
+		case DEFAULT_GLBLUB:
+			return mls_context_glblub(newcontext, scontext,
+						  tcontext);
+		}
+
+		fallthrough;
+	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+		if ((tclass == p->process_class) || sock)
+			/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
+			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
+		else
+			/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+			return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+	case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+		/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+		return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * mls_export_netlbl_lvl - Export the MLS sensitivity levels to NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Given the security context copy the low MLS sensitivity level into the
+ * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level field.
+ *
+ */
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
+	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mls_import_netlbl_lvl - Import the NetLabel MLS sensitivity levels
+ * @p: the policy
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Given the security context and the NetLabel security attributes, copy the
+ * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level into the context.
+ *
+ */
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1;
+	context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mls_export_netlbl_cat - Export the MLS categories to NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Given the security context copy the low MLS categories into the NetLabel
+ * MLS category field.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
+				   &secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+	if (rc == 0 && secattr->attr.mls.cat != NULL)
+		secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mls_import_netlbl_cat - Import the MLS categories from NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Copy the NetLabel security attributes into the SELinux context; since the
+ * NetLabel security attribute only contains a single MLS category use it for
+ * both the low and high categories of the context.  Returns zero on success,
+ * negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,
+				   secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
+	memcpy(&context->range.level[1].cat, &context->range.level[0].cat,
+	       sizeof(context->range.level[0].cat));
+
+	return 0;
+
+import_netlbl_cat_failure:
+	ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[0].cat);
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..93cde1b22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *          Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *          Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *          Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
+ *          Copyright (X) Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_H_
+
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+
+#include "context.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context);
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			char **scontext);
+bool mls_context_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, const struct context *c);
+bool mls_range_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, const struct mls_range *r);
+bool mls_level_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, const struct mls_level *l);
+
+int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p, char oldc, char *scontext,
+		       struct context *context, struct sidtab *s, u32 def_sid);
+
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+		    gfp_t gfp_mask);
+
+int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range);
+
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, struct policydb *newp,
+			struct context *oldc, struct context *newc);
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p, struct context *scontext,
+		    struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, u32 specified,
+		    struct context *newcontext, bool sock);
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p, struct context *fromcon,
+			 struct user_datum *user, struct context *usercon);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+#else
+static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+					 struct context *context,
+					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+					 struct context *context,
+					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+					struct context *context,
+					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+					struct context *context,
+					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline u32 mls_range_hash(const struct mls_range *r, u32 hash)
+{
+	hash = jhash_2words(r->level[0].sens, r->level[1].sens, hash);
+	hash = ebitmap_hash(&r->level[0].cat, hash);
+	hash = ebitmap_hash(&r->level[1].cat, hash);
+	return hash;
+}
+
+#endif /* _SS_MLS_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..51df2ebd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *          Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *          Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+
+struct mls_level {
+	u32 sens; /* sensitivity */
+	struct ebitmap cat; /* category set */
+};
+
+struct mls_range {
+	struct mls_level level[2]; /* low == level[0], high == level[1] */
+};
+
+static inline int mls_level_eq(const struct mls_level *l1,
+			       const struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+	return ((l1->sens == l2->sens) && ebitmap_equal(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_level_dom(const struct mls_level *l1,
+				const struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+	return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) &&
+		ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat, 0));
+}
+
+#define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \
+	(!mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && !mls_level_dom((l2), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_level_between(l1, l2, l3) \
+	(mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && mls_level_dom((l3), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_range_contains(r1, r2)                        \
+	(mls_level_dom(&(r2).level[0], &(r1).level[0]) && \
+	 mls_level_dom(&(r1).level[1], &(r2).level[1]))
+
+#endif /* _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ead504a63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4017 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Implementation of the policy database.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *          Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *          Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and
+ *          Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *          Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *          Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *          Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *
+ * Update: Mellanox Techonologies
+ *         Added Infiniband support
+ *         Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Techonologies
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/sort.h>
+#include "security.h"
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+/* clang-format off */
+static const char *const symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
+	"common prefixes",
+	"classes",
+	"roles",
+	"types",
+	"users",
+	"bools",
+	"levels",
+	"categories",
+};
+/* clang-format off */
+#endif
+
+struct policydb_compat_info {
+	unsigned int version;
+	unsigned int sym_num;
+	unsigned int ocon_num;
+};
+
+/* These need to be updated if SYM_NUM or OCON_NUM changes */
+static const struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 3,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 3,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 3,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_COND_XPERMS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+	},
+	{
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NEVERAUDIT,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+	},
+};
+
+static const struct policydb_compat_info *
+policydb_lookup_compat(unsigned int version)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policydb_compat); i++) {
+		if (policydb_compat[i].version == version)
+			return &policydb_compat[i];
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_destroy functions are used to
+ * free any memory allocated for each kind of
+ * symbol data in the policy database.
+ */
+
+static int perm_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	if (datum) {
+		comdatum = datum;
+		hashtab_map(&comdatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+		hashtab_destroy(&comdatum->permissions.table);
+	}
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void constraint_expr_destroy(struct constraint_expr *expr)
+{
+	if (expr) {
+		ebitmap_destroy(&expr->names);
+		if (expr->type_names) {
+			ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->types);
+			ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->negset);
+			kfree(expr->type_names);
+		}
+		kfree(expr);
+	}
+}
+
+static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	struct constraint_node *constraint, *ctemp;
+	struct constraint_expr *e, *etmp;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	if (datum) {
+		cladatum = datum;
+		hashtab_map(&cladatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+		hashtab_destroy(&cladatum->permissions.table);
+		constraint = cladatum->constraints;
+		while (constraint) {
+			e = constraint->expr;
+			while (e) {
+				etmp = e;
+				e = e->next;
+				constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
+			}
+			ctemp = constraint;
+			constraint = constraint->next;
+			kfree(ctemp);
+		}
+
+		constraint = cladatum->validatetrans;
+		while (constraint) {
+			e = constraint->expr;
+			while (e) {
+				etmp = e;
+				e = e->next;
+				constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
+			}
+			ctemp = constraint;
+			constraint = constraint->next;
+			kfree(ctemp);
+		}
+		kfree(cladatum->comkey);
+	}
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct role_datum *role;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	if (datum) {
+		role = datum;
+		ebitmap_destroy(&role->dominates);
+		ebitmap_destroy(&role->types);
+	}
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	if (datum) {
+		usrdatum = datum;
+		ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->roles);
+		ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[0].cat);
+		ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[1].cat);
+		ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->dfltlevel.cat);
+	}
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	if (datum) {
+		levdatum = datum;
+		ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level.cat);
+	}
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* clang-format off */
+static int (*const destroy_f[SYM_NUM])(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
+	common_destroy,
+	cls_destroy,
+	role_destroy,
+	type_destroy,
+	user_destroy,
+	cond_destroy_bool,
+	sens_destroy,
+	cat_destroy,
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+static int filenametr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *next, *d = datum;
+
+	kfree(ft->name);
+	kfree(key);
+	do {
+		ebitmap_destroy(&d->stypes);
+		next = d->next;
+		kfree(d);
+		d = next;
+	} while (unlikely(d));
+	cond_resched();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct mls_range *rt = datum;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[0].cat);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[1].cat);
+	kfree(datum);
+	cond_resched();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, unsigned int i)
+{
+	if (!c)
+		return;
+
+	context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
+	context_destroy(&c->context[1]);
+	if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS || i == OCON_NETIF ||
+	    i == OCON_FSUSE)
+		kfree(c->u.name);
+	kfree(c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the role table.
+ */
+static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	int rc;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+
+	role = kzalloc_obj(*role);
+	if (!role)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	role->value = ++p->p_roles.nprim;
+	if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	key = kstrdup(OBJECT_R, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = symtab_insert(&p->p_roles, key, role);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(role);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static u32 filenametr_hash(const void *k)
+{
+	const struct filename_trans_key *ft = k;
+	unsigned long salt = ft->ttype ^ ft->tclass;
+
+	return full_name_hash((void *)salt, ft->name, strlen(ft->name));
+}
+
+static int filenametr_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+	const struct filename_trans_key *ft1 = k1;
+	const struct filename_trans_key *ft2 = k2;
+	int v;
+
+	v = cmp_int(ft1->ttype, ft2->ttype);
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = cmp_int(ft1->tclass, ft2->tclass);
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	return strcmp(ft1->name, ft2->name);
+}
+
+static const struct hashtab_key_params filenametr_key_params = {
+	.hash = filenametr_hash,
+	.cmp = filenametr_cmp,
+};
+
+struct filename_trans_datum *
+policydb_filenametr_search(struct policydb *p, struct filename_trans_key *key)
+{
+	return hashtab_search(&p->filename_trans, key, filenametr_key_params);
+}
+
+static u32 rangetr_hash(const void *k)
+{
+	const struct range_trans *key = k;
+
+	return key->source_type + (key->target_type << 3) +
+	       (key->target_class << 5);
+}
+
+static int rangetr_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+	const struct range_trans *key1 = k1, *key2 = k2;
+	int v;
+
+	v = cmp_int(key1->source_type, key2->source_type);
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = cmp_int(key1->target_type, key2->target_type);
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = cmp_int(key1->target_class, key2->target_class);
+
+	return v;
+}
+
+static const struct hashtab_key_params rangetr_key_params = {
+	.hash = rangetr_hash,
+	.cmp = rangetr_cmp,
+};
+
+struct mls_range *policydb_rangetr_search(struct policydb *p,
+					  struct range_trans *key)
+{
+	return hashtab_search(&p->range_tr, key, rangetr_key_params);
+}
+
+static u32 role_trans_hash(const void *k)
+{
+	const struct role_trans_key *key = k;
+
+	return jhash_3words(key->role, key->type,
+			    (u32)key->tclass << 16 | key->tclass, 0);
+}
+
+static int role_trans_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+	const struct role_trans_key *key1 = k1, *key2 = k2;
+	int v;
+
+	v = cmp_int(key1->role, key2->role);
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = cmp_int(key1->type, key2->type);
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	return cmp_int(key1->tclass, key2->tclass);
+}
+
+static const struct hashtab_key_params roletr_key_params = {
+	.hash = role_trans_hash,
+	.cmp = role_trans_cmp,
+};
+
+struct role_trans_datum *policydb_roletr_search(struct policydb *p,
+						struct role_trans_key *key)
+{
+	return hashtab_search(&p->role_tr, key, roletr_key_params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a policy database structure.
+ */
+static void policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+
+	avtab_init(&p->te_avtab);
+	cond_policydb_init(p);
+
+	ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
+	ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
+	ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
+	ebitmap_init(&p->neveraudit_map);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_index functions are used to
+ * define the val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
+ * in a policy database structure.  The val_to_name
+ * arrays are used when converting security context
+ * structures into string representations.  The
+ * val_to_struct arrays are used when the attributes
+ * of a class, role, or user are needed.
+ */
+
+static int common_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+	comdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+	if (!comdatum->value || comdatum->value > p->p_commons.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_COMMONS][comdatum->value - 1] = key;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+
+	cladatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+	if (!cladatum->value || cladatum->value > p->p_classes.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES][cladatum->value - 1] = key;
+	p->class_val_to_struct[cladatum->value - 1] = cladatum;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+
+	role = datum;
+	p = datap;
+	if (!role->value || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim ||
+	    role->bounds > p->p_roles.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES][role->value - 1] = key;
+	p->role_val_to_struct[role->value - 1] = role;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+
+	typdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (typdatum->primary) {
+		if (!typdatum->value || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim ||
+		    typdatum->bounds > p->p_types.nprim)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES][typdatum->value - 1] = key;
+		p->type_val_to_struct[typdatum->value - 1] = typdatum;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+	usrdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+	if (!usrdatum->value || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim ||
+	    usrdatum->bounds > p->p_users.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS][usrdatum->value - 1] = key;
+	p->user_val_to_struct[usrdatum->value - 1] = usrdatum;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+	levdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (!levdatum->level.sens || levdatum->level.sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!levdatum->isalias)
+		p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS][levdatum->level.sens - 1] = key;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+
+	catdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!catdatum->isalias)
+		p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS][catdatum->value - 1] = key;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* clang-format off */
+static int (*const index_f[SYM_NUM])(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
+	common_index,
+	class_index,
+	role_index,
+	type_index,
+	user_index,
+	cond_index_bool,
+	sens_index,
+	cat_index,
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name,
+		      const char *hash_details)
+{
+	struct hashtab_info info;
+
+	hashtab_stat(h, &info);
+	pr_debug(
+		"SELinux: %s%s%s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest chain length %d, sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
+		hash_name, hash_details ? "@" : "", hash_details ?: "", h->nel,
+		info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len,
+		info.chain2_len_sum);
+}
+
+static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+		hash_eval(&s[i].table, symtab_name[i], NULL);
+}
+
+#else
+static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name,
+			     const char *hash_details)
+{
+}
+static inline void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
+
+/*
+ * Define the other val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
+ * in a policy database structure.
+ *
+ * Caller must clean up on failure.
+ */
+static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	int i, rc;
+
+	if (p->mls_enabled)
+		pr_debug(
+			"SELinux:  %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools, %d sens, %d cats\n",
+			p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
+			p->p_bools.nprim, p->p_levels.nprim, p->p_cats.nprim);
+	else
+		pr_debug("SELinux:  %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools\n",
+			 p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
+			 p->p_bools.nprim);
+
+	pr_debug("SELinux:  %d classes, %d rules\n", p->p_classes.nprim,
+		 p->te_avtab.nel);
+
+	symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab);
+
+	p->class_val_to_struct = kzalloc_objs(*p->class_val_to_struct,
+					      p->p_classes.nprim);
+	if (!p->class_val_to_struct)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	p->role_val_to_struct = kzalloc_objs(*p->role_val_to_struct,
+					     p->p_roles.nprim);
+	if (!p->role_val_to_struct)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	p->user_val_to_struct = kzalloc_objs(*p->user_val_to_struct,
+					     p->p_users.nprim);
+	if (!p->user_val_to_struct)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	p->type_val_to_struct = kvzalloc_objs(*p->type_val_to_struct,
+					      p->p_types.nprim);
+	if (!p->type_val_to_struct)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = cond_init_bool_indexes(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+		p->sym_val_to_name[i] = kvcalloc(p->symtab[i].nprim,
+						 sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!p->sym_val_to_name[i])
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		rc = hashtab_map(&p->symtab[i].table, index_f[i], p);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free any memory allocated by a policy database structure.
+ */
+void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	struct ocontext *c, *ctmp;
+	struct genfs *g, *gtmp;
+	u32 i;
+	struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+		cond_resched();
+		hashtab_map(&p->symtab[i].table, destroy_f[i], NULL);
+		hashtab_destroy(&p->symtab[i].table);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+		kvfree(p->sym_val_to_name[i]);
+
+	kfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
+	kfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
+	kfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
+	kvfree(p->type_val_to_struct);
+
+	avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < OCON_NUM; i++) {
+		cond_resched();
+		c = p->ocontexts[i];
+		while (c) {
+			ctmp = c;
+			c = c->next;
+			ocontext_destroy(ctmp, i);
+		}
+		p->ocontexts[i] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	g = p->genfs;
+	while (g) {
+		cond_resched();
+		kfree(g->fstype);
+		c = g->head;
+		while (c) {
+			ctmp = c;
+			c = c->next;
+			ocontext_destroy(ctmp, OCON_FSUSE);
+		}
+		gtmp = g;
+		g = g->next;
+		kfree(gtmp);
+	}
+	p->genfs = NULL;
+
+	cond_policydb_destroy(p);
+
+	hashtab_map(&p->role_tr, role_tr_destroy, NULL);
+	hashtab_destroy(&p->role_tr);
+
+	for (ra = p->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+		cond_resched();
+		kfree(lra);
+		lra = ra;
+	}
+	kfree(lra);
+
+	hashtab_map(&p->filename_trans, filenametr_destroy, NULL);
+	hashtab_destroy(&p->filename_trans);
+
+	hashtab_map(&p->range_tr, range_tr_destroy, NULL);
+	hashtab_destroy(&p->range_tr);
+
+	if (p->type_attr_map_array) {
+		for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++)
+			ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map_array[i]);
+		kvfree(p->type_attr_map_array);
+	}
+
+	ebitmap_destroy(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&p->neveraudit_map);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the initial SIDs specified in a policy database
+ * structure into a SID table.
+ */
+int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	struct ocontext *head, *c;
+	bool isid_init;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = sidtab_init(s);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  out of memory on SID table init\n");
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	isid_init = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps,
+				    POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT);
+
+	head = p->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
+	for (c = head; c; c = c->next) {
+		u32 sid = c->sid[0];
+		const char *name = security_get_initial_sid_context(sid);
+
+		if (sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  SID 0 was assigned a context.\n");
+			sidtab_destroy(s);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		/* Ignore initial SIDs unused by this kernel. */
+		if (!name)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * Also ignore SECINITSID_INIT if the policy doesn't declare
+		 * support for it
+		 */
+		if (sid == SECINITSID_INIT && !isid_init)
+			continue;
+
+		rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, sid, &c->context[0]);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
+			       name);
+			sidtab_destroy(s);
+			return rc;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If the policy doesn't support the "userspace_initial_context"
+		 * capability, set SECINITSID_INIT to the same context as
+		 * SECINITSID_KERNEL. This ensures the same behavior as before
+		 * the reintroduction of SECINITSID_INIT, where all tasks
+		 * started before policy load would initially get the context
+		 * corresponding to SECINITSID_KERNEL.
+		 */
+		if (sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL && !isid_init) {
+			rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, SECINITSID_INIT,
+						&c->context[0]);
+			if (rc) {
+				pr_err("SELinux:  unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
+				       name);
+				sidtab_destroy(s);
+				return rc;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+bool policydb_class_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, u16 class)
+{
+	if (!class || class > p->p_classes.nprim)
+		return false;
+	if (!p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES][class - 1])
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool policydb_user_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, u32 user)
+{
+	if (!user || user > p->p_users.nprim)
+		return false;
+	if (!p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS][user - 1])
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool policydb_role_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, u32 role)
+{
+	if (!role || role > p->p_roles.nprim)
+		return false;
+	if (!p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES][role - 1])
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool policydb_type_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, u32 type)
+{
+	if (!type || type > p->p_types.nprim)
+		return false;
+	if (!p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES][type - 1])
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool policydb_simpletype_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, u32 type)
+{
+	const struct type_datum *datum;
+
+	if (!type || type > p->p_types.nprim)
+		return false;
+
+	datum = p->type_val_to_struct[type - 1];
+	if (!datum)
+		return false;
+
+	if (datum->attribute)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true if the fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid.  Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+bool policydb_context_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, const struct context *c)
+{
+	const struct role_datum *role;
+	const struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+	if (!c->role || c->role > p->p_roles.nprim)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!c->type || c->type > p->p_types.nprim)
+		return false;
+
+	if (c->role != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+		/*
+		 * Role must be authorized for the type.
+		 */
+		role = p->role_val_to_struct[c->role - 1];
+		if (!role || !ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, c->type - 1))
+			/* role may not be associated with type */
+			return false;
+
+		/*
+		 * User must be authorized for the role.
+		 */
+		usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+		if (!usrdatum)
+			return false;
+
+		if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&usrdatum->roles, c->role - 1))
+			/* user may not be associated with role */
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	if (!mls_context_isvalid(p, c))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a MLS range structure from a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	u32 items;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	items = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: mls:  range overflow\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * items);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: mls:  truncated range\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r->level[0].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (items > 1)
+		r->level[1].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	else
+		r->level[1].sens = r->level[0].sens;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: mls:  error reading low categories\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (items > 1) {
+		rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: mls:  error reading high categories\n");
+			goto bad_high;
+		}
+	} else {
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&r->level[1].cat, &r->level[0].cat);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: mls:  out of memory\n");
+			goto bad_high;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+bad_high:
+	ebitmap_destroy(&r->level[0].cat);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read and validate a security context structure
+ * from a policydb binary representation file.
+ */
+static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c, struct policydb *p,
+				     struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: context truncated\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	c->user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	c->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	c->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+		rc = mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: error reading MLS range of context\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(p, c)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid security context\n");
+		context_destroy(c);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_read functions are used to
+ * read the symbol data from a policy database
+ * binary representation file.
+ */
+
+int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *str;
+
+	if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (size_check(sizeof(char), len, fp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
+	if (!str)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(str, fp, len);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(str);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	str[len] = '\0';
+	*strp = str;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct perm_datum *perdatum;
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	u32 len;
+
+	perdatum = kzalloc_obj(*perdatum);
+	if (!perdatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, perdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	perm_destroy(key, perdatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	u32 i, len, nel;
+	int rc;
+
+	comdatum = kzalloc_obj(*comdatum);
+	if (!comdatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (nel > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
+
+	/* perm_read() reads at least 64 bytes for any valid permission */
+	rc = size_check(2 * sizeof(u32), nel, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, nel);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = perm_read(p, &comdatum->permissions, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	hash_eval(&comdatum->permissions.table, "common_permissions", key);
+
+	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, comdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	common_destroy(key, comdatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void type_set_init(struct type_set *t)
+{
+	ebitmap_init(&t->types);
+	ebitmap_init(&t->negset);
+}
+
+static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	if (ebitmap_read(&t->types, fp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (ebitmap_read(&t->negset, fp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	t->flags = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node **nodep,
+			    u32 ncons, int allowxtarget, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct constraint_node *c, *lc;
+	struct constraint_expr *e, *le;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 i, j, nexpr;
+	int rc, depth;
+
+	lc = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < ncons; i++) {
+		c = kzalloc_obj(*c);
+		if (!c)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		if (lc)
+			lc->next = c;
+		else
+			*nodep = c;
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		c->permissions = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		nexpr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		le = NULL;
+		depth = -1;
+		for (j = 0; j < nexpr; j++) {
+			e = kzalloc_obj(*e);
+			if (!e)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+
+			if (le)
+				le->next = e;
+			else
+				c->expr = e;
+
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 3));
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			e->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			e->attr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+			e->op = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+			switch (e->expr_type) {
+			case CEXPR_NOT:
+				if (depth < 0)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_AND:
+			case CEXPR_OR:
+				if (depth < 1)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				depth--;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_ATTR:
+				if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+					return -EINVAL;
+				depth++;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NAMES:
+				if (!allowxtarget && (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET))
+					return -EINVAL;
+				if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+					return -EINVAL;
+				depth++;
+				rc = ebitmap_read(&e->names, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				if (p->policyvers >=
+				    POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
+					e->type_names = kzalloc_obj(*e->type_names);
+					if (!e->type_names)
+						return -ENOMEM;
+					type_set_init(e->type_names);
+					rc = type_set_read(e->type_names, fp);
+					if (rc)
+						return rc;
+				}
+				break;
+			default:
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			le = e;
+		}
+		if (depth != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		lc = c;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	__le32 buf[6];
+	u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val;
+	int rc;
+
+	cladatum = kzalloc_obj(*cladatum);
+	if (!cladatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 6);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (nel > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
+
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (val > U16_MAX)
+		goto bad;
+	cladatum->value = val;
+
+	/* perm_read() reads at least 64 bytes for any valid permission */
+	rc = size_check(2 * sizeof(u32), nel, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, nel);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	cladatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+	ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (len2) {
+		rc = str_read(&cladatum->comkey, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len2);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		cladatum->comdatum =
+			symtab_search(&p->p_commons, cladatum->comkey);
+		if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  unknown common %s\n",
+			       cladatum->comkey);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = perm_read(p, &cladatum->permissions, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	hash_eval(&cladatum->permissions.table, "class_permissions", key);
+
+	rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS) {
+		/* grab the validatetrans rules */
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+		ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->validatetrans, ncons, 1,
+				      fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		switch (val) {
+		case 0:
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+			cladatum->default_user = val;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		switch (val) {
+		case 0:
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+			cladatum->default_role = val;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+		switch (val) {
+		case 0:
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
+		case DEFAULT_GLBLUB:
+			cladatum->default_range = val;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		switch (val) {
+		case 0:
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+			cladatum->default_type = val;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, cladatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	cls_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid class\n");
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int to_read = 2;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 len;
+
+	role = kzalloc_obj(*role);
+	if (!role)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		to_read = 3;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	role->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		role->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&role->dominates, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&role->types, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (strcmp(key, OBJECT_R) == 0) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: Role %s has wrong value %d\n",
+			       OBJECT_R, role->value);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		rc = 0;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, role);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	role_destroy(key, role, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int to_read = 3;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	u32 len;
+
+	typdatum = kzalloc_obj(*typdatum);
+	if (!typdatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		to_read = 4;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	typdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
+		u32 prop = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+		if (prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY)
+			typdatum->primary = 1;
+		if (prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE)
+			typdatum->attribute = 1;
+
+		typdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	} else {
+		typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	}
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, typdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	type_destroy(key, typdatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a MLS level structure from a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	memset(lp, 0, sizeof(*lp));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: mls: truncated level\n");
+		return rc;
+	}
+	lp->sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: mls:  error reading level categories\n");
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int to_read = 2;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 len;
+
+	usrdatum = kzalloc_obj(*usrdatum);
+	if (!usrdatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		to_read = 3;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	usrdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		usrdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+		rc = mls_read_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+		rc = mls_read_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, usrdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	user_destroy(key, usrdatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	u32 len, val;
+
+	levdatum = kzalloc_obj(*levdatum);
+	if (!levdatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (!val_is_boolean(val))
+		goto bad;
+	levdatum->isalias = val;
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = mls_read_level(&levdatum->level, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, levdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	sens_destroy(key, levdatum, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid sensitivity\n");
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 len, val;
+
+	catdatum = kzalloc_obj(*catdatum);
+	if (!catdatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (!val_is_boolean(val))
+		goto bad;
+	catdatum->isalias = val;
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, catdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	cat_destroy(key, catdatum, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid category\n");
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* clang-format off */
+static int (*const read_f[SYM_NUM])(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s,
+				    struct policy_file *fp) = {
+	common_read,
+	class_read,
+	role_read,
+	type_read,
+	user_read,
+	cond_read_bool,
+	sens_read,
+	cat_read,
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct user_datum *upper, *user;
+	struct policydb *p = datap;
+	int depth = 0;
+
+	upper = user = datum;
+	while (upper->bounds) {
+		struct ebitmap_node *node;
+		u32 bit;
+
+		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: user %s: "
+			       "too deep or looped boundary\n",
+			       (char *)key);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (!policydb_user_isvalid(p, upper->bounds)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: user %s: invalid boundary id %d\n",
+			       (char *) key, upper->bounds);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		upper = p->user_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, node, bit)
+		{
+			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->roles, bit))
+				continue;
+
+			pr_err("SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
+			       "user=%s role=%s bounds=%s\n",
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, user->value - 1),
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, bit),
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, upper->value - 1));
+
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct role_datum *upper, *role;
+	struct policydb *p = datap;
+	int depth = 0;
+
+	upper = role = datum;
+	while (upper->bounds) {
+		struct ebitmap_node *node;
+		u32 bit;
+
+		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: role %s: "
+			       "too deep or looped bounds\n",
+			       (char *)key);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, upper->bounds)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: role %s: invalid boundary id %d\n",
+			       (char *) key, upper->bounds);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		upper = p->role_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, node, bit)
+		{
+			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->types, bit))
+				continue;
+
+			pr_err("SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
+			       "role=%s type=%s bounds=%s\n",
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, role->value - 1),
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, bit),
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, upper->value - 1));
+
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct type_datum *upper;
+	struct policydb *p = datap;
+	int depth = 0;
+
+	upper = datum;
+	while (upper->bounds) {
+		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
+			       "too deep or looped boundary\n",
+			       (char *)key);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, upper->bounds)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: type %s: invalid boundary id %d\n",
+			       (char *) key, upper->bounds);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		upper = p->type_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+		if (upper->attribute) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
+			       "bounded by attribute %s\n",
+			       (char *)key,
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, upper->value - 1));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int policydb_bounds_sanity_check(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(&p->p_users.table, user_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(&p->p_roles.table, role_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(&p->p_types.table, type_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name)
+{
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+
+	cladatum = symtab_search(&p->p_classes, name);
+	if (!cladatum)
+		return 0;
+
+	return cladatum->value;
+}
+
+u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name)
+{
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	struct perm_datum *perdatum = NULL;
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+	if (!tclass || tclass > p->p_classes.nprim)
+		return 0;
+
+	cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	comdatum = cladatum->comdatum;
+	if (comdatum)
+		perdatum = symtab_search(&comdatum->permissions, name);
+	if (!perdatum)
+		perdatum = symtab_search(&cladatum->permissions, name);
+	if (!perdatum)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1U << (perdatum->value - 1);
+}
+
+static int range_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct range_trans *rt = NULL;
+	struct mls_range *r = NULL;
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	u32 i, nel, val;
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	/* we read at least 64 bytes and mls_read_range_helper() 32 bytes
+	 * for any valid range-transition
+	 */
+	rc = size_check(3 * sizeof(u32), nel, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = hashtab_init(&p->range_tr, nel);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		rt = kzalloc_obj(*rt);
+		if (!rt)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			if (val > U16_MAX)
+				goto out;
+			rt->target_class = val;
+		} else
+			rt->target_class = p->process_class;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) ||
+		    !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) ||
+		    !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class))
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		r = kzalloc_obj(*r);
+		if (!r)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = mls_read_range_helper(r, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) {
+			pr_warn("SELinux:  rangetrans:  invalid range\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		rc = hashtab_insert(&p->range_tr, rt, r, rangetr_key_params);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rt = NULL;
+		r = NULL;
+	}
+	hash_eval(&p->range_tr, "rangetr", NULL);
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	kfree(rt);
+	kfree(r);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid range\n");
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct filename_trans_key key, *ft = NULL;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *last, *datum = NULL;
+	char *name = NULL;
+	u32 len, stype, otype, val;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	int rc;
+
+	/* length of the path component string */
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	/* path component string */
+	rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, stype))
+		goto out;
+	key.ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, key.ttype))
+		goto out;
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	if (val > U16_MAX || !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val))
+		goto out;
+	key.tclass = val;
+	key.name = name;
+
+	otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	if (!policydb_simpletype_isvalid(p, otype))
+		goto out;
+
+	last = NULL;
+	datum = policydb_filenametr_search(p, &key);
+	while (datum) {
+		if (unlikely(ebitmap_get_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1))) {
+			/* conflicting/duplicate rules are ignored */
+			datum = NULL;
+			rc = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (likely(datum->otype == otype))
+			break;
+		last = datum;
+		datum = datum->next;
+	}
+	if (!datum) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		datum = kmalloc_obj(*datum);
+		if (!datum)
+			goto out;
+
+		ebitmap_init(&datum->stypes);
+		datum->otype = otype;
+		datum->next = NULL;
+
+		if (unlikely(last)) {
+			last->next = datum;
+		} else {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			ft = kmemdup(&key, sizeof(key), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!ft)
+				goto out;
+
+			rc = hashtab_insert(&p->filename_trans, ft, datum,
+					    filenametr_key_params);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			name = NULL;
+
+			rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes,
+					     key.ttype, 1);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	}
+	kfree(name);
+	return ebitmap_set_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1, 1);
+
+out:
+	kfree(ft);
+	kfree(name);
+	kfree(datum);
+
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid compat filename transition\n");
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct filename_trans_key *ft = NULL;
+	struct filename_trans_datum **dst, *datum, *first = NULL;
+	char *name = NULL;
+	u32 len, ttype, ndatum, i, val;
+	u16 tclass;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	int rc;
+
+	/* length of the path component string */
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	/* path component string */
+	rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, ttype))
+		goto out;
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (val > U16_MAX || !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val))
+		goto out;
+	tclass = val;
+
+	ndatum = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	if (ndatum == 0) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  Filename transition key with no datum\n");
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dst = &first;
+	for (i = 0; i < ndatum; i++) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		datum = kmalloc_obj(*datum);
+		if (!datum)
+			goto out;
+
+		datum->next = NULL;
+		*dst = datum;
+
+		/* ebitmap_read() will at least init the bitmap */
+		rc = ebitmap_read(&datum->stypes, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		datum->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!policydb_simpletype_isvalid(p, datum->otype))
+			goto out;
+
+		dst = &datum->next;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	ft = kmalloc_obj(*ft);
+	if (!ft)
+		goto out;
+
+	ft->ttype = ttype;
+	ft->tclass = tclass;
+	ft->name = name;
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(&p->filename_trans, ft, first,
+			    filenametr_key_params);
+	if (rc == -EEXIST)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  Duplicate filename transition key\n");
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	return ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype, 1);
+
+out:
+	kfree(ft);
+	kfree(name);
+	while (first) {
+		datum = first;
+		first = first->next;
+
+		ebitmap_destroy(&datum->stypes);
+		kfree(datum);
+	}
+
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid filename transition\n");
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	u32 nel, i;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS) {
+		p->compat_filename_trans_count = nel;
+
+		rc = hashtab_init(&p->filename_trans, (1 << 11));
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+			rc = filename_trans_read_helper_compat(p, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	} else {
+		rc = hashtab_init(&p->filename_trans, nel);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+			rc = filename_trans_read_helper(p, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	}
+	hash_eval(&p->filename_trans, "filenametr", NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2, val;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	struct ocontext *l, *c;
+	struct ocontext *newc = NULL;
+	struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs;
+	struct genfs *newgenfs = NULL;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		newgenfs = kzalloc_obj(*newgenfs);
+		if (!newgenfs)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = str_read(&newgenfs->fstype, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
+		     genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
+				pr_err("SELinux:  dup genfs fstype %s\n",
+				       newgenfs->fstype);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+		newgenfs->next = genfs;
+		if (genfs_p)
+			genfs_p->next = newgenfs;
+		else
+			p->genfs = newgenfs;
+		genfs = newgenfs;
+		newgenfs = NULL;
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) {
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			newc = kzalloc_obj(*newc);
+			if (!newc)
+				goto out;
+
+			rc = str_read(&newc->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			if (val > U16_MAX || (val != 0 && !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val)))
+				goto out;
+			newc->v.sclass = val;
+			rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p,
+						       fp);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+
+			for (l = NULL, c = genfs->head; c; l = c, c = c->next) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
+				    (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
+				     newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
+					pr_err("SELinux:  dup genfs entry (%s,%s)\n",
+					       genfs->fstype, c->u.name);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				len = strlen(newc->u.name);
+				len2 = strlen(c->u.name);
+				if (len > len2)
+					break;
+			}
+
+			newc->next = c;
+			if (l)
+				l->next = newc;
+			else
+				genfs->head = newc;
+			newc = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	if (newgenfs) {
+		kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
+		kfree(newgenfs);
+	}
+	ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
+
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid genfs\n");
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
+			 const struct policydb_compat_info *info, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int i;
+	u32 j, nel, len, val;
+	__be64 prefixbuf[1];
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	struct ocontext *l, *c;
+	u32 nodebuf[8];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+		l = NULL;
+		for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			c = kzalloc_obj(*c);
+			if (!c)
+				goto out;
+			if (l)
+				l->next = c;
+			else
+				p->ocontexts[i] = c;
+			l = c;
+
+			switch (i) {
+			case OCON_ISID:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FS:
+			case OCON_NETIF:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+				rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				if (i == OCON_FS)
+					pr_warn("SELinux:  void and deprecated fs ocon %s\n",
+						c->u.name);
+
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1],
+							       p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_PORT:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				if (val > U8_MAX)
+					goto out;
+				c->u.port.protocol = val;
+				val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+				if (val > U16_MAX)
+					goto out;
+				c->u.port.low_port = val;
+				val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+				if (val > U16_MAX)
+					goto out;
+				c->u.port.high_port = val;
+				if (c->u.port.low_port == 0 ||
+				    c->u.port.low_port > c->u.port.high_port)
+					goto out;
+
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE:
+				rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */
+				c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FSUSE:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				/* Determined at runtime, not in policy DB. */
+				if (c->v.behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+					goto out;
+				if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX)
+					goto out;
+
+				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+				rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE6: {
+				int k;
+
+				rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+					c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k];
+				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+					c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k + 4];
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			}
+			case OCON_IBPKEY: {
+				u32 pkey_lo, pkey_hi;
+
+				rc = next_entry(prefixbuf, fp, sizeof(u64));
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				/* we need to have subnet_prefix in CPU order */
+				c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix =
+					be64_to_cpu(prefixbuf[0]);
+
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				pkey_lo = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				pkey_hi = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+				if (pkey_lo > U16_MAX || pkey_hi > U16_MAX) {
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+					goto out;
+				}
+
+				c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey = pkey_lo;
+				c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey = pkey_hi;
+
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			}
+			case OCON_IBENDPORT: {
+				u32 port;
+
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+				rc = str_read(&c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
+					      GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+				if (port > U8_MAX || port == 0) {
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+					goto out;
+				}
+
+				c->u.ibendport.port = port;
+
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			} /* end case */
+			} /* end switch */
+		}
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid ocon\n");
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the configuration data from a policy database binary
+ * representation file into a policy database structure.
+ */
+int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct role_allow *ra, *lra;
+	struct role_trans_key *rtk = NULL;
+	struct role_trans_datum *rtd = NULL;
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	u32 i, j, len, nprim, nel, perm, val;
+
+	char *policydb_str;
+	const struct policydb_compat_info *info;
+
+	policydb_init(p);
+
+	/* Read the magic number and string length. */
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (le32_to_cpu(buf[0]) != POLICYDB_MAGIC) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb magic number 0x%x does "
+		       "not match expected magic number 0x%x\n",
+		       le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_MAGIC);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	if (len != strlen(POLICYDB_STRING)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb string length %d does not "
+		       "match expected length %zu\n",
+		       len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = str_read(&policydb_str, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc) {
+		if (rc == -ENOMEM) {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  unable to allocate memory for policydb string of length %d\n",
+			       len);
+		} else {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  truncated policydb string identifier\n");
+		}
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb string %s does not match "
+		       "my string %s\n",
+		       policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
+		kfree(policydb_str);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	/* Done with policydb_str. */
+	kfree(policydb_str);
+	policydb_str = NULL;
+
+	/* Read the version and table sizes. */
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	p->policyvers = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN ||
+	    p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb version %d does not match "
+		       "my version range %d-%d\n",
+		       le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN,
+		       POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	if ((le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS)) {
+		p->mls_enabled = 1;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: security policydb version %d "
+			       "(MLS) not backwards compatible\n",
+			       p->policyvers);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	}
+	p->reject_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & REJECT_UNKNOWN);
+	p->allow_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & ALLOW_UNKNOWN);
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
+		rc = ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
+		rc = ebitmap_read(&p->permissive_map, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEVERAUDIT) {
+		rc = ebitmap_read(&p->neveraudit_map, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
+	if (!info) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to find policy compat info "
+		       "for version %d\n",
+		       p->policyvers);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (le32_to_cpu(buf[2]) != info->sym_num ||
+	    le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
+		       "not match mine (%d,%d)\n",
+		       le32_to_cpu(buf[2]), le32_to_cpu(buf[3]), info->sym_num,
+		       info->ocon_num);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < info->sym_num; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+		nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+		/* every read_f() implementation reads at least 128 bytes
+		 * for any valid entry
+		 */
+		rc = size_check(4 * sizeof(u32), nel, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = symtab_init(&p->symtab[i], nel);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (i == SYM_ROLES) {
+			rc = roles_init(p);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
+		for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+			rc = read_f[i](p, &p->symtab[i], fp);
+			if (rc)
+				goto bad;
+		}
+
+		p->symtab[i].nprim = nprim;
+	}
+
+	rc = policydb_index(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	p->process_class = string_to_security_class(p, "process");
+	if (!p->process_class) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: process class is required, not defined in policy\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = avtab_read(&p->te_avtab, fp, p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules");
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL) {
+		rc = cond_read_list(p, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	/* we read at least 96 bytes for any valid role-transition */
+	rc = size_check(3 * sizeof(u32), nel, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = hashtab_init(&p->role_tr, nel);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		rtk = kmalloc_obj(*rtk);
+		if (!rtk)
+			goto bad;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		rtd = kmalloc_obj(*rtd);
+		if (!rtd)
+			goto bad;
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+
+		rtk->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		rtk->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		rtd->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto bad;
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			if (val > U16_MAX)
+				goto bad;
+			rtk->tclass = val;
+		} else
+			rtk->tclass = p->process_class;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, rtk->role) ||
+		    !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rtk->type) ||
+		    !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rtk->tclass) ||
+		    !policydb_role_isvalid(p, rtd->new_role))
+			goto bad;
+
+		rc = hashtab_insert(&p->role_tr, rtk, rtd, roletr_key_params);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+
+		rtk = NULL;
+		rtd = NULL;
+	}
+
+	hash_eval(&p->role_tr, "roletr", NULL);
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	lra = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		ra = kzalloc_obj(*ra);
+		if (!ra)
+			goto bad;
+		if (lra)
+			lra->next = ra;
+		else
+			p->role_allow = ra;
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		ra->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		ra->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->role) ||
+		    !policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->new_role))
+			goto bad;
+		lra = ra;
+	}
+
+	rc = filename_trans_read(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	perm = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "transition");
+	if (!perm) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: process transition permission is required, not defined in policy\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	p->process_trans_perms = perm;
+	perm = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "dyntransition");
+	if (!perm) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: process dyntransition permission is required, not defined in policy\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	p->process_trans_perms |= perm;
+
+	rc = ocontext_read(p, info, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = genfs_read(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = range_read(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	p->type_attr_map_array = kvzalloc_objs(*p->type_attr_map_array,
+					       p->p_types.nprim);
+	if (!p->type_attr_map_array)
+		goto bad;
+
+	/* just in case ebitmap_init() becomes more than just a memset(0): */
+	for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++)
+		ebitmap_init(&p->type_attr_map_array[i]);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+		struct ebitmap *e = &p->type_attr_map_array[i];
+
+		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+			rc = ebitmap_read(e, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				goto bad;
+		}
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (ebitmap_get_highest_set_bit(e) >= p->p_types.nprim)
+			goto bad;
+
+		/* add the type itself as the degenerate case */
+		rc = ebitmap_set_bit(e, i, 1);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = policydb_bounds_sanity_check(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	kfree(rtk);
+	kfree(rtd);
+	policydb_destroy(p);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a MLS level structure to a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_write_level(struct mls_level *l, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(l->sens);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&l->cat, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a MLS range structure to a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_write_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	size_t items;
+	int rc, eq;
+
+	eq = mls_level_eq(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]);
+
+	if (eq)
+		items = 2;
+	else
+		items = 3;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(items - 1);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[0].sens);
+	if (!eq)
+		buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[1].sens);
+
+	BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (!eq) {
+		rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(levdatum->isalias);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = mls_write_level(&levdatum->level, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->value);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->isalias);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_trans_write_one(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	struct role_trans_key *rtk = key;
+	struct role_trans_datum *rtd = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	int rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rtk->role);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(rtk->type);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(rtd->new_role);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rtk->tclass);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_trans_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct policy_data pd = { .p = p, .fp = fp };
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->role_tr.nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return hashtab_map(&p->role_tr, role_trans_write_one, &pd);
+}
+
+static int role_allow_write(struct role_allow *r, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct role_allow *ra;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	size_t nel;
+	int rc;
+
+	nel = 0;
+	for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next)
+		nel++;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ra->role);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ra->new_role);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a security context structure
+ * to a policydb binary representation file.
+ */
+static int context_write(struct policydb *p, struct context *c, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->user);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->role);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->type);
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = mls_write_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_write functions are used to
+ * write the symbol data to a policy database
+ * binary representation file.
+ */
+
+static int perm_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct perm_datum *perdatum = datum;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(perdatum->value);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct common_datum *comdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->value);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.nprim);
+	buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.table.nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(&comdatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_set_write(struct type_set *t, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+
+	if (ebitmap_write(&t->types, fp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (ebitmap_write(&t->negset, fp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(t->flags);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node,
+			     struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct constraint_node *c;
+	struct constraint_expr *e;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 nel;
+	int rc;
+
+	for (c = node; c; c = c->next) {
+		nel = 0;
+		for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next)
+			nel++;
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->permissions);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next) {
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(e->expr_type);
+			buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(e->attr);
+			buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(e->op);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			switch (e->expr_type) {
+			case CEXPR_NAMES:
+				rc = ebitmap_write(&e->names, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				if (p->policyvers >=
+				    POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
+					rc = type_set_write(e->type_names, fp);
+					if (rc)
+						return rc;
+				}
+				break;
+			default:
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	struct constraint_node *c;
+	__le32 buf[6];
+	u32 ncons;
+	size_t len, len2;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	if (cladatum->comkey)
+		len2 = strlen(cladatum->comkey);
+	else
+		len2 = 0;
+
+	ncons = 0;
+	for (c = cladatum->constraints; c; c = c->next)
+		ncons++;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len2);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->value);
+	buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.nprim);
+	buf[4] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.table.nel);
+	buf[5] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 6, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (cladatum->comkey) {
+		rc = put_entry(cladatum->comkey, 1, len2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(&cladatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->constraints, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* write out the validatetrans rule */
+	ncons = 0;
+	for (c = cladatum->validatetrans; c; c = c->next)
+		ncons++;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->validatetrans, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_user);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_role);
+		buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_range);
+
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 3, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_type);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct role_datum *role = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	size_t items, len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	items = 0;
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->value);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->bounds);
+
+	BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&role->dominates, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&role->types, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	int rc;
+	size_t items, len;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	items = 0;
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->value);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
+		u32 properties = 0;
+
+		if (typdatum->primary)
+			properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY;
+
+		if (typdatum->attribute)
+			properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(properties);
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->bounds);
+	} else {
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->primary);
+	}
+	BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	size_t items, len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	items = 0;
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->value);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->bounds);
+	BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = mls_write_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = mls_write_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* clang-format off */
+static int (*const write_f[SYM_NUM])(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
+	common_write,
+	class_write,
+	role_write,
+	type_write,
+	user_write,
+	cond_write_bool,
+	sens_write,
+	cat_write,
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p,
+			  const struct policydb_compat_info *info,
+			  struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	unsigned int i, j;
+	int rc;
+	size_t nel, len;
+	__be64 prefixbuf[1];
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 nodebuf[8];
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+		nel = 0;
+		for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next)
+			nel++;
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next) {
+			switch (i) {
+			case OCON_ISID:
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->sid[0]);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FS:
+			case OCON_NETIF:
+				len = strlen(c->u.name);
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[1], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_PORT:
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.protocol);
+				buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.low_port);
+				buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.high_port);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE:
+				nodebuf[0] = c->u.node.addr; /* network order */
+				nodebuf[1] = c->u.node.mask; /* network order */
+				rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FSUSE:
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.behavior);
+				len = strlen(c->u.name);
+				buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE6:
+				for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+					nodebuf[j] =
+						c->u.node6.addr
+							[j]; /* network order */
+				for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+					nodebuf[j + 4] =
+						c->u.node6.mask
+							[j]; /* network order */
+				rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 8, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_IBPKEY:
+				/* subnet_prefix is in CPU order */
+				prefixbuf[0] =
+					cpu_to_be64(c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix);
+
+				rc = put_entry(prefixbuf, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey);
+				buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey);
+
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_IBENDPORT:
+				len = strlen(c->u.ibendport.dev_name);
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+				buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibendport.port);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = put_entry(c->u.ibendport.dev_name, 1, len,
+					       fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int genfs_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct genfs *genfs;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	size_t len;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	len = 0;
+	for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next)
+		len++;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+		len = strlen(genfs->fstype);
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		rc = put_entry(genfs->fstype, 1, len, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		len = 0;
+		for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next)
+			len++;
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+			len = strlen(c->u.name);
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.sclass);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	struct range_trans *rt = key;
+	struct mls_range *r = data;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	int rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->source_type);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_type);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_class);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	rc = mls_write_range_helper(r, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+	struct policy_data pd;
+
+	pd.p = p;
+	pd.fp = fp;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->range_tr.nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* actually write all of the entries */
+	rc = hashtab_map(&p->range_tr, range_write_helper, &pd);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int filename_write_helper_compat(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+	struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *datum = data;
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+	struct policy_file *fp = ptr;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	int rc;
+	u32 bit, len = strlen(ft->name);
+
+	do {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&datum->stypes, node, bit)
+		{
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(bit + 1);
+			buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
+			buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
+			buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(datum->otype);
+
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
+
+		datum = datum->next;
+	} while (unlikely(datum));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+	struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *datum;
+	struct policy_file *fp = ptr;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	int rc;
+	u32 ndatum, len = strlen(ft->name);
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	ndatum = 0;
+	datum = data;
+	do {
+		ndatum++;
+		datum = datum->next;
+	} while (unlikely(datum));
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ndatum);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	datum = data;
+	do {
+		rc = ebitmap_write(&datum->stypes, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(datum->otype);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		datum = datum->next;
+	} while (unlikely(datum));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->compat_filename_trans_count);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		rc = hashtab_map(&p->filename_trans,
+				 filename_write_helper_compat, fp);
+	} else {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->filename_trans.nel);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		rc = hashtab_map(&p->filename_trans, filename_write_helper, fp);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the configuration data in a policy database
+ * structure to a policy database binary representation
+ * file.
+ */
+int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	unsigned int num_syms;
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	u32 config, i;
+	size_t len;
+	const struct policydb_compat_info *info;
+
+	/*
+	 * refuse to write policy older than compressed avtab
+	 * to simplify the writer.  There are other tests dropped
+	 * since we assume this throughout the writer code.  Be
+	 * careful if you ever try to remove this restriction
+	 */
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d."
+		       "  Because it is less than version %d\n",
+		       p->policyvers, POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	config = 0;
+	if (p->mls_enabled)
+		config |= POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS;
+
+	if (p->reject_unknown)
+		config |= REJECT_UNKNOWN;
+	if (p->allow_unknown)
+		config |= ALLOW_UNKNOWN;
+
+	/* Write the magic number and string identifiers. */
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(POLICYDB_MAGIC);
+	len = strlen(POLICYDB_STRING);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = put_entry(POLICYDB_STRING, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Write the version, config, and table sizes. */
+	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
+	if (!info) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
+		       "version %d\n",
+		       p->policyvers);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->policyvers);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(config);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(info->sym_num);
+	buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(info->ocon_num);
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
+		rc = ebitmap_write(&p->policycaps, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
+		rc = ebitmap_write(&p->permissive_map, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEVERAUDIT) {
+		rc = ebitmap_write(&p->neveraudit_map, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	num_syms = info->sym_num;
+	for (i = 0; i < num_syms; i++) {
+		struct policy_data pd;
+
+		pd.fp = fp;
+		pd.p = p;
+
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].nprim);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].table.nel);
+
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		rc = hashtab_map(&p->symtab[i].table, write_f[i], &pd);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = avtab_write(p, &p->te_avtab, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = cond_write_list(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = role_trans_write(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = role_allow_write(p->role_allow, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = filename_trans_write(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ocontext_write(p, info, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = genfs_write(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = range_write(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+		struct ebitmap *e = &p->type_attr_map_array[i];
+
+		rc = ebitmap_write(e, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..974180b2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * A policy database (policydb) specifies the
+ * configuration data for the security policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *          Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *          Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and
+ *          Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *          Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+#define _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "mls_types.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "constraint.h"
+
+/*
+ * A datum type is defined for each kind of symbol
+ * in the configuration data:  individual permissions,
+ * common prefixes for access vectors, classes,
+ * users, roles, types, sensitivities, categories, etc.
+ */
+
+/* Permission attributes */
+struct perm_datum {
+	u32 value; /* permission bit + 1 */
+};
+
+/* Attributes of a common prefix for access vectors */
+struct common_datum {
+	u32 value; /* internal common value */
+	struct symtab permissions; /* common permissions */
+};
+
+/* Class attributes */
+struct class_datum {
+	u16 value; /* class value */
+	char *comkey; /* common name */
+	struct common_datum *comdatum; /* common datum */
+	struct symtab permissions; /* class-specific permission symbol table */
+	struct constraint_node *constraints; /* constraints on class perms */
+	struct constraint_node *validatetrans; /* special transition rules */
+/* Options how a new object user, role, and type should be decided */
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE 1
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET 2
+	char default_user;
+	char default_role;
+	char default_type;
+/* Options how a new object range should be decided */
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW	1
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH	2
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH 3
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW	4
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH	5
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH 6
+#define DEFAULT_GLBLUB		7
+	char default_range;
+};
+
+/* Role attributes */
+struct role_datum {
+	u32 value; /* internal role value */
+	u32 bounds; /* boundary of role, 0 for none */
+	struct ebitmap dominates; /* set of roles dominated by this role */
+	struct ebitmap types; /* set of authorized types for role */
+};
+
+struct role_trans_key {
+	u32 role; /* current role */
+	u32 type; /* program executable type, or new object type */
+	u16 tclass; /* process class, or new object class */
+};
+
+struct role_trans_datum {
+	u32 new_role; /* new role */
+};
+
+struct filename_trans_key {
+	u32 ttype; /* parent dir context */
+	u16 tclass; /* class of new object */
+	const char *name; /* last path component */
+};
+
+struct filename_trans_datum {
+	struct ebitmap stypes; /* bitmap of source types for this otype */
+	u32 otype; /* resulting type of new object */
+	struct filename_trans_datum *next; /* record for next otype*/
+};
+
+struct role_allow {
+	u32 role; /* current role */
+	u32 new_role; /* new role */
+	struct role_allow *next;
+};
+
+/* Type attributes */
+struct type_datum {
+	u32 value; /* internal type value */
+	u32 bounds; /* boundary of type, 0 for none */
+	/* internally unused, only forwarded via policydb_write() */
+	unsigned char primary; /* primary name? */
+	unsigned char attribute; /* attribute ?*/
+};
+
+/* User attributes */
+struct user_datum {
+	u32 value; /* internal user value */
+	u32 bounds; /* bounds of user, 0 for none */
+	struct ebitmap roles; /* set of authorized roles for user */
+	struct mls_range range; /* MLS range (min - max) for user */
+	struct mls_level dfltlevel; /* default login MLS level for user */
+};
+
+/* Sensitivity attributes */
+struct level_datum {
+	struct mls_level level; /* sensitivity and associated categories */
+	unsigned char isalias; /* is this sensitivity an alias for another? */
+};
+
+/* Category attributes */
+struct cat_datum {
+	u32 value; /* internal category bit + 1 */
+	unsigned char isalias; /* is this category an alias for another? */
+};
+
+struct range_trans {
+	u32 source_type;
+	u32 target_type;
+	u16 target_class;
+};
+
+/* Boolean data type */
+struct cond_bool_datum {
+	u32 value; /* internal type value */
+	int state;
+};
+
+struct cond_node;
+
+/*
+ * type set preserves data needed to determine constraint info from
+ * policy source. This is not used by the kernel policy but allows
+ * utilities such as audit2allow to determine constraint denials.
+ */
+struct type_set {
+	struct ebitmap types;
+	struct ebitmap negset;
+	u32 flags;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The configuration data includes security contexts for
+ * initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems, TCP and UDP port numbers,
+ * network interfaces, and nodes.  This structure stores the
+ * relevant data for one such entry.  Entries of the same kind
+ * (e.g. all initial SIDs) are linked together into a list.
+ */
+struct ocontext {
+	union {
+		char *name; /* name of initial SID, fs, netif, fstype, path */
+		struct {
+			u8 protocol;
+			u16 low_port;
+			u16 high_port;
+		} port; /* TCP or UDP port information */
+		struct {
+			u32 addr;
+			u32 mask;
+		} node; /* node information */
+		struct {
+			u32 addr[4];
+			u32 mask[4];
+		} node6; /* IPv6 node information */
+		struct {
+			u64 subnet_prefix;
+			u16 low_pkey;
+			u16 high_pkey;
+		} ibpkey;
+		struct {
+			char *dev_name;
+			u8 port;
+		} ibendport;
+	} u;
+	union {
+		u16 sclass; /* security class for genfs (can be 0 for wildcard) */
+		u32 behavior; /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
+	} v;
+	struct context context[2]; /* security context(s) */
+	u32 sid[2]; /* SID(s) */
+	struct ocontext *next;
+};
+
+struct genfs {
+	char *fstype;
+	struct ocontext *head;
+	struct genfs *next;
+};
+
+/* symbol table array indices */
+#define SYM_COMMONS 0
+#define SYM_CLASSES 1
+#define SYM_ROLES   2
+#define SYM_TYPES   3
+#define SYM_USERS   4
+#define SYM_BOOLS   5
+#define SYM_LEVELS  6
+#define SYM_CATS    7
+#define SYM_NUM	    8
+
+/* object context array indices */
+#define OCON_ISID      0 /* initial SIDs */
+#define OCON_FS	       1 /* unlabeled file systems (deprecated) */
+#define OCON_PORT      2 /* TCP and UDP port numbers */
+#define OCON_NETIF     3 /* network interfaces */
+#define OCON_NODE      4 /* nodes */
+#define OCON_FSUSE     5 /* fs_use */
+#define OCON_NODE6     6 /* IPv6 nodes */
+#define OCON_IBPKEY    7 /* Infiniband PKeys */
+#define OCON_IBENDPORT 8 /* Infiniband end ports */
+#define OCON_NUM       9
+
+/* The policy database */
+struct policydb {
+	int mls_enabled;
+
+	/* symbol tables */
+	struct symtab symtab[SYM_NUM];
+#define p_commons symtab[SYM_COMMONS]
+#define p_classes symtab[SYM_CLASSES]
+#define p_roles	  symtab[SYM_ROLES]
+#define p_types	  symtab[SYM_TYPES]
+#define p_users	  symtab[SYM_USERS]
+#define p_bools	  symtab[SYM_BOOLS]
+#define p_levels  symtab[SYM_LEVELS]
+#define p_cats	  symtab[SYM_CATS]
+
+	/* symbol names indexed by (value - 1) */
+	char **sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
+
+	/* class, role, and user attributes indexed by (value - 1) */
+	struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
+	struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct;
+	struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct;
+	struct type_datum **type_val_to_struct;
+
+	/* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */
+	struct avtab te_avtab;
+
+	/* role transitions */
+	struct hashtab role_tr;
+
+	/* file transitions with the last path component */
+	/* quickly exclude lookups when parent ttype has no rules */
+	struct ebitmap filename_trans_ttypes;
+	/* actual set of filename_trans rules */
+	struct hashtab filename_trans;
+	/* only used if policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS */
+	u32 compat_filename_trans_count;
+
+	/* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
+	struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
+	/* type enforcement conditional access vectors and transitions */
+	struct avtab te_cond_avtab;
+	/* array indexing te_cond_avtab by conditional */
+	struct cond_node *cond_list;
+	u32 cond_list_len;
+
+	/* role allows */
+	struct role_allow *role_allow;
+
+	/* security contexts of initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems,
+	   TCP or UDP port numbers, network interfaces and nodes */
+	struct ocontext *ocontexts[OCON_NUM];
+
+	/* security contexts for files in filesystems that cannot support
+	   a persistent label mapping or use another
+	   fixed labeling behavior. */
+	struct genfs *genfs;
+
+	/* range transitions table (range_trans_key -> mls_range) */
+	struct hashtab range_tr;
+
+	/* type -> attribute reverse mapping */
+	struct ebitmap *type_attr_map_array;
+
+	struct ebitmap policycaps;
+
+	struct ebitmap permissive_map;
+
+	struct ebitmap neveraudit_map;
+
+	/* length of this policy when it was loaded */
+	size_t len;
+
+	unsigned int policyvers;
+
+	unsigned int reject_unknown : 1;
+	unsigned int allow_unknown : 1;
+
+	u16 process_class;
+	u32 process_trans_perms;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+struct policy_file {
+	char *data;
+	size_t len;
+};
+
+extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
+extern int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s);
+extern bool policydb_context_isvalid(const struct policydb *p,
+				     const struct context *c);
+extern bool policydb_class_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, u16 class);
+extern bool policydb_type_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, u32 type);
+extern bool policydb_simpletype_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, u32 type);
+extern bool policydb_role_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, u32 role);
+extern bool policydb_user_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, u32 user);
+extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
+extern int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
+
+extern struct filename_trans_datum *
+policydb_filenametr_search(struct policydb *p, struct filename_trans_key *key);
+
+extern struct mls_range *policydb_rangetr_search(struct policydb *p,
+						 struct range_trans *key);
+
+extern struct role_trans_datum *
+policydb_roletr_search(struct policydb *p, struct role_trans_key *key);
+
+#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS 1
+
+/* the config flags related to unknown classes/perms are bits 2 and 3 */
+#define REJECT_UNKNOWN 0x00000002
+#define ALLOW_UNKNOWN  0x00000004
+
+#define OBJECT_R     "object_r"
+#define OBJECT_R_VAL 1
+
+#define POLICYDB_MAGIC	SELINUX_MAGIC
+#define POLICYDB_STRING "SE Linux"
+
+struct policy_data {
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct policy_file *fp;
+};
+
+static inline int size_check(size_t bytes, size_t num,
+			     const struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(bytes, num, &len)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (unlikely(len > fp->len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
+{
+	if (bytes > fp->len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(buf, fp->data, bytes);
+	fp->data += bytes;
+	fp->len -= bytes;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, size_t num,
+			    struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(bytes, num, &len)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (len > fp->len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(fp->data, buf, len);
+	fp->data += len;
+	fp->len -= len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline const char *sym_name(const struct policydb *p, unsigned int sym_num,
+			     unsigned int element_nr)
+{
+	return p->sym_val_to_name[sym_num][element_nr];
+}
+
+static inline bool val_is_boolean(u32 value)
+{
+	return value == 0 || value == 1;
+}
+
+extern int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len);
+
+extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
+extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
+
+#define pr_warn_once_policyload(policy, fmt, ...)    \
+	do {                                         \
+		static const void *prev_policy__;    \
+		if (prev_policy__ != policy) {       \
+			pr_warn(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
+			prev_policy__ = policy;      \
+		}                                    \
+	} while (0)
+
+#endif /* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2d828548f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3946 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ *	     James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *	Support for context based audit filters.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ *	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ *      Added support for NetLabel
+ *      Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
+ *
+ *  Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ *  Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
+ *
+ *  Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "services.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "policycap_names.h"
+#include "ima.h"
+
+struct selinux_policy_convert_data {
+	struct convert_context_args args;
+	struct sidtab_convert_params sidtab_params;
+};
+
+/* Forward declaration. */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
+				    struct context *context,
+				    char **scontext,
+				    u32 *scontext_len);
+
+static int sidtab_entry_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
+				  struct sidtab *sidtab,
+				  struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+				  char **scontext,
+				  u32 *scontext_len);
+
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				      struct context *scontext,
+				      struct context *tcontext,
+				      u16 tclass,
+				      struct av_decision *avd,
+				      struct extended_perms *xperms);
+
+static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
+			       const struct security_class_mapping *map,
+			       struct selinux_map *out_map)
+{
+	u16 i, j;
+	bool print_unknown_handle = false;
+
+	/* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
+	if (!map)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	i = 0;
+	while (map[i].name)
+		i++;
+
+	/* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
+	out_map->mapping = kzalloc_objs(*out_map->mapping, ++i, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!out_map->mapping)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Store the raw class and permission values */
+	j = 0;
+	while (map[j].name) {
+		const struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
+		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j;
+		u16 k;
+
+		/* An empty class string skips ahead */
+		if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
+			p_out->num_perms = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
+		if (!p_out->value) {
+			pr_info("SELinux:  Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+			       p_in->name);
+			if (pol->reject_unknown)
+				goto err;
+			p_out->num_perms = 0;
+			print_unknown_handle = true;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		k = 0;
+		while (p_in->perms[k]) {
+			/* An empty permission string skips ahead */
+			if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
+				k++;
+				continue;
+			}
+			p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
+							    p_in->perms[k]);
+			if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
+				pr_info("SELinux:  Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+				       p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
+				if (pol->reject_unknown)
+					goto err;
+				print_unknown_handle = true;
+			}
+
+			k++;
+		}
+		p_out->num_perms = k;
+	}
+
+	if (print_unknown_handle)
+		pr_info("SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
+		       pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
+
+	out_map->size = i;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	kfree(out_map->mapping);
+	out_map->mapping = NULL;
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get real, policy values from mapped values
+ */
+
+static u16 unmap_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 tclass)
+{
+	if (tclass < map->size)
+		return map->mapping[tclass].value;
+
+	return tclass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
+ */
+static u16 map_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 pol_value)
+{
+	u16 i;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < map->size; i++) {
+		if (map->mapping[i].value == pol_value)
+			return i;
+	}
+
+	return SECCLASS_NULL;
+}
+
+static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
+			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+			 int allow_unknown)
+{
+	if (tclass < map->size) {
+		struct selinux_mapping *mapping = &map->mapping[tclass];
+		unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms;
+		u32 result;
+
+		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+			if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i])
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
+			if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
+		}
+		avd->allowed = result;
+
+		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
+			if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i])
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
+		avd->auditallow = result;
+
+		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+			if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i])
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
+			if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
+		 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
+		 * should audit that denial
+		 */
+		for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
+			result |= (u32)1<<i;
+		avd->auditdeny = result;
+	}
+}
+
+int security_mls_enabled(void)
+{
+	int mls_enabled;
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	mls_enabled = policy->policydb.mls_enabled;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return mls_enabled;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
+ * when it is applied to the specified source and target
+ * security contexts.
+ *
+ * xcontext is a special beast...  It is used by the validatetrans rules
+ * only.  For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
+ * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
+ * of the process performing the transition.  All other callers of
+ * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
+ */
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct policydb *policydb,
+				struct context *scontext,
+				struct context *tcontext,
+				struct context *xcontext,
+				struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
+{
+	u32 val1, val2;
+	struct context *c;
+	struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
+	struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
+	struct constraint_expr *e;
+	int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+	int sp = -1;
+
+	for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
+		switch (e->expr_type) {
+		case CEXPR_NOT:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 0);
+			s[sp] = !s[sp];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_AND:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_OR:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_ATTR:
+			if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+				return 0;
+			switch (e->attr) {
+			case CEXPR_USER:
+				val1 = scontext->user;
+				val2 = tcontext->user;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_TYPE:
+				val1 = scontext->type;
+				val2 = tcontext->type;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_ROLE:
+				val1 = scontext->role;
+				val2 = tcontext->role;
+				r1 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+				r2 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+				switch (e->op) {
+				case CEXPR_DOM:
+					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+								  val2 - 1);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+								  val1 - 1);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+					s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+								    val2 - 1) &&
+						   !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+								    val1 - 1));
+					continue;
+				default:
+					break;
+				}
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_L1L2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L1H2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_H1L2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_H1H2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L1H1:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L2H2:
+				l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+mls_ops:
+				switch (e->op) {
+				case CEXPR_EQ:
+					s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_NEQ:
+					s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_DOM:
+					s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+					s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+					s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
+					continue;
+				default:
+					BUG();
+					return 0;
+				}
+				break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
+				break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_NAMES:
+			if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+				return 0;
+			c = scontext;
+			if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
+				c = tcontext;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
+				c = xcontext;
+				if (!c) {
+					BUG();
+					return 0;
+				}
+			}
+			if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
+				val1 = c->user;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
+				val1 = c->role;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
+				val1 = c->type;
+			else {
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+				break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			BUG();
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	BUG_ON(sp != 0);
+	return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+	char **permission_names = args;
+
+	permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				    struct context *scontext,
+				    struct context *tcontext,
+				    u16 tclass,
+				    u32 permissions,
+				    const char *reason)
+{
+	struct common_datum *common_dat;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	const char *tclass_name;
+	char *scontext_name = NULL;
+	char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+	char *permission_names[SEL_VEC_MAX];
+	int index;
+	u32 length;
+	bool need_comma = false;
+
+	if (!permissions)
+		return;
+
+	tclass_name = sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
+	tclass_dat = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+	/* init permission_names */
+	if (common_dat &&
+	    hashtab_map(&common_dat->permissions.table,
+			dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (hashtab_map(&tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+			dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext,
+				     &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext,
+				     &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* audit a message */
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+			     GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+	if (!ab)
+		goto out;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+			 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+			 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+	for (index = 0; index < SEL_VEC_MAX; index++) {
+		u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+		if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+				 need_comma ? "," : "",
+				 permission_names[index]
+				 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+		need_comma = true;
+	}
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+	/* release scontext/tcontext */
+	kfree(tcontext_name);
+	kfree(scontext_name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
+ * on boundary constraint.
+ */
+static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				     struct context *scontext,
+				     struct context *tcontext,
+				     u16 tclass,
+				     struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct context lo_scontext;
+	struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext;
+	struct av_decision lo_avd;
+	struct type_datum *source;
+	struct type_datum *target;
+	u32 masked = 0;
+
+	source = policydb->type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
+	BUG_ON(!source);
+
+	if (!source->bounds)
+		return;
+
+	target = policydb->type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
+	BUG_ON(!target);
+
+	memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+
+	memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
+	lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
+
+	if (target->bounds) {
+		memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
+		lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
+		tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
+	}
+
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, &lo_scontext,
+				  tcontextp,
+				  tclass,
+				  &lo_avd,
+				  NULL);
+
+	masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+
+	if (likely(!masked))
+		return;		/* no masked permission */
+
+	/* mask violated permissions */
+	avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+
+	/* audit masked permissions */
+	security_dump_masked_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
+				tclass, masked, "bounds");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Flag which drivers have permissions and which base permissions are covered.
+ */
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
+		struct extended_perms *xperms,
+		struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	switch (node->datum.u.xperms->specified) {
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER:
+		xperms->base_perms |= AVC_EXT_IOCTL;
+		/* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
+			xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+		break;
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION:
+		xperms->base_perms |= AVC_EXT_IOCTL;
+		/* if allowing permissions within a driver */
+		security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
+					node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
+		break;
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_NLMSG:
+		xperms->base_perms |= AVC_EXT_NLMSG;
+		/* if allowing permissions within a driver */
+		security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
+					node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	xperms->len = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
+ * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
+ */
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				      struct context *scontext,
+				      struct context *tcontext,
+				      u16 tclass,
+				      struct av_decision *avd,
+				      struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+	struct constraint_node *constraint;
+	struct role_allow *ra;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+	struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+	struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+	unsigned int i, j;
+
+	avd->allowed = 0;
+	avd->auditallow = 0;
+	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+	if (xperms) {
+		memset(xperms, 0, sizeof(*xperms));
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux:  Invalid class %u\n", tclass);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	/*
+	 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
+	 * this permission check, then use it.
+	 */
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
+	sattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[scontext->type - 1];
+	tattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[tcontext->type - 1];
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+			avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+			avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+						      &avkey);
+			     node;
+			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
+				if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+					avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
+				else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+					avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+				else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+					avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+				else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+					services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
+			}
+
+			/* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
+			cond_compute_av(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
+					avd, xperms);
+
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
+	 * the MLS policy).
+	 */
+	constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
+	while (constraint) {
+		if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
+		    !constraint_expr_eval(policydb, scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+					  constraint->expr)) {
+			avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
+		}
+		constraint = constraint->next;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If checking process transition permission and the
+	 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
+	 * pair.
+	 */
+	if (tclass == policydb->process_class &&
+	    (avd->allowed & policydb->process_trans_perms) &&
+	    scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
+		for (ra = policydb->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+			if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
+			    tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (!ra)
+			avd->allowed &= ~policydb->process_trans_perms;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the given source and target types have boundary
+	 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
+	 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
+	 *
+	 * Infinite recursion is avoided via a depth pre-check in
+	 * type_bounds_sanity_check().
