From 034dd340b08be1f2f0477ad16131d609f9dbd53c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2026 09:22:00 -0700 Subject: Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt: - Fix error output of boot instance creation failure Currently if a boot instance creation fails, instead of printing out the name of the instance that failed, it prints "(null)". That is because it prints "cur_str" that had already been processed by strsep(). Print the saved name instead. While at it, print the error code of the failure. - Fix use-after-free for same named historgrams Histograms can be named so that they can be used in multiple events. But if the named histogram has a variable attached, the second event that uses the named histogram which duplicates it and needs to free the original after duplication leaves the old variable in place and still visible. If another histogram uses than variable, it will use the stale one which will try to reference the freed duplicate histogram and crash the kernel. Free the duplicate variables along with the duplicated histogram data. - Check return value of kthread_run() in event self test The events self tests uses a kthread for testing but does not check if it succeeded in creating a kthread. If the kthread creation were to fail, the code will still try to call kthread_stop() on the error returned. - Fix race between reading trace_pipe and updating subbuffer size If a user is reading the trace_pipe file at the same time they update the ring buffer sub-buffer size, can cause the trace_pipe read to read stale data. Add trace_access_lock() around updating the ring buffer sub-buffer size. - Fix eventfs_inode on failure path in creation of the events directory In the creation of the "events" directory, if after allocating the eventfs_inode a failure is detected, it calls cleanup_ei() which calls free_ei(). The free_ei() will test if eventfs_inode being freed has no children. It is a bug if it does. But on the failure case of the creation of the "events" directory, the children lists have not yet been initialized and the free will trigger a warning because list_empty() on an uninitialized list returns false. Move the initialization into init_ei() where it makes more sense and makes sure that a created eventfs_inode has its lists initialized upon creation. - Check return value of kthread_run() in ftrace direct sample code The sample code that shows how to use the ftrace direct calls does not test the return of kthread_run() to see if it succeeds. Return a failure if the kthread_run() doesn't succeed. - Clear user events state on fork in case of alloc failure On fork, the child gets a pointer to the parent's user events state. It makes a copy of it then updates the child's pointer to it. But if the allocation fails, the duplication function leaves the child with a pointer to its parent's descriptor. When the child cleans up its data, it will free the parent's descriptor while the parent is still using it. In the duplication function, set the child's user_event_mm to NULL before testing if the allocation succeeded, and when it exits it will not free the parent's descriptor. - Fix retry exhaustion in simple ring buffer reader swap simple_ring_buffer_swap_reader_page() starts with retry set to 8 and post-decrements it only after a failed link replacement. On the final attempt, a successful replacement leaves retry at zero, while a failed replacement leaves it at -1. But the check for success expects the retry value to be non-zero and exits with an error on zero. This is the opposite result. Fix it. - Fail nicely when the remote swap_reader_page() returns an error Currently, if the swap_reader_page() of a remote buffer fails, it triggers a WARN_ON_ONCE() and continues normally. Instead, have it exit with an error and a pr_warn() print instead of a full WARNING. * tag 'trace-v7.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace: ring-buffer: Stop remote reader update when page swap fails tracing: Fix retry exhaustion in simple ring buffer reader swap tracing/user_events: Clear copied tracing state before fork duplication samples/ftrace: Fix kthread_stop() on ERR_PTR in ftrace-direct-multi-modify samples/ftrace: Fix kthread_stop() on ERR_PTR in ftrace-direct-modify eventfs: Initialize ei->children and ei->list in init_ei() tracing: Fix use-after-free in trace_pipe read on sub-buffer order change tracing: Fix crash passing ERR_PTR to kthread_stop() tracing: Fix use-after-free with same-name named triggers tracing: Fix logged instance name on creation failure --- include/crypto/aes-ccm.h | 266 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 266 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/crypto/aes-ccm.h (limited to 'include/crypto/aes-ccm.h') diff --git a/include/crypto/aes-ccm.h b/include/crypto/aes-ccm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8b00859ac --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/aes-ccm.h @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * AES-CCM authenticated encryption and decryption + * + * Copyright 2026 Google LLC + */ +#ifndef _CRYPTO_AES_CCM_H +#define _CRYPTO_AES_CCM_H + +#include + +/** + * struct aes_ccm_key - A