From a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jinke Han Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2026 15:37:42 +0800 Subject: x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructions When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ] Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Signed-off-by: Jinke Han Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Acked-by: Yafang Shao Acked-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000 --- lib/random32.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 136 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/random32.c (limited to 'lib/random32.c') diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dad90219c --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/random32.c @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * This is a maximally equidistributed combined Tausworthe generator + * based on code from GNU Scientific Library 1.5 (30 Jun 2004) + * + * lfsr113 version: + * + * x_n = (s1_n ^ s2_n ^ s3_n ^ s4_n) + * + * s1_{n+1} = (((s1_n & 4294967294) << 18) ^ (((s1_n << 6) ^ s1_n) >> 13)) + * s2_{n+1} = (((s2_n & 4294967288) << 2) ^ (((s2_n << 2) ^ s2_n) >> 27)) + * s3_{n+1} = (((s3_n & 4294967280) << 7) ^ (((s3_n << 13) ^ s3_n) >> 21)) + * s4_{n+1} = (((s4_n & 4294967168) << 13) ^ (((s4_n << 3) ^ s4_n) >> 12)) + * + * The period of this generator is about 2^113 (see erratum paper). + * + * From: P. L'Ecuyer, "Maximally Equidistributed Combined Tausworthe + * Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65, 213 (1996), 203--213: + * http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps + * ftp://ftp.iro.umontreal.ca/pub/simulation/lecuyer/papers/tausme.ps + * + * There is an erratum in the paper "Tables of Maximally Equidistributed + * Combined LFSR Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 68, 225 (1999), + * 261--269: http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps + * + * ... the k_j most significant bits of z_j must be non-zero, + * for each j. (Note: this restriction also applies to the + * computer code given in [4], but was mistakenly not mentioned + * in that paper.) + * + * This affects the seeding procedure by imposing the requirement + * s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator. + * @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state. + * + * This is used for pseudo-randomness with no outside seeding. + * For more random results, use get_random_u32(). + */ +u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state) +{ +#define TAUSWORTHE(s, a, b, c, d) ((s & c) << d) ^ (((s << a) ^ s) >> b) + state->s1 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s1, 6U, 13U, 4294967294U, 18U); + state->s2 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s2, 2U, 27U, 4294967288U, 2U); + state->s3 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s3, 13U, 21U, 4294967280U, 7U); + state->s4 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s4, 3U, 12U, 4294967168U, 13U); + + return (state->s1 ^ state->s2 ^ state->s3 ^ state->s4); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32_state); + +/** + * prandom_bytes_state - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes + * + * @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state. + * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to + * @bytes: the requested number of bytes + * + * This is used for pseudo-randomness with no outside seeding. + * For more random results, use get_random_bytes(). + */ +void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t bytes) +{ + u8 *ptr = buf; + + while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) { + put_unaligned(prandom_u32_state(state), (u32 *) ptr); + ptr += sizeof(u32); + bytes -= sizeof(u32); + } + + if (bytes > 0) { + u32 rem = prandom_u32_state(state); + do { + *ptr++ = (u8) rem; + bytes--; + rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE; + } while (bytes > 0); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes_state); + +/* + * Only declared here so that it has a prototype when made + * non-static for KUnit testing (avoids -Wmissing-prototypes). + */ +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT) +void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state); +#endif +VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state) +{ + /* Calling RNG ten times to satisfy recurrence condition */ + prandom_u32_state(state); + prandom_u32_state(state); + prandom_u32_state(state); + prandom_u32_state(state); + prandom_u32_state(state); + prandom_u32_state(state); + prandom_u32_state(state); + prandom_u32_state(state); + prandom_u32_state(state); + prandom_u32_state(state); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(prandom_warmup); + +void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state) +{ + int i; + + for_each_possible_cpu(i) { + struct rnd_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(pcpu_state, i); + u32 seeds[4]; + + get_random_bytes(&seeds, sizeof(seeds)); + state->s1 = __seed(seeds[0], 2U); + state->s2 = __seed(seeds[1], 8U); + state->s3 = __seed(seeds[2], 16U); + state->s4 = __seed(seeds[3], 128U); + + prandom_warmup(state); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed_full_state); -- cgit v1.3.1