+	 */
+	type_attribute_bounds_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
+				 tclass, avd);
+}
+
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+					struct sidtab_entry *oentry,
+					struct sidtab_entry *nentry,
+					struct sidtab_entry *tentry,
+					u16 tclass)
+{
+	struct policydb *p = &policy->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+	char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
+	u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
+
+	if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, oentry, &o, &olen))
+		goto out;
+	if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, nentry, &n, &nlen))
+		goto out;
+	if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen))
+		goto out;
+	audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+		  "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
+		  " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+		  o, n, t, sym_name(p, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+out:
+	kfree(o);
+	kfree(n);
+	kfree(t);
+
+	if (!enforcing_enabled())
+		return 0;
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+					  u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct sidtab_entry *oentry;
+	struct sidtab_entry *nentry;
+	struct sidtab_entry *tentry;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+	struct constraint_node *constraint;
+	u16 tclass;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	if (!user)
+		tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+	else
+		tclass = orig_tclass;
+
+	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	oentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, oldsid);
+	if (!oentry) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, oldsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	nentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, newsid);
+	if (!nentry) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, newsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, tasksid);
+	if (!tentry) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, tasksid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
+	while (constraint) {
+		if (!constraint_expr_eval(policydb, &oentry->context,
+					  &nentry->context, &tentry->context,
+					  constraint->expr)) {
+			if (user)
+				rc = -EPERM;
+			else
+				rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(policy,
+								oentry,
+								nentry,
+								tentry,
+								tclass);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		constraint = constraint->next;
+	}
+
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				      u16 tclass)
+{
+	return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+					      tclass, true);
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				 u16 orig_tclass)
+{
+	return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+					      orig_tclass, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
+ * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
+ * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
+ * Otherwise, it returns error code.
+ *
+ * @oldsid : current security identifier
+ * @newsid : destinated security identifier
+ */
+int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct sidtab_entry *old_entry, *new_entry;
+	struct type_datum *type;
+	u32 index;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	old_entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, old_sid);
+	if (!old_entry) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+		       __func__, old_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	new_entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, new_sid);
+	if (!new_entry) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+		       __func__, new_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+	/* type/domain unchanged */
+	if (old_entry->context.type == new_entry->context.type)
+		goto out;
+
+	index = new_entry->context.type;
+	while (true) {
+		type = policydb->type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
+		BUG_ON(!type);
+
+		/* not bounded anymore */
+		rc = -EPERM;
+		if (!type->bounds)
+			break;
+
+		/* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
+		rc = 0;
+		if (type->bounds == old_entry->context.type)
+			break;
+
+		index = type->bounds;
+	}
+
+	if (rc) {
+		char *old_name = NULL;
+		char *new_name = NULL;
+		u32 length;
+
+		if (!sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, old_entry,
+					    &old_name, &length) &&
+		    !sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, new_entry,
+					    &new_name, &length)) {
+			audit_log(audit_context(),
+				  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+				  "op=security_bounded_transition "
+				  "seresult=denied "
+				  "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
+				  old_name, new_name);
+		}
+		kfree(new_name);
+		kfree(old_name);
+	}
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void avd_init(struct selinux_policy *policy, struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	avd->allowed = 0;
+	avd->auditallow = 0;
+	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+	if (policy)
+		avd->seqno = policy->latest_granting;
+	else
+		avd->seqno = 0;
+	avd->flags = 0;
+}
+
+static void update_xperms_extended_data(u8 specified,
+					const struct extended_perms_data *from,
+					struct extended_perms_data *xp_data)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	switch (specified) {
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER:
+		memset(xp_data->p, 0xff, sizeof(xp_data->p));
+		break;
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION:
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_NLMSG:
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xp_data->p); i++)
+			xp_data->p[i] |= from->p[i];
+		break;
+	}
+
+}
+
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+					struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+	u16 specified;
+
+	switch (node->datum.u.xperms->specified) {
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION:
+		if (xpermd->base_perm != AVC_EXT_IOCTL ||
+		    xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
+			return;
+		break;
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER:
+		if (xpermd->base_perm != AVC_EXT_IOCTL ||
+		    !security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
+					 xpermd->driver))
+			return;
+		break;
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_NLMSG:
+		if (xpermd->base_perm != AVC_EXT_NLMSG ||
+		    xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
+			return;
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_warn_once(
+			"SELinux: unknown extended permission (%u) will be ignored\n",
+			node->datum.u.xperms->specified);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	specified = node->key.specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED | AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+	if (specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+		xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
+		update_xperms_extended_data(node->datum.u.xperms->specified,
+					    &node->datum.u.xperms->perms,
+					    xpermd->allowed);
+	} else if (specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+		xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
+		update_xperms_extended_data(node->datum.u.xperms->specified,
+					    &node->datum.u.xperms->perms,
+					    xpermd->auditallow);
+	} else if (specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+		xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
+		update_xperms_extended_data(node->datum.u.xperms->specified,
+					    &node->datum.u.xperms->perms,
+					    xpermd->dontaudit);
+	} else {
+		pr_warn_once("SELinux: unknown specified key (%u)\n",
+			     node->key.specified);
+	}
+}
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
+				      u32 tsid,
+				      u16 orig_tclass,
+				      u8 driver,
+				      u8 base_perm,
+				      struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	u16 tclass;
+	struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+	struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+	unsigned int i, j;
+
+	xpermd->base_perm = base_perm;
+	xpermd->driver = driver;
+	xpermd->used = 0;
+	memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+	memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+	memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		goto allow;
+
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+			goto allow;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
+	sattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[scontext->type - 1];
+	tattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[tcontext->type - 1];
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+			avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+			avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+						      &avkey);
+			     node;
+			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
+				services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+
+			cond_compute_xperms(&policydb->te_cond_avtab,
+						&avkey, xpermd);
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return;
+allow:
+	memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @orig_tclass: target security class
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @xperms: extended permissions
+ *
+ * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
+ * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
+ */
+void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
+			 u32 tsid,
+			 u16 orig_tclass,
+			 struct av_decision *avd,
+			 struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	u16 tclass;
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	avd_init(policy, avd);
+	xperms->len = 0;
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		goto allow;
+
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* permissive domain? */
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
+		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+	/* neveraudit domain? */
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->neveraudit_map, scontext->type))
+		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT;
+
+	/* both permissive and neveraudit => allow */
+	if (avd->flags == (AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE|AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT))
+		goto allow;
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+			goto allow;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+				  xperms);
+	map_decision(&policy->map, orig_tclass, avd,
+		     policydb->allow_unknown);
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT)
+		avd->auditallow = avd->auditdeny = 0;
+	return;
+allow:
+	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
+			      u32 tsid,
+			      u16 tclass,
+			      struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	avd_init(policy, avd);
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		goto allow;
+
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* permissive domain? */
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
+		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+	/* neveraudit domain? */
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->neveraudit_map, scontext->type))
+		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT;
+
+	/* both permissive and neveraudit => allow */
+	if (avd->flags == (AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE|AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT))
+		goto allow;
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+			goto allow;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+				  NULL);
+ out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT)
+		avd->auditallow = avd->auditdeny = 0;
+	return;
+allow:
+	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
+ * allocated string of the correct size.  Set `*scontext'
+ * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
+ * the length of the string.
+ */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,
+				    struct context *context,
+				    char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	char *scontextp;
+
+	if (scontext)
+		*scontext = NULL;
+	*scontext_len = 0;
+
+	if (context->len) {
+		*scontext_len = context->len;
+		if (scontext) {
+			*scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!(*scontext))
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Compute the size of the context. */
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(p, context);
+
+	if (!scontext)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
+	scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!scontextp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	*scontext = scontextp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
+	 */
+	scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
+		sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
+		sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
+		sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
+
+	mls_sid_to_context(p, context, &scontextp);
+
+	*scontextp = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sidtab_entry_to_string(struct policydb *p,
+				  struct sidtab *sidtab,
+				  struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+				  char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	int rc = sidtab_sid2str_get(sidtab, entry, scontext, scontext_len);
+
+	if (rc != -ENOENT)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(p, &entry->context, scontext,
+				      scontext_len);
+	if (!rc && scontext)
+		sidtab_sid2str_put(sidtab, entry, *scontext, *scontext_len);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+
+int security_sidtab_hash_stats(char *page)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  called before initial load_policy\n",
+		       __func__);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	rc = sidtab_hash_stats(policy->sidtab, page);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
+{
+	if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
+		return NULL;
+	return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
+}
+
+static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
+					u32 *scontext_len, int force,
+					int only_invalid)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (scontext)
+		*scontext = NULL;
+	*scontext_len  = 0;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
+			char *scontextp;
+			const char *s;
+
+			/*
+			 * Before the policy is loaded, translate
+			 * SECINITSID_INIT to "kernel", because systemd and
+			 * libselinux < 2.6 take a getcon_raw() result that is
+			 * both non-null and not "kernel" to mean that a policy
+			 * is already loaded.
+			 */
+			if (sid == SECINITSID_INIT)
+				sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+
+			s = initial_sid_to_string[sid];
+			if (!s)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			*scontext_len = strlen(s) + 1;
+			if (!scontext)
+				return 0;
+			scontextp = kmemdup(s, *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!scontextp)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			*scontext = scontextp;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  called before initial "
+		       "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	if (force)
+		entry = sidtab_search_entry_force(sidtab, sid);
+	else
+		entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, sid);
+	if (!entry) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, sid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	if (only_invalid && !entry->context.len)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	rc = sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, entry, scontext,
+				    scontext_len);
+
+out_unlock:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size.  Set @scontext
+ * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext,
+					    scontext_len, 0, 0);
+}
+
+int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid,
+				  char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext,
+					    scontext_len, 1, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context_inval - Obtain a context for a given SID if it
+ *                                 is invalid.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size, but only if the
+ * context is invalid in the current policy.  Set @scontext to point to
+ * this string (or NULL if the context is valid) and set @scontext_len to
+ * the length of the string (or 0 if the context is valid).
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context_inval(u32 sid,
+				  char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext,
+					    scontext_len, 1, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Caveat:  Mutates scontext.
+ */
+static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
+				    struct sidtab *sidtabp,
+				    char *scontext,
+				    struct context *ctx,
+				    u32 def_sid)
+{
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	context_init(ctx);
+
+	/* Parse the security context. */
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	scontextp = scontext;
+
+	/* Extract the user. */
+	p = scontextp;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+
+	if (*p == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	usrdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_users, scontextp);
+	if (!usrdatum)
+		goto out;
+
+	ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+	/* Extract role. */
+	scontextp = p;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+
+	if (*p == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	role = symtab_search(&pol->p_roles, scontextp);
+	if (!role)
+		goto out;
+	ctx->role = role->value;
+
+	/* Extract type. */
+	scontextp = p;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+	oldc = *p;
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	typdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_types, scontextp);
+	if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
+		goto out;
+
+	ctx->type = typdatum->value;
+
+	rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
+		goto out;
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	if (rc)
+		context_destroy(ctx);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+					u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
+					int force)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
+	struct context context;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/* An empty security context is never valid. */
+	if (!scontext_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */
+	scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags);
+	if (!scontext2)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		u32 i;
+
+		for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+			const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
+
+			if (s && !strcmp(s, scontext2)) {
+				*sid = i;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		*sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	if (force) {
+		/* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
+		if (!str)
+			goto out;
+	}
+retry:
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+	rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2,
+				      &context, def_sid);
+	if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
+		context.str = str;
+		context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
+		str = NULL;
+	} else if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid);
+	if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		if (context.str) {
+			str = context.str;
+			context.str = NULL;
+		}
+		context_destroy(&context);
+		goto retry;
+	}
+	context_destroy(&context);
+out_unlock:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+out:
+	kfree(scontext2);
+	kfree(str);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @gfp: context for the allocation
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
+			    gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+					    sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
+}
+
+int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext),
+				       sid, gfp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
+ * falling back to specified default if needed.
+ *
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
+ * @gfp_flags: the allocator get-free-page (GFP) flags
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
+ * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
+ * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
+ * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+				    u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+					    sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
+}
+
+int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+				  u32 *sid)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+					    sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
+}
+
+static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct selinux_policy *policy,
+	struct sidtab_entry *sentry,
+	struct sidtab_entry *tentry,
+	u16 tclass,
+	struct context *newcontext)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+	char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
+	u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+	if (sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, sentry, &s, &slen))
+		goto out;
+	if (sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen))
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen))
+		goto out;
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+	if (!ab)
+		goto out;
+	audit_log_format(ab,
+			 "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=");
+	/* no need to record the NUL with untrusted strings */
+	audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n, nlen - 1);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+			 s, t, sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+	kfree(s);
+	kfree(t);
+	kfree(n);
+	if (!enforcing_enabled())
+		return 0;
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
+				  struct context *newcontext,
+				  u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
+				  const char *objname)
+{
+	struct filename_trans_key ft;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *datum;
+
+	/*
+	 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
+	 * like /dev or /var/run.  This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
+	 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
+	 */
+	if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
+		return;
+
+	ft.ttype = ttype;
+	ft.tclass = tclass;
+	ft.name = objname;
+
+	datum = policydb_filenametr_search(policydb, &ft);
+	while (datum) {
+		if (ebitmap_get_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1)) {
+			newcontext->type = datum->otype;
+			return;
+		}
+		datum = datum->next;
+	}
+}
+
+static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
+				u32 tsid,
+				u16 orig_tclass,
+				u16 specified,
+				const char *objname,
+				u32 *out_sid,
+				bool kern)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	struct context *scontext, *tcontext, newcontext;
+	struct sidtab_entry *sentry, *tentry;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_node *avnode, *node;
+	u16 tclass;
+	int rc = 0;
+	bool sock;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		switch (orig_tclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
+			*out_sid = ssid;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*out_sid = tsid;
+			break;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+retry:
+	cladatum = NULL;
+	context_init(&newcontext);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+
+	if (kern) {
+		tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
+	} else {
+		tclass = orig_tclass;
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&policy->map,
+							  tclass));
+	}
+
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	sentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!sentry) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	tentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tentry) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	scontext = &sentry->context;
+	tcontext = &tentry->context;
+
+	if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim)
+		cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	/* Set the user identity. */
+	switch (specified) {
+	case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+		if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+			newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+		} else {
+			/* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
+			/* Use the process user identity. */
+			newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+		/* Use the related object owner. */
+		newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the role to default values. */
+	if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+		newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+		newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
+	} else {
+		if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || sock)
+			newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+		else
+			newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the type.
+	 * Look for a type transition/member/change rule.
+	 */
+	avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avkey.specified = specified;
+	avnode = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
+
+	/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
+	if (!avnode) {
+		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
+		for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
+			if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
+				avnode = node;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* If a permanent rule is found, use the type from
+	 * the type transition/member/change rule. Otherwise,
+	 * set the type to its default values.
+	 */
+	if (avnode) {
+		newcontext.type = avnode->datum.u.data;
+	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+		newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+		newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+	} else {
+		if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || sock) {
+			/* Use the type of process. */
+			newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+		} else {
+			/* Use the type of the related object. */
+			newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
+	if (objname)
+		filename_compute_type(policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
+				      tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
+
+	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
+	if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+		/* Look for a role transition rule. */
+		struct role_trans_datum *rtd;
+		struct role_trans_key rtk = {
+			.role = scontext->role,
+			.type = tcontext->type,
+			.tclass = tclass,
+		};
+
+		rtd = policydb_roletr_search(policydb, &rtk);
+		if (rtd)
+			newcontext.role = rtd->new_role;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the MLS attributes.
+	   This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
+	rc = mls_compute_sid(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+			     &newcontext, sock);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcontext)) {
+		rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(policy, sentry,
+							tentry, tclass,
+							&newcontext);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
+	if (context_equal(scontext, &newcontext))
+		*out_sid = ssid;
+	else if (context_equal(tcontext, &newcontext))
+		*out_sid = tsid;
+	else {
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+		if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			context_destroy(&newcontext);
+			goto retry;
+		}
+	}
+out_unlock:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	context_destroy(&newcontext);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @qstr: object name
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
+ * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+				    qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
+}
+
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+				    objname, out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
+ * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass,
+			u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
+				    out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
+ * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass,
+			u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
+				    out_sid, false);
+}
+
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct policydb *policydb,
+	struct context *context)
+{
+	char *s;
+	u32 len;
+
+	if (enforcing_enabled())
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) {
+		pr_warn("SELinux:  Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
+			s);
+		kfree(s);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * services_convert_context - Convert a security context across policies.
+ * @args: populated convert_context_args struct
+ * @oldc: original context
+ * @newc: converted context
+ * @gfp_flags: allocation flags
+ *
+ * Convert the values in the security context structure @oldc from the values
+ * specified in the policy @args->oldp to the values specified in the policy
+ * @args->newp, storing the new context in @newc, and verifying that the
+ * context is valid under the new policy.
+ */
+int services_convert_context(struct convert_context_args *args,
+			     struct context *oldc, struct context *newc,
+			     gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+	struct ocontext *oc;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	char *s;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (oldc->str) {
+		s = kstrdup(oldc->str, gfp_flags);
+		if (!s)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s, newc, SECSID_NULL);
+		if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+			/*
+			 * Retain string representation for later mapping.
+			 *
+			 * IMPORTANT: We need to copy the contents of oldc->str
+			 * back into s again because string_to_context_struct()
+			 * may have garbled it.
+			 */
+			memcpy(s, oldc->str, oldc->len);
+			context_init(newc);
+			newc->str = s;
+			newc->len = oldc->len;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		kfree(s);
+		if (rc) {
+			/* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
+			pr_err("SELinux:   Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
+			       oldc->str, -rc);
+			return rc;
+		}
+		pr_info("SELinux:  Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
+			oldc->str);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	context_init(newc);
+
+	/* Convert the user. */
+	usrdatum = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_users,
+				 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, oldc->user - 1));
+	if (!usrdatum)
+		goto bad;
+	newc->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+	/* Convert the role. */
+	role = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_roles,
+			     sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, oldc->role - 1));
+	if (!role)
+		goto bad;
+	newc->role = role->value;
+
+	/* Convert the type. */
+	typdatum = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_types,
+				 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, oldc->type - 1));
+	if (!typdatum)
+		goto bad;
+	newc->type = typdatum->value;
+
+	/* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
+	if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+		rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, oldc, newc);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	} else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+		/*
+		 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
+		 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
+		 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
+		 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
+		 * initial SIDs.
+		 */
+		oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
+		while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+			oc = oc->next;
+		if (!oc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  unable to look up"
+				" the initial SIDs list\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		rc = mls_range_set(newc, &oc->context[0].range);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, newc)) {
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->oldp, oldc);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, oldc, &s, &len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	context_destroy(newc);
+	newc->str = s;
+	newc->len = len;
+	pr_info("SELinux:  Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
+		newc->str);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_policy *policy)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	unsigned int i;
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+	p = &policy->policydb;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_state.policycap); i++)
+		WRITE_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[i],
+			ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
+		pr_info("SELinux:  policy capability %s=%d\n",
+			selinux_policycap_names[i],
+			ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
+
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&p->policycaps, node, i) {
+		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
+			pr_info("SELinux:  unknown policy capability %u\n",
+				i);
+	}
+}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy,
+				struct selinux_policy *newpolicy);
+
+static void selinux_policy_free(struct selinux_policy *policy)
+{
+	if (!policy)
+		return;
+
+	sidtab_destroy(policy->sidtab);
+	kfree(policy->map.mapping);
+	policydb_destroy(&policy->policydb);
+	kfree(policy->sidtab);
+	kfree(policy);
+}
+
+static void selinux_policy_cond_free(struct selinux_policy *policy)
+{
+	cond_policydb_destroy_dup(&policy->policydb);
+	kfree(policy);
+}
+
+void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy;
+
+	oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+					lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+	sidtab_cancel_convert(oldpolicy->sidtab);
+	selinux_policy_free(load_state->policy);
+	kfree(load_state->convert_data);
+}
+
+static void selinux_notify_policy_change(u32 seqno)
+{
+	/* Flush external caches and notify userspace of policy load */
+	avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+	selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+	selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+	selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
+	selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
+	selinux_ima_measure_state_locked();
+}
+
+void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy, *newpolicy = load_state->policy;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	u32 seqno;
+
+	oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+					lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+	/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
+	if (oldpolicy) {
+		if (oldpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled)
+			pr_info("SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
+		else if (!oldpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled)
+			pr_info("SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
+	}
+
+	/* Set latest granting seqno for new policy. */
+	if (oldpolicy)
+		newpolicy->latest_granting = oldpolicy->latest_granting + 1;
+	else
+		newpolicy->latest_granting = 1;
+	seqno = newpolicy->latest_granting;
+
+	/* Install the new policy. */
+	if (oldpolicy) {
+		sidtab_freeze_begin(oldpolicy->sidtab, &flags);
+		rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy);
+		sidtab_freeze_end(oldpolicy->sidtab, &flags);
+	} else {
+		rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy);
+	}
+
+	/* Load the policycaps from the new policy */
+	security_load_policycaps(newpolicy);
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		/*
+		 * After first policy load, the security server is
+		 * marked as initialized and ready to handle requests and
+		 * any objects created prior to policy load are then labeled.
+		 */
+		selinux_mark_initialized();
+		selinux_complete_init();
+	}
+
+	/* Free the old policy */
+	synchronize_rcu();
+	selinux_policy_free(oldpolicy);
+	kfree(load_state->convert_data);
+
+	/* Notify others of the policy change */
+	selinux_notify_policy_change(seqno);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ * @load_state: policy load state
+ *
+ * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
+ * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
+ * This function will flush the access vector cache after
+ * loading the new policy.
+ */
+int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len,
+			 struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, *oldpolicy;
+	struct selinux_policy_convert_data *convert_data;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
+
+	newpolicy = kzalloc_obj(*newpolicy);
+	if (!newpolicy)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	newpolicy->sidtab = kzalloc_obj(*newpolicy->sidtab);
+	if (!newpolicy->sidtab) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_policy;
+	}
+
+	rc = policydb_read(&newpolicy->policydb, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err_sidtab;
+
+	newpolicy->policydb.len = len;
+	rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicy->policydb, secclass_map,
+				&newpolicy->map);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err_policydb;
+
+	rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicy->policydb, newpolicy->sidtab);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
+		goto err_mapping;
+	}
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		/* First policy load, so no need to preserve state from old policy */
+		load_state->policy = newpolicy;
+		load_state->convert_data = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+					lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+	/* Preserve active boolean values from the old policy */
+	rc = security_preserve_bools(oldpolicy, newpolicy);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to preserve booleans\n");
+		goto err_free_isids;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
+	 * in the new SID table.
+	 */
+
+	convert_data = kmalloc_obj(*convert_data);
+	if (!convert_data) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_free_isids;
+	}
+
+	convert_data->args.oldp = &oldpolicy->policydb;
+	convert_data->args.newp = &newpolicy->policydb;
+
+	convert_data->sidtab_params.args = &convert_data->args;
+	convert_data->sidtab_params.target = newpolicy->sidtab;
+
+	rc = sidtab_convert(oldpolicy->sidtab, &convert_data->sidtab_params);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to convert the internal"
+			" representation of contexts in the new SID"
+			" table\n");
+		goto err_free_convert_data;
+	}
+
+	load_state->policy = newpolicy;
+	load_state->convert_data = convert_data;
+	return 0;
+
+err_free_convert_data:
+	kfree(convert_data);
+err_free_isids:
+	sidtab_destroy(newpolicy->sidtab);
+err_mapping:
+	kfree(newpolicy->map.mapping);
+err_policydb:
+	policydb_destroy(&newpolicy->policydb);
+err_sidtab:
+	kfree(newpolicy->sidtab);
+err_policy:
+	kfree(newpolicy);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ocontext_to_sid - Helper to safely get sid for an ocontext
+ * @sidtab: SID table
+ * @c: ocontext structure
+ * @index: index of the context entry (0 or 1)
+ * @out_sid: pointer to the resulting SID value
+ *
+ * For all ocontexts except OCON_ISID the SID fields are populated
+ * on-demand when needed. Since updating the SID value is an SMP-sensitive
+ * operation, this helper must be used to do that safely.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller
+ * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer!
+ */
+static int ocontext_to_sid(struct sidtab *sidtab, struct ocontext *c,
+			   size_t index, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	/* Ensure the associated sidtab entry is visible to this thread. */
+	sid = smp_load_acquire(&c->sid[index]);
+	if (!sid) {
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[index], &sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		/*
+		 * Ensure the new sidtab entry is visible to other threads
+		 * when they see the SID.
+		 */
+		smp_store_release(&c->sid[index], sid);
+	}
+	*out_sid = sid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
+ * @protocol: protocol number
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+retry:
+	rc = 0;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+	while (c) {
+		if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
+		    c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
+		    c->u.port.high_port >= port)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+		if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+	}
+
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_pkey_sid - Obtain the SID for a pkey.
+ * @subnet_prefix: Subnet Prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+retry:
+	rc = 0;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
+	while (c) {
+		if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
+		    c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
+		    c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
+			break;
+
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+		if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	} else
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface.
+ * @dev_name: device name
+ * @port_num: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+retry:
+	rc = 0;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
+	while (c) {
+		if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
+		    !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
+			     dev_name,
+			     IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX))
+			break;
+
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+		if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	} else
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
+ * @name: interface name
+ * @if_sid: interface SID
+ */
+int security_netif_sid(const char *name, u32 *if_sid)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	int rc;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	bool wildcard_support;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+retry:
+	rc = 0;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+	wildcard_support = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->policycaps, POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD);
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+	while (c) {
+		if (wildcard_support) {
+			if (match_wildcard(c->u.name, name))
+				break;
+		} else {
+			if (strcmp(c->u.name, name) == 0)
+				break;
+		}
+
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, if_sid);
+		if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	} else
+		*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static bool match_ipv6_addrmask(const u32 input[4], const u32 addr[4], const u32 mask[4])
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i]))
+			return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @addrp: address
+ * @addrlen: address length in bytes
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
+		      const void *addrp,
+		      u32 addrlen,
+		      u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	int rc;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+retry:
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	switch (domain) {
+	case AF_INET: {
+		u32 addr;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
+			goto out;
+
+		addr = *((const u32 *)addrp);
+
+		c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+		while (c) {
+			if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
+				break;
+			c = c->next;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case AF_INET6:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
+			goto out;
+		c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+		while (c) {
+			if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
+						c->u.node6.mask))
+				break;
+			c = c->next;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		rc = 0;
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+		if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @policy: policy
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @orig_sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
+ * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
+ * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller
+ * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer!
+ */
+static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+				       const char *fstype,
+				       const char *path,
+				       u16 orig_sclass,
+				       u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+	u16 sclass;
+	struct genfs *genfs;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int cmp = 0;
+	bool wildcard;
+
+	while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
+		path++;
+
+	sclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_sclass);
+	*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+	for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+		cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (!genfs || cmp)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	wildcard = ebitmap_get_bit(&policy->policydb.policycaps,
+				   POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD);
+	for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+		if (!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) {
+			if (wildcard) {
+				if (match_wildcard(c->u.name, path))
+					break;
+			} else {
+				size_t len = strlen(c->u.name);
+
+				if ((strncmp(c->u.name, path, len)) == 0)
+					break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!c)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	return ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @orig_sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
+ * it afterward.
+ */
+int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+		       const char *path,
+		       u16 orig_sclass,
+		       u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	int retval;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	do {
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+		retval = __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, path,
+					      orig_sclass, sid);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+	} while (retval == -ESTALE);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+int selinux_policy_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+			const char *fstype,
+			const char *path,
+			u16 orig_sclass,
+			u32 *sid)
+{
+	/* no lock required, policy is not yet accessible by other threads */
+	return __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
+ * @sb: superblock in question
+ */
+int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	int rc;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+	const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+		sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+retry:
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+	while (c) {
+		if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
+		rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, &sbsec->sid);
+		if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		rc = __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, "/",
+					SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
+		if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		if (rc) {
+			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+			rc = 0;
+		} else {
+			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+		       u32 *len, char ***names, int **values)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	u32 i;
+	int rc;
+
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+	*names = NULL;
+	*values = NULL;
+
+	rc = 0;
+	*len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
+	if (!*len)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	*names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*names)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	*values = kzalloc_objs(int, *len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*values)
+		goto err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
+		(*values)[i] = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		(*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+				      GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!(*names)[i])
+			goto err;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+err:
+	if (*names) {
+		for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
+			kfree((*names)[i]);
+		kfree(*names);
+	}
+	kfree(*values);
+	*len = 0;
+	*names = NULL;
+	*values = NULL;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+
+int security_set_bools(u32 len, const int *values)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, *oldpolicy;
+	int rc;
+	u32 i, seqno = 0;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+					lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+	/* Consistency check on number of booleans, should never fail */
+	if (WARN_ON(len != oldpolicy->policydb.p_bools.nprim))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	newpolicy = kmemdup(oldpolicy, sizeof(*newpolicy), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!newpolicy)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * Deep copy only the parts of the policydb that might be
+	 * modified as a result of changing booleans.
+	 */
+	rc = cond_policydb_dup(&newpolicy->policydb, &oldpolicy->policydb);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(newpolicy);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	/* Update the boolean states in the copy */
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		int new_state = !!values[i];
+		int old_state = newpolicy->policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+
+		if (new_state != old_state) {
+			audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC,
+				AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
+				sym_name(&newpolicy->policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+				new_state,
+				old_state,
+				from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+				audit_get_sessionid(current));
+			newpolicy->policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = new_state;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Re-evaluate the conditional rules in the copy */
+	evaluate_cond_nodes(&newpolicy->policydb);
+
+	/* Set latest granting seqno for new policy */
+	newpolicy->latest_granting = oldpolicy->latest_granting + 1;
+	seqno = newpolicy->latest_granting;
+
+	/* Install the new policy */
+	rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy);
+
+	/*
+	 * Free the conditional portions of the old policydb
+	 * that were copied for the new policy, and the oldpolicy
+	 * structure itself but not what it references.
+	 */
+	synchronize_rcu();
+	selinux_policy_cond_free(oldpolicy);
+
+	/* Notify others of the policy change */
+	selinux_notify_policy_change(seqno);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_bool_value(u32 index)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	int rc;
+	u32 len;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+	rc = -EFAULT;
+	len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
+	if (index >= len)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy,
+				struct selinux_policy *newpolicy)
+{
+	int rc, *bvalues = NULL;
+	char **bnames = NULL;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+	u32 i, nbools = 0;
+
+	rc = security_get_bools(oldpolicy, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+	for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
+		booldatum = symtab_search(&newpolicy->policydb.p_bools,
+					bnames[i]);
+		if (booldatum)
+			booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
+	}
+	evaluate_cond_nodes(&newpolicy->policydb);
+
+out:
+	if (bnames) {
+		for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
+			kfree(bnames[i]);
+	}
+	kfree(bnames);
+	kfree(bvalues);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
+ * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
+ */
+int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct context *context1;
+	struct context *context2;
+	struct context newcon;
+	char *s;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		*new_sid = sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+retry:
+	rc = 0;
+	context_init(&newcon);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	if (!policydb->mls_enabled) {
+		*new_sid = sid;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
+	if (!context1) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, sid);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid);
+	if (!context2) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, mls_sid);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	newcon.user = context1->user;
+	newcon.role = context1->role;
+	newcon.type = context1->type;
+	rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcon)) {
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(policydb,
+							&newcon);
+		if (rc) {
+			if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, &newcon, &s,
+						      &len)) {
+				struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+				ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+						     GFP_ATOMIC,
+						     AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+				audit_log_format(ab,
+						 "op=security_sid_mls_copy invalid_context=");
+				/* don't record NUL with untrusted strings */
+				audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, s, len - 1);
+				audit_log_end(ab);
+				kfree(s);
+			}
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+	}
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
+	if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		context_destroy(&newcon);
+		goto retry;
+	}
+out_unlock:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	context_destroy(&newcon);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
+ * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
+ * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
+ * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
+ * @peer_sid: network peer sid
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
+ * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
+ * returns zero.  Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
+ * returns a negative value.  A table summarizing the behavior is below:
+ *
+ *                                 | function return |      @sid
+ *   ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
+ *   no peer labels                |        0        |    SECSID_NULL
+ *   single peer label             |        0        |    <peer_label>
+ *   multiple, consistent labels   |        0        |    <peer_label>
+ *   multiple, inconsistent labels |    -<errno>     |    SECSID_NULL
+ *
+ */
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+				 u32 xfrm_sid,
+				 u32 *peer_sid)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	int rc;
+	struct context *nlbl_ctx;
+	struct context *xfrm_ctx;
+
+	*peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	/* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
+	 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
+	 * single or absent peer SID/label */
+	if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+		*peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
+	 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
+	 * is present */
+	if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
+		*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't need to check initialized here since the only way both
+	 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
+	 * security server was initialized and state->initialized was true.
+	 */
+	if (!policydb->mls_enabled) {
+		rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid);
+	if (!nlbl_ctx) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, nlbl_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid);
+	if (!xfrm_ctx) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, xfrm_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rc = (mls_context_equal(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
+	 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
+	 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
+	 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
+	 * expressive */
+	*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct class_datum *datum = d;
+	char *name = k, **classes = args;
+	u16 value = datum->value - 1;
+
+	classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!classes[value])
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+			 char ***classes, u32 *nclasses)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	int rc;
+
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	*nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim;
+	*classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*classes)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
+			 *classes);
+	if (rc) {
+		u32 i;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
+			kfree((*classes)[i]);
+		kfree(*classes);
+	}
+
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct perm_datum *datum = d;
+	char *name = k, **perms = args;
+	u32 value = datum->value - 1;
+
+	perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!perms[value])
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+			     const char *class, char ***perms, u32 *nperms)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	u32 i;
+	int rc;
+	struct class_datum *match;
+
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	match = symtab_search(&policydb->p_classes, class);
+	if (!match) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %s\n",
+			__func__, class);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	*nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
+	*perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*perms)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (match->comdatum) {
+		rc = hashtab_map(&match->comdatum->permissions.table,
+				 get_permissions_callback, *perms);
+		if (rc)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(&match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
+			 *perms);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+err:
+	for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
+		kfree((*perms)[i]);
+	kfree(*perms);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	int value;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	value = policy->policydb.reject_unknown;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return value;
+}
+
+int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	int value;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	value = policy->policydb.allow_unknown;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return value;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
+ * @req_cap: capability
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
+ * capability specified by @req_cap.  Returns true (1) if the capability is
+ * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
+ *
+ */
+int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policy->policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+struct selinux_audit_rule {
+	u32 au_seqno;
+	struct context au_ctxt;
+};
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)
+		return audit_update_lsm_rules();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
+{
+	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+
+	if (rule) {
+		context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
+		kfree(rule);
+	}
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
+			    gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
+	struct role_datum *roledatum;
+	struct type_datum *typedatum;
+	struct user_datum *userdatum;
+	struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	*rule = NULL;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
+		if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+		/* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
+		if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* only the above fields are valid */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	tmprule = kzalloc_obj(struct selinux_audit_rule, gfp);
+	if (!tmprule)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	tmprule->au_seqno = policy->latest_granting;
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+		userdatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_users, rulestr);
+		if (!userdatum) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+		roledatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_roles, rulestr);
+		if (!roledatum) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		typedatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_types, rulestr);
+		if (!typedatum) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+		rc = mls_from_string(policydb, rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt,
+				     GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (rc)
+			goto err;
+		break;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	*rule = tmprule;
+	return 0;
+
+err:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
+	*rule = NULL;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+		switch (f->type) {
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct context *ctxt;
+	struct mls_level *level;
+	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+	int match = 0;
+
+	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+
+	if (rule->au_seqno < policy->latest_granting) {
+		match = -ESTALE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ctxt = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, prop->selinux.secid);
+	if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			  prop->selinux.secid);
+		match = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
+	   without a match */
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
+			break;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
+			break;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
+			break;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+		level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
+			  field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
+			 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					     level);
+			break;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					      level);
+			break;
+		case Audit_lt:
+			match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					       level) &&
+				 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					       level));
+			break;
+		case Audit_le:
+			match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					      level);
+			break;
+		case Audit_gt:
+			match = (mls_level_dom(level,
+					      &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
+				 !mls_level_eq(level,
+					       &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
+			break;
+		case Audit_ge:
+			match = mls_level_dom(level,
+					      &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return match;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
+ * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache.  This function assumes @secattr has
+ * already been initialized.
+ *
+ */
+static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+				      u32 sid)
+{
+	u32 *sid_cache;
+
+	sid_cache = kmalloc_obj(*sid_cache, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (sid_cache == NULL)
+		return;
+	secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
+		kfree(sid_cache);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	*sid_cache = sid;
+	secattr->cache->free = kfree;
+	secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
+	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
+ * SELinux SID.  If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
+ * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation.  If possible the
+ * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
+ * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
+ * conversion for future lookups.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+				   u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	int rc;
+	struct context *ctx;
+	struct context ctx_new;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+retry:
+	rc = 0;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
+		*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
+	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
+		*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
+		rc = -EIDRM;
+		ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
+		if (ctx == NULL)
+			goto out;
+
+		context_init(&ctx_new);
+		ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
+		ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
+		ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
+		mls_import_netlbl_lvl(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
+		if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
+			rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		rc = -EIDRM;
+		if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new)) {
+			ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
+		ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
+		if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
+	} else
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	int rc;
+	struct context *ctx;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized())
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+	policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+	rc = -ENOENT;
+	ctx = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, sid);
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
+				  GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (secattr->domain == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
+	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+/**
+ * __security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @policy: SELinux policy
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+static int __security_read_policy(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+				  void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct policy_file fp;
+
+	fp.data = data;
+	fp.len = *len;
+
+	rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	*len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)data;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+
+	policy = rcu_dereference_protected(
+			state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+	if (!policy)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*len = policy->policydb.len;
+	*data = vmalloc_user(*len);
+	if (!*data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return __security_read_policy(policy, *data, len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_read_state_kernel - read the policy.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ * Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy.
+ * This function is for internal use only and should not
+ * be used for returning data to user space.
+ *
+ * This function must be called with policy_mutex held.
+ */
+int security_read_state_kernel(void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct selinux_policy *policy;
+
+	policy = rcu_dereference_protected(
+			state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+	if (!policy)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*len = policy->policydb.len;
+	*data = vmalloc(*len);
+	if (!*data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	err = __security_read_policy(policy, *data, len);
+	if (err) {
+		vfree(*data);
+		*data = NULL;
+		*len = 0;
+	}
+	return err;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..93358e7a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_SERVICES_H_
+#define _SS_SERVICES_H_
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+/* Mapping for a single class */
+struct selinux_mapping {
+	u16 value; /* policy value for class */
+	u16 num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */
+	u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; /* policy values for permissions */
+};
+
+/* Map for all of the classes, with array size */
+struct selinux_map {
+	struct selinux_mapping *mapping; /* indexed by class */
+	u16 size; /* array size of mapping */
+};
+
+struct selinux_policy {
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct policydb policydb;
+	struct selinux_map map;
+	u32 latest_granting;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+struct convert_context_args {
+	struct policydb *oldp;
+	struct policydb *newp;
+};
+
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
+				     struct avtab_node *node);
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+				      struct avtab_node *node);
+
+int services_convert_context(struct convert_context_args *args,
+			     struct context *oldc, struct context *newc,
+			     gfp_t gfp_flags);
+
+#endif /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..118af0aa2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,638 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the SID table type.
+ *
+ * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <omosnacek@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+struct sidtab_str_cache {
+	struct rcu_head rcu_member;
+	struct list_head lru_member;
+	struct sidtab_entry *parent;
+	u32 len;
+	char str[] __counted_by(len);
+};
+
+#define index_to_sid(index) ((index) + SECINITSID_NUM + 1)
+#define sid_to_index(sid)   ((sid) - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1))
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	memset(s->roots, 0, sizeof(s->roots));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
+		s->isids[i].set = 0;
+
+	s->frozen = false;
+	s->count = 0;
+	s->convert = NULL;
+	hash_init(s->context_to_sid);
+
+	spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+	s->cache_free_slots = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->cache_lru_list);
+	spin_lock_init(&s->cache_lock);
+#endif
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u32 context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 hash)
+{
+	struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+	u32 sid = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	hash_for_each_possible_rcu(s->context_to_sid, entry, list, hash) {
+		if (entry->hash != hash)
+			continue;
+		if (context_equal(&entry->context, context)) {
+			sid = entry->sid;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return sid;
+}
+
+int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
+{
+	struct sidtab_isid_entry *isid;
+	u32 hash;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (sid == 0 || sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	isid = &s->isids[sid - 1];
+
+	rc = context_cpy(&isid->entry.context, context);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+	isid->entry.cache = NULL;
+#endif
+	isid->set = 1;
+
+	hash = context_compute_hash(context);
+
+	/*
+	 * Multiple initial sids may map to the same context. Check that this
+	 * context is not already represented in the context_to_sid hashtable
+	 * to avoid duplicate entries and long linked lists upon hash
+	 * collision.
+	 */
+	if (!context_to_sid(s, context, hash)) {
+		isid->entry.sid = sid;
+		isid->entry.hash = hash;
+		hash_add(s->context_to_sid, &isid->entry.list, hash);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_hash_stats(struct sidtab *sidtab, char *page)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int chain_len = 0;
+	int slots_used = 0;
+	int entries = 0;
+	int max_chain_len = 0;
+	unsigned int cur_bucket = 0;
+	struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	hash_for_each_rcu(sidtab->context_to_sid, i, entry, list) {
+		entries++;
+		if (i == cur_bucket) {
+			chain_len++;
+			if (chain_len == 1)
+				slots_used++;
+		} else {
+			cur_bucket = i;
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+			chain_len = 0;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+		max_chain_len = chain_len;
+
+	return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE,
+			 "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
+			 "longest chain: %d\n",
+			 entries, slots_used, SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS,
+			 max_chain_len);
+}
+
+static u32 sidtab_level_from_count(u32 count)
+{
+	u32 capacity = SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES;
+	u32 level = 0;
+
+	while (count > capacity) {
+		capacity <<= SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT;
+		++level;
+	}
+	return level;
+}
+
+static int sidtab_alloc_roots(struct sidtab *s, u32 level)
+{
+	u32 l;
+
+	if (!s->roots[0].ptr_leaf) {
+		s->roots[0].ptr_leaf =
+			kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!s->roots[0].ptr_leaf)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	for (l = 1; l <= level; ++l)
+		if (!s->roots[l].ptr_inner) {
+			s->roots[l].ptr_inner =
+				kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!s->roots[l].ptr_inner)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			s->roots[l].ptr_inner->entries[0] = s->roots[l - 1];
+		}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_do_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index,
+					     int alloc)
+{
+	union sidtab_entry_inner *entry;
+	u32 level, capacity_shift, leaf_index = index / SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES;
+
+	/* find the level of the subtree we need */
+	level = sidtab_level_from_count(index + 1);
+	capacity_shift = level * SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT;
+
+	/* allocate roots if needed */
+	if (alloc && sidtab_alloc_roots(s, level) != 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* lookup inside the subtree */
+	entry = &s->roots[level];
+	while (level != 0) {
+		capacity_shift -= SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT;
+		--level;
+
+		entry = &entry->ptr_inner->entries[leaf_index >> capacity_shift];
+		leaf_index &= ((u32)1 << capacity_shift) - 1;
+
+		if (!entry->ptr_inner) {
+			if (alloc)
+				entry->ptr_inner = kzalloc(
+					SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!entry->ptr_inner)
+				return NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!entry->ptr_leaf) {
+		if (alloc)
+			entry->ptr_leaf =
+				kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!entry->ptr_leaf)
+			return NULL;
+	}
+	return &entry->ptr_leaf->entries[index % SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES];
+}
+
+static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
+{
+	/* read entries only after reading count */
+	u32 count = smp_load_acquire(&s->count);
+
+	if (index >= count)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return sidtab_do_lookup(s, index, 0);
+}
+
+static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_lookup_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+	return s->isids[sid - 1].set ? &s->isids[sid - 1].entry : NULL;
+}
+
+static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid,
+					       int force)
+{
+	if (sid != 0) {
+		struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+
+		if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
+			entry = sidtab_lookup(s, sid_to_index(sid));
+		else
+			entry = sidtab_lookup_initial(s, sid);
+		if (entry && (!entry->context.len || force))
+			return entry;
+	}
+
+	return sidtab_lookup_initial(s, SECINITSID_UNLABELED);
+}
+
+struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+	return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 0);
+}
+
+struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+	return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 1);
+}
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	u32 count, hash = context_compute_hash(context);
+	struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
+	struct sidtab_entry *dst, *dst_convert;
+	int rc;
+
+	*sid = context_to_sid(s, context, hash);
+	if (*sid)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* lock-free search failed: lock, re-search, and insert if not found */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+
+	rc = 0;
+	*sid = context_to_sid(s, context, hash);
+	if (*sid)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	if (unlikely(s->frozen)) {
+		/*
+		 * This sidtab is now frozen - tell the caller to abort and
+		 * get the new one.
+		 */
+		rc = -ESTALE;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	count = s->count;
+
+	/* bail out if we already reached max entries */
+	rc = -EOVERFLOW;
+	if (count >= SIDTAB_MAX)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/* insert context into new entry */
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1);
+	if (!dst)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	dst->sid = index_to_sid(count);
+	dst->hash = hash;
+
+	rc = context_cpy(&dst->context, context);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/*
+	 * if we are building a new sidtab, we need to convert the context
+	 * and insert it there as well
+	 */
+	convert = s->convert;
+	if (convert) {
+		struct sidtab *target = convert->target;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		dst_convert = sidtab_do_lookup(target, count, 1);
+		if (!dst_convert) {
+			context_destroy(&dst->context);
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		rc = services_convert_context(convert->args, context,
+					      &dst_convert->context,
+					      GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (rc) {
+			context_destroy(&dst->context);
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+		dst_convert->sid = index_to_sid(count);
+		dst_convert->hash = context_compute_hash(&dst_convert->context);
+		target->count = count + 1;
+
+		hash_add_rcu(target->context_to_sid, &dst_convert->list,
+			     dst_convert->hash);
+	}
+
+	if (context->len)
+		pr_info("SELinux:  Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n",
+			context->str);
+
+	*sid = index_to_sid(count);
+
+	/* write entries before updating count */
+	smp_store_release(&s->count, count + 1);
+	hash_add_rcu(s->context_to_sid, &dst->list, dst->hash);
+
+	rc = 0;
+out_unlock:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void sidtab_convert_hashtable(struct sidtab *s, u32 count)
+{
+	struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+	u32 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		entry = sidtab_do_lookup(s, i, 0);
+		entry->sid = index_to_sid(i);
+		entry->hash = context_compute_hash(&entry->context);
+
+		hash_add_rcu(s->context_to_sid, &entry->list, entry->hash);
+	}
+}
+
+static int sidtab_convert_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner *edst,
+			       union sidtab_entry_inner *esrc, u32 *pos,
+			       u32 count, u32 level,
+			       struct sidtab_convert_params *convert)
+{
+	int rc;
+	u32 i;
+
+	if (level != 0) {
+		if (!edst->ptr_inner) {
+			edst->ptr_inner =
+				kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!edst->ptr_inner)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		i = 0;
+		while (i < SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
+			rc = sidtab_convert_tree(&edst->ptr_inner->entries[i],
+						 &esrc->ptr_inner->entries[i],
+						 pos, count, level - 1,
+						 convert);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			i++;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (!edst->ptr_leaf) {
+			edst->ptr_leaf =
+				kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!edst->ptr_leaf)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		i = 0;
+		while (i < SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
+			rc = services_convert_context(
+				convert->args,
+				&esrc->ptr_leaf->entries[i].context,
+				&edst->ptr_leaf->entries[i].context,
+				GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			(*pos)++;
+			i++;
+		}
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	u32 count, level, pos;
+	int rc;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+
+	/* concurrent policy loads are not allowed */
+	if (s->convert) {
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
+	count = s->count;
+	level = sidtab_level_from_count(count);
+
+	/* allocate last leaf in the new sidtab (to avoid race with
+	 * live convert)
+	 */
+	rc = sidtab_do_lookup(params->target, count - 1, 1) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+	if (rc) {
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* set count in case no new entries are added during conversion */
+	params->target->count = count;
+
+	/* enable live convert of new entries */
+	s->convert = params;
+
+	/* we can safely convert the tree outside the lock */
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+
+	pr_info("SELinux:  Converting %u SID table entries...\n", count);
+
+	/* convert all entries not covered by live convert */
+	pos = 0;
+	rc = sidtab_convert_tree(&params->target->roots[level],
+				 &s->roots[level], &pos, count, level, params);
+	if (rc) {
+		/* we need to keep the old table - disable live convert */
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+		s->convert = NULL;
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * The hashtable can also be modified in sidtab_context_to_sid()
+	 * so we must re-acquire the lock here.
+	 */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+	sidtab_convert_hashtable(params->target, count);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void sidtab_cancel_convert(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	/* cancelling policy load - disable live convert of sidtab */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+	s->convert = NULL;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+}
+
+void sidtab_freeze_begin(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags)
+	__acquires(&s->lock)
+{
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, *flags);
+	s->frozen = true;
+	s->convert = NULL;
+}
+void sidtab_freeze_end(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags)
+	__releases(&s->lock)
+{
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, *flags);
+}
+
+static void sidtab_destroy_entry(struct sidtab_entry *entry)
+{
+	context_destroy(&entry->context);
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+	kfree(rcu_dereference_raw(entry->cache));
+#endif
+}
+
+static void sidtab_destroy_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner entry, u32 level)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	if (level != 0) {
+		struct sidtab_node_inner *node = entry.ptr_inner;
+
+		if (!node)
+			return;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES; i++)
+			sidtab_destroy_tree(node->entries[i], level - 1);
+		kfree(node);
+	} else {
+		struct sidtab_node_leaf *node = entry.ptr_leaf;
+
+		if (!node)
+			return;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES; i++)
+			sidtab_destroy_entry(&node->entries[i]);
+		kfree(node);
+	}
+}
+
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	u32 i, level;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
+		if (s->isids[i].set)
+			sidtab_destroy_entry(&s->isids[i].entry);
+
+	level = SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL;
+	while (level && !s->roots[level].ptr_inner)
+		--level;
+
+	sidtab_destroy_tree(s->roots[level], level);
+	/*
+	 * The context_to_sid hashtable's objects are all shared
+	 * with the isids array and context tree, and so don't need
+	 * to be cleaned up here.
+	 */
+}
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+
+void sidtab_sid2str_put(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+			const char *str, u32 str_len)
+{
+	struct sidtab_str_cache *cache, *victim = NULL;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	/* do not cache invalid contexts */
+	if (entry->context.len)
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&s->cache_lock, flags);
+
+	cache = rcu_dereference_protected(entry->cache,
+					  lockdep_is_held(&s->cache_lock));
+	if (cache) {
+		/* entry in cache - just bump to the head of LRU list */
+		list_move(&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	cache = kmalloc_flex(*cache, str, str_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!cache)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	if (s->cache_free_slots == 0) {
+		/* pop a cache entry from the tail and free it */
+		victim = container_of(s->cache_lru_list.prev,
+				      struct sidtab_str_cache, lru_member);
+		list_del(&victim->lru_member);
+		rcu_assign_pointer(victim->parent->cache, NULL);
+	} else {
+		s->cache_free_slots--;
+	}
+	cache->parent = entry;
+	cache->len = str_len;
+	memcpy(cache->str, str, str_len);
+	list_add(&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list);
+
+	rcu_assign_pointer(entry->cache, cache);
+
+out_unlock:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->cache_lock, flags);
+	kfree_rcu(victim, rcu_member);
+}
+
+int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry, char **out,
+		       u32 *out_len)
+{
+	struct sidtab_str_cache *cache;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (entry->context.len)
+		return -ENOENT; /* do not cache invalid contexts */
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	cache = rcu_dereference(entry->cache);
+	if (!cache) {
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+	} else {
+		*out_len = cache->len;
+		if (out) {
+			*out = kmemdup(cache->str, cache->len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!*out)
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (!rc && out)
+		sidtab_sid2str_put(s, entry, *out, *out_len);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0 */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..832c85c70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a lookup table
+ * of security context structures indexed by SID value.
+ *
+ * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <omosnacek@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+
+#include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
+#include <linux/log2.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+
+#include "context.h"
+
+struct sidtab_entry {
+	u32 sid;
+	u32 hash;
+	struct context context;
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+	struct sidtab_str_cache __rcu *cache;
+#endif
+	struct hlist_node list;
+};
+
+union sidtab_entry_inner {
+	struct sidtab_node_inner *ptr_inner;
+	struct sidtab_node_leaf *ptr_leaf;
+};
+
+/* align node size to page boundary */
+#define SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT PAGE_SHIFT
+#define SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE	PAGE_SIZE
+
+#define size_to_shift(size) ((size) == 1 ? 1 : (const_ilog2((size)-1) + 1))
+
+#define SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT         \
+	(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT - \
+	 size_to_shift(sizeof(union sidtab_entry_inner)))
+#define SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES ((size_t)1 << SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)
+#define SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES \
+	(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE / sizeof(struct sidtab_entry))
+
+#define SIDTAB_MAX_BITS 32
+#define SIDTAB_MAX	U32_MAX
+/* ensure enough tree levels for SIDTAB_MAX entries */
+#define SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL                                                   \
+	DIV_ROUND_UP(SIDTAB_MAX_BITS - size_to_shift(SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES), \
+		     SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)
+
+struct sidtab_node_leaf {
+	struct sidtab_entry entries[SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+struct sidtab_node_inner {
+	union sidtab_entry_inner entries[SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+struct sidtab_isid_entry {
+	int set;
+	struct sidtab_entry entry;
+};
+
+struct sidtab_convert_params {
+	struct convert_context_args *args;
+	struct sidtab *target;
+};
+
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS    CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS)
+
+struct sidtab {
+	/*
+	 * lock-free read access only for as many items as a prior read of
+	 * 'count'
+	 */
+	union sidtab_entry_inner roots[SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL + 1];
+	/*
+	 * access atomically via {READ|WRITE}_ONCE(); only increment under
+	 * spinlock
+	 */
+	u32 count;
+	/* access only under spinlock */
+	struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
+	bool frozen;
+	spinlock_t lock;
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+	/* SID -> context string cache */
+	u32 cache_free_slots;
+	struct list_head cache_lru_list;
+	spinlock_t cache_lock;
+#endif
+
+	/* index == SID - 1 (no entry for SECSID_NULL) */
+	struct sidtab_isid_entry isids[SECINITSID_NUM];
+
+	/* Hash table for fast reverse context-to-sid lookups. */
+	DECLARE_HASHTABLE(context_to_sid, SIDTAB_HASH_BITS);
+};
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s);
+int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context);
+struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
+struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
+
+static inline struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+	struct sidtab_entry *entry = sidtab_search_entry(s, sid);
+
+	return entry ? &entry->context : NULL;
+}
+
+static inline struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+	struct sidtab_entry *entry = sidtab_search_entry_force(s, sid);
+
+	return entry ? &entry->context : NULL;
+}
+
+int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params);
+
+void sidtab_cancel_convert(struct sidtab *s);
+
+void sidtab_freeze_begin(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags)
+	__acquires(&s->lock);
+void sidtab_freeze_end(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags)
+	__releases(&s->lock);
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid);
+
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s);
+
+int sidtab_hash_stats(struct sidtab *sidtab, char *page);
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+void sidtab_sid2str_put(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+			const char *str, u32 str_len);
+int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry, char **out,
+		       u32 *out_len);
+#else
+static inline void sidtab_sid2str_put(struct sidtab *s,
+				      struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+				      const char *str, u32 str_len)
+{
+}
+static inline int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s,
+				     struct sidtab_entry *entry, char **out,
+				     u32 *out_len)
+{
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0 */
+
+#endif /* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a756554e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the symbol table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "symtab.h"
+
+static unsigned int symhash(const void *key)
+{
+	/*
+	 * djb2a
+	 * Public domain from cdb v0.75
+	 */
+	unsigned int hash = 5381;
+	unsigned char c;
+
+	while ((c = *(const unsigned char *)key++))
+		hash = ((hash << 5) + hash) ^ c;
+
+	return hash;
+}
+
+static int symcmp(const void *key1, const void *key2)
+{
+	const char *keyp1, *keyp2;
+
+	keyp1 = key1;
+	keyp2 = key2;
+	return strcmp(keyp1, keyp2);
+}
+
+static const struct hashtab_key_params symtab_key_params = {
+	.hash = symhash,
+	.cmp = symcmp,
+};
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, u32 size)
+{
+	s->nprim = 0;
+	return hashtab_init(&s->table, size);
+}
+
+int symtab_insert(struct symtab *s, char *name, void *datum)
+{
+	return hashtab_insert(&s->table, name, datum, symtab_key_params);
+}
+
+void *symtab_search(const struct symtab *s, const char *name)
+{
+	return hashtab_search(&s->table, name, symtab_key_params);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7cfa3b449
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A symbol table (symtab) maintains associations between symbol
+ * strings and datum values.  The type of the datum values
+ * is arbitrary.  The symbol table type is implemented
+ * using the hash table type (hashtab).
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+
+#include "hashtab.h"
+
+struct symtab {
+	struct hashtab table; /* hash table (keyed on a string) */
+	u32 nprim; /* number of primary names in table */
+};
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, u32 size);
+
+int symtab_insert(struct symtab *s, char *name, void *datum);
+void *symtab_search(const struct symtab *s, const char *name);
+
+#endif /* _SS_SYMTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/status.c b/security/selinux/status.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dffca22ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/status.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * mmap based event notifications for SELinux
+ *
+ * Author: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 NEC corporation
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+/*
+ * The selinux_status_page shall be exposed to userspace applications
+ * using mmap interface on /selinux/status.
+ * It enables to notify applications a few events that will cause reset
+ * of userspace access vector without context switching.
+ *
+ * The selinux_kernel_status structure on the head of status page is
+ * protected from concurrent accesses using seqlock logic, so userspace
+ * application should reference the status page according to the seqlock
+ * logic.
+ *
+ * Typically, application checks status->sequence at the head of access
+ * control routine. If it is odd-number, kernel is updating the status,
+ * so please wait for a moment. If it is changed from the last sequence
+ * number, it means something happen, so application will reset userspace
+ * avc, if needed.
+ * In most cases, application shall confirm the kernel status is not
+ * changed without any system call invocations.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * selinux_kernel_status_page
+ *
+ * It returns a reference to selinux_status_page. If the status page is
+ * not allocated yet, it also tries to allocate it at the first time.
+ */
+struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
+	struct page		       *result = NULL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+	if (!selinux_state.status_page) {
+		selinux_state.status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
+
+		if (selinux_state.status_page) {
+			status = page_address(selinux_state.status_page);
+
+			status->version = SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION;
+			status->sequence = 0;
+			status->enforcing = enforcing_enabled();
+			/*
+			 * NOTE: the next policyload event shall set
+			 * a positive value on the status->policyload,
+			 * although it may not be 1, but never zero.
+			 * So, application can know it was updated.
+			 */
+			status->policyload = 0;
+			status->deny_unknown =
+				!security_get_allow_unknown();
+		}
+	}
+	result = selinux_state.status_page;
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_status_update_setenforce
+ *
+ * It updates status of the current enforcing/permissive mode.
+ */
+void selinux_status_update_setenforce(bool enforcing)
+{
+	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
+
+	mutex_lock(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+	if (selinux_state.status_page) {
+		status = page_address(selinux_state.status_page);
+
+		status->sequence++;
+		smp_wmb();
+
+		status->enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
+
+		smp_wmb();
+		status->sequence++;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_status_update_policyload
+ *
+ * It updates status of the times of policy reloaded, and current
+ * setting of deny_unknown.
+ */
+void selinux_status_update_policyload(u32 seqno)
+{
+	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
+
+	mutex_lock(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+	if (selinux_state.status_page) {
+		status = page_address(selinux_state.status_page);
+
+		status->sequence++;
+		smp_wmb();
+
+		status->policyload = seqno;
+		status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+
+		smp_wmb();
+		status->sequence++;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8e00b3306
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ *  Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations.
+ *
+ *  Authors:  Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
+ *	      Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ *  Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
+ *
+ *           Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments.
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
+ *  Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * USAGE:
+ * NOTES:
+ *   1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config:
+ *	CONFIG_SECURITY=y
+ *	CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
+ *	CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y
+ *	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y
+ * ISSUES:
+ *   1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation
+ *   2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
+ *   3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/checksum.h>
+#include <net/udp.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+
+/* Labeled XFRM instance counter */
+atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount __read_mostly = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the context is an LSM/SELinux context.
+ */
+static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return (ctx &&
+		(ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) &&
+		(ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux.
+ */
+static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates it using the supplied security
+ * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context.
+ */
+static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+				   struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+				   gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+	u32 str_len;
+
+	if (ctxp == NULL || uctx == NULL ||
+	    uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM ||
+	    uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
+	if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx = kmalloc_flex(*ctx, ctx_str, str_len + 1, gfp);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+	ctx->ctx_len = str_len + 1;
+	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
+	ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len,
+				     &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), ctx->ctx_sid,
+			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	*ctxp = ctx;
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	return 0;
+
+err:
+	kfree(ctx);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the xfrm_sec_ctx structure.
+ */
+static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (!ctx)
+		return;
+
+	atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authorize the deletion of a labeled SA or policy rule.
+ */
+static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (!ctx)
+		return 0;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), ctx->ctx_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use a xfrm policy
+ * rule.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	/* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an otherwise applicable
+	 * "non-labeled" policy. This would prevent inadvertent "leaks". */
+	if (!ctx)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
+	if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
+	return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
+ * the given policy, flow combo.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+				      const struct flowi_common *flic)
+{
+	u32 state_sid;
+	u32 flic_sid;
+
+	if (!xp->security)
+		if (x->security)
+			/* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
+			return 0;
+		else
+			/* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
+			return 1;
+	else
+		if (!x->security)
+			/* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
+			return 0;
+		else
+			if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+				/* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
+				return 0;
+
+	state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
+	flic_sid = flic->flowic_secid;
+
+	if (flic_sid != state_sid)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
+	 * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
+	 * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
+	return (avc_has_perm(flic_sid, state_sid,
+			     SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
+			     NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+}
+
+static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
+	struct xfrm_state *x;
+
+	if (dst == NULL)
+		return SECSID_NULL;
+	x = dst->xfrm;
+	if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+		return SECSID_NULL;
+
+	return x->security->ctx_sid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+	u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
+	struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+
+	if (sp) {
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
+			if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+
+				if (sid_session == SECSID_NULL) {
+					sid_session = ctx->ctx_sid;
+					if (!ckall)
+						goto out;
+				} else if (sid_session != ctx->ctx_sid) {
+					*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+					return -EINVAL;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	*sid = sid_session;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+ * incoming packet.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+	if (skb == NULL) {
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall);
+}
+
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0);
+	if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		*sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+			      gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx, gfp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to new
+ * for policy cloning.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+			      struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
+{
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx;
+
+	if (!old_ctx)
+		return 0;
+
+	new_ctx = kmemdup(old_ctx, sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
+			  GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!new_ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	*new_ctxp = new_ctx;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_sec_ctx security information.
+ */
+void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	selinux_xfrm_free(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return selinux_xfrm_delete(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state, populates it using
+ * the supplied security context, and assigns it to the xfrm_state.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+			     struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+{
+	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates based
+ * on a secid.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+	char *ctx_str = NULL;
+	u32 str_len;
+
+	if (!polsec)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (secid == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str,
+				     &str_len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	ctx = kmalloc_flex(*ctx, ctx_str, str_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!ctx) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+	ctx->ctx_sid = secid;
+	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
+
+	x->security = ctx;
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+out:
+	kfree(ctx_str);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information.
+ */
+void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	selinux_xfrm_free(x->security);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	return selinux_xfrm_delete(x->security);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets.  If
+ * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
+ * already authorized by the IPSec process.  If not, then
+ * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
+ * gone thru the IPSec process.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+			      struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+	u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+	if (sp) {
+		for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
+
+			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+				peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
+	 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
+	 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
+	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
+}
+
+/*
+ * POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing:
+ * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
+ * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
+ * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
+ * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+{
+	struct dst_entry *dst;
+
+	switch (proto) {
+	case IPPROTO_AH:
+	case IPPROTO_ESP:
+	case IPPROTO_COMP:
+		/* We should have already seen this packet once before it
+		 * underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the unlabeled
+		 * check. */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	dst = skb_dst(skb);
+	if (dst) {
+		struct dst_entry *iter;
+
+		for (iter = dst; iter != NULL; iter = xfrm_dst_child(iter)) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = iter->xfrm;
+
+			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+				return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
+	 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
+	 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
+	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
+}
diff --git a/security/smack/Kconfig b/security/smack/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5a8dfad46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config SECURITY_SMACK
+	bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Support"
+	depends on NET
+	depends on INET
+	depends on SECURITY
+	select NETLABEL
+	select SECURITY_NETWORK
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
+	  Smack is useful for sensitivity, integrity, and a variety
+	  of other mandatory security schemes.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	bool "Reporting on access granted by Smack rules"
+	depends on SECURITY_SMACK
+	default n
+	help
+	  Enable the bring-up ("b") access mode in Smack rules.
+	  When access is granted by a rule with the "b" mode a
+	  message about the access requested is generated. The
+	  intention is that a process can be granted a wide set
+	  of access initially with the bringup mode set on the
+	  rules. The developer can use the information to
+	  identify which rules are necessary and what accesses
+	  may be inappropriate. The developer can reduce the
+	  access rule set once the behavior is well understood.
+	  This is a superior mechanism to the oft abused
+	  "permissive" mode of other systems.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+	bool "Packet marking using secmarks for netfilter"
+	depends on SECURITY_SMACK
+	depends on NETWORK_SECMARK
+	depends on NETFILTER
+	default n
+	help
+	  This enables security marking of network packets using
+	  Smack labels.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SMACK_APPEND_SIGNALS
+	bool "Treat delivering signals as an append operation"
+	depends on SECURITY_SMACK
+	default n
+	help
+	  Sending a signal has been treated as a write operation to the
+	  receiving process. If this option is selected, the delivery
+	  will be an append operation instead. This makes it possible
+	  to differentiate between delivering a network packet and
+	  delivering a signal in the Smack rules.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/smack/Makefile b/security/smack/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6dbf6e22a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# Makefile for the SMACK LSM
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) := smack.o
+
+smack-y := smack_lsm.o smack_access.o smackfs.o
+smack-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER) += smack_netfilter.o
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9b9eb262f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -0,0 +1,541 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *      Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_SMACK_H
+#define _SECURITY_SMACK_H
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+
+/*
+ * Use IPv6 port labeling if IPv6 is enabled and secmarks
+ * are not being used.
+ */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#define SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING 1
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#define SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING 1
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Smack labels were limited to 23 characters for a long time.
+ */
+#define SMK_LABELLEN	24
+#define SMK_LONGLABEL	256
+
+/*
+ * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
+ * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chunks of memory
+ * and so that they can be shared.
+ *
+ * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label
+ * is imported (e.g. xattrset on a file) the list is checked
+ * for it and it is added if it doesn't exist. The address
+ * is passed out in either case. Entries are added, but
+ * never deleted.
+ *
+ * Since labels are hanging around anyway it doesn't
+ * hurt to maintain a secid for those awkward situations
+ * where kernel components that ought to use LSM independent
+ * interfaces don't. The secid should go away when all of
+ * these components have been repaired.
+ *
+ * The cipso value associated with the label gets stored here, too.
+ *
+ * Keep the access rules for this subject label here so that
+ * the entire set of rules does not need to be examined every
+ * time.
+ */
+struct smack_known {
+	struct list_head		list;
+	struct hlist_node		smk_hashed;
+	char				*smk_known;
+	u32				smk_secid;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr	smk_netlabel;	/* on wire labels */
+	struct list_head		smk_rules;	/* access rules */
+	struct mutex			smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for rules */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of bytes for the levels in a CIPSO IP option.
+ * Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
+ * bigger than can be used, and 24 is the next lower multiple
+ * of 8, and there are too many issues if there isn't space set
+ * aside for the terminating null byte.
+ */
+#define SMK_CIPSOLEN	24
+
+struct superblock_smack {
+	struct smack_known	*smk_root;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_floor;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_hat;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_default;
+	int			smk_flags;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Superblock flags
+ */
+#define SMK_SB_INITIALIZED	0x01
+#define SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED	0x02
+
+struct socket_smack {
+	struct smack_known	*smk_out;	/* outbound label */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_in;	/* inbound label */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_packet;	/* TCP peer label */
+	int			smk_state;	/* netlabel socket states */
+};
+#define	SMK_NETLBL_UNSET	0
+#define	SMK_NETLBL_UNLABELED	1
+#define	SMK_NETLBL_LABELED	2
+#define	SMK_NETLBL_REQSKB	3
+
+/*
+ * Inode smack data
+ */
+struct inode_smack {
+	struct smack_known	*smk_inode;	/* label of the fso */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_task;	/* label of the task */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_mmap;	/* label of the mmap domain */
+	int			smk_flags;	/* smack inode flags */
+};
+
+struct task_smack {
+	struct smack_known	*smk_task;	/* label for access control */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_forked;	/* label when forked */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_transmuted;/* label when transmuted */
+	struct list_head	smk_rules;	/* per task access rules */
+	struct mutex		smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for the rules */
+	struct list_head	smk_relabel;	/* transit allowed labels */
+};
+
+#define	SMK_INODE_INSTANT	0x01	/* inode is instantiated */
+#define	SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE	0x02	/* directory is transmuting */
+#define	SMK_INODE_CHANGED	0x04	/* smack was transmuted (unused) */
+#define	SMK_INODE_IMPURE	0x08	/* involved in an impure transaction */
+
+/*
+ * A label access rule.
+ */
+struct smack_rule {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_subject;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_object;
+	int			smk_access;
+};
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying IPv4 hosts.
+ */
+struct smk_net4addr {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct in_addr		smk_host;	/* network address */
+	struct in_addr		smk_mask;	/* network mask */
+	int			smk_masks;	/* mask size */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_label;	/* label */
+};
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying IPv6 hosts.
+ */
+struct smk_net6addr {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct in6_addr		smk_host;	/* network address */
+	struct in6_addr		smk_mask;	/* network mask */
+	int			smk_masks;	/* mask size */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_label;	/* label */
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying ports.
+ */
+struct smk_port_label {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct sock		*smk_sock;	/* socket initialized on */
+	unsigned short		smk_port;	/* the port number */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_in;	/* inbound label */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_out;	/* outgoing label */
+	short			smk_sock_type;	/* Socket type */
+	short			smk_can_reuse;
+};
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
+
+struct smack_known_list_elem {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_label;
+};
+
+enum {
+	Opt_error = -1,
+	Opt_fsdefault = 0,
+	Opt_fsfloor = 1,
+	Opt_fshat = 2,
+	Opt_fsroot = 3,
+	Opt_fstransmute = 4,
+};
+
+#define SMACK_DELETE_OPTION	"-DELETE"
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION 	"-CIPSO"
+
+/*
+ * CIPSO defaults.
+ */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT		3	/* Historical */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_INVALID		-1	/* Not a DOI */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT	250	/* Arbitrary */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT	251	/* Also arbitrary */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL            255     /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
+/*
+ * CIPSO 2.2 standard is 239, but Smack wants to use the
+ * categories in a structured way that limits the value to
+ * the bits in 23 bytes, hence the unusual number.
+ */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM           184     /* 23 * 8 */
+
+/*
+ * Ptrace rules
+ */
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT	0
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT	1
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN	2
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_MAX	SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN
+
+/*
+ * Flags for untraditional access modes.
+ * It shouldn't be necessary to avoid conflicts with definitions
+ * in fs.h, but do so anyway.
