From ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Bilal Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:54:55 +0500 Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse() rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ceph/msgpool.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 94 insertions(+) create mode 100644 net/ceph/msgpool.c (limited to 'net/ceph/msgpool.c') diff --git a/net/ceph/msgpool.c b/net/ceph/msgpool.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e3ecb80cd --- /dev/null +++ b/net/ceph/msgpool.c @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +static void *msgpool_alloc(gfp_t gfp_mask, void *arg) +{ + struct ceph_msgpool *pool = arg; + struct ceph_msg *msg; + + msg = ceph_msg_new2(pool->type, pool->front_len, pool->max_data_items, + gfp_mask, true); + if (!msg) { + dout("msgpool_alloc %s failed\n", pool->name); + } else { + dout("msgpool_alloc %s %p\n", pool->name, msg); + msg->pool = pool; + } + return msg; +} + +static void msgpool_free(void *element, void *arg) +{ + struct ceph_msgpool *pool = arg; + struct ceph_msg *msg = element; + + dout("msgpool_release %s %p\n", pool->name, msg); + msg->pool = NULL; + ceph_msg_put(msg); +} + +int ceph_msgpool_init(struct ceph_msgpool *pool, int type, + int front_len, int max_data_items, int size, + const char *name) +{ + dout("msgpool %s init\n", name); + pool->type = type; + pool->front_len = front_len; + pool->max_data_items = max_data_items; + pool->pool = mempool_create(size, msgpool_alloc, msgpool_free, pool); + if (!pool->pool) + return -ENOMEM; + pool->name = name; + return 0; +} + +void ceph_msgpool_destroy(struct ceph_msgpool *pool) +{ + dout("msgpool %s destroy\n", pool->name); + mempool_destroy(pool->pool); +} + +struct ceph_msg *ceph_msgpool_get(struct ceph_msgpool *pool, int front_len, + int max_data_items) +{ + struct ceph_msg *msg; + + if (front_len > pool->front_len || + max_data_items > pool->max_data_items) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("%s need %d/%d, pool %s has %d/%d\n", + __func__, front_len, max_data_items, pool->name, + pool->front_len, pool->max_data_items); + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + + /* try to alloc a fresh message */ + return ceph_msg_new2(pool->type, front_len, max_data_items, + GFP_NOFS, false); + } + + msg = mempool_alloc(pool->pool, GFP_NOFS); + dout("msgpool_get %s %p\n", pool->name, msg); + return msg; +} + +void ceph_msgpool_put(struct ceph_msgpool *pool, struct ceph_msg *msg) +{ + dout("msgpool_put %s %p\n", pool->name, msg); + + /* reset msg front_len; user may have changed it */ + msg->front.iov_len = pool->front_len; + msg->hdr.front_len = cpu_to_le32(pool->front_len); + + msg->data_length = 0; + msg->num_data_items = 0; + + kref_init(&msg->kref); /* retake single ref */ + mempool_free(msg, pool->pool); +} -- cgit v1.3.1