From 33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexei Starovoitov Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2026 14:52:55 +0000 Subject: selftests/bpf: Test packet range of pointers sharing an id Add tests where two packet pointers share an id and tightening one pointer's umax from its var_off would put it less than their constant distance from the other's umax: with an index & 0x38 capped at 50, the base pointer keeps umax 50, so the pointer 8 bytes further on must keep umax 58, even though its known bits allow at most 56. These refused a valid program or accepted an out-of-bounds access before the fix: - check the advanced copy, load through the base: valid, was refused; - check the base, load the byte at base + 1 through a copy advanced by 8: was accepted; - check base + 4, load 4 bytes at base + 2 through base + 8: reads two bytes past the checked range, was accepted; - the same as the second with data_meta pointers checked against data: was accepted. These pass with and without the fix and cover nearby paths: - subtract an unknown scalar from a checked pointer and load below it (the range is kept across a new id); - reach a load through two paths whose checks cover 8 and 7 bytes after the loaded pointer; the second path must not be pruned by the first; - spill a copy of a pointer, check the pointer, fill the copy and load one byte past the checked range: the load is refused, and the copy has the range of the check. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20261001145255.855630-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi --- lib/crypto/s390/aes.h | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 106 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/crypto/s390/aes.h (limited to 'lib/crypto/s390/aes.h') diff --git a/lib/crypto/s390/aes.h b/lib/crypto/s390/aes.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5466f6ecb --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/crypto/s390/aes.h @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +/* + * AES optimized using the CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions (CPACF) + * + * Copyright 2026 Google LLC + */ +#include +#include + +static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(have_cpacf_aes128); +static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(have_cpacf_aes192); +static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(have_cpacf_aes256); + +/* + * When the CPU supports CPACF AES for the requested key length, we need only + * save a copy of the raw AES key, as that's what the CPACF instructions need. + * + * When unsupported, fall back to the generic key expansion and en/decryption. + */ +static void aes_preparekey_arch(union aes_enckey_arch *k, + union aes_invkey_arch *inv_k, + const u8 *in_key, int key_len, int nrounds) +{ + if (key_len == AES_KEYSIZE_128) { + if (static_branch_likely(&have_cpacf_aes128)) { + memcpy(k->raw_key, in_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + return; + } + } else if (key_len == AES_KEYSIZE_192) { + if (static_branch_likely(&have_cpacf_aes192)) { + memcpy(k->raw_key, in_key, AES_KEYSIZE_192); + return; + } + } else { + if (static_branch_likely(&have_cpacf_aes256)) { + memcpy(k->raw_key, in_key, AES_KEYSIZE_256); + return; + } + } + aes_expandkey_generic(k->rndkeys, inv_k ? inv_k->inv_rndkeys : NULL, + in_key, key_len); +} + +static inline bool aes_crypt_s390(const struct aes_enckey *key, + u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], + const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], int decrypt) +{ + if (key->len == AES_KEYSIZE_128) { + if (static_branch_likely(&have_cpacf_aes128)) { + cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_AES_128 | decrypt, + (void *)key->k.raw_key, out, in, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + return true; + } + } else if (key->len == AES_KEYSIZE_192) { + if (static_branch_likely(&have_cpacf_aes192)) { + cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_AES_192 | decrypt, + (void *)key->k.raw_key, out, in, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + return true; + } + } else { + if (static_branch_likely(&have_cpacf_aes256)) { + cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_AES_256 | decrypt, + (void *)key->k.raw_key, out, in, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +static void aes_encrypt_arch(const struct aes_enckey *key, + u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], + const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + if (likely(aes_crypt_s390(key, out, in, 0))) + return; + aes_encrypt_generic(key->k.rndkeys, key->nrounds, out, in); +} + +static void aes_decrypt_arch(const struct aes_key *key, + u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], + const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + if (likely(aes_crypt_s390((const struct aes_enckey *)key, out, in, + CPACF_DECRYPT))) + return; + aes_decrypt_generic(key->inv_k.inv_rndkeys, key->nrounds, out, in); +} + +#define aes_mod_init_arch aes_mod_init_arch +static void aes_mod_init_arch(void) +{ + if (cpu_have_feature(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA)) { + cpacf_mask_t km_functions; + + cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions); + if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_128)) + static_branch_enable(&have_cpacf_aes128); + if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_192)) + static_branch_enable(&have_cpacf_aes192); + if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_256)) + static_branch_enable(&have_cpacf_aes256); + } +} -- cgit v1.3.1