+ */
+#define MAY_TRANSMUTE	0x00001000	/* Controls directory labeling */
+#define MAY_LOCK	0x00002000	/* Locks should be writes, but ... */
+#define MAY_BRINGUP	0x00004000	/* Report use of this rule */
+
+/*
+ * The policy for delivering signals is configurable.
+ * It is usually "write", but can be "append".
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_APPEND_SIGNALS
+#define MAY_DELIVER	MAY_APPEND	/* Signal delivery requires append */
+#else
+#define MAY_DELIVER	MAY_WRITE	/* Signal delivery requires write */
+#endif
+
+#define SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW		1	/* Allow bringup mode */
+#define SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT	2	/* Allow unconfined label */
+#define SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT		3	/* Allow unconfined label */
+
+/*
+ * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
+ */
+#define MAY_ANYREAD	(MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)
+#define MAY_READWRITE	(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
+#define MAY_NOT		0
+
+/*
+ * Number of access types used by Smack (rwxatlb)
+ */
+#define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 7
+
+/* SMACK data */
+struct smack_audit_data {
+	const char *function;
+	char *subject;
+	char *object;
+	char *request;
+	int result;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Smack audit data; is empty if CONFIG_AUDIT not set
+ * to save some stack
+ */
+struct smk_audit_info {
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct common_audit_data a;
+	struct smack_audit_data sad;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initialization
+ */
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+int smack_nf_ip_init(void);
+#else
+static inline int smack_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+int init_smk_fs(void);
+int smack_initcall(void);
+
+/*
+ * These functions are in smack_access.c
+ */
+int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
+int smk_access(struct smack_known *, struct smack_known *,
+	       int, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *, struct smack_known *,
+	       u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_curacc(struct smack_known *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access);
+struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32);
+int smk_parse_label_len(const char *string, int len);
+char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len);
+int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
+struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
+struct smack_known *smk_import_valid_label(const char *label, int label_len,
+					   gfp_t gfp);
+void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp);
+struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
+bool smack_privileged(int cap);
+bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred);
+void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);
+int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp);
+
+/*
+ * Shared data.
+ */
+extern int smack_enabled __initdata;
+extern int smack_cipso_direct;
+extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
+extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
+extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
+#endif
+extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes;
+
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_huh;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_web;
+
+extern struct mutex	smack_known_lock;
+extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
+extern struct list_head smk_net4addr_list;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+extern struct list_head smk_net6addr_list;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+extern struct mutex     smack_onlycap_lock;
+extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
+
+#define SMACK_HASH_SLOTS 16
+extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];
+extern struct kmem_cache *smack_rule_cache;
+
+static inline struct task_smack *smack_cred(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	return cred->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
+}
+
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_file(const struct file *file)
+{
+	return (struct smack_known **)(file->f_security +
+				       smack_blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+}
+
+static inline struct inode_smack *smack_inode(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return inode->i_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+}
+
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_msg_msg(const struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	return msg->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg;
+}
+
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
+{
+	return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
+}
+
+static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
+					const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+	return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+	return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_key(const struct key *key)
+{
+	return key->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+/*
+ * Is the directory transmuting?
+ */
+static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *sip = smack_inode(isp);
+	return (sip->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) != 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an inode blob.
+ */
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *sip = smack_inode(isp);
+	return sip->smk_inode;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an task blob.
+ */
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+{
+	return tsp->smk_task;
+}
+
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct_obj(
+						const struct task_struct *t)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	const struct cred *cred;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	cred = __task_cred(t);
+	skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return skp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob.
+ */
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+{
+	return tsp->smk_forked;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob.
+ */
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
+{
+	return smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
+}
+
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
+		int request,
+		int result, struct smk_audit_info *auditdata);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/*
+ * logging functions
+ */
+#define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
+#define SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT 0x2
+extern int log_policy;
+
+/*
+ * some inline functions to set up audit data
+ * they do nothing if CONFIG_AUDIT is not set
+ *
+ */
+static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+			       char type)
+{
+	memset(&a->sad, 0, sizeof(a->sad));
+	a->a.type = type;
+	a->a.smack_audit_data = &a->sad;
+	a->a.smack_audit_data->function = func;
+}
+
+static inline void smk_ad_init_net(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+				   char type, struct lsm_network_audit *net)
+{
+	smk_ad_init(a, func, type);
+	memset(net, 0, sizeof(*net));
+	a->a.u.net = net;
+}
+
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					 struct task_struct *t)
+{
+	a->a.u.tsk = t;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+						    struct dentry *d)
+{
+	a->a.u.dentry = d;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					      struct inode *i)
+{
+	a->a.u.inode = i;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					     struct path p)
+{
+	a->a.u.path = p;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					    struct sock *sk)
+{
+	a->a.u.net->sk = sk;
+}
+
+#else /* no AUDIT */
+
+static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+			       char type)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					 struct task_struct *t)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+						    struct dentry *d)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					      struct inode *i)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					     struct path p)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					    struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif  /* _SECURITY_SMACK_H */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..350b88d58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -0,0 +1,756 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *      Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_huh = {
+	.smk_known	= "?",
+	.smk_secid	= 2,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_hat = {
+	.smk_known	= "^",
+	.smk_secid	= 3,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_star = {
+	.smk_known	= "*",
+	.smk_secid	= 4,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_floor = {
+	.smk_known	= "_",
+	.smk_secid	= 5,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_web = {
+	.smk_known	= "@",
+	.smk_secid	= 7,
+};
+
+LIST_HEAD(smack_known_list);
+
+/*
+ * The initial value needs to be bigger than any of the
+ * known values above.
+ */
+static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+/*
+ * what events do we log
+ * can be overwritten at run-time by /smack/logging
+ */
+int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+/**
+ * smk_access_entry - look up matching access rule
+ * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
+ * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules to search
+ *
+ * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
+ * access rule list and returns the access mode. If no
+ * entry is found returns -ENOENT.
+ *
+ * NOTE:
+ *
+ * Earlier versions of this function allowed for labels that
+ * were not on the label list. This was done to allow for
+ * labels to come over the network that had never been seen
+ * before on this host. Unless the receiving socket has the
+ * star label this will always result in a failure check. The
+ * star labeled socket case is now handled in the networking
+ * hooks so there is no case where the label is not on the
+ * label list. Checking to see if the address of two labels
+ * is the same is now a reliable test.
+ *
+ * Do the object check first because that is more
+ * likely to differ.
+ *
+ * Allowing write access implies allowing locking.
+ */
+int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
+			struct list_head *rule_list)
+{
+	struct smack_rule *srp;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) {
+		if (srp->smk_object->smk_known == object_label &&
+		    srp->smk_subject->smk_known == subject_label) {
+			int may = srp->smk_access;
+			/*
+			 * MAY_WRITE implies MAY_LOCK.
+			 */
+			if ((may & MAY_WRITE) == MAY_WRITE)
+				may |= MAY_LOCK;
+			return may;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
+ * @subject: a pointer to the subject's Smack label entry
+ * @object: a pointer to the object's Smack label entry
+ * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : a pointer to the audit data
+ *
+ * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
+ * access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise.
+ *
+ * Smack labels are shared on smack_list
+ */
+int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
+	       int request, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+{
+	int may = MAY_NOT;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardcoded comparisons.
+	 */
+	/*
+	 * A star subject can't access any object.
+	 */
+	if (subject == &smack_known_star) {
+		rc = -EACCES;
+		goto out_audit;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * An internet object can be accessed by any subject.
+	 * Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
+	 * An internet subject can access any object.
+	 */
+	if (object == &smack_known_web || subject == &smack_known_web)
+		goto out_audit;
+	/*
+	 * A star object can be accessed by any subject.
+	 */
+	if (object == &smack_known_star)
+		goto out_audit;
+	/*
+	 * An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
+	 * with the same label.
+	 */
+	if (subject->smk_known == object->smk_known)
+		goto out_audit;
+	/*
+	 * A hat subject can read or lock any object.
+	 * A floor object can be read or locked by any subject.
+	 */
+	if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request ||
+	    (request & MAY_LOCK) == request) {
+		if (object == &smack_known_floor)
+			goto out_audit;
+		if (subject == &smack_known_hat)
+			goto out_audit;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Beyond here an explicit relationship is required.
+	 * If the requested access is contained in the available
+	 * access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's
+	 * good. A negative response from smk_access_entry()
+	 * indicates there is no entry for this pair.
+	 */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	may = smk_access_entry(subject->smk_known, object->smk_known,
+			       &subject->smk_rules);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (may <= 0 || (request & may) != request) {
+		rc = -EACCES;
+		goto out_audit;
+	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	/*
+	 * Return a positive value if using bringup mode.
+	 * This allows the hooks to identify checks that
+	 * succeed because of "b" rules.
+	 */
+	if (may & MAY_BRINGUP)
+		rc = SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW;
+#endif
+
+out_audit:
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		if (object == smack_unconfined)
+			rc = SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT;
+		if (subject == smack_unconfined)
+			rc = SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT;
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	if (a)
+		smack_log(subject->smk_known, object->smk_known,
+			  request, rc, a);
+#endif
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_tskacc - determine if a task has a specific access to an object
+ * @tsp: a pointer to the subject's task
+ * @obj_known: a pointer to the object's label entry
+ * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : common audit data
+ *
+ * This function checks the subject task's label/object label pair
+ * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that the task may have the capability
+ * to override the rules.
+ */
+int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *obj_known,
+	       u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+{
+	struct smack_known *sbj_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
+	int may;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check the global rule list
+	 */
+	rc = smk_access(sbj_known, obj_known, mode, NULL);
+	if (rc >= 0) {
+		/*
+		 * If there is an entry in the task's rule list
+		 * it can further restrict access.
+		 */
+		may = smk_access_entry(sbj_known->smk_known,
+				       obj_known->smk_known,
+				       &tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (may < 0)
+			goto out_audit;
+		if ((mode & may) == mode)
+			goto out_audit;
+		rc = -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow for privileged to override policy.
+	 */
+	if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		rc = 0;
+
+out_audit:
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	if (a)
+		smack_log(sbj_known->smk_known, obj_known->smk_known,
+			  mode, rc, a);
+#endif
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
+ * @obj_known: a pointer to the object's Smack label entry
+ * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : common audit data
+ *
+ * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
+ * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
+ * to override the rules.
+ */
+int smk_curacc(struct smack_known *obj_known,
+	       u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+
+	return smk_tskacc(tsp, obj_known, mode, a);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_str_from_perm : helper to translate an int to a
+ * readable string
+ * @string : the string to fill
+ * @access : the int
+ *
+ */
+int smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	if (access & MAY_READ)
+		string[i++] = 'r';
+	if (access & MAY_WRITE)
+		string[i++] = 'w';
+	if (access & MAY_EXEC)
+		string[i++] = 'x';
+	if (access & MAY_APPEND)
+		string[i++] = 'a';
+	if (access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+		string[i++] = 't';
+	if (access & MAY_LOCK)
+		string[i++] = 'l';
+	if (access & MAY_BRINGUP)
+		string[i++] = 'b';
+	if (i == 0)
+		string[i++] = '-';
+	string[i] = '\0';
+	return i;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+/**
+ * smack_log_callback - SMACK specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab : the audit_buffer
+ * @a  : audit_data
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+	struct smack_audit_data *sad = ad->smack_audit_data;
+	audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s",
+			 ad->smack_audit_data->function,
+			 sad->result ? "denied" : "granted");
+	audit_log_format(ab, " subject=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " object=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->object);
+	if (sad->request[0] == '\0')
+		audit_log_format(ab, " labels_differ");
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested=%s", sad->request);
+}
+
+/**
+ *  smack_log - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
+ *  @subject_label : smack label of the requester
+ *  @object_label  : smack label of the object being accessed
+ *  @request: requested permissions
+ *  @result: result from smk_access
+ *  @ad:  auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
+ * with the policy.
+ */
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+	       int result, struct smk_audit_info *ad)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	char request_buffer[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 5];
+#else
+	char request_buffer[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+#endif
+	struct smack_audit_data *sad;
+	struct common_audit_data *a = &ad->a;
+
+	/* check if we have to log the current event */
+	if (result < 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED) == 0)
+		return;
+	if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	sad = a->smack_audit_data;
+
+	if (sad->function == NULL)
+		sad->function = "unknown";
+
+	/* end preparing the audit data */
+	smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
+	sad->subject = subject_label;
+	sad->object  = object_label;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	/*
+	 * The result may be positive in bringup mode.
+	 * A positive result is an allow, but not for normal reasons.
+	 * Mark it as successful, but don't filter it out even if
+	 * the logging policy says to do so.
+	 */
+	if (result == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT)
+		strcat(request_buffer, "(US)");
+	else if (result == SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		strcat(request_buffer, "(UO)");
+
+	if (result > 0)
+		result = 0;
+#endif
+	sad->request = request_buffer;
+	sad->result  = result;
+
+	common_lsm_audit(a, smack_log_callback, NULL);
+}
+#else /* #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT */
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+	       int result, struct smk_audit_info *ad)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_known_lock);
+
+struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];
+
+/**
+ * smk_insert_entry - insert a smack label into a hash map,
+ * @skp: smack label
+ *
+ * this function must be called under smack_known_lock
+ */
+void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp)
+{
+	unsigned int hash;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+
+	hash = full_name_hash(NULL, skp->smk_known, strlen(skp->smk_known));
+	head = &smack_known_hash[hash & (SMACK_HASH_SLOTS - 1)];
+
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&skp->smk_hashed, head);
+	list_add_rcu(&skp->list, &smack_known_list);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_find_entry - find a label on the list, return the list entry
+ * @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that
+ * matches the passed string or NULL if not found.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *string)
+{
+	unsigned int hash;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	hash = full_name_hash(NULL, string, strlen(string));
+	head = &smack_known_hash[hash & (SMACK_HASH_SLOTS - 1)];
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, head, smk_hashed)
+		if (strcmp(skp->smk_known, string) == 0)
+			return skp;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_parse_label_len - calculate the length of the starting segment
+ *                       in the string that constitutes a valid smack label
+ * @string: a text string that might contain a Smack label at the beginning
+ * @len: the maximum size to look into, may be zero if string is null-terminated
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the segment (0 < L < SMK_LONGLABEL) or an error code.
+ */
+int smk_parse_label_len(const char *string, int len)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (len <= 0 || len > SMK_LONGLABEL)
+		len = SMK_LONGLABEL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Reserve a leading '-' as an indicator that
+	 * this isn't a label, but an option to interfaces
+	 * including /smack/cipso and /smack/cipso2
+	 */
+	if (string[0] == '-')
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		if (string[i] > '~' || string[i] <= ' ' || string[i] == '/' ||
+		    string[i] == '"' || string[i] == '\\' || string[i] == '\'')
+			break;
+
+	if (i == 0 || i >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return i;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_parse_smack - copy the starting segment in the string
+ *                   that constitutes a valid smack label
+ * @string: a text string that might contain a Smack label at the beginning
+ * @len: the maximum size to look into, may be zero if string is null-terminated
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the copy of the label or an error code.
+ */
+char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len)
+{
+	char *smack;
+	int i = smk_parse_label_len(string, len);
+
+	if (i < 0)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	smack = kstrndup(string, i, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!smack)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	return smack;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_netlbl_mls - convert a catset to netlabel mls categories
+ * @level: MLS sensitivity level
+ * @catset: the Smack categories
+ * @sap: where to put the netlabel categories
+ * @len: number of bytes for the levels in a CIPSO IP option
+ *
+ * Allocates and fills attr.mls
+ * Returns 0 on success, error code on failure.
+ */
+int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
+			int len)
+{
+	unsigned char *cp;
+	unsigned char m;
+	int cat;
+	int rc;
+	int byte;
+
+	sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+	sap->attr.mls.lvl = level;
+	sap->attr.mls.cat = NULL;
+
+	for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < len; cp++, byte++)
+		for (m = 0x80; m != 0; m >>= 1, cat++) {
+			if ((m & *cp) == 0)
+				continue;
+			rc = netlbl_catmap_setbit(&sap->attr.mls.cat,
+						  cat, GFP_NOFS);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				netlbl_catmap_free(sap->attr.mls.cat);
+				return rc;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_populate_secattr - fill in the smack_known netlabel information
+ * @skp: pointer to the structure to fill
+ *
+ * Populate the netlabel secattr structure for a Smack label.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 unless creating the category mapping fails
+ */
+int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp)
+{
+	int slen;
+
+	skp->smk_netlabel.attr.secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known;
+	skp->smk_netlabel.cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (skp->smk_netlabel.cache != NULL) {
+		skp->smk_netlabel.flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
+		skp->smk_netlabel.cache->free = NULL;
+		skp->smk_netlabel.cache->data = skp;
+	}
+	skp->smk_netlabel.flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID |
+				   NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL |
+				   NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN;
+	/*
+	 * If direct labeling works use it.
+	 * Otherwise use mapped labeling.
+	 */
+	slen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+	if (slen < SMK_CIPSOLEN)
+		return smk_netlbl_mls(smack_cipso_direct, skp->smk_known,
+				      &skp->smk_netlabel, slen);
+
+	return smk_netlbl_mls(smack_cipso_mapped, (char *)&skp->smk_secid,
+			      &skp->smk_netlabel, sizeof(skp->smk_secid));
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_import_valid_allocated_label - import a label, return the list entry
+ * @smack: a text string that is a valid Smack label and may be kfree()ed.
+ *         It is consumed: either becomes a part of the entry or kfree'ed.
+ * @gfp: Allocation type
+ *
+ * Returns: see description of smk_import_entry()
+ */
+static struct smack_known *
+smk_import_allocated_label(char *smack, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int rc;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
+
+	skp = smk_find_entry(smack);
+	if (skp != NULL)
+		goto freeout;
+
+	skp = kzalloc_obj(*skp, gfp);
+	if (skp == NULL) {
+		skp = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		goto freeout;
+	}
+
+	skp->smk_known = smack;
+	skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++;
+
+	rc = smack_populate_secattr(skp);
+	if (rc >= 0) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&skp->smk_rules);
+		mutex_init(&skp->smk_rules_lock);
+		/*
+		 * Make sure that the entry is actually
+		 * filled before putting it on the list.
+		 */
+		smk_insert_entry(skp);
+		goto unlockout;
+	}
+	kfree(skp);
+	skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
+freeout:
+	kfree(smack);
+unlockout:
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_known_lock);
+
+	return skp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_import_entry - import a label, return the list entry
+ * @string: a text string that might contain a Smack label at the beginning
+ * @len: the maximum size to look into, may be zero if string is null-terminated
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that
+ * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary,
+ * or an error code.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
+{
+	char *smack = smk_parse_smack(string, len);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(smack))
+		return ERR_CAST(smack);
+
+	return smk_import_allocated_label(smack, GFP_NOFS);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_import_valid_label - import a label, return the list entry
+ * @label: a text string that is a valid Smack label, not null-terminated
+ * @label_len: the length of the text string in the @label
+ * @gfp: the GFP mask used for allocating memory for the @label text string copy
+ *
+ * Return: see description of smk_import_entry()
+ */
+struct smack_known *
+smk_import_valid_label(const char *label, int label_len, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	char *smack = kstrndup(label, label_len, gfp);
+
+	if  (!smack)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	return smk_import_allocated_label(smack, gfp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
+ * @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label entry if there is one,
+ * otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+		if (skp->smk_secid == secid) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return skp;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we got this far someone asked for the translation
+	 * of a secid that is not on the list.
+	 */
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return &smack_known_huh;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unless a process is running with one of these labels
+ * even having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant
+ * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no labels are
+ * designated (the empty list case) capabilities apply to
+ * everyone.
+ */
+LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list);
+DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock);
+
+/**
+ * smack_privileged_cred - are all privilege requirements met by cred
+ * @cap: The requested capability
+ * @cred: the credential to use
+ *
+ * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by the onlycap rule.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the task is allowed to be privileged, false if it's not.
+ */
+bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
+	struct smack_known *skp = tsp->smk_task;
+	struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+	if (rc)
+		return false;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (list_empty(&smack_onlycap_list)) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(sklep, &smack_onlycap_list, list) {
+		if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_privileged - are all privilege requirements met
+ * @cap: The requested capability
+ *
+ * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by the onlycap rule.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the task is allowed to be privileged, false if it's not.
+ */
+bool smack_privileged(int cap)
+{
+	/*
+	 * All kernel tasks are privileged
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+		return true;
+
+	return smack_privileged_cred(cap, current_cred());
+}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ff115068c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5380 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ *  Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
+ *
+ *  Authors:
+ *	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *                Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
+ *  Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/icmpv6.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
+#include <linux/watch_queue.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring/cmd.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+#define TRANS_TRUE	"TRUE"
+#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE	4
+
+#define SMK_CONNECTING	0
+#define SMK_RECEIVING	1
+#define SMK_SENDING	2
+
+/*
+ * Smack uses multiple xattrs.
+ * SMACK64 - for access control,
+ * SMACK64TRANSMUTE - label initialization,
+ * Not saved on files - SMACK64IPIN and SMACK64IPOUT,
+ * Must be set explicitly - SMACK64EXEC and SMACK64MMAP
+ */
+#define SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 2
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
+static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
+#endif
+struct kmem_cache *smack_rule_cache;
+int smack_enabled __initdata;
+
+#define A(s) {"smack"#s, sizeof("smack"#s) - 1, Opt_##s}
+static struct {
+	const char *name;
+	int len;
+	int opt;
+} smk_mount_opts[] = {
+	{"smackfsdef", sizeof("smackfsdef") - 1, Opt_fsdefault},
+	A(fsdefault), A(fsfloor), A(fshat), A(fsroot), A(fstransmute)
+};
+#undef A
+
+static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(smk_mount_opts); i++) {
+		size_t len = smk_mount_opts[i].len;
+		if (len > l || memcmp(s, smk_mount_opts[i].name, len))
+			continue;
+		if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
+			continue;
+		*arg = s + len + 1;
+		return smk_mount_opts[i].opt;
+	}
+	return Opt_error;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
+	"Bringup Error",	/* Unused */
+	"Bringup",		/* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
+	"Unconfined Subject",	/* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
+	"Unconfined Object",	/* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
+};
+
+static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
+{
+	smack_str_from_perm(s, mode);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
+		       struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
+{
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
+			  int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
+		acc, current->comm, note);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct_obj(otp);
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
+		current->comm, otp->comm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+		pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %llu) %s\n",
+			inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+	if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
+	    (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %llu) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
+		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+		pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %llu) %s\n",
+			inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %llu %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
+		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
+		current->comm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+				int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
+	struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+		pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %llu) %s\n",
+			inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %llu %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
+		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
+		current->comm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
+ * @name: type of the label (attribute)
+ * @ip: a pointer to the inode
+ * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
+ * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
+					struct dentry *dp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *buffer;
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+
+	if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+
+	buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (buffer == NULL)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
+	else if (rc == 0)
+		skp = NULL;
+	else
+		skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
+
+	kfree(buffer);
+
+	return skp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * init_inode_smack - initialize an inode security blob
+ * @inode: inode to extract the info from
+ * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
+ *
+ */
+static void init_inode_smack(struct inode *inode, struct smack_known *skp)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
+
+	isp->smk_inode = skp;
+	isp->smk_flags = 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * init_task_smack - initialize a task security blob
+ * @tsp: blob to initialize
+ * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
+ * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
+ *
+ */
+static void init_task_smack(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *task,
+					struct smack_known *forked)
+{
+	tsp->smk_task = task;
+	tsp->smk_forked = forked;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
+	mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
+ * @nhead: new rules header pointer
+ * @ohead: old rules header pointer
+ * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
+ */
+static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
+				gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct smack_rule *nrp;
+	struct smack_rule *orp;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
+		nrp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_rule_cache, gfp);
+		if (nrp == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+		*nrp = *orp;
+		list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
+ * @nhead: new rules header pointer
+ * @ohead: old rules header pointer
+ * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
+ */
+static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
+				gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
+	struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
+		nklep = kzalloc_obj(struct smack_known_list_elem, gfp);
+		if (nklep == NULL) {
+			smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
+		list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
+ * @mode: input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
+ *
+ * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
+ */
+static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
+{
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
+		return MAY_READWRITE;
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
+		return MAY_READ;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
+ * @tracer: tracer process
+ * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
+ * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
+ */
+static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
+				 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
+				 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct smack_known *tracer_known;
+	const struct cred *tracercred;
+
+	if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
+		saip = &ad;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	tracercred = __task_cred(tracer);
+	tsp = smack_cred(tracercred);
+	tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
+
+	if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
+	    (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
+	     smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
+		if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
+			rc = 0;
+		else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
+			rc = -EACCES;
+		else if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_SYS_PTRACE, tracercred))
+			rc = 0;
+		else
+			rc = -EACCES;
+
+		if (saip)
+			smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
+				  tracee_known->smk_known,
+				  0, rc, saip);
+
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
+	rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hooks.
+ * We he, that is fun!
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * @ctp: child task pointer
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Do the capability checks.
+ */
+static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(ctp);
+
+	return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
+ * @ptp: parent task pointer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
+ */
+static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
+
+	return smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
+ * @typefrom_file: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
+		rc = -EACCES;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Superblock Hooks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sb);
+
+	sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
+	sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
+	sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
+	sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
+	/*
+	 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
+	 */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct smack_mnt_opts {
+	const char *fsdefault;
+	const char *fsfloor;
+	const char *fshat;
+	const char *fsroot;
+	const char *fstransmute;
+};
+
+static void smack_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
+{
+	kfree(mnt_opts);
+}
+
+static int smack_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
+{
+	struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	if (!opts) {
+		opts = kzalloc_obj(struct smack_mnt_opts);
+		if (!opts)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		*mnt_opts = opts;
+	}
+	if (!s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	skp = smk_import_entry(s, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(skp))
+		return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+	switch (token) {
+	case Opt_fsdefault:
+		if (opts->fsdefault)
+			goto out_opt_err;
+		opts->fsdefault = skp->smk_known;
+		break;
+	case Opt_fsfloor:
+		if (opts->fsfloor)
+			goto out_opt_err;
+		opts->fsfloor = skp->smk_known;
+		break;
+	case Opt_fshat:
+		if (opts->fshat)
+			goto out_opt_err;
+		opts->fshat = skp->smk_known;
+		break;
+	case Opt_fsroot:
+		if (opts->fsroot)
+			goto out_opt_err;
+		opts->fsroot = skp->smk_known;
+		break;
+	case Opt_fstransmute:
+		if (opts->fstransmute)
+			goto out_opt_err;
+		opts->fstransmute = skp->smk_known;
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+out_opt_err:
+	pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_fs_context_submount - Initialise security data for a filesystem context
+ * @fc: The filesystem context.
+ * @reference: reference superblock
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc,
+				 struct super_block *reference)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+	struct smack_mnt_opts *ctx;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+
+	ctx = kzalloc_obj(*ctx);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	fc->security = ctx;
+
+	sbsp = smack_superblock(reference);
+	isp = smack_inode(reference->s_root->d_inode);
+
+	if (sbsp->smk_default) {
+		ctx->fsdefault = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_default->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctx->fsdefault)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (sbsp->smk_floor) {
+		ctx->fsfloor = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_floor->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctx->fsfloor)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (sbsp->smk_hat) {
+		ctx->fshat = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_hat->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctx->fshat)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
+		if (sbsp->smk_root) {
+			ctx->fstransmute = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_root->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!ctx->fstransmute)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_fs_context_dup - Duplicate the security data on fs_context duplication
+ * @fc: The new filesystem context.
+ * @src_fc: The source filesystem context being duplicated.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
+				struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+	struct smack_mnt_opts *dst, *src = src_fc->security;
+
+	if (!src)
+		return 0;
+
+	fc->security = kzalloc_obj(struct smack_mnt_opts);
+	if (!fc->security)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	dst = fc->security;
+	dst->fsdefault = src->fsdefault;
+	dst->fsfloor = src->fsfloor;
+	dst->fshat = src->fshat;
+	dst->fsroot = src->fsroot;
+	dst->fstransmute = src->fstransmute;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec smack_fs_parameters[] = {
+	fsparam_string("smackfsdef",		Opt_fsdefault),
+	fsparam_string("smackfsdefault",	Opt_fsdefault),
+	fsparam_string("smackfsfloor",		Opt_fsfloor),
+	fsparam_string("smackfshat",		Opt_fshat),
+	fsparam_string("smackfsroot",		Opt_fsroot),
+	fsparam_string("smackfstransmute",	Opt_fstransmute),
+	{}
+};
+
+/**
+ * smack_fs_context_parse_param - Parse a single mount parameter
+ * @fc: The new filesystem context being constructed.
+ * @param: The parameter.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOPARAM to pass the parameter on or anything else on
+ * error.
+ */
+static int smack_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+					struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+	struct fs_parse_result result;
+	int opt, rc;
+
+	opt = fs_parse(fc, smack_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+	if (opt < 0)
+		return opt;
+
+	rc = smack_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
+	if (!rc)
+		param->string = NULL;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
+{
+	char *from = options, *to = options;
+	bool first = true;
+
+	while (1) {
+		char *next = strchr(from, ',');
+		int token, len, rc;
+		char *arg = NULL;
+
+		if (next)
+			len = next - from;
+		else
+			len = strlen(from);
+
+		token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
+		if (token != Opt_error) {
+			arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, from + len - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
+			rc = smack_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
+			kfree(arg);
+			if (unlikely(rc)) {
+				if (*mnt_opts)
+					smack_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
+				*mnt_opts = NULL;
+				return rc;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (!first) {	// copy with preceding comma
+				from--;
+				len++;
+			}
+			if (to != from)
+				memmove(to, from, len);
+			to += len;
+			first = false;
+		}
+		if (!from[len])
+			break;
+		from += len + 1;
+	}
+	*to = '\0';
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
+ * @sb: the file system superblock
+ * @mnt_opts: Smack mount options
+ * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
+ * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ *
+ * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
+ * labels.
+ */
+static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
+		void *mnt_opts,
+		unsigned long kern_flags,
+		unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
+	struct superblock_smack *sp = smack_superblock(sb);
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
+	bool transmute = false;
+
+	if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+		/*
+		 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
+		 */
+		if (opts)
+			return -EPERM;
+		/*
+		 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
+		 */
+		skp = smk_of_current();
+		sp->smk_root = skp;
+		sp->smk_default = skp;
+		/*
+		 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
+		 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
+		 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
+		 */
+		if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
+		    sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
+		    sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
+			transmute = true;
+			sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
+		}
+	}
+
+	sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
+
+	if (opts) {
+		if (opts->fsdefault) {
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsdefault, 0);
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_default = skp;
+		}
+		if (opts->fsfloor) {
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsfloor, 0);
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_floor = skp;
+		}
+		if (opts->fshat) {
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fshat, 0);
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_hat = skp;
+		}
+		if (opts->fsroot) {
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsroot, 0);
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_root = skp;
+		}
+		if (opts->fstransmute) {
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fstransmute, 0);
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_root = skp;
+			transmute = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize the root inode.
+	 */
+	init_inode_smack(inode, sp->smk_root);
+
+	if (transmute) {
+		isp = smack_inode(inode);
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
+ * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
+ * and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbp = smack_superblock(dentry->d_sb);
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * BPRM hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_bprm_creds_for_exec - Update bprm->cred if needed for exec
+ * @bprm: the exec information
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
+	struct task_smack *bsp = smack_cred(bprm->cred);
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+	int rc;
+
+	isp = smack_inode(inode);
+	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
+		return 0;
+
+	sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
+	if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
+	    isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
+		struct task_struct *tracer;
+		rc = 0;
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
+		if (likely(tracer != NULL))
+			rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
+						   isp->smk_task,
+						   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
+						   __func__);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	if (bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
+	bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+	/* Decide if this is a secure exec. */
+	if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
+		bprm->secureexec = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inode hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
+ * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+	init_inode_smack(inode, skp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_rule_transmutes - does access rule for (subject,object) contain 't'?
+ * @subject: a pointer to the subject's Smack label entry
+ * @object: a pointer to the object's Smack label entry
+ */
+static bool
+smk_rule_transmutes(struct smack_known *subject,
+	      const struct smack_known *object)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	may = smk_access_entry(subject->smk_known, object->smk_known,
+			       &subject->smk_rules);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return (may > 0) && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE);
+}
+
+static int
+xattr_dupval(struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count,
+	     const char *name, const void *value, unsigned int vallen)
+{
+	struct xattr * const xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
+
+	if (!xattr)
+		return 0;
+
+	xattr->value = kmemdup(value, vallen, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!xattr->value)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	xattr->value_len = vallen;
+	xattr->name = name;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
+ * @inode: the newly created inode
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @qstr: unused
+ * @xattrs: where to put the attributes
+ * @xattr_count: current number of LSM-provided xattrs (updated)
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
+ */
+static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				     const struct qstr *qstr,
+				     struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct inode_smack * const issp = smack_inode(inode);
+	struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
+	int rc = 0;
+	int transflag = 0;
+	bool trans_cred;
+	bool trans_rule;
+
+	/*
+	 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data. Let
+	 * UDS inode have fixed * label to keep smack_inode_permission() calm
+	 * when called from unix_find_bsd()
+	 */
+	if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
+		/* forced label, no need to save to xattrs */
+		issp->smk_inode = &smack_known_star;
+		goto instant_inode;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If equal, transmuting already occurred in
+	 * smack_dentry_create_files_as(). No need to check again.
+	 */
+	trans_cred = (tsp->smk_task == tsp->smk_transmuted);
+	if (!trans_cred)
+		trans_rule = smk_rule_transmutes(smk_of_task(tsp), dsp);
+
+	/*
+	 * In addition to having smk_task equal to smk_transmuted,
+	 * if the access rule allows transmutation and the directory
+	 * requests transmutation then by all means transmute.
+	 * Mark the inode as changed.
+	 */
+	if (trans_cred || (trans_rule && smk_inode_transmutable(dir))) {
+		/*
+		 * The caller of smack_dentry_create_files_as()
+		 * should have overridden the current cred, so the
+		 * inode label was already set correctly in
+		 * smack_inode_alloc_security().
+		 */
+		if (!trans_cred)
+			issp->smk_inode = dsp;
+
+		if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
+			transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+
+			if (xattr_dupval(xattrs, xattr_count,
+				XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE,
+				TRANS_TRUE,
+				TRANS_TRUE_SIZE
+			))
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (rc == 0)
+		if (xattr_dupval(xattrs, xattr_count,
+			    XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX,
+			    issp->smk_inode->smk_known,
+		     strlen(issp->smk_inode->smk_known)
+		))
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+instant_inode:
+	issp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
+ * @old_dentry: the existing object
+ * @dir: unused
+ * @new_dentry: the new object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
+			    struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct smack_known *isp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
+
+	isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
+	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+
+	if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
+		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: file to unlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
+ * and the object, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	/*
+	 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
+	 */
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
+		 */
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: directory to unlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
+ * and the directory, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	/*
+	 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
+	 */
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
+		 */
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
+ * @old_inode: unused
+ * @old_dentry: the old object
+ * @new_inode: unused
+ * @new_dentry: the new object
+ *
+ * Read and write access is required on both the old and
+ * new directories.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
+			      struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			      struct inode *new_inode,
+			      struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct smack_known *isp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
+
+	isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
+	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
+
+	if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
+		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
+ * @inode: the inode in question
+ * @mask: the access requested
+ *
+ * This is the important Smack hook.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
+	int rc;
+
+	mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
+	/*
+	 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
+	 */
+	if (mask == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
+		if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
+			return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	/* May be droppable after audit */
+	if (no_block)
+		return -ECHILD;
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @iattr: for the force flag
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			       struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
+	 */
+	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
+		return 0;
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
+ * @path: path to extract the info from
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_xattr_skipcap - Skip the xattr capability checks?
+ * @name: name of the xattr
+ *
+ * Returns 1 to indicate that Smack "owns" the access control rights to xattrs
+ * named @name; the LSM layer should avoid enforcing any traditional
+ * capability based access controls on this xattr.  Returns 0 to indicate that
+ * Smack does not "own" the access control rights to xattrs named @name and is
+ * deferring to the LSM layer for further access controls, including capability
+ * based controls.
+ */
+static int smack_inode_xattr_skipcap(const char *name)
+{
+	if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, strlen(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ * @value: value of the attribute
+ * @size: size of the value
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int check_priv = 0;
+	int check_import = 0;
+	int check_star = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+	umode_t const i_mode = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_mode;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * UDS inode has fixed label
+		 */
+		if (S_ISSOCK(i_mode)) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		} else {
+			check_priv = 1;
+			check_import = 1;
+		}
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
+		   strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
+		check_priv = 1;
+		check_import = 1;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+		   strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+		check_priv = 1;
+		check_import = 1;
+		check_star = 1;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+		check_priv = 1;
+		if (!S_ISDIR(i_mode) ||
+		    size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
+		    strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		rc = -EPERM;
+
+	if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
+		skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
+		if (IS_ERR(skp))
+			rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+		else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
+		    (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
+ * @dentry: object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: attribute size
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
+ * in the master label list.
+ */
+static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+		if (!IS_ERR(skp))
+			isp->smk_inode = skp;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+		if (!IS_ERR(skp))
+			isp->smk_task = skp;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+		if (!IS_ERR(skp))
+			isp->smk_mmap = skp;
+	}
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ *
+ * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				   struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+			rc = -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+	/*
+	 * Don't do anything special for these.
+	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
+	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
+	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACK if S_ISSOCK (UDS inode has fixed label)
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
+		if (!S_ISSOCK(d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_mode)) {
+			struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
+			struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
+
+			isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
+		}
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
+		isp->smk_task = NULL;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
+		isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
+		isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_set_acl - Smack check for setting posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ * @kacl: the posix acls
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			       struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+			       struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_get_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			       struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_remove_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				  struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @buffer: where to put the result
+ * @alloc: duplicate memory
+ *
+ * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				   struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				   void **buffer, bool alloc)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct super_block *sbp;
+	struct inode *ip = inode;
+	struct smack_known *isp;
+	struct inode_smack *ispp;
+	size_t label_len;
+	char *label = NULL;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+		ispp = smack_inode(inode);
+		if (ispp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE)
+			label = TRANS_TRUE;
+		else
+			label = "";
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
+		 */
+		sbp = ip->i_sb;
+		if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+		sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
+		if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+		ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+
+		if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
+			isp = ssp->smk_in;
+		else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
+			isp = ssp->smk_out;
+		else
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	if (!label)
+		label = isp->smk_known;
+
+	label_len = strlen(label);
+
+	if (alloc) {
+		*buffer = kstrdup(label, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (*buffer == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	return label_len;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @buffer: where they go
+ * @remaining_size: size of buffer
+ */
+static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char **buffer,
+				    ssize_t *remaining_size)
+{
+	return xattr_list_one(buffer, remaining_size, XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getlsmprop - Extract inode's security id
+ * @inode: inode to extract the info from
+ * @prop: where result will be saved
+ */
+static void smack_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	prop->smack.skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+}
+
+/*
+ * File Hooks
+ */
+
+/*
+ * There is no smack_file_permission hook
+ *
+ * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
+ * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
+ * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
+ *
+ * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
+ * label changing that SELinux does.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
+ * label list, so no allocation is done.
+ *
+ * f_security is the owner security information. It
+ * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
+
+	*blob = smk_of_current();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: what to do
+ * @arg: unused
+ *
+ * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			    unsigned long arg)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+
+	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	}
+
+	if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: what action to check
+ * @arg: unused
+ *
+ * Generally these operations are harmless.
+ * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
+ * for passing information, so they require write access.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			    unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case F_GETLK:
+		break;
+	case F_SETLK:
+	case F_SETLKW:
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
+		break;
+	case F_SETOWN:
+	case F_SETSIG:
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_mmap_file - Check permissions for a mmap operation.
+ * @file: contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
+ * @reqprot: contains the protection requested by the application.
+ * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @flags: contains the operational flags.
+ *
+ * The @file may be NULL, e.g. if mapping anonymous memory.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
+			   unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
+			   unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *mkp;
+	struct smack_rule *srp;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct smack_known *okp;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+	int may;
+	int mmay;
+	int tmay;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (file == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file))))
+		return 0;
+
+	isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
+	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	sbsp = smack_superblock(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
+	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
+	    isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
+		return -EACCES;
+	mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
+
+	tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	skp = smk_of_current();
+	rc = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	/*
+	 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
+	 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
+	 * to that rule's object label.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
+		okp = srp->smk_object;
+		/*
+		 * Matching labels always allows access.
+		 */
+		if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * If there is a matching local rule take
+		 * that into account as well.
+		 */
+		may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
+				       okp->smk_known,
+				       &tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (may == -ENOENT)
+			may = srp->smk_access;
+		else
+			may &= srp->smk_access;
+		/*
+		 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
+		 * possibly have less access.
+		 */
+		if (may == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * Fetch the global list entry.
+		 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
+		 * can't have as much access as current.
+		 */
+		mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
+					&mkp->smk_rules);
+		if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
+			rc = -EACCES;
+			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
+		 * potential access, too.
+		 */
+		tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
+					&tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (tmay != -ENOENT)
+			mmay &= tmay;
+
+		/*
+		 * If there is any access available to current that is
+		 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
+		 * deny access.
+		 */
+		if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
+			rc = -EACCES;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
+ * @file: object in question
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
+
+	*blob = smk_of_current();
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
+ * @tsk: The target task
+ * @fown: the object the signal come from
+ * @signum: unused
+ *
+ * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
+ * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				     struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(tsk->cred));
+	const struct cred *tcred;
+	struct file *file;
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	/*
+	 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
+	 */
+	file = fown->file;
+
+	/* we don't log here as rc can be overridden */
+	blob = smack_file(file);
+	skp = *blob;
+	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	tcred = __task_cred(tsk);
+	if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, tcred))
+		rc = 0;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
+	smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+	int rc;
+	int may = 0;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+
+	if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
+		sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
+		ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+		tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+		/*
+		 * If the receiving process can't write to the
+		 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
+		 * write to the receiving process don't accept
+		 * the passed socket.
+		 */
+		rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			return rc;
+		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * This code relies on bitmasks.
+	 */
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+		may = MAY_READ;
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		may |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * Set the security blob in the file structure.
+ * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
+ * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
+ * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_open(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+	rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Task hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
+ * @cred: the new credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification.  This must allocate all
+ * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
+ * complete without error.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	init_task_smack(smack_cred(cred), NULL, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
+ * @cred: the credentials in question
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
+	struct smack_rule *rp;
+	struct list_head *l;
+	struct list_head *n;
+
+	smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
+
+	list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
+		rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
+		list_del(&rp->list);
+		kmem_cache_free(smack_rule_cache, rp);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+			      gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
+	struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
+	int rc;
+
+	init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
+
+	rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
+				gfp);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ *
+ * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
+	struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
+
+	init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure
+ * @cred: the object creds
+ * @secid: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_getlsmprop - get the Smack label for a creds structure
+ * @cred: the object creds
+ * @prop: where to put the data
+ *
+ * Sets the Smack part of the ref
+ */
+static void smack_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *cred,
+				  struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	prop->smack.skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
+ * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
+ * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
+ *
+ * Set the security data for a kernel service.
+ */
+static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+	struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
+
+	new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
+ * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
+ * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
+ *
+ * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
+ * as the objective context of the specified inode
+ */
+static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
+					struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(new);
+
+	tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
+	tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @access: the access requested
+ * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
+ *
+ * Return 0 if access is permitted
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
+				const char *caller)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+	rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @pgid: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
+ * @p: the object task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
+ * @p: the object task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_current_getlsmprop_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task
+ * @prop: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's subjective smack label.
+ */
+static void smack_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	prop->smack.skp = smk_of_current();
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getlsmprop_obj - get the objective data of the task
+ * @p: the task
+ * @prop: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's objective smack label.
+ */
+static void smack_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+				      struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	prop->smack.skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @nice: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @ioprio: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @info: unused
+ * @sig: unused
+ * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ *
+ */
+static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
+			   int sig, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!sig)
+		return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+	/*
+	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
+	 * can write the receiver.
+	 */
+	if (cred == NULL) {
+		rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO
+	 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
+	 * we can't take privilege into account.
+	 */
+	skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
+ * @p: task to copy from
+ * @inode: inode to copy to
+ *
+ * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
+ */
+static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
+
+	isp->smk_inode = skp;
+	isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Socket hooks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @family: unused
+ * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
+ *
+ * Assign Smack pointers to current
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
+ */
+static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
+
+	/*
+	 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
+		ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
+		ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
+	} else {
+		ssp->smk_in = skp;
+		ssp->smk_out = skp;
+	}
+	ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+/**
+ * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct smk_port_label *spp;
+
+	if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+			if (spp->smk_sock != sk)
+				continue;
+			spp->smk_can_reuse = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_clone_security - Copy security context
+ * @sk: the old socket
+ * @newsk: the new socket
+ *
+ * Copy the security context of the old socket pointer to the cloned
+ */
+static void smack_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp_old = smack_sock(sk);
+	struct socket_smack *ssp_new = smack_sock(newsk);
+
+	*ssp_new = *ssp_old;
+}
+
+/**
+* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
+* @sip: the object end
+*
+* looks for host based access restrictions
+*
+* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
+* hosts.  The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
+* taken before calling this function.
+*
+* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+*/
+static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
+{
+	struct smk_net4addr *snp;
+	struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
+
+	if (siap->s_addr == 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
+		/*
+		 * we break after finding the first match because
+		 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
+		 * so we have found the most specific match
+		 */
+		if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
+		    (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
+			return snp->smk_label;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/*
+ * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
+ * @sip: the address
+ *
+ * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
+ */
+static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+	__be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
+	__be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
+
+	if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
+	    ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+* smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
+* @sip: the object end
+*
+* looks for host based access restrictions
+*
+* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
+* hosts.  The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
+* taken before calling this function.
+*
+* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+*/
+static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+	struct smk_net6addr *snp;
+	struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
+	int i;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
+	 */
+	if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
+		return NULL;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
+		/*
+		 * If the label is NULL the entry has
+		 * been renounced. Ignore it.
+		 */
+		if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		* we break after finding the first match because
+		* the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
+		* so we have found the most specific match
+		*/
+		for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+			if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
+			    snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
+				found = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (found)
+			return snp->smk_label;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+/**
+ * smack_netlbl_add - Set the secattr on a socket
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Attach the outbound smack value (smk_out) to the socket.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
+	struct smack_known *skp = ssp->smk_out;
+	int rc;
+
+	local_bh_disable();
+	bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+
+	rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel,
+				 netlbl_sk_lock_check(sk));
+	switch (rc) {
+	case 0:
+		ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_LABELED;
+		break;
+	case -EDESTADDRREQ:
+		ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_REQSKB;
+		rc = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+	local_bh_enable();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_netlbl_delete - Remove the secattr from a socket
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Remove the outbound smack value from a socket
+ */
+static void smack_netlbl_delete(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
+
+	/*
+	 * Take the label off the socket if one is set.
+	 */
+	if (ssp->smk_state != SMK_NETLBL_LABELED)
+		return;
+
+	local_bh_disable();
+	bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+	netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
+	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+	local_bh_enable();
+	ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_UNLABELED;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ipv4_check - Perform IPv4 host access checks
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @sap: the destination address
+ *
+ * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
+ * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
+ *
+ */
+static int smk_ipv4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct smack_known *hkp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
+	if (hkp != NULL) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+		ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
+		ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
+		ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
+#endif
+		skp = ssp->smk_out;
+		rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		/*
+		 * Clear the socket netlabel if it's set.
+		 */
+		if (!rc)
+			smack_netlbl_delete(sk);
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
+ * @subject: subject Smack label
+ * @object: object Smack label
+ * @address: address
+ * @act: the action being taken
+ *
+ * Check an IPv6 access
+ */
+static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
+				struct smack_known *object,
+				struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+	ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
+	ad.a.u.net->dport = address->sin6_port;
+	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
+		ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
+	else
+		ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @address: address
+ *
+ * Create or update the port list entry
+ */
+static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+	struct smk_port_label *spp;
+	unsigned short port = 0;
+
+	if (address == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * This operation is changing the Smack information
+		 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
+		 * as well.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+			if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
+				continue;
+			spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+			spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
+		 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return;
+	}
+
+	addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+	port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+	/*
+	 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
+	 */
+	if (port == 0)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Look for an existing port list entry.
+	 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
+	 */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+		if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sock->type)
+			continue;
+		if (spp->smk_can_reuse != 1) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return;
+		}
+		spp->smk_port = port;
+		spp->smk_sock = sk;
+		spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+		spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+		spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	/*
+	 * A new port entry is required.
+	 */
+	spp = kzalloc_obj(*spp);
+	if (spp == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	spp->smk_port = port;
+	spp->smk_sock = sk;
+	spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+	spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+	spp->smk_sock_type = sock->type;
+	spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
+	list_add_rcu(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
+ * @sk: socket
+ * @address: address
+ * @act: the action being taken
+ *
+ * Create or update the port list entry
+ */
+static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
+				int act)
+{
+	struct smk_port_label *spp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+	unsigned short port;
+	struct smack_known *object;
+
+	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
+		skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
+		object = ssp->smk_in;
+	} else {
+		skp = ssp->smk_out;
+		object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The other end is a single label host.
+	 */
+	if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
+		return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
+	if (skp == NULL)
+		skp = smack_net_ambient;
+	if (object == NULL)
+		object = smack_net_ambient;
+
+	/*
+	 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
+	 */
+	if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
+		return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
+
+	/*
+	 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
+	 */
+	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
+		return 0;
+
+	port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+		if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sk->sk_type)
+			continue;
+		object = spp->smk_in;
+		if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
+			ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
+		break;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: size of the attribute
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct inode_smack *nsp = smack_inode(inode);
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
+		    strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+	if (IS_ERR(skp))
+		return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+		nsp->smk_inode = skp;
+		nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
+	 */
+	if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
+	if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
+		ssp->smk_in = skp;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
+		ssp->smk_out = skp;
+		if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
+			rc = smack_netlbl_add(sock->sk);
+			if (rc != 0)
+				printk(KERN_WARNING
+					"Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
+					__func__, -rc);
+		}
+	} else
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
+		smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
+#endif
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @type: unused
+ * @protocol: unused
+ * @kern: unused
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				    int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+	if (sock->sk == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
+		ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+		ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
+		ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
+	}
+
+	if (family != PF_INET)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Set the outbound netlbl.
+	 */
+	return smack_netlbl_add(sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_socketpair - create socket pair
+ * @socka: one socket
+ * @sockb: another socket
+ *
+ * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
+		                   struct socket *sockb)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+	struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
+
+	asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
+	bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+/**
+ * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @address: the port address
+ * @addrlen: size of the address
+ *
+ * Records the label bound to a port.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+				int addrlen)
+{
+	if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
+		if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 ||
+		    address->sa_family != AF_INET6)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @sap: the other end
+ * @addrlen: size of sap
+ *
+ * Verifies that a connection may be possible
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
+				int addrlen)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (sock->sk == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
+	    (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
+		return 0;
+	if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+		return 0;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	if (sap->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+		struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
+		struct smack_known *rsp = NULL;
+
+		if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+			return 0;
+		if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING))
+			rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
+		if (rsp != NULL) {
+			struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+
+			rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
+					    SMK_CONNECTING);
+		}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif
+
+		return rc;
+	}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+	if (sap->sa_family != AF_INET || addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+		return 0;
+	rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
+ * @flags: the S_ value
+ *
+ * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
+ */
+static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
+{
+	int may = 0;
+
+	if (flags & S_IRUGO)
+		may |= MAY_READ;
+	if (flags & S_IWUGO)
+		may |= MAY_WRITE;
+	if (flags & S_IXUGO)
+		may |= MAY_EXEC;
+
+	return may;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
+ * @msg: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_msg_msg(msg);
+
+	*blob = smk_of_current();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_ipc - the smack pointer for the ipc
+ * @isp: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smack_of_ipc(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
+
+	return *blob;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ipc_alloc_security - Set the security blob for ipc
+ * @isp: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
+
+	*blob = smk_of_current();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
+ * @isp : the object
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_shm(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
+{
+	struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @shmflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int shmflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
+	return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT_ANY:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+	case SHM_LOCK:
+	case SHM_UNLOCK:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SHM_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @shmaddr: unused
+ * @shmflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, char __user *shmaddr,
+			   int shmflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
+	return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
+ * @isp : the object
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_sem(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
+{
+	struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @semflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int semflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
+	return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_semctl - Smack access check for sem
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case GETPID:
+	case GETNCNT:
+	case GETZCNT:
+	case GETVAL:
+	case GETALL:
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT_ANY:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case SETVAL:
+	case SETALL:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+	case IPC_SET:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SEM_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @sops: unused
+ * @nsops: unused
+ * @alter: unused
+ *
+ * Treated as read and write in all cases.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct sembuf *sops,
+			   unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_sem(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
+ * @isp : the msq
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_msq(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
+{
+	struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @msqflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int msqflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+	return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT_ANY:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case MSG_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @msg: unused
+ * @msqflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg,
+				  int msqflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+	return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgrcv - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @msg: unused
+ * @target: unused
+ * @type: unused
+ * @mode: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp,
+				  struct msg_msg *msg,
+				  struct task_struct *target, long type,
+				  int mode)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
+ * @ipp: the object permissions
+ * @flag: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
+	struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
+	int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ipc_getlsmprop - Extract smack security data
+ * @ipp: the object permissions
+ * @prop: where result will be saved
+ */
+static void smack_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	struct smack_known **iskpp = smack_ipc(ipp);
+
+	prop->smack.skp = *iskpp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
+ * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
+ * @inode: the object
+ *
+ * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
+ */
+static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct super_block *sbp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
+	struct smack_known *final;
+	char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
+	int transflag = 0;
+	int rc;
+	struct dentry *dp;
+
+	if (inode == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	isp = smack_inode(inode);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the inode is already instantiated
+	 * take the quick way out
+	 */
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
+		return;
+
+	sbp = inode->i_sb;
+	sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
+	/*
+	 * We're going to use the superblock default label
+	 * if there's no label on the file.
+	 */
+	final = sbsp->smk_default;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is the root inode the superblock
+	 * may be in the process of initialization.
+	 * If that is the case use the root value out
+	 * of the superblock.
+	 */
+	if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
+		switch (sbp->s_magic) {
+		case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
+			/*
+			 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
+			 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
+			 * options.
+			 */
+			sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
+			sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
+			isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
+			break;
+		case TMPFS_MAGIC:
+			/*
+			 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
+			 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
+			 */
+			isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
+			break;
+		case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
+			isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
+			break;
+		case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
+			/*
+			 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
+			 * structures associated with the task involved.
+			 */
+			isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_star;
+			break;
+		default:
+			isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
+			break;
+		}
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This is pretty hackish.
+	 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
+	 * file system specific code, but it does help
+	 * with keeping it simple.
+	 */
+	switch (sbp->s_magic) {
+	case SMACK_MAGIC:
+	case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
+	case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
+		 * that the smack file system doesn't do
+		 * extended attributes.
+		 *
+		 * Cgroupfs is special
+		 */
+		final = &smack_known_star;
+		break;
+	case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
+		 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
+		 * pty with respect.
+		 */
+		final = ckp;
+		break;
+	case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
+		 * The superblock default suffices.
+		 */
+		break;
+	case TMPFS_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
+		 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
+		 * getting recreated on every reboot.
+		 */
+		final = &smack_known_star;
+		/*
+		 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
+		 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
+		 * to set mount options simulate setting the
+		 * superblock default.
+		 */
+		fallthrough;
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * This isn't an understood special case.
+		 * Get the value from the xattr.
+		 */
+
+		/*
+		 * UDS inode has fixed label (*)
+		 */
+		if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
+			final = &smack_known_star;
+			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
+		 * Use the aforeapplied default.
+		 * It would be curious if the label of the task
+		 * does not match that assigned.
+		 */
+		if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
+		        break;
+		/*
+		 * Get the dentry for xattr.
+		 */
+		dp = dget(opt_dentry);
+		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
+		if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
+			final = skp;
+
+		/*
+		 * Transmuting directory
+		 */
+		if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
+			/*
+			 * If this is a new directory and the label was
+			 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
+			 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
+			 * and mark the inode.
+			 *
+			 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
+			 * directory mark the inode.
+			 */
+			rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
+					    XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
+					    TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
+			if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
+					       TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+			if (rc >= 0)
+				transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
+		 */
+		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+		    skp == &smack_known_web)
+			skp = NULL;
+		isp->smk_task = skp;
+
+		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
+		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+		    skp == &smack_known_web)
+			skp = NULL;
+		isp->smk_mmap = skp;
+
+		dput(dp);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (final == NULL)
+		isp->smk_inode = ckp;
+	else
+		isp->smk_inode = final;
+
+	isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_getselfattr - Smack current process attribute
+ * @attr: which attribute to fetch
+ * @ctx: buffer to receive the result
+ * @size: available size in, actual size out
+ * @flags: reserved, currently zero
+ *
+ * Fill the passed user space @ctx with the details of the requested
+ * attribute.
+ *
+ * Returns the number of attributes on success, an error code otherwise.
+ * There will only ever be one attribute.
+ */
+static int smack_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx,
+			     u32 *size, u32 flags)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	if (attr != LSM_ATTR_CURRENT)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	skp = smk_of_current();
+	rc = lsm_fill_user_ctx(ctx, size,
+			       skp->smk_known, strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1,
+			       LSM_ID_SMACK, 0);
+	return (!rc ? 1 : rc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
+ * @value: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *name, char **value)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
+	char *cp;
+	int slen;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (cp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	slen = strlen(cp);
+	*value = cp;
+	return slen;
+}
+
+/**
+ * do_setattr - Smack process attribute setting
+ * @attr: the ID of the attribute
+ * @value: the value to set
+ * @size: the size of the value
+ *
+ * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
+ * is permitted and only with privilege
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success or an error code
+ */
+static int do_setattr(unsigned int attr, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct cred *new;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int label_len;
+
+	/*
+	 * let unprivileged user validate input, check permissions later
+	 */
+	if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	label_len = smk_parse_label_len(value, size);
+	if (label_len < 0 || label_len != size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label
+	 * and the star ("*") label.
+	 */
+	if (label_len == 1 /* '@', '*' */) {
+		const char c = *(const char *)value;
+
+		if (c == *smack_known_web.smk_known ||
+		    c == *smack_known_star.smk_known)
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+		const struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
+		list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list) {
+			const char *cp = sklep->smk_label->smk_known;
+
+			if (strlen(cp) == label_len &&
+			    strncmp(cp, value, label_len) == 0)
+				goto in_relabel;
+		}
+		return -EPERM;
+in_relabel:
+		;
+	}
+
+	skp = smk_import_valid_label(value, label_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (IS_ERR(skp))
+		return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (new == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	tsp = smack_cred(new);
+	tsp->smk_task = skp;
+	/*
+	 * process can change its label only once
+	 */
+	smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_setselfattr - Set a Smack process attribute
+ * @attr: which attribute to set
+ * @ctx: buffer containing the data
+ * @size: size of @ctx
+ * @flags: reserved, must be zero
+ *
+ * Fill the passed user space @ctx with the details of the requested
+ * attribute.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx,
+			     u32 size, u32 flags)
+{
+	if (attr != LSM_ATTR_CURRENT)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (ctx->flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * string must have \0 terminator, included in ctx->ctx
+	 * (see description of struct lsm_ctx)
+	 */
+	if (ctx->ctx_len == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ctx->ctx[ctx->ctx_len - 1] != '\0')
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * other do_setattr() caller, smack_setprocattr(),
+	 * does not count \0 into size, so
+	 * decreasing length by 1 to accommodate the divergence.
+	 */
+	return do_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len - 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
+ * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
+ * @value: the value to set
+ * @size: the size of the value
+ *
+ * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
+ * is permitted and only with privilege
+ *
+ * Returns the size of the input value or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	size_t realsize = size;
+	unsigned int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
+
+	switch (attr) {
+	case LSM_ATTR_UNDEF:   return -EINVAL;
+	default:               return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
+		;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The value for the "current" attribute is the label
+	 * followed by one of the 4 trailers: none, \0, \n, \n\0
+	 *
+	 * I.e. following inputs are accepted as 3-characters long label "foo":
+	 *
+	 *   "foo"     (3 characters)
+	 *   "foo\0"   (4 characters)
+	 *   "foo\n"   (4 characters)
+	 *   "foo\n\0" (5 characters)
+	 */
+
+	if (realsize && (((const char *)value)[realsize - 1] == '\0'))
+		--realsize;
+
+	if (realsize && (((const char *)value)[realsize - 1] == '\n'))
+		--realsize;
+
+	return do_setattr(attr, value, realsize) ? : size;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
+ * @sock: one sock
+ * @other: the other sock
+ * @newsk: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
+ * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
+				     struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *okp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+	struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+	struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
+		skp = ssp->smk_out;
+		okp = osp->smk_in;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
+#endif
+		rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		if (rc == 0) {
+			okp = osp->smk_out;
+			skp = ssp->smk_in;
+			rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+			rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
+						MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
+		 */
+		nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
+		ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
+
+		/*
+		 * new/child/established socket must inherit listening socket labels
+		 */
+		nsp->smk_out = osp->smk_out;
+		nsp->smk_in  = osp->smk_in;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
+ * @sock: one socket
+ * @other: the other socket
+ *
+ * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
+ * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+	struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
+#endif
+
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @msg: the message
+ * @size: the size of the message
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
+ * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
+ * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				int size)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+	struct smack_known *rsp;
+#endif
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
+	 */
+	if (sip == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) ||
+		    sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, sip);
+		break;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	case AF_INET6:
+		if (msg->msg_namelen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 ||
+		    sap->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
+			return -EINVAL;
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+		rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
+		if (rsp != NULL)
+			rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
+						SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
+#endif
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
+		break;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
+ * @sap: netlabel secattr
+ * @ssp: socket security information
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
+						struct socket_smack *ssp)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int found = 0;
+	int acat;
+	int kcat;
+
+	/*
+	 * Netlabel found it in the cache.
+	 */
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) != 0)
+		return (struct smack_known *)sap->cache->data;
+
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
+		/*
+		 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
+		 */
+		return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
+		 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
+		 * behaving the way we expect it to.
+		 *
+		 * Look it up in the label table
+		 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+		 * for the packet fall back on the network
+		 * ambient value.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+			if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
+				continue;
+			/*
+			 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
+			 */
+			if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
+				if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
+				     NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
+					found = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+			for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
+				acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
+							  acat + 1);
+				kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
+					skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
+					kcat + 1);
+				if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
+					break;
+			}
+			if (acat == kcat) {
+				found = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		if (found)
+			return skp;
+
+		if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
+			return &smack_known_web;
+		return &smack_known_star;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+	 * for the packet fall back on the network
+	 * ambient value.
+	 */
+	return smack_net_ambient;
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+	u8 nexthdr;
+	int offset;
+	int proto = -EINVAL;
+	struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
+	struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
+	__be16 frag_off;
+	struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+	struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+	sip->sin6_port = 0;
+
+	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+	ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
+	if (ip6 == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
+
+	nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+	offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
+	offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	proto = nexthdr;
+	switch (proto) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP:
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th != NULL)
+			sip->sin6_port = th->source;
+		break;
+	case IPPROTO_UDP:
+		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh != NULL)
+			sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
+		break;
+	}
+	return proto;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_skb - Smack data from the secmark in an skb
+ * @skb: packet
+ *
+ * Returns smack_known of the secmark or NULL if that won't work.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+static struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	if (skb == NULL || skb->secmark == 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
+}
+#else
+static inline struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_netlbl - Smack data from the IP options in an skb
+ * @sk: socket data came in on
+ * @family: address family
+ * @skb: packet
+ *
+ * Find the Smack label in the IP options. If it hasn't been
+ * added to the netlabel cache, add it here.
+ *
+ * Returns smack_known of the IP options or NULL if that won't work.
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
+					     struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+
+	if (sk)
+		ssp = smack_sock(sk);
+
+	if (netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr) == 0) {
+		skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+		if (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE)
+			netlbl_cache_add(skb, family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
+	}
+
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
+	return skp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
+ * @sk: socket
+ * @skb: packet
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
+	int proto;
+
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		/*
+		 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
+		 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
+		 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
+		 */
+		skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+		if (skp == NULL) {
+			skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
+			if (skp == NULL)
+				skp = smack_net_ambient;
+		}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+		ad.a.u.net->family = family;
+		ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+		ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif
+		/*
+		 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
+		 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
+		 * This is the simplest possible security model
+		 * for networking.
+		 */
+		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
+					MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
+		break;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	case PF_INET6:
+		proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
+		if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
+			break;
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+		skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+		if (skp == NULL) {
+			if (smk_ipv6_localhost(&sadd))
+				break;
+			skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
+			if (skp == NULL)
+				skp = smack_net_ambient;
+		}
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+		ad.a.u.net->family = family;
+		ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+		ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
+					MAY_WRITE, rc);
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
+		if (rc != 0)
+			icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH,
+					ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED, 0);
+		break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @optval: user's destination
+ * @optlen: size thereof
+ * @len: max thereof
+ *
+ * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+					  sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
+					  unsigned int len)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	char *rcp = "";
+	u32 slen = 1;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+	if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
+		rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
+		slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
+	}
+	if (slen > len) {
+		rc = -ERANGE;
+		goto out_len;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, rcp, slen))
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+out_len:
+	if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &slen, sizeof(slen)))
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
+ * @sock: the peer socket
+ * @skb: packet data
+ * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+					 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct sock *sk = NULL;
+	int family = PF_UNSPEC;
+	u32 s = 0;	/* 0 is the invalid secid */
+
+	if (skb != NULL) {
+		if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+			family = PF_INET;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+		else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
+			family = PF_INET6;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+	}
+	if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
+		family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_UNIX:
+		ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+		s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
+		break;
+	case PF_INET:
+		skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+		if (skp) {
+			s = skp->smk_secid;
+			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
+		 */
+		if (sock != NULL)
+			sk = sock->sk;
+		skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
+		if (skp != NULL)
+			s = skp->smk_secid;
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+		skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+		if (skp)
+			s = skp->smk_secid;
+#endif
+		break;
+	}
+	*secid = s;
+	if (s == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
+ * @sk: socket involved
+ * @skb: packet
+ * @req: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
+ * the socket, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				   struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
+	struct sockaddr_in addr;
+	struct iphdr *hdr;
+	struct smack_known *hskp;
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	if (family == PF_INET6) {
+		/*
+		 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
+		 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
+		 * processing on IPv6.
+		 */
+		if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+			family = PF_INET;
+		else
+			return 0;
+	}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+	/*
+	 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
+	 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
+	 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
+	 */
+	skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+	if (skp == NULL) {
+		skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
+		if (skp == NULL)
+			skp = &smack_known_huh;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+	ad.a.u.net->family = family;
+	ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+	ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
+	 * here. Read access is not required.
+	 */
+	rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
+	 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
+	 */
+	req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
+	 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
+	 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
+	 */
+	hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
+	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (hskp == NULL)
+		rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &ssp->smk_out->smk_netlabel);
+	else
+		netlbl_req_delattr(req);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
+ * @sk: the new socket
+ * @req: the connection's request_sock
+ *
+ * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
+ */
+static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
+				 const struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
+		skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
+		ssp->smk_packet = skp;
+	} else
+		ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key management security hooks
+ *
+ * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
+ * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
+ * If you care about keys please have a look.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
+ * @key: object
+ * @cred: the credentials to use
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * No allocation required
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
+			   unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+
+	*blob = skp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
+ * @key_ref: gets to the object
+ * @cred: the credentials to use
+ * @need_perm: requested key permission
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
+ * an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
+				const struct cred *cred,
+				enum key_need_perm need_perm)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct key *keyp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+	int request = 0;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Validate requested permissions
+	 */
+	switch (need_perm) {
+	case KEY_NEED_READ:
+	case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
+	case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
+		request |= MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
+	case KEY_NEED_LINK:
+	case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
+		request |= MAY_WRITE;
+		break;
+	case KEY_NEED_UNSPECIFIED:
+	case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
+	case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
+	case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
+	case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	if (keyp == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
+	 * it may do so.
+	 */
+	blob = smack_key(keyp);
+	skp = *blob;
+	if (skp == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * This should not occur
+	 */
+	if (tkp == NULL)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
+	ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
+	ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_access(tkp, skp, request, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, skp, request, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
+ * @key points to the key to be queried
+ * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
+ * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
+ * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
+ * an error.
+ * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
+ */
+static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
+	struct smack_known *skp = *blob;
+	size_t length;
+	char *copy;
+
+	if (skp == NULL) {
+		*_buffer = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (copy == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	length = strlen(copy) + 1;
+
+	*_buffer = copy;
+	return length;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+/**
+ * smack_watch_key - Smack access to watch a key for notifications.
+ * @key: The key to be watched
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the @watch->cred has permission to read from the key object and
+ * an error otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_watch_key(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_current();
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * This should not occur
+	 */
+	if (tkp == NULL)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred()))
+		return 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
+	ad.a.u.key_struct.key = key->serial;
+	ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = key->description;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_access(tkp, *blob, MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("key watch", tkp, *blob, MAY_READ, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
+/**
+ * smack_post_notification - Smack access to post a notification to a queue
+ * @w_cred: The credentials of the watcher.
+ * @cred: The credentials of the event source (may be NULL).
+ * @n: The notification message to be posted.
+ */
+static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
+				   const struct cred *cred,
+				   struct watch_notification *n)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *subj, *obj;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* Always let maintenance notifications through. */
+	if (n->type == WATCH_TYPE_META)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!cred)
+		return 0;
+	subj = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+	obj = smk_of_task(smack_cred(w_cred));
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NOTIFICATION);
+	rc = smk_access(subj, obj, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("notification", subj, obj, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
+
+/*
+ * Smack Audit hooks
+ *
+ * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
+ * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
+ * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
+ * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
+ *
+ * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
+ * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
+ * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
+ * model where nearly everything is a label.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
+ * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
+ * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
+ * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
+ * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
+ * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
+ *
+ * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
+ * The label to be audited is created if necessary.
+ */
+static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
+				 gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	char **rule = (char **)vrule;
+	*rule = NULL;
+
+	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(skp))
+		return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+	*rule = skp->smk_known;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
+ * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
+ *
+ * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
+ * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
+ * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
+ */
+static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+	struct audit_field *f;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
+		f = &krule->fields[i];
+
+		if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
+ * @prop: security id for identifying the object to test
+ * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
+ * @op: required testing operator
+ * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
+ *
+ * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
+ * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
+ */
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
+				  void *vrule)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = prop->smack.skp;
+	char *rule = vrule;
+
+	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
+	 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
+	 * label.
+	 */
+	if (op == Audit_equal)
+		return (rule == skp->smk_known);
+	if (op == Audit_not_equal)
+		return (rule != skp->smk_known);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
+ * No memory was allocated.
+ */
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+/**
+ * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
+ * @name: Full xattr name to check.
+ */
+static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_to_secctx - fill a lsm_context
+ * @skp: Smack label
+ * @cp: destination
+ *
+ * Fill the passed @cp and return the length of the string
+ */
+static int smack_to_secctx(struct smack_known *skp, struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	int len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+
+	if (cp) {
+		cp->context = skp->smk_known;
+		cp->len = len;
+		cp->id = LSM_ID_SMACK;
+	}
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
+ * @secid: incoming integer
+ * @cp: destination
+ *
+ * Exists for networking code.
