From 5febf432df1cfa5b25d99b54c32103fafbdd0eb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miguel Ojeda Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2026 15:32:33 +0200 Subject: kbuild: rust: keep Rust objects out of Clang LTO with inline helpers Under `CONFIG_LTO_CLANG` + `CONFIG_RUST_INLINE_HELPERS`, one may hit `objtool` errors such as: vmlinux.o: error: objtool: _R..._3Gsp4boot+0xd6a: can't find jump dest instruction at .text._R..._3Gsp4boot+0x1dfd The reason is that in such builds, the Clang invocation that compiles the combined Rust plus helpers bitcode emits LLVM bitcode (again) -- the final code generation happens in the linker's LTO step, which the `-mllvm` trap options passed to Clang do not reach. This, in turn, means that unreachable traps are missing, and the impossible paths do not merely fallthrough to the next symbol, but past the end of their own section, since LTO builds place each function in its own section. Thus filter `CC_FLAGS_LTO` out of the Clang invocation, so that it always emits machine code directly, with the traps in place. Assisted-by: LLM Cc: Gary Guo Cc: Boqun Feng Cc: Alice Ryhl Cc: Matthew Maurer Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3a2486cc1da5 ("kbuild: rust: provide an option to inline C helpers into Rust") Acked-by: Gary Guo Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260816133233.197500-2-ojeda@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda --- security/ipe/Kconfig | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 117 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/Kconfig (limited to 'security/ipe/Kconfig') diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a110a6cd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +# +# Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) configuration +# + +menuconfig SECURITY_IPE + bool "Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)" + depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS && AUDIT && AUDITSYSCALL + select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + select IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY if DM_VERITY + select IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE if DM_VERITY && DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG + select IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY if FS_VERITY + select IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG if FS_VERITY && FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES + help + This option enables the Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM + allowing users to define a policy to enforce a trust-based access + control. A key feature of IPE is a customizable policy to allow + admins to reconfigure trust requirements on the fly. + + If unsure, answer N. + +if SECURITY_IPE +config IPE_BOOT_POLICY + string "Integrity policy to apply on system startup" + help + This option specifies a filepath to an IPE policy that is compiled + into the kernel. This policy will be enforced until a policy update + is deployed via the $securityfs/ipe/policies/$policy_name/active + interface. + + If unsure, leave blank. + +config IPE_POLICY_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING + bool "IPE policy update verification with secondary keyring" + default y + depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + help + Also allow the secondary trusted keyring to verify IPE policy + updates. + + If unsure, answer Y. + +config IPE_POLICY_SIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING + bool "IPE policy update verification with platform keyring" + default y + depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + help + Also allow the platform keyring to verify IPE policy updates. + + If unsure, answer Y. + +menu "IPE Trust Providers" + +config IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + bool "Enable support for dm-verity based on root hash" + depends on DM_VERITY + help + This option enables the 'dmverity_roothash' property within IPE + policies. The property evaluates to TRUE when a file from a dm-verity + volume is evaluated, and the volume's root hash matches the value + supplied in the policy. + +config IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE + bool "Enable support for dm-verity based on root hash signature" + depends on DM_VERITY && DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG + help + This option enables the 'dmverity_signature' property within IPE + policies. The property evaluates to TRUE when a file from a dm-verity + volume, which has been mounted with a valid signed root hash, + is evaluated. + + If unsure, answer Y. + +config IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY + bool "Enable support for fs-verity based on file digest" + depends on FS_VERITY + help + This option enables the 'fsverity_digest' property within IPE + policies. The property evaluates to TRUE when a file is fsverity + enabled and its digest matches the supplied digest value in the + policy. + + if unsure, answer Y. + +config IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG + bool "Enable support for fs-verity based on builtin signature" + depends on FS_VERITY && FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES + help + This option enables the 'fsverity_signature' property within IPE + policies. The property evaluates to TRUE when a file is fsverity + enabled and it has a valid builtin signature whose signing cert + is in the .fs-verity keyring. + + if unsure, answer Y. + +endmenu + +config SECURITY_IPE_KUNIT_TEST + bool "Build KUnit tests for IPE" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS + depends on KUNIT=y + default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS + help + This builds the IPE KUnit tests. + + KUnit tests run during boot and output the results to the debug log + in TAP format (https://testanything.org/). Only useful for kernel devs + running KUnit test harness and are not for inclusion into a + production build. + + For more information on KUnit and unit tests in general please refer + to the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/. + + If unsure, say N. + +endif -- cgit v1.3.1