From 9062d50e75c24dc7911be05c9b1719b3b256af15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liu Chao Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2026 15:25:51 +0800 Subject: usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmd generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]: u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F); /* 0 .. 15 */ ... con->data[cmd] = value; /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */ struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44 bytes past the end of the array on the heap. A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions. Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions. Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu Signed-off-by: Liu Chao Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/acpi/debugfs.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/acpi/debugfs.c (limited to 'drivers/acpi/debugfs.c') diff --git a/drivers/acpi/debugfs.c b/drivers/acpi/debugfs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..074eb98d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/acpi/debugfs.c @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * debugfs.c - ACPI debugfs interface to userspace. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "internal.h" + +struct dentry *acpi_debugfs_dir; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(acpi_debugfs_dir); + +void __init acpi_debugfs_init(void) +{ + acpi_debugfs_dir = debugfs_create_dir("acpi", NULL); +} -- cgit v1.3.1