From d22c3e0088e85be8131f7a9283f759cdbb20726d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Schnelle Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2026 11:29:53 +0200 Subject: selftests/ftrace: Fix unique symbol check in kprobe_non_uniq_symbol.tc The current regex also matches symbols in modules, which makes the test fail on s390 where name_show is present only once in the kernel, but also multiple times in modules: 000001b1401cdc20 t name_show 000001b0c05e6c40 t name_show [mdev] 000001b0c0495f30 t name_show [i2c_core] Fix this by changing the regular expression to only match the function name. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260909092954.2200558-1-svens@linux.ibm.com/ Fixes: 03b80ff8023a ("selftests/ftrace: Add new test case which checks non unique symbol") Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) --- Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco (limited to 'Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco') diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco b/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f2b690915 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +What: security/secrets/coco +Date: February 2022 +Contact: Dov Murik +Description: + Exposes confidential computing (coco) EFI secrets to + userspace via securityfs. + + EFI can declare memory area used by confidential computing + platforms (such as AMD SEV and SEV-ES) for secret injection by + the Guest Owner during VM's launch. The secrets are encrypted + by the Guest Owner and decrypted inside the trusted enclave, + and therefore are not readable by the untrusted host. + + The efi_secret module exposes the secrets to userspace. Each + secret appears as a file under /secrets/coco, + where the filename is the GUID of the entry in the secrets + table. This module is loaded automatically by the EFI driver + if the EFI secret area is populated. + + Two operations are supported for the files: read and unlink. + Reading the file returns the content of secret entry. + Unlinking the file overwrites the secret data with zeroes and + removes the entry from the filesystem. A secret cannot be read + after it has been unlinked. + + For example, listing the available secrets:: + + # modprobe efi_secret + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + Reading the secret data by reading a file:: + + # cat /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + the-content-of-the-secret-data + + Wiping a secret by unlinking a file:: + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + Note: The binary format of the secrets table injected by the + Guest Owner is described in + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c under "Structure of + the EFI secret area". -- cgit v1.3.1