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2026-09-18x86/build/64: Prevent native builds from generating EGPR useChang S. Bae
Omar reports that CONFIG_X86_NATIVE_CPU=y allows builds to opportunistically emit instructions using %r16-%r31 (EGPRs) when the build host supports APX since the commit: ea1dcca1de12 ("x86/kbuild/64: Add the CONFIG_X86_NATIVE_CPU option to locally optimize the kernel with '-march=native'") But the kernel is not yet prepared to use new registers internally. For example, there is no context-switch support for general in-kernel use. Explicitly disable EGPR use when building with -march=native. For C, since GCC 14 and Clang 18, both compilers support suppressing EGPR use with -mno-apx-features=egpr, whose availability can be detected via cc-option. For Rust, pass features=-apxf through the generated JSON to avoid unstable-feature warnings, see https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/139284 Note Rust only accepts the option to disable APX instructions entirely or not. Support for this gating also depends on the Rust/LLVM combination. Rust 1.88 introduced the `apxf` feature option, but versions prior to 1.93 may emit an `apxf` attribute to the backend that only LLVM 23 or later can interpret. Restrict native Rust builds accordingly. Fixes: ea1dcca1de12 ("x86/kbuild/64: Add the CONFIG_X86_NATIVE_CPU option to locally optimize the kernel with '-march=native'") Reported-by: Omar Avelar <omar.avelar@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260916230003.1144622-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
2026-09-18selftests/x86: Check signal state for rejected software interruptsMatthew Schwartz
Add a test of the signal ABI for INT instructions in both 32-bit and 64-bit processes. Check the signal number, trap number, error code, si_code, si_addr, instruction pointer and RF/TF state against legacy IDT behavior. Include a 15-byte prefixed INT to check that IP uses the hardware instruction length. Exercise both INT3 encodings, INT4, UD2 and HLT to cover the unchanged trap and fault paths. Run each instruction with TF clear and set. Resume at a known NOP after handling the signal and check that single-stepping traps after the NOP. Also drive INT 0x2d under ptrace, which resumes through the fault frame rather than sigreturn and so exposes a stale FRED software event flag. Start from an INT3 stop, whose FRED frame has no software event flag, instead of the syscall frame of raise(SIGSTOP). Single-step into the INT and check that the fault reports its address. Then suppress SIGSEGV and resume at the NOP, once with PTRACE_SINGLESTEP and once with PTRACE_CONT and TF set. Section 6.2.3 of the Intel FRED specification [1] specifies the immediate single-step trap caused by returning with both that flag and TF set. Check that each trap occurs after the NOP, rather than at its address. Report whether the CPU supports FRED, since a pass looks the same on either entry path. INT 0x80 with IA32 emulation disabled and a 64-bit tracer of a 32-bit tracee are not covered. Both variants pass all 29 checks on a non-FRED AMD host and on Panther Lake with FRED enabled and the fix applied. With the same binaries on unpatched Panther Lake, 16 signal-context checks fail and the first ptrace check reports the IP after the INT. The two dependent ptrace resume checks are not reached. [1] Intel Flexible Return and Event Delivery (FRED) Specification, revision 9.0 (346446-009US), section 6.2.3. Signed-off-by: Matthew Schwartz <matthew.schwartz@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/678938 # [1] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260917230907.2080792-3-matthew.schwartz@linux.dev
2026-09-18x86/fred: Reconstruct the #GP context for rejected INT instructionsMatthew Schwartz
FRED event delivery does not use the IDT, so the gate DPL check that rejects a user INT n falls to software (Intel FRED specification [1], section 8.3). fred_intx() rejects the same vectors as IDT delivery, but reports a zero error code and the IP after the INT. This breaks the signal ABI. Wine uses the error code to recognize INT 0x2d, so the changed context turns a handled breakpoint into an access violation in Elden Ring. Rewind IP using the instruction length in the augmented SS and synthesize the IDT selector error code, (vector << 3) | 2. Set RF in the saved flags, as the CPU does for a #GP fault. Section 5.2.1 defines the saved vector, instruction length and RF state. The supplied length handles prefixes without reading user memory. Limit the changes to already-rejected software interrupts, preserving the accepted INT3, INT4 and enabled INT80 paths and hardware exceptions. With IA32 emulation disabled, INT 0x80 now reports the same #GP as the DPL 0 gate IDT installs there. The rewound IP also stops fixup_iopl_exception() from inspecting the byte after the INT. Also clear the software event flag. Section 6.2.3 specifies that ERETU with this flag and TF set traps before executing any user instruction. A tracer that suppresses SIGSEGV and resumes with TF set expects the next instruction to run first, as after IRET. The sigreturn path clears the same flag for this reason in prevent_single_step_upon_eretu(). [1] Intel Flexible Return and Event Delivery (FRED) Specification, revision 9.0 (346446-009US), sections 5.2.1, 6.2.3 and 8.3. Fixes: 14619d912b65 ("x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/work_items/15745 Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/work_items/16132 Reported-by: Paul Gofman <pgofman@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Schwartz <matthew.schwartz@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/678938 # [1] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260917230907.2080792-2-matthew.schwartz@linux.dev
2026-09-17x86/microcode/intel: Reject problematic loading on Granite Rapids systemsChang S. Bae
Microcode updates can usually jump revisions. However, there is an erratum on Granite Rapids systems. If they "jump over" revision 0x1000405, they result in an #MC. Avoid it. Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260916225939.1144524-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
2026-09-10x86/amd_node: Fix PCI device reference counting in amd_smn_init()graftedYazen Ghannam
The local "root" pointer is a temporary variable used during the device search. Therefore, refcount related to the search iterators should be cleaned up after the search is complete. Use the __free() cleanup macro to ensure the refcount is decremented when the temporary pointer goes out of scope. Additionally, increment the refcount when caching a root pointer. This ensures the in-use refcount is separate from the temporary search refcounting. Finally, drop the redundant "root = NULL" before the second search loop. The pci_get_class() iterator always decrements the refcount of its "from" argument, so the first loop can only fall through with "root" already NULL. Fixes: 0a4b61d9c2e4 ("x86/amd_node: Fix AMD root device caching") Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260806160159.230453-1-jason.andryuk%40amd.com Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org> Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260903154325.74343-1-yazen.ghannam@amd.com