From ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Bilal Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:54:55 +0500 Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse() rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/landlock/log.h | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 86 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/landlock/log.h (limited to 'security/landlock/log.h') diff --git a/security/landlock/log.h b/security/landlock/log.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e0a6e44f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/log.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Landlock - Log helpers + * + * Copyright © 2023-2025 Microsoft Corporation + * Copyright © 2026 Cloudflare, Inc. + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG_H +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG_H + +#include + +#include "access.h" + +struct landlock_cred_security; +struct landlock_hierarchy; + +enum landlock_request_type { + LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE = 1, + LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY, + LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS, + LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS, + LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET, + LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL, +}; + +/* + * We should be careful to only use a variable of this type for + * landlock_log_denial(). This way, the compiler can remove it entirely if + * CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG is not set. + */ +struct landlock_request { + /* Mandatory fields. */ + enum landlock_request_type type; + struct common_audit_data audit; + + /** + * layer_plus_one: First layer level that denies the request + 1. The + * extra one is useful to detect uninitialized field. + */ + size_t layer_plus_one; + + /* Required field for configurable access control. */ + access_mask_t access; + + /* Required fields for requests with layer masks. */ + const struct layer_masks *layer_masks; + + /* Required fields for requests with deny masks. */ + const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access; + deny_masks_t deny_masks; + optional_access_t quiet_optional_accesses; + + /* + * Other-party domain ID for a relational (scope/ptrace) denial, or 0 if + * that party is unsandboxed. An ID, not a pointer: the other task can + * replace its credential and free the domain it referenced. Trace path + * only; audit ignores it. + */ + u64 other_domain_id; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG + +void landlock_log_free_domain(const struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy); + +void landlock_log_denial(const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject, + const struct landlock_request *const request); + +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG */ + +static inline void +landlock_log_free_domain(const struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy) +{ +} + +static inline void +landlock_log_denial(const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject, + const struct landlock_request *const request) +{ +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG */ + +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG_H */ -- cgit v1.3.1