key prepared for AES-CCM encryption and decryption + */ +struct aes_ccm_key { + /* private: */ + struct aes_enckey aes; + size_t authtag_len; /* Length of authentication tags in bytes */ +}; + +/** + * struct aes_ccm_ctx - Context for incrementally en/decrypting a message + */ +struct aes_ccm_ctx { + /* private: */ + /* + * Pointer to the key, which is assumed to live at least as long as this + * struct. + */ + const struct aes_ccm_key *key; + /* + * The current CBC-MAC chaining value. When not on a block boundary, + * the partial block has been XOR'ed into this. The number of partial + * bytes is 'partial_len'. + */ + u8 mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(__be64)); + /* The current counter, a 128-bit big endian value */ + u8 ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(__be64)); + /* Buffered keystream for partial block updates */ + u8 keystream[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(__be64)); + /* Encrypted counter of 0. This gets XOR'ed with the tag at the end. */ + u8 s0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(__be64)); + /* Number of associated data bytes remaining to be provided */ + u64 ad_remaining; + /* Number of en/decrypted data bytes remaining to be provided */ + u64 data_remaining; + /* Current partial block length, 0 <= partial_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE */ + u32 partial_len; + /* True if associated data padding has been done */ + bool ad_padded; +}; + +/** + * aes_ccm_preparekey() - Prepare a key for AES-CCM encryption and decryption + * @key: (output) The key structure to initialize + * @in_key: The raw AES-CCM key + * @key_len: Length of the raw key in bytes: 16, 24, or 32 + * @authtag_len: Length of the authentication tag in bytes: + * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, or 16. 16 is recommended. + * + * Users should use memzero_explicit() to zeroize the key struct at the end of + * its lifetime. (But if this function fails, zeroization is unnecessary.) + * + * Context: Any context. + * Return: + * * 0 on success + * * -EINVAL if either of the lengths is invalid + */ +int __must_check aes_ccm_preparekey(struct aes_ccm_key *key, const u8 *in_key, + size_t key_len, size_t authtag_len); + +/** + * aes_ccm_encrypt() - Encrypt a message with AES-CCM + * @dst: The destination ciphertext data. Can be in-place or out-of-place. + * For other overlaps the behavior is unspecified. + * @src: The source plaintext data + * @data_len: Length of plaintext in bytes (and ciphertext excluding the tag): + * at most 2^(120 - (8 * @nonce_len)) - 1 + * @authtag: The output authentication tag. Length is the authtag_len that was + * passed to aes_ccm_preparekey(). Usually protocols using AES-CCM + * put the tag at the end of the ciphertext, in which case this should + * be set to @dst + @data_len and @dst must have room for the tag. + * @ad: The associated data + * @ad_len: Length of associated data in bytes + * @nonce: The nonce. All (key, nonce) pairs used MUST be distinct. + * @nonce_len: Length of the nonce in bytes: between 7 and 13 inclusive + * @key: The key, already prepared using aes_ccm_preparekey() + * + * Context: Any context. + * Return: + * * 0 on success + * * -EINVAL if @nonce_len is invalid + * * -EOVERFLOW if @data_len is too large for the selected @nonce_len + */ +int __must_check aes_ccm_encrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, + u8 *authtag, const u8 *ad, size_t ad_len, + const u8 *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const struct aes_ccm_key *key); + +/** + * aes_ccm_decrypt() - Decrypt a message with AES-CCM + * @dst: The destination plaintext data. Can be in-place or out-of-place. + * For other overlaps the behavior is unspecified. + * @src: The source ciphertext data + * @data_len: Length of plaintext in bytes (and ciphertext excluding the tag): + * at most 2^(120 - (8 * @nonce_len)) - 1 + * @authtag: The stored authentication tag. Length is the authtag_len that was + * passed to aes_ccm_preparekey(). Usually protocols using AES-CCM + * put the tag at the end of the ciphertext, in which case this should + * be set to @src + @data_len and @src must have room for the tag. + * @ad: The associated data + * @ad_len: Length of associated data in bytes + * @nonce: The nonce + * @nonce_len: Length of the nonce in bytes: between 7 and 13 inclusive + * @key: The key, already prepared using aes_ccm_preparekey() + * + * Context: Any context. + * Return: + * * 0 on success. This is the only case where any decrypted or associated data + * can be used. + * * -EBADMSG if the message is inauthentic + * * -EINVAL if @nonce_len is invalid + * * -EOVERFLOW if @data_len is too large for the selected @nonce_len + */ +int __must_check aes_ccm_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, + const u8 *authtag, const u8 *ad, size_t ad_len, + const u8 *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const struct aes_ccm_key *key); + +/** + * aes_ccm_init() - Initialize context for incremental AES-CCM encryption or + * decryption + * @ctx: The context to initialize + * @data_len: Length of the en/decrypted data that will be provided in bytes: + * at most 2^(120 - (8 * @nonce_len)) - 1 + * @ad_len: Length of the associated data that will be provided in bytes + * @nonce: The nonce. All (key, nonce) pairs used for encryption MUST be + * distinct. + * @nonce_len: Length of the nonce in bytes: between 7 and 13 inclusive + * @key: The key, already prepared using aes_ccm_preparekey(). Note that a + * pointer to the key is saved in the context, so the key must live at + * least as long as the context. + * + * Unlike AES-GCM, AES-CCM requires the total lengths of the associated data and + * the en/decrypted data to be known during initialization. Callers MUST ensure + * that these lengths are correct. + * + * If this function returns success, the context should be zeroized at the end + * of its lifetime. Normally that happens in aes_ccm_encrypt_final() or + * aes_ccm_decrypt_final(), but callers that abandon a context without + * finalizing it should explicitly zeroize it. + * + * IMPORTANT: Callers that are decrypting MUST NOT assume that any decrypted or + * associated data is authentic until the authentication tag has been verified. + * This incremental API is provided solely to support callers that can't + * efficiently use the one-shot functions due to using a nonlinear data layout. + * + * For incremental AES-CCM encryption, use: + * + * 1. aes_ccm_init() + * 2. aes_ccm_auth_update() (any number of times) + * 3. aes_ccm_encrypt_update() (any number of times) + * 4. aes_ccm_encrypt_final() + * + * For incremental AES-CCM decryption, use: + * + * 1. aes_ccm_init() + * 2. aes_ccm_auth_update() (any number of times) + * 3. aes_ccm_decrypt_update() (any number of times) + * 4. aes_ccm_decrypt_final() + * + * Context: Any context. + * Return: + * * 0 on success + * * -EINVAL if @nonce_len is invalid + * * -EOVERFLOW if @data_len is too large for the selected @nonce_len + */ +int __must_check aes_ccm_init(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, u64 data_len, u64 ad_len, + const u8 *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const struct aes_ccm_key *key); + +/** + * aes_ccm_auth_update() - Incrementally process AES-CCM associated data + * @ctx: An AES-CCM context + * @ad: The associated data + * @len: Length of the associated data in bytes + * + * IMPORTANT: Callers MUST NOT assume that any decrypted or associated data is + * authentic until the authentication tag has been verified. + * + * The total length of the associated data (over all calls to this function) + * MUST match the ad_len that was passed to aes_ccm_init(). + * + * Context: Any context. + */ +void aes_ccm_auth_update(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *ad, size_t len); + +/** + * aes_ccm_encrypt_update() - Incrementally encrypt data with AES-CCM + * @ctx: An AES-CCM context + * @dst: The destination buffer. Can be in-place or out-of-place. For other + * overlaps the behavior is unspecified. + * @src: The source plaintext data + * @len: Number of bytes to encrypt + * + * This can be called only after all associated data has been processed. + * + * The total length of the encrypted data (over all calls to this function) MUST + * match the data_len that was passed to aes_ccm_init(). + * + * Context: Any context. + */ +void aes_ccm_encrypt_update(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + size_t len); + +/** + * aes_ccm_decrypt_update() - Incrementally decrypt data with AES-CCM + * @ctx: An AES-CCM context + * @dst: The destination buffer. Can be in-place or out-of-place. For other + * overlaps the behavior is unspecified. + * @src: The source ciphertext data (not including auth tag) + * @len: Number of bytes to decrypt + * + * This can be called only after all associated data has been processed. + * + * The total length of the decrypted data (over all calls to this function) MUST + * match the data_len that was passed to aes_ccm_init(). + * + * IMPORTANT: Callers MUST NOT assume that any decrypted or associated data is + * authentic until the authentication tag has been verified. + * + * Context: Any context. + */ +void aes_ccm_decrypt_update(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + size_t len); + +/** + * aes_ccm_encrypt_final() - Finish encrypting a message with AES-CCM + * @ctx: An AES-CCM context + * @authtag: The output authentication tag. Length is the authtag_len that was + * passed to aes_ccm_preparekey(). + * + * This also zeroizes @ctx, so the caller doesn't need to do it. + * + * Context: Any context. + */ +void aes_ccm_encrypt_final(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, u8 *authtag); + +/** + * aes_ccm_decrypt_final() - Finish decrypting a message with AES-CCM + * @ctx: An AES-CCM context + * @authtag: The stored authentication tag. Length is the authtag_len that was + * passed to aes_ccm_preparekey(). + * + * This also zeroizes @ctx, so the caller doesn't need to do it. + * + * Context: Any context. + * Return: + * * 0 on success. This is the only case where any decrypted or associated data + * can be used. + * * -EBADMSG if the message is inauthentic + */ +int __must_check aes_ccm_decrypt_final(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, + const u8 *authtag); + +#endif /* _CRYPTO_AES_CCM_H */ -- cgit v1.3.1