From 5febf432df1cfa5b25d99b54c32103fafbdd0eb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miguel Ojeda Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2026 15:32:33 +0200 Subject: kbuild: rust: keep Rust objects out of Clang LTO with inline helpers Under `CONFIG_LTO_CLANG` + `CONFIG_RUST_INLINE_HELPERS`, one may hit `objtool` errors such as: vmlinux.o: error: objtool: _R..._3Gsp4boot+0xd6a: can't find jump dest instruction at .text._R..._3Gsp4boot+0x1dfd The reason is that in such builds, the Clang invocation that compiles the combined Rust plus helpers bitcode emits LLVM bitcode (again) -- the final code generation happens in the linker's LTO step, which the `-mllvm` trap options passed to Clang do not reach. This, in turn, means that unreachable traps are missing, and the impossible paths do not merely fallthrough to the next symbol, but past the end of their own section, since LTO builds place each function in its own section. Thus filter `CC_FLAGS_LTO` out of the Clang invocation, so that it always emits machine code directly, with the traps in place. Assisted-by: LLM Cc: Gary Guo Cc: Boqun Feng Cc: Alice Ryhl Cc: Matthew Maurer Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3a2486cc1da5 ("kbuild: rust: provide an option to inline C helpers into Rust") Acked-by: Gary Guo Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260816133233.197500-2-ojeda@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda --- security/apparmor/ipc.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 116 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/apparmor/ipc.c (limited to 'security/apparmor/ipc.c') diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..df5712cea --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. + */ + +#include + +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/capability.h" +#include "include/cred.h" +#include "include/policy.h" +#include "include/ipc.h" +#include "include/sig_names.h" + + +static inline int map_signal_num(int sig) +{ + if (sig > SIGRTMAX) + return SIGUNKNOWN; + else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN) + return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE; + else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG) + return sig_map[sig]; + return SIGUNKNOWN; +} + +/** + * audit_signal_mask - convert mask to permission string + * @mask: permission mask to convert + * + * Returns: pointer to static string + */ +static const char *audit_signal_mask(u32 mask) +{ + if (mask & MAY_READ) + return "receive"; + if (mask & MAY_WRITE) + return "send"; + return ""; +} + +/** + * audit_signal_cb() - call back for signal specific audit fields + * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL) + */ +static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa); + + if (ad->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"", + audit_signal_mask(ad->request)); + if (ad->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"", + audit_signal_mask(ad->denied)); + } + } + if (ad->signal == SIGUNKNOWN) + audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)", + ad->unmappedsig); + else if (ad->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME) + audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[ad->signal]); + else + audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d", + ad->signal - SIGRT_BASE); + audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer, + FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); +} + +static int profile_signal_perm(const struct cred *cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) +{ + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; + struct aa_perms perms; + aa_state_t state; + + if (profile_unconfined(profile)) + return 0; + + ad->subj_cred = cred; + ad->peer = peer; + /* TODO: secondary cache check */ + state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL); + if (!state) + return 0; + state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, ad->signal); + aa_label_match(profile, rules, peer, state, false, request, &perms); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_signal_cb); +} + +int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender, + const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target, + int sig) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL, OP_SIGNAL); + + ad.signal = map_signal_num(sig); + ad.unmappedsig = sig; + return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile, + profile_signal_perm(subj_cred, profile, target, + MAY_WRITE, &ad), + profile_signal_perm(target_cred, profile, sender, + MAY_READ, &ad)); +} -- cgit v1.3.1