From ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Bilal Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:54:55 +0500 Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse() rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/loadpin/Kconfig | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/loadpin/Kconfig (limited to 'security/loadpin/Kconfig') diff --git a/security/loadpin/Kconfig b/security/loadpin/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aef63d3e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/loadpin/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +config SECURITY_LOADPIN + bool "Pin load of kernel files (modules, fw, etc) to one filesystem" + depends on SECURITY && BLOCK + help + Any files read through the kernel file reading interface + (kernel modules, firmware, kexec images, security policy) + can be pinned to the first filesystem used for loading. When + enabled, any files that come from other filesystems will be + rejected. This is best used on systems without an initrd that + have a root filesystem backed by a read-only device such as + dm-verity or a CDROM. + +config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE + bool "Enforce LoadPin at boot" + depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN + # Module compression breaks LoadPin unless modules are decompressed in + # the kernel. + depends on !MODULE_COMPRESS || MODULE_DECOMPRESS + help + If selected, LoadPin will enforce pinning at boot. If not + selected, it can be enabled at boot with the kernel parameter + "loadpin.enforce=1". + +config SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY + bool "Allow reading files from certain other filesystems that use dm-verity" + depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN && DM_VERITY=y && SECURITYFS + help + If selected LoadPin can allow reading files from filesystems + that use dm-verity. LoadPin maintains a list of verity root + digests it considers trusted. A verity backed filesystem is + considered trusted if its root digest is found in the list + of trusted digests. + + The list of trusted verity can be populated through an ioctl + on the LoadPin securityfs entry 'dm-verity'. The ioctl + expects a file descriptor of a file with verity digests as + parameter. The file must be located on the pinned root and + start with the line: + + # LOADPIN_TRUSTED_VERITY_ROOT_DIGESTS + + This is followed by the verity digests, with one digest per + line. -- cgit v1.3.1