+ */
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	return smack_to_secctx(smack_from_secid(secid), cp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_lsmprop_to_secctx - return the smack label
+ * @prop: includes incoming Smack data
+ * @cp: destination
+ *
+ * Exists for audit code.
+ */
+static int smack_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop,
+				   struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	return smack_to_secctx(prop->smack.skp, cp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
+ * @secdata: smack label
+ * @seclen: how long result is
+ * @secid: outgoing integer
+ *
+ * Exists for audit and networking code.
+ */
+static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
+
+	if (skp)
+		*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	else
+		*secid = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
+ * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
+ * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
+ */
+
+static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	/*
+	 * UDS inode has fixed label. Ignore nfs label.
+	 */
+	if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode))
+		return 0;
+	return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx,
+				       ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
+				     ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+
+	cp->context = skp->smk_known;
+	cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+	cp->id = LSM_ID_SMACK;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
+{
+
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct cred *new_creds = *new;
+
+	if (new_creds == NULL) {
+		new_creds = prepare_creds();
+		if (new_creds == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	tsp = smack_cred(new_creds);
+
+	/*
+	 * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
+	 */
+	isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry));
+	skp = isp->smk_inode;
+	tsp->smk_task = skp;
+	*new = new_creds;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Return -ECANCELED if this is the smack access Smack attribute.
+	 */
+	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK))
+		return -ECANCELED;
+
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+					const struct qstr *name,
+					const struct cred *old,
+					struct cred *new)
+{
+	struct task_smack *otsp = smack_cred(old);
+	struct task_smack *ntsp = smack_cred(new);
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Use the process credential unless all of
+	 * the transmuting criteria are met
+	 */
+	ntsp->smk_task = otsp->smk_task;
+
+	/*
+	 * the attribute of the containing directory
+	 */
+	isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
+
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
+		/*
+		 * If the directory is transmuting and the rule
+		 * providing access is transmuting use the containing
+		 * directory label instead of the process label.
+		 */
+		if (smk_rule_transmutes(otsp->smk_task, isp->smk_inode)) {
+			ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
+			ntsp->smk_transmuted = ntsp->smk_task;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+/**
+ * smack_uring_override_creds - Is io_uring cred override allowed?
+ * @new: the target creds
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
+ * to service an io_uring operation.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct task_smack *nsp = smack_cred(new);
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow the degenerate case where the new Smack value is
+	 * the same as the current Smack value.
+	 */
+	if (tsp->smk_task == nsp->smk_task)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred()))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
+ * kernel polling thread.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+	if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_ADMIN, current_cred()))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_uring_cmd - check on file operations for io_uring
+ * @ioucmd: the command in question
+ *
+ * Make a best guess about whether a io_uring "command" should
+ * be allowed. Use the same logic used for determining if the
+ * file could be opened for read in the absence of better criteria.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+	struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!file)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
+	inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+	rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
+	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
+	.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+	.lbs_key = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+	.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
+	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
+	.lbs_xattr_count = SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = {
+	.name = "smack",
+	.id = LSM_ID_SMACK,
+};
+
+static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, smack_fs_context_submount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, smack_fs_context_dup),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, smack_bprm_creds_for_exec),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, smack_inode_xattr_skipcap),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, smack_inode_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, smack_inode_get_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, smack_inode_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getlsmprop, smack_inode_getlsmprop),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, smack_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getlsmprop, smack_cred_getlsmprop),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, smack_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, smack_task_getlsmprop_obj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getlsmprop, smack_ipc_getlsmprop),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, smack_getselfattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, smack_setselfattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, smack_socket_socketpair),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
+#endif
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, smack_sk_clone_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
+
+ /* key management security hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, smack_watch_key),
+#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(post_notification, smack_post_notification),
+#endif
+
+ /* Audit hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsmprop_to_secctx, smack_lsmprop_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, smack_uring_override_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, smack_uring_sqpoll),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, smack_uring_cmd),
+#endif
+};
+
+
+static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Initialize rule list locks
+	 */
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
+	/*
+	 * Initialize rule lists
+	 */
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
+	/*
+	 * Create the known labels list
+	 */
+	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
+	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
+	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
+	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
+	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_init - initialize the smack system
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
+ */
+static __init int smack_init(void)
+{
+	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+	smack_rule_cache = KMEM_CACHE(smack_rule, 0);
+	if (!smack_rule_cache)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the security state for the initial task.
+	 */
+	tsp = smack_cred(cred);
+	init_task_smack(tsp, &smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor);
+
+	/*
+	 * Register with LSM
+	 */
+	security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
+	smack_enabled = 1;
+
+	pr_info("Smack:  Initializing.\n");
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+	pr_info("Smack:  Netfilter enabled.\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+	pr_info("Smack:  IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+	pr_info("Smack:  IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
+#endif
+
+	/* initialize the smack_known_list */
+	init_smack_known_list();
+
+	/* Inform the audit system that secctx is used */
+	audit_cfg_lsm(&smack_lsmid,
+		      AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_SUBJECT |
+		      AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_OBJECT);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int __init smack_initcall(void)
+{
+	int rc_fs = init_smk_fs();
+	int rc_nf = smack_nf_ip_init();
+
+	return rc_fs ? rc_fs : rc_nf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
+ * all processes and objects when they are created.
+ */
+DEFINE_LSM(smack) = {
+	.id = &smack_lsmid,
+	.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+	.blobs = &smack_blob_sizes,
+	.init = smack_init,
+	.initcall_device = smack_initcall,
+};
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..17ba578b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ *  Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the Smack netfilter implementation
+ *
+ *  Author:
+ *	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2014 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <net/inet_sock.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+static unsigned int smack_ip_output(void *priv,
+				    struct sk_buff *skb,
+				    const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	if (sk) {
+		ssp = smack_sock(sk);
+		skp = ssp->smk_out;
+		skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
+	}
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static const struct nf_hook_ops smack_nf_ops[] = {
+	{
+		.hook =		smack_ip_output,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	{
+		.hook =		smack_ip_output,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+		.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+};
+
+static int __net_init smack_nf_register(struct net *net)
+{
+	return nf_register_net_hooks(net, smack_nf_ops,
+				     ARRAY_SIZE(smack_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static void __net_exit smack_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
+{
+	nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, smack_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations smack_net_ops = {
+	.init = smack_nf_register,
+	.exit = smack_nf_unregister,
+};
+
+int __init smack_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+	if (smack_enabled == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "Smack: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
+	return register_pernet_subsys(&smack_net_ops);
+}
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6e62dcb36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3044 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * 	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ * 	Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Special thanks to the authors of selinuxfs.
+ *
+ *	Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *	James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+#define BEBITS	(sizeof(__be32) * 8)
+/*
+ * smackfs pseudo filesystem.
+ */
+
+enum smk_inos {
+	SMK_ROOT_INO	= 2,
+	SMK_LOAD	= 3,	/* load policy */
+	SMK_CIPSO	= 4,	/* load label -> CIPSO mapping */
+	SMK_DOI		= 5,	/* CIPSO DOI */
+	SMK_DIRECT	= 6,	/* CIPSO level indicating direct label */
+	SMK_AMBIENT	= 7,	/* internet ambient label */
+	SMK_NET4ADDR	= 8,	/* single label hosts */
+	SMK_ONLYCAP	= 9,	/* the only "capable" label */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	SMK_LOGGING	= 10,	/* logging */
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+	SMK_LOAD_SELF	= 11,	/* task specific rules */
+	SMK_ACCESSES	= 12,	/* access policy */
+	SMK_MAPPED	= 13,	/* CIPSO level indicating mapped label */
+	SMK_LOAD2	= 14,	/* load policy with long labels */
+	SMK_LOAD_SELF2	= 15,	/* load task specific rules with long labels */
+	SMK_ACCESS2	= 16,	/* make an access check with long labels */
+	SMK_CIPSO2	= 17,	/* load long label -> CIPSO mapping */
+	SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ	= 18,	/* set rules with subject label to '-' */
+	SMK_CHANGE_RULE	= 19,	/* change or add rules (long labels) */
+	SMK_SYSLOG	= 20,	/* change syslog label) */
+	SMK_PTRACE	= 21,	/* set ptrace rule */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	SMK_UNCONFINED	= 22,	/* define an unconfined label */
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	SMK_NET6ADDR	= 23,	/* single label IPv6 hosts */
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+	SMK_RELABEL_SELF = 24, /* relabel possible without CAP_MAC_ADMIN */
+};
+
+/*
+ * List locks
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_net4addr_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_cipso_doi_lock);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_net6addr_lock);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+/*
+ * This is the "ambient" label for network traffic.
+ * If it isn't somehow marked, use this.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/ambient
+ */
+struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
+
+/*
+ * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
+ * smack label is contained directly in the category set.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/direct
+ */
+int smack_cipso_direct = SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT;
+
+/*
+ * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
+ * secid is contained directly in the category set.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/mapped
+ */
+int smack_cipso_mapped = SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+/*
+ * Allow one label to be unconfined. This is for
+ * debugging and application bring-up purposes only.
+ * It is bad and wrong, but everyone seems to expect
+ * to have it.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * If this value is set restrict syslog use to the label specified.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/syslog
+ */
+struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
+
+/*
+ * Ptrace current rule
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT    regular smack ptrace rules (/proc based)
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT      labels must match, but can be overriden with
+ *			   CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN  labels must match, CAP_SYS_PTRACE has no effect
+ */
+int smack_ptrace_rule = SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT;
+
+/*
+ * Certain IP addresses may be designated as single label hosts.
+ * Packets are sent there unlabeled, but only from tasks that
+ * can write to the specified label.
+ */
+
+LIST_HEAD(smk_net4addr_list);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+LIST_HEAD(smk_net6addr_list);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+/*
+ * Rule lists are maintained for each label.
+ */
+struct smack_parsed_rule {
+	struct smack_known	*smk_subject;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_object;
+	int			smk_access1;
+	int			smk_access2;
+};
+
+static u32 smk_cipso_doi_value = CIPSO_V4_DOI_UNKNOWN;
+
+/*
+ * Values for parsing cipso rules
+ * SMK_DIGITLEN: Length of a digit field in a rule.
+ * SMK_CIPSOMIN: Minimum possible cipso rule length.
+ * SMK_CIPSOMAX: Maximum possible cipso rule length.
+ */
+#define SMK_DIGITLEN 4
+#define SMK_CIPSOMIN (SMK_LABELLEN + 2 * SMK_DIGITLEN)
+#define SMK_CIPSOMAX (SMK_CIPSOMIN + SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM * SMK_DIGITLEN)
+
+/*
+ * Values for parsing MAC rules
+ * SMK_ACCESS: Maximum possible combination of access permissions
+ * SMK_ACCESSLEN: Maximum length for a rule access field
+ * SMK_LOADLEN: Smack rule length
+ */
+#define SMK_OACCESS	"rwxa"
+#define SMK_ACCESS	"rwxatl"
+#define SMK_OACCESSLEN	(sizeof(SMK_OACCESS) - 1)
+#define SMK_ACCESSLEN	(sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1)
+#define SMK_OLOADLEN	(SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_OACCESSLEN)
+#define SMK_LOADLEN	(SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN)
+
+/*
+ * Strictly for CIPSO level manipulation.
+ * Set the category bit number in a smack label sized buffer.
+ */
+static inline void smack_catset_bit(unsigned int cat, char *catsetp)
+{
+	if (cat == 0 || cat > (SMK_CIPSOLEN * 8))
+		return;
+
+	catsetp[(cat - 1) / 8] |= 0x80 >> ((cat - 1) % 8);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_netlabel_audit_set - fill a netlbl_audit struct
+ * @nap: structure to fill
+ */
+static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
+{
+	nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+	nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+	nap->prop.smack.skp = smk_of_current();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Value for parsing single label host rules
+ * "1.2.3.4 X"
+ */
+#define SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN	9
+
+/**
+ * smk_set_access - add a rule to the rule list or replace an old rule
+ * @srp: the rule to add or replace
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules
+ * @rule_lock: the rule list lock
+ *
+ * Looks through the current subject/object/access list for
+ * the subject/object pair and replaces the access that was
+ * there. If the pair isn't found add it with the specified
+ * access.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if nothing goes wrong or -ENOMEM if it fails
+ * during the allocation of the new pair to add.
+ */
+static int smk_set_access(struct smack_parsed_rule *srp,
+				struct list_head *rule_list,
+				struct mutex *rule_lock)
+{
+	struct smack_rule *sp;
+	int found = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(rule_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Because the object label is less likely to match
+	 * than the subject label check it first
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, rule_list, list) {
+		if (sp->smk_object == srp->smk_object &&
+		    sp->smk_subject == srp->smk_subject) {
+			found = 1;
+			sp->smk_access |= srp->smk_access1;
+			sp->smk_access &= ~srp->smk_access2;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (found == 0) {
+		sp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_rule_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (sp == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		sp->smk_subject = srp->smk_subject;
+		sp->smk_object = srp->smk_object;
+		sp->smk_access = srp->smk_access1 & ~srp->smk_access2;
+
+		list_add_rcu(&sp->list, rule_list);
+	}
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_perm_from_str - parse smack accesses from a text string
+ * @string: a text string that contains a Smack accesses code
+ *
+ * Returns an integer with respective bits set for specified accesses.
+ */
+static int smk_perm_from_str(const char *string)
+{
+	int perm = 0;
+	const char *cp;
+
+	for (cp = string; ; cp++)
+		switch (*cp) {
+		case '-':
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+		case 'R':
+			perm |= MAY_READ;
+			break;
+		case 'w':
+		case 'W':
+			perm |= MAY_WRITE;
+			break;
+		case 'x':
+		case 'X':
+			perm |= MAY_EXEC;
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+		case 'A':
+			perm |= MAY_APPEND;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+		case 'T':
+			perm |= MAY_TRANSMUTE;
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+		case 'L':
+			perm |= MAY_LOCK;
+			break;
+		case 'b':
+		case 'B':
+			perm |= MAY_BRINGUP;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return perm;
+		}
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_fill_rule - Fill Smack rule from strings
+ * @subject: subject label string
+ * @object: object label string
+ * @access1: access string
+ * @access2: string with permissions to be removed
+ * @rule: Smack rule
+ * @import: if non-zero, import labels
+ * @len: label length limit
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, appropriate error code on failure.
+ */
+static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
+				const char *access1, const char *access2,
+				struct smack_parsed_rule *rule, int import,
+				int len)
+{
+	const char *cp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	if (import) {
+		rule->smk_subject = smk_import_entry(subject, len);
+		if (IS_ERR(rule->smk_subject))
+			return PTR_ERR(rule->smk_subject);
+
+		rule->smk_object = smk_import_entry(object, len);
+		if (IS_ERR(rule->smk_object))
+			return PTR_ERR(rule->smk_object);
+	} else {
+		cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, len);
+		if (IS_ERR(cp))
+			return PTR_ERR(cp);
+		skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
+		kfree(cp);
+		if (skp == NULL)
+			return -ENOENT;
+		rule->smk_subject = skp;
+
+		cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
+		if (IS_ERR(cp))
+			return PTR_ERR(cp);
+		skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
+		kfree(cp);
+		if (skp == NULL)
+			return -ENOENT;
+		rule->smk_object = skp;
+	}
+
+	rule->smk_access1 = smk_perm_from_str(access1);
+	if (access2)
+		rule->smk_access2 = smk_perm_from_str(access2);
+	else
+		rule->smk_access2 = ~rule->smk_access1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_parse_rule - parse Smack rule from load string
+ * @data: string to be parsed whose size is SMK_LOADLEN
+ * @rule: Smack rule
+ * @import: if non-zero, import labels
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on errors.
+ */
+static int smk_parse_rule(const char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule,
+				int import)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = smk_fill_rule(data, data + SMK_LABELLEN,
+			   data + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN, NULL, rule,
+			   import, SMK_LABELLEN);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_parse_long_rule - parse Smack rule from rule string
+ * @data: string to be parsed, null terminated
+ * @rule: Will be filled with Smack parsed rule
+ * @import: if non-zero, import labels
+ * @tokens: number of substrings expected in data
+ *
+ * Returns number of processed bytes on success, -ERRNO on failure.
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_parse_long_rule(char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule,
+				int import, int tokens)
+{
+	ssize_t cnt = 0;
+	char *tok[4];
+	int rc;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Parsing the rule in-place, filling all white-spaces with '\0'
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < tokens; ++i) {
+		while (isspace(data[cnt]))
+			data[cnt++] = '\0';
+
+		if (data[cnt] == '\0')
+			/* Unexpected end of data */
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		tok[i] = data + cnt;
+
+		while (data[cnt] && !isspace(data[cnt]))
+			++cnt;
+	}
+	while (isspace(data[cnt]))
+		data[cnt++] = '\0';
+
+	while (i < 4)
+		tok[i++] = NULL;
+
+	rc = smk_fill_rule(tok[0], tok[1], tok[2], tok[3], rule, import, 0);
+	return rc == 0 ? cnt : rc;
+}
+
+#define SMK_FIXED24_FMT	0	/* Fixed 24byte label format */
+#define SMK_LONG_FMT	1	/* Variable long label format */
+#define SMK_CHANGE_FMT	2	/* Rule modification format */
+/**
+ * smk_write_rules_list - write() for any /smack rule file
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules to write to
+ * @rule_lock: lock for the rule list
+ * @format: /smack/load or /smack/load2 or /smack/change-rule format.
+ *
+ * Get one smack access rule from above.
+ * The format for SMK_LONG_FMT is:
+ *	"subject<whitespace>object<whitespace>access[<whitespace>...]"
+ * The format for SMK_FIXED24_FMT is exactly:
+ *	"subject                 object                  rwxat"
+ * The format for SMK_CHANGE_FMT is:
+ *	"subject<whitespace>object<whitespace>
+ *	 acc_enable<whitespace>acc_disable[<whitespace>...]"
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
+					struct list_head *rule_list,
+					struct mutex *rule_lock, int format)
+{
+	struct smack_parsed_rule rule;
+	char *data;
+	int rc;
+	int trunc = 0;
+	int tokens;
+	ssize_t cnt = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT) {
+		/*
+		 * Minor hack for backward compatibility
+		 */
+		if (count < SMK_OLOADLEN || count > SMK_LOADLEN)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) {
+			count = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
+			trunc = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	/*
+	 * In case of parsing only part of user buf,
+	 * avoid having partial rule at the data buffer
+	 */
+	if (trunc) {
+		while (count > 0 && (data[count - 1] != '\n'))
+			--count;
+		if (count == 0) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	data[count] = '\0';
+	tokens = (format == SMK_CHANGE_FMT ? 4 : 3);
+	while (cnt < count) {
+		if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT) {
+			rc = smk_parse_rule(data, &rule, 1);
+			if (rc < 0)
+				goto out;
+			cnt = count;
+		} else {
+			rc = smk_parse_long_rule(data + cnt, &rule, 1, tokens);
+			if (rc < 0)
+				goto out;
+			if (rc == 0) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			cnt += rc;
+		}
+
+		if (rule_list == NULL)
+			rc = smk_set_access(&rule, &rule.smk_subject->smk_rules,
+				&rule.smk_subject->smk_rules_lock);
+		else
+			rc = smk_set_access(&rule, rule_list, rule_lock);
+
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = cnt;
+out:
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Core logic for smackfs seq list operations.
+ */
+
+static void *smk_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos,
+				struct list_head *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *list;
+	int i = *pos;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	for (list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(head));
+		list != head;
+		list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(list))) {
+		if (i-- == 0)
+			return list;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *smk_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos,
+				struct list_head *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+
+	++*pos;
+	list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(list));
+
+	return (list == head) ? NULL : list;
+}
+
+static void smk_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
+{
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+	/*
+	 * Don't show any rules with label names too long for
+	 * interface file (/smack/load or /smack/load2)
+	 * because you should expect to be able to write
+	 * anything you read back.
+	 */
+	if (strlen(srp->smk_subject->smk_known) >= max ||
+	    strlen(srp->smk_object->smk_known) >= max)
+		return;
+
+	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+		return;
+
+	smack_str_from_perm(acc, srp->smk_access);
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %s %s\n",
+		   srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
+		   srp->smk_object->smk_known,
+		   acc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load
+ */
+
+static void *load2_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_known_list);
+}
+
+static void *load2_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_known_list);
+}
+
+static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_rule *srp;
+	struct smack_known *skp =
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known, list);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list)
+		smk_rule_show(s, srp, SMK_LABELLEN);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = {
+	.start = load2_seq_start,
+	.next  = load2_seq_next,
+	.show  = load_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load - open() for /smack/load
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &load_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 */
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
+				    SMK_FIXED24_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_load,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_load,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_cipso_doi - set netlabel maps
+ * @ndoi: new value for our CIPSO DOI
+ * @gfp_flags: kmalloc allocation context
+ */
+static int
+smk_cipso_doi(u32 ndoi, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct cipso_v4_doi *doip;
+	struct netlbl_audit nai;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smk_cipso_doi_lock);
+
+	if (smk_cipso_doi_value == ndoi)
+		goto clr_doi_lock;
+
+	smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
+
+	doip = kmalloc_obj(struct cipso_v4_doi, gfp_flags);
+	if (!doip) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto clr_doi_lock;
+	}
+	doip->map.std = NULL;
+	doip->doi = ndoi;
+	doip->type = CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS;
+	doip->tags[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBITMAP;
+	for (rc = 1; rc < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT; rc++)
+		doip->tags[rc] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;
+
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add(doip, &nai);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(doip);
+		goto clr_doi_lock;
+	}
+
+	if (smk_cipso_doi_value != CIPSO_V4_DOI_UNKNOWN) {
+		rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+		if (rc && rc != -ENOENT)
+			goto clr_ndoi_def;
+
+		netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del(smk_cipso_doi_value, &nai);
+	}
+
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(ndoi, NULL, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+	if (rc) {
+		smk_cipso_doi_value = CIPSO_V4_DOI_UNKNOWN; // no default map
+clr_ndoi_def:	netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del(ndoi, &nai);
+	} else
+		smk_cipso_doi_value = ndoi;
+
+clr_doi_lock:
+	mutex_unlock(&smk_cipso_doi_lock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_unlbl_ambient - initialize the unlabeled domain
+ * @oldambient: previous domain string
+ */
+static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_audit nai;
+
+	smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
+
+	if (oldambient != NULL) {
+		rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d remove rc = %d\n",
+			       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+	}
+	if (smack_net_ambient == NULL)
+		smack_net_ambient = &smack_known_floor;
+
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient->smk_known, PF_INET,
+				      NULL, NULL, &nai);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
+		       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/cipso
+ */
+
+static void *cipso_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_known_list);
+}
+
+static void *cipso_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_known_list);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print cipso labels in format:
+ * label level[/cat[,cat]]
+ */
+static int cipso_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head  *list = v;
+	struct smack_known *skp =
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known, list);
+	struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
+	char sep = '/';
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't show a label that could not have been set using
+	 * /smack/cipso. This is in support of the notion that
+	 * anything read from /smack/cipso ought to be writeable
+	 * to /smack/cipso.
+	 *
+	 * /smack/cipso2 should be used instead.
+	 */
+	if (strlen(skp->smk_known) >= SMK_LABELLEN)
+		return 0;
+
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %3d", skp->smk_known, skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl);
+
+	for (i = netlbl_catmap_walk(cmp, 0); i >= 0;
+	     i = netlbl_catmap_walk(cmp, i + 1)) {
+		seq_printf(s, "%c%d", sep, i);
+		sep = ',';
+	}
+
+	seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations cipso_seq_ops = {
+	.start = cipso_seq_start,
+	.next  = cipso_seq_next,
+	.show  = cipso_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_cipso - open() for /smack/cipso
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "cipso" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our cipso_seq_* operations with /smack/cipso
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_cipso(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &cipso_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_set_cipso - do the work for write() for cipso and cipso2
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ * @format: /smack/cipso or /smack/cipso2
+ *
+ * Accepts only one cipso rule per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int format)
+{
+	struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *old_cat;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr ncats;
+	char mapcatset[SMK_CIPSOLEN];
+	int maplevel;
+	unsigned int cat;
+	int catlen;
+	ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
+	char *data = NULL;
+	char *rule;
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 */
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT &&
+	    (count < SMK_CIPSOMIN || count > SMK_CIPSOMAX))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	rule = data;
+	/*
+	 * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+	 * quite rare and small in any case.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&smack_cipso_lock);
+
+	skp = smk_import_entry(rule, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT)
+		rule += SMK_LABELLEN;
+	else
+		rule += strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1;
+
+	if (rule > data + count) {
+		rc = -EOVERFLOW;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
+	if (ret != 1 || maplevel < 0 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
+		goto out;
+
+	rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
+	if (rule > data + count) {
+		rc = -EOVERFLOW;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &catlen);
+	if (ret != 1 || catlen < 0 || catlen > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT &&
+	    count != (SMK_CIPSOMIN + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN))
+		goto out;
+
+	memset(mapcatset, 0, sizeof(mapcatset));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < catlen; i++) {
+		rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
+		if (rule > data + count) {
+			rc = -EOVERFLOW;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		ret = sscanf(rule, "%u", &cat);
+		if (ret != 1 || cat > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
+			goto out;
+
+		smack_catset_bit(cat, mapcatset);
+	}
+
+	rc = smk_netlbl_mls(maplevel, mapcatset, &ncats, SMK_CIPSOLEN);
+	if (rc >= 0) {
+		old_cat = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
+		rcu_assign_pointer(skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat, ncats.attr.mls.cat);
+		if (ncats.attr.mls.cat)
+			skp->smk_netlabel.flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+		else
+			skp->smk_netlabel.flags &= ~(u32)NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+		skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = ncats.attr.mls.lvl;
+		synchronize_rcu();
+		netlbl_catmap_free(old_cat);
+		rc = count;
+		/*
+		 * This mapping may have been cached, so clear the cache.
+		 */
+		netlbl_cache_invalidate();
+	}
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_cipso_lock);
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_cipso - write() for /smack/cipso
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one cipso rule per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return smk_set_cipso(file, buf, count, ppos, SMK_FIXED24_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_cipso_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_cipso,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_cipso,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/cipso2
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Print cipso labels in format:
+ * label level[/cat[,cat]]
+ */
+static int cipso2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head  *list = v;
+	struct smack_known *skp =
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known, list);
+	struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
+	char sep = '/';
+	int i;
+
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %3d", skp->smk_known, skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl);
+
+	for (i = netlbl_catmap_walk(cmp, 0); i >= 0;
+	     i = netlbl_catmap_walk(cmp, i + 1)) {
+		seq_printf(s, "%c%d", sep, i);
+		sep = ',';
+	}
+
+	seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations cipso2_seq_ops = {
+	.start = cipso_seq_start,
+	.next  = cipso_seq_next,
+	.show  = cipso2_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_cipso2 - open() for /smack/cipso2
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "cipso2" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our cipso_seq_* operations with /smack/cipso2
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_cipso2(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &cipso2_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_cipso2 - write() for /smack/cipso2
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one cipso rule per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_cipso2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return smk_set_cipso(file, buf, count, ppos, SMK_LONG_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_cipso2_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_cipso2,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_cipso2,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/netlabel
+ */
+
+static void *net4addr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smk_net4addr_list);
+}
+
+static void *net4addr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smk_net4addr_list);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print host/label pairs
+ */
+static int net4addr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smk_net4addr *skp =
+			list_entry_rcu(list, struct smk_net4addr, list);
+	char *kp = SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION;
+
+	if (skp->smk_label != NULL)
+		kp = skp->smk_label->smk_known;
+	seq_printf(s, "%pI4/%d %s\n", &skp->smk_host.s_addr,
+			skp->smk_masks, kp);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations net4addr_seq_ops = {
+	.start = net4addr_seq_start,
+	.next  = net4addr_seq_next,
+	.show  = net4addr_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_net4addr - open() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "netlabel" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our net4addr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_net4addr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &net4addr_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_net4addr_insert - insert a new entry into the net4addrs list
+ * @new : netlabel to insert
+ *
+ * This helper inserts netlabel in the smack_net4addrs list
+ * sorted by netmask length (longest to smallest)
+ * locked by &smk_net4addr_lock in smk_write_net4addr.
+ */
+static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
+{
+	struct smk_net4addr *m;
+	struct smk_net4addr *m_next;
+
+	if (list_empty(&smk_net4addr_list)) {
+		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net4addr_list);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	m = list_entry_rcu(smk_net4addr_list.next,
+			   struct smk_net4addr, list);
+
+	/* the comparison '>' is a bit hacky, but works */
+	if (new->smk_masks > m->smk_masks) {
+		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net4addr_list);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &smk_net4addr_list, list) {
+		if (list_is_last(&m->list, &smk_net4addr_list)) {
+			list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+			return;
+		}
+		m_next = list_entry_rcu(m->list.next,
+					struct smk_net4addr, list);
+		if (new->smk_masks > m_next->smk_masks) {
+			list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_net4addr - write() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one net4addr per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smk_net4addr *snp;
+	struct sockaddr_in newname;
+	char *smack;
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+	char *data;
+	char *host = (char *)&newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+	struct in_addr mask;
+	unsigned int m;
+	unsigned int masks;
+	int found;
+	u32 mask_bits = (1<<31);
+	__be32 nsa;
+	u32 temp_mask;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 * "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>"
+	 * "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>"
+	 */
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	smack = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (smack == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_data_out;
+	}
+
+	rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%u %s",
+		&host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &masks, smack);
+	if (rc != 6) {
+		rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd %s",
+			&host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], smack);
+		if (rc != 5) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_out;
+		}
+		masks = 32;
+	}
+	if (masks > BEBITS) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto free_out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If smack begins with '-', it is an option, don't import it
+	 */
+	if (smack[0] != '-') {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(smack, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+			goto free_out;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Only the -CIPSO option is supported for IPv4
+		 */
+		if (strcmp(smack, SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION) != 0) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (m = masks, temp_mask = 0; m > 0; m--) {
+		temp_mask |= mask_bits;
+		mask_bits >>= 1;
+	}
+	mask.s_addr = cpu_to_be32(temp_mask);
+
+	newname.sin_addr.s_addr &= mask.s_addr;
+	/*
+	 * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+	 * quite rare and small in any case.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&smk_net4addr_lock);
+
+	nsa = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+	/* try to find if the prefix is already in the list */
+	found = 0;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list) {
+		if (snp->smk_host.s_addr == nsa && snp->smk_masks == masks) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	smk_netlabel_audit_set(&audit_info);
+
+	if (found == 0) {
+		snp = kzalloc_obj(*snp);
+		if (snp == NULL)
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+		else {
+			rc = 0;
+			snp->smk_host.s_addr = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+			snp->smk_mask.s_addr = mask.s_addr;
+			snp->smk_label = skp;
+			snp->smk_masks = masks;
+			smk_net4addr_insert(snp);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Delete the unlabeled entry, only if the previous label
+		 * wasn't the special CIPSO option
+		 */
+		if (snp->smk_label != NULL)
+			rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
+					&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,
+					PF_INET, &audit_info);
+		else
+			rc = 0;
+		snp->smk_label = skp;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now tell netlabel about the single label nature of
+	 * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
+	 * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
+	 */
+	if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+		rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
+			&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
+			snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = count;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smk_net4addr_lock);
+
+free_out:
+	kfree(smack);
+free_data_out:
+	kfree(data);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_net4addr_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_net4addr,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_net4addr,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/netlabel6
+ */
+
+static void *net6addr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smk_net6addr_list);
+}
+
+static void *net6addr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smk_net6addr_list);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print host/label pairs
+ */
+static int net6addr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smk_net6addr *skp =
+			 list_entry(list, struct smk_net6addr, list);
+
+	if (skp->smk_label != NULL)
+		seq_printf(s, "%pI6/%d %s\n", &skp->smk_host, skp->smk_masks,
+				skp->smk_label->smk_known);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations net6addr_seq_ops = {
+	.start = net6addr_seq_start,
+	.next  = net6addr_seq_next,
+	.show  = net6addr_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_net6addr - open() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "netlabel" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our net6addr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_net6addr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &net6addr_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_net6addr_insert - insert a new entry into the net6addrs list
+ * @new : entry to insert
+ *
+ * This inserts an entry in the smack_net6addrs list
+ * sorted by netmask length (longest to smallest)
+ * locked by &smk_net6addr_lock in smk_write_net6addr.
+ */
+static void smk_net6addr_insert(struct smk_net6addr *new)
+{
+	struct smk_net6addr *m_next;
+	struct smk_net6addr *m;
+
+	if (list_empty(&smk_net6addr_list)) {
+		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net6addr_list);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	m = list_entry_rcu(smk_net6addr_list.next,
+			   struct smk_net6addr, list);
+
+	if (new->smk_masks > m->smk_masks) {
+		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net6addr_list);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
+		if (list_is_last(&m->list, &smk_net6addr_list)) {
+			list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+			return;
+		}
+		m_next = list_entry_rcu(m->list.next,
+					struct smk_net6addr, list);
+		if (new->smk_masks > m_next->smk_masks) {
+			list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_net6addr - write() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one net6addr per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_net6addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smk_net6addr *snp;
+	struct in6_addr newname;
+	struct in6_addr fullmask;
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+	char *smack;
+	char *data;
+	int rc = 0;
+	int found = 0;
+	int i;
+	unsigned int scanned[8];
+	unsigned int m;
+	unsigned int mask = 128;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 * "<addr/mask, as a:b:c:d:e:f:g:h/e><space><label>"
+	 * "<addr, as a:b:c:d:e:f:g:h><space><label>"
+	 */
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	smack = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (smack == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_data_out;
+	}
+
+	i = sscanf(data, "%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x/%u %s",
+			&scanned[0], &scanned[1], &scanned[2], &scanned[3],
+			&scanned[4], &scanned[5], &scanned[6], &scanned[7],
+			&mask, smack);
+	if (i != 10) {
+		i = sscanf(data, "%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x %s",
+				&scanned[0], &scanned[1], &scanned[2],
+				&scanned[3], &scanned[4], &scanned[5],
+				&scanned[6], &scanned[7], smack);
+		if (i != 9) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_out;
+		}
+	}
+	if (mask > 128) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto free_out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+		if (scanned[i] > 0xffff) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_out;
+		}
+		newname.s6_addr16[i] = htons(scanned[i]);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If smack begins with '-', it is an option, don't import it
+	 */
+	if (smack[0] != '-') {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(smack, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+			goto free_out;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Only -DELETE is supported for IPv6
+		 */
+		if (strcmp(smack, SMACK_DELETE_OPTION) != 0) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0, m = mask; i < 8; i++) {
+		if (m >= 16) {
+			fullmask.s6_addr16[i] = 0xffff;
+			m -= 16;
+		} else if (m > 0) {
+			fullmask.s6_addr16[i] = (1 << m) - 1;
+			m = 0;
+		} else
+			fullmask.s6_addr16[i] = 0;
+		newname.s6_addr16[i] &= fullmask.s6_addr16[i];
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+	 * quite rare and small in any case.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&smk_net6addr_lock);
+	/*
+	 * Try to find the prefix in the list
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
+		if (mask != snp->smk_masks)
+			continue;
+		for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+			if (newname.s6_addr16[i] !=
+			    snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
+				found = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (found == 1)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (found == 0) {
+		snp = kzalloc_obj(*snp);
+		if (snp == NULL)
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+		else {
+			snp->smk_host = newname;
+			snp->smk_mask = fullmask;
+			snp->smk_masks = mask;
+			snp->smk_label = skp;
+			smk_net6addr_insert(snp);
+		}
+	} else {
+		snp->smk_label = skp;
+	}
+
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = count;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smk_net6addr_lock);
+
+free_out:
+	kfree(smack);
+free_data_out:
+	kfree(data);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_net6addr_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_net6addr,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_net6addr,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_doi - read() for /smack/doi
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_doi(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%lu", (unsigned long)smk_cipso_doi_value);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_doi - write() for /smack/doi
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_doi(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	unsigned long u;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	temp[count] = '\0';
+
+	if (kstrtoul(temp, 10, &u))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (u == CIPSO_V4_DOI_UNKNOWN || u > U32_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return smk_cipso_doi(u, GFP_KERNEL) ? : count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_doi_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_doi,
+	.write		= smk_write_doi,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_direct - read() for /smack/direct
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_direct(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d", smack_cipso_direct);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_direct - write() for /smack/direct
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_direct(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	char temp[80];
+	int i;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	temp[count] = '\0';
+
+	if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't do anything if the value hasn't actually changed.
+	 * If it is changing reset the level on entries that were
+	 * set up to be direct when they were created.
+	 */
+	if (smack_cipso_direct != i) {
+		mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list)
+			if (skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl ==
+			    smack_cipso_direct)
+				skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = i;
+		smack_cipso_direct = i;
+		mutex_unlock(&smack_known_lock);
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_direct_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_direct,
+	.write		= smk_write_direct,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_mapped - read() for /smack/mapped
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_mapped(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d", smack_cipso_mapped);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_mapped - write() for /smack/mapped
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_mapped(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	char temp[80];
+	int i;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	temp[count] = '\0';
+
+	if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't do anything if the value hasn't actually changed.
+	 * If it is changing reset the level on entries that were
+	 * set up to be mapped when they were created.
+	 */
+	if (smack_cipso_mapped != i) {
+		mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list)
+			if (skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl ==
+			    smack_cipso_mapped)
+				skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = i;
+		smack_cipso_mapped = i;
+		mutex_unlock(&smack_known_lock);
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_mapped_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_mapped,
+	.write		= smk_write_mapped,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_ambient - read() for /smack/ambient
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	ssize_t rc;
+	int asize;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Being careful to avoid a problem in the case where
+	 * smack_net_ambient gets changed in midstream.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
+
+	asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient->smk_known) + 1;
+
+	if (cn >= asize)
+		rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos,
+					     smack_net_ambient->smk_known,
+					     asize);
+	else
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_ambient_lock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_ambient - write() for /smack/ambient
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	char *oldambient;
+	char *data;
+	int rc = count;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* Enough data must be present */
+	if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
+
+	oldambient = smack_net_ambient->smk_known;
+	smack_net_ambient = skp;
+	smk_unlbl_ambient(oldambient);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_ambient_lock);
+
+out:
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_ambient_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_ambient,
+	.write		= smk_write_ambient,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file operations for /smack/onlycap
+ */
+static void *onlycap_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_onlycap_list);
+}
+
+static void *onlycap_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_onlycap_list);
+}
+
+static int onlycap_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep =
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known_list_elem, list);
+
+	seq_puts(s, sklep->smk_label->smk_known);
+	seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations onlycap_seq_ops = {
+	.start = onlycap_seq_start,
+	.next  = onlycap_seq_next,
+	.show  = onlycap_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+static int smk_open_onlycap(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &onlycap_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_list_swap_rcu - swap public list with a private one in RCU-safe way
+ * The caller must hold appropriate mutex to prevent concurrent modifications
+ * to the public list.
+ * Private list is assumed to be not accessible to other threads yet.
+ *
+ * @public: public list
+ * @private: private list
+ */
+static void smk_list_swap_rcu(struct list_head *public,
+			      struct list_head *private)
+{
+	struct list_head *first, *last;
+
+	if (list_empty(public)) {
+		list_splice_init_rcu(private, public, synchronize_rcu);
+	} else {
+		/* Remember public list before replacing it */
+		first = public->next;
+		last = public->prev;
+
+		/* Publish private list in place of public in RCU-safe way */
+		private->prev->next = public;
+		private->next->prev = public;
+		rcu_assign_pointer(public->next, private->next);
+		public->prev = private->prev;
+
+		synchronize_rcu();
+
+		/* When all readers are done with the old public list,
+		 * attach it in place of private */
+		private->next = first;
+		private->prev = last;
+		first->prev = private;
+		last->next = private;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_parse_label_list - parse list of Smack labels, separated by spaces
+ *
+ * @data: the string to parse
+ * @list: destination list
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static int smk_parse_label_list(char *data, struct list_head *list)
+{
+	char *tok;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
+
+	while ((tok = strsep(&data, " ")) != NULL) {
+		if (!*tok)
+			continue;
+
+		skp = smk_import_entry(tok, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(skp))
+			return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+		sklep = kzalloc_obj(*sklep);
+		if (sklep == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		sklep->smk_label = skp;
+		list_add(&sklep->list, list);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_destroy_label_list - destroy a list of smack_known_list_elem
+ * @list: header pointer of the list to destroy
+ */
+void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list)
+{
+	struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
+	struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep2;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(sklep, sklep2, list, list)
+		kfree(sklep);
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(list);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_onlycap - write() for smackfs/onlycap
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	LIST_HEAD(list_tmp);
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	rc = smk_parse_label_list(data, &list_tmp);
+	kfree(data);
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear the smack_onlycap on invalid label errors. This means
+	 * that we can pass a null string to unset the onlycap value.
+	 *
+	 * Importing will also reject a label beginning with '-',
+	 * so "-usecapabilities" will also work.
+	 *
+	 * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors.
+	 * The invalid label must be first to count as clearing attempt.
+	 */
+	if (!rc || (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))) {
+		mutex_lock(&smack_onlycap_lock);
+		smk_list_swap_rcu(&smack_onlycap_list, &list_tmp);
+		mutex_unlock(&smack_onlycap_lock);
+		rc = count;
+	}
+
+	smk_destroy_label_list(&list_tmp);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
+	.open		= smk_open_onlycap,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.write		= smk_write_onlycap,
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+	.release	= seq_release,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+/**
+ * smk_read_unconfined - read() for smackfs/unconfined
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_unconfined(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+					size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *smack = "";
+	ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
+	int asize;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (smack_unconfined != NULL)
+		smack = smack_unconfined->smk_known;
+
+	asize = strlen(smack) + 1;
+
+	if (cn >= asize)
+		rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, smack, asize);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_unconfined - write() for smackfs/unconfined
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_unconfined(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int rc = count;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear the smack_unconfined on invalid label errors. This means
+	 * that we can pass a null string to unset the unconfined value.
+	 *
+	 * Importing will also reject a label beginning with '-',
+	 * so "-confine" will also work.
+	 *
+	 * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors.
+	 */
+	skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+	if (PTR_ERR(skp) == -EINVAL)
+		skp = NULL;
+	else if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+		goto freeout;
+	}
+
+	smack_unconfined = skp;
+
+freeout:
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_unconfined_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_unconfined,
+	.write		= smk_write_unconfined,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+/**
+ * smk_read_logging - read() for /smack/logging
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_logging(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[32];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d\n", log_policy);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_logging - write() for /smack/logging
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[32];
+	int i;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	temp[count] = '\0';
+
+	if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (i < 0 || i > 3)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	log_policy = i;
+	return count;
+}
+
+
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_logging,
+	.write		= smk_write_logging,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load-self
+ */
+
+static void *load_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
+}
+
+static void *load_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
+}
+
+static int load_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_rule *srp =
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+
+	smk_rule_show(s, srp, SMK_LABELLEN);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_self_seq_ops = {
+	.start = load_self_seq_start,
+	.next  = load_self_seq_next,
+	.show  = load_self_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load_self - open() for /smack/load-self2
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &load_self_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load_self - write() for /smack/load-self
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+
+	return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules,
+				    &tsp->smk_rules_lock, SMK_FIXED24_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load_self_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_load_self,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_load_self,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_user_access - handle access check transaction
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ * @format: /smack/load or /smack/load2 or /smack/change-rule format.
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_user_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int format)
+{
+	struct smack_parsed_rule rule;
+	char *data;
+	int res;
+
+	data = simple_transaction_get(file, buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT) {
+		if (count < SMK_LOADLEN)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		res = smk_parse_rule(data, &rule, 0);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * simple_transaction_get() returns null-terminated data
+		 */
+		res = smk_parse_long_rule(data, &rule, 0, 3);
+	}
+
+	if (res >= 0)
+		res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object,
+				 rule.smk_access1, NULL);
+	else if (res != -ENOENT)
+		return res;
+
+	/*
+	 * smk_access() can return a value > 0 in the "bringup" case.
+	 */
+	data[0] = res >= 0 ? '1' : '0';
+	data[1] = '\0';
+
+	simple_transaction_set(file, 2);
+
+	if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT)
+		return SMK_LOADLEN;
+	return count;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_access - handle access check transaction
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return smk_user_access(file, buf, count, ppos, SMK_FIXED24_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_access_ops = {
+	.write		= smk_write_access,
+	.read		= simple_transaction_read,
+	.release	= simple_transaction_release,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load2
+ */
+
+static int load2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_rule *srp;
+	struct smack_known *skp =
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known, list);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list)
+		smk_rule_show(s, srp, SMK_LONGLABEL);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load2_seq_ops = {
+	.start = load2_seq_start,
+	.next  = load2_seq_next,
+	.show  = load2_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load2 - open() for /smack/load2
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load2" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load2_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load2(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &load2_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load2 - write() for /smack/load2
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 */
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
+				    SMK_LONG_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load2_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_load2,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_load2,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load-self2
+ */
+
+static void *load_self2_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
+}
+
+static void *load_self2_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
+}
+
+static int load_self2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_rule *srp =
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+
+	smk_rule_show(s, srp, SMK_LONGLABEL);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_self2_seq_ops = {
+	.start = load_self2_seq_start,
+	.next  = load_self2_seq_next,
+	.show  = load_self2_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load_self2 - open() for /smack/load-self2
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load_self2(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &load_self2_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load_self2 - write() for /smack/load-self2
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load_self2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+
+	return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules,
+				    &tsp->smk_rules_lock, SMK_LONG_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load_self2_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_load_self2,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_load_self2,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_access2 - handle access check transaction
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_access2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return smk_user_access(file, buf, count, ppos, SMK_LONG_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_access2_ops = {
+	.write		= smk_write_access2,
+	.read		= simple_transaction_read,
+	.release	= simple_transaction_release,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_revoke_subj - write() for /smack/revoke-subject
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	const char *cp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_rule *sp;
+	struct list_head *rule_list;
+	struct mutex *rule_lock;
+	int rc = count;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count == 0 || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = memdup_user(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	cp = smk_parse_smack(data, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(cp)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(cp);
+		goto out_data;
+	}
+
+	skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
+	if (skp == NULL)
+		goto out_cp;
+
+	rule_list = &skp->smk_rules;
+	rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock;
+
+	mutex_lock(rule_lock);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, rule_list, list)
+		sp->smk_access = 0;
+
+	mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
+
+out_cp:
+	kfree(cp);
+out_data:
+	kfree(data);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_revoke_subj_ops = {
+	.write		= smk_write_revoke_subj,
+	.read		= simple_transaction_read,
+	.release	= simple_transaction_release,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_init_sysfs - initialize /sys/fs/smackfs
+ *
+ */
+static int smk_init_sysfs(void)
+{
+	return sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "smackfs");
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_change_rule - write() for /smack/change-rule
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_change_rule(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 */
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
+				    SMK_CHANGE_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_change_rule_ops = {
+	.write		= smk_write_change_rule,
+	.read		= simple_transaction_read,
+	.release	= simple_transaction_release,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_syslog - read() for smackfs/syslog
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_syslog(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
+	int asize;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (smack_syslog_label == NULL)
+		skp = &smack_known_star;
+	else
+		skp = smack_syslog_label;
+
+	asize = strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1;
+
+	if (cn >= asize)
+		rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, skp->smk_known,
+						asize);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_syslog - write() for smackfs/syslog
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int rc = count;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* Enough data must be present */
+	if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(skp))
+		rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+	else
+		smack_syslog_label = skp;
+
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_syslog_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_syslog,
+	.write		= smk_write_syslog,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/relabel-self
+ */
+
+static void *relabel_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_relabel);
+}
+
+static void *relabel_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_relabel);
+}
+
+static int relabel_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep =
+		list_entry(list, struct smack_known_list_elem, list);
+
+	seq_puts(s, sklep->smk_label->smk_known);
+	seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations relabel_self_seq_ops = {
+	.start = relabel_self_seq_start,
+	.next  = relabel_self_seq_next,
+	.show  = relabel_self_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_relabel_self - open() for /smack/relabel-self
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "relabel-self" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our relabel_self_seq_* operations with /smack/relabel-self
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_relabel_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &relabel_self_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_relabel_self - write() for /smack/relabel-self
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	int rc;
+	LIST_HEAD(list_tmp);
+
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 */
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/*
+	 * No partial write.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	rc = smk_parse_label_list(data, &list_tmp);
+	kfree(data);
+
+	if (!rc || (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))) {
+		struct cred *new;
+		struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+		new = prepare_creds();
+		if (!new) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		tsp = smack_cred(new);
+		smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
+		list_splice(&list_tmp, &tsp->smk_relabel);
+		commit_creds(new);
+		return count;
+	}
+out:
+	smk_destroy_label_list(&list_tmp);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_relabel_self_ops = {
+	.open		= smk_open_relabel_self,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_relabel_self,
+	.release	= seq_release,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_ptrace - read() for /smack/ptrace
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_ptrace(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[32];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d\n", smack_ptrace_rule);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_ptrace - write() for /smack/ptrace
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_ptrace(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[32];
+	int i;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0 || count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	temp[count] = '\0';
+
+	if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (i < SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT || i > SMACK_PTRACE_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	smack_ptrace_rule = i;
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_ptrace_ops = {
+	.write		= smk_write_ptrace,
+	.read		= smk_read_ptrace,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_fill_super - fill the smackfs superblock
+ * @sb: the empty superblock
+ * @fc: unused
+ *
+ * Fill in the well known entries for the smack filesystem
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ */
+static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	static const struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
+		[SMK_LOAD] = {
+			"load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_CIPSO] = {
+			"cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_DOI] = {
+			"doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_DIRECT] = {
+			"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_AMBIENT] = {
+			"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_NET4ADDR] = {
+			"netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_ONLYCAP] = {
+			"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		[SMK_LOGGING] = {
+			"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+		[SMK_LOAD_SELF] = {
+			"load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SMK_ACCESSES] = {
+			"access", &smk_access_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SMK_MAPPED] = {
+			"mapped", &smk_mapped_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_LOAD2] = {
+			"load2", &smk_load2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_LOAD_SELF2] = {
+			"load-self2", &smk_load_self2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SMK_ACCESS2] = {
+			"access2", &smk_access2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SMK_CIPSO2] = {
+			"cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ] = {
+			"revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops,
+			S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_CHANGE_RULE] = {
+			"change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_SYSLOG] = {
+			"syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_PTRACE] = {
+			"ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+		[SMK_UNCONFINED] = {
+			"unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+		[SMK_NET6ADDR] = {
+			"ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+		[SMK_RELABEL_SELF] = {
+			"relabel-self", &smk_relabel_self_ops,
+				S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		/* last one */
+			{""}
+	};
+
+	rc = simple_fill_super(sb, SMACK_MAGIC, smack_files);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s failed %d while creating inodes\n",
+			__func__, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_get_tree - get the smackfs superblock
+ * @fc: The mount context, including any options
+ *
+ * Just passes everything along.
+ *
+ * Returns what the lower level code does.
+ */
+static int smk_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	return get_tree_single(fc, smk_fill_super);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations smk_context_ops = {
+	.get_tree	= smk_get_tree,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_init_fs_context - Initialise a filesystem context for smackfs
+ * @fc: The blank mount context
+ */
+static int smk_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	fc->ops = &smk_context_ops;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type smk_fs_type = {
+	.name		= "smackfs",
+	.init_fs_context = smk_init_fs_context,
+	.kill_sb	= kill_anon_super,
+};
+
+static struct vfsmount *smackfs_mount;
+
+/**
+ * init_smk_fs - get the smackfs superblock
+ *
+ * register the smackfs
+ *
+ * Do not register smackfs if Smack wasn't enabled
+ * on boot. We can not put this method normally under the
+ * smack_init() code path since the security subsystem get
+ * initialized before the vfs caches.
+ *
+ * Returns true if we were not chosen on boot or if
+ * we were chosen and filesystem registration succeeded.
+ */
+int __init init_smk_fs(void)
+{
+	int err;
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_audit nai;
+
+	if (smack_enabled == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	err = smk_init_sysfs();
+	if (err)
+		printk(KERN_ERR "smackfs: sysfs mountpoint problem.\n");
+
+	err = register_filesystem(&smk_fs_type);
+	if (!err) {
+		smackfs_mount = kern_mount(&smk_fs_type);
+		if (IS_ERR(smackfs_mount)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "smackfs:  could not mount!\n");
+			err = PTR_ERR(smackfs_mount);
+			smackfs_mount = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
+	(void) netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+	(void) smk_cipso_doi(SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT,
+			     GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
+	smk_unlbl_ambient(NULL);
+
+	rc = smack_populate_secattr(&smack_known_floor);
+	if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
+		err = rc;
+	rc = smack_populate_secattr(&smack_known_hat);
+	if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
+		err = rc;
+	rc = smack_populate_secattr(&smack_known_huh);
+	if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
+		err = rc;
+	rc = smack_populate_secattr(&smack_known_star);
+	if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
+		err = rc;
+	rc = smack_populate_secattr(&smack_known_web);
+	if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
+		err = rc;
+
+	return err;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/.gitignore b/security/tomoyo/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9f300cdce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+builtin-policy.h
+policy/*.conf
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1e0dd1a6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	bool "TOMOYO Linux Support"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	depends on NET
+	select SECURITYFS
+	select SECURITY_PATH
+	select SECURITY_NETWORK
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects TOMOYO Linux, pathname-based access control.
+	  Required userspace tools and further information may be
+	  found at <https://tomoyo.sourceforge.net/>.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY
+	int "Default maximal count for learning mode"
+	default 2048
+	range 0 2147483647
+	depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	help
+	  This is the default value for maximal ACL entries
+	  that are automatically appended into policy at "learning mode".
+	  Some programs access thousands of objects, so running
+	  such programs in "learning mode" dulls the system response
+	  and consumes much memory.
+	  This is the safeguard for such programs.
+
+config SECURITY_TOMOYO_MAX_AUDIT_LOG
+	int "Default maximal count for audit log"
+	default 1024
+	range 0 2147483647
+	depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	help
+	  This is the default value for maximal entries for
+	  audit logs that the kernel can hold on memory.
+	  You can read the log via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit.
+	  If you don't need audit logs, you may set this value to 0.
+
+config SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
+	bool "Activate without calling userspace policy loader."
+	default n
+	depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	help
+	  Say Y here if you want to activate access control as soon as built-in
+	  policy was loaded. This option will be useful for systems where
+	  operations which can lead to the hijacking of the boot sequence are
+	  needed before loading the policy. For example, you can activate
+	  immediately after loading the fixed part of policy which will allow
+	  only operations needed for mounting a partition which contains the
+	  variant part of policy and verifying (e.g. running GPG check) and
+	  loading the variant part of policy. Since you can start using
+	  enforcing mode from the beginning, you can reduce the possibility of
+	  hijacking the boot sequence.
+
+config SECURITY_TOMOYO_POLICY_LOADER
+	string "Location of userspace policy loader"
+	default "/sbin/tomoyo-init"
+	depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	depends on !SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
+	help
+	  This is the default pathname of policy loader which is called before
+	  activation. You can override this setting via TOMOYO_loader= kernel
+	  command line option.
+
+config SECURITY_TOMOYO_ACTIVATION_TRIGGER
+	string "Trigger for calling userspace policy loader"
+	default "/sbin/init"
+	depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	depends on !SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
+	help
+	  This is the default pathname of activation trigger.
+	  You can override this setting via TOMOYO_trigger= kernel command line
+	  option. For example, if you pass init=/bin/systemd option, you may
+	  want to also pass TOMOYO_trigger=/bin/systemd option.
+
+config SECURITY_TOMOYO_INSECURE_BUILTIN_SETTING
+	bool "Use insecure built-in settings for fuzzing tests."
+	default n
+	depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	select SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
+	help
+	  Enabling this option forces minimal built-in policy and disables
+	  domain/program checks for run-time policy modifications. Please enable
+	  this option only if this kernel is built for doing fuzzing tests.
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e3c0f853a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+CONTEXT_ANALYSIS := y
+
+obj-y = audit.o common.o condition.o domain.o environ.o file.o gc.o group.o load_policy.o memory.o mount.o network.o realpath.o securityfs_if.o tomoyo.o util.o
+
+targets += builtin-policy.h
+
+quiet_cmd_policy = POLICY  $@
+      cmd_policy = { \
+	$(foreach x, profile exception_policy domain_policy manager stat, \
+	printf 'static char tomoyo_builtin_$x[] __initdata =\n'; \
+	sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/\"/\\"/g' -e 's/\(.*\)/\t"\1\\n"/' -- $(firstword $(filter %/$x.conf %/$x.conf.default, $^) /dev/null);  \
+	printf '\t"";\n';) \
+	} > $@
+
+$(obj)/builtin-policy.h: $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/*.conf $(src)/policy/*.conf.default) FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,policy)
+
+ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_INSECURE_BUILTIN_SETTING
+$(obj)/common.o: $(obj)/builtin-policy.h
+endif
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/audit.c b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1fba46aa3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,477 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/audit.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_bprm - Print "struct linux_binprm" for auditing.
+ *
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
+ * @dump: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_page_dump".
+ *
+ * Returns the contents of @bprm on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This function uses kzalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function
+ * didn't return NULL.
+ */
+static char *tomoyo_print_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			       struct tomoyo_page_dump *dump)
+{
+	static const int tomoyo_buffer_len = 4096 * 2;
+	char *buffer = kzalloc(tomoyo_buffer_len, GFP_NOFS);
+	char *cp;
+	char *last_start;
+	int len;
+	unsigned long pos = bprm->p;
+	int offset = pos % PAGE_SIZE;
+	int argv_count = bprm->argc;
+	int envp_count = bprm->envc;
+	bool truncated = false;
+
+	if (!buffer)
+		return NULL;
+	len = snprintf(buffer, tomoyo_buffer_len - 1, "argv[]={ ");
+	cp = buffer + len;
+	if (!argv_count) {
+		memmove(cp, "} envp[]={ ", 11);
+		cp += 11;
+	}
+	last_start = cp;
+	while (argv_count || envp_count) {
+		if (!tomoyo_dump_page(bprm, pos, dump))
+			goto out;
+		pos += PAGE_SIZE - offset;
+		/* Read. */
+		while (offset < PAGE_SIZE) {
+			const char *kaddr = dump->data;
+			const unsigned char c = kaddr[offset++];
+
+			if (cp == last_start)
+				*cp++ = '"';
+			if (cp >= buffer + tomoyo_buffer_len - 32) {
+				/* Reserve some room for "..." string. */
+				truncated = true;
+			} else if (c == '\\') {
+				*cp++ = '\\';
+				*cp++ = '\\';
+			} else if (c > ' ' && c < 127) {
+				*cp++ = c;
+			} else if (!c) {
+				*cp++ = '"';
+				*cp++ = ' ';
+				last_start = cp;
+			} else {
+				*cp++ = '\\';
+				*cp++ = (c >> 6) + '0';
+				*cp++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
+				*cp++ = (c & 7) + '0';
+			}
+			if (c)
+				continue;
+			if (argv_count) {
+				if (--argv_count == 0) {
+					if (truncated) {
+						cp = last_start;
+						memmove(cp, "... ", 4);
+						cp += 4;
+					}
+					memmove(cp, "} envp[]={ ", 11);
+					cp += 11;
+					last_start = cp;
+					truncated = false;
+				}
+			} else if (envp_count) {
+				if (--envp_count == 0) {
+					if (truncated) {
+						cp = last_start;
+						memmove(cp, "... ", 4);
+						cp += 4;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			if (!argv_count && !envp_count)
+				break;
+		}
+		offset = 0;
+	}
+	*cp++ = '}';
+	*cp = '\0';
+	return buffer;
+out:
+	snprintf(buffer, tomoyo_buffer_len - 1,
+		 "argv[]={ ... } envp[]= { ... }");
+	return buffer;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_filetype - Get string representation of file type.
+ *
+ * @mode: Mode value for stat().
+ *
+ * Returns file type string.
+ */
+static inline const char *tomoyo_filetype(const umode_t mode)
+{
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFREG:
+	case 0:
+		return tomoyo_condition_keyword[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_FILE];
+	case S_IFDIR:
+		return tomoyo_condition_keyword[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_DIRECTORY];
+	case S_IFLNK:
+		return tomoyo_condition_keyword[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_SYMLINK];
+	case S_IFIFO:
+		return tomoyo_condition_keyword[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_FIFO];
+	case S_IFSOCK:
+		return tomoyo_condition_keyword[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_SOCKET];
+	case S_IFBLK:
+		return tomoyo_condition_keyword[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_BLOCK_DEV];
+	case S_IFCHR:
+		return tomoyo_condition_keyword[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_CHAR_DEV];
+	}
+	return "unknown"; /* This should not happen. */
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_header - Get header line of audit log.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns string representation.
+ *
+ * This function uses kmalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function
+ * didn't return NULL.
+ */
+static char *tomoyo_print_header(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_time stamp;
+	const pid_t gpid = task_pid_nr(current);
+	struct tomoyo_obj_info *obj = r->obj;
+	static const int tomoyo_buffer_len = 4096;
+	char *buffer = kmalloc(tomoyo_buffer_len, GFP_NOFS);
+	int pos;
+	u8 i;
+
+	if (!buffer)
+		return NULL;
+
+	tomoyo_convert_time(ktime_get_real_seconds(), &stamp);
+
+	pos = snprintf(buffer, tomoyo_buffer_len - 1,
+		       "#%04u/%02u/%02u %02u:%02u:%02u# profile=%u mode=%s granted=%s (global-pid=%u) task={ pid=%u ppid=%u uid=%u gid=%u euid=%u egid=%u suid=%u sgid=%u fsuid=%u fsgid=%u }",
+		       stamp.year, stamp.month, stamp.day, stamp.hour,
+		       stamp.min, stamp.sec, r->profile, tomoyo_mode[r->mode],
+		       str_yes_no(r->granted), gpid, tomoyo_sys_getpid(),
+		       tomoyo_sys_getppid(),
+		       from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()),
+		       from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_gid()),
+		       from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_euid()),
+		       from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_egid()),
+		       from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_suid()),
+		       from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_sgid()),
+		       from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_fsuid()),
+		       from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_fsgid()));
+	if (!obj)
+		goto no_obj_info;
+	if (!obj->validate_done) {
+		tomoyo_get_attributes(obj);
+		obj->validate_done = true;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_STAT; i++) {
+		struct tomoyo_mini_stat *stat;
+		unsigned int dev;
+		umode_t mode;
+
+		if (!obj->stat_valid[i])
+			continue;
+		stat = &obj->stat[i];
+		dev = stat->dev;
+		mode = stat->mode;
+		if (i & 1) {
+			pos += snprintf(buffer + pos,
+					tomoyo_buffer_len - 1 - pos,
+					" path%u.parent={ uid=%u gid=%u ino=%llu perm=0%o }",
+					(i >> 1) + 1,
+					from_kuid(&init_user_ns, stat->uid),
+					from_kgid(&init_user_ns, stat->gid),
+					stat->ino, stat->mode & S_IALLUGO);
+			continue;
+		}
+		pos += snprintf(buffer + pos, tomoyo_buffer_len - 1 - pos,
+				" path%u={ uid=%u gid=%u ino=%llu major=%u minor=%u perm=0%o type=%s",
+				(i >> 1) + 1,
+				from_kuid(&init_user_ns, stat->uid),
+				from_kgid(&init_user_ns, stat->gid),
+				stat->ino, MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev),
+				mode & S_IALLUGO, tomoyo_filetype(mode));
+		if (S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) {
+			dev = stat->rdev;
+			pos += snprintf(buffer + pos,
+					tomoyo_buffer_len - 1 - pos,
+					" dev_major=%u dev_minor=%u",
+					MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev));
+		}
+		pos += snprintf(buffer + pos, tomoyo_buffer_len - 1 - pos,
+				" }");
+	}
+no_obj_info:
+	if (pos < tomoyo_buffer_len - 1)
+		return buffer;
+	kfree(buffer);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_init_log - Allocate buffer for audit logs.
+ *
+ * @r:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @len:  Buffer size needed for @fmt and @args.
+ * @fmt:  The printf()'s format string.
+ * @args: va_list structure for @fmt.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to allocated memory.
+ *
+ * This function uses kzalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function
+ * didn't return NULL.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_init_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, int len, const char *fmt,
+		      va_list args)
+{
+	char *buf = NULL;
+	char *bprm_info = NULL;
+	const char *header = NULL;
+	char *realpath = NULL;
+	const char *symlink = NULL;
+	int pos;
+	const char *domainname = r->domain->domainname->name;
+
+	header = tomoyo_print_header(r);
+	if (!header)
+		return NULL;
+	/* +10 is for '\n' etc. and '\0'. */
+	len += strlen(domainname) + strlen(header) + 10;
+	if (r->ee) {
+		struct file *file = r->ee->bprm->file;
+
+		realpath = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&file->f_path);
+		bprm_info = tomoyo_print_bprm(r->ee->bprm, &r->ee->dump);
+		if (!realpath || !bprm_info)
+			goto out;
+		/* +80 is for " exec={ realpath=\"%s\" argc=%d envc=%d %s }" */
+		len += strlen(realpath) + 80 + strlen(bprm_info);
+	} else if (r->obj && r->obj->symlink_target) {
+		symlink = r->obj->symlink_target->name;
+		/* +18 is for " symlink.target=\"%s\"" */
+		len += 18 + strlen(symlink);
+	}
+	len = kmalloc_size_roundup(len);
+	buf = kzalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!buf)
+		goto out;
+	len--;
+	pos = snprintf(buf, len, "%s", header);
+	if (realpath) {
+		struct linux_binprm *bprm = r->ee->bprm;
+
+		pos += snprintf(buf + pos, len - pos,
+				" exec={ realpath=\"%s\" argc=%d envc=%d %s }",
+				realpath, bprm->argc, bprm->envc, bprm_info);
+	} else if (symlink)
+		pos += snprintf(buf + pos, len - pos, " symlink.target=\"%s\"",
+				symlink);
+	pos += snprintf(buf + pos, len - pos, "\n%s\n", domainname);
+	vsnprintf(buf + pos, len - pos, fmt, args);
+out:
+	kfree(realpath);
+	kfree(bprm_info);
+	kfree(header);
+	return buf;
+}
+
+/* Wait queue for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit. */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(tomoyo_log_wait);
+
+/* Structure for audit log. */
+struct tomoyo_log {
+	struct list_head list;
+	char *log;
+	int size;
+};
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_log". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_log);
+
+/* Lock for "struct list_head tomoyo_log". */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tomoyo_log_lock);
+
+/* Length of "struct list_head tomoyo_log". */
+static unsigned int tomoyo_log_count;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_audit - Get audit mode.
+ *
+ * @ns:          Pointer to "struct tomoyo_policy_namespace".
+ * @profile:     Profile number.
+ * @index:       Index number of functionality.
+ * @matched_acl: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @is_granted:  True if granted log, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Returns true if this request should be audited, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_get_audit(const struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns,
+			     const u8 profile, const u8 index,
+			     const struct tomoyo_acl_info *matched_acl,
+			     const bool is_granted)
+{
+	u8 mode;
+	const u8 category = tomoyo_index2category[index] +
+		TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX;
+	struct tomoyo_profile *p;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+		return false;
+	p = tomoyo_profile(ns, profile);
+	if (tomoyo_log_count >= p->pref[TOMOYO_PREF_MAX_AUDIT_LOG])
+		return false;
+	if (is_granted && matched_acl && matched_acl->cond &&
+	    matched_acl->cond->grant_log != TOMOYO_GRANTLOG_AUTO)
+		return matched_acl->cond->grant_log == TOMOYO_GRANTLOG_YES;
+	mode = p->config[index];
+	if (mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT)
+		mode = p->config[category];
+	if (mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT)
+		mode = p->default_config;
+	if (is_granted)
+		return mode & TOMOYO_CONFIG_WANT_GRANT_LOG;
+	return mode & TOMOYO_CONFIG_WANT_REJECT_LOG;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_log2 - Write an audit log.
+ *
+ * @r:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @len:  Buffer size needed for @fmt and @args.
+ * @fmt:  The printf()'s format string.
+ * @args: va_list structure for @fmt.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_write_log2(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, int len, const char *fmt,
+		       va_list args)
+{
+	char *buf;
+	struct tomoyo_log *entry;
+	bool quota_exceeded = false;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_get_audit(r->domain->ns, r->profile, r->type,
+			      r->matched_acl, r->granted))
+		goto out;
+	buf = tomoyo_init_log(r, len, fmt, args);
+	if (!buf)
+		goto out;
+	entry = kzalloc_obj(*entry, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!entry) {
+		kfree(buf);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	entry->log = buf;
+	len = kmalloc_size_roundup(strlen(buf) + 1);
+	/*
+	 * The entry->size is used for memory quota checks.
+	 * Don't go beyond strlen(entry->log).
+	 */
+	entry->size = len + kmalloc_size_roundup(sizeof(*entry));
+	spin_lock(&tomoyo_log_lock);
+	if (tomoyo_memory_quota[TOMOYO_MEMORY_AUDIT] &&
+	    tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MEMORY_AUDIT] + entry->size >=
+	    tomoyo_memory_quota[TOMOYO_MEMORY_AUDIT]) {
+		quota_exceeded = true;
+	} else {
+		tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MEMORY_AUDIT] += entry->size;
+		list_add_tail(&entry->list, &tomoyo_log);
+		tomoyo_log_count++;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_log_lock);
+	if (quota_exceeded) {
+		kfree(buf);
+		kfree(entry);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	wake_up(&tomoyo_log_wait);
+out:
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_log - Write an audit log.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @fmt: The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_write_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	int len;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, args) + 1;
+	va_end(args);
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	tomoyo_write_log2(r, len, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_log - Read an audit log.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_read_log(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_log *ptr = NULL;
+
+	if (head->r.w_pos)
+		return;
+	kfree(head->read_buf);
+	head->read_buf = NULL;
+	spin_lock(&tomoyo_log_lock);
+	if (!list_empty(&tomoyo_log)) {
+		ptr = list_entry(tomoyo_log.next, typeof(*ptr), list);
+		list_del(&ptr->list);
+		tomoyo_log_count--;
+		tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MEMORY_AUDIT] -= ptr->size;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_log_lock);
+	if (ptr) {
+		head->read_buf = ptr->log;
+		head->r.w[head->r.w_pos++] = head->read_buf;
+		kfree(ptr);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_poll_log - Wait for an audit log.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". Maybe NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM when ready to read an audit log.
