From 3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2026 15:31:14 -0700 Subject: treewide: refresh kmalloc_obj() conversions This is another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc() family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules in scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci This catches both the set of kmalloc() uses added since the first kmalloc_obj() conversions in v7.0 and adds a large group missed in the first pass due to Coccinelle not interacting well with the cleanup.h scoped_...() family of macros[1]. I worked around this with spatch's "--macro-file" argument to a file with all the scoped_...() macros mapped to Coccinelle's YACFE_ITERATOR[2] as that was the closest viable control flow indicator I could find. Build tested allmodconfig on x86, arm64, arm, loongarch, mips, powerpc, riscv, and s390 with no new warnings. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202609021314.8A9C0B8@keescook/ [1] Link: https://github.com/coccinelle/coccinelle/blob/master/standard.h [2] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- security/loadpin/Kconfig | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/loadpin/Kconfig (limited to 'security/loadpin/Kconfig') diff --git a/security/loadpin/Kconfig b/security/loadpin/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aef63d3e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/loadpin/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +config SECURITY_LOADPIN + bool "Pin load of kernel files (modules, fw, etc) to one filesystem" + depends on SECURITY && BLOCK + help + Any files read through the kernel file reading interface + (kernel modules, firmware, kexec images, security policy) + can be pinned to the first filesystem used for loading. When + enabled, any files that come from other filesystems will be + rejected. This is best used on systems without an initrd that + have a root filesystem backed by a read-only device such as + dm-verity or a CDROM. + +config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE + bool "Enforce LoadPin at boot" + depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN + # Module compression breaks LoadPin unless modules are decompressed in + # the kernel. + depends on !MODULE_COMPRESS || MODULE_DECOMPRESS + help + If selected, LoadPin will enforce pinning at boot. If not + selected, it can be enabled at boot with the kernel parameter + "loadpin.enforce=1". + +config SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY + bool "Allow reading files from certain other filesystems that use dm-verity" + depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN && DM_VERITY=y && SECURITYFS + help + If selected LoadPin can allow reading files from filesystems + that use dm-verity. LoadPin maintains a list of verity root + digests it considers trusted. A verity backed filesystem is + considered trusted if its root digest is found in the list + of trusted digests. + + The list of trusted verity can be populated through an ioctl + on the LoadPin securityfs entry 'dm-verity'. The ioctl + expects a file descriptor of a file with verity digests as + parameter. The file must be located on the pinned root and + start with the line: + + # LOADPIN_TRUSTED_VERITY_ROOT_DIGESTS + + This is followed by the verity digests, with one digest per + line. -- cgit v1.3.1