From 9062d50e75c24dc7911be05c9b1719b3b256af15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liu Chao Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2026 15:25:51 +0800 Subject: usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmd generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]: u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F); /* 0 .. 15 */ ... con->data[cmd] = value; /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */ struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44 bytes past the end of the array on the heap. A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions. Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions. Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu Signed-off-by: Liu Chao Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/stp.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/net/stp.h (limited to 'include/net/stp.h') diff --git a/include/net/stp.h b/include/net/stp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..528103fce --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/stp.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _NET_STP_H +#define _NET_STP_H + +#include + +struct stp_proto { + unsigned char group_address[ETH_ALEN]; + void (*rcv)(const struct stp_proto *, struct sk_buff *, + struct net_device *); + void *data; +}; + +int stp_proto_register(const struct stp_proto *proto); +void stp_proto_unregister(const struct stp_proto *proto); + +#endif /* _NET_STP_H */ -- cgit v1.3.1