+ */
+__poll_t tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+{
+	if (tomoyo_log_count)
+		return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+	poll_wait(file, &tomoyo_log_wait, wait);
+	if (tomoyo_log_count)
+		return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fdaeaff01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3025 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/common.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
+#include "common.h"
+
+/* String table for operation mode. */
+const char * const tomoyo_mode[TOMOYO_CONFIG_MAX_MODE] = {
+	[TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED]   = "disabled",
+	[TOMOYO_CONFIG_LEARNING]   = "learning",
+	[TOMOYO_CONFIG_PERMISSIVE] = "permissive",
+	[TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING]  = "enforcing"
+};
+
+/* String table for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile */
+const char * const tomoyo_mac_keywords[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX
+				       + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX] = {
+	/* CONFIG::file group */
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_EXECUTE]    = "execute",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN]       = "open",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CREATE]     = "create",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UNLINK]     = "unlink",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_GETATTR]    = "getattr",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKDIR]      = "mkdir",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RMDIR]      = "rmdir",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKFIFO]     = "mkfifo",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKSOCK]     = "mksock",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_TRUNCATE]   = "truncate",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_SYMLINK]    = "symlink",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKBLOCK]    = "mkblock",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKCHAR]     = "mkchar",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_LINK]       = "link",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RENAME]     = "rename",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHMOD]      = "chmod",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHOWN]      = "chown",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHGRP]      = "chgrp",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_IOCTL]      = "ioctl",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHROOT]     = "chroot",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MOUNT]      = "mount",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UMOUNT]     = "unmount",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_PIVOT_ROOT] = "pivot_root",
+	/* CONFIG::network group */
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_STREAM_BIND]       = "inet_stream_bind",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_STREAM_LISTEN]     = "inet_stream_listen",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_STREAM_CONNECT]    = "inet_stream_connect",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_DGRAM_BIND]        = "inet_dgram_bind",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_DGRAM_SEND]        = "inet_dgram_send",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_RAW_BIND]          = "inet_raw_bind",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_RAW_SEND]          = "inet_raw_send",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_STREAM_BIND]       = "unix_stream_bind",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_STREAM_LISTEN]     = "unix_stream_listen",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_STREAM_CONNECT]    = "unix_stream_connect",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_DGRAM_BIND]        = "unix_dgram_bind",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_DGRAM_SEND]        = "unix_dgram_send",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_SEQPACKET_BIND]    = "unix_seqpacket_bind",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_SEQPACKET_LISTEN]  = "unix_seqpacket_listen",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_SEQPACKET_CONNECT] = "unix_seqpacket_connect",
+	/* CONFIG::misc group */
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_ENVIRON] = "env",
+	/* CONFIG group */
+	[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE] = "file",
+	[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK] = "network",
+	[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_MISC] = "misc",
+};
+
+/* String table for conditions. */
+const char * const tomoyo_condition_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_CONDITION_KEYWORD] = {
+	[TOMOYO_TASK_UID]             = "task.uid",
+	[TOMOYO_TASK_EUID]            = "task.euid",
+	[TOMOYO_TASK_SUID]            = "task.suid",
+	[TOMOYO_TASK_FSUID]           = "task.fsuid",
+	[TOMOYO_TASK_GID]             = "task.gid",
+	[TOMOYO_TASK_EGID]            = "task.egid",
+	[TOMOYO_TASK_SGID]            = "task.sgid",
+	[TOMOYO_TASK_FSGID]           = "task.fsgid",
+	[TOMOYO_TASK_PID]             = "task.pid",
+	[TOMOYO_TASK_PPID]            = "task.ppid",
+	[TOMOYO_EXEC_ARGC]            = "exec.argc",
+	[TOMOYO_EXEC_ENVC]            = "exec.envc",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_SOCKET]       = "socket",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_SYMLINK]      = "symlink",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_FILE]         = "file",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_BLOCK_DEV]    = "block",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_DIRECTORY]    = "directory",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_CHAR_DEV]     = "char",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_FIFO]         = "fifo",
+	[TOMOYO_MODE_SETUID]          = "setuid",
+	[TOMOYO_MODE_SETGID]          = "setgid",
+	[TOMOYO_MODE_STICKY]          = "sticky",
+	[TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_READ]      = "owner_read",
+	[TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_WRITE]     = "owner_write",
+	[TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_EXECUTE]   = "owner_execute",
+	[TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_READ]      = "group_read",
+	[TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_WRITE]     = "group_write",
+	[TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_EXECUTE]   = "group_execute",
+	[TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_READ]     = "others_read",
+	[TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_WRITE]    = "others_write",
+	[TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_EXECUTE]  = "others_execute",
+	[TOMOYO_EXEC_REALPATH]        = "exec.realpath",
+	[TOMOYO_SYMLINK_TARGET]       = "symlink.target",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_UID]            = "path1.uid",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_GID]            = "path1.gid",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_INO]            = "path1.ino",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_MAJOR]          = "path1.major",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_MINOR]          = "path1.minor",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_PERM]           = "path1.perm",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_TYPE]           = "path1.type",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_DEV_MAJOR]      = "path1.dev_major",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_DEV_MINOR]      = "path1.dev_minor",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_UID]            = "path2.uid",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_GID]            = "path2.gid",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_INO]            = "path2.ino",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_MAJOR]          = "path2.major",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_MINOR]          = "path2.minor",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_PERM]           = "path2.perm",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_TYPE]           = "path2.type",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_DEV_MAJOR]      = "path2.dev_major",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_DEV_MINOR]      = "path2.dev_minor",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_UID]     = "path1.parent.uid",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_GID]     = "path1.parent.gid",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_INO]     = "path1.parent.ino",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_PERM]    = "path1.parent.perm",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_UID]     = "path2.parent.uid",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_GID]     = "path2.parent.gid",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_INO]     = "path2.parent.ino",
+	[TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_PERM]    = "path2.parent.perm",
+};
+
+/* String table for PREFERENCE keyword. */
+static const char * const tomoyo_pref_keywords[TOMOYO_MAX_PREF] = {
+	[TOMOYO_PREF_MAX_AUDIT_LOG]      = "max_audit_log",
+	[TOMOYO_PREF_MAX_LEARNING_ENTRY] = "max_learning_entry",
+};
+
+/* String table for path operation. */
+const char * const tomoyo_path_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION] = {
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE]    = "execute",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_READ]       = "read",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE]      = "write",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_APPEND]     = "append",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK]     = "unlink",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_GETATTR]    = "getattr",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR]      = "rmdir",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE]   = "truncate",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK]    = "symlink",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT]     = "chroot",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT]     = "unmount",
+};
+
+/* String table for socket's operation. */
+const char * const tomoyo_socket_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_NETWORK_OPERATION] = {
+	[TOMOYO_NETWORK_BIND]    = "bind",
+	[TOMOYO_NETWORK_LISTEN]  = "listen",
+	[TOMOYO_NETWORK_CONNECT] = "connect",
+	[TOMOYO_NETWORK_SEND]    = "send",
+};
+
+/* String table for categories. */
+static const char * const tomoyo_category_keywords
+[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX] = {
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE]    = "file",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK] = "network",
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_MISC]    = "misc",
+};
+
+/* Permit policy management by non-root user? */
+static bool tomoyo_manage_by_non_root;
+
+/* Utility functions. */
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_addprintf - strncat()-like-snprintf().
+ *
+ * @buffer: Buffer to write to. Must be '\0'-terminated.
+ * @len:    Size of @buffer.
+ * @fmt:    The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+__printf(3, 4)
+static void tomoyo_addprintf(char *buffer, int len, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	const int pos = strlen(buffer);
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(buffer + pos, len - pos - 1, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_flush - Flush queued string to userspace's buffer.
+ *
+ * @head:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true if all data was flushed, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_flush(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	while (head->r.w_pos) {
+		const char *w = head->r.w[0];
+		size_t len = strlen(w);
+
+		if (len) {
+			if (len > head->read_user_buf_avail)
+				len = head->read_user_buf_avail;
+			if (!len)
+				return false;
+			if (copy_to_user(head->read_user_buf, w, len))
+				return false;
+			head->read_user_buf_avail -= len;
+			head->read_user_buf += len;
+			w += len;
+		}
+		head->r.w[0] = w;
+		if (*w)
+			return false;
+		/* Add '\0' for audit logs and query. */
+		if (head->poll) {
+			if (!head->read_user_buf_avail ||
+			    copy_to_user(head->read_user_buf, "", 1))
+				return false;
+			head->read_user_buf_avail--;
+			head->read_user_buf++;
+		}
+		head->r.w_pos--;
+		for (len = 0; len < head->r.w_pos; len++)
+			head->r.w[len] = head->r.w[len + 1];
+	}
+	head->r.avail = 0;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_set_string - Queue string to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" structure.
+ *
+ * @head:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @string: String to print.
+ *
+ * Note that @string has to be kept valid until @head is kfree()d.
+ * This means that char[] allocated on stack memory cannot be passed to
+ * this function. Use tomoyo_io_printf() for char[] allocated on stack memory.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_set_string(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *string)
+{
+	if (head->r.w_pos < TOMOYO_MAX_IO_READ_QUEUE) {
+		head->r.w[head->r.w_pos++] = string;
+		tomoyo_flush(head);
+	} else
+		WARN_ON(1);
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_io_printf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt,
+			     ...) __printf(2, 3);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_io_printf - printf() to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" structure.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @fmt:  The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_io_printf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt,
+			     ...)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	size_t len;
+	size_t pos = head->r.avail;
+	int size = head->readbuf_size - pos;
+
+	if (size <= 0)
+		return;
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	len = vsnprintf(head->read_buf + pos, size, fmt, args) + 1;
+	va_end(args);
+	if (pos + len >= head->readbuf_size) {
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		return;
+	}
+	head->r.avail += len;
+	tomoyo_set_string(head, head->read_buf + pos);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_set_space - Put a space to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" structure.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_set_space(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	tomoyo_set_string(head, " ");
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_set_lf - Put a line feed to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" structure.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_set_lf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	tomoyo_set_string(head, "\n");
+	return !head->r.w_pos;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_set_slash - Put a shash to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" structure.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_set_slash(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	tomoyo_set_string(head, "/");
+}
+
+/* List of namespaces. */
+LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_namespace_list);
+/* True if namespace other than tomoyo_kernel_namespace is defined. */
+static bool tomoyo_namespace_enabled;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_init_policy_namespace - Initialize namespace.
+ *
+ * @ns: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_policy_namespace".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_init_policy_namespace(struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+
+	for (idx = 0; idx < TOMOYO_MAX_ACL_GROUPS; idx++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->acl_group[idx]);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP; idx++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->group_list[idx]);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY; idx++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->policy_list[idx]);
+	ns->profile_version = 20150505;
+	tomoyo_namespace_enabled = !list_empty(&tomoyo_namespace_list);
+	list_add_tail_rcu(&ns->namespace_list, &tomoyo_namespace_list);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_namespace - Print namespace header.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_print_namespace(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (!tomoyo_namespace_enabled)
+		return;
+	tomoyo_set_string(head,
+			  container_of(head->r.ns,
+				       struct tomoyo_policy_namespace,
+				       namespace_list)->name);
+	tomoyo_set_space(head);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_name_union - Print a tomoyo_name_union.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ */
+static void tomoyo_print_name_union(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+				    const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+	tomoyo_set_space(head);
+	if (ptr->group) {
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, "@");
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->group->group_name->name);
+	} else {
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->filename->name);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_name_union_quoted - Print a tomoyo_name_union with a quote.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_print_name_union_quoted(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+					   const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+	if (ptr->group) {
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, "@");
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->group->group_name->name);
+	} else {
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, "\"");
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->filename->name);
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, "\"");
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_number_union_nospace - Print a tomoyo_number_union without a space.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_union".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void
+tomoyo_print_number_union_nospace(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	if (ptr->group) {
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, "@");
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->group->group_name->name);
+	} else {
+		int i;
+		unsigned long min = ptr->values[0];
+		const unsigned long max = ptr->values[1];
+		u8 min_type = ptr->value_type[0];
+		const u8 max_type = ptr->value_type[1];
+		char buffer[128];
+
+		buffer[0] = '\0';
+		for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+			switch (min_type) {
+			case TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_HEXADECIMAL:
+				tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer),
+						 "0x%lX", min);
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_OCTAL:
+				tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer),
+						 "0%lo", min);
+				break;
+			default:
+				tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%lu",
+						 min);
+				break;
+			}
+			if (min == max && min_type == max_type)
+				break;
+			tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "-");
+			min_type = max_type;
+			min = max;
+		}
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s", buffer);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_number_union - Print a tomoyo_number_union.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_union".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_print_number_union(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+				      const struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	tomoyo_set_space(head);
+	tomoyo_print_number_union_nospace(head, ptr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_assign_profile - Create a new profile.
+ *
+ * @ns:      Pointer to "struct tomoyo_policy_namespace".
+ * @profile: Profile number to create.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_profile" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_assign_profile
+(struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns, const unsigned int profile)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_profile *ptr;
+	struct tomoyo_profile *entry;
+
+	if (profile >= TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES)
+		return NULL;
+	ptr = ns->profile_ptr[profile];
+	if (ptr)
+		return ptr;
+	entry = kzalloc_obj(*entry, GFP_NOFS | __GFP_NOWARN);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
+	ptr = ns->profile_ptr[profile];
+	if (!ptr && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
+		ptr = entry;
+		ptr->default_config = TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED |
+			TOMOYO_CONFIG_WANT_GRANT_LOG |
+			TOMOYO_CONFIG_WANT_REJECT_LOG;
+		memset(ptr->config, TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT,
+		       sizeof(ptr->config));
+		ptr->pref[TOMOYO_PREF_MAX_AUDIT_LOG] =
+			CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_MAX_AUDIT_LOG;
+		ptr->pref[TOMOYO_PREF_MAX_LEARNING_ENTRY] =
+			CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY;
+		mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */
+		ns->profile_ptr[profile] = ptr;
+		entry = NULL;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ out:
+	kfree(entry);
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_profile - Find a profile.
+ *
+ * @ns:      Pointer to "struct tomoyo_policy_namespace".
+ * @profile: Profile number to find.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_profile".
+ */
+struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_profile(const struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns,
+				      const u8 profile)
+{
+	static struct tomoyo_profile tomoyo_null_profile;
+	struct tomoyo_profile *ptr = ns->profile_ptr[profile];
+
+	if (!ptr)
+		ptr = &tomoyo_null_profile;
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_yesno - Find values for specified keyword.
+ *
+ * @string: String to check.
+ * @find:   Name of keyword.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if "@find=yes" was found, 0 if "@find=no" was found, -1 otherwise.
+ */
+static s8 tomoyo_find_yesno(const char *string, const char *find)
+{
+	const char *cp = strstr(string, find);
+
+	if (cp) {
+		cp += strlen(find);
+		if (!strncmp(cp, "=yes", 4))
+			return 1;
+		else if (!strncmp(cp, "=no", 3))
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_set_uint - Set value for specified preference.
+ *
+ * @i:      Pointer to "unsigned int".
+ * @string: String to check.
+ * @find:   Name of keyword.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_set_uint(unsigned int *i, const char *string,
+			    const char *find)
+{
+	const char *cp = strstr(string, find);
+
+	if (cp)
+		sscanf(cp + strlen(find), "=%u", i);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_set_mode - Set mode for specified profile.
+ *
+ * @name:    Name of functionality.
+ * @value:   Mode for @name.
+ * @profile: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_profile".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_set_mode(char *name, const char *value,
+			   struct tomoyo_profile *profile)
+{
+	u8 i;
+	u8 config;
+
+	if (!strcmp(name, "CONFIG")) {
+		i = TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX;
+		config = profile->default_config;
+	} else if (tomoyo_str_starts(&name, "CONFIG::")) {
+		config = 0;
+		for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX
+			     + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX; i++) {
+			int len = 0;
+
+			if (i < TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX) {
+				const u8 c = tomoyo_index2category[i];
+				const char *category =
+					tomoyo_category_keywords[c];
+
+				len = strlen(category);
+				if (strncmp(name, category, len) ||
+				    name[len++] != ':' || name[len++] != ':')
+					continue;
+			}
+			if (strcmp(name + len, tomoyo_mac_keywords[i]))
+				continue;
+			config = profile->config[i];
+			break;
+		}
+		if (i == TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (strstr(value, "use_default")) {
+		config = TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT;
+	} else {
+		u8 mode;
+
+		for (mode = 0; mode < 4; mode++)
+			if (strstr(value, tomoyo_mode[mode]))
+				/*
+				 * Update lower 3 bits in order to distinguish
+				 * 'config' from 'TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT'.
+				 */
+				config = (config & ~7) | mode;
+		if (config != TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT) {
+			switch (tomoyo_find_yesno(value, "grant_log")) {
+			case 1:
+				config |= TOMOYO_CONFIG_WANT_GRANT_LOG;
+				break;
+			case 0:
+				config &= ~TOMOYO_CONFIG_WANT_GRANT_LOG;
+				break;
+			}
+			switch (tomoyo_find_yesno(value, "reject_log")) {
+			case 1:
+				config |= TOMOYO_CONFIG_WANT_REJECT_LOG;
+				break;
+			case 0:
+				config &= ~TOMOYO_CONFIG_WANT_REJECT_LOG;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (i < TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX)
+		profile->config[i] = config;
+	else if (config != TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT)
+		profile->default_config = config;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_profile - Write profile table.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	unsigned int i;
+	char *cp;
+	struct tomoyo_profile *profile;
+
+	if (sscanf(data, "PROFILE_VERSION=%u", &head->w.ns->profile_version)
+	    == 1)
+		return 0;
+	i = simple_strtoul(data, &cp, 10);
+	if (*cp != '-')
+		return -EINVAL;
+	data = cp + 1;
+	profile = tomoyo_assign_profile(head->w.ns, i);
+	if (!profile)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	cp = strchr(data, '=');
+	if (!cp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*cp++ = '\0';
+	if (!strcmp(data, "COMMENT")) {
+		static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
+		const struct tomoyo_path_info *new_comment
+			= tomoyo_get_name(cp);
+		const struct tomoyo_path_info *old_comment;
+
+		if (!new_comment)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		spin_lock(&lock);
+		old_comment = profile->comment;
+		profile->comment = new_comment;
+		spin_unlock(&lock);
+		tomoyo_put_name(old_comment);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!strcmp(data, "PREFERENCE")) {
+		for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_PREF; i++)
+			tomoyo_set_uint(&profile->pref[i], cp,
+					tomoyo_pref_keywords[i]);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return tomoyo_set_mode(data, cp, profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_config - Print mode for specified functionality.
+ *
+ * @head:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @config: Mode for that functionality.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ *
+ * Caller prints functionality's name.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_print_config(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const u8 config)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	tomoyo_io_printf(head, "={ mode=%s grant_log=%s reject_log=%s }\n",
+			 tomoyo_mode[config & 3],
+			 str_yes_no(config & TOMOYO_CONFIG_WANT_GRANT_LOG),
+			 str_yes_no(config & TOMOYO_CONFIG_WANT_REJECT_LOG));
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_profile - Read profile table.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_read_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	u8 index;
+	struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns =
+		container_of(head->r.ns, typeof(*ns), namespace_list);
+	const struct tomoyo_profile *profile;
+
+	if (head->r.eof)
+		return;
+ next:
+	index = head->r.index;
+	profile = ns->profile_ptr[index];
+	switch (head->r.step) {
+	case 0:
+		tomoyo_print_namespace(head);
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "PROFILE_VERSION=%u\n",
+				 ns->profile_version);
+		head->r.step++;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		for ( ; head->r.index < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES;
+		      head->r.index++)
+			if (ns->profile_ptr[head->r.index])
+				break;
+		if (head->r.index == TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES) {
+			head->r.eof = true;
+			return;
+		}
+		head->r.step++;
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		{
+			u8 i;
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *comment =
+				profile->comment;
+
+			tomoyo_print_namespace(head);
+			tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-COMMENT=", index);
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, comment ? comment->name : "");
+			tomoyo_set_lf(head);
+			tomoyo_print_namespace(head);
+			tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-PREFERENCE={ ", index);
+			for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_PREF; i++)
+				tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s=%u ",
+						 tomoyo_pref_keywords[i],
+						 profile->pref[i]);
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, "}\n");
+			head->r.step++;
+		}
+		break;
+	case 3:
+		{
+			tomoyo_print_namespace(head);
+			tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-%s", index, "CONFIG");
+			tomoyo_print_config(head, profile->default_config);
+			head->r.bit = 0;
+			head->r.step++;
+		}
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		for ( ; head->r.bit < TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX
+			      + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX; head->r.bit++) {
+			const u8 i = head->r.bit;
+			const u8 config = profile->config[i];
+
+			if (config == TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT)
+				continue;
+			tomoyo_print_namespace(head);
+			if (i < TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX)
+				tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-CONFIG::%s::%s",
+						 index,
+						 tomoyo_category_keywords
+						 [tomoyo_index2category[i]],
+						 tomoyo_mac_keywords[i]);
+			else
+				tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-CONFIG::%s", index,
+						 tomoyo_mac_keywords[i]);
+			tomoyo_print_config(head, config);
+			head->r.bit++;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (head->r.bit == TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX
+		    + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX) {
+			head->r.index++;
+			head->r.step = 1;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	if (tomoyo_flush(head))
+		goto next;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_manager - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_manager" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_manager(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a,
+				const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b)
+{
+	return container_of(a, struct tomoyo_manager, head)->manager ==
+		container_of(b, struct tomoyo_manager, head)->manager;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_manager_entry - Add a manager entry.
+ *
+ * @manager:   The path to manager or the domainnamme.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_manager_entry(const char *manager,
+				       const bool is_delete)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_manager e = { };
+	struct tomoyo_acl_param param = {
+		/* .ns = &tomoyo_kernel_namespace, */
+		.is_delete = is_delete,
+		.list = &tomoyo_kernel_namespace.policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER],
+	};
+	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_correct_domain(manager) &&
+	    !tomoyo_correct_word(manager))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	e.manager = tomoyo_get_name(manager);
+	if (e.manager) {
+		error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), &param,
+					     tomoyo_same_manager);
+		tomoyo_put_name(e.manager);
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_manager - Write manager policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_manager(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+
+	if (!strcmp(data, "manage_by_non_root")) {
+		tomoyo_manage_by_non_root = !head->w.is_delete;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return tomoyo_update_manager_entry(data, head->w.is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_manager - Read manager policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static void tomoyo_read_manager(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	if (head->r.eof)
+		return;
+	list_for_each_cookie(head->r.acl, &tomoyo_kernel_namespace.policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER]) {
+		struct tomoyo_manager *ptr =
+			list_entry(head->r.acl, typeof(*ptr), head.list);
+
+		if (ptr->head.is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_flush(head))
+			return;
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->manager->name);
+		tomoyo_set_lf(head);
+	}
+	head->r.eof = true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_manager - Check whether the current process is a policy manager.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the current process is permitted to modify policy
+ * via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_manager(void)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_manager *ptr;
+	const char *exe;
+	const struct task_struct *task = current;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname = tomoyo_domain()->domainname;
+	bool found = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_INSECURE_BUILTIN_SETTING);
+
+	if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+		return true;
+	if (!tomoyo_manage_by_non_root &&
+	    (!uid_eq(task->cred->uid,  GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ||
+	     !uid_eq(task->cred->euid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)))
+		return false;
+	exe = tomoyo_get_exe();
+	if (!exe)
+		return false;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_kernel_namespace.policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER], head.list,
+				srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+		if (!ptr->head.is_deleted &&
+		    (!tomoyo_pathcmp(domainname, ptr->manager) ||
+		     !strcmp(exe, ptr->manager->name))) {
+			found = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!found) { /* Reduce error messages. */
+		static pid_t last_pid;
+		const pid_t pid = current->pid;
+
+		if (last_pid != pid) {
+			pr_warn("%s ( %s ) is not permitted to update policies.\n",
+				domainname->name, exe);
+			last_pid = pid;
+		}
+	}
+	kfree(exe);
+	return found;
+}
+
+static struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid
+(unsigned int serial);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_select_domain - Parse select command.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_select_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+				 const char *data)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	unsigned int pid;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
+	bool global_pid = false;
+
+	if (strncmp(data, "select ", 7))
+		return false;
+	data += 7;
+	if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1 ||
+	    (global_pid = true, sscanf(data, "global-pid=%u", &pid) == 1)) {
+		struct task_struct *p;
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		if (global_pid)
+			p = find_task_by_pid_ns(pid, &init_pid_ns);
+		else
+			p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+		if (p)
+			domain = tomoyo_task(p)->domain_info;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+	} else if (!strncmp(data, "domain=", 7)) {
+		if (tomoyo_domain_def(data + 7))
+			domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data + 7);
+	} else if (sscanf(data, "Q=%u", &pid) == 1) {
+		domain = tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid(pid);
+	} else
+		return false;
+	head->w.domain = domain;
+	/* Accessing read_buf is safe because head->io_sem is held. */
+	if (!head->read_buf)
+		return true; /* Do nothing if open(O_WRONLY). */
+	memset(&head->r, 0, sizeof(head->r));
+	head->r.print_this_domain_only = true;
+	if (domain)
+		head->r.domain = &domain->list;
+	else
+		head->r.eof = true;
+	tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# select %s\n", data);
+	if (domain && domain->is_deleted)
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# This is a deleted domain.\n");
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_task_acl - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_task_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_task_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				 const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_task_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head);
+	const struct tomoyo_task_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head);
+
+	return p1->domainname == p2->domainname;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_task - Update task related list.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_task(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	int error = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&param->data, "manual_domain_transition ")) {
+		struct tomoyo_task_acl e = {
+			.head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MANUAL_TASK_ACL,
+			.domainname = tomoyo_get_domainname(param),
+		};
+
+		if (e.domainname)
+			error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+						     tomoyo_same_task_acl,
+						     NULL);
+		tomoyo_put_name(e.domainname);
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_delete_domain - Delete a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+	name.name = domainname;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		return -EINTR;
+	/* Is there an active domain? */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list,
+				srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+		/* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
+		if (domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+			continue;
+		if (domain->is_deleted ||
+		    tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+			continue;
+		domain->is_deleted = true;
+		break;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_domain2 - Write domain policy.
+ *
+ * @ns:        Pointer to "struct tomoyo_policy_namespace".
+ * @list:      Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ * @data:      Policy to be interpreted.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_domain2(struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns,
+				struct list_head *list, char *data,
+				const bool is_delete)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_acl_param param = {
+		.ns = ns,
+		.list = list,
+		.data = data,
+		.is_delete = is_delete,
+	};
+	static const struct {
+		const char *keyword;
+		int (*write)(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param);
+	} tomoyo_callback[5] = {
+		{ "file ", tomoyo_write_file },
+		{ "network inet ", tomoyo_write_inet_network },
+		{ "network unix ", tomoyo_write_unix_network },
+		{ "misc ", tomoyo_write_misc },
+		{ "task ", tomoyo_write_task },
+	};
+	u8 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_callback); i++) {
+		if (!tomoyo_str_starts(&param.data,
+				       tomoyo_callback[i].keyword))
+			continue;
+		return tomoyo_callback[i].write(&param);
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/* String table for domain flags. */
+const char * const tomoyo_dif[TOMOYO_MAX_DOMAIN_INFO_FLAGS] = {
+	[TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED]      = "quota_exceeded\n",
+	[TOMOYO_DIF_TRANSITION_FAILED] = "transition_failed\n",
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_domain - Write domain policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = head->w.domain;
+	const bool is_delete = head->w.is_delete;
+	bool is_select = !is_delete && tomoyo_str_starts(&data, "select ");
+	unsigned int idx;
+
+	if (*data == '<') {
+		int ret = 0;
+
+		domain = NULL;
+		if (is_delete)
+			ret = tomoyo_delete_domain(data);
+		else if (is_select)
+			domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data);
+		else
+			domain = tomoyo_assign_domain(data, false);
+		head->w.domain = domain;
+		return ret;
+	}
+	if (!domain)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	ns = domain->ns;
+	if (sscanf(data, "use_profile %u", &idx) == 1
+	    && idx < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES) {
+		if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded || ns->profile_ptr[idx])
+			if (!is_delete)
+				domain->profile = (u8) idx;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (sscanf(data, "use_group %u\n", &idx) == 1
+	    && idx < TOMOYO_MAX_ACL_GROUPS) {
+		if (!is_delete)
+			set_bit(idx, domain->group);
+		else
+			clear_bit(idx, domain->group);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	for (idx = 0; idx < TOMOYO_MAX_DOMAIN_INFO_FLAGS; idx++) {
+		const char *cp = tomoyo_dif[idx];
+
+		if (strncmp(data, cp, strlen(cp) - 1))
+			continue;
+		domain->flags[idx] = !is_delete;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return tomoyo_write_domain2(ns, &domain->acl_info_list, data,
+				    is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_condition - Print condition part.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @cond: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_condition".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_print_condition(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+				   const struct tomoyo_condition *cond)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	switch (head->r.cond_step) {
+	case 0:
+		head->r.cond_index = 0;
+		head->r.cond_step++;
+		if (cond->transit) {
+			tomoyo_set_space(head);
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, cond->transit->name);
+		}
+		fallthrough;
+	case 1:
+		{
+			const u16 condc = cond->condc;
+			const struct tomoyo_condition_element *condp =
+				(typeof(condp)) (cond + 1);
+			const struct tomoyo_number_union *numbers_p =
+				(typeof(numbers_p)) (condp + condc);
+			const struct tomoyo_name_union *names_p =
+				(typeof(names_p))
+				(numbers_p + cond->numbers_count);
+			const struct tomoyo_argv *argv =
+				(typeof(argv)) (names_p + cond->names_count);
+			const struct tomoyo_envp *envp =
+				(typeof(envp)) (argv + cond->argc);
+			u16 skip;
+
+			for (skip = 0; skip < head->r.cond_index; skip++) {
+				const u8 left = condp->left;
+				const u8 right = condp->right;
+
+				condp++;
+				switch (left) {
+				case TOMOYO_ARGV_ENTRY:
+					argv++;
+					continue;
+				case TOMOYO_ENVP_ENTRY:
+					envp++;
+					continue;
+				case TOMOYO_NUMBER_UNION:
+					numbers_p++;
+					break;
+				}
+				switch (right) {
+				case TOMOYO_NAME_UNION:
+					names_p++;
+					break;
+				case TOMOYO_NUMBER_UNION:
+					numbers_p++;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			while (head->r.cond_index < condc) {
+				const u8 match = condp->equals;
+				const u8 left = condp->left;
+				const u8 right = condp->right;
+
+				if (!tomoyo_flush(head))
+					return false;
+				condp++;
+				head->r.cond_index++;
+				tomoyo_set_space(head);
+				switch (left) {
+				case TOMOYO_ARGV_ENTRY:
+					tomoyo_io_printf(head,
+							 "exec.argv[%lu]%s=\"",
+							 argv->index, argv->is_not ? "!" : "");
+					tomoyo_set_string(head,
+							  argv->value->name);
+					tomoyo_set_string(head, "\"");
+					argv++;
+					continue;
+				case TOMOYO_ENVP_ENTRY:
+					tomoyo_set_string(head,
+							  "exec.envp[\"");
+					tomoyo_set_string(head,
+							  envp->name->name);
+					tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\"]%s=", envp->is_not ? "!" : "");
+					if (envp->value) {
+						tomoyo_set_string(head, "\"");
+						tomoyo_set_string(head, envp->value->name);
+						tomoyo_set_string(head, "\"");
+					} else {
+						tomoyo_set_string(head,
+								  "NULL");
+					}
+					envp++;
+					continue;
+				case TOMOYO_NUMBER_UNION:
+					tomoyo_print_number_union_nospace
+						(head, numbers_p++);
+					break;
+				default:
+					tomoyo_set_string(head,
+					       tomoyo_condition_keyword[left]);
+					break;
+				}
+				tomoyo_set_string(head, match ? "=" : "!=");
+				switch (right) {
+				case TOMOYO_NAME_UNION:
+					tomoyo_print_name_union_quoted
+						(head, names_p++);
+					break;
+				case TOMOYO_NUMBER_UNION:
+					tomoyo_print_number_union_nospace
+						(head, numbers_p++);
+					break;
+				default:
+					tomoyo_set_string(head,
+					  tomoyo_condition_keyword[right]);
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		head->r.cond_step++;
+		fallthrough;
+	case 2:
+		if (!tomoyo_flush(head))
+			break;
+		head->r.cond_step++;
+		fallthrough;
+	case 3:
+		if (cond->grant_log != TOMOYO_GRANTLOG_AUTO)
+			tomoyo_io_printf(head, " grant_log=%s",
+					 str_yes_no(cond->grant_log ==
+						    TOMOYO_GRANTLOG_YES));
+		tomoyo_set_lf(head);
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_set_group - Print "acl_group " header keyword and category name.
+ *
+ * @head:     Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @category: Category name.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_set_group(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+			     const char *category)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	if (head->type == TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY) {
+		tomoyo_print_namespace(head);
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "acl_group %u ",
+				 head->r.acl_group_index);
+	}
+	tomoyo_set_string(head, category);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_entry - Print an ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @acl:  Pointer to an ACL entry.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_print_entry(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+			       struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	const u8 acl_type = acl->type;
+	bool first = true;
+	u8 bit;
+
+	if (head->r.print_cond_part)
+		goto print_cond_part;
+	if (acl->is_deleted)
+		return true;
+	if (!tomoyo_flush(head))
+		return false;
+	else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL) {
+		struct tomoyo_path_acl *ptr =
+			container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head);
+		const u16 perm = ptr->perm;
+
+		for (bit = 0; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION; bit++) {
+			if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+				continue;
+			if (head->r.print_transition_related_only &&
+			    bit != TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE)
+				continue;
+			if (first) {
+				tomoyo_set_group(head, "file ");
+				first = false;
+			} else {
+				tomoyo_set_slash(head);
+			}
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_path_keyword[bit]);
+		}
+		if (first)
+			return true;
+		tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name);
+	} else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_MANUAL_TASK_ACL) {
+		struct tomoyo_task_acl *ptr =
+			container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head);
+
+		tomoyo_set_group(head, "task ");
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, "manual_domain_transition ");
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->domainname->name);
+	} else if (head->r.print_transition_related_only) {
+		return true;
+	} else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL) {
+		struct tomoyo_path2_acl *ptr =
+			container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head);
+		const u8 perm = ptr->perm;
+
+		for (bit = 0; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION; bit++) {
+			if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+				continue;
+			if (first) {
+				tomoyo_set_group(head, "file ");
+				first = false;
+			} else {
+				tomoyo_set_slash(head);
+			}
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_mac_keywords
+					  [tomoyo_pp2mac[bit]]);
+		}
+		if (first)
+			return true;
+		tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name1);
+		tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name2);
+	} else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL) {
+		struct tomoyo_path_number_acl *ptr =
+			container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head);
+		const u8 perm = ptr->perm;
+
+		for (bit = 0; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION; bit++) {
+			if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+				continue;
+			if (first) {
+				tomoyo_set_group(head, "file ");
+				first = false;
+			} else {
+				tomoyo_set_slash(head);
+			}
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_mac_keywords
+					  [tomoyo_pn2mac[bit]]);
+		}
+		if (first)
+			return true;
+		tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name);
+		tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &ptr->number);
+	} else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL) {
+		struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl *ptr =
+			container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head);
+		const u8 perm = ptr->perm;
+
+		for (bit = 0; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION; bit++) {
+			if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+				continue;
+			if (first) {
+				tomoyo_set_group(head, "file ");
+				first = false;
+			} else {
+				tomoyo_set_slash(head);
+			}
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_mac_keywords
+					  [tomoyo_pnnn2mac[bit]]);
+		}
+		if (first)
+			return true;
+		tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name);
+		tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &ptr->mode);
+		tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &ptr->major);
+		tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &ptr->minor);
+	} else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_INET_ACL) {
+		struct tomoyo_inet_acl *ptr =
+			container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head);
+		const u8 perm = ptr->perm;
+
+		for (bit = 0; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_NETWORK_OPERATION; bit++) {
+			if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+				continue;
+			if (first) {
+				tomoyo_set_group(head, "network inet ");
+				tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_proto_keyword
+						  [ptr->protocol]);
+				tomoyo_set_space(head);
+				first = false;
+			} else {
+				tomoyo_set_slash(head);
+			}
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_socket_keyword[bit]);
+		}
+		if (first)
+			return true;
+		tomoyo_set_space(head);
+		if (ptr->address.group) {
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, "@");
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->address.group->group_name
+					  ->name);
+		} else {
+			char buf[128];
+
+			tomoyo_print_ip(buf, sizeof(buf), &ptr->address);
+			tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s", buf);
+		}
+		tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &ptr->port);
+	} else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_UNIX_ACL) {
+		struct tomoyo_unix_acl *ptr =
+			container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head);
+		const u8 perm = ptr->perm;
+
+		for (bit = 0; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_NETWORK_OPERATION; bit++) {
+			if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+				continue;
+			if (first) {
+				tomoyo_set_group(head, "network unix ");
+				tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_proto_keyword
+						  [ptr->protocol]);
+				tomoyo_set_space(head);
+				first = false;
+			} else {
+				tomoyo_set_slash(head);
+			}
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_socket_keyword[bit]);
+		}
+		if (first)
+			return true;
+		tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name);
+	} else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL) {
+		struct tomoyo_mount_acl *ptr =
+			container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head);
+
+		tomoyo_set_group(head, "file mount");
+		tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->dev_name);
+		tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->dir_name);
+		tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->fs_type);
+		tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &ptr->flags);
+	} else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_ENV_ACL) {
+		struct tomoyo_env_acl *ptr =
+			container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head);
+
+		tomoyo_set_group(head, "misc env ");
+		tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->env->name);
+	}
+	if (acl->cond) {
+		head->r.print_cond_part = true;
+		head->r.cond_step = 0;
+		if (!tomoyo_flush(head))
+			return false;
+print_cond_part:
+		if (!tomoyo_print_condition(head, acl->cond))
+			return false;
+		head->r.print_cond_part = false;
+	} else {
+		tomoyo_set_lf(head);
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_domain2 - Read domain policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @list: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_read_domain2(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+				struct list_head *list)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	list_for_each_cookie(head->r.acl, list) {
+		struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr =
+			list_entry(head->r.acl, typeof(*ptr), list);
+
+		if (!tomoyo_print_entry(head, ptr))
+			return false;
+	}
+	head->r.acl = NULL;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_domain - Read domain policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static void tomoyo_read_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	if (head->r.eof)
+		return;
+	list_for_each_cookie(head->r.domain, &tomoyo_domain_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain =
+			list_entry(head->r.domain, typeof(*domain), list);
+		u8 i;
+
+		switch (head->r.step) {
+		case 0:
+			if (domain->is_deleted &&
+			    !head->r.print_this_domain_only)
+				continue;
+			/* Print domainname and flags. */
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, domain->domainname->name);
+			tomoyo_set_lf(head);
+			tomoyo_io_printf(head, "use_profile %u\n",
+					 domain->profile);
+			for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_DOMAIN_INFO_FLAGS; i++)
+				if (domain->flags[i])
+					tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_dif[i]);
+			head->r.index = 0;
+			head->r.step++;
+			fallthrough;
+		case 1:
+			while (head->r.index < TOMOYO_MAX_ACL_GROUPS) {
+				i = head->r.index++;
+				if (!test_bit(i, domain->group))
+					continue;
+				tomoyo_io_printf(head, "use_group %u\n", i);
+				if (!tomoyo_flush(head))
+					return;
+			}
+			head->r.index = 0;
+			head->r.step++;
+			tomoyo_set_lf(head);
+			fallthrough;
+		case 2:
+			if (!tomoyo_read_domain2(head, &domain->acl_info_list))
+				return;
+			head->r.step++;
+			if (!tomoyo_set_lf(head))
+				return;
+			fallthrough;
+		case 3:
+			head->r.step = 0;
+			if (head->r.print_this_domain_only)
+				goto done;
+		}
+	}
+ done:
+	head->r.eof = true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_pid: Specify PID to obtain domainname.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	head->r.eof = false;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_pid - Get domainname of the specified PID.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns the domainname which the specified PID is in on success,
+ * empty string otherwise.
+ * The PID is specified by tomoyo_write_pid() so that the user can obtain
+ * using read()/write() interface rather than sysctl() interface.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_read_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	char *buf = head->write_buf;
+	bool global_pid = false;
+	unsigned int pid;
+	struct task_struct *p;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
+
+	/* Accessing write_buf is safe because head->io_sem is held. */
+	if (!buf) {
+		head->r.eof = true;
+		return; /* Do nothing if open(O_RDONLY). */
+	}
+	if (head->r.w_pos || head->r.eof)
+		return;
+	head->r.eof = true;
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&buf, "global-pid "))
+		global_pid = true;
+	if (kstrtouint(buf, 10, &pid))
+		return;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (global_pid)
+		p = find_task_by_pid_ns(pid, &init_pid_ns);
+	else
+		p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+	if (p)
+		domain = tomoyo_task(p)->domain_info;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (!domain)
+		return;
+	tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u %u ", pid, domain->profile);
+	tomoyo_set_string(head, domain->domainname->name);
+}
+
+/* String table for domain transition control keywords. */
+static const char *tomoyo_transition_type[TOMOYO_MAX_TRANSITION_TYPE] = {
+	[TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_RESET]      = "no_reset_domain ",
+	[TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_RESET]         = "reset_domain ",
+	[TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_INITIALIZE] = "no_initialize_domain ",
+	[TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_INITIALIZE]    = "initialize_domain ",
+	[TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_KEEP]       = "no_keep_domain ",
+	[TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_KEEP]          = "keep_domain ",
+};
+
+/* String table for grouping keywords. */
+static const char *tomoyo_group_name[TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP] = {
+	[TOMOYO_PATH_GROUP]    = "path_group ",
+	[TOMOYO_NUMBER_GROUP]  = "number_group ",
+	[TOMOYO_ADDRESS_GROUP] = "address_group ",
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_exception - Write exception policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_exception(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	const bool is_delete = head->w.is_delete;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_param param = {
+		.ns = head->w.ns,
+		.is_delete = is_delete,
+		.data = head->write_buf,
+	};
+	u8 i;
+
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&param.data, "aggregator "))
+		return tomoyo_write_aggregator(&param);
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_TRANSITION_TYPE; i++)
+		if (tomoyo_str_starts(&param.data, tomoyo_transition_type[i]))
+			return tomoyo_write_transition_control(&param, i);
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP; i++)
+		if (tomoyo_str_starts(&param.data, tomoyo_group_name[i]))
+			return tomoyo_write_group(&param, i);
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&param.data, "acl_group ")) {
+		unsigned int group;
+		char *data;
+
+		group = simple_strtoul(param.data, &data, 10);
+		if (group < TOMOYO_MAX_ACL_GROUPS && *data++ == ' ')
+			return tomoyo_write_domain2
+				(head->w.ns, &head->w.ns->acl_group[group],
+				 data, is_delete);
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_group - Read "struct tomoyo_path_group"/"struct tomoyo_number_group"/"struct tomoyo_address_group" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @idx:  Index number.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_read_group(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const int idx)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns =
+		container_of(head->r.ns, typeof(*ns), namespace_list);
+	struct list_head *list = &ns->group_list[idx];
+
+	list_for_each_cookie(head->r.group, list) {
+		struct tomoyo_group *group =
+			list_entry(head->r.group, typeof(*group), head.list);
+
+		list_for_each_cookie(head->r.acl, &group->member_list) {
+			struct tomoyo_acl_head *ptr =
+				list_entry(head->r.acl, typeof(*ptr), list);
+
+			if (ptr->is_deleted)
+				continue;
+			if (!tomoyo_flush(head))
+				return false;
+			tomoyo_print_namespace(head);
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_group_name[idx]);
+			tomoyo_set_string(head, group->group_name->name);
+			if (idx == TOMOYO_PATH_GROUP) {
+				tomoyo_set_space(head);
+				tomoyo_set_string(head, container_of
+					       (ptr, struct tomoyo_path_group,
+						head)->member_name->name);
+			} else if (idx == TOMOYO_NUMBER_GROUP) {
+				tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &container_of
+							  (ptr,
+						   struct tomoyo_number_group,
+							   head)->number);
+			} else if (idx == TOMOYO_ADDRESS_GROUP) {
+				char buffer[128];
+				struct tomoyo_address_group *member =
+					container_of(ptr, typeof(*member),
+						     head);
+
+				tomoyo_print_ip(buffer, sizeof(buffer),
+						&member->address);
+				tomoyo_io_printf(head, " %s", buffer);
+			}
+			tomoyo_set_lf(head);
+		}
+		head->r.acl = NULL;
+	}
+	head->r.group = NULL;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_..._entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @idx:  Index number.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_read_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const int idx)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns =
+		container_of(head->r.ns, typeof(*ns), namespace_list);
+	struct list_head *list = &ns->policy_list[idx];
+
+	list_for_each_cookie(head->r.acl, list) {
+		struct tomoyo_acl_head *acl =
+			container_of(head->r.acl, typeof(*acl), list);
+		if (acl->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_flush(head))
+			return false;
+		switch (idx) {
+		case TOMOYO_ID_TRANSITION_CONTROL:
+			{
+				struct tomoyo_transition_control *ptr =
+					container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head);
+
+				tomoyo_print_namespace(head);
+				tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_transition_type
+						  [ptr->type]);
+				tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->program ?
+						  ptr->program->name : "any");
+				tomoyo_set_string(head, " from ");
+				tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->domainname ?
+						  ptr->domainname->name :
+						  "any");
+			}
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_AGGREGATOR:
+			{
+				struct tomoyo_aggregator *ptr =
+					container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head);
+
+				tomoyo_print_namespace(head);
+				tomoyo_set_string(head, "aggregator ");
+				tomoyo_set_string(head,
+						  ptr->original_name->name);
+				tomoyo_set_space(head);
+				tomoyo_set_string(head,
+					       ptr->aggregated_name->name);
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			continue;
+		}
+		tomoyo_set_lf(head);
+	}
+	head->r.acl = NULL;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_exception - Read exception policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static void tomoyo_read_exception(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns =
+		container_of(head->r.ns, typeof(*ns), namespace_list);
+
+	if (head->r.eof)
+		return;
+	while (head->r.step < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY &&
+	       tomoyo_read_policy(head, head->r.step))
+		head->r.step++;
+	if (head->r.step < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY)
+		return;
+	while (head->r.step < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY + TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP &&
+	       tomoyo_read_group(head, head->r.step - TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY))
+		head->r.step++;
+	if (head->r.step < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY + TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP)
+		return;
+	while (head->r.step < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY + TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP
+	       + TOMOYO_MAX_ACL_GROUPS) {
+		head->r.acl_group_index = head->r.step - TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY
+			- TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP;
+		if (!tomoyo_read_domain2(head, &ns->acl_group
+					 [head->r.acl_group_index]))
+			return;
+		head->r.step++;
+	}
+	head->r.eof = true;
+}
+
+/* Wait queue for kernel -> userspace notification. */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(tomoyo_query_wait);
+/* Wait queue for userspace -> kernel notification. */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(tomoyo_answer_wait);
+
+/* Structure for query. */
+struct tomoyo_query {
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	char *query;
+	size_t query_len;
+	unsigned int serial;
+	u8 timer;
+	u8 answer;
+	u8 retry;
+};
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_query". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_query_list);
+
+/* Lock for manipulating tomoyo_query_list. */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+
+/*
+ * Number of "struct file" referring /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query
+ * interface.
+ */
+static atomic_t tomoyo_query_observers = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_truncate - Truncate a line.
+ *
+ * @str: String to truncate.
+ *
+ * Returns length of truncated @str.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_truncate(char *str)
+{
+	char *start = str;
+
+	while (*(unsigned char *) str > (unsigned char) ' ')
+		str++;
+	*str = '\0';
+	return strlen(start) + 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_numscan - sscanf() which stores the length of a decimal integer value.
+ *
+ * @str:   String to scan.
+ * @head:  Leading string that must start with.
+ * @width: Pointer to "int" for storing length of a decimal integer value after @head.
+ * @tail:  Optional character that must match after a decimal integer value.
+ *
+ * Returns whether @str starts with @head and a decimal value follows @head.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_numscan(const char *str, const char *head, int *width, const char tail)
+{
+	const char *cp;
+	const int n = strlen(head);
+
+	if (!strncmp(str, head, n)) {
+		cp = str + n;
+		while (*cp && *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9')
+			cp++;
+		if (*cp == tail || !tail) {
+			*width = cp - (str + n);
+			return *width != 0;
+		}
+	}
+	*width = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_patternize_path - Make patterns for file path. Used by learning mode.
+ *
+ * @buffer: Destination buffer.
+ * @len:    Size of @buffer.
+ * @entry:  Original line.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_patternize_path(char *buffer, const int len, char *entry)
+{
+	int width;
+	char *cp = entry;
+
+	/* Nothing to do if this line is not for "file" related entry. */
+	if (strncmp(entry, "file ", 5))
+		goto flush;
+	/*
+	 * Nothing to do if there is no colon in this line, for this rewriting
+	 * applies to only filesystems where numeric values in the path are volatile.
+	 */
+	cp = strchr(entry + 5, ':');
+	if (!cp) {
+		cp = entry;
+		goto flush;
+	}
+	/* Flush e.g. "file ioctl" part. */
+	while (*cp != ' ')
+		cp--;
+	*cp++ = '\0';
+	tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, "%s ", entry);
+	/* e.g. file ioctl pipe:[$INO] $CMD */
+	if (tomoyo_numscan(cp, "pipe:[", &width, ']')) {
+		cp += width + 7;
+		tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, "pipe:[\\$]");
+		goto flush;
+	}
+	/* e.g. file ioctl socket:[$INO] $CMD */
+	if (tomoyo_numscan(cp, "socket:[", &width, ']')) {
+		cp += width + 9;
+		tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, "socket:[\\$]");
+		goto flush;
+	}
+	if (!strncmp(cp, "proc:/self", 10)) {
+		/* e.g. file read proc:/self/task/$TID/fdinfo/$FD */
+		cp += 10;
+		tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, "proc:/self");
+	} else if (tomoyo_numscan(cp, "proc:/", &width, 0)) {
+		/* e.g. file read proc:/$PID/task/$TID/fdinfo/$FD */
+		/*
+		 * Don't patternize $PID part if $PID == 1, for several
+		 * programs access only files in /proc/1/ directory.
+		 */
+		cp += width + 6;
+		if (width == 1 && *(cp - 1) == '1')
+			tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, "proc:/1");
+		else
+			tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, "proc:/\\$");
+	} else {
+		goto flush;
+	}
+	/* Patternize $TID part if "/task/" follows. */
+	if (tomoyo_numscan(cp, "/task/", &width, 0)) {
+		cp += width + 6;
+		tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, "/task/\\$");
+	}
+	/* Patternize $FD part if "/fd/" or "/fdinfo/" follows. */
+	if (tomoyo_numscan(cp, "/fd/", &width, 0)) {
+		cp += width + 4;
+		tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, "/fd/\\$");
+	} else if (tomoyo_numscan(cp, "/fdinfo/", &width, 0)) {
+		cp += width + 8;
+		tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, "/fdinfo/\\$");
+	}
+flush:
+	/* Flush remaining part if any. */
+	if (*cp)
+		tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, "%s", cp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_add_entry - Add an ACL to current thread's domain. Used by learning mode.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @header: Lines containing ACL.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_add_entry(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, char *header)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	char *buffer;
+	char *realpath = NULL;
+	char *argv0 = NULL;
+	char *symlink = NULL;
+	char *cp = strchr(header, '\n');
+	int len;
+
+	if (!cp)
+		return;
+	cp = strchr(cp + 1, '\n');
+	if (!cp)
+		return;
+	*cp++ = '\0';
+	/* Reserve some space for potentially using patterns. */
+	len = strlen(cp) + 16;
+	/* strstr() will return NULL if ordering is wrong. */
+	if (*cp == 'f') {
+		argv0 = strstr(header, " argv[]={ \"");
+		if (argv0) {
+			argv0 += 10;
+			len += tomoyo_truncate(argv0) + 14;
+		}
+		realpath = strstr(header, " exec={ realpath=\"");
+		if (realpath) {
+			realpath += 8;
+			len += tomoyo_truncate(realpath) + 6;
+		}
+		symlink = strstr(header, " symlink.target=\"");
+		if (symlink)
+			len += tomoyo_truncate(symlink + 1) + 1;
+	}
+	buffer = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return;
+	tomoyo_patternize_path(buffer, len, cp);
+	if (realpath)
+		tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, " exec.%s", realpath);
+	if (argv0)
+		tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, " exec.argv[0]=%s", argv0);
+	if (symlink)
+		tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, len, "%s", symlink);
+	tomoyo_normalize_line(buffer);
+	if (!tomoyo_write_domain2(domain->ns, &domain->acl_info_list, buffer,
+				  false))
+		tomoyo_update_stat(TOMOYO_STAT_POLICY_UPDATES);
+	kfree(buffer);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_supervisor - Ask for the supervisor's decision.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @fmt: The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the supervisor decided to permit the access request which
+ * violated the policy in enforcing mode, TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST if the
+ * supervisor decided to retry the access request which violated the policy in
+ * enforcing mode, 0 if it is not in enforcing mode, -EPERM otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_supervisor(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	int error;
+	int len;
+	static unsigned int tomoyo_serial;
+	struct tomoyo_query entry = { };
+	bool quota_exceeded = false;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, args) + 1;
+	va_end(args);
+	/* Write /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit. */
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	tomoyo_write_log2(r, len, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	/* Nothing more to do if granted. */
+	if (r->granted)
+		return 0;
+	if (r->mode)
+		tomoyo_update_stat(r->mode);
+	switch (r->mode) {
+	case TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING:
+		error = -EPERM;
+		if (atomic_read(&tomoyo_query_observers))
+			break;
+		goto out;
+	case TOMOYO_CONFIG_LEARNING:
+		error = 0;
+		/* Check max_learning_entry parameter. */
+		if (tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(r))
+			break;
+		fallthrough;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Get message. */
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	entry.query = tomoyo_init_log(r, len, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	if (!entry.query)
+		goto out;
+	entry.query_len = strlen(entry.query) + 1;
+	if (!error) {
+		tomoyo_add_entry(r->domain, entry.query);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	len = kmalloc_size_roundup(entry.query_len);
+	entry.domain = r->domain;
+	spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	if (tomoyo_memory_quota[TOMOYO_MEMORY_QUERY] &&
+	    tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MEMORY_QUERY] + len
+	    >= tomoyo_memory_quota[TOMOYO_MEMORY_QUERY]) {
+		quota_exceeded = true;
+	} else {
+		entry.serial = tomoyo_serial++;
+		entry.retry = r->retry;
+		tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MEMORY_QUERY] += len;
+		list_add_tail(&entry.list, &tomoyo_query_list);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	if (quota_exceeded)
+		goto out;
+	/* Give 10 seconds for supervisor's opinion. */
+	while (entry.timer < 10) {
+		wake_up_all(&tomoyo_query_wait);
+		if (wait_event_interruptible_timeout
+		    (tomoyo_answer_wait, entry.answer ||
+		     !atomic_read(&tomoyo_query_observers), HZ))
+			break;
+		entry.timer++;
+	}
+	spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	list_del(&entry.list);
+	tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MEMORY_QUERY] -= len;
+	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	switch (entry.answer) {
+	case 3: /* Asked to retry by administrator. */
+		error = TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST;
+		r->retry++;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		/* Granted by administrator. */
+		error = 0;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Timed out or rejected by administrator. */
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	kfree(entry.query);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid - Get domain by query id.
+ *
+ * @serial: Query ID assigned by tomoyo_supervisor().
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" if found, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid
+(unsigned int serial)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_query *ptr;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
+
+	spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_query_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->serial != serial)
+			continue;
+		domain = ptr->domain;
+		break;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	return domain;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_poll_query - poll() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table".
+ *
+ * Returns EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM when ready to read, 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * Waits for access requests which violated policy in enforcing mode.
+ */
+static __poll_t tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+{
+	if (!list_empty(&tomoyo_query_list))
+		return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+	poll_wait(file, &tomoyo_query_wait, wait);
+	if (!list_empty(&tomoyo_query_list))
+		return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_query - Read access requests which violated policy in enforcing mode.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ */
+static void tomoyo_read_query(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	struct list_head *tmp;
+	unsigned int pos = 0;
+	size_t len = 0;
+	char *buf;
+
+	if (head->r.w_pos)
+		return;
+	kfree(head->read_buf);
+	head->read_buf = NULL;
+	spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list);
+
+		if (pos++ != head->r.query_index)
+			continue;
+		len = ptr->query_len;
+		break;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	if (!len) {
+		head->r.query_index = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+	buf = kzalloc(len + 32, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!buf)
+		return;
+	pos = 0;
+	spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list);
+
+		if (pos++ != head->r.query_index)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * Some query can be skipped because tomoyo_query_list
+		 * can change, but I don't care.
+		 */
+		if (len == ptr->query_len)
+			snprintf(buf, len + 31, "Q%u-%hu\n%s", ptr->serial,
+				 ptr->retry, ptr->query);
+		break;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	if (buf[0]) {
+		head->read_buf = buf;
+		head->r.w[head->r.w_pos++] = buf;
+		head->r.query_index++;
+	} else {
+		kfree(buf);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_answer - Write the supervisor's decision.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_answer(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	struct list_head *tmp;
+	unsigned int serial;
+	unsigned int answer;
+
+	spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list);
+
+		ptr->timer = 0;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	if (sscanf(data, "A%u=%u", &serial, &answer) != 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list);
+
+		if (ptr->serial != serial)
+			continue;
+		ptr->answer = answer;
+		/* Remove from tomoyo_query_list. */
+		if (ptr->answer)
+			list_del_init(&ptr->list);
+		break;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_version: Get version.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns version information.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_read_version(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	if (!head->r.eof) {
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "2.6.0");
+		head->r.eof = true;
+	}
+}
+
+/* String table for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/stat interface. */
+static const char * const tomoyo_policy_headers[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT] = {
+	[TOMOYO_STAT_POLICY_UPDATES]    = "update:",
+	[TOMOYO_STAT_POLICY_LEARNING]   = "violation in learning mode:",
+	[TOMOYO_STAT_POLICY_PERMISSIVE] = "violation in permissive mode:",
+	[TOMOYO_STAT_POLICY_ENFORCING]  = "violation in enforcing mode:",
+};
+
+/* String table for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/stat interface. */
+static const char * const tomoyo_memory_headers[TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT] = {
+	[TOMOYO_MEMORY_POLICY] = "policy:",
+	[TOMOYO_MEMORY_AUDIT]  = "audit log:",
+	[TOMOYO_MEMORY_QUERY]  = "query message:",
+};
+
+/* Counter for number of updates. */
+static atomic_t tomoyo_stat_updated[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT];
+/* Timestamp counter for last updated. */
+static time64_t tomoyo_stat_modified[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT];
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_stat - Update statistic counters.
+ *
+ * @index: Index for policy type.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_update_stat(const u8 index)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&tomoyo_stat_updated[index]);
+	tomoyo_stat_modified[index] = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_stat - Read statistic data.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_read_stat(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	u8 i;
+	unsigned int total = 0;
+
+	if (head->r.eof)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT; i++) {
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Policy %-30s %10u",
+				 tomoyo_policy_headers[i],
+				 atomic_read(&tomoyo_stat_updated[i]));
+		if (tomoyo_stat_modified[i]) {
+			struct tomoyo_time stamp;
+
+			tomoyo_convert_time(tomoyo_stat_modified[i], &stamp);
+			tomoyo_io_printf(head, " (Last: %04u/%02u/%02u %02u:%02u:%02u)",
+					 stamp.year, stamp.month, stamp.day,
+					 stamp.hour, stamp.min, stamp.sec);
+		}
+		tomoyo_set_lf(head);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT; i++) {
+		unsigned int used = tomoyo_memory_used[i];
+
+		total += used;
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Memory used by %-22s %10u",
+				 tomoyo_memory_headers[i], used);
+		used = tomoyo_memory_quota[i];
+		if (used)
+			tomoyo_io_printf(head, " (Quota: %10u)", used);
+		tomoyo_set_lf(head);
+	}
+	tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Total memory used:                    %10u\n",
+			 total);
+	head->r.eof = true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_stat - Set memory quota.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_stat(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	u8 i;
+
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, "Memory used by "))
+		for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT; i++)
+			if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, tomoyo_memory_headers[i]))
+				sscanf(data, "%u", &tomoyo_memory_quota[i]);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_open_control - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @type: Type of interface.
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = kzalloc_obj(*head, GFP_NOFS);
+
+	if (!head)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	guard(mutex_init)(&head->io_sem);
+	head->type = type;
+	switch (type) {
+	case TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_domain;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_domain;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_exception;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_exception;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_AUDIT:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit */
+		head->poll = tomoyo_poll_log;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_log;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.process_status */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_pid;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_pid;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_VERSION:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version */
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_version;
+		head->readbuf_size = 128;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_STAT:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/stat */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_stat;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_stat;
+		head->readbuf_size = 1024;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_PROFILE:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_profile;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_profile;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_QUERY: /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query */
+		head->poll = tomoyo_poll_query;
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_answer;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_query;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_MANAGER:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_manager;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_manager;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
+		/*
+		 * No need to allocate read_buf since it is not opened
+		 * for reading.
+		 */
+		head->read = NULL;
+		head->poll = NULL;
+	} else if (!head->poll) {
+		/* Don't allocate read_buf for poll() access. */
+		if (!head->readbuf_size)
+			head->readbuf_size = 4096 * 2;
+		head->read_buf = kzalloc(head->readbuf_size, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!head->read_buf) {
+			kfree(head);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) {
+		/*
+		 * No need to allocate write_buf since it is not opened
+		 * for writing.
+		 */
+		head->write = NULL;
+	} else if (head->write) {
+		head->writebuf_size = 4096 * 2;
+		head->write_buf = kzalloc(head->writebuf_size, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!head->write_buf) {
+			kfree(head->read_buf);
+			kfree(head);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If the file is /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query , increment the
+	 * observer counter.
+	 * The obserber counter is used by tomoyo_supervisor() to see if
+	 * there is some process monitoring /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query.
+	 */
+	if (type == TOMOYO_QUERY)
+		atomic_inc(&tomoyo_query_observers);
+	file->private_data = head;
+	tomoyo_notify_gc(head, true);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_poll_control - poll() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". Maybe NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM | EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM if ready to read/write,
+ * EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM otherwise.
+ */
+__poll_t tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+
+	if (head->poll)
+		return head->poll(file, wait) | EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+	return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM | EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_set_namespace_cursor - Set namespace to read.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_set_namespace_cursor(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *ns;
+
+	if (head->type != TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY &&
+	    head->type != TOMOYO_PROFILE)
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * If this is the first read, or reading previous namespace finished
+	 * and has more namespaces to read, update the namespace cursor.
+	 */
+	ns = head->r.ns;
+	if (!ns || (head->r.eof && ns->next != &tomoyo_namespace_list)) {
+		/* Clearing is OK because tomoyo_flush() returned true. */
+		memset(&head->r, 0, sizeof(head->r));
+		head->r.ns = ns ? ns->next : tomoyo_namespace_list.next;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_has_more_namespace - Check for unread namespaces.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true if we have more entries to print, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_has_more_namespace(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	return (head->type == TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY ||
+		head->type == TOMOYO_PROFILE) && head->r.eof &&
+		head->r.ns->next != &tomoyo_namespace_list;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_control - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @head:       Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @buffer:     Pointer to buffer to write to.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+ssize_t tomoyo_read_control(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, char __user *buffer,
+			    const int buffer_len)
+{
+	int len;
+	int idx;
+
+	if (!head->read)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
+		return -EINTR;
+	head->read_user_buf = buffer;
+	head->read_user_buf_avail = buffer_len;
+	idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+	if (tomoyo_flush(head))
+		/* Call the policy handler. */
+		do {
+			tomoyo_set_namespace_cursor(head);
+			head->read(head);
+		} while (tomoyo_flush(head) &&
+			 tomoyo_has_more_namespace(head));
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	len = head->read_user_buf - buffer;
+	mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_parse_policy - Parse a policy line.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @line: Line to parse.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_parse_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, char *line)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+	__must_hold(&head->io_sem)
+{
+	/* Delete request? */
+	head->w.is_delete = !strncmp(line, "delete ", 7);
+	if (head->w.is_delete)
+		memmove(line, line + 7, strlen(line + 7) + 1);
+	/* Selecting namespace to update. */
+	if (head->type == TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY ||
+	    head->type == TOMOYO_PROFILE) {
+		if (*line == '<') {
+			char *cp = strchr(line, ' ');
+
+			if (cp) {
+				*cp++ = '\0';
+				head->w.ns = tomoyo_assign_namespace(line);
+				memmove(line, cp, strlen(cp) + 1);
+			} else
+				head->w.ns = NULL;
+		} else
+			head->w.ns = &tomoyo_kernel_namespace;
+		/* Don't allow updating if namespace is invalid. */
+		if (!head->w.ns)
+			return -ENOENT;
+	}
+	/* Do the update. */
+	return head->write(head);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_control - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @head:       Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @buffer:     Pointer to buffer to read from.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns @buffer_len on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+ssize_t tomoyo_write_control(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+			     const char __user *buffer, const int buffer_len)
+{
+	int error = buffer_len;
+	size_t avail_len = buffer_len;
+	char *cp0;
+	int idx;
+
+	if (!head->write)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
+		return -EINTR;
+	cp0 = head->write_buf;
+	head->read_user_buf_avail = 0;
+	idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+	/* Read a line and dispatch it to the policy handler. */
+	while (avail_len > 0) {
+		char c;
+
+		if (head->w.avail >= head->writebuf_size - 1) {
+			const int len = head->writebuf_size * 2;
+			char *cp = kzalloc(len, GFP_NOFS | __GFP_NOWARN);
+
+			if (!cp) {
+				error = -ENOMEM;
+				break;
+			}
+			memmove(cp, cp0, head->w.avail);
+			kfree(cp0);
+			head->write_buf = cp;
+			cp0 = cp;
+			head->writebuf_size = len;
+		}
+		if (get_user(c, buffer)) {
+			error = -EFAULT;
+			break;
+		}
+		buffer++;
+		avail_len--;
+		cp0[head->w.avail++] = c;
+		if (c != '\n')
+			continue;
+		cp0[head->w.avail - 1] = '\0';
+		head->w.avail = 0;
+		tomoyo_normalize_line(cp0);
+		if (!strcmp(cp0, "reset")) {
+			head->w.ns = &tomoyo_kernel_namespace;
+			head->w.domain = NULL;
+			memset(&head->r, 0, sizeof(head->r));
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */
+		switch (head->type) {
+		case TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS:
+			/* This does not write anything. */
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY:
+			if (tomoyo_select_domain(head, cp0))
+				continue;
+			fallthrough;
+		case TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY:
+			if (!strcmp(cp0, "select transition_only")) {
+				head->r.print_transition_related_only = true;
+				continue;
+			}
+			fallthrough;
+		default:
+			if (!tomoyo_manager()) {
+				error = -EPERM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		switch (tomoyo_parse_policy(head, cp0)) {
+		case -EPERM:
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		case 0:
+			switch (head->type) {
+			case TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY:
+			case TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY:
+			case TOMOYO_STAT:
+			case TOMOYO_PROFILE:
+			case TOMOYO_MANAGER:
+				tomoyo_update_stat(TOMOYO_STAT_POLICY_UPDATES);
+				break;
+			default:
+				break;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_close_control - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ */
+void tomoyo_close_control(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If the file is /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query , decrement the
+	 * observer counter.
+	 */
+	if (head->type == TOMOYO_QUERY &&
+	    atomic_dec_and_test(&tomoyo_query_observers))
+		wake_up_all(&tomoyo_answer_wait);
+	tomoyo_notify_gc(head, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_profile - Check all profiles currently assigned to domains are defined.
+ */
+void tomoyo_check_profile(void)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	const int idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+
+	tomoyo_policy_loaded = true;
+	pr_info("TOMOYO: 2.6.0\n");
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list,
+				srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+		const u8 profile = domain->profile;
+		struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns = domain->ns;
+
+		if (ns->profile_version == 20110903) {
+			pr_info_once("Converting profile version from %u to %u.\n",
+				     20110903, 20150505);
+			ns->profile_version = 20150505;
+		}
+		if (ns->profile_version != 20150505)
+			pr_err("Profile version %u is not supported.\n",
+			       ns->profile_version);
+		else if (!ns->profile_ptr[profile])
+			pr_err("Profile %u (used by '%s') is not defined.\n",
+			       profile, domain->domainname->name);
+		else
+			continue;
+		pr_err("Userland tools for TOMOYO 2.6 must be installed and policy must be initialized.\n");
+		pr_err("Please see https://tomoyo.sourceforge.net/2.6/ for more information.\n");
+		panic("STOP!");
+	}
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	pr_info("Mandatory Access Control activated.\n");
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_load_builtin_policy - Load built-in policy.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void __init tomoyo_load_builtin_policy(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_INSECURE_BUILTIN_SETTING
+	static char tomoyo_builtin_profile[] __initdata =
+		"PROFILE_VERSION=20150505\n"
+		"0-CONFIG={ mode=learning grant_log=no reject_log=yes }\n";
+	static char tomoyo_builtin_exception_policy[] __initdata =
+		"aggregator proc:/self/exe /proc/self/exe\n";
+	static char tomoyo_builtin_domain_policy[] __initdata = "";
+	static char tomoyo_builtin_manager[] __initdata = "";
+	static char tomoyo_builtin_stat[] __initdata = "";
+#else
+	/*
+	 * This include file is manually created and contains built-in policy
+	 * named "tomoyo_builtin_profile", "tomoyo_builtin_exception_policy",
+	 * "tomoyo_builtin_domain_policy", "tomoyo_builtin_manager",
+	 * "tomoyo_builtin_stat" in the form of "static char [] __initdata".
+	 */
+#include "builtin-policy.h"
+#endif
+	u8 i;
+	const int idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+		struct tomoyo_io_buffer head = { };
+		char *start = "";
+
+		switch (i) {
+		case 0:
+			start = tomoyo_builtin_profile;
+			head.type = TOMOYO_PROFILE;
+			head.write = tomoyo_write_profile;
+			break;
+		case 1:
+			start = tomoyo_builtin_exception_policy;
+			head.type = TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY;
+			head.write = tomoyo_write_exception;
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			start = tomoyo_builtin_domain_policy;
+			head.type = TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY;
+			head.write = tomoyo_write_domain;
+			break;
+		case 3:
+			start = tomoyo_builtin_manager;
+			head.type = TOMOYO_MANAGER;
+			head.write = tomoyo_write_manager;
+			break;
+		case 4:
+			start = tomoyo_builtin_stat;
+			head.type = TOMOYO_STAT;
+			head.write = tomoyo_write_stat;
+			break;
+		}
+		while (1) {
+			char *end = strchr(start, '\n');
+
+			if (!end)
+				break;
+			*end = '\0';
+			tomoyo_normalize_line(start);
+			/* head is stack-local and not shared. */
+			context_unsafe(
+				head.write_buf = start;
+				tomoyo_parse_policy(&head, start);
+			);
+			start = end + 1;
+		}
+	}
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
+	tomoyo_check_profile();
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d098cf8aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1292 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/common.h
+ *
+ * Header file for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H
+#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
+
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/kmod.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/poll.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/inet.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/udp.h>
+
+/********** Constants definitions. **********/
+
+/*
+ * TOMOYO uses this hash only when appending a string into the string
+ * table. Frequency of appending strings is very low. So we don't need
+ * large (e.g. 64k) hash size. 256 will be sufficient.
+ */
+#define TOMOYO_HASH_BITS  8
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_HASH (1u<<TOMOYO_HASH_BITS)
+
+/*
+ * TOMOYO checks only SOCK_STREAM, SOCK_DGRAM, SOCK_RAW, SOCK_SEQPACKET.
+ * Therefore, we don't need SOCK_MAX.
+ */
+#define TOMOYO_SOCK_MAX 6
+
+#define TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE     4096
+
+/* Garbage collector is trying to kfree() this element. */
+#define TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS -1
+
+/* Profile number is an integer between 0 and 255. */
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES 256
+
+/* Group number is an integer between 0 and 255. */
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_ACL_GROUPS 256
+
+/* Index numbers for "struct tomoyo_condition". */
+enum tomoyo_conditions_index {
+	TOMOYO_TASK_UID,             /* current_uid()   */
+	TOMOYO_TASK_EUID,            /* current_euid()  */
+	TOMOYO_TASK_SUID,            /* current_suid()  */
+	TOMOYO_TASK_FSUID,           /* current_fsuid() */
+	TOMOYO_TASK_GID,             /* current_gid()   */
+	TOMOYO_TASK_EGID,            /* current_egid()  */
+	TOMOYO_TASK_SGID,            /* current_sgid()  */
+	TOMOYO_TASK_FSGID,           /* current_fsgid() */
+	TOMOYO_TASK_PID,             /* sys_getpid()   */
+	TOMOYO_TASK_PPID,            /* sys_getppid()  */
+	TOMOYO_EXEC_ARGC,            /* "struct linux_binprm *"->argc */
+	TOMOYO_EXEC_ENVC,            /* "struct linux_binprm *"->envc */
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_SOCKET,       /* S_IFSOCK */
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_SYMLINK,      /* S_IFLNK */
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_FILE,         /* S_IFREG */
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_BLOCK_DEV,    /* S_IFBLK */
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_DIRECTORY,    /* S_IFDIR */
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_CHAR_DEV,     /* S_IFCHR */
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_FIFO,         /* S_IFIFO */
+	TOMOYO_MODE_SETUID,          /* S_ISUID */
+	TOMOYO_MODE_SETGID,          /* S_ISGID */
+	TOMOYO_MODE_STICKY,          /* S_ISVTX */
+	TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_READ,      /* S_IRUSR */
+	TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_WRITE,     /* S_IWUSR */
+	TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_EXECUTE,   /* S_IXUSR */
+	TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_READ,      /* S_IRGRP */
+	TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_WRITE,     /* S_IWGRP */
+	TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_EXECUTE,   /* S_IXGRP */
+	TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_READ,     /* S_IROTH */
+	TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_WRITE,    /* S_IWOTH */
+	TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_EXECUTE,  /* S_IXOTH */
+	TOMOYO_EXEC_REALPATH,
+	TOMOYO_SYMLINK_TARGET,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_UID,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_GID,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_INO,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_MAJOR,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_MINOR,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_PERM,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_TYPE,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_DEV_MAJOR,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_DEV_MINOR,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_UID,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_GID,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_INO,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_MAJOR,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_MINOR,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_PERM,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_TYPE,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_DEV_MAJOR,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_DEV_MINOR,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_UID,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_GID,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_INO,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_PERM,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_UID,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_GID,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_INO,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_PERM,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_CONDITION_KEYWORD,
+	TOMOYO_NUMBER_UNION,
+	TOMOYO_NAME_UNION,
+	TOMOYO_ARGV_ENTRY,
+	TOMOYO_ENVP_ENTRY,
+};
+
+
+/* Index numbers for stat(). */
+enum tomoyo_path_stat_index {
+	/* Do not change this order. */
+	TOMOYO_PATH1,
+	TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2,
+	TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_STAT
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for operation mode. */
+enum tomoyo_mode_index {
+	TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED,
+	TOMOYO_CONFIG_LEARNING,
+	TOMOYO_CONFIG_PERMISSIVE,
+	TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING,
+	TOMOYO_CONFIG_MAX_MODE,
+	TOMOYO_CONFIG_WANT_REJECT_LOG =  64,
+	TOMOYO_CONFIG_WANT_GRANT_LOG  = 128,
+	TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT     = 255,
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for entry type. */
+enum tomoyo_policy_id {
+	TOMOYO_ID_GROUP,
+	TOMOYO_ID_ADDRESS_GROUP,
+	TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP,
+	TOMOYO_ID_NUMBER_GROUP,
+	TOMOYO_ID_TRANSITION_CONTROL,
+	TOMOYO_ID_AGGREGATOR,
+	TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER,
+	TOMOYO_ID_CONDITION,
+	TOMOYO_ID_NAME,
+	TOMOYO_ID_ACL,
+	TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for domain's attributes. */
+enum tomoyo_domain_info_flags_index {
+	/* Quota warnning flag.   */
+	TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED,
+	/*
+	 * This domain was unable to create a new domain at
+	 * tomoyo_find_next_domain() because the name of the domain to be
+	 * created was too long or it could not allocate memory.
+	 * More than one process continued execve() without domain transition.
+	 */
+	TOMOYO_DIF_TRANSITION_FAILED,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_DOMAIN_INFO_FLAGS
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for audit type. */
+enum tomoyo_grant_log {
+	/* Follow profile's configuration. */
+	TOMOYO_GRANTLOG_AUTO,
+	/* Do not generate grant log. */
+	TOMOYO_GRANTLOG_NO,
+	/* Generate grant_log. */
+	TOMOYO_GRANTLOG_YES,
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for group entries. */
+enum tomoyo_group_id {
+	TOMOYO_PATH_GROUP,
+	TOMOYO_NUMBER_GROUP,
+	TOMOYO_ADDRESS_GROUP,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for type of numeric values. */
+enum tomoyo_value_type {
+	TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_INVALID,
+	TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_DECIMAL,
+	TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_OCTAL,
+	TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_HEXADECIMAL,
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for domain transition control keywords. */
+enum tomoyo_transition_type {
+	/* Do not change this order, */
+	TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_RESET,
+	TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_RESET,
+	TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_INITIALIZE,
+	TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_INITIALIZE,
+	TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_KEEP,
+	TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_KEEP,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_TRANSITION_TYPE
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
+enum tomoyo_acl_entry_type_index {
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_INET_ACL,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_UNIX_ACL,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_ENV_ACL,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_MANUAL_TASK_ACL,
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for access controls with one pathname. */
+enum tomoyo_path_acl_index {
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_READ,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_APPEND,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_GETATTR,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/stat interface. */
+enum tomoyo_memory_stat_type {
+	TOMOYO_MEMORY_POLICY,
+	TOMOYO_MEMORY_AUDIT,
+	TOMOYO_MEMORY_QUERY,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT
+};
+
+enum tomoyo_mkdev_acl_index {
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for socket operations. */
+enum tomoyo_network_acl_index {
+	TOMOYO_NETWORK_BIND,    /* bind() operation. */
+	TOMOYO_NETWORK_LISTEN,  /* listen() operation. */
+	TOMOYO_NETWORK_CONNECT, /* connect() operation. */
+	TOMOYO_NETWORK_SEND,    /* send() operation. */
+	TOMOYO_MAX_NETWORK_OPERATION
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for access controls with two pathnames. */
+enum tomoyo_path2_acl_index {
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for access controls with one pathname and one number. */
+enum tomoyo_path_number_acl_index {
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN,
+	TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interfaces. */
+enum tomoyo_securityfs_interface_index {
+	TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY,
+	TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY,
+	TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS,
+	TOMOYO_STAT,
+	TOMOYO_AUDIT,
+	TOMOYO_VERSION,
+	TOMOYO_PROFILE,
+	TOMOYO_QUERY,
+	TOMOYO_MANAGER
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for special mount operations. */
+enum tomoyo_special_mount {
+	TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND,            /* mount --bind /source /dest   */
+	TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE,            /* mount --move /old /new       */
+	TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT,         /* mount -o remount /dir        */
+	TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE, /* mount --make-unbindable /dir */
+	TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE,    /* mount --make-private /dir    */
+	TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE,      /* mount --make-slave /dir      */
+	TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED,     /* mount --make-shared /dir     */
+	TOMOYO_MAX_SPECIAL_MOUNT
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for functionality. */
+enum tomoyo_mac_index {
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_EXECUTE,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CREATE,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UNLINK,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_GETATTR,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKDIR,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RMDIR,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKFIFO,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKSOCK,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_TRUNCATE,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_SYMLINK,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKBLOCK,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKCHAR,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_LINK,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RENAME,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHMOD,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHOWN,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHGRP,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_IOCTL,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHROOT,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MOUNT,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UMOUNT,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_PIVOT_ROOT,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_STREAM_BIND,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_STREAM_LISTEN,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_STREAM_CONNECT,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_DGRAM_BIND,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_DGRAM_SEND,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_RAW_BIND,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_RAW_SEND,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_STREAM_BIND,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_STREAM_LISTEN,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_STREAM_CONNECT,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_DGRAM_BIND,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_DGRAM_SEND,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_SEQPACKET_BIND,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_SEQPACKET_LISTEN,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_SEQPACKET_CONNECT,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_ENVIRON,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for category of functionality. */
+enum tomoyo_mac_category_index {
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_MISC,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX
+};
+
+/*
+ * Retry this request. Returned by tomoyo_supervisor() if policy violation has
+ * occurred in enforcing mode and the userspace daemon decided to retry.
+ *
+ * We must choose a positive value in order to distinguish "granted" (which is
+ * 0) and "rejected" (which is a negative value) and "retry".
+ */
+#define TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST 1
+
+/* Index numbers for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/stat interface. */
+enum tomoyo_policy_stat_type {
+	/* Do not change this order. */
+	TOMOYO_STAT_POLICY_UPDATES,
+	TOMOYO_STAT_POLICY_LEARNING,   /* == TOMOYO_CONFIG_LEARNING */
+	TOMOYO_STAT_POLICY_PERMISSIVE, /* == TOMOYO_CONFIG_PERMISSIVE */
+	TOMOYO_STAT_POLICY_ENFORCING,  /* == TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING */
+	TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT
+};
+
+/* Index numbers for profile's PREFERENCE values. */
+enum tomoyo_pref_index {
+	TOMOYO_PREF_MAX_AUDIT_LOG,
+	TOMOYO_PREF_MAX_LEARNING_ENTRY,
+	TOMOYO_MAX_PREF
+};
+
+/********** Structure definitions. **********/
+
+/* Common header for holding ACL entries. */
+struct tomoyo_acl_head {
+	struct list_head list;
+	s8 is_deleted; /* true or false or TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS */
+} __packed;
+
+/* Common header for shared entries. */
+struct tomoyo_shared_acl_head {
+	struct list_head list;
+	atomic_t users;
+} __packed;
+
+struct tomoyo_policy_namespace;
+
+/* Structure for request info. */
+struct tomoyo_request_info {
+	/*
+	 * For holding parameters specific to operations which deal files.
+	 * NULL if not dealing files.
+	 */
+	struct tomoyo_obj_info *obj;
+	/*
+	 * For holding parameters specific to execve() request.
+	 * NULL if not dealing execve().
+	 */
+	struct tomoyo_execve *ee;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	/* For holding parameters. */
+	union {
+		struct {
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
+			/* For using wildcards at tomoyo_find_next_domain(). */
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *matched_path;
+			/* One of values in "enum tomoyo_path_acl_index". */
+			u8 operation;
+		} path;
+		struct {
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename1;
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename2;
+			/* One of values in "enum tomoyo_path2_acl_index". */
+			u8 operation;
+		} path2;
+		struct {
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
+			unsigned int mode;
+			unsigned int major;
+			unsigned int minor;
+			/* One of values in "enum tomoyo_mkdev_acl_index". */
+			u8 operation;
+		} mkdev;
+		struct {
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
+			unsigned long number;
+			/*
+			 * One of values in
+			 * "enum tomoyo_path_number_acl_index".
+			 */
+			u8 operation;
+		} path_number;
+		struct {
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *name;
+		} environ;
+		struct {
+			const __be32 *address;
+			u16 port;
+			/* One of values smaller than TOMOYO_SOCK_MAX. */
+			u8 protocol;
+			/* One of values in "enum tomoyo_network_acl_index". */
+			u8 operation;
+			bool is_ipv6;
+		} inet_network;
+		struct {
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *address;
+			/* One of values smaller than TOMOYO_SOCK_MAX. */
+			u8 protocol;
+			/* One of values in "enum tomoyo_network_acl_index". */
+			u8 operation;
+		} unix_network;
+		struct {
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *type;
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *dir;
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *dev;
+			unsigned long flags;
+			int need_dev;
+		} mount;
+		struct {
+			const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname;
+		} task;
+	} param;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *matched_acl;
+	u8 param_type;
+	bool granted;
+	u8 retry;
+	u8 profile;
+	u8 mode; /* One of tomoyo_mode_index . */
+	u8 type;
+};
+
+/* Structure for holding a token. */
+struct tomoyo_path_info {
+	const char *name;
+	u32 hash;          /* = full_name_hash(name, strlen(name)) */
+	u16 const_len;     /* = tomoyo_const_part_length(name)     */
+	bool is_dir;       /* = tomoyo_strendswith(name, "/")      */
+	bool is_patterned; /* = tomoyo_path_contains_pattern(name) */
+};
+
+/* Structure for holding string data. */
+struct tomoyo_name {
+	struct tomoyo_shared_acl_head head;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info entry;
+};
+
+/* Structure for holding a word. */
+struct tomoyo_name_union {
+	/* Either @filename or @group is NULL. */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
+	struct tomoyo_group *group;
+};
+
+/* Structure for holding a number. */
+struct tomoyo_number_union {
+	unsigned long values[2];
+	struct tomoyo_group *group; /* Maybe NULL. */
+	/* One of values in "enum tomoyo_value_type". */
+	u8 value_type[2];
+};
+
+/* Structure for holding an IP address. */
+struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union {
+	struct in6_addr ip[2]; /* Big endian. */
+	struct tomoyo_group *group; /* Pointer to address group. */
+	bool is_ipv6; /* Valid only if @group == NULL. */
+};
+
+/* Structure for "path_group"/"number_group"/"address_group" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_group {
+	struct tomoyo_shared_acl_head head;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *group_name;
+	struct list_head member_list;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "path_group" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_path_group {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_head head;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *member_name;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "number_group" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_number_group {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_head head;
+	struct tomoyo_number_union number;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "address_group" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_address_group {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_head head;
+	/* Structure for holding an IP address. */
+	struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union address;
+};
+
+/* Subset of "struct stat". Used by conditional ACL and audit logs. */
+struct tomoyo_mini_stat {
+	kuid_t uid;
+	kgid_t gid;
+	u64 ino;
+	umode_t mode;
+	dev_t dev;
+	dev_t rdev;
+};
+
+/* Structure for dumping argv[] and envp[] of "struct linux_binprm". */
+struct tomoyo_page_dump {
+	struct page *page;    /* Previously dumped page. */
+	char *data;           /* Contents of "page". Size is PAGE_SIZE. */
+};
+
+/* Structure for attribute checks in addition to pathname checks. */
+struct tomoyo_obj_info {
+	/*
+	 * True if tomoyo_get_attributes() was already called, false otherwise.
+	 */
+	bool validate_done;
+	/* True if @stat[] is valid. */
+	bool stat_valid[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_STAT];
+	/* First pathname. Initialized with { NULL, NULL } if no path. */
+	struct path path1;
+	/* Second pathname. Initialized with { NULL, NULL } if no path. */
+	struct path path2;
+	/*
+	 * Information on @path1, @path1's parent directory, @path2, @path2's
+	 * parent directory.
+	 */
+	struct tomoyo_mini_stat stat[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_STAT];
+	/*
+	 * Content of symbolic link to be created. NULL for operations other
+	 * than symlink().
+	 */
+	struct tomoyo_path_info *symlink_target;
+};
+
+/* Structure for argv[]. */
+struct tomoyo_argv {
+	unsigned long index;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *value;
+	bool is_not;
+};
+
+/* Structure for envp[]. */
+struct tomoyo_envp {
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *name;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *value;
+	bool is_not;
+};
+
+/* Structure for execve() operation. */
+struct tomoyo_execve {
+	struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+	struct tomoyo_obj_info obj;
+	struct linux_binprm *bprm;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *transition;
+	/* For dumping argv[] and envp[]. */
+	struct tomoyo_page_dump dump;
+	/* For temporary use. */
+	char *tmp; /* Size is TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE bytes */
+};
+
+/* Structure for entries which follows "struct tomoyo_condition". */
+struct tomoyo_condition_element {
+	/*
+	 * Left hand operand. A "struct tomoyo_argv" for TOMOYO_ARGV_ENTRY, a
+	 * "struct tomoyo_envp" for TOMOYO_ENVP_ENTRY is attached to the tail
+	 * of the array of this struct.
+	 */
+	u8 left;
+	/*
+	 * Right hand operand. A "struct tomoyo_number_union" for
+	 * TOMOYO_NUMBER_UNION, a "struct tomoyo_name_union" for
+	 * TOMOYO_NAME_UNION is attached to the tail of the array of this
+	 * struct.
+	 */
+	u8 right;
+	/* Equation operator. True if equals or overlaps, false otherwise. */
+	bool equals;
+};
+
+/* Structure for optional arguments. */
+struct tomoyo_condition {
+	struct tomoyo_shared_acl_head head;
+	u32 size; /* Memory size allocated for this entry. */
+	u16 condc; /* Number of conditions in this struct. */
+	u16 numbers_count; /* Number of "struct tomoyo_number_union values". */
+	u16 names_count; /* Number of "struct tomoyo_name_union names". */
+	u16 argc; /* Number of "struct tomoyo_argv". */
+	u16 envc; /* Number of "struct tomoyo_envp". */
+	u8 grant_log; /* One of values in "enum tomoyo_grant_log". */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *transit; /* Maybe NULL. */
+	/*
+	 * struct tomoyo_condition_element condition[condc];
+	 * struct tomoyo_number_union values[numbers_count];
+	 * struct tomoyo_name_union names[names_count];
+	 * struct tomoyo_argv argv[argc];
+	 * struct tomoyo_envp envp[envc];
+	 */
+};
+
+/* Common header for individual entries. */
+struct tomoyo_acl_info {
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct tomoyo_condition *cond; /* Maybe NULL. */
+	s8 is_deleted; /* true or false or TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS */
+	u8 type; /* One of values in "enum tomoyo_acl_entry_type_index". */
+} __packed;
+
+/* Structure for domain information. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info {
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct list_head acl_info_list;
+	/* Name of this domain. Never NULL.          */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname;
+	/* Namespace for this domain. Never NULL. */
+	struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns;
+	/* Group numbers to use.   */
+	unsigned long group[TOMOYO_MAX_ACL_GROUPS / BITS_PER_LONG];
+	u8 profile;        /* Profile number to use. */
+	bool is_deleted;   /* Delete flag.           */
+	bool flags[TOMOYO_MAX_DOMAIN_INFO_FLAGS];
+	atomic_t users; /* Number of referring tasks. */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Structure for "task manual_domain_transition" directive.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_task_acl {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MANUAL_TASK_ACL */
+	/* Pointer to domainname. */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Structure for "file execute", "file read", "file write", "file append",
+ * "file unlink", "file getattr", "file rmdir", "file truncate",
+ * "file symlink", "file chroot" and "file unmount" directive.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_path_acl {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL */
+	u16 perm; /* Bitmask of values in "enum tomoyo_path_acl_index". */
+	struct tomoyo_name_union name;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Structure for "file create", "file mkdir", "file mkfifo", "file mksock",
+ * "file ioctl", "file chmod", "file chown" and "file chgrp" directive.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_path_number_acl {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL */
+	/* Bitmask of values in "enum tomoyo_path_number_acl_index". */
+	u8 perm;
+	struct tomoyo_name_union name;
+	struct tomoyo_number_union number;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "file mkblock" and "file mkchar" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL */
+	u8 perm; /* Bitmask of values in "enum tomoyo_mkdev_acl_index". */
+	struct tomoyo_name_union name;
+	struct tomoyo_number_union mode;
+	struct tomoyo_number_union major;
+	struct tomoyo_number_union minor;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Structure for "file rename", "file link" and "file pivot_root" directive.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_path2_acl {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL */
+	u8 perm; /* Bitmask of values in "enum tomoyo_path2_acl_index". */
+	struct tomoyo_name_union name1;
+	struct tomoyo_name_union name2;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "file mount" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_mount_acl {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL */
+	struct tomoyo_name_union dev_name;
+	struct tomoyo_name_union dir_name;
+	struct tomoyo_name_union fs_type;
+	struct tomoyo_number_union flags;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "misc env" directive in domain policy. */
+struct tomoyo_env_acl {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info head;        /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_ENV_ACL  */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *env; /* environment variable */
+};
+
+/* Structure for "network inet" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_inet_acl {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_INET_ACL */
+	u8 protocol;
+	u8 perm; /* Bitmask of values in "enum tomoyo_network_acl_index" */
+	struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union address;
+	struct tomoyo_number_union port;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "network unix" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_unix_acl {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_UNIX_ACL */
+	u8 protocol;
+	u8 perm; /* Bitmask of values in "enum tomoyo_network_acl_index" */
+	struct tomoyo_name_union name;
+};
+
+/* Structure for holding a line from /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+struct tomoyo_acl_param {
+	char *data;
+	struct list_head *list;
+	struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns;
+	bool is_delete;
+};
+
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_IO_READ_QUEUE 64
+
+/*
+ * Structure for reading/writing policy via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo
+ * interfaces.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_io_buffer {
+	void (*read)(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+	int (*write)(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+	__poll_t (*poll)(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+	/* Exclusive lock for this structure.   */
+	struct mutex io_sem;
+	char __user *read_user_buf;
+	size_t read_user_buf_avail;
+	struct {
+		struct list_head *ns;
+		struct list_head *domain;
+		struct list_head *group;
+		struct list_head *acl;
+		size_t avail;
+		unsigned int step;
+		unsigned int query_index;
+		u16 index;
+		u16 cond_index;
+		u8 acl_group_index;
+		u8 cond_step;
+		u8 bit;
+		u8 w_pos;
+		bool eof;
+		bool print_this_domain_only;
+		bool print_transition_related_only;
+		bool print_cond_part;
+		const char *w[TOMOYO_MAX_IO_READ_QUEUE];
+	} r;
+	struct {
+		struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns;
+		/* The position currently writing to.   */
+		struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+		/* Bytes available for writing.         */
+		size_t avail;
+		bool is_delete;
+	} w;
+	/* Buffer for reading.                  */
+	char *read_buf		__guarded_by(&io_sem);
+	/* Size of read buffer.                 */
+	size_t readbuf_size	__guarded_by(&io_sem);
+	/* Buffer for writing.                  */
+	char *write_buf		__guarded_by(&io_sem);
+	/* Size of write buffer.                */
+	size_t writebuf_size	__guarded_by(&io_sem);
+	/* Type of this interface.              */
+	enum tomoyo_securityfs_interface_index type;
+	/* Users counter protected by tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock. */
+	u8 users;
+	/* List for telling GC not to kfree() elements. */
+	struct list_head list;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Structure for "initialize_domain"/"no_initialize_domain"/"keep_domain"/
+ * "no_keep_domain" keyword.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_transition_control {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_head head;
+	u8 type; /* One of values in "enum tomoyo_transition_type".  */
+	/* True if the domainname is tomoyo_get_last_name(). */
+	bool is_last_name;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname; /* Maybe NULL */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *program;    /* Maybe NULL */
+};
+
+/* Structure for "aggregator" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_aggregator {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_head head;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *original_name;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *aggregated_name;
+};
+
+/* Structure for policy manager. */
+struct tomoyo_manager {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_head head;
+	/* A path to program or a domainname. */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *manager;
+};
+
+struct tomoyo_preference {
+	unsigned int learning_max_entry;
+	bool enforcing_verbose;
+	bool learning_verbose;
+	bool permissive_verbose;
+};
+
+/* Structure for /sys/kernel/security/tomnoyo/profile interface. */
+struct tomoyo_profile {
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *comment;
+	struct tomoyo_preference *learning;
+	struct tomoyo_preference *permissive;
+	struct tomoyo_preference *enforcing;
+	struct tomoyo_preference preference;
+	u8 default_config;
+	u8 config[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX];
+	unsigned int pref[TOMOYO_MAX_PREF];
+};
+
+/* Structure for representing YYYY/MM/DD hh/mm/ss. */
+struct tomoyo_time {
+	u16 year;
+	u8 month;
+	u8 day;
+	u8 hour;
+	u8 min;
+	u8 sec;
+};
+
+/* Structure for policy namespace. */
+struct tomoyo_policy_namespace {
+	/* Profile table. Memory is allocated as needed. */
+	struct tomoyo_profile *profile_ptr[TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES];
+	/* List of "struct tomoyo_group". */
+	struct list_head group_list[TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP];
+	/* List of policy. */
+	struct list_head policy_list[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY];
+	/* The global ACL referred by "use_group" keyword. */
+	struct list_head acl_group[TOMOYO_MAX_ACL_GROUPS];
+	/* List for connecting to tomoyo_namespace_list list. */
+	struct list_head namespace_list;
+	/* Profile version. Currently only 20150505 is defined. */
+	unsigned int profile_version;
+	/* Name of this namespace (e.g. "<kernel>", "</usr/sbin/httpd>" ). */
+	const char *name;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "struct task_struct"->security. */
+struct tomoyo_task {
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain_info;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain_info;
+};
+
+/********** External variable definitions. **********/
+
+extern bool tomoyo_policy_loaded;
+extern int tomoyo_enabled;
+extern const char * const tomoyo_condition_keyword
+[TOMOYO_MAX_CONDITION_KEYWORD];
+extern const char * const tomoyo_dif[TOMOYO_MAX_DOMAIN_INFO_FLAGS];
+extern const char * const tomoyo_mac_keywords[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX
+					      + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX];
+extern const char * const tomoyo_mode[TOMOYO_CONFIG_MAX_MODE];
+extern const char * const tomoyo_path_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION];
+extern const char * const tomoyo_proto_keyword[TOMOYO_SOCK_MAX];
+extern const char * const tomoyo_socket_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_NETWORK_OPERATION];
+extern const u8 tomoyo_index2category[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX];
+extern const u8 tomoyo_pn2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION];
+extern const u8 tomoyo_pnnn2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION];
+extern const u8 tomoyo_pp2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION];
+extern struct list_head tomoyo_condition_list;
+extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_list;
+extern struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH];
+extern struct list_head tomoyo_namespace_list;
+extern struct mutex tomoyo_policy_lock;
+extern struct srcu_struct tomoyo_ss;
+extern struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+extern struct tomoyo_policy_namespace tomoyo_kernel_namespace;
+extern unsigned int tomoyo_memory_quota[TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT];
+extern unsigned int tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT];
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes;
+
+/********** Function prototypes. **********/
+
+int tomoyo_interface_init(void);
+
+bool tomoyo_address_matches_group(const bool is_ipv6, const __be32 *address,
+				  const struct tomoyo_group *group);
+bool tomoyo_compare_number_union(const unsigned long value,
+				 const struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr);
+bool tomoyo_condition(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+		      const struct tomoyo_condition *cond);
+bool tomoyo_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname);
+bool tomoyo_correct_path(const char *filename);
+bool tomoyo_correct_word(const char *string);
+bool tomoyo_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer);
+bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_request_info *r);
+bool tomoyo_dump_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
+		      struct tomoyo_page_dump *dump);
+bool tomoyo_memory_ok(void *ptr);
+bool tomoyo_number_matches_group(const unsigned long min,
+				 const unsigned long max,
+				 const struct tomoyo_group *group);
+bool tomoyo_parse_ipaddr_union(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+			       struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union *ptr);
+bool tomoyo_parse_name_union(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+			     struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr);
+bool tomoyo_parse_number_union(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+			       struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr);
+bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+				 const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern);
+bool tomoyo_permstr(const char *string, const char *keyword);
+bool tomoyo_str_starts(char **src, const char *find);
+char *tomoyo_encode(const char *str);
+char *tomoyo_encode2(const char *str, int str_len);
+char *tomoyo_init_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, int len, const char *fmt,
+		      va_list args) __printf(3, 0);
+char *tomoyo_read_token(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param);
+char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(const struct path *path);
+char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname);
+const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void);
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_compare_name_union
+(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name, const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr);
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_domainname
+(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param);
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_name(const char *name);
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_path_matches_group
+(const struct tomoyo_path_info *pathname, const struct tomoyo_group *group);
+int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+				 const struct path *path, const int flag);
+void tomoyo_close_control(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+int tomoyo_env_perm(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *env) __must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss);
+int tomoyo_execute_permission(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+			      const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) __must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss);
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm) __must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss);
+int tomoyo_get_mode(const struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns, const u8 profile,
+		    const u8 index);
+int tomoyo_init_request_info(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+			     struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+			     const u8 index);
+int tomoyo_mkdev_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path,
+		      const unsigned int mode, unsigned int dev);
+int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+			    const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+			    void *data_page);
+int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file);
+int tomoyo_path2_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path1,
+		      const struct path *path2);
+int tomoyo_path_number_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path,
+			    unsigned long number);
+int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path,
+		     const char *target);
+__poll_t tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+__poll_t tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+int tomoyo_socket_bind_permission(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+				  int addr_len);
+int tomoyo_socket_connect_permission(struct socket *sock,
+				     struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len);
+int tomoyo_socket_listen_permission(struct socket *sock);
+int tomoyo_socket_sendmsg_permission(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				     int size);
+int tomoyo_supervisor(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+	__printf(2, 3);
+int tomoyo_update_domain(struct tomoyo_acl_info *new_entry, const int size,
+			 struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+			 bool (*check_duplicate)
+			 (const struct tomoyo_acl_info *,
+			  const struct tomoyo_acl_info *),
+			 bool (*merge_duplicate)
+			 (struct tomoyo_acl_info *, struct tomoyo_acl_info *,
+			  const bool));
+int tomoyo_update_policy(struct tomoyo_acl_head *new_entry, const int size,
+			 struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+			 bool (*check_duplicate)
+			 (const struct tomoyo_acl_head *,
+			  const struct tomoyo_acl_head *));
+int tomoyo_write_aggregator(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param);
+int tomoyo_write_file(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param);
+int tomoyo_write_group(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param, const u8 type);
+int tomoyo_write_misc(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param);
+int tomoyo_write_inet_network(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param);
+int tomoyo_write_transition_control(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+				    const u8 type);
+int tomoyo_write_unix_network(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param);
+ssize_t tomoyo_read_control(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, char __user *buffer,
+			    const int buffer_len);
+ssize_t tomoyo_write_control(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+			     const char __user *buffer, const int buffer_len);
+struct tomoyo_condition *tomoyo_get_condition(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param);
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_assign_domain(const char *domainname,
+						const bool transit);
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void);
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname);
+struct tomoyo_group *tomoyo_get_group(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+				      const u8 idx);
+struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *tomoyo_assign_namespace
+(const char *domainname);
+struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_profile(const struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns,
+				      const u8 profile);
+u8 tomoyo_parse_ulong(unsigned long *result, char **str);
+void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size);
+void __init tomoyo_load_builtin_policy(void);
+void __init tomoyo_mm_init(void);
+void tomoyo_check_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+		      bool (*check_entry)(struct tomoyo_request_info *,
+					  const struct tomoyo_acl_info *));
+void tomoyo_check_profile(void);
+void tomoyo_convert_time(time64_t time, struct tomoyo_time *stamp);
+void tomoyo_del_condition(struct list_head *element);
+void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr);
+void tomoyo_get_attributes(struct tomoyo_obj_info *obj);
+void tomoyo_init_policy_namespace(struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns);
+void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename);
+void tomoyo_normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer);
+void tomoyo_notify_gc(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const bool is_register);
+void tomoyo_print_ip(char *buf, const unsigned int size,
+		     const struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union *ptr);
+void tomoyo_print_ulong(char *buffer, const int buffer_len,
+			const unsigned long value, const u8 type);
+void tomoyo_put_name_union(struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr);
+void tomoyo_put_number_union(struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr);
+void tomoyo_read_log(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) __must_hold(&head->io_sem);
+void tomoyo_update_stat(const u8 index);
+void tomoyo_warn_oom(const char *function);
+void tomoyo_write_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...)
+	__printf(2, 3);
+void tomoyo_write_log2(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, int len, const char *fmt,
+		       va_list args) __printf(3, 0);
+
+/********** Inlined functions. **********/
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_lock - Take lock for protecting policy.
+ *
+ * Returns index number for tomoyo_read_unlock().
+ */
+static inline int tomoyo_read_lock(void)
+	__acquires_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	return srcu_read_lock(&tomoyo_ss);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_unlock - Release lock for protecting policy.
+ *
+ * @idx: Index number returned by tomoyo_read_lock().
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_read_unlock(int idx)
+	__releases_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	srcu_read_unlock(&tomoyo_ss, idx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sys_getppid - Copy of getppid().
+ *
+ * Returns parent process's PID.
+ *
+ * Alpha does not have getppid() defined. To be able to build this module on
+ * Alpha, I have to copy getppid() from kernel/timer.c.
+ */
+static inline pid_t tomoyo_sys_getppid(void)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return pid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sys_getpid - Copy of getpid().
+ *
+ * Returns current thread's PID.
+ *
+ * Alpha does not have getpid() defined. To be able to build this module on
+ * Alpha, I have to copy getpid() from kernel/timer.c.
+ */
+static inline pid_t tomoyo_sys_getpid(void)
+{
+	return task_tgid_vnr(current);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_pathcmp - strcmp() for "struct tomoyo_path_info" structure.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_pathcmp(const struct tomoyo_path_info *a,
+				  const struct tomoyo_path_info *b)
+{
+	return a->hash != b->hash || strcmp(a->name, b->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_put_name - Drop reference on "struct tomoyo_name".
+ *
+ * @name: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info". Maybe NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_put_name(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name)
+{
+	if (name) {
+		struct tomoyo_name *ptr =
+			container_of(name, typeof(*ptr), entry);
+		atomic_dec(&ptr->head.users);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_put_condition - Drop reference on "struct tomoyo_condition".
+ *
+ * @cond: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_condition". Maybe NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_put_condition(struct tomoyo_condition *cond)
+{
+	if (cond)
+		atomic_dec(&cond->head.users);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_put_group - Drop reference on "struct tomoyo_group".
+ *
+ * @group: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_group". Maybe NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_put_group(struct tomoyo_group *group)
+{
+	if (group)
+		atomic_dec(&group->head.users);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_task - Get "struct tomoyo_task" for specified thread.
+ *
+ * @task - Pointer to "struct task_struct".
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_task" for specified thread.
+ */
+static inline struct tomoyo_task *tomoyo_task(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return task->security + tomoyo_blob_sizes.lbs_task;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_name_union - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_name_union" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_same_name_union
+(const struct tomoyo_name_union *a, const struct tomoyo_name_union *b)
+{
+	return a->filename == b->filename && a->group == b->group;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_number_union - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_number_union" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_union".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_same_number_union
+(const struct tomoyo_number_union *a, const struct tomoyo_number_union *b)
+{
+	return a->values[0] == b->values[0] && a->values[1] == b->values[1] &&
+		a->group == b->group && a->value_type[0] == b->value_type[0] &&
+		a->value_type[1] == b->value_type[1];
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_ipaddr_union - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_same_ipaddr_union
+(const struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union *a, const struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union *b)
+{
+	return !memcmp(a->ip, b->ip, sizeof(a->ip)) && a->group == b->group &&
+		a->is_ipv6 == b->is_ipv6;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_current_namespace - Get "struct tomoyo_policy_namespace" for current thread.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_policy_namespace" for current thread.
+ */
+static inline struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *tomoyo_current_namespace(void)
+{
+	return tomoyo_domain()->ns;
+}
+
+/**
+ * list_for_each_cookie - iterate over a list with cookie.
+ * @pos:        the &struct list_head to use as a loop cursor.
+ * @head:       the head for your list.
+ */
+#define list_for_each_cookie(pos, head)					\
+	if (!pos)							\
+		pos =  srcu_dereference((head)->next, &tomoyo_ss);	\
+	for ( ; pos != (head); pos = srcu_dereference(pos->next, &tomoyo_ss))
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H) */
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/condition.c b/security/tomoyo/condition.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8b107b1ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/condition.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1122 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/condition.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+/* List of "struct tomoyo_condition". */
+LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_condition_list);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_argv - Check argv[] in "struct linux_binbrm".
+ *
+ * @index:   Index number of @arg_ptr.
+ * @arg_ptr: Contents of argv[@index].
+ * @argc:    Length of @argv.
+ * @argv:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_argv".
+ * @checked: Set to true if @argv[@index] was found.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_argv(const unsigned int index, const char *arg_ptr,
+			const int argc, const struct tomoyo_argv *argv,
+			u8 *checked)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info arg;
+
+	arg.name = arg_ptr;
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; argv++, checked++, i++) {
+		bool result;
+
+		if (index != argv->index)
+			continue;
+		*checked = 1;
+		tomoyo_fill_path_info(&arg);
+		result = tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(&arg, argv->value);
+		if (argv->is_not)
+			result = !result;
+		if (!result)
+			return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_envp - Check envp[] in "struct linux_binbrm".
+ *
+ * @env_name:  The name of environment variable.
+ * @env_value: The value of environment variable.
+ * @envc:      Length of @envp.
+ * @envp:      Pointer to "struct tomoyo_envp".
+ * @checked:   Set to true if @envp[@env_name] was found.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_envp(const char *env_name, const char *env_value,
+			const int envc, const struct tomoyo_envp *envp,
+			u8 *checked)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info value;
+
+	name.name = env_name;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+	value.name = env_value;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&value);
+	for (i = 0; i < envc; envp++, checked++, i++) {
+		bool result;
+
+		if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(&name, envp->name))
+			continue;
+		*checked = 1;
+		if (envp->value) {
+			result = tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(&value,
+							     envp->value);
+			if (envp->is_not)
+				result = !result;
+		} else {
+			result = true;
+			if (!envp->is_not)
+				result = !result;
+		}
+		if (!result)
+			return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_scan_bprm - Scan "struct linux_binprm".
+ *
+ * @ee:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_execve".
+ * @argc: Length of @argc.
+ * @argv: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_argv".
+ * @envc: Length of @envp.
+ * @envp: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_envp".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_scan_bprm(struct tomoyo_execve *ee,
+			     const u16 argc, const struct tomoyo_argv *argv,
+			     const u16 envc, const struct tomoyo_envp *envp)
+{
+	struct linux_binprm *bprm = ee->bprm;
+	struct tomoyo_page_dump *dump = &ee->dump;
+	char *arg_ptr = ee->tmp;
+	int arg_len = 0;
+	unsigned long pos = bprm->p;
+	int offset = pos % PAGE_SIZE;
+	int argv_count = bprm->argc;
+	int envp_count = bprm->envc;
+	bool result = true;
+	u8 local_checked[32];
+	u8 *checked;
+
+	if (argc + envc <= sizeof(local_checked)) {
+		checked = local_checked;
+		memset(local_checked, 0, sizeof(local_checked));
+	} else {
+		checked = kzalloc(argc + envc, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!checked)
+			return false;
+	}
+	while (argv_count || envp_count) {
+		if (!tomoyo_dump_page(bprm, pos, dump)) {
+			result = false;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		pos += PAGE_SIZE - offset;
+		while (offset < PAGE_SIZE) {
+			/* Read. */
+			const char *kaddr = dump->data;
+			const unsigned char c = kaddr[offset++];
+
+			if (c && arg_len < TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 10) {
+				if (c == '\\') {
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = '\\';
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = '\\';
+				} else if (c > ' ' && c < 127) {
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = c;
+				} else {
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = '\\';
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = (c >> 6) + '0';
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] =
+						((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = (c & 7) + '0';
+				}
+			} else {
+				arg_ptr[arg_len] = '\0';
+			}
+			if (c)
+				continue;
+			/* Check. */
+			if (argv_count) {
+				if (!tomoyo_argv(bprm->argc - argv_count,
+						 arg_ptr, argc, argv,
+						 checked)) {
+					result = false;
+					break;
+				}
+				argv_count--;
+			} else if (envp_count) {
+				char *cp = strchr(arg_ptr, '=');
+
+				if (cp) {
+					*cp = '\0';
+					if (!tomoyo_envp(arg_ptr, cp + 1,
+							 envc, envp,
+							 checked + argc)) {
+						result = false;
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+				envp_count--;
+			} else {
+				break;
+			}
+			arg_len = 0;
+		}
+		offset = 0;
+		if (!result)
+			break;
+	}
+out:
+	if (result) {
+		int i;
+
+		/* Check not-yet-checked entries. */
+		for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+			if (checked[i])
+				continue;
+			/*
+			 * Return true only if all unchecked indexes in
+			 * bprm->argv[] are not matched.
+			 */
+			if (argv[i].is_not)
+				continue;
+			result = false;
+			break;
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < envc; envp++, i++) {
+			if (checked[argc + i])
+				continue;
+			/*
+			 * Return true only if all unchecked environ variables
+			 * in bprm->envp[] are either undefined or not matched.
+			 */
+			if ((!envp->value && !envp->is_not) ||
+			    (envp->value && envp->is_not))
+				continue;
+			result = false;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (checked != local_checked)
+		kfree(checked);
+	return result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_scan_exec_realpath - Check "exec.realpath" parameter of "struct tomoyo_condition".
+ *
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @ptr:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ * @match: True if "exec.realpath=", false if "exec.realpath!=".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_scan_exec_realpath(struct file *file,
+				      const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr,
+				      const bool match)
+{
+	bool result;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info exe;
+
+	if (!file)
+		return false;
+	exe.name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&file->f_path);
+	if (!exe.name)
+		return false;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&exe);
+	result = tomoyo_compare_name_union(&exe, ptr);
+	kfree(exe.name);
+	return result == match;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_dqword - tomoyo_get_name() for a quoted string.
+ *
+ * @start: String to save.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_dqword(char *start)
+{
+	char *cp = start + strlen(start) - 1;
+
+	if (cp == start || *start++ != '"' || *cp != '"')
+		return NULL;
+	*cp = '\0';
+	if (*start && !tomoyo_correct_word(start))
+		return NULL;
+	return tomoyo_get_name(start);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_parse_name_union_quoted - Parse a quoted word.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ * @ptr:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_parse_name_union_quoted(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+					   struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+	char *filename = param->data;
+
+	if (*filename == '@')
+		return tomoyo_parse_name_union(param, ptr);
+	ptr->filename = tomoyo_get_dqword(filename);
+	return ptr->filename != NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_parse_argv - Parse an argv[] condition part.
+ *
+ * @left:  Lefthand value.
+ * @right: Righthand value.
+ * @argv:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_argv".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_parse_argv(char *left, char *right,
+			      struct tomoyo_argv *argv)
+{
+	if (tomoyo_parse_ulong(&argv->index, &left) !=
+	    TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_DECIMAL || *left++ != ']' || *left)
+		return false;
+	argv->value = tomoyo_get_dqword(right);
+	return argv->value != NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_parse_envp - Parse an envp[] condition part.
+ *
+ * @left:  Lefthand value.
+ * @right: Righthand value.
+ * @envp:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_envp".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_parse_envp(char *left, char *right,
+			      struct tomoyo_envp *envp)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *name;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *value;
+	char *cp = left + strlen(left) - 1;
+
+	if (*cp-- != ']' || *cp != '"')
+		goto out;
+	*cp = '\0';
+	if (!tomoyo_correct_word(left))
+		goto out;
+	name = tomoyo_get_name(left);
+	if (!name)
+		goto out;
+	if (!strcmp(right, "NULL")) {
+		value = NULL;
+	} else {
+		value = tomoyo_get_dqword(right);
+		if (!value) {
+			tomoyo_put_name(name);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	envp->name = name;
+	envp->value = value;
+	return true;
+out:
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_condition - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_condition" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_condition".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_condition".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_same_condition(const struct tomoyo_condition *a,
+					 const struct tomoyo_condition *b)
+{
+	return a->size == b->size && a->condc == b->condc &&
+		a->numbers_count == b->numbers_count &&
+		a->names_count == b->names_count &&
+		a->argc == b->argc && a->envc == b->envc &&
+		a->grant_log == b->grant_log && a->transit == b->transit &&
+		!memcmp(a + 1, b + 1, a->size - sizeof(*a));
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_condition_type - Get condition type.
+ *
+ * @word: Keyword string.
+ *
+ * Returns one of values in "enum tomoyo_conditions_index" on success,
+ * TOMOYO_MAX_CONDITION_KEYWORD otherwise.
+ */
+static u8 tomoyo_condition_type(const char *word)
+{
+	u8 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_CONDITION_KEYWORD; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(word, tomoyo_condition_keyword[i]))
+			break;
+	}
+	return i;
+}
+
+/* Define this to enable debug mode. */
+/* #define DEBUG_CONDITION */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_CONDITION
+#define dprintk printk
+#else
+#define dprintk(...) do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_commit_condition - Commit "struct tomoyo_condition".
+ *
+ * @entry: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_condition".
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_condition" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This function merges duplicated entries. This function returns NULL if
+ * @entry is not duplicated but memory quota for policy has exceeded.
+ */
+static struct tomoyo_condition *tomoyo_commit_condition
+(struct tomoyo_condition *entry)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_condition *ptr;
+	bool found = false;
+
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) {
+		dprintk(KERN_WARNING "%u: %s failed\n", __LINE__, __func__);
+		ptr = NULL;
+		found = true;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_condition_list, head.list) {
+		if (!tomoyo_same_condition(ptr, entry) ||
+		    atomic_read(&ptr->head.users) == TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS)
+			continue;
+		/* Same entry found. Share this entry. */
+		atomic_inc(&ptr->head.users);
+		found = true;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (!found) {
+		if (tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
+			atomic_set(&entry->head.users, 1);
+			list_add(&entry->head.list, &tomoyo_condition_list);
+		} else {
+			found = true;
+			ptr = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+out:
+	if (found) {
+		tomoyo_del_condition(&entry->head.list);
+		kfree(entry);
+		entry = ptr;
+	}
+	return entry;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_transit_preference - Parse domain transition preference for execve().
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ * @e:     Pointer to "struct tomoyo_condition".
+ *
+ * Returns the condition string part.
+ */
+static char *tomoyo_get_transit_preference(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+					   struct tomoyo_condition *e)
+{
+	char * const pos = param->data;
+	bool flag;
+
+	if (*pos == '<') {
+		e->transit = tomoyo_get_domainname(param);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	{
+		char *cp = strchr(pos, ' ');
+
+		if (cp)
+			*cp = '\0';
+		flag = tomoyo_correct_path(pos) || !strcmp(pos, "keep") ||
+			!strcmp(pos, "initialize") || !strcmp(pos, "reset") ||
+			!strcmp(pos, "child") || !strcmp(pos, "parent");
+		if (cp)
+			*cp = ' ';
+	}
+	if (!flag)
+		return pos;
+	e->transit = tomoyo_get_name(tomoyo_read_token(param));
+done:
+	if (e->transit)
+		return param->data;
+	/*
+	 * Return a bad read-only condition string that will let
+	 * tomoyo_get_condition() return NULL.
+	 */
+	return "/";
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_condition - Parse condition part.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_condition" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_condition *tomoyo_get_condition(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_condition *entry = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_condition_element *condp = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_number_union *numbers_p = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_name_union *names_p = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_argv *argv = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_envp *envp = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_condition e = { };
+	char * const start_of_string =
+		tomoyo_get_transit_preference(param, &e);
+	char * const end_of_string = start_of_string + strlen(start_of_string);
+	char *pos;
+
+rerun:
+	pos = start_of_string;
+	while (1) {
+		u8 left = -1;
+		u8 right = -1;
+		char *left_word = pos;
+		char *cp;
+		char *right_word;
+		bool is_not;
+
+		if (!*left_word)
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * Since left-hand condition does not allow use of "path_group"
+		 * or "number_group" and environment variable's names do not
+		 * accept '=', it is guaranteed that the original line consists
+		 * of one or more repetition of $left$operator$right blocks
+		 * where "$left is free from '=' and ' '" and "$operator is
+		 * either '=' or '!='" and "$right is free from ' '".
+		 * Therefore, we can reconstruct the original line at the end
+		 * of dry run even if we overwrite $operator with '\0'.
+		 */
+		cp = strchr(pos, ' ');
+		if (cp) {
+			*cp = '\0'; /* Will restore later. */
+			pos = cp + 1;
+		} else {
+			pos = "";
+		}
+		right_word = strchr(left_word, '=');
+		if (!right_word || right_word == left_word)
+			goto out;
+		is_not = *(right_word - 1) == '!';
+		if (is_not)
+			*(right_word++ - 1) = '\0'; /* Will restore later. */
+		else if (*(right_word + 1) != '=')
+			*right_word++ = '\0'; /* Will restore later. */
+		else
+			goto out;
+		dprintk(KERN_WARNING "%u: <%s>%s=<%s>\n", __LINE__, left_word,
+			is_not ? "!" : "", right_word);
+		if (!strcmp(left_word, "grant_log")) {
+			if (entry) {
+				if (is_not ||
+				    entry->grant_log != TOMOYO_GRANTLOG_AUTO)
+					goto out;
+				else if (!strcmp(right_word, "yes"))
+					entry->grant_log = TOMOYO_GRANTLOG_YES;
+				else if (!strcmp(right_word, "no"))
+					entry->grant_log = TOMOYO_GRANTLOG_NO;
+				else
+					goto out;
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!strncmp(left_word, "exec.argv[", 10)) {
+			if (!argv) {
+				e.argc++;
+				e.condc++;
+			} else {
+				e.argc--;
+				e.condc--;
+				left = TOMOYO_ARGV_ENTRY;
+				argv->is_not = is_not;
+				if (!tomoyo_parse_argv(left_word + 10,
+						       right_word, argv++))
+					goto out;
+			}
+			goto store_value;
+		}
+		if (!strncmp(left_word, "exec.envp[\"", 11)) {
+			if (!envp) {
+				e.envc++;
+				e.condc++;
+			} else {
+				e.envc--;
+				e.condc--;
+				left = TOMOYO_ENVP_ENTRY;
+				envp->is_not = is_not;
+				if (!tomoyo_parse_envp(left_word + 11,
+						       right_word, envp++))
+					goto out;
+			}
+			goto store_value;
+		}
+		left = tomoyo_condition_type(left_word);
+		dprintk(KERN_WARNING "%u: <%s> left=%u\n", __LINE__, left_word,
+			left);
+		if (left == TOMOYO_MAX_CONDITION_KEYWORD) {
+			if (!numbers_p) {
+				e.numbers_count++;
+			} else {
+				e.numbers_count--;
+				left = TOMOYO_NUMBER_UNION;
+				param->data = left_word;
+				if (*left_word == '@' ||
+				    !tomoyo_parse_number_union(param,
+							       numbers_p++))
+					goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		if (!condp)
+			e.condc++;
+		else
+			e.condc--;
+		if (left == TOMOYO_EXEC_REALPATH ||
+		    left == TOMOYO_SYMLINK_TARGET) {
+			if (!names_p) {
+				e.names_count++;
+			} else {
+				e.names_count--;
+				right = TOMOYO_NAME_UNION;
+				param->data = right_word;
+				if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union_quoted(param,
+								    names_p++))
+					goto out;
+			}
+			goto store_value;
+		}
+		right = tomoyo_condition_type(right_word);
+		if (right == TOMOYO_MAX_CONDITION_KEYWORD) {
+			if (!numbers_p) {
+				e.numbers_count++;
+			} else {
+				e.numbers_count--;
+				right = TOMOYO_NUMBER_UNION;
+				param->data = right_word;
+				if (!tomoyo_parse_number_union(param,
+							       numbers_p++))
+					goto out;
+			}
+		}
+store_value:
+		if (!condp) {
+			dprintk(KERN_WARNING "%u: dry_run left=%u right=%u match=%u\n",
+				__LINE__, left, right, !is_not);
+			continue;
+		}
+		condp->left = left;
+		condp->right = right;
+		condp->equals = !is_not;
+		dprintk(KERN_WARNING "%u: left=%u right=%u match=%u\n",
+			__LINE__, condp->left, condp->right,
+			condp->equals);
+		condp++;
+	}
+	dprintk(KERN_INFO "%u: cond=%u numbers=%u names=%u ac=%u ec=%u\n",
+		__LINE__, e.condc, e.numbers_count, e.names_count, e.argc,
+		e.envc);
+	if (entry) {
+		BUG_ON(e.names_count | e.numbers_count | e.argc | e.envc |
+		       e.condc);
+		return tomoyo_commit_condition(entry);
+	}
+	e.size = sizeof(*entry)
+		+ e.condc * sizeof(struct tomoyo_condition_element)
+		+ e.numbers_count * sizeof(struct tomoyo_number_union)
+		+ e.names_count * sizeof(struct tomoyo_name_union)
+		+ e.argc * sizeof(struct tomoyo_argv)
+		+ e.envc * sizeof(struct tomoyo_envp);
+	entry = kzalloc(e.size, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!entry)
+		goto out2;
+	*entry = e;
+	e.transit = NULL;
+	condp = (struct tomoyo_condition_element *) (entry + 1);
+	numbers_p = (struct tomoyo_number_union *) (condp + e.condc);
+	names_p = (struct tomoyo_name_union *) (numbers_p + e.numbers_count);
+	argv = (struct tomoyo_argv *) (names_p + e.names_count);
+	envp = (struct tomoyo_envp *) (argv + e.argc);
+	{
+		bool flag = false;
+
+		for (pos = start_of_string; pos < end_of_string; pos++) {
+			if (*pos)
+				continue;
+			if (flag) /* Restore " ". */
+				*pos = ' ';
+			else if (*(pos + 1) == '=') /* Restore "!=". */
+				*pos = '!';
+			else /* Restore "=". */
+				*pos = '=';
+			flag = !flag;
+		}
+	}
+	goto rerun;
+out:
+	dprintk(KERN_WARNING "%u: %s failed\n", __LINE__, __func__);
+	if (entry) {
+		tomoyo_del_condition(&entry->head.list);
+		kfree(entry);
+	}
+out2:
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.transit);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_attributes - Revalidate "struct inode".
+ *
+ * @obj: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_obj_info".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_get_attributes(struct tomoyo_obj_info *obj)
+{
+	u8 i;
+	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_STAT; i++) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		switch (i) {
+		case TOMOYO_PATH1:
+			dentry = obj->path1.dentry;
+			if (!dentry)
+				continue;
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_PATH2:
+			dentry = obj->path2.dentry;
+			if (!dentry)
+				continue;
+			break;
+		default:
+			if (!dentry)
+				continue;
+			dentry = dget_parent(dentry);
+			break;
+		}
+		inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+		if (inode) {
+			struct tomoyo_mini_stat *stat = &obj->stat[i];
+
+			stat->uid  = inode->i_uid;
+			stat->gid  = inode->i_gid;
+			stat->ino  = inode->i_ino;
+			stat->mode = inode->i_mode;
+			stat->dev  = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+			stat->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+			obj->stat_valid[i] = true;
+		}
+		if (i & 1) /* TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT or TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT */
+			dput(dentry);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_condition - Check condition part.
+ *
+ * @r:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @cond: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_condition". Maybe NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+bool tomoyo_condition(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+		      const struct tomoyo_condition *cond)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	u64 min_v[2] = { 0, 0 };
+	u64 max_v[2] = { 0, 0 };
+	const struct tomoyo_condition_element *condp;
+	const struct tomoyo_number_union *numbers_p;
+	const struct tomoyo_name_union *names_p;
+	const struct tomoyo_argv *argv;
+	const struct tomoyo_envp *envp;
+	struct tomoyo_obj_info *obj;
+	u16 condc;
+	u16 argc;
+	u16 envc;
+	struct linux_binprm *bprm = NULL;
+
+	if (!cond)
+		return true;
+	condc = cond->condc;
+	argc = cond->argc;
+	envc = cond->envc;
+	obj = r->obj;
+	if (r->ee)
+		bprm = r->ee->bprm;
+	if (!bprm && (argc || envc))
+		return false;
+	condp = (struct tomoyo_condition_element *) (cond + 1);
+	numbers_p = (const struct tomoyo_number_union *) (condp + condc);
+	names_p = (const struct tomoyo_name_union *)
+		(numbers_p + cond->numbers_count);
+	argv = (const struct tomoyo_argv *) (names_p + cond->names_count);
+	envp = (const struct tomoyo_envp *) (argv + argc);
+	for (i = 0; i < condc; i++) {
+		const bool match = condp->equals;
+		const u8 left = condp->left;
+		const u8 right = condp->right;
+		bool is_bitop[2] = { false, false };
+		u8 j;
+
+		condp++;
+		/* Check argv[] and envp[] later. */
+		if (left == TOMOYO_ARGV_ENTRY || left == TOMOYO_ENVP_ENTRY)
+			continue;
+		/* Check string expressions. */
+		if (right == TOMOYO_NAME_UNION) {
+			const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr = names_p++;
+			struct tomoyo_path_info *symlink;
+			struct tomoyo_execve *ee;
+			struct file *file;
+
+			switch (left) {
+			case TOMOYO_SYMLINK_TARGET:
+				symlink = obj ? obj->symlink_target : NULL;
+				if (!symlink ||
+				    !tomoyo_compare_name_union(symlink, ptr)
+				    == match)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_EXEC_REALPATH:
+				ee = r->ee;
+				file = ee ? ee->bprm->file : NULL;
+				if (!tomoyo_scan_exec_realpath(file, ptr,
+							       match))
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Check numeric or bit-op expressions. */
+		for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+			const u8 index = j ? right : left;
+			u64 value = 0;
+
+			switch (index) {
+			case TOMOYO_TASK_UID:
+				value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid());
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TASK_EUID:
+				value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_euid());
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TASK_SUID:
+				value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_suid());
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TASK_FSUID:
+				value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_fsuid());
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TASK_GID:
+				value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_gid());
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TASK_EGID:
+				value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_egid());
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TASK_SGID:
+				value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_sgid());
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TASK_FSGID:
+				value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_fsgid());
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TASK_PID:
+				value = tomoyo_sys_getpid();
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TASK_PPID:
+				value = tomoyo_sys_getppid();
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_SOCKET:
+				value = S_IFSOCK;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_SYMLINK:
+				value = S_IFLNK;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_FILE:
+				value = S_IFREG;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_BLOCK_DEV:
+				value = S_IFBLK;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_DIRECTORY:
+				value = S_IFDIR;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_CHAR_DEV:
+				value = S_IFCHR;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_TYPE_IS_FIFO:
+				value = S_IFIFO;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_SETUID:
+				value = S_ISUID;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_SETGID:
+				value = S_ISGID;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_STICKY:
+				value = S_ISVTX;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_READ:
+				value = 0400;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_WRITE:
+				value = 0200;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_EXECUTE:
+				value = 0100;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_READ:
+				value = 0040;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_WRITE:
+				value = 0020;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_EXECUTE:
+				value = 0010;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_READ:
+				value = 0004;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_WRITE:
+				value = 0002;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_EXECUTE:
+				value = 0001;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_EXEC_ARGC:
+				if (!bprm)
+					goto out;
+				value = bprm->argc;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_EXEC_ENVC:
+				if (!bprm)
+					goto out;
+				value = bprm->envc;
+				break;
+			case TOMOYO_NUMBER_UNION:
+				/* Fetch values later. */
+				break;
+			default:
+				if (!obj)
+					goto out;
+				if (!obj->validate_done) {
+					tomoyo_get_attributes(obj);
+					obj->validate_done = true;
+				}
+				{
+					u8 stat_index;
+					struct tomoyo_mini_stat *stat;
+
+					switch (index) {
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_UID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_GID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_INO:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_MAJOR:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_MINOR:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_TYPE:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_DEV_MAJOR:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_DEV_MINOR:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_PERM:
+						stat_index = TOMOYO_PATH1;
+						break;
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_UID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_GID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_INO:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_MAJOR:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_MINOR:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_TYPE:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_DEV_MAJOR:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_DEV_MINOR:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_PERM:
+						stat_index = TOMOYO_PATH2;
+						break;
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_UID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_GID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_INO:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_PERM:
+						stat_index =
+							TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT;
+						break;
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_UID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_GID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_INO:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_PERM:
+						stat_index =
+							TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT;
+						break;
+					default:
+						goto out;
+					}
+					if (!obj->stat_valid[stat_index])
+						goto out;
+					stat = &obj->stat[stat_index];
+					switch (index) {
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_UID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_UID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_UID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_UID:
+						value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, stat->uid);
+						break;
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_GID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_GID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_GID:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_GID:
+						value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, stat->gid);
+						break;
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_INO:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_INO:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_INO:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_INO:
+						value = stat->ino;
+						break;
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_MAJOR:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_MAJOR:
+						value = MAJOR(stat->dev);
+						break;
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_MINOR:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_MINOR:
+						value = MINOR(stat->dev);
+						break;
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_TYPE:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_TYPE:
+						value = stat->mode & S_IFMT;
+						break;
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_DEV_MAJOR:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_DEV_MAJOR:
+						value = MAJOR(stat->rdev);
+						break;
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_DEV_MINOR:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_DEV_MINOR:
+						value = MINOR(stat->rdev);
+						break;
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_PERM:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_PERM:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_PERM:
+					case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_PERM:
+						value = stat->mode & S_IALLUGO;
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+				break;
+			}
+			max_v[j] = value;
+			min_v[j] = value;
+			switch (index) {
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_SETUID:
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_SETGID:
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_STICKY:
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_READ:
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_WRITE:
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_EXECUTE:
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_READ:
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_WRITE:
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_EXECUTE:
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_READ:
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_WRITE:
+			case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_EXECUTE:
+				is_bitop[j] = true;
+			}
+		}
+		if (left == TOMOYO_NUMBER_UNION) {
+			/* Fetch values now. */
+			const struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr = numbers_p++;
+
+			min_v[0] = ptr->values[0];
+			max_v[0] = ptr->values[1];
+		}
+		if (right == TOMOYO_NUMBER_UNION) {
+			/* Fetch values now. */
+			const struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr = numbers_p++;
+
+			if (ptr->group) {
+				if (tomoyo_number_matches_group(min_v[0],
+								max_v[0],
+								ptr->group)
+				    == match)
+					continue;
+			} else {
+				if ((min_v[0] <= ptr->values[1] &&
+				     max_v[0] >= ptr->values[0]) == match)
+					continue;
+			}
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Bit operation is valid only when counterpart value
+		 * represents permission.
+		 */
+		if (is_bitop[0] && is_bitop[1]) {
+			goto out;
+		} else if (is_bitop[0]) {
+			switch (right) {
+			case TOMOYO_PATH1_PERM:
+			case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_PERM:
+			case TOMOYO_PATH2_PERM:
+			case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_PERM:
+				if (!(max_v[0] & max_v[1]) == !match)
+					continue;
+			}
+			goto out;
+		} else if (is_bitop[1]) {
+			switch (left) {
+			case TOMOYO_PATH1_PERM:
+			case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_PERM:
+			case TOMOYO_PATH2_PERM:
+			case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_PERM:
+				if (!(max_v[0] & max_v[1]) == !match)
+					continue;
+			}
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* Normal value range comparison. */
+		if ((min_v[0] <= max_v[1] && max_v[0] >= min_v[1]) == match)
+			continue;
+out:
+		return false;
+	}
+	/* Check argv[] and envp[] now. */
+	if (r->ee && (argc || envc))
+		return tomoyo_scan_bprm(r->ee, argc, argv, envc, envp);
+	return true;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eeaad421f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -0,0 +1,950 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/domain.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+
+/* Variables definitions.*/
+
+/* The initial domain. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_policy - Update an entry for exception policy.
+ *
+ * @new_entry:       Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @size:            Size of @new_entry in bytes.
+ * @param:           Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ * @check_duplicate: Callback function to find duplicated entry.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+int tomoyo_update_policy(struct tomoyo_acl_head *new_entry, const int size,
+			 struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+			 bool (*check_duplicate)(const struct tomoyo_acl_head
+						 *,
+						 const struct tomoyo_acl_head
+						 *))
+{
+	int error = param->is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_head *entry;
+	struct list_head *list = param->list;
+
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, list, list,
+				srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+		if (entry->is_deleted == TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS)
+			continue;
+		if (!check_duplicate(entry, new_entry))
+			continue;
+		entry->is_deleted = param->is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (error && !param->is_delete) {
+		entry = tomoyo_commit_ok(new_entry, size);
+		if (entry) {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
+			error = 0;
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_acl_head - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_acl_info" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_same_acl_head(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+					const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b)
+{
+	return a->type == b->type && a->cond == b->cond;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_domain - Update an entry for domain policy.
+ *
+ * @new_entry:       Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @size:            Size of @new_entry in bytes.
+ * @param:           Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ * @check_duplicate: Callback function to find duplicated entry.
+ * @merge_duplicate: Callback function to merge duplicated entry.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+int tomoyo_update_domain(struct tomoyo_acl_info *new_entry, const int size,
+			 struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+			 bool (*check_duplicate)(const struct tomoyo_acl_info
+						 *,
+						 const struct tomoyo_acl_info
+						 *),
+			 bool (*merge_duplicate)(struct tomoyo_acl_info *,
+						 struct tomoyo_acl_info *,
+						 const bool))
+{
+	const bool is_delete = param->is_delete;
+	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *entry;
+	struct list_head * const list = param->list;
+
+	if (param->data[0]) {
+		new_entry->cond = tomoyo_get_condition(param);
+		if (!new_entry->cond)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		/*
+		 * Domain transition preference is allowed for only
+		 * "file execute" entries.
+		 */
+		if (new_entry->cond->transit &&
+		    !(new_entry->type == TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL &&
+		      container_of(new_entry, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head)
+		      ->perm == 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, list, list,
+				srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+		if (entry->is_deleted == TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_same_acl_head(entry, new_entry) ||
+		    !check_duplicate(entry, new_entry))
+			continue;
+		if (merge_duplicate)
+			entry->is_deleted = merge_duplicate(entry, new_entry,
+							    is_delete);
+		else
+			entry->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (error && !is_delete) {
+		entry = tomoyo_commit_ok(new_entry, size);
+		if (entry) {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
+			error = 0;
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+out:
+	tomoyo_put_condition(new_entry->cond);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_acl - Do permission check.
+ *
+ * @r:           Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @check_entry: Callback function to check type specific parameters.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+void tomoyo_check_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+		      bool (*check_entry)(struct tomoyo_request_info *,
+					  const struct tomoyo_acl_info *))
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = r->domain;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+	const struct list_head *list = &domain->acl_info_list;
+	u16 i = 0;
+
+retry:
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, list, list,
+				srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+		if (ptr->is_deleted || ptr->type != r->param_type)
+			continue;
+		if (!check_entry(r, ptr))
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_condition(r, ptr->cond))
+			continue;
+		r->matched_acl = ptr;
+		r->granted = true;
+		return;
+	}
+	for (; i < TOMOYO_MAX_ACL_GROUPS; i++) {
+		if (!test_bit(i, domain->group))
+			continue;
+		list = &domain->ns->acl_group[i++];
+		goto retry;
+	}
+	r->granted = false;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
+LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_list);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_last_word - Get last component of a domainname.
+ *
+ * @name: Domainname to check.
+ *
+ * Returns the last word of @domainname.
+ */
+static const char *tomoyo_last_word(const char *name)
+{
+	const char *cp = strrchr(name, ' ');
+
+	if (cp)
+		return cp + 1;
+	return name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_transition_control - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_transition_control" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_transition_control(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a,
+					   const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_transition_control *p1 = container_of(a,
+								  typeof(*p1),
+								  head);
+	const struct tomoyo_transition_control *p2 = container_of(b,
+								  typeof(*p2),
+								  head);
+
+	return p1->type == p2->type && p1->is_last_name == p2->is_last_name
+		&& p1->domainname == p2->domainname
+		&& p1->program == p2->program;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_transition_control - Write "struct tomoyo_transition_control" list.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ * @type:  Type of this entry.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_transition_control(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+				    const u8 type)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_transition_control e = { .type = type };
+	int error = param->is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
+	char *program = param->data;
+	char *domainname = strstr(program, " from ");
+
+	if (domainname) {
+		*domainname = '\0';
+		domainname += 6;
+	} else if (type == TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_KEEP ||
+		   type == TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_KEEP) {
+		domainname = program;
+		program = NULL;
+	}
+	if (program && strcmp(program, "any")) {
+		if (!tomoyo_correct_path(program))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		e.program = tomoyo_get_name(program);
+		if (!e.program)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (domainname && strcmp(domainname, "any")) {
+		if (!tomoyo_correct_domain(domainname)) {
+			if (!tomoyo_correct_path(domainname))
+				goto out;
+			e.is_last_name = true;
+		}
+		e.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname);
+		if (!e.domainname)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	param->list = &param->ns->policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_TRANSITION_CONTROL];
+	error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+				     tomoyo_same_transition_control);
+out:
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.domainname);
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.program);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_scan_transition - Try to find specific domain transition type.
+ *
+ * @list:       Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ * @domainname: The name of current domain.
+ * @program:    The name of requested program.
+ * @last_name:  The last component of @domainname.
+ * @type:       One of values in "enum tomoyo_transition_type".
+ *
+ * Returns true if found one, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_scan_transition
+(const struct list_head *list, const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *program, const char *last_name,
+ const enum tomoyo_transition_type type)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_transition_control *ptr;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, list, head.list,
+				srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+		if (ptr->head.is_deleted || ptr->type != type)
+			continue;
+		if (ptr->domainname) {
+			if (!ptr->is_last_name) {
+				if (ptr->domainname != domainname)
+					continue;
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 * Use direct strcmp() since this is
+				 * unlikely used.
+				 */
+				if (strcmp(ptr->domainname->name, last_name))
+					continue;
+			}
+		}
+		if (ptr->program && tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->program, program))
+			continue;
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_transition_type - Get domain transition type.
+ *
+ * @ns:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_policy_namespace".
+ * @domainname: The name of current domain.
+ * @program:    The name of requested program.
+ *
+ * Returns TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_TRANSIT if executing @program causes
+ * domain transition across namespaces, TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_INITIALIZE if
+ * executing @program reinitializes domain transition within that namespace,
+ * TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_KEEP if executing @program stays at @domainname ,
+ * others otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static enum tomoyo_transition_type tomoyo_transition_type
+(const struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *program)
+{
+	const char *last_name = tomoyo_last_word(domainname->name);
+	enum tomoyo_transition_type type = TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_RESET;
+
+	while (type < TOMOYO_MAX_TRANSITION_TYPE) {
+		const struct list_head * const list =
+			&ns->policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_TRANSITION_CONTROL];
+
+		if (!tomoyo_scan_transition(list, domainname, program,
+					    last_name, type)) {
+			type++;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (type != TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_RESET &&
+		    type != TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_INITIALIZE)
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * Do not check for reset_domain if no_reset_domain matched.
+		 * Do not check for initialize_domain if no_initialize_domain
+		 * matched.
+		 */
+		type++;
+		type++;
+	}
+	return type;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_aggregator - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_aggregator" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_aggregator(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a,
+				   const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_aggregator *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1),
+							  head);
+	const struct tomoyo_aggregator *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2),
+							  head);
+
+	return p1->original_name == p2->original_name &&
+		p1->aggregated_name == p2->aggregated_name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_aggregator - Write "struct tomoyo_aggregator" list.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_aggregator(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_aggregator e = { };
+	int error = param->is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
+	const char *original_name = tomoyo_read_token(param);
+	const char *aggregated_name = tomoyo_read_token(param);
+
+	if (!tomoyo_correct_word(original_name) ||
+	    !tomoyo_correct_path(aggregated_name))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	e.original_name = tomoyo_get_name(original_name);
+	e.aggregated_name = tomoyo_get_name(aggregated_name);
+	if (!e.original_name || !e.aggregated_name ||
+	    e.aggregated_name->is_patterned) /* No patterns allowed. */
+		goto out;
+	param->list = &param->ns->policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_AGGREGATOR];
+	error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+				     tomoyo_same_aggregator);
+out:
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.original_name);
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.aggregated_name);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_namespace - Find specified namespace.
+ *
+ * @name: Name of namespace to find.
+ * @len:  Length of @name.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_policy_namespace" if found,
+ * NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *tomoyo_find_namespace
+(const char *name, const unsigned int len)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(ns, &tomoyo_namespace_list, namespace_list) {
+		if (strncmp(name, ns->name, len) ||
+		    (name[len] && name[len] != ' '))
+			continue;
+		return ns;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_assign_namespace - Create a new namespace.
+ *
+ * @domainname: Name of namespace to create.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_policy_namespace" on success,
+ * NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *tomoyo_assign_namespace(const char *domainname)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ptr;
+	struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *entry;
+	const char *cp = domainname;
+	unsigned int len = 0;
+
+	while (*cp && *cp++ != ' ')
+		len++;
+	ptr = tomoyo_find_namespace(domainname, len);
+	if (ptr)
+		return ptr;
+	if (len >= TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 10 || !tomoyo_domain_def(domainname))
+		return NULL;
+	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry) + len + 1, GFP_NOFS | __GFP_NOWARN);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
+	ptr = tomoyo_find_namespace(domainname, len);
+	if (!ptr && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
+		char *name = (char *) (entry + 1);
+
+		ptr = entry;
+		memmove(name, domainname, len);
+		name[len] = '\0';
+		entry->name = name;
+		tomoyo_init_policy_namespace(entry);
+		entry = NULL;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+out:
+	kfree(entry);
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_namespace_jump - Check for namespace jump.
+ *
+ * @domainname: Name of domain.
+ *
+ * Returns true if namespace differs, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_namespace_jump(const char *domainname)
+{
+	const char *namespace = tomoyo_current_namespace()->name;
+	const int len = strlen(namespace);
+
+	return strncmp(domainname, namespace, len) ||
+		(domainname[len] && domainname[len] != ' ');
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_assign_domain - Create a domain or a namespace.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @transit:    True if transit to domain found or created.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_assign_domain(const char *domainname,
+						const bool transit)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info e = { };
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *entry = tomoyo_find_domain(domainname);
+	bool created = false;
+
+	if (entry) {
+		if (transit) {
+			/*
+			 * Since namespace is created at runtime, profiles may
+			 * not be created by the moment the process transits to
+			 * that domain. Do not perform domain transition if
+			 * profile for that domain is not yet created.
+			 */
+			if (tomoyo_policy_loaded &&
+			    !entry->ns->profile_ptr[entry->profile])
+				return NULL;
+		}
+		return entry;
+	}
+	/* Requested domain does not exist. */
+	/* Don't create requested domain if domainname is invalid. */
+	if (strlen(domainname) >= TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 10 ||
+	    !tomoyo_correct_domain(domainname))
+		return NULL;
+	/*
+	 * Since definition of profiles and acl_groups may differ across
+	 * namespaces, do not inherit "use_profile" and "use_group" settings
+	 * by automatically creating requested domain upon domain transition.
+	 */
+	if (transit && tomoyo_namespace_jump(domainname))
+		return NULL;
+	e.ns = tomoyo_assign_namespace(domainname);
+	if (!e.ns)
+		return NULL;
+	/*
+	 * "use_profile" and "use_group" settings for automatically created
+	 * domains are inherited from current domain. These are 0 for manually
+	 * created domains.
+	 */
+	if (transit) {
+		const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = tomoyo_domain();
+
+		e.profile = domain->profile;
+		memcpy(e.group, domain->group, sizeof(e.group));
+	}
+	e.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname);
+	if (!e.domainname)
+		return NULL;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
+	entry = tomoyo_find_domain(domainname);
+	if (!entry) {
+		entry = tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+		if (entry) {
+			INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->acl_info_list);
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_domain_list);
+			created = true;
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+out:
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.domainname);
+	if (entry && transit) {
+		if (created) {
+			struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+			int i;
+
+			tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, entry,
+						 TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_EXECUTE);
+			r.granted = false;
+			tomoyo_write_log(&r, "use_profile %u\n",
+					 entry->profile);
+			for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_ACL_GROUPS; i++)
+				if (test_bit(i, entry->group))
+					tomoyo_write_log(&r, "use_group %u\n",
+							 i);
+			tomoyo_update_stat(TOMOYO_STAT_POLICY_UPDATES);
+		}
+	}
+	return entry;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_environ - Check permission for environment variable names.
+ *
+ * @ee: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_execve".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_environ(struct tomoyo_execve *ee)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_request_info *r = &ee->r;
+	struct linux_binprm *bprm = ee->bprm;
+	/* env_page.data is allocated by tomoyo_dump_page(). */
+	struct tomoyo_page_dump env_page = { };
+	char *arg_ptr; /* Size is TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE bytes */
+	int arg_len = 0;
+	unsigned long pos = bprm->p;
+	int offset = pos % PAGE_SIZE;
+	int argv_count = bprm->argc;
+	int envp_count = bprm->envc;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	ee->r.type = TOMOYO_MAC_ENVIRON;
+	ee->r.profile = r->domain->profile;
+	ee->r.mode = tomoyo_get_mode(r->domain->ns, ee->r.profile,
+				     TOMOYO_MAC_ENVIRON);
+	if (!r->mode || !envp_count)
+		return 0;
+	arg_ptr = kzalloc(TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!arg_ptr)
+		goto out;
+	while (error == -ENOMEM) {
+		if (!tomoyo_dump_page(bprm, pos, &env_page))
+			goto out;
+		pos += PAGE_SIZE - offset;
+		/* Read. */
+		while (argv_count && offset < PAGE_SIZE) {
+			if (!env_page.data[offset++])
+				argv_count--;
+		}
+		if (argv_count) {
+			offset = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+		while (offset < PAGE_SIZE) {
+			const unsigned char c = env_page.data[offset++];
+
+			if (c && arg_len < TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 10) {
+				if (c == '=') {
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = '\0';
+				} else if (c == '\\') {
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = '\\';
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = '\\';
+				} else if (c > ' ' && c < 127) {
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = c;
+				} else {
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = '\\';
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = (c >> 6) + '0';
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++]
+						= ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
+					arg_ptr[arg_len++] = (c & 7) + '0';
+				}
+			} else {
+				arg_ptr[arg_len] = '\0';
+			}
+			if (c)
+				continue;
+			if (tomoyo_env_perm(r, arg_ptr)) {
+				error = -EPERM;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (!--envp_count) {
+				error = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+			arg_len = 0;
+		}
+		offset = 0;
+	}
+out:
+	if (r->mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING)
+		error = 0;
+	kfree(env_page.data);
+	kfree(arg_ptr);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_next_domain - Find a domain.
+ *
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain = tomoyo_domain();
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
+	const char *original_name = bprm->filename;
+	int retval = -ENOMEM;
+	bool reject_on_transition_failure = false;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *candidate;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info exename;
+	struct tomoyo_execve *ee = kzalloc_obj(*ee, GFP_NOFS);
+
+	if (!ee)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	ee->tmp = kzalloc(TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!ee->tmp) {
+		kfree(ee);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	/* ee->dump->data is allocated by tomoyo_dump_page(). */
+	tomoyo_init_request_info(&ee->r, NULL, TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_EXECUTE);
+	ee->r.ee = ee;
+	ee->bprm = bprm;
+	ee->r.obj = &ee->obj;
+	ee->obj.path1 = bprm->file->f_path;
+	/*
+	 * Get symlink's pathname of program, but fallback to realpath if
+	 * symlink's pathname does not exist or symlink's pathname refers
+	 * to proc filesystem (e.g. /dev/fd/<num> or /proc/self/fd/<num> ).
+	 */
+	exename.name = tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(original_name);
+	if (exename.name && !strncmp(exename.name, "proc:/", 6)) {
+		kfree(exename.name);
+		exename.name = NULL;
+	}
+	if (!exename.name) {
+		exename.name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&bprm->file->f_path);
+		if (!exename.name)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&exename);
+retry:
+	/* Check 'aggregator' directive. */
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_aggregator *ptr;
+		struct list_head *list =
+			&old_domain->ns->policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_AGGREGATOR];
+
+		/* Check 'aggregator' directive. */
+		candidate = &exename;
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, list, head.list,
+					srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+			if (ptr->head.is_deleted ||
+			    !tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(&exename,
+							 ptr->original_name))
+				continue;
+			candidate = ptr->aggregated_name;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Check execute permission. */
+	retval = tomoyo_execute_permission(&ee->r, candidate);
+	if (retval == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST)
+		goto retry;
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out;
+	/*
+	 * To be able to specify domainnames with wildcards, use the
+	 * pathname specified in the policy (which may contain
+	 * wildcard) rather than the pathname passed to execve()
+	 * (which never contains wildcard).
+	 */
+	if (ee->r.param.path.matched_path)
+		candidate = ee->r.param.path.matched_path;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for domain transition preference if "file execute" matched.
+	 * If preference is given, make execve() fail if domain transition
+	 * has failed, for domain transition preference should be used with
+	 * destination domain defined.
+	 */
+	if (ee->transition) {
+		const char *domainname = ee->transition->name;
+
+		reject_on_transition_failure = true;
+		if (!strcmp(domainname, "keep"))
+			goto force_keep_domain;
+		if (!strcmp(domainname, "child"))
+			goto force_child_domain;
+		if (!strcmp(domainname, "reset"))
+			goto force_reset_domain;
+		if (!strcmp(domainname, "initialize"))
+			goto force_initialize_domain;
+		if (!strcmp(domainname, "parent")) {
+			char *cp;
+
+			strscpy(ee->tmp, old_domain->domainname->name, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE);
+			cp = strrchr(ee->tmp, ' ');
+			if (cp)
+				*cp = '\0';
+		} else if (*domainname == '<')
+			strscpy(ee->tmp, domainname, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE);
+		else
+			snprintf(ee->tmp, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 1, "%s %s",
+				 old_domain->domainname->name, domainname);
+		goto force_jump_domain;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * No domain transition preference specified.
+	 * Calculate domain to transit to.
+	 */
+	switch (tomoyo_transition_type(old_domain->ns, old_domain->domainname,
+				       candidate)) {
+	case TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_RESET:
+force_reset_domain:
+		/* Transit to the root of specified namespace. */
+		snprintf(ee->tmp, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 1, "<%s>",
+			 candidate->name);
+		/*
+		 * Make execve() fail if domain transition across namespaces
+		 * has failed.
+		 */
+		reject_on_transition_failure = true;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_INITIALIZE:
+force_initialize_domain:
+		/* Transit to the child of current namespace's root. */
+		snprintf(ee->tmp, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 1, "%s %s",
+			 old_domain->ns->name, candidate->name);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_KEEP:
+force_keep_domain:
+		/* Keep current domain. */
+		domain = old_domain;
+		break;
+	default:
+		if (old_domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain &&
+		    !tomoyo_policy_loaded) {
+			/*
+			 * Needn't to transit from kernel domain before
+			 * starting /sbin/init. But transit from kernel domain
+			 * if executing initializers because they might start
+			 * before /sbin/init.
+			 */
+			domain = old_domain;
+			break;
+		}
+force_child_domain:
+		/* Normal domain transition. */
+		snprintf(ee->tmp, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 1, "%s %s",
+			 old_domain->domainname->name, candidate->name);
+		break;
+	}
+force_jump_domain:
+	if (!domain)
+		domain = tomoyo_assign_domain(ee->tmp, true);
+	if (domain)
+		retval = 0;
+	else if (reject_on_transition_failure) {
+		pr_warn("ERROR: Domain '%s' not ready.\n", ee->tmp);
+		retval = -ENOMEM;
+	} else if (ee->r.mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING)
+		retval = -ENOMEM;
+	else {
+		retval = 0;
+		if (!old_domain->flags[TOMOYO_DIF_TRANSITION_FAILED]) {
+			old_domain->flags[TOMOYO_DIF_TRANSITION_FAILED] = true;
+			ee->r.granted = false;
+			tomoyo_write_log(&ee->r, "%s", tomoyo_dif
+					 [TOMOYO_DIF_TRANSITION_FAILED]);
+			pr_warn("ERROR: Domain '%s' not defined.\n", ee->tmp);
+		}
+	}
+ out:
+	if (!domain)
+		domain = old_domain;
+	/* Update reference count on "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
+
+		s->old_domain_info = s->domain_info;
+		s->domain_info = domain;
+		atomic_inc(&domain->users);
+	}
+	kfree(exename.name);
+	if (!retval) {
+		ee->r.domain = domain;
+		retval = tomoyo_environ(ee);
+	}
+	kfree(ee->tmp);
+	kfree(ee->dump.data);
+	kfree(ee);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_dump_page - Dump a page to buffer.
+ *
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
+ * @pos:  Location to dump.
+ * @dump: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_page_dump".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_dump_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
+		      struct tomoyo_page_dump *dump)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+	int ret;
+#endif
+
+	/* dump->data is released by tomoyo_find_next_domain(). */
+	if (!dump->data) {
+		dump->data = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!dump->data)
+			return false;
+	}
+	/* Same with get_arg_page(bprm, pos, 0) in fs/exec.c */
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+	/*
+	 * This is called at execve() time in order to dig around
+	 * in the argv/environment of the new process
+	 * (represented by bprm).
+	 */
+	mmap_read_lock(bprm->mm);
+	ret = get_user_pages_remote(bprm->mm, pos, 1,
+				    FOLL_FORCE, &page, NULL);
+	mmap_read_unlock(bprm->mm);
+	if (ret <= 0)
+		return false;
+#else
+	page = bprm->page[pos / PAGE_SIZE];
+#endif
+	if (page != dump->page) {
+		const unsigned int offset = pos % PAGE_SIZE;
+		char *kaddr = kmap_local_page(page);
+
+		dump->page = page;
+		memcpy(dump->data + offset, kaddr + offset,
+		       PAGE_SIZE - offset);
+		kunmap_local(kaddr);
+	}
+	/* Same with put_arg_page(page) in fs/exec.c */
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+	put_page(page);
+#endif
+	return true;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/environ.c b/security/tomoyo/environ.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bcb05910f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/environ.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/environ.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_env_acl - Check permission for environment variable's name.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if granted, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_check_env_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+				 const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_env_acl *acl =
+		container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), head);
+
+	return tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(r->param.environ.name, acl->env);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_audit_env_log - Audit environment variable name log.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_audit_env_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	return tomoyo_supervisor(r, "misc env %s\n",
+				 r->param.environ.name->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_env_perm - Check permission for environment variable's name.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @env: The name of environment variable.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+int tomoyo_env_perm(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *env)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_path_info environ;
+	int error;
+
+	if (!env || !*env)
+		return 0;
+	environ.name = env;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&environ);
+	r->param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_ENV_ACL;
+	r->param.environ.name = &environ;
+	do {
+		tomoyo_check_acl(r, tomoyo_check_env_acl);
+		error = tomoyo_audit_env_log(r);
+	} while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_env_acl - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_env_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_env_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_env_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head);
+	const struct tomoyo_env_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head);
+
+	return p1->env == p2->env;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_env - Write "struct tomoyo_env_acl" list.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_env(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_env_acl e = { .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_ENV_ACL };
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	const char *data = tomoyo_read_token(param);
+
+	if (!tomoyo_correct_word(data) || strchr(data, '='))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	e.env = tomoyo_get_name(data);
+	if (!e.env)
+		return error;
+	error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+				  tomoyo_same_env_acl, NULL);
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.env);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_misc - Update environment variable list.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_misc(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&param->data, "env "))
+		return tomoyo_write_env(param);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e9b67dbb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1050 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/file.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+/*
+ * Mapping table from "enum tomoyo_path_acl_index" to "enum tomoyo_mac_index".
+ */
+static const u8 tomoyo_p2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION] = {
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE]    = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_EXECUTE,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_READ]       = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE]      = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_APPEND]     = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK]     = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UNLINK,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_GETATTR]    = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_GETATTR,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR]      = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RMDIR,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE]   = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_TRUNCATE,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK]    = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_SYMLINK,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT]     = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHROOT,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT]     = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UMOUNT,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Mapping table from "enum tomoyo_mkdev_acl_index" to "enum tomoyo_mac_index".
+ */
+const u8 tomoyo_pnnn2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION] = {
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKBLOCK,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR]  = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKCHAR,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Mapping table from "enum tomoyo_path2_acl_index" to "enum tomoyo_mac_index".
+ */
+const u8 tomoyo_pp2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION] = {
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK]       = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_LINK,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME]     = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RENAME,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_PIVOT_ROOT,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Mapping table from "enum tomoyo_path_number_acl_index" to
+ * "enum tomoyo_mac_index".
+ */
+const u8 tomoyo_pn2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION] = {
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CREATE,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR]  = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKDIR,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKFIFO,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKSOCK,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL]  = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_IOCTL,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD]  = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHMOD,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN]  = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHOWN,
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP]  = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHGRP,
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_put_name_union - Drop reference on "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ *
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_put_name_union(struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+	tomoyo_put_group(ptr->group);
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->filename);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_compare_name_union - Check whether a name matches "struct tomoyo_name_union" or not.
+ *
+ * @name: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info".
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ *
+ * Returns "struct tomoyo_path_info" if @name matches @ptr, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+tomoyo_compare_name_union(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name,
+			  const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+	if (ptr->group)
+		return tomoyo_path_matches_group(name, ptr->group);
+	if (tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(name, ptr->filename))
+		return ptr->filename;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_put_number_union - Drop reference on "struct tomoyo_number_union".
+ *
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_union".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_put_number_union(struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr)
+{
+	tomoyo_put_group(ptr->group);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_compare_number_union - Check whether a value matches "struct tomoyo_number_union" or not.
+ *
+ * @value: Number to check.
+ * @ptr:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @value matches @ptr, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_compare_number_union(const unsigned long value,
+				 const struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr)
+{
+	if (ptr->group)
+		return tomoyo_number_matches_group(value, value, ptr->group);
+	return value >= ptr->values[0] && value <= ptr->values[1];
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_add_slash - Add trailing '/' if needed.
+ *
+ * @buf: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ *
+ * @buf must be generated by tomoyo_encode() because this function does not
+ * allocate memory for adding '/'.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_add_slash(struct tomoyo_path_info *buf)
+{
+	if (buf->is_dir)
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * This is OK because tomoyo_encode() reserves space for appending "/".
+	 */
+	strcat((char *) buf->name, "/");
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_realpath - Get realpath.
+ *
+ * @buf:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info".
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_get_realpath(struct tomoyo_path_info *buf, const struct path *path)
+{
+	buf->name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(path);
+	if (buf->name) {
+		tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf);
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_audit_path_log - Audit path request log.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_audit_path_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	return tomoyo_supervisor(r, "file %s %s\n", tomoyo_path_keyword
+				 [r->param.path.operation],
+				 r->param.path.filename->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_audit_path2_log - Audit path/path request log.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_audit_path2_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	return tomoyo_supervisor(r, "file %s %s %s\n", tomoyo_mac_keywords
+				 [tomoyo_pp2mac[r->param.path2.operation]],
+				 r->param.path2.filename1->name,
+				 r->param.path2.filename2->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_audit_mkdev_log - Audit path/number/number/number request log.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_audit_mkdev_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	return tomoyo_supervisor(r, "file %s %s 0%o %u %u\n",
+				 tomoyo_mac_keywords
+				 [tomoyo_pnnn2mac[r->param.mkdev.operation]],
+				 r->param.mkdev.filename->name,
+				 r->param.mkdev.mode, r->param.mkdev.major,
+				 r->param.mkdev.minor);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_audit_path_number_log - Audit path/number request log.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_audit_path_number_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	const u8 type = r->param.path_number.operation;
+	u8 radix;
+	char buffer[64];
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE:
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR:
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO:
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK:
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD:
+		radix = TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_OCTAL;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL:
+		radix = TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_HEXADECIMAL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		radix = TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_DECIMAL;
+		break;
+	}
+	tomoyo_print_ulong(buffer, sizeof(buffer), r->param.path_number.number,
+			   radix);
+	return tomoyo_supervisor(r, "file %s %s %s\n", tomoyo_mac_keywords
+				 [tomoyo_pn2mac[type]],
+				 r->param.path_number.filename->name, buffer);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_path_acl - Check permission for path operation.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if granted, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * To be able to use wildcard for domain transition, this function sets
+ * matching entry on success. Since the caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(),
+ * it is safe to set matching entry.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_check_path_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+				  const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_path_acl *acl = container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl),
+							 head);
+
+	if (acl->perm & (1 << r->param.path.operation)) {
+		r->param.path.matched_path =
+			tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.path.filename,
+						  &acl->name);
+		return r->param.path.matched_path != NULL;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_path_number_acl - Check permission for path number operation.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if granted, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_check_path_number_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+					 const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_path_number_acl *acl =
+		container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), head);
+
+	return (acl->perm & (1 << r->param.path_number.operation)) &&
+		tomoyo_compare_number_union(r->param.path_number.number,
+					    &acl->number) &&
+		tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.path_number.filename,
+					  &acl->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_path2_acl - Check permission for path path operation.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if granted, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_check_path2_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+				   const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_path2_acl *acl =
+		container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), head);
+
+	return (acl->perm & (1 << r->param.path2.operation)) &&
+		tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.path2.filename1, &acl->name1)
+		&& tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.path2.filename2,
+					     &acl->name2);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_mkdev_acl - Check permission for path number number number operation.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if granted, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_check_mkdev_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+				   const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl *acl =
+		container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), head);
+
+	return (acl->perm & (1 << r->param.mkdev.operation)) &&
+		tomoyo_compare_number_union(r->param.mkdev.mode,
+					    &acl->mode) &&
+		tomoyo_compare_number_union(r->param.mkdev.major,
+					    &acl->major) &&
+		tomoyo_compare_number_union(r->param.mkdev.minor,
+					    &acl->minor) &&
+		tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.mkdev.filename,
+					  &acl->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_path_acl - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_path_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b except permission bits, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_path_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				 const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_path_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head);
+	const struct tomoyo_path_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head);
+
+	return tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->name, &p2->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_merge_path_acl - Merge duplicated "struct tomoyo_path_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @is_delete: True for @a &= ~@b, false for @a |= @b.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a is empty, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_merge_path_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				  struct tomoyo_acl_info *b,
+				  const bool is_delete)
+{
+	u16 * const a_perm = &container_of(a, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head)
+		->perm;
+	u16 perm = READ_ONCE(*a_perm);
+	const u16 b_perm = container_of(b, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head)->perm;
+
+	if (is_delete)
+		perm &= ~b_perm;
+	else
+		perm |= b_perm;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*a_perm, perm);
+	return !perm;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_path_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_path_acl" list.
+ *
+ * @perm:  Permission.
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_path_acl(const u16 perm,
+				  struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_path_acl e = {
+		.head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL,
+		.perm = perm
+	};
+	int error;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(param, &e.name))
+		error = -EINVAL;
+	else
+		error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+					     tomoyo_same_path_acl,
+					     tomoyo_merge_path_acl);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_mkdev_acl - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b except permission bits, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_mkdev_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+					 const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head);
+	const struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head);
+
+	return tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->name, &p2->name) &&
+		tomoyo_same_number_union(&p1->mode, &p2->mode) &&
+		tomoyo_same_number_union(&p1->major, &p2->major) &&
+		tomoyo_same_number_union(&p1->minor, &p2->minor);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_merge_mkdev_acl - Merge duplicated "struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @is_delete: True for @a &= ~@b, false for @a |= @b.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a is empty, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_merge_mkdev_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				   struct tomoyo_acl_info *b,
+				   const bool is_delete)
+{
+	u8 *const a_perm = &container_of(a, struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl,
+					 head)->perm;
+	u8 perm = READ_ONCE(*a_perm);
+	const u8 b_perm = container_of(b, struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl, head)
+		->perm;
+
+	if (is_delete)
+		perm &= ~b_perm;
+	else
+		perm |= b_perm;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*a_perm, perm);
+	return !perm;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_mkdev_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl" list.
+ *
+ * @perm:  Permission.
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_mkdev_acl(const u8 perm,
+				   struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl e = {
+		.head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL,
+		.perm = perm
+	};
+	int error;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(param, &e.name) ||
+	    !tomoyo_parse_number_union(param, &e.mode) ||
+	    !tomoyo_parse_number_union(param, &e.major) ||
+	    !tomoyo_parse_number_union(param, &e.minor))
+		error = -EINVAL;
+	else
+		error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+					     tomoyo_same_mkdev_acl,
+					     tomoyo_merge_mkdev_acl);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name);
+	tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.mode);
+	tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.major);
+	tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.minor);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_path2_acl - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_path2_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b except permission bits, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_path2_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				  const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_path2_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head);
+	const struct tomoyo_path2_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head);
+
+	return tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->name1, &p2->name1) &&
+		tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->name2, &p2->name2);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_merge_path2_acl - Merge duplicated "struct tomoyo_path2_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @is_delete: True for @a &= ~@b, false for @a |= @b.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a is empty, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_merge_path2_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				   struct tomoyo_acl_info *b,
+				   const bool is_delete)
+{
+	u8 * const a_perm = &container_of(a, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head)
+		->perm;
+	u8 perm = READ_ONCE(*a_perm);
+	const u8 b_perm = container_of(b, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head)->perm;
+
+	if (is_delete)
+		perm &= ~b_perm;
+	else
+		perm |= b_perm;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*a_perm, perm);
+	return !perm;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_path2_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_path2_acl" list.
+ *
+ * @perm:  Permission.
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_path2_acl(const u8 perm,
+				   struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_path2_acl e = {
+		.head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL,
+		.perm = perm
+	};
+	int error;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(param, &e.name1) ||
+	    !tomoyo_parse_name_union(param, &e.name2))
+		error = -EINVAL;
+	else
+		error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+					     tomoyo_same_path2_acl,
+					     tomoyo_merge_path2_acl);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name1);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name2);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_permission - Check permission for single path operation.
+ *
+ * @r:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ * @filename:  Filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_permission(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, u8 operation,
+				  const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	r->type = tomoyo_p2mac[operation];
+	r->mode = tomoyo_get_mode(r->domain->ns, r->profile, r->type);
+	if (r->mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED)
+		return 0;
+	r->param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL;
+	r->param.path.filename = filename;
+	r->param.path.operation = operation;
+	do {
+		tomoyo_check_acl(r, tomoyo_check_path_acl);
+		error = tomoyo_audit_path_log(r);
+	} while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_execute_permission - Check permission for execute operation.
+ *
+ * @r:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @filename:  Filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+int tomoyo_execute_permission(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+			      const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Unlike other permission checks, this check is done regardless of
+	 * profile mode settings in order to check for domain transition
+	 * preference.
+	 */
+	r->type = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_EXECUTE;
+	r->mode = tomoyo_get_mode(r->domain->ns, r->profile, r->type);
+	r->param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL;
+	r->param.path.filename = filename;
+	r->param.path.operation = TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE;
+	tomoyo_check_acl(r, tomoyo_check_path_acl);
+	r->ee->transition = r->matched_acl && r->matched_acl->cond ?
+		r->matched_acl->cond->transit : NULL;
+	if (r->mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED)
+		return tomoyo_audit_path_log(r);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_path_number_acl - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_path_number_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b except permission bits, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_path_number_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+					const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_path_number_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1),
+							       head);
+	const struct tomoyo_path_number_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2),
+							       head);
+
+	return tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->name, &p2->name) &&
+		tomoyo_same_number_union(&p1->number, &p2->number);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_merge_path_number_acl - Merge duplicated "struct tomoyo_path_number_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @is_delete: True for @a &= ~@b, false for @a |= @b.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a is empty, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_merge_path_number_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+					 struct tomoyo_acl_info *b,
+					 const bool is_delete)
+{
+	u8 * const a_perm = &container_of(a, struct tomoyo_path_number_acl,
+					  head)->perm;
+	u8 perm = READ_ONCE(*a_perm);
+	const u8 b_perm = container_of(b, struct tomoyo_path_number_acl, head)
+		->perm;
+
+	if (is_delete)
+		perm &= ~b_perm;
+	else
+		perm |= b_perm;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*a_perm, perm);
+	return !perm;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_path_number_acl - Update ioctl/chmod/chown/chgrp ACL.
+ *
+ * @perm:  Permission.
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_path_number_acl(const u8 perm,
+					 struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_path_number_acl e = {
+		.head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL,
+		.perm = perm
+	};
+	int error;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(param, &e.name) ||
+	    !tomoyo_parse_number_union(param, &e.number))
+		error = -EINVAL;
+	else
+		error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+					     tomoyo_same_path_number_acl,
+					     tomoyo_merge_path_number_acl);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name);
+	tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.number);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_number_perm - Check permission for "create", "mkdir", "mkfifo", "mksock", "ioctl", "chmod", "chown", "chgrp".
+ *
+ * @type:   Type of operation.
+ * @path:   Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @number: Number.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_path_number_perm(const u8 type, const struct path *path,
+			    unsigned long number)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+	struct tomoyo_obj_info obj = {
+		.path1 = { .mnt = path->mnt, .dentry = path->dentry },
+	};
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info buf;
+	int idx;
+
+	if (tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, tomoyo_pn2mac[type])
+	    == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED)
+		return 0;
+	idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+	if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path))
+		goto out;
+	r.obj = &obj;
+	if (type == TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR)
+		tomoyo_add_slash(&buf);
+	r.param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL;
+	r.param.path_number.operation = type;
+	r.param.path_number.filename = &buf;
+	r.param.path_number.number = number;
+	do {
+		tomoyo_check_acl(&r, tomoyo_check_path_number_acl);
+		error = tomoyo_audit_path_number_log(&r);
+	} while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+	kfree(buf.name);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	if (r.mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_open_permission - Check permission for "read" and "write".
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @path:   Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @flag:   Flags for open().
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+				 const struct path *path, const int flag)
+{
+	const u8 acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flag);
+	int error = 0;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info buf;
+	struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+	struct tomoyo_obj_info obj = {
+		.path1 = { .mnt = path->mnt, .dentry = path->dentry },
+	};
+	int idx;
+
+	buf.name = NULL;
+	r.mode = TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED;
+	idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+	if (acc_mode &&
+	    tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN)
+	    != TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED) {
+		if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path)) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		r.obj = &obj;
+		if (acc_mode & MAY_READ)
+			error = tomoyo_path_permission(&r, TOMOYO_TYPE_READ,
+						       &buf);
+		if (!error && (acc_mode & MAY_WRITE))
+			error = tomoyo_path_permission(&r, (flag & O_APPEND) ?
+						       TOMOYO_TYPE_APPEND :
+						       TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE,
+						       &buf);
+	}
+ out:
+	kfree(buf.name);
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	if (r.mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_perm - Check permission for "unlink", "rmdir", "truncate", "symlink", "append", "chroot" and "unmount".
+ *
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ * @path:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @target:    Symlink's target if @operation is TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK,
+ *             NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path, const char *target)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+	struct tomoyo_obj_info obj = {
+		.path1 = { .mnt = path->mnt, .dentry = path->dentry },
+	};
+	int error;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info buf;
+	bool is_enforce;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info symlink_target;
+	int idx;
+
+	if (tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, tomoyo_p2mac[operation])
+	    == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED)
+		return 0;
+	is_enforce = (r.mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING);
+	error = -ENOMEM;
+	buf.name = NULL;
+	idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+	if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path))
+		goto out;
+	r.obj = &obj;
+	switch (operation) {
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR:
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT:
+		tomoyo_add_slash(&buf);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK:
+		symlink_target.name = tomoyo_encode(target);
+		if (!symlink_target.name)
+			goto out;
+		tomoyo_fill_path_info(&symlink_target);
+		obj.symlink_target = &symlink_target;
+		break;
+	}
+	error = tomoyo_path_permission(&r, operation, &buf);
+	if (operation == TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK)
+		kfree(symlink_target.name);
+ out:
+	kfree(buf.name);
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	if (!is_enforce)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_mkdev_perm - Check permission for "mkblock" and "mkchar".
+ *
+ * @operation: Type of operation. (TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR or TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK)
+ * @path:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @mode:      Create mode.
+ * @dev:       Device number.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_mkdev_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path,
+		      const unsigned int mode, unsigned int dev)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+	struct tomoyo_obj_info obj = {
+		.path1 = { .mnt = path->mnt, .dentry = path->dentry },
+	};
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info buf;
+	int idx;
+
+	if (tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, tomoyo_pnnn2mac[operation])
+	    == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED)
+		return 0;
+	idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+	error = -ENOMEM;
+	if (tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path)) {
+		r.obj = &obj;
+		dev = new_decode_dev(dev);
+		r.param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL;
+		r.param.mkdev.filename = &buf;
+		r.param.mkdev.operation = operation;
+		r.param.mkdev.mode = mode;
+		r.param.mkdev.major = MAJOR(dev);
+		r.param.mkdev.minor = MINOR(dev);
+		tomoyo_check_acl(&r, tomoyo_check_mkdev_acl);
+		error = tomoyo_audit_mkdev_log(&r);
+		kfree(buf.name);
+	}
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	if (r.mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path2_perm - Check permission for "rename", "link" and "pivot_root".
+ *
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ * @path1:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @path2:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_path2_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path1,
+		      const struct path *path2)
+{
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info buf1;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info buf2;
+	struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+	struct tomoyo_obj_info obj = {
+		.path1 = { .mnt = path1->mnt, .dentry = path1->dentry },
+		.path2 = { .mnt = path2->mnt, .dentry = path2->dentry }
+	};
+	int idx;
+
+	if (tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, tomoyo_pp2mac[operation])
+	    == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED)
+		return 0;
+	buf1.name = NULL;
+	buf2.name = NULL;
+	idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+	if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf1, path1) ||
+	    !tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf2, path2))
+		goto out;
+	switch (operation) {
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME:
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK:
+		if (!d_is_dir(path1->dentry))
+			break;
+		fallthrough;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT:
+		tomoyo_add_slash(&buf1);
+		tomoyo_add_slash(&buf2);
+		break;
+	}
+	r.obj = &obj;
+	r.param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL;
+	r.param.path2.operation = operation;
+	r.param.path2.filename1 = &buf1;
+	r.param.path2.filename2 = &buf2;
+	do {
+		tomoyo_check_acl(&r, tomoyo_check_path2_acl);
+		error = tomoyo_audit_path2_log(&r);
+	} while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+ out:
+	kfree(buf1.name);
+	kfree(buf2.name);
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	if (r.mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_mount_acl - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_mount_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_mount_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				  const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_mount_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head);
+	const struct tomoyo_mount_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head);
+
+	return tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->dev_name, &p2->dev_name) &&
+		tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->dir_name, &p2->dir_name) &&
+		tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->fs_type, &p2->fs_type) &&
+		tomoyo_same_number_union(&p1->flags, &p2->flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_mount_acl - Write "struct tomoyo_mount_acl" list.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_mount_acl e = { .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL };
+	int error;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(param, &e.dev_name) ||
+	    !tomoyo_parse_name_union(param, &e.dir_name) ||
+	    !tomoyo_parse_name_union(param, &e.fs_type) ||
+	    !tomoyo_parse_number_union(param, &e.flags))
+		error = -EINVAL;
+	else
+		error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+					     tomoyo_same_mount_acl, NULL);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.dev_name);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.dir_name);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.fs_type);
+	tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.flags);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_file - Update file related list.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_file(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	u16 perm = 0;
+	u8 type;
+	const char *operation = tomoyo_read_token(param);
+
+	for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION; type++)
+		if (tomoyo_permstr(operation, tomoyo_path_keyword[type]))
+			perm |= 1 << type;
+	if (perm)
+		return tomoyo_update_path_acl(perm, param);
+	for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION; type++)
+		if (tomoyo_permstr(operation,
+				   tomoyo_mac_keywords[tomoyo_pp2mac[type]]))
+			perm |= 1 << type;
+	if (perm)
+		return tomoyo_update_path2_acl(perm, param);
+	for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION; type++)
+		if (tomoyo_permstr(operation,
+				   tomoyo_mac_keywords[tomoyo_pn2mac[type]]))
+			perm |= 1 << type;
+	if (perm)
+		return tomoyo_update_path_number_acl(perm, param);
+	for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION; type++)
+		if (tomoyo_permstr(operation,
+				   tomoyo_mac_keywords[tomoyo_pnnn2mac[type]]))
+			perm |= 1 << type;
+	if (perm)
+		return tomoyo_update_mkdev_acl(perm, param);
+	if (tomoyo_permstr(operation,
+			   tomoyo_mac_keywords[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MOUNT]))
+		return tomoyo_update_mount_acl(param);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/gc.c b/security/tomoyo/gc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8e2008863
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/gc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/gc.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_memory_free - Free memory for elements.
+ *
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to allocated memory.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_policy_lock mutex.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_memory_free(void *ptr)
+{
+	tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MEMORY_POLICY] -= ksize(ptr);
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+/* Lock for protecting tomoyo_io_buffer_list. */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". */
+static __guarded_by(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock) LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_io_buffer_list);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_struct_used_by_io_buffer - Check whether the list element is used by /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ users or not.
+ *
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @element is used by /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ users,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_struct_used_by_io_buffer(const struct list_head *element)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head;
+	bool in_use = false;
+
+	spin_lock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(head, &tomoyo_io_buffer_list, list) {
+		head->users++;
+		spin_unlock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+		mutex_lock(&head->io_sem);
+		if (head->r.domain == element || head->r.group == element ||
+		    head->r.acl == element || &head->w.domain->list == element)
+			in_use = true;
+		mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
+		spin_lock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+		head->users--;
+		if (in_use)
+			break;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+	return in_use;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_name_used_by_io_buffer - Check whether the string is used by /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ users or not.
+ *
+ * @string: String to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @string is used by /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ users,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_name_used_by_io_buffer(const char *string)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head;
+	const size_t size = strlen(string) + 1;
+	bool in_use = false;
+
+	spin_lock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(head, &tomoyo_io_buffer_list, list) {
+		int i;
+
+		head->users++;
+		spin_unlock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+		mutex_lock(&head->io_sem);
+		for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_IO_READ_QUEUE; i++) {
+			const char *w = head->r.w[i];
+
+			if (w < string || w > string + size)
+				continue;
+			in_use = true;
+			break;
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
+		spin_lock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+		head->users--;
+		if (in_use)
+			break;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+	return in_use;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_del_transition_control - Delete members in "struct tomoyo_transition_control".
+ *
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_del_transition_control(struct list_head *element)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_transition_control *ptr =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list);
+
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->domainname);
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->program);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_del_aggregator - Delete members in "struct tomoyo_aggregator".
+ *
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_del_aggregator(struct list_head *element)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_aggregator *ptr =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list);
+
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->original_name);
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->aggregated_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_del_manager - Delete members in "struct tomoyo_manager".
+ *
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_del_manager(struct list_head *element)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_manager *ptr =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list);
+
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->manager);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_del_acl - Delete members in "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_del_acl(struct list_head *element)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*acl), list);
+
+	tomoyo_put_condition(acl->cond);
+	switch (acl->type) {
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_path_acl *entry
+				= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name);
+		}
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_path2_acl *entry
+				= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name1);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name2);
+		}
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_path_number_acl *entry
+				= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name);
+			tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->number);
+		}
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl *entry
+				= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name);
+			tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->mode);
+			tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->major);
+			tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->minor);
+		}
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_mount_acl *entry
+				= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->dev_name);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->dir_name);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->fs_type);
+			tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->flags);
+		}
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_ENV_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_env_acl *entry =
+				container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+
+			tomoyo_put_name(entry->env);
+		}
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_INET_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_inet_acl *entry =
+				container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+
+			tomoyo_put_group(entry->address.group);
+			tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->port);
+		}
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_UNIX_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_unix_acl *entry =
+				container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name);
+		}
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_MANUAL_TASK_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_task_acl *entry =
+				container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+
+			tomoyo_put_name(entry->domainname);
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_del_domain - Delete members in "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ *
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_policy_lock mutex.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_del_domain(struct list_head *element)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*domain), list);
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *tmp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since this domain is referenced from neither
+	 * "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" nor "struct cred"->security, we can delete
+	 * elements without checking for is_deleted flag.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(acl, tmp, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		tomoyo_del_acl(&acl->list);
+		tomoyo_memory_free(acl);
+	}
+	tomoyo_put_name(domain->domainname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_del_condition - Delete members in "struct tomoyo_condition".
+ *
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_del_condition(struct list_head *element)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_condition *cond = container_of(element, typeof(*cond),
+						     head.list);
+	const u16 condc = cond->condc;
+	const u16 numbers_count = cond->numbers_count;
+	const u16 names_count = cond->names_count;
+	const u16 argc = cond->argc;
+	const u16 envc = cond->envc;
+	unsigned int i;
+	const struct tomoyo_condition_element *condp
+		= (const struct tomoyo_condition_element *) (cond + 1);
+	struct tomoyo_number_union *numbers_p
+		= (struct tomoyo_number_union *) (condp + condc);
+	struct tomoyo_name_union *names_p
+		= (struct tomoyo_name_union *) (numbers_p + numbers_count);
+	const struct tomoyo_argv *argv
+		= (const struct tomoyo_argv *) (names_p + names_count);
+	const struct tomoyo_envp *envp
+		= (const struct tomoyo_envp *) (argv + argc);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < numbers_count; i++)
+		tomoyo_put_number_union(numbers_p++);
+	for (i = 0; i < names_count; i++)
+		tomoyo_put_name_union(names_p++);
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; argv++, i++)
+		tomoyo_put_name(argv->value);
+	for (i = 0; i < envc; envp++, i++) {
+		tomoyo_put_name(envp->name);
+		tomoyo_put_name(envp->value);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_del_name - Delete members in "struct tomoyo_name".
+ *
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_del_name(struct list_head *element)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do. */
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_del_path_group - Delete members in "struct tomoyo_path_group".
+ *
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_del_path_group(struct list_head *element)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_path_group *member =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*member), head.list);
+
+	tomoyo_put_name(member->member_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_del_group - Delete "struct tomoyo_group".
+ *
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_del_group(struct list_head *element)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_group *group =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*group), head.list);
+
+	tomoyo_put_name(group->group_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_del_address_group - Delete members in "struct tomoyo_address_group".
+ *
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_del_address_group(struct list_head *element)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do. */
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_del_number_group - Delete members in "struct tomoyo_number_group".
+ *
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static inline void tomoyo_del_number_group(struct list_head *element)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do. */
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_try_to_gc - Try to kfree() an entry.
+ *
+ * @type:    One of values in "enum tomoyo_policy_id".
+ * @element: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_policy_lock mutex.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_try_to_gc(const enum tomoyo_policy_id type,
+			     struct list_head *element)
+	__must_hold(&tomoyo_policy_lock)
+{
+	/*
+	 * __list_del_entry() guarantees that the list element became no longer
+	 * reachable from the list which the element was originally on (e.g.
+	 * tomoyo_domain_list). Also, synchronize_srcu() guarantees that the
+	 * list element became no longer referenced by syscall users.
+	 */
+	__list_del_entry(element);
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	synchronize_srcu(&tomoyo_ss);
+	/*
+	 * However, there are two users which may still be using the list
+	 * element. We need to defer until both users forget this element.
+	 *
+	 * Don't kfree() until "struct tomoyo_io_buffer"->r.{domain,group,acl}
+	 * and "struct tomoyo_io_buffer"->w.domain forget this element.
+	 */
+	if (tomoyo_struct_used_by_io_buffer(element))
+		goto reinject;
+	switch (type) {
+	case TOMOYO_ID_TRANSITION_CONTROL:
+		tomoyo_del_transition_control(element);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER:
+		tomoyo_del_manager(element);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_ID_AGGREGATOR:
+		tomoyo_del_aggregator(element);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_ID_GROUP:
+		tomoyo_del_group(element);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP:
+		tomoyo_del_path_group(element);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_ID_ADDRESS_GROUP:
+		tomoyo_del_address_group(element);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_ID_NUMBER_GROUP:
+		tomoyo_del_number_group(element);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_ID_CONDITION:
+		tomoyo_del_condition(element);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_ID_NAME:
+		/*
+		 * Don't kfree() until all "struct tomoyo_io_buffer"->r.w[]
+		 * forget this element.
+		 */
+		if (tomoyo_name_used_by_io_buffer
+		    (container_of(element, typeof(struct tomoyo_name),
+				  head.list)->entry.name))
+			goto reinject;
+		tomoyo_del_name(element);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_ID_ACL:
+		tomoyo_del_acl(element);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN:
+		/*
+		 * Don't kfree() until all "struct cred"->security forget this
+		 * element.
+		 */
+		if (atomic_read(&container_of
+				(element, typeof(struct tomoyo_domain_info),
+				 list)->users))
+			goto reinject;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY:
+		break;
+	}
+	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	if (type == TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN)
+		tomoyo_del_domain(element);
+	tomoyo_memory_free(element);
+	return;
+reinject:
+	/*
+	 * We can safely reinject this element here because
+	 * (1) Appending list elements and removing list elements are protected
+	 *     by tomoyo_policy_lock mutex.
+	 * (2) Only this function removes list elements and this function is
+	 *     exclusively executed by tomoyo_gc_mutex mutex.
+	 * are true.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	list_add_rcu(element, element->prev);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_collect_member - Delete elements with "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ *
+ * @id:          One of values in "enum tomoyo_policy_id".
+ * @member_list: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_collect_member(const enum tomoyo_policy_id id,
+				  struct list_head *member_list)
+	__must_hold(&tomoyo_policy_lock)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_acl_head *member;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_head *tmp;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(member, tmp, member_list, list) {
+		if (!member->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		member->is_deleted = TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS;
+		tomoyo_try_to_gc(id, &member->list);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_collect_acl - Delete elements in "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ *
+ * @list: Pointer to "struct list_head".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_collect_acl(struct list_head *list)
+	__must_hold(&tomoyo_policy_lock)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *tmp;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(acl, tmp, list, list) {
+		if (!acl->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		acl->is_deleted = TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS;
+		tomoyo_try_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_ACL, &acl->list);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_collect_entry - Try to kfree() deleted elements.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_collect_entry(void)
+{
+	int i;
+	enum tomoyo_policy_id id;
+	struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns;
+
+	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+		struct tomoyo_domain_info *tmp;
+
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(domain, tmp, &tomoyo_domain_list,
+					 list) {
+			tomoyo_collect_acl(&domain->acl_info_list);
+			if (!domain->is_deleted || atomic_read(&domain->users))
+				continue;
+			tomoyo_try_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN, &domain->list);
+		}
+	}
+	list_for_each_entry(ns, &tomoyo_namespace_list, namespace_list) {
+		for (id = 0; id < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY; id++)
+			tomoyo_collect_member(id, &ns->policy_list[id]);
+		for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_ACL_GROUPS; i++)
+			tomoyo_collect_acl(&ns->acl_group[i]);
+	}
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_shared_acl_head *ptr;
+		struct tomoyo_shared_acl_head *tmp;
+
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(ptr, tmp, &tomoyo_condition_list,
+					 list) {
+			if (atomic_read(&ptr->users) > 0)
+				continue;
+			atomic_set(&ptr->users, TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS);
+			tomoyo_try_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_CONDITION, &ptr->list);
+		}
+	}
+	list_for_each_entry(ns, &tomoyo_namespace_list, namespace_list) {
+		for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP; i++) {
+			struct list_head *list = &ns->group_list[i];
+			struct tomoyo_group *group;
+			struct tomoyo_group *tmp;
+
+			switch (i) {
+			case 0:
+				id = TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP;
+				break;
+			case 1:
+				id = TOMOYO_ID_NUMBER_GROUP;
+				break;
+			default:
+				id = TOMOYO_ID_ADDRESS_GROUP;
+				break;
+			}
+			list_for_each_entry_safe(group, tmp, list, head.list) {
+				tomoyo_collect_member(id, &group->member_list);
+				if (!list_empty(&group->member_list) ||
+				    atomic_read(&group->head.users) > 0)
+					continue;
+				atomic_set(&group->head.users,
+					   TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS);
+				tomoyo_try_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_GROUP,
+						 &group->head.list);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++) {
+		struct list_head *list = &tomoyo_name_list[i];
+		struct tomoyo_shared_acl_head *ptr;
+		struct tomoyo_shared_acl_head *tmp;
+
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(ptr, tmp, list, list) {
+			if (atomic_read(&ptr->users) > 0)
+				continue;
+			atomic_set(&ptr->users, TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS);
+			tomoyo_try_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_NAME, &ptr->list);
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_gc_thread - Garbage collector thread function.
+ *
+ * @unused: Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_gc_thread(void *unused)
+{
+	/* Garbage collector thread is exclusive. */
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(tomoyo_gc_mutex);
+
+	if (!mutex_trylock(&tomoyo_gc_mutex))
+		goto out;
+	tomoyo_collect_entry();
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head;
+		struct tomoyo_io_buffer *tmp;
+
+		spin_lock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(head, tmp, &tomoyo_io_buffer_list,
+					 list) {
+			if (head->users)
+				continue;
+			list_del(&head->list);
+			/* Safe destruction because no users are left. */
+			context_unsafe(
+				kfree(head->read_buf);
+				kfree(head->write_buf);
+			);
+			kfree(head);
+		}
+		spin_unlock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_gc_mutex);
+out:
+	/* This acts as do_exit(0). */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_notify_gc - Register/unregister /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ users.
+ *
+ * @head:        Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @is_register: True if register, false if unregister.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_notify_gc(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const bool is_register)
+{
+	bool is_write = false;
+
+	spin_lock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+	if (is_register) {
+		head->users = 1;
+		list_add(&head->list, &tomoyo_io_buffer_list);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * tomoyo_write_control() can concurrently update write_buf from
+		 * a non-NULL to new non-NULL pointer with io_sem held.
+		 */
+		is_write = data_race(head->write_buf != NULL);
+		if (!--head->users) {
+			list_del(&head->list);
+			/* Safe destruction because no users are left. */
+			context_unsafe(
+				kfree(head->read_buf);
+				kfree(head->write_buf);
+			);
+			kfree(head);
+		}
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
+	if (is_write)
+		kthread_run(tomoyo_gc_thread, NULL, "GC for TOMOYO");
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/group.c b/security/tomoyo/group.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1cecdd797
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/group.c
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/group.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_path_group - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_path_group" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_path_group(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a,
+				   const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b)
+{
+	return container_of(a, struct tomoyo_path_group, head)->member_name ==
+		container_of(b, struct tomoyo_path_group, head)->member_name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_number_group - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_number_group" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_number_group(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a,
+				     const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b)
+{
+	return !memcmp(&container_of(a, struct tomoyo_number_group, head)
+		       ->number,
+		       &container_of(b, struct tomoyo_number_group, head)
+		       ->number,
+		       sizeof(container_of(a, struct tomoyo_number_group, head)
+			      ->number));
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_address_group - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_address_group" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_head".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_address_group(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a,
+				      const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_address_group *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1),
+							     head);
+	const struct tomoyo_address_group *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2),
+							     head);
+
+	return tomoyo_same_ipaddr_union(&p1->address, &p2->address);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_group - Write "struct tomoyo_path_group"/"struct tomoyo_number_group"/"struct tomoyo_address_group" list.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ * @type:  Type of this group.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_group(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param, const u8 type)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_group *group = tomoyo_get_group(param, type);
+	int error = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!group)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	param->list = &group->member_list;
+	if (type == TOMOYO_PATH_GROUP) {
+		struct tomoyo_path_group e = { };
+
+		e.member_name = tomoyo_get_name(tomoyo_read_token(param));
+		if (!e.member_name) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+					  tomoyo_same_path_group);
+		tomoyo_put_name(e.member_name);
+	} else if (type == TOMOYO_NUMBER_GROUP) {
+		struct tomoyo_number_group e = { };
+
+		if (param->data[0] == '@' ||
+		    !tomoyo_parse_number_union(param, &e.number))
+			goto out;
+		error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+					  tomoyo_same_number_group);
+		/*
+		 * tomoyo_put_number_union() is not needed because
+		 * param->data[0] != '@'.
+		 */
+	} else {
+		struct tomoyo_address_group e = { };
+
+		if (param->data[0] == '@' ||
+		    !tomoyo_parse_ipaddr_union(param, &e.address))
+			goto out;
+		error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+					     tomoyo_same_address_group);
+	}
+out:
+	tomoyo_put_group(group);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_matches_group - Check whether the given pathname matches members of the given pathname group.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The name of pathname.
+ * @group:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_group".
+ *
+ * Returns matched member's pathname if @pathname matches pathnames in @group,
+ * NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+tomoyo_path_matches_group(const struct tomoyo_path_info *pathname,
+			  const struct tomoyo_group *group)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_path_group *member;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, head.list,
+				srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+		if (member->head.is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(pathname, member->member_name))
+			continue;
+		return member->member_name;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_number_matches_group - Check whether the given number matches members of the given number group.
+ *
+ * @min:   Min number.
+ * @max:   Max number.
+ * @group: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_group".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @min and @max partially overlaps @group, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+bool tomoyo_number_matches_group(const unsigned long min,
+				 const unsigned long max,
+				 const struct tomoyo_group *group)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_number_group *member;
+	bool matched = false;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, head.list,
+				srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+		if (member->head.is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (min > member->number.values[1] ||
+		    max < member->number.values[0])
+			continue;
+		matched = true;
+		break;
+	}
+	return matched;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_address_matches_group - Check whether the given address matches members of the given address group.
+ *
+ * @is_ipv6: True if @address is an IPv6 address.
+ * @address: An IPv4 or IPv6 address.
+ * @group:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_address_group".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @address matches addresses in @group group, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+bool tomoyo_address_matches_group(const bool is_ipv6, const __be32 *address,
+				  const struct tomoyo_group *group)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_address_group *member;
+	bool matched = false;
+	const u8 size = is_ipv6 ? 16 : 4;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, head.list,
+				srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+		if (member->head.is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (member->address.is_ipv6 != is_ipv6)
+			continue;
+		if (memcmp(&member->address.ip[0], address, size) > 0 ||
+		    memcmp(address, &member->address.ip[1], size) > 0)
+			continue;
+		matched = true;
+		break;
+	}
+	return matched;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..363b65be8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
+
+/*
+ * Path to the policy loader. (default = CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_POLICY_LOADER)
+ */
+static const char *tomoyo_loader;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_loader_setup - Set policy loader.
+ *
+ * @str: Program to use as a policy loader (e.g. /sbin/tomoyo-init ).
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int __init tomoyo_loader_setup(char *str)
+{
+	tomoyo_loader = str;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+__setup("TOMOYO_loader=", tomoyo_loader_setup);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_policy_loader_exists - Check whether /sbin/tomoyo-init exists.
+ *
+ * Returns true if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_policy_loader_exists(void)
+{
+	struct path path;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_loader)
+		tomoyo_loader = CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_POLICY_LOADER;
+	if (kern_path(tomoyo_loader, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path)) {
+		pr_info("Not activating Mandatory Access Control as %s does not exist.\n",
+			tomoyo_loader);
+		return false;
+	}
+	path_put(&path);
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Path to the trigger. (default = CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_ACTIVATION_TRIGGER)
+ */
+static const char *tomoyo_trigger;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_trigger_setup - Set trigger for activation.
+ *
+ * @str: Program to use as an activation trigger (e.g. /sbin/init ).
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int __init tomoyo_trigger_setup(char *str)
+{
+	tomoyo_trigger = str;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+__setup("TOMOYO_trigger=", tomoyo_trigger_setup);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_load_policy - Run external policy loader to load policy.
+ *
+ * @filename: The program about to start.
+ *
+ * This function checks whether @filename is /sbin/init , and if so
+ * invoke /sbin/tomoyo-init and wait for the termination of /sbin/tomoyo-init
+ * and then continues invocation of /sbin/init.
+ * /sbin/tomoyo-init reads policy files in /etc/tomoyo/ directory and
+ * writes to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interfaces.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename)
+{
+	static bool done;
+	char *argv[2];
+	char *envp[3];
+
+	if (tomoyo_policy_loaded || done)
+		return;
+	if (!tomoyo_trigger)
+		tomoyo_trigger = CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_ACTIVATION_TRIGGER;
+	if (strcmp(filename, tomoyo_trigger))
+		return;
+	if (!tomoyo_policy_loader_exists())
+		return;
+	done = true;
+	pr_info("Calling %s to load policy. Please wait.\n", tomoyo_loader);
+	argv[0] = (char *) tomoyo_loader;
+	argv[1] = NULL;
+	envp[0] = "HOME=/";
+	envp[1] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin";
+	envp[2] = NULL;
+	call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_PROC);
+	tomoyo_check_profile();
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/memory.c b/security/tomoyo/memory.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1b570bde7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/memory.c
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/memory.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/hash.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "common.h"
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_warn_oom - Print out of memory warning message.
+ *
+ * @function: Function's name.
+ */
+void tomoyo_warn_oom(const char *function)
+{
+	/* Reduce error messages. */
+	static pid_t tomoyo_last_pid;
+	const pid_t pid = current->pid;
+
+	if (tomoyo_last_pid != pid) {
+		pr_warn("ERROR: Out of memory at %s.\n", function);
+		tomoyo_last_pid = pid;
+	}
+	if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+		panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n");
+}
+
+/* Memoy currently used by policy/audit log/query. */
+unsigned int tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT];
+/* Memory quota for "policy"/"audit log"/"query". */
+unsigned int tomoyo_memory_quota[TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT];
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_memory_ok - Check memory quota.
+ *
+ * @ptr: Pointer to allocated memory.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @ptr is not NULL and quota not exceeded, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_policy_lock mutex.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_memory_ok(void *ptr)
+{
+	if (ptr) {
+		const size_t s = ksize(ptr);
+
+		tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MEMORY_POLICY] += s;
+		if (!tomoyo_memory_quota[TOMOYO_MEMORY_POLICY] ||
+		    tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MEMORY_POLICY] <=
+		    tomoyo_memory_quota[TOMOYO_MEMORY_POLICY])
+			return true;
+		tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MEMORY_POLICY] -= s;
+	}
+	tomoyo_warn_oom(__func__);
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_commit_ok - Check memory quota.
+ *
+ * @data:   Data to copy from.
+ * @size:   Size in byte.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise.
+ * @data is zero-cleared on success.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_policy_lock mutex.
+ */
+void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size)
+{
+	void *ptr = kzalloc(size, GFP_NOFS | __GFP_NOWARN);
+
+	if (tomoyo_memory_ok(ptr)) {
+		memmove(ptr, data, size);
+		memset(data, 0, size);
+		return ptr;
+	}
+	kfree(ptr);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_group - Allocate memory for "struct tomoyo_path_group"/"struct tomoyo_number_group".
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ * @idx:   Index number.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_group" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_group *tomoyo_get_group(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+				      const u8 idx)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_group e = { };
+	struct tomoyo_group *group = NULL;
+	struct list_head *list;
+	const char *group_name = tomoyo_read_token(param);
+	bool found = false;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_correct_word(group_name) || idx >= TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP)
+		return NULL;
+	e.group_name = tomoyo_get_name(group_name);
+	if (!e.group_name)
+		return NULL;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
+	list = &param->ns->group_list[idx];
+	list_for_each_entry(group, list, head.list) {
+		if (e.group_name != group->group_name ||
+		    atomic_read(&group->head.users) == TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS)
+			continue;
+		atomic_inc(&group->head.users);
+		found = true;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (!found) {
+		struct tomoyo_group *entry = tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+
+		if (entry) {
+			INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->member_list);
+			atomic_set(&entry->head.users, 1);
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->head.list, list);
+			group = entry;
+			found = true;
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+out:
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.group_name);
+	return found ? group : NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * tomoyo_name_list is used for holding string data used by TOMOYO.
+ * Since same string data is likely used for multiple times (e.g.
+ * "/lib/libc-2.5.so"), TOMOYO shares string data in the form of
+ * "const struct tomoyo_path_info *".
+ */
+struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH];
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_name - Allocate permanent memory for string data.
+ *
+ * @name: The string to store into the permernent memory.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_name(const char *name)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_name *ptr;
+	unsigned int hash;
+	int len;
+	struct list_head *head;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return NULL;
+	len = strlen(name) + 1;
+	hash = full_name_hash(NULL, (const unsigned char *) name, len - 1);
+	head = &tomoyo_name_list[hash_long(hash, TOMOYO_HASH_BITS)];
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		return NULL;
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, head, head.list) {
+		if (hash != ptr->entry.hash || strcmp(name, ptr->entry.name) ||
+		    atomic_read(&ptr->head.users) == TOMOYO_GC_IN_PROGRESS)
+			continue;
+		atomic_inc(&ptr->head.users);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(*ptr) + len, GFP_NOFS | __GFP_NOWARN);
+	if (tomoyo_memory_ok(ptr)) {
+		ptr->entry.name = ((char *) ptr) + sizeof(*ptr);
+		memmove((char *) ptr->entry.name, name, len);
+		atomic_set(&ptr->head.users, 1);
+		tomoyo_fill_path_info(&ptr->entry);
+		list_add_tail(&ptr->head.list, head);
+	} else {
+		kfree(ptr);
+		ptr = NULL;
+	}
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL;
+}
+
+/* Initial namespace.*/
+struct tomoyo_policy_namespace tomoyo_kernel_namespace;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_mm_init - Initialize mm related code.
+ */
+void __init tomoyo_mm_init(void)
+{
+	int idx;
+
+	for (idx = 0; idx < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; idx++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_name_list[idx]);
+	tomoyo_kernel_namespace.name = "<kernel>";
+	tomoyo_init_policy_namespace(&tomoyo_kernel_namespace);
+	tomoyo_kernel_domain.ns = &tomoyo_kernel_namespace;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.acl_info_list);
+	tomoyo_kernel_domain.domainname = tomoyo_get_name("<kernel>");
+	list_add_tail_rcu(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.list, &tomoyo_domain_list);
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..322dfd188
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/mount.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
+#include "common.h"
+
+/* String table for special mount operations. */
+static const char * const tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MAX_SPECIAL_MOUNT] = {
+	[TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND]            = "--bind",
+	[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE]            = "--move",
+	[TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT]         = "--remount",
+	[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE] = "--make-unbindable",
+	[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE]    = "--make-private",
+	[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE]      = "--make-slave",
+	[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED]     = "--make-shared",
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_audit_mount_log - Audit mount log.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_audit_mount_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	return tomoyo_supervisor(r, "file mount %s %s %s 0x%lX\n",
+				 r->param.mount.dev->name,
+				 r->param.mount.dir->name,
+				 r->param.mount.type->name,
+				 r->param.mount.flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_mount_acl - Check permission for path path path number operation.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if granted, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_check_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+				   const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_mount_acl *acl =
+		container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), head);
+
+	return tomoyo_compare_number_union(r->param.mount.flags,
+					   &acl->flags) &&
+		tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.mount.type,
+					  &acl->fs_type) &&
+		tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.mount.dir,
+					  &acl->dir_name) &&
+		(!r->param.mount.need_dev ||
+		 tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.mount.dev,
+					   &acl->dev_name));
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_mount_acl - Check permission for mount() operation.
+ *
+ * @r:        Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @dev_name: Name of device file. Maybe NULL.
+ * @dir:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @type:     Name of filesystem type.
+ * @flags:    Mount options.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+			    const char *dev_name,
+			    const struct path *dir, const char *type,
+			    unsigned long flags)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_obj_info obj = { };
+	struct path path;
+	struct file_system_type *fstype = NULL;
+	const char *requested_type = NULL;
+	const char *requested_dir_name = NULL;
+	const char *requested_dev_name = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info rtype;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info rdev;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info rdir;
+	int need_dev = 0;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	r->obj = &obj;
+
+	/* Get fstype. */
+	requested_type = tomoyo_encode(type);
+	if (!requested_type)
+		goto out;
+	rtype.name = requested_type;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rtype);
+
+	/* Get mount point. */
+	obj.path2 = *dir;
+	requested_dir_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(dir);
+	if (!requested_dir_name) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rdir.name = requested_dir_name;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rdir);
+
+	/* Compare fs name. */
+	if (type == tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT]) {
+		/* dev_name is ignored. */
+	} else if (type == tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE] ||
+		   type == tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE] ||
+		   type == tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE] ||
+		   type == tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED]) {
+		/* dev_name is ignored. */
+	} else if (type == tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND] ||
+		   type == tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE]) {
+		need_dev = -1; /* dev_name is a directory */
+	} else {
+		fstype = get_fs_type(type);
+		if (!fstype) {
+			error = -ENODEV;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV)
+			/* dev_name is a block device file. */
+			need_dev = 1;
+	}
+	if (need_dev) {
+		/* Get mount point or device file. */
+		if (!dev_name || kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path)) {
+			error = -ENOENT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		obj.path1 = path;
+		requested_dev_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path);
+		if (!requested_dev_name) {
+			error = -ENOENT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Map dev_name to "<NULL>" if no dev_name given. */
+		if (!dev_name)
+			dev_name = "<NULL>";
+		requested_dev_name = tomoyo_encode(dev_name);
+		if (!requested_dev_name) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	rdev.name = requested_dev_name;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rdev);
+	r->param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL;
+	r->param.mount.need_dev = need_dev;
+	r->param.mount.dev = &rdev;
+	r->param.mount.dir = &rdir;
+	r->param.mount.type = &rtype;
+	r->param.mount.flags = flags;
+	do {
+		tomoyo_check_acl(r, tomoyo_check_mount_acl);
+		error = tomoyo_audit_mount_log(r);
+	} while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+ out:
+	kfree(requested_dev_name);
+	kfree(requested_dir_name);
+	if (fstype)
+		put_filesystem(fstype);
+	kfree(requested_type);
+	/* Drop refcount obtained by kern_path(). */
+	if (obj.path1.dentry)
+		path_put(&obj.path1);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_mount_permission - Check permission for mount() operation.
+ *
+ * @dev_name:  Name of device file. Maybe NULL.
+ * @path:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @type:      Name of filesystem type. Maybe NULL.
+ * @flags:     Mount options.
+ * @data_page: Optional data. Maybe NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+			    const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+			    void *data_page)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+	int error;
+	int idx;
+
+	if (tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MOUNT)
+	    == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED)
+		return 0;
+	if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
+		flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
+	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) {
+		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT];
+		flags &= ~MS_REMOUNT;
+	} else if (flags & MS_BIND) {
+		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND];
+		flags &= ~MS_BIND;
+	} else if (flags & MS_SHARED) {
+		if (flags & (MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED];
+		flags &= ~MS_SHARED;
+	} else if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) {
+		if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE];
+		flags &= ~MS_PRIVATE;
+	} else if (flags & MS_SLAVE) {
+		if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE];
+		flags &= ~MS_SLAVE;
+	} else if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) {
+		if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE];
+		flags &= ~MS_UNBINDABLE;
+	} else if (flags & MS_MOVE) {
+		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE];
+		flags &= ~MS_MOVE;
+	}
+	if (!type)
+		type = "<NULL>";
+	idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+	error = tomoyo_mount_acl(&r, dev_name, path, type, flags);
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/network.c b/security/tomoyo/network.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cfc2a019d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/network.c
@@ -0,0 +1,780 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/network.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+/* Structure for holding inet domain socket's address. */
+struct tomoyo_inet_addr_info {
+	__be16 port;           /* In network byte order. */
+	const __be32 *address; /* In network byte order. */
+	bool is_ipv6;
+};
+
+/* Structure for holding unix domain socket's address. */
+struct tomoyo_unix_addr_info {
+	u8 *addr; /* This may not be '\0' terminated string. */
+	unsigned int addr_len;
+};
+
+/* Structure for holding socket address. */
+struct tomoyo_addr_info {
+	u8 protocol;
+	u8 operation;
+	struct tomoyo_inet_addr_info inet;
+	struct tomoyo_unix_addr_info unix0;
+};
+
+/* String table for socket's protocols. */
+const char * const tomoyo_proto_keyword[TOMOYO_SOCK_MAX] = {
+	[SOCK_STREAM]    = "stream",
+	[SOCK_DGRAM]     = "dgram",
+	[SOCK_RAW]       = "raw",
+	[SOCK_SEQPACKET] = "seqpacket",
+	[0] = " ", /* Dummy for avoiding NULL pointer dereference. */
+	[4] = " ", /* Dummy for avoiding NULL pointer dereference. */
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_parse_ipaddr_union - Parse an IP address.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ * @ptr:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_parse_ipaddr_union(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+			       struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union *ptr)
+{
+	u8 * const min = ptr->ip[0].in6_u.u6_addr8;
+	u8 * const max = ptr->ip[1].in6_u.u6_addr8;
+	char *address = tomoyo_read_token(param);
+	const char *end;
+
+	if (!strchr(address, ':') &&
+	    in4_pton(address, -1, min, '-', &end) > 0) {
+		ptr->is_ipv6 = false;
+		if (!*end)
+			ptr->ip[1].s6_addr32[0] = ptr->ip[0].s6_addr32[0];
+		else if (*end++ != '-' ||
+			 in4_pton(end, -1, max, '\0', &end) <= 0 || *end)
+			return false;
+		return true;
+	}
+	if (in6_pton(address, -1, min, '-', &end) > 0) {
+		ptr->is_ipv6 = true;
+		if (!*end)
+			memmove(max, min, sizeof(u16) * 8);
+		else if (*end++ != '-' ||
+			 in6_pton(end, -1, max, '\0', &end) <= 0 || *end)
+			return false;
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_ipv4 - Print an IPv4 address.
+ *
+ * @buffer:     Buffer to write to.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ * @min_ip:     Pointer to __be32.
+ * @max_ip:     Pointer to __be32.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_print_ipv4(char *buffer, const unsigned int buffer_len,
+			      const __be32 *min_ip, const __be32 *max_ip)
+{
+	snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "%pI4%c%pI4", min_ip,
+		 *min_ip == *max_ip ? '\0' : '-', max_ip);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_ipv6 - Print an IPv6 address.
+ *
+ * @buffer:     Buffer to write to.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ * @min_ip:     Pointer to "struct in6_addr".
+ * @max_ip:     Pointer to "struct in6_addr".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_print_ipv6(char *buffer, const unsigned int buffer_len,
+			      const struct in6_addr *min_ip,
+			      const struct in6_addr *max_ip)
+{
+	snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "%pI6c%c%pI6c", min_ip,
+		 !memcmp(min_ip, max_ip, 16) ? '\0' : '-', max_ip);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_ip - Print an IP address.
+ *
+ * @buf:  Buffer to write to.
+ * @size: Size of @buf.
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to "struct ipaddr_union".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_print_ip(char *buf, const unsigned int size,
+		     const struct tomoyo_ipaddr_union *ptr)
+{
+	if (ptr->is_ipv6)
+		tomoyo_print_ipv6(buf, size, &ptr->ip[0], &ptr->ip[1]);
+	else
+		tomoyo_print_ipv4(buf, size, &ptr->ip[0].s6_addr32[0],
+				  &ptr->ip[1].s6_addr32[0]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Mapping table from "enum tomoyo_network_acl_index" to
+ * "enum tomoyo_mac_index" for inet domain socket.
+ */
+static const u8 tomoyo_inet2mac
+[TOMOYO_SOCK_MAX][TOMOYO_MAX_NETWORK_OPERATION] = {
+	[SOCK_STREAM] = {
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_BIND]    = TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_STREAM_BIND,
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_LISTEN]  =
+		TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_STREAM_LISTEN,
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_CONNECT] =
+		TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_STREAM_CONNECT,
+	},
+	[SOCK_DGRAM] = {
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_BIND]    = TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_DGRAM_BIND,
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_SEND]    = TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_DGRAM_SEND,
+	},
+	[SOCK_RAW]    = {
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_BIND]    = TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_RAW_BIND,
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_SEND]    = TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_RAW_SEND,
+	},
+};
+
+/*
+ * Mapping table from "enum tomoyo_network_acl_index" to
+ * "enum tomoyo_mac_index" for unix domain socket.
+ */
+static const u8 tomoyo_unix2mac
+[TOMOYO_SOCK_MAX][TOMOYO_MAX_NETWORK_OPERATION] = {
+	[SOCK_STREAM] = {
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_BIND]    = TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_STREAM_BIND,
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_LISTEN]  =
+		TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_STREAM_LISTEN,
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_CONNECT] =
+		TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_STREAM_CONNECT,
+	},
+	[SOCK_DGRAM] = {
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_BIND]    = TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_DGRAM_BIND,
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_SEND]    = TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_DGRAM_SEND,
+	},
+	[SOCK_SEQPACKET] = {
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_BIND]    =
+		TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_SEQPACKET_BIND,
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_LISTEN]  =
+		TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_SEQPACKET_LISTEN,
+		[TOMOYO_NETWORK_CONNECT] =
+		TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_SEQPACKET_CONNECT,
+	},
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_inet_acl - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_inet_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b except permission bits, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_inet_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				 const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_inet_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head);
+	const struct tomoyo_inet_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head);
+
+	return p1->protocol == p2->protocol &&
+		tomoyo_same_ipaddr_union(&p1->address, &p2->address) &&
+		tomoyo_same_number_union(&p1->port, &p2->port);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_same_unix_acl - Check for duplicated "struct tomoyo_unix_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a == @b except permission bits, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_same_unix_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				 const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_unix_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head);
+	const struct tomoyo_unix_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head);
+
+	return p1->protocol == p2->protocol &&
+		tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->name, &p2->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_merge_inet_acl - Merge duplicated "struct tomoyo_inet_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @is_delete: True for @a &= ~@b, false for @a |= @b.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a is empty, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_merge_inet_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				  struct tomoyo_acl_info *b,
+				  const bool is_delete)
+{
+	u8 * const a_perm =
+		&container_of(a, struct tomoyo_inet_acl, head)->perm;
+	u8 perm = READ_ONCE(*a_perm);
+	const u8 b_perm = container_of(b, struct tomoyo_inet_acl, head)->perm;
+
+	if (is_delete)
+		perm &= ~b_perm;
+	else
+		perm |= b_perm;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*a_perm, perm);
+	return !perm;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_merge_unix_acl - Merge duplicated "struct tomoyo_unix_acl" entry.
+ *
+ * @a:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @b:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * @is_delete: True for @a &= ~@b, false for @a |= @b.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @a is empty, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_merge_unix_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				  struct tomoyo_acl_info *b,
+				  const bool is_delete)
+{
+	u8 * const a_perm =
+		&container_of(a, struct tomoyo_unix_acl, head)->perm;
+	u8 perm = READ_ONCE(*a_perm);
+	const u8 b_perm = container_of(b, struct tomoyo_unix_acl, head)->perm;
+
+	if (is_delete)
+		perm &= ~b_perm;
+	else
+		perm |= b_perm;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*a_perm, perm);
+	return !perm;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_inet_network - Write "struct tomoyo_inet_acl" list.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_inet_network(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_inet_acl e = { .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_INET_ACL };
+	int error = -EINVAL;
+	u8 type;
+	const char *protocol = tomoyo_read_token(param);
+	const char *operation = tomoyo_read_token(param);
+
+	for (e.protocol = 0; e.protocol < TOMOYO_SOCK_MAX; e.protocol++)
+		if (!strcmp(protocol, tomoyo_proto_keyword[e.protocol]))
+			break;
+	for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_NETWORK_OPERATION; type++)
+		if (tomoyo_permstr(operation, tomoyo_socket_keyword[type]))
+			e.perm |= 1 << type;
+	if (e.protocol == TOMOYO_SOCK_MAX || !e.perm)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (param->data[0] == '@') {
+		param->data++;
+		e.address.group =
+			tomoyo_get_group(param, TOMOYO_ADDRESS_GROUP);
+		if (!e.address.group)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	} else {
+		if (!tomoyo_parse_ipaddr_union(param, &e.address))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (!tomoyo_parse_number_union(param, &e.port) ||
+	    e.port.values[1] > 65535)
+		goto out;
+	error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+				     tomoyo_same_inet_acl,
+				     tomoyo_merge_inet_acl);
+out:
+	tomoyo_put_group(e.address.group);
+	tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.port);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_unix_network - Write "struct tomoyo_unix_acl" list.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_unix_network(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_unix_acl e = { .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_UNIX_ACL };
+	int error;
+	u8 type;
+	const char *protocol = tomoyo_read_token(param);
+	const char *operation = tomoyo_read_token(param);
+
+	for (e.protocol = 0; e.protocol < TOMOYO_SOCK_MAX; e.protocol++)
+		if (!strcmp(protocol, tomoyo_proto_keyword[e.protocol]))
+			break;
+	for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_NETWORK_OPERATION; type++)
+		if (tomoyo_permstr(operation, tomoyo_socket_keyword[type]))
+			e.perm |= 1 << type;
+	if (e.protocol == TOMOYO_SOCK_MAX || !e.perm)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(param, &e.name))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), param,
+				     tomoyo_same_unix_acl,
+				     tomoyo_merge_unix_acl);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_audit_net_log - Audit network log.
+ *
+ * @r:         Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @family:    Name of socket family ("inet" or "unix").
+ * @protocol:  Name of protocol in @family.
+ * @operation: Name of socket operation.
+ * @address:   Name of address.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_audit_net_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+				const char *family, const u8 protocol,
+				const u8 operation, const char *address)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	return tomoyo_supervisor(r, "network %s %s %s %s\n", family,
+				 tomoyo_proto_keyword[protocol],
+				 tomoyo_socket_keyword[operation], address);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_audit_inet_log - Audit INET network log.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_audit_inet_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	char buf[128];
+	int len;
+	const __be32 *address = r->param.inet_network.address;
+
+	if (r->param.inet_network.is_ipv6)
+		tomoyo_print_ipv6(buf, sizeof(buf), (const struct in6_addr *)
+				  address, (const struct in6_addr *) address);
+	else
+		tomoyo_print_ipv4(buf, sizeof(buf), address, address);
+	len = strlen(buf);
+	snprintf(buf + len, sizeof(buf) - len, " %u",
+		 r->param.inet_network.port);
+	return tomoyo_audit_net_log(r, "inet", r->param.inet_network.protocol,
+				    r->param.inet_network.operation, buf);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_audit_unix_log - Audit UNIX network log.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_audit_unix_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
+	__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
+{
+	return tomoyo_audit_net_log(r, "unix", r->param.unix_network.protocol,
+				    r->param.unix_network.operation,
+				    r->param.unix_network.address->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_inet_acl - Check permission for inet domain socket operation.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if granted, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_check_inet_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+				  const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_inet_acl *acl =
+		container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), head);
+	const u8 size = r->param.inet_network.is_ipv6 ? 16 : 4;
+
+	if (!(acl->perm & (1 << r->param.inet_network.operation)) ||
+	    !tomoyo_compare_number_union(r->param.inet_network.port,
+					 &acl->port))
+		return false;
+	if (acl->address.group)
+		return tomoyo_address_matches_group
+			(r->param.inet_network.is_ipv6,
+			 r->param.inet_network.address, acl->address.group);
+	return acl->address.is_ipv6 == r->param.inet_network.is_ipv6 &&
+		memcmp(&acl->address.ip[0],
+		       r->param.inet_network.address, size) <= 0 &&
+		memcmp(r->param.inet_network.address,
+		       &acl->address.ip[1], size) <= 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_unix_acl - Check permission for unix domain socket operation.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if granted, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_check_unix_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+				  const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_unix_acl *acl =
+		container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), head);
+
+	return (acl->perm & (1 << r->param.unix_network.operation)) &&
+		tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.unix_network.address,
+					  &acl->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_inet_entry - Check permission for INET network operation.
+ *
+ * @address: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_addr_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_inet_entry(const struct tomoyo_addr_info *address)
+{
+	const int idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+	struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+	int error = 0;
+	const u8 type = tomoyo_inet2mac[address->protocol][address->operation];
+
+	if (type && tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, type)
+	    != TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED) {
+		r.param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_INET_ACL;
+		r.param.inet_network.protocol = address->protocol;
+		r.param.inet_network.operation = address->operation;
+		r.param.inet_network.is_ipv6 = address->inet.is_ipv6;
+		r.param.inet_network.address = address->inet.address;
+		r.param.inet_network.port = ntohs(address->inet.port);
+		do {
+			tomoyo_check_acl(&r, tomoyo_check_inet_acl);
+			error = tomoyo_audit_inet_log(&r);
+		} while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+	}
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_inet_address - Check permission for inet domain socket's operation.
+ *
+ * @addr:     Pointer to "struct sockaddr".
+ * @addr_len: Size of @addr.
+ * @port:     Port number.
+ * @address:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_addr_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_inet_address(const struct sockaddr *addr,
+				     const unsigned int addr_len,
+				     const u16 port,
+				     struct tomoyo_addr_info *address)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_inet_addr_info *i = &address->inet;
+
+	if (addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+		return 0;
+	switch (addr->sa_family) {
+	case AF_INET6:
+		if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+			goto skip;
+		i->is_ipv6 = true;
+		i->address = (__be32 *)
+			((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addr)->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+		i->port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addr)->sin6_port;
+		break;
+	case AF_INET:
+		if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+			goto skip;
+		i->is_ipv6 = false;
+		i->address = (__be32 *)
+			&((struct sockaddr_in *) addr)->sin_addr;
+		i->port = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addr)->sin_port;
+		break;
+	default:
+		goto skip;
+	}
+	if (address->protocol == SOCK_RAW)
+		i->port = htons(port);
+	return tomoyo_inet_entry(address);
+skip:
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_unix_entry - Check permission for UNIX network operation.
+ *
+ * @address: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_addr_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_unix_entry(const struct tomoyo_addr_info *address)
+{
+	const int idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+	struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+	int error = 0;
+	const u8 type = tomoyo_unix2mac[address->protocol][address->operation];
+
+	if (type && tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, type)
+	    != TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED) {
+		char *buf = address->unix0.addr;
+		int len = address->unix0.addr_len - sizeof(sa_family_t);
+
+		if (len <= 0) {
+			buf = "anonymous";
+			len = 9;
+		} else if (buf[0]) {
+			len = strnlen(buf, len);
+		}
+		buf = tomoyo_encode2(buf, len);
+		if (buf) {
+			struct tomoyo_path_info addr;
+
+			addr.name = buf;
+			tomoyo_fill_path_info(&addr);
+			r.param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_UNIX_ACL;
+			r.param.unix_network.protocol = address->protocol;
+			r.param.unix_network.operation = address->operation;
+			r.param.unix_network.address = &addr;
+			do {
+				tomoyo_check_acl(&r, tomoyo_check_unix_acl);
+				error = tomoyo_audit_unix_log(&r);
+			} while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+			kfree(buf);
+		} else
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_unix_address - Check permission for unix domain socket's operation.
+ *
+ * @addr:     Pointer to "struct sockaddr".
+ * @addr_len: Size of @addr.
+ * @address:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_addr_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_unix_address(struct sockaddr *addr,
+				     const unsigned int addr_len,
+				     struct tomoyo_addr_info *address)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_unix_addr_info *u = &address->unix0;
+
+	if (addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+		return 0;
+	if (addr->sa_family != AF_UNIX)
+		return 0;
+	u->addr = ((struct sockaddr_un *) addr)->sun_path;
+	u->addr_len = addr_len;
+	return tomoyo_unix_entry(address);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_kernel_service - Check whether I'm kernel service or not.
+ *
+ * Returns true if I'm kernel service, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_kernel_service(void)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do if I am a kernel service. */
+	return current->flags & PF_KTHREAD;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sock_family - Get socket's family.
+ *
+ * @sk: Pointer to "struct sock".
+ *
+ * Returns one of PF_INET, PF_INET6, PF_UNIX or 0.
+ */
+static u8 tomoyo_sock_family(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	u8 family;
+
+	if (tomoyo_kernel_service())
+		return 0;
+	family = sk->sk_family;
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+	case PF_INET6:
+	case PF_UNIX:
+		return family;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_socket_listen_permission - Check permission for listening a socket.
+ *
+ * @sock: Pointer to "struct socket".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_socket_listen_permission(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_addr_info address;
+	const u8 family = tomoyo_sock_family(sock->sk);
+	const unsigned int type = sock->type;
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	int addr_len;
+
+	if (!family || (type != SOCK_STREAM && type != SOCK_SEQPACKET))
+		return 0;
+	{
+		const int error = sock->ops->getname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)
+						     &addr, 0);
+
+		if (error < 0)
+			return error;
+		addr_len = error;
+	}
+	address.protocol = type;
+	address.operation = TOMOYO_NETWORK_LISTEN;
+	if (family == PF_UNIX)
+		return tomoyo_check_unix_address((struct sockaddr *) &addr,
+						 addr_len, &address);
+	return tomoyo_check_inet_address((struct sockaddr *) &addr, addr_len,
+					 0, &address);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_socket_connect_permission - Check permission for setting the remote address of a socket.
+ *
+ * @sock:     Pointer to "struct socket".
+ * @addr:     Pointer to "struct sockaddr".
+ * @addr_len: Size of @addr.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_socket_connect_permission(struct socket *sock,
+				     struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_addr_info address;
+	const u8 family = tomoyo_sock_family(sock->sk);
+	const unsigned int type = sock->type;
+
+	if (!family)
+		return 0;
+	address.protocol = type;
+	switch (type) {
+	case SOCK_DGRAM:
+	case SOCK_RAW:
+		address.operation = TOMOYO_NETWORK_SEND;
+		break;
+	case SOCK_STREAM:
+	case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
+		address.operation = TOMOYO_NETWORK_CONNECT;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (family == PF_UNIX)
+		return tomoyo_check_unix_address(addr, addr_len, &address);
+	return tomoyo_check_inet_address(addr, addr_len, sock->sk->sk_protocol,
+					 &address);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_socket_bind_permission - Check permission for setting the local address of a socket.
+ *
+ * @sock:     Pointer to "struct socket".
+ * @addr:     Pointer to "struct sockaddr".
+ * @addr_len: Size of @addr.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_socket_bind_permission(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+				  int addr_len)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_addr_info address;
+	const u8 family = tomoyo_sock_family(sock->sk);
+	const unsigned int type = sock->type;
+
+	if (!family)
+		return 0;
+	switch (type) {
+	case SOCK_STREAM:
+	case SOCK_DGRAM:
+	case SOCK_RAW:
+	case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
+		address.protocol = type;
+		address.operation = TOMOYO_NETWORK_BIND;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (family == PF_UNIX)
+		return tomoyo_check_unix_address(addr, addr_len, &address);
+	return tomoyo_check_inet_address(addr, addr_len, sock->sk->sk_protocol,
+					 &address);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_socket_sendmsg_permission - Check permission for sending a datagram.
+ *
+ * @sock: Pointer to "struct socket".
+ * @msg:  Pointer to "struct msghdr".
+ * @size: Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_socket_sendmsg_permission(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				     int size)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_addr_info address;
+	const u8 family = tomoyo_sock_family(sock->sk);
+	const unsigned int type = sock->type;
+
+	if (!msg->msg_name || !family ||
+	    (type != SOCK_DGRAM && type != SOCK_RAW))
+		return 0;
+	address.protocol = type;
+	address.operation = TOMOYO_NETWORK_SEND;
+	if (family == PF_UNIX)
+		return tomoyo_check_unix_address((struct sockaddr *)
+						 msg->msg_name,
+						 msg->msg_namelen, &address);
+	return tomoyo_check_inet_address((struct sockaddr *) msg->msg_name,
+					 msg->msg_namelen,
+					 sock->sk->sk_protocol, &address);
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default b/security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2678df496
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+initialize_domain /sbin/modprobe from any
+initialize_domain /sbin/hotplug from any
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c483ee7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/realpath.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_encode2 - Encode binary string to ascii string.
+ *
+ * @str:     String in binary format.
+ * @str_len: Size of @str in byte.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to @str in ascii format on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This function uses kzalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function
+ * didn't return NULL.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_encode2(const char *str, int str_len)
+{
+	int i;
+	int len = 0;
+	const char *p = str;
+	char *cp;
+	char *cp0;
+
+	if (!p)
+		return NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < str_len; i++) {
+		const unsigned char c = p[i];
+
+		if (c == '\\')
+			len += 2;
+		else if (c > ' ' && c < 127)
+			len++;
+		else
+			len += 4;
+	}
+	len++;
+	/* Reserve space for appending "/". */
+	cp = kzalloc(len + 10, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!cp)
+		return NULL;
+	cp0 = cp;
+	p = str;
+	for (i = 0; i < str_len; i++) {
+		const unsigned char c = p[i];
+
+		if (c == '\\') {
+			*cp++ = '\\';
+			*cp++ = '\\';
+		} else if (c > ' ' && c < 127) {
+			*cp++ = c;
+		} else {
+			*cp++ = '\\';
+			*cp++ = (c >> 6) + '0';
+			*cp++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
+			*cp++ = (c & 7) + '0';
+		}
+	}
+	return cp0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_encode - Encode binary string to ascii string.
+ *
+ * @str: String in binary format.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to @str in ascii format on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This function uses kzalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function
+ * didn't return NULL.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_encode(const char *str)
+{
+	return str ? tomoyo_encode2(str, strlen(str)) : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_absolute_path - Get the path of a dentry but ignores chroot'ed root.
+ *
+ * @path:   Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @buffer: Pointer to buffer to return value in.
+ * @buflen: Sizeof @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns the buffer on success, an error code otherwise.
+ *
+ * If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
+ */
+static char *tomoyo_get_absolute_path(const struct path *path, char * const buffer,
+				      const int buflen)
+{
+	char *pos = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	if (buflen >= 256) {
+		/* go to whatever namespace root we are under */
+		pos = d_absolute_path(path, buffer, buflen - 1);
+		if (!IS_ERR(pos) && *pos == '/' && pos[1]) {
+			struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
+
+			if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
+				buffer[buflen - 2] = '/';
+				buffer[buflen - 1] = '\0';
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return pos;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_dentry_path - Get the path of a dentry.
+ *
+ * @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
+ * @buffer: Pointer to buffer to return value in.
+ * @buflen: Sizeof @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns the buffer on success, an error code otherwise.
+ *
+ * If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
+ */
+static char *tomoyo_get_dentry_path(struct dentry *dentry, char * const buffer,
+				    const int buflen)
+{
+	char *pos = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	if (buflen >= 256) {
+		pos = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, buflen - 1);
+		if (!IS_ERR(pos) && *pos == '/' && pos[1]) {
+			struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+			if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
+				buffer[buflen - 2] = '/';
+				buffer[buflen - 1] = '\0';
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return pos;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_local_path - Get the path of a dentry.
+ *
+ * @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
+ * @buffer: Pointer to buffer to return value in.
+ * @buflen: Sizeof @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns the buffer on success, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static char *tomoyo_get_local_path(struct dentry *dentry, char * const buffer,
+				   const int buflen)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
+	char *pos = tomoyo_get_dentry_path(dentry, buffer, buflen);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(pos))
+		return pos;
+	/* Convert from $PID to self if $PID is current thread. */
+	if (sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC && *pos == '/') {
+		char *ep;
+		const pid_t pid = (pid_t) simple_strtoul(pos + 1, &ep, 10);
+		struct pid_namespace *proc_pidns = proc_pid_ns(sb);
+
+		if (*ep == '/' && pid && pid ==
+		    task_tgid_nr_ns(current, proc_pidns)) {
+			pos = ep - 5;
+			if (pos < buffer)
+				goto out;
+			memmove(pos, "/self", 5);
+		}
+		goto prepend_filesystem_name;
+	}
+	/* Use filesystem name for unnamed devices. */
+	if (!MAJOR(sb->s_dev))
+		goto prepend_filesystem_name;
+	{
+		struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root);
+
+		/*
+		 * Use filesystem name if filesystem does not support rename()
+		 * operation.
+		 */
+		if (!inode->i_op->rename)
+			goto prepend_filesystem_name;
+	}
+	/* Prepend device name. */
+	{
+		char name[64];
+		int name_len;
+		const dev_t dev = sb->s_dev;
+
+		name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
+		snprintf(name, sizeof(name) - 1, "dev(%u,%u):", MAJOR(dev),
+			 MINOR(dev));
+		name_len = strlen(name);
+		pos -= name_len;
+		if (pos < buffer)
+			goto out;
+		memmove(pos, name, name_len);
+		return pos;
+	}
+	/* Prepend filesystem name. */
+prepend_filesystem_name:
+	{
+		const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
+		const int name_len = strlen(name);
+
+		pos -= name_len + 1;
+		if (pos < buffer)
+			goto out;
+		memmove(pos, name, name_len);
+		pos[name_len] = ':';
+	}
+	return pos;
+out:
+	return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_realpath_from_path - Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root.
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns the realpath of the given @path on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
+ * Characters out of 0x20 < c < 0x7F range are converted to
+ * \ooo style octal string.
+ * Character \ is converted to \\ string.
+ *
+ * These functions use kzalloc(), so the caller must call kfree()
+ * if these functions didn't return NULL.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(const struct path *path)
+{
+	char *buf = NULL;
+	char *name = NULL;
+	unsigned int buf_len = PAGE_SIZE / 2;
+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
+	struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
+
+	while (1) {
+		char *pos;
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		buf_len <<= 1;
+		kfree(buf);
+		buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!buf)
+			break;
+		/* To make sure that pos is '\0' terminated. */
+		buf[buf_len - 1] = '\0';
+		/* For "pipe:[\$]" and "socket:[\$]". */
+		if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_dname) {
+			pos = dentry->d_op->d_dname(dentry, buf, buf_len - 1);
+			goto encode;
+		}
+		inode = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root);
+		/*
+		 * Get local name for filesystems without rename() operation
+		 */
+		if ((!inode->i_op->rename &&
+		     !(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV)))
+			pos = tomoyo_get_local_path(path->dentry, buf,
+						    buf_len - 1);
+		/* Get absolute name for the rest. */
+		else {
+			pos = tomoyo_get_absolute_path(path, buf, buf_len - 1);
+			/*
+			 * Fall back to local name if absolute name is not
+			 * available.
+			 */
+			if (pos == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
+				pos = tomoyo_get_local_path(path->dentry, buf,
+							    buf_len - 1);
+		}
+encode:
+		if (IS_ERR(pos))
+			continue;
+		name = tomoyo_encode(pos);
+		break;
+	}
+	kfree(buf);
+	if (!name)
+		tomoyo_warn_oom(__func__);
+	return name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_realpath_nofollow - Get realpath of a pathname.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The pathname to solve.
+ *
+ * Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname)
+{
+	struct path path;
+
+	if (pathname && kern_path(pathname, 0, &path) == 0) {
+		char *buf = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path);
+
+		path_put(&path);
+		return buf;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..33933645f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "common.h"
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_task_acl - Check permission for task operation.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if granted, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_check_task_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+				  const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_task_acl *acl = container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl),
+							 head);
+
+	return !tomoyo_pathcmp(r->param.task.domainname, acl->domainname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_self - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain interface.
+ *
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf:   Domainname to transit to.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos:  Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns @count on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * If domain transition was permitted but the domain transition failed, this
+ * function returns error rather than terminating current thread with SIGKILL.
+ */
+static ssize_t tomoyo_write_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	int error;
+
+	if (!count || count >= TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 10)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+	tomoyo_normalize_line(data);
+	if (tomoyo_correct_domain(data)) {
+		const int idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+		struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+		struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+
+		name.name = data;
+		tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+		/* Check "task manual_domain_transition" permission. */
+		tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_EXECUTE);
+		r.param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MANUAL_TASK_ACL;
+		r.param.task.domainname = &name;
+		tomoyo_check_acl(&r, tomoyo_check_task_acl);
+		if (!r.granted)
+			error = -EPERM;
+		else {
+			struct tomoyo_domain_info *new_domain =
+				tomoyo_assign_domain(data, true);
+			if (!new_domain) {
+				error = -ENOENT;
+			} else {
+				struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
+				struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain =
+					s->domain_info;
+
+				s->domain_info = new_domain;
+				atomic_inc(&new_domain->users);
+				atomic_dec(&old_domain->users);
+				error = 0;
+			}
+		}
+		tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	} else
+		error = -EINVAL;
+	kfree(data);
+	return error ? error : count;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_self - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain interface.
+ *
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf:   Domainname which current thread belongs to.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos:  Bytes read by now.
+ *
+ * Returns read size on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tomoyo_read_self(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	const char *domain = tomoyo_domain()->domainname->name;
+	loff_t len = strlen(domain);
+	loff_t pos = *ppos;
+
+	if (pos >= len || !count)
+		return 0;
+	len -= pos;
+	if (count < len)
+		len = count;
+	if (copy_to_user(buf, domain + pos, len))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	*ppos += len;
+	return len;
+}
+
+/* Operations for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain interface. */
+static const struct file_operations tomoyo_self_operations = {
+	.write = tomoyo_write_self,
+	.read  = tomoyo_read_self,
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_open - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	const u8 key = (uintptr_t) file_inode(file)->i_private;
+
+	return tomoyo_open_control(key, file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_release - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ */
+static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	tomoyo_close_control(file->private_data);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_poll - poll() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". Maybe NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM | EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM if ready to read/write,
+ * EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM otherwise.
+ */
+static __poll_t tomoyo_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+{
+	return tomoyo_poll_control(file, wait);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf:   Pointer to buffer.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos:  Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tomoyo_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+			   loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return tomoyo_read_control(file->private_data, buf, count);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf:   Pointer to buffer.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos:  Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns @count on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tomoyo_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return tomoyo_write_control(file->private_data, buf, count);
+}
+
+/*
+ * tomoyo_operations is a "struct file_operations" which is used for handling
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * Some files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory accept open(O_RDWR).
+ * See tomoyo_io_buffer for internals.
+ */
+static const struct file_operations tomoyo_operations = {
+	.open    = tomoyo_open,
+	.release = tomoyo_release,
+	.poll    = tomoyo_poll,
+	.read    = tomoyo_read,
+	.write   = tomoyo_write,
+	.llseek  = noop_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_create_entry - Create interface files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory.
+ *
+ * @name:   The name of the interface file.
+ * @mode:   The permission of the interface file.
+ * @parent: The parent directory.
+ * @key:    Type of interface.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void __init tomoyo_create_entry(const char *name, const umode_t mode,
+				       struct dentry *parent, const u8 key)
+{
+	securityfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, (void *) (uintptr_t) key,
+			       &tomoyo_operations);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_interface_init - Initialize /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+int __init tomoyo_interface_init(void)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	struct dentry *tomoyo_dir;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_enabled)
+		return 0;
+	domain = tomoyo_domain();
+	/* Don't create securityfs entries unless registered. */
+	if (domain != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+		return 0;
+
+	tomoyo_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("query",            0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_QUERY);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("domain_policy",    0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("exception_policy", 0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("audit",            0400, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_AUDIT);
+	tomoyo_create_entry(".process_status",  0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("stat",             0644, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_STAT);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("profile",          0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_PROFILE);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("manager",          0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_MANAGER);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("version",          0400, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_VERSION);
+	securityfs_create_file("self_domain", 0666, tomoyo_dir, NULL,
+			       &tomoyo_self_operations);
+	tomoyo_load_builtin_policy();
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c66e02ed8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -0,0 +1,621 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+#include "common.h"
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_domain - Get "struct tomoyo_domain_info" for current thread.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" for current thread.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
+
+	if (s->old_domain_info && !current->in_execve) {
+		atomic_dec(&s->old_domain_info->users);
+		s->old_domain_info = NULL;
+	}
+	return s->domain_info;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_cred_prepare - Target for security_prepare_creds().
+ *
+ * @new: Pointer to "struct cred".
+ * @old: Pointer to "struct cred".
+ * @gfp: Memory allocation flags.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+			       gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	/* Restore old_domain_info saved by previous execve() request. */
+	struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
+
+	if (s->old_domain_info && !current->in_execve) {
+		atomic_dec(&s->domain_info->users);
+		s->domain_info = s->old_domain_info;
+		s->old_domain_info = NULL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_bprm_committed_creds - Target for security_bprm_committed_creds().
+ *
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
+ */
+static void tomoyo_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/* Clear old_domain_info saved by execve() request. */
+	struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
+
+	atomic_dec(&s->old_domain_info->users);
+	s->old_domain_info = NULL;
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
+/**
+ * tomoyo_bprm_creds_for_exec - Target for security_bprm_creds_for_exec().
+ *
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Load policy if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists and /sbin/init is requested
+	 * for the first time.
+	 */
+	if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+		tomoyo_load_policy(bprm->filename);
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_bprm_check_security - Target for security_bprm_check().
+ *
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
+
+	/*
+	 * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to execve()
+	 * using current domain.
+	 */
+	if (!s->old_domain_info) {
+		const int idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+		const int err = tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm);
+
+		tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+		return err;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
+	 */
+	return tomoyo_check_open_permission(s->domain_info,
+					    &bprm->file->f_path, O_RDONLY);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_inode_getattr - Target for security_inode_getattr().
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+{
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_GETATTR, path, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_truncate - Target for security_path_truncate().
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
+{
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE, path, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_truncate - Target for security_file_truncate().
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_file_truncate(struct file *file)
+{
+	return tomoyo_path_truncate(&file->f_path);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_unlink - Target for security_path_unlink().
+ *
+ * @parent: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_unlink(const struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct path path = { .mnt = parent->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
+
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK, &path, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_mkdir - Target for security_path_mkdir().
+ *
+ * @parent: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
+ * @mode:   DAC permission mode.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_mkdir(const struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     umode_t mode)
+{
+	struct path path = { .mnt = parent->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
+
+	return tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR, &path,
+				       mode & S_IALLUGO);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_rmdir - Target for security_path_rmdir().
+ *
+ * @parent: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_rmdir(const struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct path path = { .mnt = parent->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
+
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR, &path, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_symlink - Target for security_path_symlink().
+ *
+ * @parent:   Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @dentry:   Pointer to "struct dentry".
+ * @old_name: Symlink's content.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_symlink(const struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
+			       const char *old_name)
+{
+	struct path path = { .mnt = parent->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
+
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK, &path, old_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_mknod - Target for security_path_mknod().
+ *
+ * @parent: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
+ * @mode:   DAC permission mode.
+ * @dev:    Device attributes.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_mknod(const struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
+{
+	struct path path = { .mnt = parent->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
+	int type = TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE;
+	const unsigned int perm = mode & S_IALLUGO;
+
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFCHR:
+		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR;
+		break;
+	case S_IFBLK:
+		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK;
+		break;
+	default:
+		goto no_dev;
+	}
+	return tomoyo_mkdev_perm(type, &path, perm, dev);
+ no_dev:
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFIFO:
+		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO;
+		break;
+	case S_IFSOCK:
+		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK;
+		break;
+	}
+	return tomoyo_path_number_perm(type, &path, perm);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_link - Target for security_path_link().
+ *
+ * @old_dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
+ * @new_dir:    Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @new_dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
+			    struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct path path1 = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = old_dentry };
+	struct path path2 = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = new_dentry };
+
+	return tomoyo_path2_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK, &path1, &path2);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_rename - Target for security_path_rename().
+ *
+ * @old_parent: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @old_dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
+ * @new_parent: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @new_dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
+ * @flags: Rename options.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_rename(const struct path *old_parent,
+			      struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			      const struct path *new_parent,
+			      struct dentry *new_dentry,
+			      const unsigned int flags)
+{
+	struct path path1 = { .mnt = old_parent->mnt, .dentry = old_dentry };
+	struct path path2 = { .mnt = new_parent->mnt, .dentry = new_dentry };
+
+	if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
+		const int err = tomoyo_path2_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME, &path2,
+				&path1);
+
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+	return tomoyo_path2_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME, &path1, &path2);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_fcntl - Target for security_file_fcntl().
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @cmd:  Command for fcntl().
+ * @arg:  Argument for @cmd.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			     unsigned long arg)
+{
+	if (!(cmd == F_SETFL && ((arg ^ file->f_flags) & O_APPEND)))
+		return 0;
+	return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &file->f_path,
+					    O_WRONLY | (arg & O_APPEND));
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_open - Target for security_file_open().
+ *
+ * @f: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f)
+{
+	/* Don't check read permission here if called from execve(). */
+	/* Illogically, FMODE_EXEC is in f_flags, not f_mode. */
+	if (f->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC)
+		return 0;
+	return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &f->f_path,
+					    f->f_flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_ioctl - Target for security_file_ioctl().
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @cmd:  Command for ioctl().
+ * @arg:  Argument for @cmd.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			     unsigned long arg)
+{
+	return tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL, &file->f_path, cmd);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_chmod - Target for security_path_chmod().
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @mode: DAC permission mode.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
+{
+	return tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD, path,
+				       mode & S_IALLUGO);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_chown - Target for security_path_chown().
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @uid:  Owner ID.
+ * @gid:  Group ID.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
+{
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (uid_valid(uid))
+		error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, path,
+						from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid));
+	if (!error && gid_valid(gid))
+		error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, path,
+						from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid));
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_chroot - Target for security_path_chroot().
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
+{
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT, path, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sb_mount - Target for security_sb_mount().
+ *
+ * @dev_name: Name of device file. Maybe NULL.
+ * @path:     Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @type:     Name of filesystem type. Maybe NULL.
+ * @flags:    Mount options.
+ * @data:     Optional data. Maybe NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+			   const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+	return tomoyo_mount_permission(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sb_umount - Target for security_sb_umount().
+ *
+ * @mnt:   Pointer to "struct vfsmount".
+ * @flags: Unmount options.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	struct path path = { .mnt = mnt, .dentry = mnt->mnt_root };
+
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT, &path, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sb_pivotroot - Target for security_sb_pivotroot().
+ *
+ * @old_path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @new_path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path)
+{
+	return tomoyo_path2_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT, new_path, old_path);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_socket_listen - Check permission for listen().
+ *
+ * @sock:    Pointer to "struct socket".
+ * @backlog: Backlog parameter.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	return tomoyo_socket_listen_permission(sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_socket_connect - Check permission for connect().
+ *
+ * @sock:     Pointer to "struct socket".
+ * @addr:     Pointer to "struct sockaddr".
+ * @addr_len: Size of @addr.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+				 int addr_len)
+{
+	return tomoyo_socket_connect_permission(sock, addr, addr_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_socket_bind - Check permission for bind().
+ *
+ * @sock:     Pointer to "struct socket".
+ * @addr:     Pointer to "struct sockaddr".
+ * @addr_len: Size of @addr.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+			      int addr_len)
+{
+	return tomoyo_socket_bind_permission(sock, addr, addr_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_socket_sendmsg - Check permission for sendmsg().
+ *
+ * @sock: Pointer to "struct socket".
+ * @msg:  Pointer to "struct msghdr".
+ * @size: Size of message.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				 int size)
+{
+	return tomoyo_socket_sendmsg_permission(sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_task = sizeof(struct tomoyo_task),
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_task_alloc - Target for security_task_alloc().
+ *
+ * @task:        Pointer to "struct task_struct".
+ * @clone_flags: clone() flags.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
+			     u64 clone_flags)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_task *old = tomoyo_task(current);
+	struct tomoyo_task *new = tomoyo_task(task);
+
+	new->domain_info = old->domain_info;
+	atomic_inc(&new->domain_info->users);
+	new->old_domain_info = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_task_free - Target for security_task_free().
+ *
+ * @task: Pointer to "struct task_struct".
+ */
+static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(task);
+
+	if (s->domain_info) {
+		atomic_dec(&s->domain_info->users);
+		s->domain_info = NULL;
+	}
+	if (s->old_domain_info) {
+		atomic_dec(&s->old_domain_info->users);
+		s->old_domain_info = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static const struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid = {
+	.name = "tomoyo",
+	.id = LSM_ID_TOMOYO,
+};
+
+/* tomoyo_hooks is used for registering TOMOYO. */
+static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, tomoyo_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, tomoyo_bprm_committed_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, tomoyo_task_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, tomoyo_task_free),
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, tomoyo_bprm_creds_for_exec),
+#endif
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, tomoyo_bprm_check_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, tomoyo_file_fcntl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, tomoyo_file_open),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, tomoyo_file_truncate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, tomoyo_path_truncate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, tomoyo_path_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, tomoyo_path_mkdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, tomoyo_path_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, tomoyo_path_symlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, tomoyo_path_mknod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, tomoyo_path_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, tomoyo_path_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, tomoyo_inode_getattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, tomoyo_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, tomoyo_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, tomoyo_path_chmod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, tomoyo_path_chown),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chroot, tomoyo_path_chroot),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, tomoyo_sb_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, tomoyo_sb_umount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, tomoyo_sb_pivotroot),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, tomoyo_socket_bind),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, tomoyo_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, tomoyo_socket_listen),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, tomoyo_socket_sendmsg),
+};
+
+/* Lock for GC. */
+DEFINE_SRCU(tomoyo_ss);
+
+int tomoyo_enabled __ro_after_init = 1;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_init - Register TOMOYO Linux as a LSM module.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
+
+	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
+	security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
+			   &tomoyo_lsmid);
+	pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
+	s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+	atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
+	s->old_domain_info = NULL;
+	tomoyo_mm_init();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) = {
+	.id = &tomoyo_lsmid,
+	.enabled = &tomoyo_enabled,
+	.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
+	.blobs = &tomoyo_blob_sizes,
+	.init = tomoyo_init,
+	.initcall_fs = tomoyo_interface_init,
+};
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6799b1122
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1106 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/util.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+/* Lock for protecting policy. */
+DEFINE_MUTEX(tomoyo_policy_lock);
+
+/* Has /sbin/init started? */
+bool tomoyo_policy_loaded;
+
+/*
+ * Mapping table from "enum tomoyo_mac_index" to
+ * "enum tomoyo_mac_category_index".
+ */
+const u8 tomoyo_index2category[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX] = {
+	/* CONFIG::file group */
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_EXECUTE]    = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN]       = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CREATE]     = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UNLINK]     = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_GETATTR]    = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKDIR]      = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RMDIR]      = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKFIFO]     = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKSOCK]     = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_TRUNCATE]   = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_SYMLINK]    = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKBLOCK]    = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKCHAR]     = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_LINK]       = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RENAME]     = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHMOD]      = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHOWN]      = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHGRP]      = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_IOCTL]      = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHROOT]     = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MOUNT]      = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UMOUNT]     = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_PIVOT_ROOT] = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+	/* CONFIG::network group */
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_STREAM_BIND]       =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_STREAM_LISTEN]     =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_STREAM_CONNECT]    =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_DGRAM_BIND]        =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_DGRAM_SEND]        =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_RAW_BIND]          =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_INET_RAW_SEND]          =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_STREAM_BIND]       =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_STREAM_LISTEN]     =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_STREAM_CONNECT]    =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_DGRAM_BIND]        =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_DGRAM_SEND]        =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_SEQPACKET_BIND]    =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_SEQPACKET_LISTEN]  =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_NETWORK_UNIX_SEQPACKET_CONNECT] =
+	TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_NETWORK,
+	/* CONFIG::misc group */
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_ENVIRON]         = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_MISC,
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_convert_time - Convert time_t to YYYY/MM/DD hh/mm/ss.
+ *
+ * @time64: Seconds since 1970/01/01 00:00:00.
+ * @stamp:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_time".
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_convert_time(time64_t time64, struct tomoyo_time *stamp)
+{
+	struct tm tm;
+
+	time64_to_tm(time64, 0, &tm);
+	stamp->sec = tm.tm_sec;
+	stamp->min = tm.tm_min;
+	stamp->hour = tm.tm_hour;
+	stamp->day = tm.tm_mday;
+	stamp->month = tm.tm_mon + 1;
+	stamp->year = tm.tm_year + 1900;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_permstr - Find permission keywords.
+ *
+ * @string: String representation for permissions in foo/bar/buz format.
+ * @keyword: Keyword to find from @string/
+ *
+ * Returns true if @keyword was found in @string, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * This function assumes that strncmp(w1, w2, strlen(w1)) != 0 if w1 != w2.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_permstr(const char *string, const char *keyword)
+{
+	const char *cp = strstr(string, keyword);
+
+	if (cp)
+		return cp == string || *(cp - 1) == '/';
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_token - Read a word from a line.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns a word on success, "" otherwise.
+ *
+ * To allow the caller to skip NULL check, this function returns "" rather than
+ * NULL if there is no more words to read.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_read_token(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	char *pos = param->data;
+	char *del = strchr(pos, ' ');
+
+	if (del)
+		*del++ = '\0';
+	else
+		del = pos + strlen(pos);
+	param->data = del;
+	return pos;
+}
+
+static bool tomoyo_correct_path2(const char *filename, const size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_domainname - Read a domainname from a line.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ *
+ * Returns a domainname on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_domainname
+(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
+{
+	char *start = param->data;
+	char *pos = start;
+
+	while (*pos) {
+		if (*pos++ != ' ' ||
+		    tomoyo_correct_path2(pos, strchrnul(pos, ' ') - pos))
+			continue;
+		*(pos - 1) = '\0';
+		break;
+	}
+	param->data = pos;
+	if (tomoyo_correct_domain(start))
+		return tomoyo_get_name(start);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_parse_ulong - Parse an "unsigned long" value.
+ *
+ * @result: Pointer to "unsigned long".
+ * @str:    Pointer to string to parse.
+ *
+ * Returns one of values in "enum tomoyo_value_type".
+ *
+ * The @src is updated to point the first character after the value
+ * on success.
+ */
+u8 tomoyo_parse_ulong(unsigned long *result, char **str)
+{
+	const char *cp = *str;
+	char *ep;
+	int base = 10;
+
+	if (*cp == '0') {
+		char c = *(cp + 1);
+
+		if (c == 'x' || c == 'X') {
+			base = 16;
+			cp += 2;
+		} else if (c >= '0' && c <= '7') {
+			base = 8;
+			cp++;
+		}
+	}
+	*result = simple_strtoul(cp, &ep, base);
+	if (cp == ep)
+		return TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_INVALID;
+	*str = ep;
+	switch (base) {
+	case 16:
+		return TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_HEXADECIMAL;
+	case 8:
+		return TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_OCTAL;
+	default:
+		return TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_DECIMAL;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_ulong - Print an "unsigned long" value.
+ *
+ * @buffer:     Pointer to buffer.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ * @value:      An "unsigned long" value.
+ * @type:       Type of @value.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_print_ulong(char *buffer, const int buffer_len,
+			const unsigned long value, const u8 type)
+{
+	if (type == TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_DECIMAL)
+		snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "%lu", value);
+	else if (type == TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_OCTAL)
+		snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "0%lo", value);
+	else if (type == TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_HEXADECIMAL)
+		snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "0x%lX", value);
+	else
+		snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "type(%u)", type);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_parse_name_union - Parse a tomoyo_name_union.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ * @ptr:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_parse_name_union(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+			     struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+	char *filename;
+
+	if (param->data[0] == '@') {
+		param->data++;
+		ptr->group = tomoyo_get_group(param, TOMOYO_PATH_GROUP);
+		return ptr->group != NULL;
+	}
+	filename = tomoyo_read_token(param);
+	if (!tomoyo_correct_word(filename))
+		return false;
+	ptr->filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename);
+	return ptr->filename != NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_parse_number_union - Parse a tomoyo_number_union.
+ *
+ * @param: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_param".
+ * @ptr:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_parse_number_union(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param,
+			       struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr)
+{
+	char *data;
+	u8 type;
+	unsigned long v;
+
+	memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(*ptr));
+	if (param->data[0] == '@') {
+		param->data++;
+		ptr->group = tomoyo_get_group(param, TOMOYO_NUMBER_GROUP);
+		return ptr->group != NULL;
+	}
+	data = tomoyo_read_token(param);
+	type = tomoyo_parse_ulong(&v, &data);
+	if (type == TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_INVALID)
+		return false;
+	ptr->values[0] = v;
+	ptr->value_type[0] = type;
+	if (!*data) {
+		ptr->values[1] = v;
+		ptr->value_type[1] = type;
+		return true;
+	}
+	if (*data++ != '-')
+		return false;
+	type = tomoyo_parse_ulong(&v, &data);
+	if (type == TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_INVALID || *data || ptr->values[0] > v)
+		return false;
+	ptr->values[1] = v;
+	ptr->value_type[1] = type;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_byte_range - Check whether the string is a \ooo style octal value.
+ *
+ * @str: Pointer to the string.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @str is a \ooo style octal value, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * TOMOYO uses \ooo style representation for 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x7F - 0xFF.
+ * This function verifies that \ooo is in valid range.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_byte_range(const char *str)
+{
+	return *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '3' &&
+		*str >= '0' && *str++ <= '7' &&
+		*str >= '0' && *str <= '7';
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_alphabet_char - Check whether the character is an alphabet.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is an alphabet character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_alphabet_char(const char c)
+{
+	return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z');
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_make_byte - Make byte value from three octal characters.
+ *
+ * @c1: The first character.
+ * @c2: The second character.
+ * @c3: The third character.
+ *
+ * Returns byte value.
+ */
+static inline u8 tomoyo_make_byte(const u8 c1, const u8 c2, const u8 c3)
+{
+	return ((c1 - '0') << 6) + ((c2 - '0') << 3) + (c3 - '0');
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_valid - Check whether the character is a valid char.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is a valid character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_valid(const unsigned char c)
+{
+	return c > ' ' && c < 127;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_invalid - Check whether the character is an invalid char.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is an invalid character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_invalid(const unsigned char c)
+{
+	return c && (c <= ' ' || c >= 127);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_str_starts - Check whether the given string starts with the given keyword.
+ *
+ * @src:  Pointer to pointer to the string.
+ * @find: Pointer to the keyword.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @src starts with @find, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The @src is updated to point the first character after the @find
+ * if @src starts with @find.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_str_starts(char **src, const char *find)
+{
+	const int len = strlen(find);
+	char *tmp = *src;
+
+	if (strncmp(tmp, find, len))
+		return false;
+	tmp += len;
+	*src = tmp;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_normalize_line - Format string.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The line to normalize.
+ *
+ * Leading and trailing whitespaces are removed.
+ * Multiple whitespaces are packed into single space.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+	unsigned char *sp = buffer;
+	unsigned char *dp = buffer;
+	bool first = true;
+
+	while (tomoyo_invalid(*sp))
+		sp++;
+	while (*sp) {
+		if (!first)
+			*dp++ = ' ';
+		first = false;
+		while (tomoyo_valid(*sp))
+			*dp++ = *sp++;
+		while (tomoyo_invalid(*sp))
+			sp++;
+	}
+	*dp = '\0';
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_correct_word2 - Validate a string.
+ *
+ * @string: The string to check. Maybe non-'\0'-terminated.
+ * @len:    Length of @string.
+ *
+ * Check whether the given string follows the naming rules.
+ * Returns true if @string follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_correct_word2(const char *string, size_t len)
+{
+	u8 recursion = 20;
+	const char *const start = string;
+	bool in_repetition = false;
+
+	if (!len)
+		goto out;
+	while (len--) {
+		unsigned char c = *string++;
+
+		if (c == '\\') {
+			if (!len--)
+				goto out;
+			c = *string++;
+			if (c >= '0' && c <= '3') {
+				unsigned char d;
+				unsigned char e;
+
+				if (!len-- || !len--)
+					goto out;
+				d = *string++;
+				e = *string++;
+				if (d < '0' || d > '7' || e < '0' || e > '7')
+					goto out;
+				c = tomoyo_make_byte(c, d, e);
+				if (c <= ' ' || c >= 127)
+					continue;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			switch (c) {
+			case '\\':  /* "\\" */
+			case '+':   /* "\+" */
+			case '?':   /* "\?" */
+			case 'x':   /* "\x" */
+			case 'a':   /* "\a" */
+			case '-':   /* "\-" */
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (!recursion--)
+				goto out;
+			switch (c) {
+			case '*':   /* "\*" */
+			case '@':   /* "\@" */
+			case '$':   /* "\$" */
+			case 'X':   /* "\X" */
+			case 'A':   /* "\A" */
+				continue;
+			case '{':   /* "/\{" */
+				if (string - 3 < start || *(string - 3) != '/')
+					goto out;
+				in_repetition = true;
+				continue;
+			case '}':   /* "\}/" */
+				if (*string != '/')
+					goto out;
+				if (!in_repetition)
+					goto out;
+				in_repetition = false;
+				continue;
+			}
+			goto out;
+		} else if (in_repetition && c == '/') {
+			goto out;
+		} else if (c <= ' ' || c >= 127) {
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if (in_repetition)
+		goto out;
+	return true;
+ out:
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_correct_word - Validate a string.
+ *
+ * @string: The string to check.
+ *
+ * Check whether the given string follows the naming rules.
+ * Returns true if @string follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_correct_word(const char *string)
+{
+	return tomoyo_correct_word2(string, strlen(string));
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_correct_path2 - Check whether the given pathname follows the naming rules.
+ *
+ * @filename: The pathname to check.
+ * @len:      Length of @filename.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_correct_path2(const char *filename, const size_t len)
+{
+	const char *cp1 = memchr(filename, '/', len);
+	const char *cp2 = memchr(filename, '.', len);
+
+	return cp1 && (!cp2 || (cp1 < cp2)) && tomoyo_correct_word2(filename, len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_correct_path - Validate a pathname.
+ *
+ * @filename: The pathname to check.
+ *
+ * Check whether the given pathname follows the naming rules.
+ * Returns true if @filename follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_correct_path(const char *filename)
+{
+	return tomoyo_correct_path2(filename, strlen(filename));
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_correct_domain - Check whether the given domainname follows the naming rules.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The domainname to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @domainname follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname)
+{
+	if (!domainname || !tomoyo_domain_def(domainname))
+		return false;
+	domainname = strchr(domainname, ' ');
+	if (!domainname++)
+		return true;
+	while (1) {
+		const unsigned char *cp = strchr(domainname, ' ');
+
+		if (!cp)
+			break;
+		if (!tomoyo_correct_path2(domainname, cp - domainname))
+			return false;
+		domainname = cp + 1;
+	}
+	return tomoyo_correct_path(domainname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_domain_def - Check whether the given token can be a domainname.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The token to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @buffer possibly be a domainname, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+	const unsigned char *cp;
+	int len;
+
+	if (*buffer != '<')
+		return false;
+	cp = strchr(buffer, ' ');
+	if (!cp)
+		len = strlen(buffer);
+	else
+		len = cp - buffer;
+	if (buffer[len - 1] != '>' ||
+	    !tomoyo_correct_word2(buffer + 1, len - 2))
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_domain - Find a domain by the given name.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The domainname to find.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" if found, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+	name.name = domainname;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list,
+				srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+		if (!domain->is_deleted &&
+		    !tomoyo_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname))
+			return domain;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_const_part_length - Evaluate the initial length without a pattern in a token.
+ *
+ * @filename: The string to evaluate.
+ *
+ * Returns the initial length without a pattern in @filename.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_const_part_length(const char *filename)
+{
+	char c;
+	int len = 0;
+
+	if (!filename)
+		return 0;
+	while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') {
+		if (c != '\\') {
+			len++;
+			continue;
+		}
+		c = *filename++;
+		switch (c) {
+		case '\\':  /* "\\" */
+			len += 2;
+			continue;
+		case '0':   /* "\ooo" */
+		case '1':
+		case '2':
+		case '3':
+			c = *filename++;
+			if (c < '0' || c > '7')
+				break;
+			c = *filename++;
+			if (c < '0' || c > '7')
+				break;
+			len += 4;
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_fill_path_info - Fill in "struct tomoyo_path_info" members.
+ *
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" to fill in.
+ *
+ * The caller sets "struct tomoyo_path_info"->name.
+ */
+void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr)
+{
+	const char *name = ptr->name;
+	const int len = strlen(name);
+
+	ptr->const_len = tomoyo_const_part_length(name);
+	ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/');
+	ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len);
+	ptr->hash = full_name_hash(NULL, name, len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2 - Pattern matching without '/' character and "\-" pattern.
+ *
+ * @filename:     The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern:      The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end:  The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(const char *filename,
+					 const char *filename_end,
+					 const char *pattern,
+					 const char *pattern_end)
+{
+	while (filename < filename_end && pattern < pattern_end) {
+		char c;
+		int i;
+		int j;
+
+		if (*pattern != '\\') {
+			if (*filename++ != *pattern++)
+				return false;
+			continue;
+		}
+		c = *filename;
+		pattern++;
+		switch (*pattern) {
+		case '?':
+			if (c == '/') {
+				return false;
+			} else if (c == '\\') {
+				if (filename[1] == '\\')
+					filename++;
+				else if (tomoyo_byte_range(filename + 1))
+					filename += 3;
+				else
+					return false;
+			}
+			break;
+		case '\\':
+			if (c != '\\')
+				return false;
+			if (*++filename != '\\')
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case '+':
+			if (!isdigit(c))
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case 'x':
+			if (!isxdigit(c))
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			if (!tomoyo_alphabet_char(c))
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case '0':
+		case '1':
+		case '2':
+		case '3':
+			if (c == '\\' && tomoyo_byte_range(filename + 1)
+			    && strncmp(filename + 1, pattern, 3) == 0) {
+				filename += 3;
+				pattern += 2;
+				break;
+			}
+			return false; /* Not matched. */
+		case '*':
+		case '@':
+			for (i = 0; i <= filename_end - filename; i++) {
+				if (tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(
+						    filename + i, filename_end,
+						    pattern + 1, pattern_end))
+					return true;
+				c = filename[i];
+				if (c == '.' && *pattern == '@')
+					break;
+				if (c != '\\')
+					continue;
+				if (filename[i + 1] == '\\')
+					i++;
+				else if (tomoyo_byte_range(filename + i + 1))
+					i += 3;
+				else
+					break; /* Bad pattern. */
+			}
+			return false; /* Not matched. */
+		default:
+			j = 0;
+			c = *pattern;
+			if (c == '$') {
+				while (isdigit(filename[j]))
+					j++;
+			} else if (c == 'X') {
+				while (isxdigit(filename[j]))
+					j++;
+			} else if (c == 'A') {
+				while (tomoyo_alphabet_char(filename[j]))
+					j++;
+			}
+			for (i = 1; i <= j; i++) {
+				if (tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(
+						    filename + i, filename_end,
+						    pattern + 1, pattern_end))
+					return true;
+			}
+			return false; /* Not matched or bad pattern. */
+		}
+		filename++;
+		pattern++;
+	}
+	while (*pattern == '\\' &&
+	       (*(pattern + 1) == '*' || *(pattern + 1) == '@'))
+		pattern += 2;
+	return filename == filename_end && pattern == pattern_end;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_matches_pattern - Pattern matching without '/' character.
+ *
+ * @filename:     The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern:      The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end:  The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(const char *filename,
+					const char *filename_end,
+					const char *pattern,
+					const char *pattern_end)
+{
+	const char *pattern_start = pattern;
+	bool first = true;
+	bool result;
+
+	while (pattern < pattern_end - 1) {
+		/* Split at "\-" pattern. */
+		if (*pattern++ != '\\' || *pattern++ != '-')
+			continue;
+		result = tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(filename,
+						      filename_end,
+						      pattern_start,
+						      pattern - 2);
+		if (first)
+			result = !result;
+		if (result)
+			return false;
+		first = false;
+		pattern_start = pattern;
+	}
+	result = tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(filename, filename_end,
+					      pattern_start, pattern_end);
+	return first ? result : !result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2 - Do pathname pattern matching.
+ *
+ * @f: The start of string to check.
+ * @p: The start of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @f matches @p, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(const char *f, const char *p)
+{
+	const char *f_delimiter;
+	const char *p_delimiter;
+
+	while (*f && *p) {
+		f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/');
+		if (!f_delimiter)
+			f_delimiter = f + strlen(f);
+		p_delimiter = strchr(p, '/');
+		if (!p_delimiter)
+			p_delimiter = p + strlen(p);
+		if (*p == '\\' && *(p + 1) == '{')
+			goto recursive;
+		if (!tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p,
+						 p_delimiter))
+			return false;
+		f = f_delimiter;
+		if (*f)
+			f++;
+		p = p_delimiter;
+		if (*p)
+			p++;
+	}
+	/* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */
+	while (*p == '\\' &&
+	       (*(p + 1) == '*' || *(p + 1) == '@'))
+		p += 2;
+	return !*f && !*p;
+ recursive:
+	/*
+	 * The "\{" pattern is permitted only after '/' character.
+	 * This guarantees that below "*(p - 1)" is safe.
+	 * Also, the "\}" pattern is permitted only before '/' character
+	 * so that "\{" + "\}" pair will not break the "\-" operator.
+	 */
+	if (*(p - 1) != '/' || p_delimiter <= p + 3 || *p_delimiter != '/' ||
+	    *(p_delimiter - 1) != '}' || *(p_delimiter - 2) != '\\')
+		return false; /* Bad pattern. */
+	do {
+		/* Compare current component with pattern. */
+		if (!tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p + 2,
+						 p_delimiter - 2))
+			break;
+		/* Proceed to next component. */
+		f = f_delimiter;
+		if (!*f)
+			break;
+		f++;
+		/* Continue comparison. */
+		if (tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(f, p_delimiter + 1))
+			return true;
+		f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/');
+	} while (f_delimiter);
+	return false; /* Not matched. */
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern - Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern.
+ *
+ * @filename: The filename to check.
+ * @pattern:  The pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if matches, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The following patterns are available.
+ *   \\     \ itself.
+ *   \ooo   Octal representation of a byte.
+ *   \*     Zero or more repetitions of characters other than '/'.
+ *   \@     Zero or more repetitions of characters other than '/' or '.'.
+ *   \?     1 byte character other than '/'.
+ *   \$     One or more repetitions of decimal digits.
+ *   \+     1 decimal digit.
+ *   \X     One or more repetitions of hexadecimal digits.
+ *   \x     1 hexadecimal digit.
+ *   \A     One or more repetitions of alphabet characters.
+ *   \a     1 alphabet character.
+ *
+ *   \-     Subtraction operator.
+ *
+ *   /\{dir\}/   '/' + 'One or more repetitions of dir/' (e.g. /dir/ /dir/dir/
+ *               /dir/dir/dir/ ).
+ */
+bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+				 const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern)
+{
+	const char *f = filename->name;
+	const char *p = pattern->name;
+	const int len = pattern->const_len;
+
+	/* If @pattern doesn't contain pattern, I can use strcmp(). */
+	if (!pattern->is_patterned)
+		return !tomoyo_pathcmp(filename, pattern);
+	/* Don't compare directory and non-directory. */
+	if (filename->is_dir != pattern->is_dir)
+		return false;
+	/* Compare the initial length without patterns. */
+	if (strncmp(f, p, len))
+		return false;
+	f += len;
+	p += len;
+	return tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(f, p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_exe - Get tomoyo_realpath() of current process.
+ *
+ * Returns the tomoyo_realpath() of current process on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This function uses kzalloc(), so the caller must call kfree()
+ * if this function didn't return NULL.
+ */
+const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void)
+{
+	struct file *exe_file;
+	const char *cp;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+
+	if (!mm)
+		return NULL;
+	exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
+	if (!exe_file)
+		return NULL;
+
+	cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&exe_file->f_path);
+	fput(exe_file);
+	return cp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_mode - Get MAC mode.
+ *
+ * @ns:      Pointer to "struct tomoyo_policy_namespace".
+ * @profile: Profile number.
+ * @index:   Index number of functionality.
+ *
+ * Returns mode.
+ */
+int tomoyo_get_mode(const struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns, const u8 profile,
+		    const u8 index)
+{
+	u8 mode;
+	struct tomoyo_profile *p;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+		return TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED;
+	p = tomoyo_profile(ns, profile);
+	mode = p->config[index];
+	if (mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT)
+		mode = p->config[tomoyo_index2category[index]
+				 + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX];
+	if (mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT)
+		mode = p->default_config;
+	return mode & 3;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_init_request_info - Initialize "struct tomoyo_request_info" members.
+ *
+ * @r:      Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info" to initialize.
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". NULL for tomoyo_domain().
+ * @index:  Index number of functionality.
+ *
+ * Returns mode.
+ */
+int tomoyo_init_request_info(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+			     struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, const u8 index)
+{
+	u8 profile;
+
+	memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r));
+	if (!domain)
+		domain = tomoyo_domain();
+	r->domain = domain;
+	profile = domain->profile;
+	r->profile = profile;
+	r->type = index;
+	r->mode = tomoyo_get_mode(domain->ns, profile, index);
+	return r->mode;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok - Check for domain's quota.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if the domain is not exceeded quota, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
+{
+	unsigned int count = 0;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = r->domain;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+
+	if (r->mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_LEARNING)
+		return false;
+	if (!domain)
+		return true;
+	if (READ_ONCE(domain->flags[TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED]))
+		return false;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list,
+				srcu_read_lock_held(&tomoyo_ss)) {
+		u16 perm;
+
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * Reading perm bitmap might race with tomoyo_merge_*() because
+		 * caller does not hold tomoyo_policy_lock mutex. But exceeding
+		 * max_learning_entry parameter by a few entries does not harm.
+		 */
+		switch (ptr->type) {
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL:
+			perm = data_race(container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head)->perm);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL:
+			perm = data_race(container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head)->perm);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL:
+			perm = data_race(container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path_number_acl, head)
+				  ->perm);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL:
+			perm = data_race(container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl, head)->perm);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_INET_ACL:
+			perm = data_race(container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_inet_acl, head)->perm);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_UNIX_ACL:
+			perm = data_race(container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_unix_acl, head)->perm);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_MANUAL_TASK_ACL:
+			perm = 0;
+			break;
+		default:
+			perm = 1;
+		}
+		count += hweight16(perm);
+	}
+	if (count < tomoyo_profile(domain->ns, domain->profile)->
+	    pref[TOMOYO_PREF_MAX_LEARNING_ENTRY])
+		return true;
+	WRITE_ONCE(domain->flags[TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED], true);
+	/* r->granted = false; */
+	tomoyo_write_log(r, "%s", tomoyo_dif[TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED]);
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_INSECURE_BUILTIN_SETTING
+	pr_warn("WARNING: Domain '%s' has too many ACLs to hold. Stopped learning mode.\n",
+		domain->domainname->name);
+#endif
+	return false;
+}
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a81030412
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config SECURITY_YAMA
+	bool "Yama support"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
+	  system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
+	  access controls. Currently available is ptrace scope restriction.
+	  Like capabilities, this security module stacks with other LSMs.
+	  Further information can be found in
+	  Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/yama/Makefile b/security/yama/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0fa5d0fe2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/yama/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) := yama.o
+
+yama-y := yama_lsm.o
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cef3776cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Yama Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Canonical, Ltd.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
+#include <linux/task_work.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+#define YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED	0
+#define YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL	1
+#define YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY	2
+#define YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH	3
+
+static int ptrace_scope = YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL;
+
+/* describe a ptrace relationship for potential exception */
+struct ptrace_relation {
+	struct task_struct *tracer;
+	struct task_struct *tracee;
+	bool invalid;
+	struct list_head node;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(ptracer_relations);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock);
+
+static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work);
+static DECLARE_WORK(yama_relation_work, yama_relation_cleanup);
+
+struct access_report_info {
+	struct callback_head work;
+	const char *access;
+	struct task_struct *target;
+	struct task_struct *agent;
+};
+
+static void __report_access(struct callback_head *work)
+{
+	struct access_report_info *info =
+		container_of(work, struct access_report_info, work);
+	char *target_cmd, *agent_cmd;
+
+	target_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(info->target, GFP_KERNEL);
+	agent_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(info->agent, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	pr_notice_ratelimited(
+		"ptrace %s of \"%s\"[%d] was attempted by \"%s\"[%d]\n",
+		info->access, target_cmd, info->target->pid, agent_cmd,
+		info->agent->pid);
+
+	kfree(agent_cmd);
+	kfree(target_cmd);
+
+	put_task_struct(info->agent);
+	put_task_struct(info->target);
+	kfree(info);
+}
+
+/* defers execution because cmdline access can sleep */
+static void report_access(const char *access, struct task_struct *target,
+				struct task_struct *agent)
+{
+	struct access_report_info *info;
+
+	assert_spin_locked(&target->alloc_lock); /* for target->comm */
+
+	if (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD) {
+		/* I don't think kthreads call task_work_run() before exiting.
+		 * Imagine angry ranting about procfs here.
+		 */
+		pr_notice_ratelimited(
+		    "ptrace %s of \"%s\"[%d] was attempted by \"%s\"[%d]\n",
+		    access, target->comm, target->pid, agent->comm, agent->pid);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	info = kmalloc_obj(*info, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!info)
+		return;
+	init_task_work(&info->work, __report_access);
+	get_task_struct(target);
+	get_task_struct(agent);
+	info->access = access;
+	info->target = target;
+	info->agent = agent;
+	if (task_work_add(current, &info->work, TWA_RESUME) == 0)
+		return; /* success */
+
+	WARN(1, "report_access called from exiting task");
+	put_task_struct(target);
+	put_task_struct(agent);
+	kfree(info);
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_relation_cleanup - remove invalid entries from the relation list
+ * @work: unused
+ *
+ */
+static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct ptrace_relation *relation;
+
+	spin_lock(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
+		if (relation->invalid) {
+			list_del_rcu(&relation->node);
+			kfree_rcu(relation, rcu);
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	spin_unlock(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_ptracer_add - add/replace an exception for this tracer/tracee pair
+ * @tracer: the task_struct of the process doing the ptrace
+ * @tracee: the task_struct of the process to be ptraced
+ *
+ * Each tracee can have, at most, one tracer registered. Each time this
+ * is called, the prior registered tracer will be replaced for the tracee.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if relationship was added, -ve on error.
+ */
+static int yama_ptracer_add(struct task_struct *tracer,
+			    struct task_struct *tracee)
+{
+	struct ptrace_relation *relation, *added;
+
+	added = kmalloc_obj(*added);
+	if (!added)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	added->tracee = tracee;
+	added->tracer = tracer;
+	added->invalid = false;
+
+	spin_lock(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
+		if (relation->invalid)
+			continue;
+		if (relation->tracee == tracee) {
+			list_replace_rcu(&relation->node, &added->node);
+			kfree_rcu(relation, rcu);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	list_add_rcu(&added->node, &ptracer_relations);
+
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	spin_unlock(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_ptracer_del - remove exceptions related to the given tasks
+ * @tracer: remove any relation where tracer task matches
+ * @tracee: remove any relation where tracee task matches
+ */
+static void yama_ptracer_del(struct task_struct *tracer,
+			     struct task_struct *tracee)
+{
+	struct ptrace_relation *relation;
+	bool marked = false;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
+		if (relation->invalid)
+			continue;
+		if (relation->tracee == tracee ||
+		    (tracer && relation->tracer == tracer)) {
+			relation->invalid = true;
+			marked = true;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (marked)
+		schedule_work(&yama_relation_work);
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_task_free - check for task_pid to remove from exception list
+ * @task: task being removed
+ */
+static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	yama_ptracer_del(task, task);
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_task_prctl - check for Yama-specific prctl operations
+ * @option: operation
+ * @arg2: argument
+ * @arg3: argument
+ * @arg4: argument
+ * @arg5: argument
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -ve on error.  -ENOSYS is returned when Yama
+ * does not handle the given option.
+ */
+static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+			   unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
+{
+	int rc = -ENOSYS;
+	struct task_struct *myself;
+
+	switch (option) {
+	case PR_SET_PTRACER:
+		/* Since a thread can call prctl(), find the group leader
+		 * before calling _add() or _del() on it, since we want
+		 * process-level granularity of control. The tracer group
+		 * leader checking is handled later when walking the ancestry
+		 * at the time of PTRACE_ATTACH check.
+		 */
+		myself = current->group_leader;
+
+		if (arg2 == 0) {
+			yama_ptracer_del(NULL, myself);
+			rc = 0;
+		} else if (arg2 == PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY || (int)arg2 == -1) {
+			rc = yama_ptracer_add(NULL, myself);
+		} else {
+			struct task_struct *tracer;
+
+			tracer = find_get_task_by_vpid(arg2);
+			if (!tracer) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+			} else {
+				rc = yama_ptracer_add(tracer, myself);
+				put_task_struct(tracer);
+			}
+		}
+
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * task_is_descendant - walk up a process family tree looking for a match
+ * @parent: the process to compare against while walking up from child
+ * @child: the process to start from while looking upwards for parent
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if child is a descendant of parent, 0 if not.
+ */
+static int task_is_descendant(struct task_struct *parent,
+			      struct task_struct *child)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct task_struct *walker = child;
+
+	if (!parent || !child)
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (!thread_group_leader(parent))
+		parent = rcu_dereference(parent->group_leader);
+	while (walker->pid > 0) {
+		if (!thread_group_leader(walker))
+			walker = rcu_dereference(walker->group_leader);
+		if (walker == parent) {
+			rc = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		walker = rcu_dereference(walker->real_parent);
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ptracer_exception_found - tracer registered as exception for this tracee
+ * @tracer: the task_struct of the process attempting ptrace
+ * @tracee: the task_struct of the process to be ptraced
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if tracer has a ptracer exception ancestor for tracee.
+ */
+static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer,
+				   struct task_struct *tracee)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ptrace_relation *relation;
+	struct task_struct *parent = NULL;
+	bool found = false;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	/*
+	 * If there's already an active tracing relationship, then make an
+	 * exception for the sake of other accesses, like process_vm_rw().
+	 */
+	parent = ptrace_parent(tracee);
+	if (parent != NULL && same_thread_group(parent, tracer)) {
+		rc = 1;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	/* Look for a PR_SET_PTRACER relationship. */
+	if (!thread_group_leader(tracee))
+		tracee = rcu_dereference(tracee->group_leader);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
+		if (relation->invalid)
+			continue;
+		if (relation->tracee == tracee) {
+			parent = relation->tracer;
+			found = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (found && (parent == NULL || task_is_descendant(parent, tracer)))
+		rc = 1;
+
+unlock:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_ptrace_access_check - validate PTRACE_ATTACH calls
+ * @child: task that current task is attempting to ptrace
+ * @mode: ptrace attach mode
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
+ */
+static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+				    unsigned int mode)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
+		switch (ptrace_scope) {
+		case YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED:
+			/* No additional restrictions. */
+			break;
+		case YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL:
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			if (!pid_alive(child))
+				rc = -EPERM;
+			if (!rc && !task_is_descendant(current, child) &&
+			    !ptracer_exception_found(current, child) &&
+			    !ns_capable(__task_cred(child)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+				rc = -EPERM;
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			break;
+		case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY:
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			if (!ns_capable(__task_cred(child)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+				rc = -EPERM;
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			break;
+		case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH:
+		default:
+			rc = -EPERM;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (rc && (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0)
+		report_access("attach", child, current);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_ptrace_traceme - validate PTRACE_TRACEME calls
+ * @parent: task that will become the ptracer of the current task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
+ */
+static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/* Only disallow PTRACE_TRACEME on more aggressive settings. */
+	switch (ptrace_scope) {
+	case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY:
+		if (!has_ns_capability(parent, current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+			rc = -EPERM;
+		break;
+	case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH:
+		rc = -EPERM;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (rc) {
+		task_lock(current);
+		report_access("traceme", current, parent);
+		task_unlock(current);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct lsm_id yama_lsmid = {
+	.name = "yama",
+	.id = LSM_ID_YAMA,
+};
+
+static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, yama_task_prctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, yama_task_free),
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static int yama_dointvec_minmax(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+				void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct ctl_table table_copy;
+
+	if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* Lock the max value if it ever gets set. */
+	table_copy = *table;
+	if (*(int *)table_copy.data == *(int *)table_copy.extra2)
+		table_copy.extra1 = table_copy.extra2;
+
+	return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
+static int max_scope = YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH;
+
+static const struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname       = "ptrace_scope",
+		.data           = &ptrace_scope,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = yama_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+		.extra2         = &max_scope,
+	},
+};
+static void __init yama_init_sysctl(void)
+{
+	if (!register_sysctl("kernel/yama", yama_sysctl_table))
+		panic("Yama: sysctl registration failed.\n");
+}
+#else
+static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
+static int __init yama_init(void)
+{
+	pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
+	security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
+	yama_init_sysctl();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(yama) = {
+	.id = &yama_lsmid,
+	.init = yama_init,
+};
-- 
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